UNRWA – Annual report of the Director

ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINE REFUGEES

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR

OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY

FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OFFICIAL RECORDS : SIXTH SESSION

SUPPLEMENT No. 16 (A/1905)

Paris, 1951

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Letter dated 28 September 1951 from the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, addressed to the President of the sixth session of the General Assembly.

Beirut, 28 September 1951

I have the honour to refer to resolution 302 of the fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and specifically to paragraph 21 which requests the Director to submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations an annual report on the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, including an audit of funds, and to resolution 393 of the fifth session of the General Assembly which authorizes continued assistance to Palestine refugees.

In accordance with the first of these resolutions, my predecessor submitted an interim report to the fifth session, and I now have the honour to enclose a report on the work  of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees from 1 May 1950,1/ being the date when the responsibility was taken over from its predecessor, the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, to 30 June 1951, being the end of the first fiscal period as envisaged by General Assembly resolution 302 of the fourth session. I am advised that the audited accounts for this period will be transmitted to you by the External Auditors.

A further report on the current work and prospects of the Agency, including recommendations for the future, is under preparation and will be transmitted to you jointly by the Director and the Advisory Commission prior to the opening of the sixth session of the General Assembly.0

(Signed) John B. BLANDFORD, Jr.

Director

_____________

1/  See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 19.

FOREWORD

The war in Palestine added to an area that formerly supported five million persons the crushing burden of a million Arab refugees. Some of these Palestinians brought with then enough to live on, or to establish themselves in the host countries, but over 800,000 were virtually destitute. At the beginning they were assisted by both public and private generosity; but, in an area where there is little margin between subsistence and starvation, and no store of wealth to fall back upon if things go wrong, a million extra mouths is too big a burden to be borne for very long.

Since the end of 1948, needy refugees, who have lost both their homes and their livelihood as a result of hostilities in Palestine, have existed principally on relief provided by the United Nations, supplemented by private contributions from all over the world. The recorded total of this cost is 66 million dollars and today, after three years, the refugee still waits to know what is to become of him. Purposeful action is required now if he is to be given hope for the years ahead.

This report is a record of the assistance given, by arrangement with the governments of the area, over the period from 1 May 1950, when the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East took over from its predecessor, to 30 June 1951.

PART ONE

Problem and prospect

Chapter I

THE REFUGEE FROM PALESTINE

A. HIS BACKGROUND

1 The Arab population in Palestine before the war consisted for the greater part of peasants. About 65 percent of the 1.3 million were country people living in villages of less than 5 000 inhabitants and cultivating cereals, olives, pulses, vegetables, fruits, particularly citrus and bananas, and raising herds of sheep and goats and other livestock. Small though the average holdings were (about one half of the plot calculated to be at subsistence level), the ordinary villager owned both his land and his house and only a few of the rural population were landless, working perhaps on large citrus groves. The proportion of the land held by big landowners was small, and the average income per head of the agricultural population, $300 to $400, was high by Middle Eastern standards.

2. The structure of village society was strongly patriarchal and was usually composed of two or three families (hamouleh) in the wide sense of the word, which might consist of several hundred persons. Even the biological family that lived together under one roof was larger than the average family unit in the West. The village was run by a council of elders, composed of the two or three most important members of each hamouleh and, depending on size, each village had one, two or sometimes three Mukhtars who, besides being the most prominent and anthoritative members of the council, were also entrusted with certain administrative functions by the Mandatory Government, such as the notification of births and deaths and in some cases the maintenance of order.

3. In general, the sense of social consciousness in the villages was not strong and the hamouleh was the highest unit that commanded any great loyalty; although quite recently a few co-operative ventures had been started here and there, and some villages had  contributed labour to build their own schools, for which the government supplied the teachers. The rate of illiteracy was about 58 per cent, and a little over half of all the children of school age (towns included) was receiving some sort of education. A doctor visited the villages once or twice a week, and some of the larger ones had a permanent clinic run by a nurse.

4. The average villager was, like most peasants who own their own land, deeply attached to the soil.

5. The townspeople who constituted the remaining 30 to 40 per cent of the Arab population were, in addition to the professional classes, merchants, small landowners, skilled artisans and small shop keepers. In the large towns such as Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem, there was, in addition, a fairly large floating population of unskilled labourers, working in the ports, or for the oil companies, who had migrated from the country owing to the pressure on the land. Since the last census under the Mandate was taken, as far back as 1931, such persons were mostly registered in their village of origin, although for many years they had lived and worked in the large towns. The effect of this unrecorded movement of population has been to introduce a double source of error into any estimates of the number of persons who could have become refugees; since more people came out of towns in Israeli-held territory than were registered there and fewer people were actually living in the villages of the area which was later annexed to Jordan.

B.  HIS FLIGHT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

6. For over a year, from before the end of the Mandate in May 1948 until after the end of hostilities in Palestine, hundreds of thousands of Arabs moved in waves across the frontiers of neighbouring countries or into the Arab-held parts of Palestine. The reasons for their flight are still a point of bitter dispute between the contending parties.

7. The population of the northern part of Palestine from the districts of Acre, Haifa, Safad and the Galilee area went northwards into Syria and Lebanon, where great efforts were made by both public and private bodies to deal with this influx of over 200 000 destitute and exhausted people, which increased the population of Lebanon by about 10 per cent and the much larger one of Syria by about 3 per cent.

8. Refugees began arriving in Syria in small numbers towards the end of 1947, and an Association for the Liberation of Palestine was promptly formed to give them assistance. However, the numbers soon grew to such dimensions that the Association, depending upon voluntary aid, found itself unable to deal with the problem and, towards the middle of 1948, it appealed to the Government for help. From that time onward until the establishment of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees the relief work carried out by the Association was financed almost entirely by the Government. Relief was given partly in kind and partly in cash payments, with an extra allowance for pregnant women. Sick persons received free medical attendance, and orphans were placed in institutions where they were given free food, lodging and primary education. The Government estimated that the total outlay made on behalf of the refugees during the year 1948 amounted to between 7.2 and 8.4 million Syrian pounds, including voluntary contributions from the Syrian people totalling some 2 million pounds. Some 5 000 persons penetrated beyond Syria to Iraq, where they were cared for on a generous scale entirely by the Government and have never at any time been on international relief.

9. A committee was also set up in Lebanon in April 1948 under the chairmanship of the Director-General of the President's Office and consisting of representatives of the main Ministries concerned. The relief provided was a monthly allocation of 10 kilogrammes of flour and a sum of 3 Lebanese pounds per person, to which a supplement of 25 Lebanese pounds was added in the case of pregnant women and 50 Lebanese pounds for deaths. An allowance of 25 Lebanese pounds a month was given for orphans placed in charity institutions, and the worst cases of sickness were put into hospitals. Total expenditure by the Government amounted to 5.2 million Lebanese pounds, and another million was spent by the Palestine Bureau, a private organization for the relief of refugees.

10. Some of the people of Jaffa and most of the inhabitants of Gaza and Beersheba districts in the south crowded together into the area held by the Egyptian Army, which, at the time of the armistice, had dwindled to a narrow strip from 3 to 6 kilometres wide and 40 kilometres long, stretching from just north of Gaza itself to the Egyptian frontier. The existing population of this area was about 80 000, and into it came 200 000 refugees giving a population density of 2 000 per square mile. Moreover, about one-third of the area consists of sand dunes and is entirely unproductive. The strip is completely isolated from the rest of Arab Palestine and its only link with the outside world, except by sea, is about 300 kilometres of road or railway line across the desert to Egypt. All supplies have to be brought in along this route, the former method taking two days and the latter six or more. It is therefore hardly surprising that conditions very rapidly deteriorated. The few existing assets in the way of equipment wore out and could not be replace; many animals died or were killed for food; and every movable object that could be burnt was collected by the refugees for fuel. Wages fell to half or one-third of their previous rate, and were soon below subsistence level owing to the competition from the refugees; so that the original population, who received no help from the international community, became in greater need than the refugees themselves.

11. The population of the coastal area of Palestine, including some of those from Haifa and Jaffa and most of the inhabitants of the Ramleh and Jerusalem districts, fled up to the hilly country now known as Arab Palestine, an area shaped like a reversed "B" with its flat side on the Jordan and Dead Sea and tied in at the middle by Jerusalem (which is split into an Arab and a Jewish half). This area was formally annexed to Transjordan on 24 April 1950 and is now administered as part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

12. The impact of this influx of refugees, which took place mainly between April and August 1948, and the added effect of union with Arab Palestine upon Transjordan, politically, socially and economically was very great. About four-fifths of the refugees who came into Jordan remained on the west bank of the river in Arab Palestine where the population more than doubled. The rest continued over into Trans-jordan collecting around Amman and Zerka and moving between the high ground in this area and the Jordan Valley, which was warm in the winter but unbearably hot in summer. Some of the refugees brought with them money and purchasing power (estimated at 10 million Palestine pounds cash alone) which initially generated a considerable economic activity in building, transport and consumers' goods industries, especially in Amman; but this tended to fall off later as funds ran out and exile was seen to stretch indefinitely into the future. Unfortunately, the real productivity of the country has been increased comparatively little by this uncoordinated spending, and the situation that would have existed in Jordan had the main mass of destitute refugees not been given international assistance after the end of 1948 may perhaps be gauged by the fact that the influx raised the number of persons per square kilometre of cultivable land in east Jordan from 80 to 107, and in west Jordan from 200 to 580.

13. Although great efforts were made by the Arab Governments to deal with this situation, three-quarters of a million homeless and destitute persons whose numbers increased day by day was too much for the limited resources of countries that were far from rich themselves. The United Nations Mediator for Palestine, fearing complete collapse and knowing that this would jeopardize the precarious stability that had been achieved, appealed to the international community for help. Since September 1948, when personnel from the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund first arrived in the field, the refugees have been cared for by the United Nations and various voluntary organizations; and minimal though this care has necessarily been, there have been no major epidemics and no starvation.

14. About 150 000 of the Arab population of Palestine stayed in Israel and of these some were "refugees" in that their homes were destroyed and their means of livelihood gone. They were thus temporarily as much dependent on relief as those who had left the country, and when the United Nations took over the relief of refugees it was agreed with the Israel Government that a certain number of both Jews and Arabs in this position should be given assistance.

C. PRESENT CONDITIONS

15. Today, after nearly three years, the refugees are still scattered over 100,000 square miles of territory in five different countries; still dependent on relief and without knowledge of the future; the victims of circumstances they are unable to grasp. Legally, humanly and economically speaking, they are little better off than they were when they first left Palestine, since against the sporadic and low-paid work that some of them have found must be set the exhaustion of the resources that others managed to bring out.  No government, except in Jordan, has proclaimed their right to stay.

(a) Number of refugees

16. One of the first tasks undertaken by the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East was to organize a census operation to determine who should and who should not receive relief. In spite of these efforts, which lasted for approximately one year and cost the Agency $295 639, it is still not possible to give an absolute figure of the true number of refugees as understood by the working definition of "a person normally resident in Palestine who has lost his home and his livelihood as a result of the hostilities, and who is in need". If the object had been to establish the true number of Palestinians now in other countries, the results of the census would have been more accurate; but the Agency's mandate was expressly limited to those "in need" and, not only is the dividing line between pauperism and self-sufficiency extremely small and the truth hard to ascertain, but a family who has work today in porterage or harvesting may genuinely need relief tomorrow. Thus, it has been the practice to readmit to the relief rolls refugees who become unemployed. A further difficulty is that, whereas all births are eagerly announced, the deaths wherever possible are passed over in silence, and as the birthrate is high in any case, a net addition of 30,000 names a year is made to the relief rolls. In spite of this, a considerable reduction has been achieved and many false and duplicate registrations weeded out. By June 1951, there were 876,000 persons registered on UNWRAPRNE relief rolls compared with 957,000 when the Agency took over. They were distributed as follows :

17. In Lebanon, in Syria and in Gaza, the number of refugees is now reasonably well established, although some of them may not now be in need; but in Jordan, where more than half of them are gathered, there is a much greater margin of error. In western Jordan the whole population is Palestinian and the refugee is therefore not distinguished from his neighbour by speech, appearance or necessarily by poverty; rendering still harder the task of the investigator (himself a Palestinian), which is already complicated by all the wiles that hungry men can muster, and all the pressure that can be brought to bear.

18. Another special problem concerns the bedouins. These nomadic and semi-nomadic people who inhabited the southern half of Palestine known as the Negev were divided into seven main tribes and numbered, according to 1947 estimates, some 93 000 persons. The true nomads, who depended on their flocks and herds, lived in the desert; the others were gradually becoming settled in the cultivable areas as they laid claim to certain plots of land and remained there all the year; some even building small stone houses to replace their tents. A smaller number of semi-settled bedouins also inhabited the Jordan Valley.

19. When the war reached the Negev in October 1948, some of the bedouins remained bewildered and helpless and others fled in disorder in whatever direction promised safety; subtribe was mixed with subtribe and families scattered. Some 30 000 crowded into the Gaza strip along the coast and others went north and east to Arab Palestine and Jordan.

20. Today the position is difficult to assess. On the premise that some of the nomads had brought their animals with them, it was orginally planned to give the bedouins half rations, but the objection was raised that a bedouin who had owned land was in no different position from the ordinary peasant refugee. Furthermore, the scattering and mixing of the tribes and subtribes makes it very difficult to check false and duplicate registrations, particularly since the bedouins can and do move between Gaza, Israel and Jordan and between northern Israel and Lebanon, so that the possibilities of double registrations are greatly increased. Nearly 30 000 claim that they have been expelled from Israel to Jordan during the past year, but it is thought that at least half of these are fictitious persons or are already registered. At present, therefore, some bedouins are receiving half rations, some whole, some are doubtless registered twice, and some not at all. A concerted attempt is now to be made to clear up this position with the co-operation of all districts and the use of old Mandate registers, although even these were admitted at the time of compilation to be only approximate.

21. A complicating factor that has become much more acute during the past year, owing to the drought and poor harvest in the area, is the growing poverty and distress of many persons who cannot be counted as refugees in the strict sense of the term (as defined), and are therefore outside the Agency's mandate.

22. The demarcation line that divided Israeli-held from Arab-held territory under the Rhodes Armistice Agreement, which has since solidified into the frontier between Israel and western Jordan, cuts arbitrarily across country and, in many cases, severs towns and villages from the land that once supported them. Moreover, the separation of the old City of Jerusalem from the more modern and prosperous part has deprived many persons of their livelihood, depressed the tourist trade and created great congestion and severe competition for the few jobs that remain.

23. In the Gaza strip, a large proportion of the original population is in a similar position and suffers even more acute poverty owing to the almost complete isolation from the surrounding country. In many houses even doors and window frames have now been sold to raise a little money.

24. It is estimated from investigations made by UNRWAPRNE that there are some 67 000 persons in Jordan and some 60 000 in Gaza who have in this way lost their means of livelihood as a direct result of hostilities and who are in genuine need, only differing from Agency beneficiaries in that they are still living in their own homes. The position of these "economic refugees" is worsening as time goes on, and each month increases the number of those who need assistance, and who therefore constitute a pressure to expand relief rolls.

(b) Where and how the refugee lives

25. About one-third of all the refugees are living in sixty organized camps that vary in size from a few hundred to over 20 000; the other two-thirds live scattered among towns and villages of the host countries. The type of shelter provided for refugees in camps is for the greater part tents, but sometimes also barracks or other buildings are utilized. Unfortunately, tents are becoming almost impossible to find on world markets at any price, and the refugees are therefore being encouraged to put up small structures for themselves, not in any sense as lasting housing, but merely as a substitute for tents. These huts are made of whatever material can be found locally, such as mud brick in the Jordan Valley and Gaza, stone in the hills of Arab Palestine and matting in Syria. The main difficulty has been roofing; the Agency has offered to provide wooden beams and has itself experimented with reeds, milk cartons, empty asphalt barrels, tiles and ceramics.

26. Broadly speaking, these camp inhabitants represent the poorest and therefore most unfortunate of the refugees, and yet in many ways they are better off than those who have found their accommodation in towns and villages. The camp dwellers have rent-free shelter and are given fuel. Constant medical care is provided at an easily accessible clinic; sometimes maternal and child health clinics exist as well. Cases of undernourishment are given supplementary feeding. There are often clubs and sport facilities and shower baths. There are regular campaigns against flies, fleas, lice and malaria mosquitoes. Moreover, where the camp is not in a town, there is always the possibility of making a vegetable garden (for which seeds are often provided) around the tent.

27. Nevertheless, the fact remains that these people are leading an abnormal existence, under crowded and uncomfortable conditions. The tents often leak or are blown down in the violent storms that occur in the area. Barracks and mosques though dry, are draughty, comfortless and squalid in the extreme; and in spite of the efforts to provide partitioning, the few square feet occupied by one family is sometimes still separated from that of another only by a piece of sacking or one of the blankets which should be covering some member of the family. The tented camps are often situated in isolated spots, because there is a convenient water supply or because no land can be obtained elsewhere, and the possibilities of finding work are thereby reduced to a minimum.

28. The number of refugees housed in UNRWAPRNE camps has risen by some twenty per cent since May 1950, and is still rising. Many thousands of new applications are received each month. These originate from (I) families who have hitherto managed to maintain themselves in lodgings but are now too poor to pay the rent however small; (II) new arrivals from Israel; (III) refugees who have been evicted for quarrelling with the villagers or for cutting down the fruit trees for fuel; and, lately (IV), some considerable movement of the population in the search of water, particularly in Jordan, as a result of the severe drought that has dried up wells and cisterns.

29. Blankets and clothing are a constant source of difficulty. Blankets, like tents, are difficult to obtain on world markets owing to the large demand for military purposes; but efforts are made to distribute them to at least the neediest cases, who would otherwise be sleeping on the bare earth or on the stone floors of barracks and mosques. Since the Agency took over, an additional 235 000 blankets have been distributed, or one blanket for every four persons of the refugee population.

30. For supplies of clothing the Agency has had to rely mainly on donations from voluntary agencies, although the Agency's weaving schemes in Jordan and Gaza produced over 1 million metres of cloth, of which one-third was made into garments under Agency auspices. In spite of these efforts, the average of distribution is just under one garment per refugee, and their clothing after three years has become shabby and ragged; many of the women have sold their embroidered peasant dresses to raise money, and the majority of the men employed on Agency road-building projects had no shoes. Both blankets and the tent flies issued as additional protection are often diverted from their proper use and cut up for clothing. The most fortunate are the children in schools (less than half the total number of children on the rolls), who have generally been given both clothing and footwear.

31. The standard monthly food ration for each refugee consists of:

kilogrammes

Flour ……………..   10 000

Sugar ……………..    0 600

Rice ………………    0 500

Pulses …………….    0 600

Margarine ………….    0 150

Vegetable ………….

Oil ……………….    0 250

which provides a daily average of 1 600 calories per head, including the issue of UNICEF milk to children, pregnant women and nursing mothers, who form about half the total population. In past winters the scale has been raised to 1 700 calories. Under-nourished children and old people are also given supplementary feeding on medical certificates. The diet provided by the standard ration is not by any means a balanced one, the most important lack being fresh fruits, vegetables and meat. However, this deficiency is rectified to some extent by the produce that many refugees manage to grow themselves, by the use of wild plants or by what can be obtained from the expenditure of earnings or from selling part of the standard ration. In many camps the existence of butchers, greengrocers and other types of shops set up by the refugees themselves, points to a more varied diet than that provided by the rations. However, there are undoubtedly many individual refugees, particularly those unable to fend for themselves, who have no supplements and find it hard to make the ration stretch for a whole month. In general, the results of this diet on the refugee do not appear to be gravely unsatisfactory. A nutritional survey carried out in April showed that there was not only no starvation but no widespread undernourishment; in fact, in Jordan and Gaza the refugees seemed better off from a nutritional point of view than the local inhabitants, and these findings were borne out, so far as infants are concerned, by an earlier investigation made into the weights of refugee and non-refugee babies in the two countries. However, the survey did show the existence of vitamin deficiency and a mild form of scurvy, which is also widespread amongst the local population.

(c) The morale of the refugee

32. Owing to his intense individualism, the refugee has little sense of solidarity with his fellows. The concept of giving increased relief to the very needy is incomprehensible to him, making it very difficult for the Agency to distribute welfare goods to special cases. In the same way, much persuasion is necessary before he is willing to contribute labour for the greater good of the camp, or even for mending his own tent, unless he is paid for it.

33. To his natural individualistic tendencies has now been added the characteristics of the typical refugee mentality, and its passive expectation of continued benefits. In the crowded and abnormal existence that the refugee leads, moral values tend to deteriorate and the authority of the head of the family, which would formerly have kept such behaviour in check, has seriously declined; yet, in spite of this, he has retained his inherent dignity to a remarkable degree.

34. It is probably true to say that the refugees are physically better off than the poorest levels of the population of the host countries; and in some cases better off, in the way of social services, than they were in Palestine; but, in their minds, the overwhelming fact of being uprooted from their homes, dependent and yet insecure, is more than enough to cancel out these benefits.

35. The United Nations, in particular certain of the great Powers, are considered by the refugee to be entirely responsible for both his past and present misfortunes, and for his future fate. They say that they have lost faith in United Nations action since, after more than thirty months, the General Assembly resolution recommending their return home, although not revoked, has never been implemented and no progress has been made towards compensation.

36. The relief given by the Agency is therefore considered as a right, and as such is regarded as inadequate. Individual efforts to explain the situation to them are usually in vain; the refugee will listen politely but in the end remains convinced both of the bitter injustice done to him, and the fact that little or nothing is being done to rectify it.

37. The desire to go back to their homes is general among all classes; it is proclaimed orally at all meetings and organized demonstrations, and, in writing, in all letters addressed to the Agency and all complaints handed in to the area officers. Many refugees are ceasing to believe in a possible return, yet this does not prevent them from insisting on it, since they feel that to agree to consider any other solution would be to show their weakness and to relinquish their fundamental right, acknowledged even by the General Assembly. They are, moreover, sceptical of the promised payment of compensation.

38. This sense of injustice, frustration and disappointment has made the refugee irritable and unstable. There are occasional strikes, demonstrations and small riots.  There have been demonstrations over the census operation, strikes against the medical and welfare services, strikes for cash payment instead of relief, strikes against making any improvements, such as school buildings, in camps in case this might mean permanent resettlement; experimental houses to replace tents, erected by the Agency, have been torn down; and for many months, in Syria and Lebanon, there was widespread refusal to work on agency road-building and afforestation schemes.

39. This then is rich and tempting soil for exploitation by those with other motives than the welfare of the refugee. Happily, there are defences that blunt this effort. There are enduring religious defences and there still exist resistant strengths of communal ties and leadership. There are sustaining services of food, shelter, health and education from many sources. There are refugees who left no assets in Palestine. There are refugees who wish to live in Arab countries. There are refugees who have sought and found new roots.

Chapter II

EXPLORATORY STEPS IN A WORKS PROGRAMME

A. THE PROBLEM

40. Between the era of direct relief under UNRPR and the new programme of homes and jobs, there has been a period of employment on public works projects.

41. Following the recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission, the UNRWAPRNE was created by General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) principally to transform the existing programme of direct relief into a dynamic programme of works projects. It was hoped that employment of refugees would not only arrest the demoralizing effects of long continued relief and the development of a professional refugee mentality, but would also stimulate the economy of the host countries. It was further hoped to diminish the number of persons on relief to the hard core of unemployables, thereby reducing the money cost of relief to proportions manageable by the host governments themselves and allowing the early ending of international relief.

42. Unfortunately, the objectives of the Economic Survey Mission were not realized. Many difficulties developed that had not been foreseen. Foremost among these was the constant uncertainty as to the availability of funds. Of the $54 million which was the goal for the period January 1950 to June 1951 in cash and kind (including direct aid and services of governments and voluntary agencies), only $37.1 million were freely disposable by the Agency. Moreover, the receipt of contributions was often so delayed that the Agency was at times forced to borrow money from the Working Capital Fund of the United Nations in order to meet its commitments for the following month and, by 30 June 1951, $1 million of the pledged amount had still not been received.

43. From the end of 1950 onwards, the situation was greatly aggravated by the unforeseen increase in the cost of the relief programme, which rose from about $4.7 million a quarter at the beginning of the programme to $6.9 million in April to June 1951. The general rise in prices was caused, not only by the increase in price of certain commodities such as tents and blankets due to the war in Korea, but also to the world shortage of flour, and to the poor prospects for the harvest in the area; this made governments reluctant to part with any of their stocks and therefore forced the Agency to look abroad for its purchases of flour. The effect on Agency budgeting was that a great part of the cash previously estimated to be available for works during the first half of 1951 had to be earmarked for forward purchasing from Australia and North America up to five months in advance, and the works programme therefore tapered off. However, the lack of ready money was so acute that forward purchasing was not possible. As a result, the Agency was forced to pay considerably higher prices than would otherwise have been necessary, owing to a steeply rising market and a world shortage of commodities. The prices of flour, sugar, oil, pulses and other food items have risen by between 30 and 45 per cent over the last six months. In short, the sums available for a works programme were very limited and over the whole period only some $24 million were spent. The lack of funds effectively prevented any forward planning and necessitated a certain restraint in the Agency's dealing with governments. This led in turn to a certain reluctance to co-operate with the Agency, particularly in longer term projects such as agricultural schemes.

44. Another unforeseen difficulty was the opposition of the refugees themselves. This hostility to all works undertaken by the Agency was based upon their conviction that to accept employment within the host countries would be tantamount to renouncing the right to return home, and perhaps even the right to compensation. This suspicion was not so widespread in Jordan, where the works programme was in fact the most successful, but for over six months it was very strong in both Syria and Lebanon.

Not only was it difficult to recruit sufficient workers, but demonstrations and threats to Agency personnel were made and, even, once on the job, some of the workers displayed, on occasion, an unwilling approach which greatly reduced output. However, in many places this attitude gradually changed; at some sites, requests for employment greatly exceeded the financial possibilities, and when work finally stopped, towards the middle of 1951, there was strong opposition to the closedown.

45. The main criteria of the work schemes to be adopted were that they should provide for the employment of refugees; that they should make the maximum contribution towards resettlement, temporary or otherwise; that their cost should be composed of the maximum amount for wages and the minimum amount for material; and that they should improve the economy of the host countries. The works undertaken had to be complete in themselves, since governments had not the funds to continue or maintain expensive schemes. Owing to the fact that it was imperative to start the work as soon as possible and little planning on long-range development schemes existed with the governments, it was found necessary to choose the type of work that needed the least preliminary study, namely, road-building and afforestation. Even here the haste with which the work had to be begun materially added to the cost.

B. PUBLIC WORKS

(a) Road building

46. Road construction, which formed the most important part of the whole UNRWAPRNE works programme, employed at its peak some 5,110 men. It is not possible to estimate the total number of refugees who received wages for this type of work, as some districts rotated employment to spread the benefit over as many people as possible, although this was found to increase inefficiency and was abandoned towards the end of the operation. The total number of man-days worked in the different countries was 735 000.

47. In Lebanon, two roads of a total length of 18 kms were planned, and of this approximately 8 kms, or 44 per cent, were constructed. In Syria, one road of 26 kms was undertaken, and 16 kms of the earthwork were finished. In Jordan, five roads of a total length of 67.25 kms were planned, and of this 60 kms were finished, and 3.5 kms partly completed. Taking all districts, some 75 per cent of the planned kilometrage was completely or partially constructed.

48. The total cost to the Agency of the road-building programme was approximately $814 000. It is impossible to give the over-all cost per kilometre, since the nature and extent of the work varied very widely, but the cost per kilometre in Jordan, where the four chief roads were all asphalted and bridges were built, amounted to about $8 288. In Syria and Lebanon, costs were higher for less finished work.

49. Government co-operation in the execution of these works varied considerably. In all cases, the roads were chosen in the first place by the government concerned, and approved or rejected by the Planning Board of UNRWAPRNE. The plant, such as stone-crushers and steam-rollers, was provided by governments, and the labour and material by UNRWAPRNE. The usual arrangement was that the provision of tools should be undertaken in the proportion of 50-50 or 55-45 by UNRWAPRNE and the governments, but, in practice, the latter in some cases supplied nothing, and in others everything, that was needed.

(b) Afforestation

50. It was not possible to develop a long-term comprehensive forestry programme for the area as a whole, owing to the fact that not all the governments involved had as yet a very clear idea of the importance of soil conservation and afforestation, and the fact that it was necessary to provide immediate employment for the refugees. Hence, preliminary work such as the establishment of nurseries had to be cut to the minimum and, for that reason, seeds had to be sown instead of seedlings planted on most of the afforestation projects. Besides the difficulty of recruitment, which caused initial delay, individual output was at first very low, but once the workers were able with their wages to feed themselves better, and had regained the habit of working, the daily output increased and on some sites reached figures comparable to the normal output of other Mediterranean workers. Finally, certain governments had not initially adequate means and personnel for ensuring efficient technical control of work on such a large scale, although the various forestry services made serious and generally successful efforts to adapt themselves.

51. In order to link afforestation to soil conservation mountain sites and land obviously suitable only for forestry and not for any other kind of cultivation were chosen in conjunction with the local forestry officers. The work was carried out by manual labour only; in very rocky areas this was the only method possible, but in others, if employment had not been the prime object, the soil could have been worked more quickly and more thoroughly by mechanical means. In the majority of cases the planting of fruit and nut trees rather than forest species would have been more advantageous to the local economy, particularly if agreements could have been concluded with nearby villages whereby the inhabitants would agree not to keep goats in return for the ownership of the orchards thus created. However, this was not possible in a short term programme, since the Agency had no nurseries for fruit trees, and the governments, had not the necessary legal powers.

52. Forestry work was undertaken in Syria, Jordan and to a lesser extent in Lebanon. In Syria, there were three main projects, on Mt. Qassioun overlooking Damascus, on Mt. Hermon, and in the Zebadani area, covering in all some 1 700 hectares. About 82 per cent of this planned area was actually completed, and in addition 6 kms of forest road constructed, at a total cost of about $122 313. In Jordan, there were also three main sites at Arroub, Wadi Quff and Wadi Zerka. Of the planned area of 2 945 hectares, about 90 per cent was completed, two cisterns and several check-dams constructed and 35 kms of forest road improved at a total cost of a little over $137 600. In Lebanon, the main project was to be the afforestation of 600 hectares near the Becharre Cedars, but owing to difficulties in recruitment and employment the progress of the work was very slow and it had to be stopped altogether at the end of October 1950. The related nursery project for the growing of forest seedlings was, however, continued on a reduced scale, to produce 150 000 seedlings in pots and some 200 000 in beds.

53. The total area dealt with, for both soil conservation and afforestation, amounted to 4 031 hectares (about 10 000 acres) compared with 4 700 hectares planned. The Economic Survey Mission recommendations had called for the completion of 3 255 hectares during the first year, so that the Agency in fact achieved 125 per cent of the amount scheduled. Mixed broadleaf and coniferous forests were sown, check-dams were built across the gullies, and gradoni and strips following the contour lines were constructed. The programme cost $272 320 and employed about 3 144 men in the peak month of December 1950.

54. The success of the Agency's afforestation programme can be judged only at the end of 1951 as the summer drought, which is particularly severe this year, will be a great test for the young plants whether they have been grown direct from seed or planted as seedlings, and much will depend upon whether governments can assure the protection of the afforested areas against grazing.

(c) Other works

55. Road-building and afforestation together accounted for over 43 per cent of the total cost of the works programme undertaken. The rest was spent on projects of lesser importance such as an irrigation scheme on private land in Syria, municipal improvement in Lebanon, a school and a sanatorium in Jordan, and various types of experimental and other housing projects in Jordan, Gaza and Syria.

56. In order to meet the problem of the refugees who were more highly skilled than ordinary labourers, small schemes were also started to provide employment for craftsmen such as carpenters, shoemakers, tailors, dressmakers, tinsmiths, and so on. The men worked in groups on premises belonging to or rented by the Agency, and were paid daily wages, the raw material being supplied by UNRWAPRNE. The products of their work were almost entirely taken up by the Agency. The carpenters made furniture for UNRWAPRNE offices and schools; the shoemakers, tailors and dressmakers produced shoes and clothing for distribution to the refugees; the tinsmiths made measures to be used in the distribution of foodstuffs. Some made soap, bricks or matting; others produced wheelbarrows and rubber baskets made from old tyres for workmen on the road-building projects.

57. Another works scheme for skilled refugees was set up in Gaza for the weavers from Majdal. Some 2 500 persons were employed in this scheme, which was later extended to Jordan, and over 1 128 000 metres of cloth of different types were produced for garment manufacture.

C. RESULTS

58. Broadly speaking, the works programme failed to produce the effect hoped for in the report of the Economic Survey Mission. In some measure this may have resulted from the lack of funds to launch the programme on a full-scale basis. Nevertheless, there were assets. Even though the volume of employment and the expenditure were small, the programme certainly injected a new note of activity and diversion into a dull relief routine. Further, the operations of the programme, with all its mishaps, yielded valuable experience in working relationships between UNRWAPRNE and local governments. There were even moments when projects flamed up hopefully in terms of stimulated refugee morale and country economies.

59. An example of the willingness and enthusiasm that could be aroused, when the work was in the interest of the refugees and its advantages were clearly understood by them, was the case of Battir village. This village is situated almost on the demarcation line between Arab Palestine and Israel, and some of its land and several houses are on the Jewish side, although in this case access to them is permitted by the Israeli authorities. The village had formerly existed by marketing its vegetables in Jerusalem, and since no road existed and the railway was now in Israeli hands, economic activity was virtually at a standstill. The Agency therefore undertook the construction of a 7 kms road to link Battir to the main Jerusalem-Hebron road and provide access to the village, using local refugee labour. Once the refugees had overcome their initial suspicion of the Agency's work and saw what advantages the new road would bring, they gave their active and enthusiastic cooperation. On five separate holidays, 250 men, women and children worked without pay so that the work might be expedited. When the shortage of blasting powder threatened to interrupt operations for a few days, the refugees, unwilling to delay the work, purchased the powder themselves as a donation to the Agency. When a house stood in the way of the road the owner agreed that it should be demolished without compensation, trusting that his neighbours would later help him to build another. Moreover, the village was stimulated to make many improvements on its own initiative such as a retaining wall, a reservoir, baths and a handsome mosque at the entrance to the village.

60. Another instance of the economic benefits that might result on a small scale even from the public works type of undertaking, when judiciously chosen, was the Huweisha scheme, for which a special letter of thanks was received by the Agency from the Lands and Surveys Department of the Jordan Government. At Huweisha, on the east side of the River Jordan in the hills below Amman, the soil conservation and afforestation of 25 000 dunums was undertaken, and 35 kms of dry-weather road constructed, opening a hitherto isolated area and serving eight villages and nomadic tribes. As a result, the villagers were enabled for the first time to sell firewood from the neighbouring hills in Amman, to market their surplus crops, to set up their own flour mills instead of travelling to Amman in order to grind their flour, and to obtain medical assistance when necessary. As well as the immediate benefits, the afforestation undertaken will provide a long-term source of wealth and improve the flow of the Jordan, thereby increasing the possibilities of irrigation, upon which almost all cultivation in this area depends.

61. On the other hand, it must be recorded that the public works type of project which, under the circumstances, was the only kind that could have been undertaken, did not appreciably improve the absorptive capacity of the host countries and did not directly benefit the refugees except by the payment of labourers' wages which totalled $1 326 719 or 54 per cent of the whole amount spent on works. This employment did not set up the secondary reactions that might be expected in countries with more highly developed economies. The refugee himself, instead of being made more nearly self-supporting, was paradoxically made more dependent, since the United Nations became his employer as well as his provider and he therefore came to expect as a right the provision of work as well as of relief and social services.

62. The Economic Survey Mission report envisaged that employed persons and their families would be removed from the ration lists, thereby progressively reducing the relief rolls to meet the early ending of international relief. In practice, this simple automatic solution did not prove possible. Employment on road-building could not be expected to last more than a few months at the most, or if employment was rotated, for only a few weeks, and at the end of it the man and his family would be no nearer independence except for a small sum of money in his pocket. Moreover, automatic cancellation would penalize the larger families and make it more profitable for them to remain on relief. On the other hand, to pay refugees the prevailing wage and at the same time maintain them and their families would be to create a privileged class within the host countries. The compromise solution eventually reached was that labourers employed on Agency works schemes had a cash deduction made from their wages, to cover in theory the purchase of four rations from the Agency; in practice the system of deductions used was not the same in all districts, owing to widely varying conditions. When they again became unemployed they and their families were reinstated on the lists. Thus, no persons were removed permanently from the Agency rolls as a result of works projects.

63. Sober appraisal must record that the works programme was costly to the Agency, as it cost five times more to keep a man at work than on relief. There was a tendency to build up a separate refugee economy. Projects were selected by governments out of the backlog of public works needs rather than as aids to refugee reintegration. The programme proved to be no detour around fundamental obstacles.

Chapter III

THE ROAD TO HOMES AND SELF-SUPPORT

A. CHANGE OF EMPHASIS

64. Towards the end of 1950, it became obvious that programme of useful public works for the employment of able refugees as a first measure towards their rehabilitation, recommended in the interim report of the Economic Survey Mission, could not provide the basis for continuing employment or remove 100 000 workers and their families from relief rolls by the end of the first year. A more direct approach was needed if international

aid were ever to be ended.

65. The General Assembly at its fifth session, recognizing that direct relief could not be terminated as envisaged in its resolution 302 (IV), authorized the Agency, by resolution 393 (V), to continue to furnish such relief for the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952, and considered that "the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement, is essential for the time when international assistance is no longer available and for the realization of conditions of peace and stability in in the area".

66. The emphasis was thus placed upon works leading to integration rather than temporary employment on public works. The existing programme of public works was therefore gradually diminished from December onwards, and by 30 June 1951, no refugees were employed on UNRWAPRNE works projects in any country, with the one exception of the nursery forest seedlings in Lebanon.

67. With the new approach has come a growing recognition that the refugees cannot all find homes and jobs in the countries where they now reside. All the refugees in Gaza and a large part of those in Lebanon and Jordan must find their opportunities in countries of greater economic possibilities. This must take place in a setting which leaves the refugee free to take advantage of repatriation if opportunity develops and he so chooses. Further he must feel that rights to compensation will not be prejudiced. There are likewise considerations of importance to governments plus the further recognition that a refugee adequately established becomes an economic asset rather than a liability.

68. Progress toward these new realities was revealed in the full support of Near East governments for the resolution of December 1950. Then followed a Cairo meeting of the Arab League at which Arab governments offered co-operation in a framework of limited contributions, protection of refugee rights and assurances that the United Nations would see the programme through.

B. FRESH APPRAISAL

69. A certain proportion of the refugees receiving international aid are not completely destitute. Many have found work in cotton fields or factories, in casual labour or in harvesting. Even in the camps, small shops have sprung up spontaneously and range from a bench in the open air to solid little stone or mud-brick houses. There are grocers' and butchers' shops, cafés, restaurants, bakeries, carpenters, tinsmiths, tailors, potters, barbers, shoemakers, cloth dealers, confectioners, mat makers and others types of trade, showing that at least some of the refugees have money to spend. The ownership of animals is not uncommon and some camp inhabitants possess sheep or goats, a donkey or even a cow, which is an asset of considerable value.

70. Yet, with all this small trading and a measure of seasonal or casual employment, very few are genuinely reintegrated in the sense that they could support themselves and their families if UNRWAPRNE aid were withdrawn. In most countries, private employment pays the refugees less than the local wage for daily labour; the little shops that exist on a small turn-over and a narrow margin of profit could not survive except for rent-free premises and the possession of basic rations; moreover, there is a constant diminution of the assets brought out of Palestine by the more fortunate few, whose situation becomes daily more precarious and who apply to the Agency for rations when their money is gone. Applications for reinstatement are also continually received from unemployed persons, who were removed from the list at a time when they had jobs and were considered to be earning enough to subsist without aid.

71. The compelling fact, in terms of size of programme, is that 876 000 are at present on the ration list. Every year, another 30 000 "refugees" are born. An offsetting factor is that the list is undoubtedly swollen by irregular registration and includes some reintegrated but not identified persons. A conservative target for Agency assistance night be 750 000, representing genuine cases of major economic dislocation. In the last analysis, availability of contributions will of course determine the scope of the programme.

72. This picture would be incomplete without reference to at least another 100 000 needy persons, product of the Palestine strife, differing from the refugee only in that they are still living in their own houses. For these, the economic situation grows daily worse.

73. All this leads to the firm conclusion that the total problem cannot be solved in a period of months by the mere expedient of providing employment. Basically, it is a problem of the economy of the area. Large-scale assistance by the Agency must inevitably be paralleled by even larger efforts towards economic development by governments themselves.

C. SOME LINES OF APPROACH

74. Although the Agency's real effort to assist governments to deal with the refugee problem must come with the new financial period after 1 July 1951, much preliminary work has already been done and, since the problem cannot be solved by any one method, many different lines of approach have been explored.

(a) Housing

75. The provision of durable housing for the refugees is an essential element in any plan for better living, and preliminary research has been done on types, requirements, costs and possible materials.

76. The two main requirements are, first, that the housing provided should not be of so high a standard that the refugees are given a great advantage over the surrounding population; and, second, that it should somewhat raise the local standard rather than lower it. In an attempt to steer a middle course between these opposite conditions, detailed plans have been prepared of alternative types of houses, based on investigations made of local practice in Egypt, Morocco, Greece and the Sudan, as well as of the local housing within the area itself. The materials to be used must vary with the regions; stone and mudbrick or rammed earth being the two main types. Much experimenting has been done with different types of roofing, which is at once the most expensive and the most difficult part of the construction. Roofs have been made with wood beams covered with flattened asphalt barrels, cement tiles, corrugated iron sheets, reeds and plaster; and investigation has been made of the two local expedients of the conical beehive house of northern Syria which consists entirely of mud-brick, and the Palestine type in which hollow pottery cylinders are built into an arched roof.

77. Consideration has also been given to the layout of village communities, which must include, as well as houses, adequate provision for sanitation and garbage disposal, wells, a school, baths, a mosque or church and perhaps a village hall.

78. In Gaza, a large-scale housing project has already been undertaken and blocks of eight one-family rooms have been built of mud-brick and roofed with cement tiles, although these are not up to the standard of the somewhat more elaborate and permanent housing necessary in a reintegration scheme. In Jordan, the Government has co-operated with the Agency in a housing scheme on the outskirts of Amman, the Government providing the land and arranging for construction, which is financed by UNRWAPRNE. This housing is intended for middle class Palestinians, many of whom are not on relief rolls. The Jordan Government has also itself financed construction of an elaborate housing project in the Jordan Valley.

79. In Syria, an experimental urban house has been erected in Damascus on a plot provided by the Government, and trials have been made, in a nearby camp, of a new type of concrete structure based on the principle of the Ctesiphon arch. The Government has also shown interest in the provision by the Agency of temporary housing for the refugees, particularly in the Lattakia area, where they may be able to find work in the projected port development.

(b) Agriculture

80. Effort has also been devoted to the investigation of possible agricultural schemes, but up to the end of the period under review results have been limited. Quite apart from other obstacles, the condition of the land itself, even when offered freely, has presented many difficulties. The chief of these is the need for an adequate water supply. The countries concerned form part of an area of small rainfall, and such land as has been offered or proposed is located, almost without exception, where cultivation is either entirely impossible without irrigation or can only provide a living if part of each holding is irrigated. Since water is generally not available from surface sources, underground supplies must be sought. Thus, much time is necessary for initial surveys followed by exploratory drilling. Even when results are favourable, further delay occurs in starting actual settlement by the necessity to import pumping and other equipment from abroad.

81. In Jordan, the Agency began by preparing a number of projects for the terracing of hilly land in Arab Palestine. Various private landowners were prepared to put their unproductive land at the disposal of the Agency for improvement by terracing; and, had it been possible to agree on reasonable terms, it is probable that a large programme of this type could have been undertaken. Unfortunately, the costs in all cases were prohibitive in relation to the funds at the Agency's disposal. The local custom in such cases is for the landowner to give one-third of the developed area to those who have done the work but, in view of the Agency's purpose, landowners were prepared to make over to the refugees half the land. Even so, to provide land for one family, 8 hectares would have to be terraced at an estimated cost of $2 240, not counting housing, livestock, implements, and seeds for future use. Difficulties were also met in terracing village forest reserve lands for use by refugee farmers. In conjunction with the Agricultural Department, terracing projects were prepared for a number of areas of undeveloped village lands in west Jordan; but the Department of Lands and Surveys subsequently expressed its conviction that all such reserves were needed not only as grazing for villages but for afforestation, of which the country was greatly in need. This view finally prevailed and these projects could not be pursued.

82. It was hoped that a considerable number of refugees might be able to settle in the Jordan Valley, although it was known from the outset that the quality of the soil on the available land was far from good. Everything depended on the provision of an adequate supply of water sufficiently sweet for irrigation purposes; exploratory work was therefore undertaken for underground water supplies. Unfortunately, of the sixteen exploratory bores that were made on both sides of the Jordan, only two have produced water with a sufficiently low salinity and chlorine content to be practicable for irrigation purposes; it is hoped to convert these into tube wells and to place thirty-six refugee families on the land in time to sow their crops in the coming winter.

83. Much essential preliminary research and analysis have also been done on other possible projects in Jordan, but by the end of June none had reached the stage where actual settlement could begin. The confirmation of the Government is awaited that certain lands, which preliminary investigation had shown to be suitable, will actually be made available for refugees. The Agency is also engaged on an engineering survey of the Zors lands on the east bank of the Jordan; also on the possible irrigation of sufficient land for a few families on the west side by the waters of Wadi Faraa. Arrangements had also been made for a survey of the Sheraa region in south Jordan.

84. In Syria, premilinary arrangements for a number of projects on privately owned land had almost been completed, and in one case the necessary funds had actually been allotted, when the Government indicated that it would not favour reintegration on privately owned lands, where the refugees concerned were employed as share croppers, even though a long term agreement with the landlord was contemplated, since arrangements would be difficult to enforce and the refugee tenants might suffer. As no private owner who offered his land for cultivation by refugees was prepared to grant permanent ownership, the hope of reintegrating refugees on this type of land had to be abandoned. Two pilot projects, each to settle 1 200 families, were submitted to the Syrian Government in May 1951, but, up to 30 June, the Government had given no firm indication that it would make State domain lands available for the permanent reintegration of refugees.

85. The reintegration of refugees on the Gaza strip is impossible, since it can hardly support its previous inhabitants; but the Egyptian Government informed the Agency, at the beginning of 1951, of its willingness to co-operate in the reintegration on the land of 50 000 refugees in Sinai, if conditions in that area should prove suitable. A joint reconnaissance by officers of the Egyptian Government and the Agency showed that the three tracts finally chosen are likely to be suitable for development, provided that sufficient supplies of sweet water can be obtained from underground sources, since the annual rainfall only amounts to four inches. The Agency procured the services of a geophysicist to advise on the prospects of finding water, and his survey is now in progress.

(c) Loans

86. With the change of emphasis from works employment to reintegration it was intended, wherever possible, to transform the small work relief schemes for craftsmen into self-supporting ventures, since the Agency could no longer afford the indefinite payment of wages and the provision of a market simply in order to give employment to refugees. This change was to be effected by giving workers in existing schemes the tools and equipment as an initial grant, and letting them finance their running expenses by the proceeds of sales on the open market (or in some cases of sales to the Agency), so that as soon as they became self-supporting they could be removed from the relief rolls.

87. Unfortunately, when faced with this proposal the workers were not willing to take the risk of launching out on their own, preferring to forfeit their wages and continue on relief. In Syria and Jordan, most workers refused the offer, in Lebanon, they were in any case not officially allowed to work, and, in Gaza, the economic stagnation was such that very little market existed outside the Agency itself. Thus, with the exception of a few schemes that were needed by the Agency for camp maintenance purposes, nearly all such undertakings were closed down.

88. In abandoning the work relief schemes, the Agency decided to offer small loans to individuals or groups who could thereby become self-supporting. The offer was enthusiastically received, and so many applications came in that it became a difficult task to sift them for projects that offered some prospect of success. Certain guiding rules were applied. The schemes must not only be economically sound, but use local material and produce articles in short supply; work giving maximum employment was to be preferred over that with any considerable degree of mechanization. The object of such loans was to cancel, within a specified time not exceeding six months, the breadwinners concerned and their families from the relief rolls. Loans should not exceed the equivalent of $5 000 on any one project, and should not normally be made for a period of more than three years; no interest should be charged, and the whole of the loan need not be made at the same time; risks should be shared with third parties as far as possible; UNRWAPRNE should maintain the right of inspection of the accounts; and ownership of fixed assets should be retained by the Agency until the loan was repaid.

89. Owing to political and economic factors in the other countries, Jordan is at present the only country in which such loans are being granted. Approved projects include such varied businesses as a lime-kiln, a machine repair-shop, a stone-crusher, an upholstery shop, a confectionery business, shoemaking, a garage, a tractor hire service, a number of bee-keeping schemes, carpentry, a tobacco plantation, a dry-cleaning and laundry business, a salt and coffee factory, a textile factory and a tailoring and ready-made clothing business. By the end of June 1951, about a hundred persons had been taken off the ration lists, and a further 800 were due to come off at varying dates in the future. The total sum approved for small loans amounted to the equivalent of some $70 000; including two larger schemes for a cement-pipe factory and clothing factory, the Agency had advanced a total of some $ 116,063.

(d) Placement

90. A placement service has been set up on a small scale at headquarters to ensure that, in the interim period before large scale reintegration can take place, such employment opportunities as arise may not be wasted. Notice of several hundred vacancies for skilled or semi-skilled workers have been sent to the Agency from Iraq, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and efforts are made to select and test suitable candidates. Full time liaison officers have been appointed to both Tripolitania and Iraq. The Agency also approved a two months' experiment of assisting overseas emigration for refugees who had already obtained visas.

(e) Development Bank of Jordan

91. To encourage economic development in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and with a view to raising the general standard of living of all inhabitants including refugees, articles of association of the Development Bank of Jordan, Ltd. were drawn up on 8 June 1951. These were agreed to by both the Jordan Goyernment and the Agency.

92. In order to attain the stated aims it is proposed that the Bank should grant medium and long-term loans, normally not to exceed ten years, to individuals, companies and co-operative societies in agriculture and industry. It may also participate in all types of agricultural and industrial enterprises by subscribing capital. It is further contemplated that it may establish new enterprises which will, in the first instance be financed and managed by itself. Technical and administrative aid will be furnished to its clients and full advantage will be taken of the technical assistance programme of the United Nations and of the Member countries. The Bank may acquire real estate, accept mortgages, sell or otherwise dispose of its securities and real estate participations, and in general engage in various types of banking business necessary for the attainment of its objects.

93. The Bank may not accept deposits at interest or make loans to the Government or to agencies in which the Government has a controlling interest. Not more than 10 per cent of the total capital may be loaned to any one concern.

94. The capital of the Bank consists of 500 000 one-Jordan-dinar shares of which 50 000 may be subscribed by private shareholders, 50 000 by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, both payable in cash; 400 000 shares are to be subscribed by UNRWAPRNE payable as mutually agreed by the Government and Agency, partly in cash and partly in promissory notes (up to a total of 25 000 Jordan dinars) of refugee borrowers from the Agency who have benefited from reintegration loans. The acceptance of the last named should be at the discretion of the Bank.

95. The registration of the articles of the Bank has been delayed for various causes, and the Board of Directors has not been selected. However, these matters are in hand and early establishment may be anticipated.

96. The above exploratory steps were under way at the end of the fiscal year. Obviously they were but tentative probings. Ahead must be large scale approaches, generous contributions and full acquiescence of hospitable governments.

Chapter IV

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

A. THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE

97. The facts of economic life in the Middle East, so far as they are known, abundantly justify the conclusion of the Economic Survey Mission experts that the Middle East suffers from poverty in the extreme. The spectacular recent improvements in road transport across the Syrian desert or the extraordinary expansion of the oil industry in the area of the Persian Gulf in recent years may be cited as examples of signs pointing in the contrary direction; but they are isolated examples and should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the standard of living throughout the Middle East is far below Western levels, and that there has been resistance to change, and lack of technology and investment capital.

98. On the other hand, taking account of natural resources in the broadest sense, the region is undoubtedly one of the potentially richest areas of the world. It not only contains nearly half the world oil proved resources, exploitation of which has started only recently, but it has large areas of cultivable land, part of which constituted in previous centuries the homelands of large and prosperous populations, while other parts have never been seriously developed at all. The fundamental obstacle to development and redevelopment throughout the area is lack of capital. Capital imports into the area before and since the First World War have been substantial in certain lines, particularly oil and transport,  but over the whole field of agriculture and industry it is clear that the major flow has yet to come.

99. There is a good deal of evidence to show that appreciation of this fact is growing among the chief creditor countries and the national and international agencies concerned. For instance, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that, in 1949, feasible investment in the Middle East in farm development alone (irrigation and drainage, import of machinery, construction of grain storage, mills and fertilizers factories) could be set at $500 million for the following decade. The estimated cost of the more important of probable development plans for the Middle East countries summarized in the Economic Survey Mission's report was approximately twice this amount. Following the Gray report, which recommended that United States economic assistance to the under- developed areas should be increased up to $500 million for several years, the report of President Truman's International Development Advisory Board specifically mentioned reclamation works in the Jordan Valley and the Tigris-Euphrates Basin as possibilities for large-scale development, based partly on external finance. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, in a report on its recent loan of $12.8 million for the construction of the Wadi Tharthar flood control project in Iraq, states that land that could be cultivated under irrigation is plentiful and possibilities for further agricultural production and exports are therefore considerable. Apart from the increasing flow of capital into the oil industry an expectation of substantial capital imports for the purpose of general economic development would therefore be reasonable.

100. Inevitably, this prospect of large-scale economic development for nationals of Near East governments holds large by-products in terms of homes and jobs for many Palestinian refugees. The Agency hopes that the process of formulating plans and procuring financial and technical assistance will quicken. It realizes, too, that its own programme of expenditure will need co-ordination with these large economic efforts of local governments. There is great need, on the part of the Agency, for economic intelligence. Even the most essential indicators, such as price indices, employment returns, are often defective or non-existent. The Agency, too, can help in the field of technical assistance as a stimulus and a service.

THE ROLE OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

101. Recognizing the importance of exchange of information and co-ordination of technical assistance activities in the area, the General Assembly, in resolution 393 (V), identified the Agency as a point of reference and a possible point of service to United Nations specialized agencies and the Technical Assistance Administration.

102. The number of programmes in the area and the wide variety of technical assistance services available, both bilateral, and multilateral, makes manifest the need for frequent and frank exchange of information by organizations dealing with project requests submitted by governments. In September 1950, the Agency sent an observer to the meeting of the Technical Assistance Board in New York, and in that month a Technical Assistance Division of the Agency was established. One of its principal activities has been the stimulation of interest in its field on the part of Near Eastern governments. By means of correspondence, periodical reports, personal visits and attendance at conferences, the Division has endeavoured to effect close liaison, and to acquaint governments with the available resources.

103. The Division has been able to integrate the services of Agency staff experts, as they relate to technical assistance, with the work of specialized agency personnel engaged on projects in area countries. In addition, several projects have been carried out by the Agency itself under grants from the Technical Assistance Division.

(i) UNRWAPRNE specialists in agriculture, forestry, irrigation, engineering, economics, social welfare and health, plus seconded experts from WHO and from UNESCO, have provided high quality technical advice to governments, both in connexion with the execution of works projects and in the parallel programme of care and maintenance of refugees.

(ii) The Agency has co-operated with the Jordan Government in operating a laboratory for the production of smallpox, typhoid, and anti-rabies vaccines. The Government provides the premises, the animals and a portion of the supplies and equipment; UNRWAPRNE furnishes the technicians and the remainder of the supplies.

(iii) The assignment of an economic adviser to Jordan is a precedent which might well be applied elsewhere. His function is to advise the Ministry of Development on general economic planning and programming as they affect refugees, and to serve as secretary of the planning unit of the Ministry. He also acts as a centre of reference, information and co-ordination in technical assistance matters generally. Working closely with him is an industrial economist of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, an agricultural economist assigned by the Food and Agriculture Organization and a construction engineer provided by the Agency.

(iv) Technical assistance has been provided by UNRWAPRNE in Jordan, in the Gaza strip, in Lebanon and in Syria, in the form of vocational training in weaving, bookbinding, shoemaking, carpentry, tinsmithing, brickmaking, motor-vehicle repairing and, arts and crafts.

(v) Planning and implementation of works projects resulted in the creation of development boards to examine the works proposed, and to encourage governments to assume major responsibility for their execution. The works programme brought technical assistance to the several countries in the form of agricultural, engineering and industrial advice.

(vi) In the course of maintaining health and adequate environmental sanitation for refugees, technical assistance has been provided in the medical and public health fields. A survey of malaria and suggestions for control measures to aid in the preparation of the malaria control budget for Jordan were made by an expert provided by WHO. The Agency has engaged two technicians to implement the findings of the expert. It is also providing the services of an ophthalmologist in connexion with a trachoma-control programme, for which UNICEF furnishes the drugs.

104. Close contact has been maintained with the United States Technical Cooperation Administration, with the British Middle East Office, with the French representative on the Agency's Advisory Commission who is in charge of the French programmes of technical assistance in the Middle East and with the regional offices of the specialized agencies. An observer has attended meetings of the Technical Assistance Board, and a number of discussions and negotiations have taken place with representatives of FAO, ICAO, TAA, ILO, WHO and UNESCO.

105. Administrative, financial and advisory services are rendered to various United Nations experts in, keeping with the Agency's policy to provide such aid to experts operating in the area.

106. To facilitate a broad exchange of information among the various agencies offering technical assistance, the Division maintains files on all relevant activities in the countries of its concern. A record is kept of each technical assistance project as it is requested, as it is put into operation and as it is completed. Two reports are issued : a semi-monthly news letter and a comprehensive tabular listing of technical assistance activities in the area. The report covers work of the Technical Assistance Administration and specialized agencies, the United States Technical Cooperation Administration and the British and French bilateral assistance programmes, as well as those of private foundations and other agencies. These reports are circulated to interested groups.

107. Economic ferment in the area is apparent. An economic renaissance is within the range of reasonable prediction. Technical assistance and economic research and reporting are essential approaches to betterment of living conditions for refugees from Palestine and nationals of Near East countries.

PART II

The United Nations at work

Chapter I

ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE AGENCY

108. At its fourth session, the General Assembly, by resolution 302 (IV) of December 1949, established the "United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East" to carry out, in collaboration with local governments, the direct relief and works programme as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission, and to consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects would no longer be available. This same resolution established an Advisory Commission to advise and assist the Director of the Agency in the execution of the programme and requested the Secretary- General, in consultation with the Governments represented on this Commission, to appoint a Director to be the Chief Executive Officer of the Agency responsible to the General Assembly for the operation of the programme.

109. When the Agency took over operational responsibility on 1 May 1950 from UNRPR, the administration and organization were devoted primarily to the many problems of the relief progamme, although there was an ever-increasing emphasis on works which, toward the end of 1950, employed some 12 000 Palestinian refugees. The organization was constantly in a state of evolution to meet varying conditions; although some administrative changes were of major significance, in general the original outline was adhered to. Five districts were established : Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Gaza and Israel, each under a chief district officer responsible to the Director for the over-all programme in his district. Districts were subdivided into areas, each under a Palestine refugee official. The headquarters of the Agency at Beirut was organized into : the Office of the Director, with a Deputy Director, a personal assistant, an adviser on Arab affairs, senior staff members responsible for public relations, inspection and reports, liaison officers in New York, and, later, Iraq and Cyrenaica; the secretariat of the Advisory Commission; division of supply, of administration, of finance of health, education and welfare; a placement service, a works office to which was linked advisers on economics, agriculture, engineering and housing. A technical assistance branch was formed, designed to become a point of service for all United Nations activities in this field.

110. The total number of international staff, as of 30 June 1951, was 133 of twenty nationalities, and there were 5 840 local recruits employed in administration, ration distribution and servicing functions. It is a policy of the Agency to employ Palestine refugees whenever possible.

111. The Director's relations with the Advisory Commission are based on the fairly general directives of paragraph 8 of resolution 302 (IV). Its principal duty consists in considering the financing of UNRWAPRNE, in approving the plan of expenditure, and in providing broad guidance to the Director on matters of policy, especially concerning relations with governments.

112. Following the report of the Director and the members of the Advisory Commission of the fifth session of the General Assembly, a change in the terms of reference of the Agency was evolved. Stress was placed not on public works as in the past, but on the provision of work opportunities leading to reintegration. This can be broadly interpreted as the building of homes in areas which would permit the refugee to become self-supporting, without prejudicing rights to repatriation or compensation in accordance with other General Assembly resolutions. Consequent to the new emphasis, further organizational and administrative changes are being effected.

113. The term of office of the Director of the Agency, Mr. Howard Kennedy, expired on 30 June 1951. The Secretary-General, in consultation with governments members of the Advisory Commission appointed Mr. John B. Blandford, Junior, to succeed him. Mr. Blandford reached the area on 4 July 1951.

Chapter II

THE PART PLAYED BY UNITED NATIONS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES IN THE

UNRWAPRNE PROGRAMME

(1) UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S

EMERGENCY FUND

114. UNRPR, through its three distributing agencies, had had an arrangement with UNICEF (the first international organization to start operations in the field) under which the latter supplied milk and supplementary rations of rice, sugar, flour and other commodities to children and pregnant and nursing women who amounted to about one-half of the total number of refugees. These supplies, with the exception of milk and sugar, were later pooled with UNRPR supplies and distributed, as was the milk, by the three agencies, UNICEF maintaining a mission at Beirut with observers in the field to supervise the use of UNICEF supplies.

115. When UNRWAPRNE took over from UNRPR and the agencies, a new situation arose. An exchange of letters, having the validity of an agreement, took place in April 1950, between the Director of UNRWAPRNE and the Director of UNICEF, European headquarters, Paris. This arrangement took effect on 1 May 1950, and was to remain in force for as long as the UNICEF programme for Palestine refugees continued, or as long as direct aid by UNRWAPRNE continued or until terminated by either party with two months written notice to the other.

116. It was laid down that UNICEF would, subject to the allocations of its Executive Board, continue to furnish supplies calculated on the basis of the requirements of the children, adolescents and expectant and nursing mothers among the refugee population.  All commodities would be pooled with the basic rations, except milk, which would be handled separately and distributed on a daily basis to UNICEF beneficiaries alone. The existing UNICEF field organization was to cease to function as such, and some of its staff were to be integrated in the field organization of UNRWAPRNE. Of these, two senior officials were to be administratively under the control of UNRWAPRNE but to remain UNICEF employees and maintain direct contact with UNICEF. Any other UNICEF staff required by the Agency would cease to be employed by UNICEF and would become UNRWAPRNE staff members.

117. UNRWAPRNE would then be responsible for the distribution of UNICEF supplies and accept certain other responsibilities hitherto discharged by the UNICEF mission.

118. It was agreed that the closest co-ordination and consultation should exist between the two organizations, and that UNICEF should have the right to examine and approve plans involving the use of UNICEF supplies, and to make recommendations for future activities and programming. UNICEF would be responsible for procuring and transporting its supplies as far as the seaports of entry to be used by UNRWAPRNE, which would then be responsible for all handling, warehousing, transportation and distribution in the field, subject to the UNICEF policies of non-discrimination. UNRWAPRNE would maintain accounting for UNICEF supplies according to arrangements to be mutually agreed upon in accordance with UNICEF procedures. UNRWAPRNE would also give UNICEF fair credit both to the general public and to the refugees.

119. It was also agreed that as long as UNICEF maintained a separate mission in Israel it would be directly responsible, in accordance with its agreement with the Israel Government, for the distribution through government machinery of all UNICEF supplies in Israel to UNRWAPRNE beneficiaries in UNICEF categories. This plan was to be quite distinct from the special UNICEF national programme for Israel, which would be carried on as a separate operation. It was not until March 1951, that, at the request of the Israel Government, the two programmes were amalgamated, with the exception of the demilitarized zone where the distribution was to be carried out, for political reasons, by UNRWAPRNE.

120. The last allocation for the assistance of Palestine refugees, before the formation of UNRWAPRNE, had been made by the Executive Board in March 1950, and had covered the period 1 April to 30 September 1950, bringing the total amount spent since the beginning of UNICEF operations to over 10 million dollars; and, at its June session 1950, the Executive Board endorsed the recommendation of the Administration that the provision of UNICEF supplies, which contribute 330 to 350 calories to the daily ration of the refugees, should be continued until the end of 1950. At its meeting in December 1950, the Board further authorized $ 630 000 for the continuance (against the block allocation to the refugee programme, unspent funds and stocks on hand) of UNICEF's feeding programme and its participation in the UNRWAPRNE medical programme at least until June 1951. The most recent step taken has been the Board's allocation at its May meeting of $ 700 000 (in addition to the $ 195 000 voted in February to cover July), to continue the purchase of milk and fats until the end of 1951. Sugar is to be made available from the proceeds of the exchange of other commodities.

121. UNICEF has also continued to provide various additional supplies, such as $ 150 000 worth of Czech textiles and shoes (at a low cost to the Agency) and $ 91 000 worth of children's clothing.

122. UNRWAPRNE is finding the expenses involved in milk distribution somewhat heavy in view of its limited funds, and has transmitted a formal communication to this effect to UNICEF. Conversations have therefore been held between the Agency and the chief representative of UNICEF in the Middle East (who was until 1 February 1951 the senior staff member seconded to UNRWAPRNE by UNICEF) in order to determine the best approach to governments with a view to their undertaking administration of UNICEF aid as is the practice in other parts of the world.

(2) WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

123. In response to the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, made in December 1948, WHO had assumed responsibility for technical co-ordination of the health programme administered by UNRPR, making available a grant of $ 50 000 from the UNRWAPRNE special fund, and had assigned a chief medical officer and a medical officer to work with the organization.

124. At the beginning of 1950, the Director-General of WHO renewed the assignment of these two officers and made available a second grant of $ 50 000 (although this was later reduced by one-seventh to $ 42 857). This action was confirmed in relation to UNRWAPRNE at the beginning of June by the World Health Assembly which, desiring to respond to the request of the General Assembly of the United Nations expressed in paragraph 18 of resolution 302 (IV), decided to continue the technical direction of the health programme administered by UNRWAPRNE, and requested the Director General to negotiate an agreement with UNRWAPRNE on the basis of the principles suggested by the Director General in April.

125. It was agreed, however, after personal contacts between officers of the two organizations, that a formal agreement would not be necessary to govern the relationship between WHO and UNRWAPRNE since this was already adequately covered by the principles in operation under UNRPR.

126. When UNRWAPRNE started its work in May 1950, the chief medical officer of UNRPR (WHO staff member on loan) became the chief medical officer of the new Agency, and the WHO malariologist was similarly transferred. To this headquarters staff were added a chief nurse, a sanitary engineer (also a member of WHO), a medical supply officer and a deputy chief medical officer. This staff replaced that of UNRPR and the chief medical officers and other personnel in the three voluntary agencies.

127. WHO has also continued to loan to UNRWAPRNE the services of various experts in the field of venereal diseases, health education, nursing and public health administration from among the staff of both WHO headquarters in Geneva and the regional office in Alexandria. These experts have planned and set up campaigns and courses of instruction in their respective fields among Palestinian refugees and the locally recruited medical staff of UNRWAPRNE.

128. On 4 January 1951, the Director of UNRWAPRNE wrote to the Director General of WHO reminding him that the agreement between the two organizations was due to lapse on 31 December 1950, and suggesting, since the agreement in its present form was satisfactory to the Agency, an exchange of letters to extend the agreement until 31 December 1951, or the dissolution of the Agency, whichever might be the sooner. The formal answer in agreement was received in Beirut on 21 March 1951.

129. During February, UNRWAPRNE received a cheque for $ 42 857, representing the WHO grant to the Agency for the calendar year 1951. The proceeds of this cheque was used for the purchase of insecticides for the 1951 anti-fly and anti-malaria campaign.

(3) UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,

 SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

130. After correspondence and exchanges of views between UNRWAPRNE and UNESCO that lasted for about six months, it was finally agreed, towards the end of August 1950, that UNESCO should contribute to the Agency a net sum of approximately $ 50 000 towards the education of Palestine refugees during 1950, and would make available the services of one of its staff members to be educational adviser and to act in the capacity of education officer with UNRWAPRNE. This officer would also be the UNESCO representative in the Middle East.

131. It was agreed that educational questions would fall within the competence of the Director-General of UNESCO and administrative questions within that of the Director of UNRWAPRNE. Thus, the Director-General of UNESCO and/or his representatives would undertake the inspection of schools, the preparation of reports and the choice of curricula, books and other scholastic materials. On the other hand, UNRWAPRNE would undertake the purchase and distribution of equipment and the payment of teachers, and would send regular statements of expenditure to UNESCO.

132. All contributions and gifts received by UNESCO for the education of Palestine refugees would be dispatched by UNESCO to Beirut, at which point their transport and distribution would become the responsibility of UNRWAPRNE; all the capital equipment would remain the property of UNESCO at the end of the operation. It was further agreed that no new schools would be opened, since the expected life of the Agency was less than one year. It was suggested that the schools would be called UNRWAPRNE schools technically supervised by UNESCO, and that each organization would recognize the work of the other in any publicity undertaken.

133. The Agency indicated in December 1950, that it was prepared to forego a maximum of $ 15 000 from the UNESCO grant for assistance to three Lebanese and Syrian Universities at present educating Palestinian refugees, provided that UNESCO itself would deal with the three universities in question and would decide the amount of individual contributions and select the students who would benefit from them.

134. Voluntary contributions received by the Agency in kind during 1950 amounted to a total value of $ 5 328.

135. The text of a proposed agreement was received on 19 March 1951, from the Acting Director-General of UNESCO. This agreement embodies the general understanding reached late in 1950 and is to remain valid until 31 December 1951. The new points are that UNESCO, while undertaking to contribute from its own budget the sum of $ 80 850 which amount will be paid into the account of UNRWAPRNE, Beirut, for the purpose of the educational programme for Arab refugees in the Middle East, while UNRWAPRNE will undertake to continue to provide staff and facilities as hitherto, within a budgetary limitation of $ 400 000.

136. The total cost to UNRWAPRNE of the education programme for the current year was thus fixed at $ 400 000, of which the UNESCO contribution would therefore constitute about 17 per cent. However, the analysis of actual costs made for the preparation of the third quarter budget showed that the true level of the present education programme amounts to about $ 150 000 a quarter, and UNESCO has been notified that it may not be possible for the Agency to continue to provide the additional $ 30 000 a quarter, in excess of the agreement.

137. The present number of schools for children from six to fourteen years of age maintained wholly by UNRWAPRNE-UNESCO is 114 (not including various private schools partially supported by grants). These schools are educating 43 658 pupils and are staffed by 846 teachers and headmasters.

Chapter III

HEALTH

A. GENERAL

138. Unlike the other social welfare activities such as education and welfare which did not receive official recognition until the beginning of UNRWAPRNE, the health programme was one of the first to be inaugurated. Medical supplies were brought into the area under the disaster relief programme of Count Folke Bernadotte, and with the beginning of UNRPR, health programmes were instituted in all the areas services by the three voluntary agencies. WHO was requested by the United Nations to be responsible for health work and has done so from the beginning by the designation of one of its staff members as chief medical officer for the refugee programme, and two technicians, as well as various experts and consultants on a part-time basis. WHO also has made a cash grant to the Agency each year, which is used for financing the insecticidal programme. UNICEF has provided half the medical supplies used in the programme.

139. The emphasis has been on public health and preventive medicine. The goal in curative medicine is to provide a minimum adequate service, not much above the level provided by host countries for their indigent nationals. For this reason, and because of limitation of funds, the health programme has not expanded appreciably during the past year.

140. Considering the adverse conditions under which this unfortunate group of Palestine refugees has to live — dislocation, overcrowding, exposure to the elements, economic instability, bitterness and resentment at their plight — it is remarkable that their health has stood up as well as it has. Indeed, for the great majority, it is felt that their health compares favorably with that of comparable groups of nationals in the host countries. There is no doubt, however, that their health, both mental and physical, would be improved by a solution of their problem and a return to normal living.

141. The nutritional status of the refugees has been watched carefully, not only by the health division's own staff but by experts loaned from the WHO nutrition section. Minor nutritional deficiencies are found, but appear to be no more widespread than among the indigenous populations of the host countries.

142. The effects of the term "reintegration" as expressed in General Assembly resolution 393 (V) are being felt in the health division as well as in the Agency as a whole. A number of training projects have been started, designed to provide refugees with skills in medical or para-medical fields so that they can get self-supporting jobs. The other implication of the reintegration policy is the planning for health services for resettled refugees.

B.  ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL

143. In order to understand the organizational problems of UNRWAPRNE, one should try to visualize a community of 850 000 persons scattered over 100 000 square miles and coming under five different governments (8, 13, 22 1/). For this community practically all services must be provided.

144. As regards the health programme, reference is made here to the relationship between WHO and the Agency (9). WHO assumes responsibility for technical direction of the programme by designating and providing the chief medical officer of the Agency. The chief medical officer organizes and carries out the programme within budgetary limits provided and with the guidance of various consultants sent from time to time by WHO. The latter also supplies and pays for a malariologist; it supplies, on a reimbursable basis, a sanitary engineer. In addition to these three, the rest of the division's staff at headquarters include : deputy chief medical officer, chief nurse, medical training officer, medical supply officer, statistical clerk, malaria technicians, administrative assistant and clerical staff (14).

145. The health programme in each District is headed by a field health officer, responsible technically to the chief medical officer at headquarters and administratively to the chief district officer. He is assisted in his District headquarters by a nurse, a camp and sanitation officer, and a medical supply officer. Doctors, nurses, sanitarians, technicians, [i:et cetera] are assigned to posts as indicated.

146. Monthly reports are sent to the chief medical officer where they are compiled, along with sections by headquarters staff, into an Agency report on the health programme. Weekly returns of infectious diseases, births, deaths, special data on malaria and sanitation are compiled in the regions and sent to headquarters.

147. At the regional level, efforts are made to co-ordinate the UNRWAPRNE programme with the health programme of the host country. To that end, close liaison is maintained with the officials of the Ministries of Health and local departments of health.

148. The complete picture of the Agency's health personnel as at the end of the period under review is shown above. The column "Others" includes administrative and clerical, sanitary above the labour category, laboratory, pharmaceutical and supply personnel. The table includes only personnel on the UNRWAPRNE payroll and not the hundreds of workers at hospitals subsidized by UNRWAPRNE and providing service to the refugees.

149. It has been the policy in the health division to employ local personnel, whenever possible. The following table shows the reduction in international personnel to allow for replacement by local recruits in keeping with the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Regional Committee's request in 1949 to those bodies which have operational responsibility to employ local health personnel wherever possible.

 (a) Voluntary Agencies.

 (b) UNRWAPRNE.

 (c) Figures not available.

C. INFECTIOUS DISEASES

150. The table below shows the number of cases of certain infectious diseases by districts for a twelve month period. The populations stated do not represent the total refugee population, but rather the population at risk from which the reporting of the diseases was based. There are some scattered groups of refugees from whom returns of infectious diseases are not obtainable.

151. As the result of a special survey of meningitis in Gaza it was found that forty cases had been confirmed among refugees and non-refugees. East Jordan's report for last week of the period under review is not available.

152. Of the five classical treaty diseases, cholera, plague and yellow fever did not occur, either among refugees or the indigenous population. Smallpox, of which 181 cases were reported the previous year with 176 in Arab Palestine (West Jordan), appears to have come under control with only five cases this year. Typhus has increased a little, although the only outbreak was a minor one near Irbed in East Jordan. All cases were comparatively mild and were probably of the endemic murine type. The malaria reporting is greatly exaggerated and is dealt with in the bibliographical reference 4A below.

153. The enteric disease incidence is not high for the population and the often primitive sanitary conditions under which they live, nor is the mortality high; in one hospital the case fatality for proved cases of typhoid is said to be only 2 per cent.

154. Bilharziasis has not been thought to be endemic, although recently it was discovered around Tyre, Lebanon (19). This is being studied further. Eye diseases, as elsewhere in the Near East, are highly prevalent. This has been the subject of study (20, 21) on the basis of which a programme has been started.

D. CLINICS

155. The number of clinics operated by the Agency has increased during the year from seventy-two to eighty one. Most of them are fixed, stationary ones, although a few mobile clinics are used to serve refugees in villages. The main clinic divisions are : general medical, skin and dressings, ophtalmic, school health, prenatal and infant welfare. Venereal diseases and tuberculosis clinics are held in some areas or combined in general clinics in others. Immunizations may be done in special programmes or routinely through the general clinics.

156. Attendance at these clinics is shown in the above table. The monthly average is 601 000.

157. Hospital beds provided either in Agency-operated hospitals or other hospitals subsidized by the Agency increased from 1 472 to 1 808.

158. Immunizations are performed for smallpox, typhoid and paratyphoid, and diphtheria. As regards the latter, most of the antigen used also has pertussis and tetanus components. The total number of immunizations performed during the year for all three diseases was almost 850 000. Body-dusting with 10 per cent DDT is done once a year to every one, oftener where the louse infestation is high and wherever louse-borne diseases threaten.

E.  INSECT CONTROL, INCLUDING MALARIA

159. Since the inception of the Relief Organization for Palestinian Refugees this programme has been subsidized and guided by WHO. An annual contribution of $50 000 during 1949 and $42 857 for each of 1950 and 1951, for the purchase of insecticides and equipment, and the loan of a WHO malaria and insect control expert to plan and carry out the programme, have been maintained during these three years of the UNRPR and UNRWAPRNE operation. (A detailed report on this activity is found in the bibliographical reference 4A below.)

160. The area where UNRWAPRNE operates lies in the subtropical zone, and has been historically known over centuries to be the site of insect-borne epidemics (plague, typhus and malaria) that decimated the original population and even invaded the less-favourable temperate climate of Europe with catastrophic results. It was felt natural that the dislocation of hundreds of thousands of poverty-stricken refugees from their homeland and their wanderings in the neighbouring Arab countries, with their low-budgeted public health administrations, would have caused a great public health hazard in the Middle East. Indications of such a danger were quite apparent in the autumn of 1948 before the United Nations relief work began, when malaria epidemics caused great havoc among refugees in Southern Syria, Lebanon and in the Jordan Valley, and small typhus epidemics started in villages in Gaza and Hebron. The different breeding habits of insects and their varying seasons of prevalence — lice during winter, fleas in spring, flies and malaria vectors during summer and autumn — necessitated a continuous insect control operation. In 1950, two residual sprayings were done of all camps, barracks and villages lying in malarious zones, using a DDT Gammexane wettable powder. In 1951, a spring spraying was done, and larvical measures will be continued until the end of October. It is felt that malaria has been adequately controlled by the programme, as evidenced by the rarity of transmission of the disease.

F. ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION

161. The camp and sanitation section is headed by a WHO public health Engineer. This section is concerned with camp planning, water supply, shelter, latrine and bath-house construction, and disposal of refuse. Due to the drought throughout the area in 1951, the supply of water has been precarious, and it has been necessary to use tank cars to bring water to camps. In the way of shelter, attempts are being made to house the refugees in mud-brick, stone or straw-mat dwellings instead of tents.

162. Since the preparation of last year's report on the health programme of UNRWAPRNE the responsibilities of the health division of the Agency have been broadened considerably in the field of environmental sanitation. All "camp maintenance" work is now done by our sanitation personnel; it includes the provision of water and shelter for refugees in camps and the planning and erection of camps. With this change, no other division is now assigned work in any field of environmental sanitation. This facilitates the inauguration of new work in other fields as the need appears. The change was initiated by the appointment in two districts of the camp maintenance officer to be sanitation officer simultaneously, on the premise that a man will always co-operate with himself. Control of camp maintenance funds is exercised in headquarters by the head, camp and sanitation section, under the direction of the chief medical officer, so that continued co-ordination is ensured between the work done in the field of sanitation by the permanent sanitation personnel and the work done in sanitation by the temporary personnel hired from camp maintenance funds. A detailed report on this activity is found in the bibliographical  reference 4A below.

G. SPECIAL PROGRAMMES

163. Venereal disease control. This began in 1949, in the days of UNRPR and the voluntary agencies. The venereal disease section of WHO at Geneva took an interest in the programme and in response to a request, provided an expert consultant in March 1950 who studied the conditions and reported his findings and recommendations (17). He was followed by a WHO serologist who reported on the laboratory work done (18). Many of the recommendations made by these experts have been put into effect and attempts are being made to carry out others. Although a good system of registering cases has not yet been adopted and therefore no reliable statistics can be given, the laboratories report doing 9 750 serological tests for the six-month period December 1950 through May 1951. Of these, 1287 or 12.2 per cent were positive. This cannot be considered an indication of incidence of syphilis as the majority of those tested were prenatal patients and the contacts of serologically positive pregnant women. The numbers also include repeat examinations. Previous small spot surveys among pregnant women had indicated positive serology in about 5 to 6 per cent. A recent serologic survey of pregnant women in Syria shows that of 1 250 examined,  forty-nine were positive and forty-three doubtful. The doubtfuls are to be repeated. For the first seven months of this year, testing of pregnant women in Syria revealed 7.9 per cent positive of 441 specimens examined. However, this group represented women coming voluntarily to prenatal clinics seeking advice and help and is therefore selected. UNICEF funds had provided for the experts and the penicillin used in the programme. It is hoped that WHO will arrange for a follow-up visit by a headquarters serologist in the fall of 1951.

164. Trachoma control. In the fall of 1950, WHO sent Professor G. Bietti, an internationally known ophthalmologist from Parma, Italy, to survey the trachoma situation among the refugees and to initiate a control programme. Professor Bietti spent the month of December in the area and returned to continue his study in March-April 1951, and duly reported (20, 21). His assistant, Dr. Ferraris, has been recruited by the Agency to carry out the programme outlined by Professor Bietti. This consists of a regimen of an ophthalmic antibiotic (aureomycine, terramycine ointment locally, together with sulphonamides by the mouth). UNICEF is assisting materially with the procurement of drugs. So far, only a few thousand patients are under treatment, but it is hoped that, if sufficient drugs can be obtained, all refugees with trachoma may be treated. There are great possibilities for an outstanding mass control programme.

165. Maternal and child health. Although Palestine is said to have had a fairly well organized maternal and child Health programme during the Mandate, there is no doubt that the maternal and child Health programme at present offered to the refugees is considerably advanced over that of any of the host countries. Particularly in Jordan and Gaza, very good care is taken of pregnant women, infants and school children. For most pregnant women the following routine examination is carried out:

1.  General examination;

2.  Urine examination;

3.  Blood pressure;

4.  Pelvimetry;

  5.  S. T. S. (Kahm & Meinicke tests).

Ante-natal charts are used for all patients. The introduction of venereal disease control to ante-natal clinics has been a marked improvement in maternal and child health  services.

166. Health education, through bathing demonstrations and feeding of undernourished infants, has had signal results. Infant health centres have special hours for new-born babies; milk formulas with different dilutions for different ages are being prepared; the

weaning period and the introduction of food has been worked out in detail; vitamins are distributed routinely at the infant health centres.

167. The diets were scientifically studied by the senior medical officer for maternal and child health, in Jordan, and prepared to suit the constitution of the infants in that country. One menu is used in all centres, which facilitates supervision.

168. In several areas, small maternity centres were organized at which local midwives, most of them illiterate, are supervised and taught by qualified personnel. The midwives usually attend the infant health centres and ante-natal and venereal disease clinics in turn. The difference between local midwives who have worked with the Agency for a year and those newly appointed is striking, and it can be said that the standard of work has been raised considerably during the past year.

169. In most areas, school children are getting medical attention. Undernourished children are, on medical certificate, allowed an extra meal served by the welfare service in their special feeding centres.

170. In November 1950, the Agency collaborated with the American University of Beirut, WHO and other organizations in holding in Beirut a first Middle East symposium on tropical medicine. Some 650 doctors attended the various sections of the two day symposium; among them were most of the UNRWAPRNE staff doctors.

171. During the summer of 1950, twenty medical and sociology students from universities in Beirut were taken on by the Agency to work on a health education programme directed by the WHO health programme specialist from the Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office, Alexandria. They lived and worked in the various camps and were able in some degree to transmit to the refugees some fundamental concepts of hygiene, such as the use of latrines, protection of water supply, protection from flies and use of clinics, particularly those for maternal and child health.

H. MEDICAL AND SANITATION SUPPLIES

172. The situation in regard to supplies was quite satisfactory during the year under review. Thanks to generous contributions from UNICEF, to some donations by voluntary agencies and to the Agency's purchases, a steady and adequate flow of supplies was maintained. Small amounts of streptomycin and P. A. S. were obtained for use in certain types of tuberculosis, as recommended by WHO. Some chloromycetin was procured for the more severe cases of typhoid fever. The supply and demand routine has been mastered by all concerned, with greater caution being exercised over the expenditure of expensive items. Periodic inspection of issuing units is carried out to ensure proper distribution of stocks.

173. The following shows the value and course of the supplies received during the twelve month period:

I.  HEALTH PROGRAMME BUDGET

174. The cost of the health programme is in the neighbourhood of 2 million dollars per year. This includes wages, salaries, supplies, equipment and subsidies for the medical, public health, sanitation and camp maintenance aspects of the Agency's programme.

175. The following list furnishes references for the reader wanting more details on the health programme:

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. A Preliminary Report on Health Conditions of Palestine Refugees and Estimate of Costs of Public Health and Sanitary Service. Presented at the inaugural meeting of the First Eastern Mediterranean Regional Conference of WHO in Cairo, Egypt, in February 1949. WHO, Alexandria.

2. Report by Director, United Nations Disaster Relief (1949).

3. Palestine Refugees – Health Needs. A report to the WHO Regional Committee for the Eastern Mediterranean, RC2/EM/8 of 1 September 1949. WHO, Alexandria.

4. The United Nations Relief and Works Health Programme for Palestine Refugees. A report to the WHO Regional Committee for the Eastern Mediterranean, RC3/EM/19 of 7 August 1950, WHO, Alexandria.

4 A. The United Nations Relief and Works Health Programme for Palestine Refugees July 1950-July 1951, WHO RC4/EM/19, Alexandria. Also obtainable at UNRWAPRNE. Liaison Office, United Nations, New York.

5. Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey for the Middle East, part I. Final Report and Appendices, part II. The Technical Supplement. United Nations, New York.

6. Resolution 302 (IV) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its 273rd plenary meeting on 8 December 1949, United Nations, New York.

7. Resolution 393 (V) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its 315th plenary meeting on 2 December 1950, United Nations, New York.

8. Assistance to Palestine Refugees. An Interim Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, A/1451 of 19 October 1950, United Nations, New York.

9. Agreement between UNRWAPRNE and WHO. Drawn in April 1950, signed on 23 and 29 September 1950, and extended by mutual consent until 30 June 1952. WHO, Geneva.

10. Rapport général d'activité du Service médical du Commissariat du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge pour l'aide aux réfugiés en Palestine, Geneva.

11. Health Programme established for the Arab Refugees by the United Nations. A background sketch issued by UNRWAPRNE on 30 November 1950, Beirut.

12. Report of the Relief Operation on behalf on the Palestine Refugees conducted by the Middle East Commission of the League of Red Cross Societies in conjunction with the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, 1949-1950, Geneva.

13. The Structure of the UNRWAPRNE (Background Information Sheet No. 3), UNRWAPRNE,

5 February 1951, Beirut.

14. The Medical Programme of UNRWAPRNE (Background Information Sheet No. 5), UNRWAPRNE, 23 June 1951, Beirut.

15. Observations on the Nutritional Status of Arab Refugees, February-March 1950, MH 21.050, WHO, Geneva.

16. Nutritional State of the Palestine Refugees in the Spring of 1951, WHO, Geneva.

17. Recommendations for a Venereal Disease Control. Programme for UNRWAPRNE, INT/VD/47, WHO, Geneva.

18. The Venereal Disease Control Programme of UNRWAPRNE, INT/VD/48, WHO, Geneva.

19. Bilharziasis Survey in some Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean Region, EM/BIL/1 May 1951 and Add. 1, July 1951, WHO, Alexandria.

20. Report on the Mission to Arab Refugees in Palestine on behalf of WHO (2-30 December 1950), WHO/Trachoma/10, WHO, Geneva.

21. Report on the Mission accomplished from 26 March 1951 to 15 April 1951 among the Arab Refugees in Palestine on behalf of WHO, WHO/Trachoma/11, WHO, Geneva.

22. The United Nations and the Arab Refugees. Situation as at June 1951, UNRWAPRNE, Beirut.

23. Nursing Report on Visit to Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, EM/NURS/3, WHO,  Alexandria.

Chapter IV

SOCIAL WELFARE

A. GENERAL

176. In the beginning, the welfare programme derived its entire financial support from the sale of empty containers. This was because the original operation was deemed to be an emergency programme of short duration and funds were available only to provide basic food, clothing and shelter for a nine-month period to August 1949. During this time it was hoped that an agreement between Arab and Jew might be reached and the problem resolved. However, when it became clear there was little likelihood of this, the League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS), the International Committee of the Red Cross (CICR), and the American Friends' Service Committee (Quakers), realizing that bread alone was not enough, inaugurated a limited welfare and education programme, financed by the sale of empty relief  supply containers.

177. When UNRWAPRNE began operations on 1 May 1950, welfare became a recognized part of its programme and a special Section was set up to carry on such work within the limited budget possibilities of the Agency. Such funds as were made available were utilized to their fullest extent, but it must be recognized that UNRWAPRNE was designed to provide basic relief and works and that the welfare programme, while a valuable adjunct, was but supplementary to the general purpose.

178. Before considering individually the various aspects of the Welfare programme the table below is given to show the number of refugees with whom this Section is directly concerned, together with the type of habitation. All figures, unless otherwise stipulated,

are as of 30 June 1951.

179. In addition, there are 24 331 refugees in Israel who are drawing rations from the Agency, but to whom we do not give welfare services since such are provided by the  Israel Government.

180. For the fourteen-month period May 1950 through June 1951, the expenditure of the Agency on its welfare programme amounted to some $460 000. This was not enough to permit other desirable phases of welfare activities such as individual case work. It should be emphasized that a great deal of welfare work is done for the refugees by other agencies and by public-spirited groups. There are many voluntary groups with which the Agency co-ordinates its efforts, and it is hoped that this relationship will prosper even more when the strengthened proposed new co-ordination committee for the voluntary agencies is established. The Agency sets great store on the increased participation of voluntary  agencies in its welfare programme.

 1. The Co-ordinating Committee of Voluntary Agencies.

 2. Lebanese Red Cross.

 3. Jordan Red Crescent.

 4. Young Women's Christian Association.

 5. Young Men's Christian Association.

 6. British Save-the-Children Fund.

 7. British-Syrian-Lebanese Mission.

 8. Middle East Relief Inc.

 9. Near East Foundation.

10. Pontifical Mission for Palestine.

11. Church Missionary Society.

12. Anglican Relief.

13. Church of the Nazarene.

14. Mennonite Central Committee.

15. Congregational Christian Service Committee.

16. Church World Service and United Missionary Council.

17. Lutheran World Federation.

18. American Presbyterian Mission.

19. Arab Evangelical Episcopal Community.

20. Sisters of Nazareth.

21. Greek Catholic Church.

22. Greek Orthodox Church.

23. Armenian Church.

24. Arab Women's Union.

25. Civic Welfare League of the American University, Beirut.

26. French University, Beirut.

27. Middle East Union Mission (Seventh Day Adventists).

28. Egyptian Red Crescent.

29. Syrian Red Crescent.

30. Arab Superior Council.

H. DIGEST OF WELFARE EXPENDITURE

1 May 1950 through 30 June 1951.

202. The following is a digest of welfare expenditure according to district:

Chapter V

EDUCATION

A.  THE SITUATION PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNRWAPRNE

203. When, at the end of 1948, the United Nations first began to budget funds for the Palestinian refugees, no provision was made for education in what was expected to be a temporary operation. However, as months went by without bringing any progress towards a peace settlement between the Arab States and Israel, or the repatriation of the refugees, it became clear that something had to be done to continue the education of refugee children.

204. At first, as in the case of welfare matters, the necessary funds were derived chiefly from the sale of empty containers and also from appeals launched overseas, principally by UNESCO, which itself contributed $38 000 in 1949. With these funds, it was possible to establish sixty-one schools in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and in the Gaza area, attended by 33 631 children between the ages of six and fourteen. In addition, the Arab governments, together with private schools in the area, gave whatever help lay in their power. Thus, when UNRWAPRNE took over from UNRPR in May 1950, approximately 40 per cent of the refugee school-age children in Lebanon, 30 per cent in Syria, 20 per cent in Jordan, 30 per cent in Gaza and 15 per cent in Arab Palestine were receiving tuition, under this  improvised emergency programme.

B. THE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMME UNDER UNRWAPRNE

205. When UNRWAPRNE began work, it entered into an agreement with UNESCO for the expansion of the education programme, with UNESCO assuming technical supervision. It was decided to allot a monthly sum of $25 000 from the UNRWAPRNE budget for elementary education, while UNESCO provided $53 000 for the eight remaining months of 1950. These allocations were subsequently increased so that, in the first two quarters of 1951, UNRWAPRNE spent an average of $42 000 monthly on education, including vocational training. Part of this was covered by UNESCO, which set aside $80 850 as its contribution to the  programme of the year.

206. With an established regular budget, UNRWAPRNE and UNESCO, during their first year's operations, were able to effect many improvements, and the problem of extending educational facilities to as many refugee children as possible was tackled with enthusiasm and efficiency. As a result, 10 000 more pupils attended UNRWAPRNE-UNESCO schools in May 1951 than in May 1950. Out of a total of 225 282 refugee children from six to fourteen years old, 93 634 or over 42 per cent are now receiving elementary education in 114 schools (compared with sixty-four at the time of take over by the Agency), plus eighty-four other  schools financially assisted by the Agency.

207. The table on page 27 shows the distribution of Palestine refugee children of school age (six to fourteen) as on 30 June 1951.

208. The percentage of children of school age receiving education varies according to the country, partly because of the facilities available and the degree of dispersion of the refugees, but also because the level of education of the refugee children must be parallel to the standards existing in the host country. This explains why the percentage of children receiving education in June 1951 was 60 per cent in Lebanon, while it was only 32 per cent in Jordan, 49 per cent in the Gaza area, and 50 per cent in Syria. These figures, which may seem inadequate from the western standpoint, compare not unfavourably with the  statistics of host countries.

Distribution of Palestine refugee children

C. CO-OPERATION WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

209. Close co-operation has been established between local educational authorities and the UNRWAPRNE district educational officers. In the Gaza area, government school buildings are shared by local and refugee children, and nineteen teachers appointed by UNRWAPRNE are working in government schools, while one headmaster and two headmistresses appointed by the government are employed in UNRWAPRNE-UNESCO schools.  In Jordan, nineteen Palestinian teachers have been appointed in government schools by UNRWAPRNE, thus making it possible to absorb another 1 500 refugee pupils in these schools. In Lebanon, as many as 15 400 refugee children are being educated by government and private schools. In Syria, the government passes on the qualifications of all UNRWAPRNE teachers and has supplied a head-master and a teacher for the Naireb School in Aleppo. The government school at Mazzeh employs three teachers who are paid by the Agency. In Israel, refugee children attend schools operated by the Government or by foreign religious groups; UNRWAPRNE consequently  has no educational programme here.

D. SYLLABUS

210. The syllabus in the UNRWAPRNE-UNESCO schools is virtually the same as in government schools. Refugee children receive instruction as well in the history and geography of their homeland, and are either taught English or French. Examinations are identical to those in local schools and are supervised by the local educational authorities. This co-ordination of syllabus has meant a considerable capital outlay by the  Agency.

211. In addition, some 2 100 boys are being trained in carpentry, shoemaking, weaving, tinsmithing, agriculture, broom-making, poultry-raising, bookbinding and mechanics. The agriculture classes are perhaps the most important as over half the refugees used to earn their living from the land in Palestine, and will probably have to do so in the countries where they settle.

Technical instruction

(as of June 1951)

E.  SCHOOL EQUIPMENT

212. The emergency schools set up through UNRPR were chiefly conducted in large hospital-tents which had become worn out by the time UNRWAPRNE took over. Little equipment in the way of tables, desks, chairs or stools had been provided. One of the first problems, therefore, was to repair and reinforce the old tents to make them suitable for winter conditions. Mud-brick walls were built, floors were laid, and in some cases new schools were constructed. Costs were kept to a minimum by using voluntary aid, and it is gratifying to note, particularly in the Gaza area and in Jordan, that teachers, pupils and parents gave their services in an operation which they recognized to be for the benefit of the whole refugee community. Most of the equipment was manufactured in workshops run by the Agency to provide employment for the refugees. This had the dual advantage of providing temporary benefit for parents as well as better schools for the children.

F.  TEACHERS' SALARIES AND TRAINING

213. In the former emergency programme, much of the teaching was done either on a voluntary basis, or for such low wages that teachers were less well paid than the cleaners employed in the camps. Classification and proper compensation for these teachers was therefore one of the major responsibilities of the UNESCO representative. Since May 1950, the monthly wage has been raised and is now at a maximum of $42 for headmasters, and $37 for teachers, which approaches local standards, when it is remembered that many of the teachers have access to free shelter in the Agency's camps as well as to free welfare and medical facilities for themselves and their families.

G. HIGHER EDUCATION

214. The question of refugee students needing assistance to finish their studies, particularly in technical branches, has given much concern, There is a shortage of qualified professional young men and women in this region. In December 1950, a grant of $15 000 was made by UNESCO to assist Palestinian university students. Of this, $10 000 was allocated to the American University of Beirut to assist seventy-five students, $3 000 to the University of St. Joseph (Beirut) to assist twenty-six students, and $2 000 to the Syrian University (Damascus) to assist forty-two students. Courses followed by these refugees include medicine, pharmacy, arts, sciences and engineering.

H. CAMPAIGN AGAINST ILLITERACY

215. UNRWAPRNE has participated, in co-operation with the American Mission, Cairo, in a campaign against illiteracy, which was open to persons of all ages. It was begun in Gaza in the late summer of 1950, and later spread to Lebanon and Jordan. The work depends for its success on voluntary efforts, particularly of teachers, and the basic principle is that anyone who learns to read by the Laubach method employed, should immediately begin to  teach others.

216. Up to the end of June 1951, 9 460 men and women had completed the primer (El Murshid), and 1 167 had completed the fourth reader and were thereby considered to be  literate.

217. It is the belief of the education section that the work carried out has served a valuable purpose, not only in providing basic education but in promulgating the ideas of service inherent in the UNESCO concept. It is felt that so long as United Nations assistance for Palestinian refugees continues, the education programme should be part and  parcel of it.

Chapter VI

ECONOMIC AND STATISTICAL SUMMARY

A. Statistics of UNRWAPRNE operations

1.  NUMBER OF REFUGEES REPORTED RECEIVING RATIONS BY DISTRICTS (IN THOUSANDS)

(GRAPH)

A.  Statistics of UNRWAPRNE operations (continued)

(graph)

B. Value of relief goods distributed

(Thousands of dollar equivalents and thousands of national currency units)

C.  Contributions and Expenditures

May 1950 – June 1951

(charts)

D.  Breakdown of expenditures

May 1950 – June 1951

(chart)

E.  Purchasing power of contributions

Quantity of stable refugees' foods bought with one dollar

June 1950 – June 1951

(graph)

F. Value of local purchases

(in thousands of currency units)

(a) Egypt

(b) Jordan

(c)  Lebanon

(d) Syria

1/  Pulses, textiles, soap, medical supplies, and fuel other than for transport.

2/  Via Lebanon.

3/  Of which £L29million were exported to Lebanon under Agency licence and purchased by the Agency with Lebanese pounds.

NOTE : The importing country is defined as the country where distribution actually took place.

H. Costs of Works 1/

Thousands of U. S. dollar equivalents)

____________

1/  Minor works those costing less than $5000 and lately included loans to individual refugees.

2/  Includes $17 760 headquarters funds for reintegration works.

G.  Proportion of refugees to host population

June 1951

(graph)

I. Number of refugees employed on UNRWAPRNE works

(Average per month)

J. Distribution of refugees by occupations

K.  Medical statistics

ATTENDANCES AT CLINICS AND OUT-PATIENTS DEPARTMENTS

(INCLUDING REPEAT VISITS)

K.  Medical statistics (continued)

INCIDENCE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 16 July 1950–15 July 1951

L. Distribution of refugees by district according to their residences

JUNE 1951

M. Educational programme (in conjunction with UNESCO)

NUMBER OF UNRWAPRNE-UNESCO SCHOOLS

NUMBER OF PUPILS ATTENDING UNRWAPRNE-UNESCO SCHOOLS

PAID EDUCATIONAL SUBSIDIES AND TEACHERS' SALARIES (in dollar equivalents)

   1/  End August

N.  Religion of refugees

    As at 30 June 1951

    (graph)

O.  Employment

  (graph)

Chapter VII

FINANCIAL STATEMENT FOR THE PERIOD MAY 1950-30 JUNE 1951

ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AS OF 30 JUNE 1951

 Approved:

INCOME AND EXPENDITURE

DURING THE PERIOD FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS

AS OF 1 MAY 1950 TO 30 JUNE 1951

SCHEDULE A

Contributions received in cash during the period from the commencement

of operation as of 1 May 1950 to 30 June 1951

SCHEDULE B

—-

Note

1/  The numbers in parentheses refer to numbered references on the bibliography at the end of the present chapter, pages 22 and 23.