YEARBOOK
OF THE
UNITED
NATIONS
1968
Volume 22
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
During 1968, the situation in the Middle East continued to be of concern to the United Nations. Its various aspects are dealt with in the sections below under the following categories: (a) the status of the cease-fire between Israel on the one hand and, respectively, Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq on the other hand; (b) questions concerning the treatment of civilian populations in Israel-occupied territories and changes in those territories; (c) the situation in and around Jerusalem and its Holy Places; (d) reports of the Secretary-General on the progress of the efforts of his Special Representative to the Middle East; (e) communications concerning the treatment of Jewish communities in Arab States; and (f) the item on the situation in the Middle East which was before the twenty-third (1968) session of the General Assembly. Other questions bearing on the situation in the Middle East which were considered by the United Nations during 1968 were the "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East" (see pages 278-93) and "Respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories" (see pp. 552-54 and p. 594.)
THE STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE
COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND JORDAN
COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL
(1 JANUARY-11 MARCH 1968)
Between January and mid-February 1968, communications were sent to the Security Council or to the Secretary-General by Jordan and Israel, each complaining of violations of the cease-fire by the other party. Jordan's allegations concerned firing by Israeli forces against Jordanian positions east of the Jordan River, and shelling and bombing of villages and refugee camps. Israel's allegations related to firing by Jordanian forces on Israeli positions, shelling of Israeli villages, and acts of hostility and sabotage raids carried out against Israeli villages by persons coming from Jordan who, Israel alleged, acted with the knowledge and connivance of Jordanian authorities and armed forces. In most cases, casualties were alleged and the parties denied opening fire, stating that fire was returned in self-defence.
On 15 February, Israel complained of long and heavy shelling of Israeli villages by Jordanian artillery; its letter stated that recent Jordanian armed attacks and raids had assumed the character of a premeditated campaign of aggression directed against the civilian population. Jordan replied that Israel had submitted false charges to camouflage preparations for an in- discriminate act of aggression: a seven-hour shelling and air bombing by Israeli forces of numerous villages and the Karameh refugee camp on the East Bank of Jordan which resulted in 56 soldiers and civilians killed and 82 seriously injured.
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL
DURING PERIOD 18 -25 MARCH 1968
In two letters to the Security Council dated 18 March, Israel charged Jordan with responsibility for a series of cease-fire violations and acts of terrorism and sabotage carried out between 4 and 18 March by armed infiltrators increasingly assisted by covering fire from Jordan. The second letter emphasized the strain on the structure of the cease-fire and Israel's duty to take all necessary measures for the security of the territory and population under its jurisdiction.
Jordan informed the Security Council on 19 March that Israeli authorities were contemplating a mass armed attack against the East Bank of Jordan; on 20 March, it rejected Israel's charges as groundless and fabricated to mask Israel's aggressive designs.
On 21 March, the Jordanian representative charged that Israel had on that morning launched a mass attack and he requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council. On the same day, the representative of Israel also requested an urgent meeting of the Council to deal with what he described as the continuous acts of aggression and violations of the cease-fire by Jordan. Referring to information received about an impending increased campaign of raids and sabotage from Jordan, the letter went on to say that Israeli forces had been compelled to take preventive measures that morning against raider training centres and staging bases located on the East Bank of the Jordan River.
In a report submitted on 21 March, the Secretary-General said that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) had that morning appealed to Israel and Jordan to observe the cease-fire and suspend all military activities in the area. The report pointed out that information indicating recently increasing tension in the Israel-Jordan sector relating to terrorist activities on the Israel side and threats of retaliatory action by Israel could unfortunately not be verified because no United Nations observers were deployed there. An initiative by the senior Jordanian delegate to the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission to meet urgently on 20 March with the Israel Defence Forces liaison officer, under United Nations auspices, had been rejected by Israel, a rejection, which, in the circumstances, the Secretary-General thought unnecessarily negative and rigid.
A second report of the Secretary-General indicated Israel's acceptance of the cease-fire on condition of reciprocity and cited Jordan's statement that it would respond positively once Israel withdrew its forces from the East Bank and ceased firing.
The Security Council met from 21 to 24 March 1968 to consider the Jordanian and Israeli letters of 21 March and invited the representatives of Iraq, Morocco, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic to participate in the discussion.
The representative of Jordan said that for six months his Government had, with restraint and patience, not sought a remedy from the Security Council for Israel's cease-fire violations and illegal acts in the occupied territories, not wishing to disturb the mission of Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General under the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, 1/ and heeding the appeals of its friends. The present premeditated attack, Jordan charged, was larger than the usual retaliatory raid and had been directed against civilians and refugees at the Karameh camp near the cease-fire area. Both civilian and military casualties were numerous and damage heavy. If the Security Council did not condemn the Israeli aggression and invoke sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 2/ its resolutions would become meaningless and thus encourage Israel's defiance. In that connexion, the representative of Jordan recalled that in the Security Council's resolution 228 of 25 November 1966, 3/ censuring Israel's attack on the Jordanian village of Es-Samu, the Council had emphasized that actions of military reprisal could not be tolerated; if they were to be repeated, the Security Council would have to consider more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter.
As to the Israeli complaint, the Jordanian representative observed that it was nothing but an attempt to divert the Security Council from the real issue to what he called irrelevant and fabricated allegations. Jordan, he said, had no responsibility for the events Israel alleged were taking place in Arab areas presently under military occupation. Resistance to aggression and foreign domination on the West Bank, in Gaza and in Syria was, he said, a natural, normal reaction. The people of Karameh had resisted the invaders. The claim that Karameh was a terrorist base was only an attempt to justify the killing of every young man there on the allegation that he was a member of El-Fatah.
Commenting on the suggestion of having observers on the cease-fire line, the representative of Jordan declared that there was no cease-fire line; there were cease-fire resolutions and a cease-fire area. His Government welcomed the stationing of observers on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line–the only line recognized by the United Nations–and wanted the Armistice Agreement fully activated. It did not support anything new which would freeze the so-called cease-fire line and enable Israel to consolidate the fruits of its aggression and its programme for new expansion. Pressure must be put on Israel to withdraw to the 5 June 1967 line by members of the Council morally responsible for the behaviour of a defiant Zionist State which it had been wrong to create. As to Israel's idea of negotiations, he declared that one never negotiated at the point of a gun.
The Israeli representative said that the Arab States were continuing their 20-year war against Israel through terror, sabotage, blockade and boycott, despite United Nations decisions calling for a permanent peace, Armistice Agreements designed to lead to a final settlement, Charter obligations and the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 prohibiting the exercise of belligerency. Time and again, he said, a veto had paralysed the Council when Israel had appealed for action and assistance to preserve peace. In recent months, he said, Israel had informed the Security Council of numerous hostile acts directed against Israel from Jordan. In Israel's Parliament, the Knesset, the Prime Minister of Israel had stated on 21 March 1968 that in recent months terrorist training bases had been concentrated in Jordan near the cease-fire line with the knowledge of the authorities. Faced with authoritative information that indicated a new wave of terror was impending, Israel had had no choice but to act in self-defence and destroy those camps. Israel, the Prime Minister's statement continued, had respected, and would continue to abide by, the cease-fire agreement but demanded that Jordan do the same: the cease-fire obliged not only abstention from any military activities by regular armies, but also prevention of any acts of aggression and terrorism by any faction within the territory of those States which had agreed to the cease-fire.
Karameh, the Israeli representative continued, had been found to be a huge base fully armed and under the complete control of the terrorists under their leader Yassir Arafat.
In conclusion, he urged that the Security Council condemn warfare by any means and call on Jordan to put an end to the campaign of murder and sabotage staged from its territory and to move forward on the path to a permanent peace, negotiated and contractually ratified by the States concerned. The Council could not remain silent when the Arab States, Members of the United Nations, were waging an illegal, aggressive war against Israel, another Member State.
The United States representative said that his Government opposed violence in the Middle East, regardless of the direction from which it came. It opposed military actions in violation of the Council's cease-fire resolutions, opposed acts of terrorism which were in violation of the cease-fire and deplored military counter-actions, such as the current one by Israel, which was on a scale out of proportion to the acts of violence that preceded it. The rules applicable to the cease-fire resolutions of 1967 were those decided upon by the Security Council in its resolution of 19 August 1948 (56 (1948)) 4/–when it declared that each party had the obligation to prevent truce violations either by individuals or groups subject to its authority or in the territory under its control, and that no party was permitted to violate the truce on the ground of reprisals or retaliation against the other party.
No one faithful to these principles could view with equanimity the acts of terrorism which had taken place, the United States representative continued. But large-scale military actions across cease-fire lines were not the answer; they only brought deeper insecurity. One peaceful means of ending the provocation was available: it was vitally necessary, in the light of developments, to strengthen the United Nations role in the Israel-Jordan sector where the absence of observers handicapped the task of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and the Secretary-General in observing and supervising the cease-fire.
He went on to say that not only must the parties scrupulously comply with the cease-fire arrangements but they must rededicate themselves to the principles of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 and co-operate with the Secretary-General's Special Representative. The United States, he said, was gravely concerned with the peril which recent events had created for the all-important peacemaking process set in motion by that resolution of the Council, with the objective of a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area could live in security.
Replying to criticism by the USSR representative that the United States had not been evenhanded regarding problems in the Middle East, the United States representative contrasted the veto by the USSR on 4 November 1966 of a draft resolution inviting Syria to strengthen its measures for preventing terrorist incidents 5/ with the firm support of the United States on 25 November 1966 for a far more drastic resolution deploring a large-scale military action by Israel. 6/ The United States, he said, had consistently sought good relations with all the States of the Near East and the records of the Security Council disclosed its policy as clear, explicit and evenhanded throughout. His Government favoured the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area; it did not favour the return to a state of belligerency, uncertain boundaries or hostilities. It had used, and would continue to use, its full political influence in support of Mr. Jarring's mission and of the Council's entire resolution of 22 November 1967 7/ with all its interdependent principles. If the USSR would truly use its political influence in the direction of a just and lasting peace in the area and similarly support that resolution, it could make a major contribution and Mr. Jarring would have the support he needed.
The representative of the United Kingdom declared that the Council's first demands must be for an end to all violence, which only bred violence, and a return to the cease-fire. His Government deplored the acts of violence preceding the Israeli attack, as well as that deliberate breach of the cease-fire, and agreed with other Council members who had condemned the practice of retaliation. The United Kingdom especially deplored resort to violence which put in jeopardy the patient work of Mr. Jarring. The Security Council must stand by its 22 November resolution–the whole resolution–which had been accepted by everyone chiefly concerned. His Government, he said, was convinced that no other course offered hope of the secure settlement and permanent peace desired. The events since November made it all the more necessary to support the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative and to insist that the framework for a settlement be respected and carried out completely.
The representatives of Brazil, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay deplored the large-scale military action by Israel which followed a mounting number of incidents in the Israel-Jordan sector. The Council must oppose such violence and the resort to force and insist upon complete compliance with the cease-fire resolutions. Their violation seriously endangered the task undertaken by the Secretary-General's Special Representative. The Council must support the 22 November 1967 resolution and call upon the parties concerned to co-operate with Mr. Jarring.
Brazil, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay–and also China–expressed support for endeavours by the Secretary-General to establish United Nations supervision in the area. The representative of Canada also appealed to Israel and Jordan to facilitate the assignment by the Secretary-General of United Nations observers to supervise the cease-fire in the Israel-Jordan sector. The Council, he said, was undoubtedly placed at a disadvantage by the absence of an impartial source of information which only such observers could provide.
The Ethiopian representative said that the military reprisal undertaken by Israel could not even be justified by what Israel described as measures to avert terrorist activities allegedly committed by armed bands organized on the Jordanian side of the Armistice position. While recognizing the need for strict observance of all cease-fire provisions and for the avoidance of hostile acts on all sides, he maintained that none the less military reprisals could not be tolerated, as the Council had already emphasized. The way to lasting peace lay in the acceptance of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 and the unreserved co-operation with Mr. Jarring of all the parties concerned.
The representative of China also felt that the mass attack launched by Israel in the name of retaliation called for censure, stating that no Government, even under extreme provocation, was justified in taking the law into its own hands.
The spokesman for France said that the fact that Israel's ground and air operation, directed especially against the refugee camp of Karameh, had been pictured as a reprisal in no way diminished Israel's responsibility. The action was surely out of proportion to the events supposedly preceding it. Moreover, the very idea of reprisals had never seemed acceptable to his Government. So-called acts of terrorism were the almost inevitable consequence of military occupation. The Security Council was duty-bound to condemn the military operation, call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories and demand prompt and full compliance with the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967.
The Indian representative declared that the latest action of the Israeli authorities was in utter defiance of the Security Council's resolution 236 of 11 June 1967 8/ which prohibited any forward military movement subsequent to the cease-fire. That attack could not be justified on any ground. The Council must not only order an immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Israeli forces from across the Jordan but demand that Israel desist from such actions in the future. His Government had always held that the Council could not expect the return of peace and security to the area without the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from occupied Arab lands. That principle had been clearly recognized in the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. Without its full implementation–towards which no progress had been made despite the patient efforts of Mr. Jarring–there could be no hope of laying the foundation of lasting peace.
The USSR representative said that Israel, as in the past, was trying to justify its aggression and its violation of Security Council decisions as an act of reprisal. On four previous occasions, the Council had condemned Israel for such so-called reprisals. The aggressive acts and administrative measures of Israel clearly proved that its policy was designed to annex the Arab territories it had occupied in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and to resist the clearing of the Suez Canal. The statements by Israel showed that Tel Aviv had no intention of renouncing its provocative policy. Recent events showed that Israel, in pursuing its aggressive line, relied primarily on the political, economic, military and diplomatic assistance of the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western powers.
He went on to say that the so-called evenhanded approach of those countries amounted to an attempt to justify aggression and to prevent an unconditional condemnation of Israel, which bore complete responsibility for the new attack and for the delay in implementing the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. The Arab Governments had, he continued, officially informed the United Nations of their readiness to comply with that resolution and to co-operate with Mr. Jarring. Israel, however, had made no such categorical statement. The United States should exert influence on Israel so that Israel officially declared that it recognized and was ready to implement the resolution and withdraw its troops from all occupied Arab territories.
In reply to a question from the United States representative, the USSR representative said that his Government had voted for all parts of the 22 November resolution and consequently recognized all its parts. The most important prerequisite for a political settlement, as his Government had repeatedly stated, continued to be the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied territories to positions held before 5 June 1967. Quoting from a USSR statement issued on 22 March 1968, he said that as long as Israel's leaders, with support from outside, adhered to the position of annexing Arab territories, the USSR and other countries which were friends of Arab States would help the victims of aggression in accordance with their duty under the Charter.
With regard to United Nations observers in the Israel-Jordan sector, the representative of the USSR expressed serious doubts about the value of sending them there, since their presence in the Suez Canal Zone had not prevented Israel from committing acts of military provocation and aggression. Moreover, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report of 21 March 1968, Israel had refused to meet with representatives of Jordan in the presence of the United Nations.
The Security Council, he concluded, should categorically condemn Israel's latest act of aggression and, if Israel again disregarded decisions of the Council, should apply sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 9/
Hungary's representative said that the Security Council had the duty to condemn the latest Israeli aggression against Jordan. The United Nations Charter forbade preventive wars and the resistance of the Jordanians against the invaders of their homeland was lawful and in full conformity with the Charter. To eliminate all consequences of the Israeli aggression the Council should achieve full implementation of the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 with which Israel, unlike the Arab States, had refused to comply.
The representative of Algeria said that the situation created by the Israeli forces was a direct continuation of Israel's behaviour of 5 June 1967 and dovetailed with an over-all policy of continuing provocations and aggression. Israel's war upon the Arab States was a manifestation of a colonial type of policy, which led to the eviction of a people from their homeland. The crux of the problem was still the desire of the Palestinians to recover their rights. In carrying out its aggressive policies, he continued, Israel had benefited from the support of certain capitals and Zionist organizations. The imperialist concept of reprisals could not be tolerated; what some called terrorism was in fact the strengthening of Arab resistance movements against enemy occupation.
Pakistan called for Council condemnation of Israel's premeditated aggression, as did Algeria. Pakistan's representative emphasized that as long as Israeli forces were not withdrawn from the occupied territories, a resistance movement, marked by terrorism, would inevitably grow. The doctrine of the right of reprisal, again asserted by Israel, had been regarded by the Security Council as intolerable.
The representative of Iraq said that the massive Israeli attack was the culmination of Israel's policy of eventually annexing the occupied Arab territory and of preventing the success of the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. In the delicately balanced Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, 10/ Mr. Jarring had been entrusted with the main responsibility for trying to settle the problem peacefully. That resolution had deliberately not provided for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab States, as the Israeli Government tried to interpret it, because there was no possibility of the Arab side accepting such negotiations while their territories were under military occupation.
The people of Palestine, he went on, were no different from other peoples which had fought against foreign occupation and repressive military acts. The country of Palestine alone in the world had been denied the right of self-determination. There was no Government in the Arab world that was able or willing to prevent the activities of the freedom fighters, as the Arabs called them, or terrorists as Israel called them. Their activities could not be considered as violations of the cease-fire resolution which was directed to Governments, not to individuals acting without the instigation of any Government. Only the action of the Israeli armed forces could be considered a cease-fire violation.
The Security Council, he concluded, should condemn that act of aggression and, under Chapter VII of the Charter, should take enforcement and punitive measures, including sanctions, against Israel.
The representative of the United Arab Republic said that Israel's act of reprisal would aggravate the situation caused by its occupation of Arab territories and its continuing policy of repression against their inhabitants. Those Arab peoples, he asserted, were entitled, the same as all other oppressed peoples, to struggle in a resistance movement to liberate their land. To condemn Israel for another gross violation of the cease-fire resolution, a military reprisal in defiance of previous Council resolutions, would not be adequate; the Council must now discharge its responsibilities and consider and apply the further steps, envisaged in Articles 41 and 42 11/ of Chapter VII of the Charter, which the Council had referred to in its resolution of 25 November 1966 12/ in connexion with any repetition of acts of military reprisal.
The Syrian representative said that the latest Israeli aggression was a continuation of what the Israelis had been perpetrating against the Arabs under the yoke of their domination and in violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It was also part of Israel's unceasing quest for lebensraum and a consolidation of its conquests. If the word "terrorist" were used to describe the Arab people of Palestine, who had become a nation in exile as the result of Israeli terrorism, or the Arabs under the yoke of Israeli occupation, that description contradicted references to the Arab refugees by the Secretary-General as a people who had a natural right to be in their homeland, as well as references in many United Nations resolutions which reaffirmed that right. The Arabs of Palestine, the Syrian representative added, were still the legal owners of their stolen lands and property and had never ceded their inalienable rights or accepted the colonial conquest as a fait accompli. The freedom fighters who were resisting the Israeli occupation were doing what ought to be done.
In reply to the Israeli representative's remarks about Syria's non-acceptance of the cease-fire resolution and its belligerence, he cited statements to show Israel's belligerence. Regarding Israel's appeals for peace, he declared that one could not force peace by occupying someone's house and then asking him to submit to one's own terms.
Morocco's representative observed that Israel, described by its representative as daily struggling for survival, had in 20 years become stronger and more consolidated–had become a power, a colonizer, an imperialist, at the expense of the wrongfully expelled Palestinians and shielded by the United Nations. As for the cease-fire resolution of 1967, the Arab side had agreed to it immediately, while Israel had not only rejected it until it had achieved its aims but from then onward Israel's actions to annex the conquered territories had constantly increased. Israel had also sabotaged Mr. Jarring's entire effort. The 22 November 1967 resolution must be imposed on those to whom it was addressed. The Security Council must condemn Israel. Israel's military actions must not be compared with the actions of those who, in the light of illegal aggression, could only take the legal action of liberation. The Council must stand up to its obligations and responsibilities.
Saudi Arabia said that the so-called terrorists were Palestine freedom fighters trying to regain their homeland. It was the Palestinian people, not the Arab States, who had a dispute with Israel which had usurped their land. As long as the Palestinian people were not taken into consideration, every arrangement or treaty that might be worked out by third parties would boomerang.
Replying to Arab speakers, the Israeli representative said that the statement by the representative of the United Arab Republic had made it clear that the United Arab Republic Government would not alter its policies and was, in fact, suggesting that the Security Council sanction the continued belligerency of the Arab States and their defiance of the United Nations Charter. No Government, the Israeli representative said, was more responsible for the events of June 1967. Syria, he added, had rejected the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, had refused to receive Mr. Jarring and had had no qualms about proclaiming that it would continue to wage war on Israel.
The representative of Iraq, he continued, had carefully avoided reference to Iraq's joining the June 1967 fighting and not accepting the cease-fire called for by the Council. Iraqi forces remained in Jordan assisting the marauder units.
It was not by accident, he declared, that these Arab States had joined hands in the complaint about Israel's defensive action against terrorist raids. The thesis that such acts of aggression were not violations of the cease-fire had been used to justify war against Israel during the truce, under the Armistice and now under the cease-fire. That thesis had brought renewal of hostilities in 1956 and 1967. It was an attempt to gain unanimity for the continuation of war, terror and murder.
In reply to a challenge by Jordan that he state Israel's acceptance of and agreement to implement the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, the representative of Israel replied that his Government accepted the basic goal of that resolution: to establish a just and lasting peace by agreement, together with Jordan.
Algeria, the representative of Israel added, persisted in its rejection of the cease-fire.
On 23 March 1968, India, Pakistan and Senegal submitted a draft resolution by which the Security Council would: (1) condemn the military action launched by Israel on 21 March 1968 in flagrant violation of the Charter and of the cease-fire resolutions; (2) warn Israel that military reprisals could not be tolerated, and that the Council would have to consider such measures as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against any repetition; (3) call upon Israel to desist from acts or activities in contravention of the Council's resolution of 14 June 1967; 13/ and (4) request the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review and report to the Council as appropriate.
On 24 March, the President of the Council submitted the text of a draft resolution resulting from negotiations among the Council's members. This was adopted unanimously later the same day as resolution 248 (1968).
By the preambular part of the resolution, the Security Council recalled its resolution 236 of 11 June 1967, condemning violations of the cease-fire; 14/ observed that the military action by the armed forces of Israel on Jordanian territory was of a large-scale and carefully planned nature; and recalled its resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 which called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of inhabitants of areas where military operations had taken place. (These provisions were also in the three-power draft resolution submitted on 23 March.) The text adopted by the Council added a paragraph by which the Council stated the view that all violent incidents and other cease-fire violations should be prevented, not overlooking past incidents of this nature.
By the operative part of the text submitted by the President of the Council, the Council: (1) deplored the loss of life and heavy damage to property; (2) condemned the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and cease-fire resolutions; (3) deplored all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire and declared that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire could not be tolerated, and that the Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts; (4) called upon Israel to desist from acts or activities in contravention of the Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967; and (5) requested the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review and to report to the Security Council as appropriate. (For full text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)
Explanations of vote followed adoption of the resolution. The representatives of Brazil, Canada, Denmark, the United Kingdom and the United States indicated that they had supported the resolution because it took into account all types of violence in violation of the cease-fire.
The USSR representative said that the Council's decision to condemn Israel's newest aggression and to warn the aggressor against similar acts was the very minimum of what the Council should have done. By his one-sided interpretation of the resolution, the United States representative was trying to place the aggressor and the victim of aggression on the same footing.
The spokesman for Hungary said that the resolution was not complete: due reparation to the victims of the aggression should have been included. The civilian populations in the occupied areas, he asserted, had every right to fight for freedom and independence against the oppressors.
The French representative said that his delegation had voted for the resolution because, although asking for a strict cease-fire, the resolution did not try to put on the same footing deliberate government military operations and acts by individuals inspired by quite obvious feelings.
The representative of Pakistan stated that the sponsors of the three-power draft resolution had not pressed it to a vote in the interest of unanimity. His delegation had voted with sorrow for the resolution which, while condemning the attack, did not ask for reparations. He went on to note that the resolution did not in any way imply that the sporadic acts of terrorism alleged by Israel were to be equated with Israel's large-scale military attack. Such military reprisals could not be tolerated by the Council, said the representative of Pakistan.
The Algerian representative said his delegation rejected any interpretation of the resolution aimed at putting the stamp of legitimacy on reprisals and at denying the legitimate right of the freedom fighters to fight against the occupation.
The representatives of Iraq, Morocco and Saudi Arabia declared, in varying terms, that the resolution did not equate the planned Israeli reprisal action with the legitimate activities of self-defence undertaken by the people of Palestine against the occupiers of their homeland.
The representative of Israel said that any resolution which did not censure terrorist activities would have been most unfortunate. Israel, he declared, could not accept the condemnation of the military action which its forces had been compelled to undertake in self-defence against terrorist bases on Jordanian territory. Israel would abide by its obligations under the cease-fire; however, the cease-fire could exist only on the basis of full reciprocity. If the cease-fire were violated in any way, Israel would maintain its right and duty to take all necessary measures for the security of the territory and the population under its responsibility.
The representative of Jordan expressed satisfaction with the unanimous adoption of the resolution which had established no link between Israel's aggression and its allegations concerning terrorist incidents. But in his view, the Security Council had not gone far enough. The nature and scale of the attack should have led to sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII 15/ of the Charter, all the more so since Israel had now been condemned by the Council seven times. The representative of Jordan hoped that this resolution would be the final warning before
Chapter VII was invoked.
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL
DURING PERIOD 27 MARCH-6 MAY 1968
In a letter dated 27 March 1968, Jordan drew the attention of the Security Council to a speech on 26 March by the Prime Minister of Israel containing, it was stated, new threats against Jordan and allegations intended to pave the way for future justification of a new Israeli attack. The letter stated that Jordan denied any connexion with alleged incidents in Israel-occupied Arab territory or responsibility for the security of the occupying forces. The cause of the alleged incidents was the Arab population's refusal to accept foreign military occupation.
In three letters dated 29 March 1968, Israel stated that a trailer had been blown up by a mine in the Jordan valley at 0800 hours, killing four Israeli farmers, and that Jordanian army positions had at 1130 hours opened a large-scale, prolonged attack upon Israeli villages in the upper Jordan valley; firing had been returned and aircraft used to silence Jordanian artillery positions.
In two letters, also dated 29 March, Jordan stated that Israeli forces had opened fire at 1130 hours against Jordanian positions, and aircraft had bombed Jordanian villages, in defiance of the Security Council's resolution of 24 March 1968. The second letter requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the serious situation resulting from this renewed aggression. On the same date, Israel, referring to its earlier three letters dated 29 March, also requested an urgent meeting of the Council.
The Council considered the Jordanian and Israeli communications at four meetings held between 30 March and 4 April 1968. In addition to the Jordanian and Israeli representatives, the representatives of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United Arab Republic were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion.
When the Council met on 30 March, it had before it supplemental information from the Secretary-General. In view of his responsibilities under the Council's resolution 248 of 24 March 1968 (see above), the Secretary-General particularly regretted his inability to submit a helpful report on the fighting of 29 March 1968 since there were, as he had previously pointed out to the Council, no United Nations observers stationed in the Israel-Jordan sector.
The Secretary-General observed that the mere presence of United Nations observers in an area could act as a deterrent to military activity and noted that, largely because of their presence, the cease-fire resolutions were better maintained in the Suez Canal and Israel-Syria sectors.
The representative of Jordan stated that on 29 March 1968 the Israeli forces had, without provocation, heavily shelled and bombed Jordanian positions and frontier villages in the northern part of the East Bank of Jordan. Jordan's actions had been confined to defensive measures. In thus attacking Jordan's most productive agricultural area and its irrigation facilities, Israel's aim was to deprive the inhabitants of their only livelihood, to terrorize and force them to move east, creating a new vacuum for Israel's aggressive designs. Israel's Minister for Tourism had threatened that next time the attack would be wider in scope. The merciless attacks had been preceded by a conference of the chiefs of Israeli Defence Ministry missions in Europe to discuss the 1968 armament programme. The Security Council must call for an immediate halt to any arms shipment to Israel. Member States arming Israel assumed a heavy responsibility by encouraging Israeli aggression. The Council's solemn warning to Israel last week against violations of the cease-fire had not been enough; the only way to stop Israeli aggression was by invoking Chapter VII of the Charter.
As for Israel's pretext for its aggression–support from Jordan for the so-called terrorists–the Jordanian representative said that Jordan was not responsible for the Israeli security dilemma posed by the resistance struggle of the Palestinian people. The only answer to that legitimate struggle was complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. Further delay by the Council in bringing about that withdrawal would result in intensification of the resistance movement. Occupation called for resistance. Conquest called for liberation.
The representative of Israel said that his Government's misgivings about the Council's resolution of 24 March 1968 (see above), had been confirmed by the Jordanian Foreign Minister's declaration the next day that the resolution's paragraph on cease-fire violations did not concern Jordan. Aggression by Jordan had continued, he asserted, in a series of incidents between 22 March and 3 April 1968. The only way to silence the concentrated artillery attack on the heavily populated Beit Shean area had been by bombing.
He went on to say that Jordan still proclaimed that it was at war with Israel. If Israel were not to take military security measures in self-defence, Jordan must cease to wage and encourage aggression by terror organizations operating from its territory with its support. The Arab States, which were bound by their obligations under the cease-fire, were not free to evade responsibility for the activities of raiders being trained in their territories. By the decision of Arab Governments, the 20-year Arab war of aggression against Israel was being continued by raid, terror and sabotage, the method relied upon to prepare the ground for resumption of full-scale military activities.
The Israeli representative directed attention to pronouncements and activities in Iraq, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic emphasizing the official military character of the terrorist war machine and its activities. He hoped that the Council realized that in the outcome of this debate the forces of war in the area would either see further encouragement, as they did after the Council had failed Israel on 24 March, or find in it a clear warning not to persist in their acts of aggression in violation of the cease-fire.
The United States representative said he wished to reaffirm that his Government opposed violence in the Middle East from wherever it came and whatever its form. It opposed military actions as well as acts of terrorism in violation of the cease-fire. Neither side could find security in violence. The Council's 24 March resolution had been grossly violated and Mr. Jarring's peacemaking work imperilled. The Council was handicapped in evaluating the very different accounts of the parties by the absence of impartial observers. Clearly the first step required was to heed the advice of the Secretary-General and station United Nations observers in the Israel-Jordan cease-fire sector. Although neither party welcomed this type of initiative, the Council ought to take an action which in no way prejudiced the positions of the parties on fundamental issues.
The representative of the United Kingdom emphasized the futility of violence and the need for the Council to try to ensure an effective cease-fire. The framework of a settlement having been laid down, political action was more urgent than ever. The parties must state their full acceptance of the whole of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 16/ with the consequent obligations of carrying it out in full and co-operating with Mr. Jarring.
The representatives of Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, France and Paraguay expressed, in varying terms, their grave concern over aggravation of an explosive situation by renewed violence in violation of the Council's resolution of 24 March 1968. The Council, by that resolution, adopted only five days previously, had deplored all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire. The Council could not condone such actions and must ensure respect for its cease-fire resolutions. Such violence impeded the progress of Mr. Jarring's delicate peacemaking mission. It was essential for all Council members to support Mr. Jarring and reiterate their confidence in the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, and for all parties to co-operate with Mr. Jarring on the basis of acceptance of that resolution as a whole.
Given the eruption of violence, the conflicting evidence and the reasonable observations in the Secretary-General's report, all these representatives supported action by the Council to arrange, with the co-operation of the parties, the stationing of observers or mobile units in the Israel-Jordan sector to provide impartial reports and to deter a recurrence of violence. The French representative emphasized that it could not be a question of taking action which might in any way appear to be condoning conquest or military occupation, or as fixing the positions at which the adversaries found themselves at the time of the cease-fire.
The representatives of India and Pakistan, noting the renewal of violence, said that as long as Israel refused to withdraw from the occupied territories, serious tensions would continue and the Arabs would continue to resist the occupation. Israel must accept and implement without further delay the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, and the parties must co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in his task of bringing about its implementation. As for the presence of observers in the Israel-Jordan sector, the representative of Pakistan stressed that the machinery of the United Nations should not be so exploited as to lead to the insidious transformation of an occupation into de facto annexation of conquered territory.
The USSR representative said that the Security Council was faced with the fact that Israel, in disregard of repeated Council decisions on a cease-fire and on the liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression, was continuing its policy of armed aggression. Therefore, the Council must of necessity take more effective measures, as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter and in the Council's resolution of 24 March 1968. If the Council decided on sanctions to halt Israel's aggression, his Government would be ready to take part in their implementation.
The spokesman for Hungary said that Israel's most recent attack was an expression of its policy of conquest and oppressive occupation. The Council should call on supporters of Israel to cease their assistance to the aggressor, should not condone stabilization of the occupation of foreign territories and should recognize the right of the Arab peoples to self-defence. It should not tolerate Israel's contemptuous refusal to implement the Council's resolutions of 22 November 1967 and 24 March 1968, in clear violation of Article 25 of the Charter, 17/ but should impose the strongest sanctions.
The Algerian representative said that the Israeli policy of massive military reprisals had been resumed to meet the resistance of the population of the occupied zones. Certain explanations of vote after the adoption of the Council's resolution of 24 March 1968 had encouraged Israel. The substance of the Middle East problem, he said, was the existence of the Palestinian nation in full integrity and sovereignty. It was high time for the Council to concern itself with the problem posed by the usurpation of Palestine; a solution of that problem was the only way to end the aggression and create conditions for a stable peace.
The Council, the Algerian representative added, must aim at ending the repressive occupation, stress the legitimate nature of the struggle for liberation and ensure respect for its resolution of 24 March 1968.
The Syrian representative said that the continuous attacks on Jordan under the pretext of stopping infiltration, and the large concentration of troops on Syrian borders and in Sinai, were proof of Israel's aggressive expansionist designs and military planning. The threat by the Security Council to take effective measures had not deterred Israel from repeating its ever wider acts of aggression. The Council would fail in its responsibility if it did not halt the aggressor and uphold the right of the victim. The right of the Palestinian people to resist liquidation of their rights, and the right of every Arab under Israeli occupation to resist annexation and occupation, was a natural right recognized by the Charter and scores of United Nations resolutions on colonialism. Exercise of that right was an act of honour, not an act of sabotage and terrorism.
The spokesman for Iraq said that there was one central issue before the Council: would Israel be allowed to solidify its occupation and thus realize its avowed aim of annexing the occupied Arab territories? There was virtual unanimity on the principle that territorial conquest by military force was inadmissible under the Charter and therefore on the necessity for complete Israeli withdrawal. Besides flatly rejecting the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, Israel had completely disregarded resolutions on Jerusalem, the refugees and the application of the Geneva Conventions to occupied territories and had unilaterally denounced the Armistice Agreement. All the problems besetting the area were the result of the onslaught of Zionism against the people of Palestine–a classic example of a racist settler regime, which wanted to establish in Palestine an exclusively Jewish society. Such an aim was bound to be opposed by the Arabs of Palestine who would never submit. Iraq was proud to help the freedom fighters in their legitimate struggle against the alien occupation of their country. The Council, he stressed, must take enforcement measures against the aggressor. Nothing would be settled and nothing would endure until and unless the consequences and implications of Israeli aggression were recognized and fearlessly dealt with.
The United Arab Republic said that the Israeli authorities, hiding behind an alleged right of self-defence against so-called terrorist activities, were trying to intimidate the Arabs and to justify their persistent policy of expansion. Direct and indirect attempts had been made to vilify the endeavours of the national liberation movement in the occupied territories. The crux of the problem was the continued occupation of the territories by Israel in defiance of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. The Council should make clear that Israel's refusal to withdraw constituted a threat to international peace and security and should apply enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.
The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the argument had proceeded on the assumption of a dispute between Jordan and Israel, whereas the problem was due to a conflict between political Zionism and the people of Palestine and their Arab neighbours. The Palestinians were pursuing their struggle to regain their homeland. The United Nations had erred in 1947 in establishing Israel under pressure and in ignoring self-determination. Council discussions were becoming purely academic. He hoped that the United States and the USSR would issue an ultimatum to the aggressors to withdraw; otherwise the situation would continue.
In exercise of the right of reply, the Jordanian representative said that the Security Council had not adopted anything more than a cease-fire resolution. A cease-fire did not mean peace, peace with occupation, coexistence with aggression. As for the argument that because there were no observers at the time of the Israeli attack, the Security Council was not in a position to make any determination, there was ample evidence to convict Israel–for instance, the open admission of Israel's Defence Minister. To make out of the Israeli crime a call for observers in the Israel-Jordan cease-fire sector was not helpful because it amounted to diversion. If, after having given Jordan's complaint an effective remedy under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council saw fit to deal with the question of observers, it should take action that was not in conflict with existing arrangements concerning peace-keeping in the area–namely, the Armistice machinery. To do otherwise would be to weaken the Council's own resolution of 22 November 1967, which, by calling for "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict," recognized the machinery existing before 5 June and the Demarcation Line of the Armistice Agreement. That Agreement, as the Secretary-General had said, was still valid, and no one–neither Israel nor Jordan–had a veto for its revocation. Jordan, he said, rejected as illegal attempts to create a new machinery and establish a new so-called line and cease-fire agreement. The Secretary-General could not submit a helpful report because the Israelis would not permit the stationing of observers within the occupied territories. The immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops would reactivate the only valid machinery in the area, the Armistice machinery; then the observers could function effectively on the Armistice Demarcation Line.
Exercising his right of reply, the representative of Israel said that the Algerian Government had made clear that it was at war with Israel and did not accept the cease-fire obligation. Commenting on the statements of the representatives of Iraq and the United Arab Republic, he said that those two countries refused to make peace with Israel. They promised to make war against it by murder and sabotage despite their obligations under the Charter, despite Security Council decisions. The Israeli representative also referred to the tragic situation of the Jews in Iraq.
He went on to say that if there were a State in the Middle East whose actions symbolized above those of all others a perverse inhumanity, it was Syria. Moreover, the Jewish communities of Syria lived in oppression and suffering, many of them in prison and concentration camps. Only when the Arab States changed their attitude towards Israel, only when they agreed to peace, to negotiations, to recognition, would the Middle East conflict find a solution, and hope and happiness come to all nations of the area.
The representatives of Syria and Iraq, exercising the right of reply, denied the allegations of the representative of Israel about the treatment of the Jewish communities in Syria and Iraq.
The Israeli representative said that, as the discussion proceeded, Arab armed attacks and incursions continued, and warlike pronouncements were made daily in Arab capitals. He stressed the urgency of measures that the Jordanian authorities must take, without further delay, to put an end to acts of aggression perpetrated from their territory against Israel. He reiterated Israel's policy to abide fully by its obligations under the cease-fire on the basis of reciprocity. However, Israel expected the Arab States to act accordingly.
At the conclusion of the Security Councils meeting on 4 April, the President made the following statement as a result of consultations which had taken place on the item:
Having heard the statements of the parties in regard to the renewal of hostilities, the members of the Security Council are deeply concerned at the deteriorating situation in the area. They, therefore, consider that the Council should remain seized of the situation and keep it under close review.
On 8 April 1968, Jordan and Israel each made charges against the other of violations of the cease-fire on 8 April. Jordan charged that an armoured Israeli battalion consisting of tanks supported by helicopters had entered villages south of the Dead Sea and that Israeli paratroopers had landed in the same area east of the cease-fire sector. Israel, on the other hand, charged that Israeli patrols in the Eastern Negev had encountered a unit of armed saboteurs from Jordan inside Israel, and had pursued them to their base across the cease-fire line.
By letter of 6 May, Jordan charged Israel with planting anti-vehicle mines following the incident of 8 April, one of which had destroyed a car and killed four passengers.
In another letter dated 6 May, Jordan charged that during the months of January, February and March and the first week of April, Israeli military aircraft had violated Jordanian air space more than 100 times.
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL
DURING PERIOD 4 JUNE-16 AUGUST 1968
On 4 June 1968, Jordan charged that Israel had committed a further act of aggression in violation of the cease-fire: a surprise attack that day by Israeli forces which were heavily bombing areas across the Jordan River, including the city of Irbid, using artillery, land-to-land rockets and aircraft. Casualties in Irbid alone had reached 30 killed and 60 injured.
In two letters on the same day, Israel charged that persistent, heavy and unprovoked artillery attacks by Jordan on seven villages in the Jordan valley, involving nine casualties, had made it necessary to order Israeli aircraft to take action to silence the sources of fire. They added that the attacks came in the wake of a series of acts of aggression in violation of the cease-fire, including artillery fire and armed infiltration, on 16 May and daily from 25 May through 4 June.
On 5 June, both Jordan and Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.
The letters were placed on the provisional agenda of the Security Council's meeting held on 5 June 1968. However, that meeting was devoted to statements in tribute to the memory of United States Senator Robert F. Kennedy and, on the proposal of the representative of Algeria, the Council adjourned without voting on the agenda. In a further letter dated 21 June, Jordan charged that on 39 days, between 14 April and 10 June, Israeli forces had engaged in wide-ranging firing across the Jordan with the purpose of destroying civilian life in the Jordan valley.
On 24 June, Israel charged that between 26 May and 23 June there had been 68 Jordanian violations of the cease-fire: 49 of them attacks from military positions employing artillery, mortars, bazookas and machine-guns; 11 mining raids; and eight attacks by armed commandos who had penetrated across the cease-fire line.
On 29 July, Jordan charged that Israel, in attempting to force the expulsion of Arab refugees from Gaza across the King Hussein bridge to the East Bank of the Jordan River, had fired on Jordanian observation posts which had foiled the attempt. (See also below, pp. 237-49.) On 31 July, Israel replied that Jordan had distorted the facts and that Jordanian forces had opened fire on Israeli positions on the West Bank north of the bridge. The Jordanian attack was said to have been unprovoked and to have had no connexion with the question of movement across the bridge.
On 2 August, Israel submitted charges of continued violation of the cease-fire from Jordanian territory, both by regular Jordanian troops and by paramilitary terror units, with the co-operation and encouragement of the Jordanian authorities. Listed were 104 cases of such violations between 23 June and 1 August.
On 4 August, Jordan complained to the Security Council that on that date Israeli forces had committed another act of aggression when Israeli aircraft had bombed areas west and south of the city of Salt, 19 miles from Amman. On the same date, Israel stated that in view of persistent attacks against Israel from Jordanian territory, it had become necessary for Israel to act in self-defence. Its air attack had been directed exclusively against two terrorist bases in the Salt area, including the central headquarters of the El-Fatah organization, stores of ammunition and sabotage equipment, training facilities and barracks. Subsequently, in a letter dated 8 August, Jordan charged that Israeli aircraft had used napalm bombs in their attack. Pictures were attached to the letter to show that the Israeli attack had been aimed at civilians.
On 5 August, Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the grave situation resulting from the continued Israeli acts of aggression against Jordan. On the same day, the representative of Israel also requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to resume consideration of the previous Israeli complaint regarding the grave and continued violations of the cease-fire by Jordan which had been submitted by his Government on 5 June.
At seven meetings between 5 and 16 August 1968, the Security Council considered the complaints of Jordan and Israel of 5 August, as well as their previous complaints which had been on the provisional agenda on 5 June.
The representatives of Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic and, subsequently, the representatives of Saudi Arabia and Syria were invited, at their request, to participate in the Council's discussion without vote.
At the Council's meeting on 5 August, the representative of Jordan said that Israel's premeditated attack, including air bombardment and shelling, on the previous day, had been carefully directed against the civilian population of the areas around the city of Salt and that it was similar in nature to Israel's earlier attack on 4 June against civilian centres in Irbid and neighbouring villages. Incomplete reports indicated that 34 Jordanians had been killed and 82 seriously wounded in Israel's latest attack.
There could be no doubt, Jordan said, that Israel's attack had been planned at the highest level and Israeli officials had been issuing warnings that dire consequences would result for Jordan. It was also clear that the attack was primarily directed against the civilian population, as shown by the large number of civilian casualties and the extensive damage to civilian property. Israel wished to destroy the agriculture of the East Bank of the Jordan River and to terrorize and expel the people of that area. The attack was part of the effort to intimidate Jordan. Having turned more than 450,000 people into homeless refugees, Israel was trying to do the same to the residents of the northern part of the Jordan valley on the East Bank. The areas attacked were Jordan's most productive ones, upon which the country depended for a great part of its agricultural needs.
The Jordanian representative went on to say that in the past the Security Council, while warning Israel against actions of military reprisal, had at the same time promised to consider more effective measures as envisaged in the United Nations Charter. It was therefore incumbent upon the Security Council to take more effective measures, as envisaged in Chapter VII 18/ of the Charter, to cope with the problem; otherwise, more Israeli attacks were to be expected.
The representative of Israel said that, despite the cease-fire obligations assumed by Jordan, warfare against Israel was pursued from Jordanian territory. Israel had repeatedly asked the Council to take effective action to stop Jordanian violations of the cease-fire. It had also explained that the cease-fire could not be a screen for Arab aggression and that Israel had to take measures to defend itself. It had emphasized the impact of Security Council deliberations on the region and had repeatedly stated that the adoption of resolutions lacking in equity would increase intransigence and breed additional violence. The Council's resolution 248 of 24 March 1968 (see p. 198), in spite of its denunciations of cease-fire violations, had promptly been interpreted by Jordan as non-applicable to Arab acts of hostility against Israel. On 4 April, the Security Council had expressed its concern at the deteriorating situation. Since then, military attacks and armed incursions from Jordanian territory had continued unabated.
Israel's representative went on to say that Jordan had become the principal base for Arab aggression against Israel. Special military camps had been established there to train saboteurs. Recruiting centres had been opened in Amman. Officers and men of Egyptian and Syrian regular army units had been transferred to Jordan and assigned to terror operations. Iraqi troops had been given full freedom to operate as they wished.
He said that two types of warfare were being conducted from Jordanian territory: terror raids and armed attacks from military positions, and both were being carried out from across the cease-fire line. Those two methods had been developed because the Arab Governments had been unable to use Arab inhabitants in the areas under Israeli control as instruments of war.
Continuing, the Israeli representative said that the shelling of Israeli villages had reached a climax in May and June. On 4 June, a large-scale assault had been launched by Jordanian artillery, resulting in extensive damage to certain villages and to the town of Beit Shean and including civilian casualties. It had therefore become necessary for Israeli aircraft to take action. Since Jordan had used inhabited centres such as Irbid as locations for its artillery positions, civilian casualties on the Jordanian side had become inevitable. Since then, there had been a change in tactics. Warfare was now more and more being carried out by terrorist and sabotage raids which had steadily increased in intensity and had become a daily occurrence. In July alone, 98 acts of aggression had been committed. Israel had repeatedly emphasized Jordan's responsibility for that unabated warfare and had called on its Government to put an end to those attacks, but to no avail.
The Israeli representative declared that, since Israel's security was in danger and its people were under constant threat, it had no alternative but to take action in self-defence. It was for that reason that on 4 August 1968 Israeli aircraft had taken action exclusively against two terrorist bases in the Salt area. The town of Salt and Jordanian camps in the vicinity had remained outside the scope of Israel's action.
He added that only faithful and reciprocal observance of the cease-fire and an effort by the parties to reason and work together towards a peaceful agreement could break the vicious circle of the 20-year war. The Security Council could also help by impressing on Jordan the vital necessity to abide by the cease-fire obligations and to terminate all acts of aggression from its territory against Israel.
At the same Council meeting on 5 August, the representative of Iraq–after expressing the concern of his Government and people over the continued violation of the cease-fire and its effect on the prospects of the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General–stated that Israel had advanced the same excuses and justifications for its acts of aggression as it had in March 1968. The Security Council had then rejected those arguments and, on 24 March 1968, had adopted unanimously a resolution stating that Israel's military action in Jordanian territory had been of a large-scale and carefully planned nature. Israel's latest act of military reprisal, as well as its attack on Irbid, fell entirely within the scope of the 24 March resolution and confronted the Council with a situation in which it had to take the effective steps referred to in that resolution. Until the Council acted to condemn and to prevent military reprisals, which could not be tolerated in any circumstances, it was futile to speak of observers. Any attempt to equate individual and sporadic activities of Palestinians seeking justice and fighting for their rights with Israel's military attacks against the Arab countries would be interpreted by Israel as a vindication of its stand.
Algeria held the view that the basic problem of the Middle East was the conflict between an aggressive power, which was supported by imperialist interests, and the Palestinian nation, which was determined to regain its rights. The Council's attention had been drawn to the probable intentions of Israel concerning the territories east of the Jordan River. Certain friendly nations were now more concerned with bringing peace to the Middle East in a way that would leave Israel most of the fruits of its conquest than in helping the Security Council to fulfil its mission. These powers had stated that a solution must be found, but they now said it must be one that would satisfy all the interests at stake. That attitude, based on eternal compromise, could not serve as a guideline. The United Nations must return to basic principles and not place on an equal footing the complaint of the victim and the statements of the aggressor.
Israel's latest act of aggression, the representative of Algeria said, was the systematic destruction of the Jordanian region which was the major source of grain for the people of the region, and the attack was basically a response to Israel's need to force Jordan to bow to Israel's orders. It was, therefore, all the more necessary that the Security Council should insist on United Nations principles and full implementation of its previous decisions, which could not be implemented under military occupation or under threat of destruction or famine.
The USSR representative recalled that the Security Council, in its resolution 248 of 24 March 1968, had stated that it would be obliged to consider more effective steps in accordance with the Charter in order to ensure that acts of military reprisals would not be repeated. Israel's latest acts of aggression made clear its attitude towards Security Council resolutions and its disregard for principles of international law. Israel's attempts at justification were groundless. Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories constituted a standing violation of all the principles of the Charter; the people of those territories had every right to resist that occupation and wage a just struggle for their freedom and independence.
Besides continuing its aggressive acts, the USSR representative said, Israel had also continued creating obstacles to a political settlement in the Middle East, counteracting any implementation of the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. 19/ Israel's latest act of aggression had come precisely at a time when the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was carrying out the next stage in a series of consultations regarding a peaceful settlement of the Middle East situation. It was the duty of the Council to take effective and decisive measures against the aggressor.
The United States representative said his Government did not condone the major military attack of 4 August by Israel against Jordan, but neither did it condone the terrorism and sabotage which had been launched with increasing frequency from Jordan in the past weeks. Those acts should not be judged as isolated events; they were a concerted effort that could not but have a cumulative impact. They violated the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions, killed not only military personnel but also civilians and fed the tension and fear that frustrated the search for a peaceful settlement.
The Council, he said, once again found itself confronted not with facts but with charges and counter-charges, making it impossible for it to fulfil its role with objectivity. This again underlined the need for some mechanism that could enable the Council to act in a truly informed manner when events of this kind occurred. It would be helpful if the parties were to reconsider their positions and agree to the presence of United Nations observers in the area. Their presence, while not prejudicing the rights or claims of either side, would serve as a deterrent to further incidents.
A solution to the Middle East situation, he stressed, could be found only through the instruments and processes of accommodation and agreement, which were readily available, particularly in the person of Mr. Jarring.
The representatives of Denmark and the United Kingdom deplored the latest attack, on 4 August, just as they deplored all the acts of violence in violation of the cease-fire that had preceded it. Such actions impeded progress towards peace; the cease-fire must be adhered to. They believed that the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 still offered the best hope for a settlement. The Council's efforts must be directed towards breaking the vicious circle of violence and counter-violence and advancing gradually towards a settlement which could be accepted by all.
The representative of Jordan said that whenever Jordan had submitted to the Council a situation dangerous to peace in the area, Israel had always attempted to confuse the issue by making counter-charges. As long as Israel remained in the Arab territories, there would be resistance, struggle and sacrifices for freedom, as was to be expected in the circumstances. Resistance against occupation had precedents in every country occupied. The situation in Angola, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was no different from the struggle of the Arabs of Palestine. Europeans had resisted nazi occupation in similar manner and millions of them had lost their lives in the struggle to regain their homelands. Jordan would not stop acts of a people's national resistance against Israeli occupation. He went on to say that some members of the Council had raised the question of observers. But he recalled that there was already legal machinery in the area–the Mixed Armistice Commission–which should not be ignored. One could not ask for observers only on the cease-fire lines while ignoring violations in the occupied territories. Observers should be all along the entire Armistice Demarcation Line, including the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Israel-Syria Armistice Demarcation Line. Observers were also needed in Jerusalem.
On 6 August, the representative of the United Arab Republic stated that Israel had put a remarkable emphasis on the cease-fire and its observance. One need not, however, recall the circumstances that had led to the adoption of the Security Councils resolution of 9 June 1967 20/ and the fact that the cease-fire was only a temporary measure. At that time, the United States representative had clearly stated that his Government considered the cease-fire as a first step towards the establishment of peace in the area. With the adoption of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, a second step was taken towards that goal. Containing the basic elements of a permanent settlement, that resolution was based on fundamental principles of the United Nations and its Charter. There was, however, no official indication that Israel had accepted it or was prepared to implement it.
The United Arab Republic representative went on to say that a planned military attack by one country against another, whether under a cease-fire regime or not, was clearly a case of aggression. Israel's defiance of the Security Council resolutions undoubtedly constituted a serious threat to international peace and security. On the other hand, a people resisting an oppressive occupier could only be defined as freedom fighters, not terrorists. Since 24 March 1968, when the Council had unanimously adopted a resolution on the matter, Israel had twice engaged in retaliation and massive reprisals. This time, therefore, it was necessary to consider taking more effective measures, as envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter, to avoid further violations.
Israel's representative replied that Arab terrorist tactics against Israel had been condemned by the United Nations as long ago as 1948. Those who supported such actions were guilty of continuing the Arab war against Israel and had no right to question Israel's actions in self-defence. Egypt was in the forefront of Arab belligerency. Its previous statements about readiness for a peaceful settlement and acceptance of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 had been entirely repudiated by President Nasser, who had recently indicated that his policy was to have a new war in the Middle East for the purpose of bringing about Israel's complete liquidation.
The spokesman for France said that his Government had learned with deep concern of the bombing of Salt by the Israeli Air Force, and it deplored the loss of human life and damage to property. It was also seriously alarmed by the repetition of such incidents in spite of the appeals and decisions of the Security Council. The attack on Salt, like those on Karameh on 21 March and on Irbid 4 June 1968, could not be justified by claims of legitimate defence, since they were reprisals. The very idea of military reprisals was unacceptable to the French Government and was equally condemned by the United Nations and by its Charter. Reprisals ineluctably created a tragic cycle of reactions.
The French representative said that the opposite road to military reprisals–the road leading to a peaceful settlement–was shown by the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, which must serve as the basis for a settlement in the Middle East. At a moment when Mr. Jarring was doing his best to accomplish the task entrusted to him, military operations, such as the bombing of Salt, could only render his task more difficult. The Security Council, while condemning such actions, should try to prevent their recurrence by ensuring the effective application of its resolution of 22 November 1967.
Canada said it could not deny the serious nature of the grievances presented by Jordan and Israel, and it regretted the military operation against Jordan on 4 August and the loss of life involved. Canada appealed to all concerned to observe scrupulously the cease-fire and to avoid positions or actions likely to make more unstable the precarious peace still partially maintained in the Near East. Moreover, such acts of violence could not foster a propitious atmosphere for the continuing efforts of Mr. Jarring to promote an agreement. The decision of the Security Council might well have a far-reaching impact on his vital work, which was at present the only hope for a peaceful solution.
The representative of Pakistan described the latest attack by Israel as the fourth large-scale aggression by Israel against Jordan since adoption of the Security Council's resolution 248 of 24 March 1968. To have a deterrent effect, mere condemnation of Israel was not enough. However, there were two trends in the discussion which might impede the Council's objectivity and render its deliberations totally fruitless. The first was the tendency to be over-impressed by the fact that the Council was faced with charges and counter-charges and had no independent knowledge of the truth. In the present case, such confusion was unwarranted as Israel had itself admitted its military action. The second trend was the tendency to equate the military actions of Israel with all other violations of the cease-fire and to strike a posture of even-handedness in disregard of the human realities of the area. To equate the small, sporadic and spontaneous acts of resistance of the people of the occupied territories with the carefully planned and large-scale military operations of Israeli forces was to ignore a startling disparity of magnitude and quality and to confer equal rights on the aggressor and its victim. In the present case, that would amount to condoning military reprisals.
Moreover, Pakistan's representative continued, it was unrealistic to think that there was a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence between Jordan and Israel for which both parties were equally responsible. Pakistan shared the anxiety of other members of the Council that the latest developments in the area should not adversely affect the progress of the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative. However, progress towards even a temporary solution required that a measure of balance be introduced by first checking Israel's aggressive actions.
The Syrian representative said that the latest attack against Jordan was not an isolated incident but a link in a long chain of violence against Arab States. Three important things, directly related to the Jordanian complaint and the question of Palestine in general, needed to be emphasized. First, if Israel had not driven out the Arabs of Palestine through terrorism and massacre, it could not have been the exclusive Jewish State its leaders wanted it to be, for the Arab and Jewish populations would have been equal in number. Second, in accordance with the last report of the Mandatory Power to the United Nations in 1947, Jewish land ownership in Palestine had amounted to only 5.66 per cent. The Arab people of Palestine were still the legal owners of the land of Palestine from which they had been forcibly expelled. Third, the term belligerence could not be applied to a people who were defending their legal rights against a brutal conquest.
In Hungary's view, there was no justification for the serious violation of the United Nations Charter which had occurred when Israeli military aircraft and shells bombed the territory of Jordan. Israel had advanced the pretext of "self-defence." That argument, however, could not hide the fact that the so-called terror raids were the direct consequence of the illegal occupation of Arab lands and that resistance to that occupation did not entitle Israel to attack its neighbours. The latest act of aggression of the Israeli policy-makers and the expulsion of 50,000 Arabs from the Gaza Strip clearly showed that they had no interest in decreasing tension. As for deploying United Nations observers along a certain line, when Israel felt free to send its aircraft deep inside its neighbour's territory the observers would not be able to fulfil their mission. To send observers in the current circumstances would only prolong Israel's occupation of the territory.
The representative of Senegal said that a mistaken concept of self-defence could lead to a world conflagration. Leaders in Portugal, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were watching the Security Council's reaction to the Israeli interpretation of the concept of self-defence. In his opinion, the victim of aggression could respond immediately with means proportionate to the attack. Israel's action in bombing two of Jordan's towns could not be interpreted as self-defence. Jordan had been attacked; therefore it was not the aggressor. The basic problem, however, was the settlement of the destiny of the Palestinian refugees and the evacuation by Israel of the territory that it had occupied by force. Senegal, he said, placed great hope in Mr. Jarring's mission for securing implementation of the resolution of 22 November 1967, and it condemned the raids and military operations which could only jeopardize his efforts.
The spokesman for Saudi Arabia declared that the rulers of Israel were using religion for political ends. The Zionists had taken Palestine and now the people of Palestine had risen against that occupation. The Palestinians, though displaced and living in refugee camps, were a people with a separate identity of their own. Neither the United Nations nor anybody else, including the Arab Governments, had the right to tell them to forget about their homeland and live elsewhere.
The Saudi Arabian representative went on to say that there were some 16 million Jews in the world, over 1,000 million Christians and about 600 million Moslems. For the Christians and the Moslems, Palestine was as holy to their religions as it was for the Jews. The Zionist claim to Palestine was invalid. Under no circumstances would the people of Saudi Arabia accept Zionist domination of Jerusalem. The situation could be settled only if the Zionists were to agree to live in the State of Palestine, containing both Arabs and Jews, without Israeli domination, as citizens of the Holy Land under a Palestine banner.
The representative of Paraguay said that strict observance of the cease-fire was the minimum condition to ensure the success of the efforts of the Secretary-General and Mr. Jarring. No peace could be built on the use of force or the threat of force and the acquisition of territory. His Government, he noted, had previously deplored the absence of a United Nations presence in the sector where the cease-fire had most often been violated. Such a presence might be helpful in deterring new acts of violence and in providing impartial evidence.
The Chinese representative deplored the latest retaliatory action by Israel. His country's belief that no Government should take the law into its own hands did not, however, mean that other provocative acts of violence and terrorism might in any way be justified. The first order of business was therefore to stop violence and counter-violence. The cease-fire must be scrupulously maintained. China, he said, had previously urged that United Nations observers be deployed in the Israel-Jordan sector. Inasmuch as the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 had stressed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the eventual withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories in the recent conflict, the presence of observers should not have the effect of freezing a temporary situation or hardening the cease-fire lines. The absence of observers would make it difficult to bring about a climate conducive to a peaceful settlement in conformity with the resolution of 22 November 1967.
The spokesman for India, after expressing his Government's concern over the bombing of the city of Salt and the heavy loss of life, said this clearly showed the precarious nature of the cease-fire in the area. Since the adoption of its cease-fire resolutions, the Council had had to meet on a number of occasions to consider acts violating those resolutions and to condemn them. The present incident, which was similar to the one that the Council had condemned by its resolution 248 of 24 March 1968, must be similarly condemned.
India held the view that there could be no peace in West Asia until Israel withdrew its armed forces from the occupied territories. That was one of the fundamental principles in the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. The Council should insist on full co-operation by all parties in the area with the mission of Mr. Jarring in bringing about the full implementation of that resolution. The United Arab Republic and Jordan had already indicated their willingness to implement it in full. The Council must expect Israel to make a similar commitment.
The representative of Brazil said his Government viewed the recent incidents with the utmost concern. These developments were clear and undisguised violations of the cease-fire and showed complete disregard for the Security Council's authority. Over the past 14 months there had been constant violations of the cease-fire by both sides. The Security Council should place its full weight and prestige behind the efforts of Mr. Jarring to secure agreement for the implementation of its resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 which was one of the most positive actions taken by the Council to restore peace and order in the Middle East.
Short of enforcement action, Brazil continued, the Security Council had gone as far as it could and had laid down the basis for a just and lasting peace. A better political climate would be created if the major powers harmonized their actions and interests in the area through an understanding on the supply of armaments, either through total cessation of military assistance or through an accorded regulation and balanced limitation on supplies of defensive equipment.
On 12 August, the representative of Jordan, said that Israel's repeated assertions that its military operations and air attacks were directed against "terrorist bases" and not against civilian installations could not conceal the truth. Citing details of Israel's attack of 4 August 1968, the Jordanian representative said that the bombing of a public works camp, the coffee shops of farmers, their crops and their trucks, often with napalm, could not be represented as directed against the so-called terrorist bases. With regard to Israel's allegations that Jordan had become the principal base for attacks against Israel, he had been instructed by his Government to state that no recruitment centres had ever been opened in Amman and that there were no fedayeen bases or special training camps in his country. Iraqi army units were in Jordan for defensive purposes against any Israeli aggression and they did not help or train fedayeen. There was also no truth in Israel's allegation that there was co-ordination among the Governments of Iraq, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic on the one hand, and the fedayeen on the other, or that El-Fatah had Iraqi officers. Israel wanted to convince the world and the Security Council that Palestinians were happy with its usurpation of their rights and their homes and that there was no resistance from them but only from the Arab States.
The representative of Israel said his Government had decided to release confidential information illustrating the involvement of the Jordanian Government in what he described as the terror warfare against Israel. The information showed that the Jordanian authorities had not limited themselves to general support of the terror operations but had participated directly in those operations. There was full operational co-ordination between the Jordanian Army and the raider commandos to prevent clashes as a result of mistaken identity. For that purpose, the commandos were given special guidance concerning the location of Jordanian minefields on the East Bank and of Jordanian Army ambushes. The Jordanian Army Command had also issued instructions to its forces to assist the raider units in determining the best timing and route for crossing the cease-fire line, in obtaining military intelligence with regard to Israeli minefields, defence installations, patrols and posts and by giving them covering fire. Moreover, a supreme co-ordination committee of the Jordanian Army and the terror organizations had recently been established. The raiders were well-trained military commandos, sometimes of Egyptian, Iraqi and Syrian origin, who were frequently transferred to terror operations from the regular army units of the Arab States. These organizations of commandos were artificially maintained and encouraged by the Arab Governments–an expression of their belligerency. They would crumble the moment the Arab Governments decided to abide by their cease-fire obligations.
Jordan's representative said that there was no agreement between Jordan and Israel which could be described as a cease-fire agreement. There was, however, an international agreement, the Mixed Armistice Agreement, which had created the Armistice machinery and which United Nations jurisprudence continued to regard as valid and binding on both Israel and Jordan. With regard to the cease-fire, there was a decision by the Security Council, and Jordan was abiding by that decision. However, Jordan could not be held responsible for the rise of liberation movements inside the occupied territories. The violation of the cease-fire came from Israel's actions in occupied territories.
On 15 August, the Ethiopian representative said that no appreciable progress had been made since the unanimous adoption of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. In fact, despite efforts to implement that resolution, the situation remained as dangerously deadlocked as ever, with the prospect of another conflict beginning to loom large. The deplorable and repeated incidents of the previous 10 months were the inevitable consequences of the deadlock, which would continue to cause the same sort of violent actions and counter-actions. The only way to get out of the vicious circle of violence and conflict was for the Council to see to it that its 22 November 1967 decision was faithfully and effectively acted upon. All members should support the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative. The special responsibility of the permanent members in the peacemaking efforts was too obvious to require elaboration. Meanwhile, the Council must call for the strictest observance of the cease-fire on the part of all concerned and censure all violations. It should also warn that continued violation of the cease-fire would call unavoidably for Council action under the relevant Chapter of the United Nations Charter.
Israel's representative said that during the current discussion of the Middle East situation resulting from Jordan's aggression and his country's defence action, attacks from Jordan had continued. During the period from 5 to 14 August 1968, there had been almost daily mortar fire and shelling from Jordanian military positions. In spite of those military actions, the Arab representatives and their supporters had suggested that the Security Council should address itself only to Israel's defence action and provide immunity to the Arab States for their acts of aggression. Such a course would be a miscarriage of justice, and Israel, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, would not accept it. After citing further evidence to show the involvement of Jordan and other Arab States in the activities of the commandos, the representative of Israel said that the situation in the Middle East was likely to become even more grave unless warfare against Israel from Jordanian territory ceased, and Jordan ensured the strict observance of the cease-fire.
Jordan's representative said that the representative of Israel had once again described the acts of terrorism and had cited certain so-called evidence to show the involvement of Arab States. In that respect, the truth could easily be found by letting the Secretary-General's Special Representative visit the Israel-occupied territories in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of 14 June 1967. 21/ The implementation of that resolution so far had been held up by Israel. (See also pp. 237-51 below.)
The representative of Israel said that the Secretary-General's Special Representative was welcome to come to Israel but the Arab Governments themselves were barring him from investigating, in accordance with Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, the oppression, discrimination and torture to which Jews in Arab States were being subjected.
On 16 August 1968, the President of the Security Council announced that, as a result of consultations, agreement had been reached on the text of a draft resolution. On the same day, the draft resolution was adopted unanimously by the Security Council as resolution 256 (1968).
By the preambular part of this resolution, the Council, among others things, considered that all violations of the cease-fire should be prevented, observed that both massive air attacks by Israel on Jordanian territory were of a large-scale and carefully planned nature in violation of resolution 248 of 24 March 1968 (see page 198) and expressed grave concern about the deteriorating situation resulting therefrom.
By the operative paragraphs, the Council: (1) reaffirmed its resolution 248 of 24 March 1968 which, among other things, declared that grave violations of the cease-fire could not be tolerated and that the Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts; (2) deplored the loss of life and heavy damage to property; (3) considered that premeditated and repeated military attacks endangered the maintenance of the peace; and (4) condemned the further military attacks launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the Council's resolution 248 of 24 March 1968 and warned that if such attacks were to be repeated the Council would duly take account of the failure to comply with the current resolution. (For text see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)
After the vote, the Council's President took note of the widespread support that had been expressed for the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jarring, in the mission entrusted to him. With the consent of the Council, he requested the Secretary-General to convey to Mr. Jarring that expression of support.
The United States representative said that while his Government could appreciate the difficulties of restraining terrorist elements in the emotional climate that prevailed, every Government in the area was, nevertheless, responsible for maintaining the cease-fire. Moreover, acts of violence inevitably gave rise to retaliation and repression. The main thrust of the resolution just adopted by the Council was directed against those excessive acts of retaliation undertaken in disregard of its resolution of 24 March 1968. The Council had also considered that acts of violence and, specifically, such repeated air attacks endangered peace in the area; this was an expression of concern couched in the language of Chapter VI of the Charter. 22/ The United States Government hoped that the parties would do their utmost to abide by the resolution. The way to peace, however, lay through the implementation of the resolution of 22 November 1967 which the Council had adopted unanimously.
The Algerian representative said that his delegation regretted that the Council, in balancing the grievances brought before it with so-called counter-grievances, was failing to live up to its obligations under the Charter. If the Security Council had again not responded to the repeated aggression of Israel with the required firmness, the reason was that there were forces whose interests were directly threatened by the national liberation movements not only in the Middle East but in South-East Asia, Africa and even Latin America. Nevertheless, the Council's unanimous resolution had warned Israel that, if those attacks were repeated, the Council would have to contemplate more effective additional steps in accordance with the Charter.
The spokesman for Denmark said that the resolution was very explicit in its assessment of Israel's military actions and left no doubt that those actions should not be repeated. It was equally clear that all violations of the cease-fire should be prevented. In view of the unfortunate lack of reference to the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, he noted with great satisfaction the statement of the Council's President regarding the widespread support for Mr. Jarring's efforts, which meant that the parties must extend their full and unconditional co-operation to him. Only in that context could the Danish delegation support the resolution.
The representative of Pakistan said that the resolution was a compromise resulting from intensive consultations and, therefore, not entirely satisfactory to all delegations. He had, he said, expected a resolution which would have been the logical sequel to the resolution of 24 March 1968, by which the Council had pledged itself to consider further and more effective steps, as envisaged in the Charter, to ensure against repetition of premeditated and massive military attacks. Pakistan had, nevertheless, voted for the present resolution because it condemned Israel's military attacks on Jordan and also warned Israel against repeating those attacks. He hoped this was the last occasion on which the Council would remain content with a resolution of this kind.
The Canadian representative said that while it was desirable for the Council to try for such a successful consensus it should not be thought that such resolutions represented an answer in the long run. The Council could at times facilitate a settlement by stating positions or setting forth guidelines, but it could not impose a settlement. That required the co-operation of the parties concerned, on whom the main responsibility lay.
Senegal said that the resolution just adopted showed that the Council was even more resolved not to tolerate in the future such incidents as those of Irbid and Salt. In Senegal's opinion, the Arab delegations had exhibited moderation during the negotiations over the text. Israel should realize that it was dangerous to depend on concepts like that of legitimate defence.
Paraguay observed that the compromise resolution did not entirely coincide with the views of his delegation. However, Paraguay had voted in favour of unanimity. It considered that in prevailing conditions the only real possibilities of a lasting peace in the Middle East were based on the fulfilment of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. An essential condition for that was the co-operation of the parties and, as a prerequisite, observance by all the parties of the cease-fire ordered by the Council in 1967.
The USSR representative said that the resolution contained the required minimum provisions. The USSR had supported it because unanimity in the Council might serve as a barrier to Israeli aggression. The resolution, however, lacked a number of important provisions which might have strengthened it and enhanced its significance. The possibility of reaching a political settlement on the basis of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 depended on Israel, since the Arab States, for their part, had stated clearly that they were prepared to accept and fulfil all the provisions of that resolution and to set up a timetable for its implementation. Those States which continued to support Israel and had even condoned its aggressive actions, also bore responsibility for any lack of progress in the implementation of that resolution. The USSR was convinced of the need for a swift settlement of the Middle East problem on the basis of the Council's 22 November resolution, and it supported Mr. Jarring's mission.
The Brazilian representative observed that the resolution just adopted by the Council deplored all violations of the cease-fire while laying stress on the premeditated military attacks of Israel against Jordan. After expressing his Government's full support of Mr. Jarring's efforts, he reiterated Brazil's appeal to the major powers to reach an understanding on the question of supply of armaments to the parties involved in the Middle East crisis.
Israel said the debate had shown that the attitude of the Arab States towards Israel remained one of intransigence and belligerency and left no doubt of their direct responsibility for the terror warfare. The resolution adopted showed the inadequacy of the Council's handling of the situation. Israel had the inalienable right to defend itself against the continued warfare waged by the Arab States and would discharge its responsibility for the security of the population in territory under its control. If the Arab Governments took action to terminate all military attacks, by regular or irregular forces, against Israel, the cease-fire would be effectively maintained. Israel would pursue its efforts to attain a just and lasting peace through negotiations and agreement and would co-operate with Mr. Jarring towards that objective. It hoped that the Arab States would act likewise.
Jordan expressed satisfaction at the constructive approach of members of the Council, all of whom had condemned Israel's pre-meditated large-scale military attacks. As to the question of observers, emphasis should be placed on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories and not on any idea which might help to freeze the situation. The continued Israeli presence and the arbitrary measures being taken in the occupied territories were a grave violation of the cease-fire, which was a temporary arrangement. Moreover, Jordan had hoped that this time the Council, besides condemning Israel, would have faced Israel's aggression with the only effective remedy–sanctions–especially since the latest attacks were aimed at civilian centres. Leniency by the Council could only encourage Israel and lead to a further deterioration of the situation and a loss of faith in the Security Council. Jordan had co-operated with Mr. Jarring and would continue to do so. It would continue to accept the 22 November 1967 resolution; Israel had not accepted that resolution in its entirety.
COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL
(AUGUST-DECEMBER 1968)
During August 1968, Jordan continued to charge firing by Israeli forces against Jordanian villages and farms. A letter of 9 August listed 27 such alleged attacks since 17 June 1968. Jordan also charged that Israel had on 20 and 25 August shelled villages and civilian centres in the northern part of the Jordan valley, resulting in civilian casualties and the destruction of a school, a mosque, a part of the East Ghor irrigation canal and houses in a number of villages. These attacks, it was stated, had taken place only a few days after adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 256 of 16 August 1968.
On the other hand, Israel charged that a large-scale attack with mortars and small arms had been carried out on 25 August 1968 from Jordanian territory against Israeli villages in the Beit Shean and Jordan valleys; Israeli forces had returned fire. Israel listed 15 other cases of alleged cease-fire violations between 18 and 23 August by both regular and irregular forces from Jordanian territory.
On 28 August 1968, Jordan, in a letter to the Security Council, charged that a large-scale attack against Jordan was being prepared by Israel. On 30 August, Israel rejected that charge, stating that it was designed to divert attention from the continued attacks from Jordan's own territory.
On 17 September 1968, Jordan charged that the city of Irbid had again been shelled by Israeli heavy artillery. On the same day, Israel stated that Jordanian forces had opened fire on Israeli forces in the Beit Shean valley, and that fire was returned in self-defence. Israel alleged 103 attacks from Jordanian territory between 18 August and 17 September, involving small-arms fire, bazooka fire, minelaying and rocket shellings.
On 10 October 1968, Jordan referred to earlier protests it had made against Israeli attacks across the Armistice Line, south of the Dead Sea, and against Israeli steps to change that Line in the Aqaba area. Israel, it was stated, had refused to attend the emergency meeting, requested by Jordan, of the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission on the ground that it did not recognize the continued validity of the General Armistice Agreement of 1949. That, it was said, showed Israel's disrespect for international agreements. Israel replied on 21 October that there was no factual basis for Jordan's complaint, and that it was incongruous for Jordan to invoke the Armistice Agreement of 1949 which collapsed when that Government had initiated hostilities against Israel on 5 June 1967.
On 15 October 1968, Jordan submitted a list of 51 alleged military attacks by Israel between 5 August and 29 September, most of them involving firing directed against Jordanian villages and farms.
On 23 October 1968, Israel complained of more attacks from Jordanian territory on Israel's civilian population and defence forces, partly by Jordanian forces, partly by terror organizations enjoying semi-official status in Jordan. It listed 108 alleged violations of the cease-fire since 16 September 1968. On 3 November, Israel stated that these incidents had culminated on 2 November in the shelling of the city of Elath from across the cease-fire line.
Israel also submitted a further list of 36 alleged cease-fire violations since 23 October.
On 2 December 1968, Jordan complained of several attacks by Israel, on the previous day, in the northern part of the Jordan valley and deep inside Jordan's territory in the south, resulting in casualties. In particular, Jordan's complaint listed an air attack, on a convoy of trucks near Al-Hasa on the Amman-Aqaba route, which destroyed six Saudi Arabian trucks and caused civilian casualties, and an armed forces raid which destroyed two bridges. On the same date, Israel stated that an Israeli commando unit, in pursuance of Israel's right of self-defence, had blown up two Jordanian bridges because an Israeli industrial establishment, the Sodom Potash Works, had been shelled on the previous night. In the letter, Israel complained of increased attacks from Jordanian territory since the conclusion on 16 November 1968 of a pact between the Government of Jordan and terror warfare organizations operating against Israel from Jordan. By thus granting official sponsorship and protection to these organizations, Jordan had assumed direct responsibility for all acts of terror carried out from bases in its territory. A particularly grave act of aggression, the letter stated, was the explosion detonated in a Jerusalem market on 22 November, which killed 12 persons and wounded 53.
On 3 December 1968, Jordan and Israel submitted further charges and counter-charges relating to cease-fire violations on that day. Jordan charged shelling of the whole northern part of the Jordan valley, as well as the city of Irbid and the village of Kufor Asad. Israel charged artillery fire against nine Israeli villages in the Beit Shean and Jordan valleys and a serious aggravation of such attacks by Jordan's introduction of USSR Katyusha-type rockets in 11 attacks between 10 September and 30 November.
On 4 December 1968, Jordan stated that the situation had grown more serious as Israeli aircraft had on 4 December attacked Iraqi troop positions in the Mafraq area, as well as Jordanian posts and densely populated villages in northern Jordan. On the same day, Israel replied that its aircraft had acted in self-defence against Iraqi military positions which had shelled Israeli villages the night before.
On 18 December 1968, Jordan submitted a list of 69 alleged attacks by Israel from 2 October to 15 December against centres of civilian population in Jordanian territory. Many of these, it was stated, had been carried out by Israeli armed units, some of which had penetrated deep into Jordanian territory. On 3 December, it was charged, more than 30 elderly men, women and children had been killed in the village of Kufor Asad alone as a result of indiscriminate Israeli bombing and shelling, and 40 houses had been destroyed. On 30 December, Jordan charged that on the previous day Israel again had launched a four-hour artillery attack on Jordanian territory from which casualties had resulted.
COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS
(1 JANUARY-16 JULY 1968)
In a supplemental information report issued on 26 January 1968, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council two reports received from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO), based on observations by United Nations military observers stationed in the Suez Canal sector. The reports contained information on an exchange of machine-gun fire, initiated from the east side, in the Suez Canal sector, and UNTSO efforts, which eventually succeeded, to secure a cease-fire.
On 30 January 1968, the United Arab Republic charged that on that morning Israeli forces had twice fired upon Suez Canal Authority launches carrying out an arranged survey and had thus obstructed operations for the release of 15 ships stranded in the Suez Canal. In the second firing, Israel's forces had also shelled United Arab Republic positions from which the fire was returned in self-defence.
In a report to the Security Council dated 31 January 1968, the Secretary-General stated that the incident of 30 January had occurred when Suez Canal Authority boats, engaged in a technical survey of navigational conditions northward in the Canal, had been fired upon by the Israeli forces, and the firing had been returned by United Arab Republic forces; heavy fire had continued from both sides until a cease-fire became effective on the same day. The incident was related to a plan–which had been developed after consultation with both the United Arab Republic and Israel by the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Middle East, Mr. Jarring–for the evacuation of the 15 non-Egyptian ships stranded in the Suez Canal since June 1967. The role of UNTSO, which had been made clear to the parties, was to safeguard the cease-fire by transmitting to the Israeli authorities notice of all activity and the schedule of work to be carried out by the Suez Canal Authority in the course of the evacuation and during its preparatory phases. The evacuation was to be a one-time operation to be carried out without prejudice to the 27 July 1967 arrangement agreed to by the United Arab Republic and Israel concerning movement of boats in the Canal. 23/
In view of Israel's position that it had agreed only to the southward exit of the ships and not to a northward feasibility survey, UNTSO warned the United Arab Republic on 29 January 1968 and again on 30 January that it could not give assurance about maintaining the cease-fire if the United Arab Republic insisted that the planned survey include the northern as well as the southern parts of the Canal.
By letter of 28 January 1968, the Secretary-General had urged Israel to permit the survey of the Canal to the north, under the eyes of United Nations observers. The Secretary-General's position was that the survey was a technical undertaking and that its findings should not be prejudged. He did not consider there was any security risk for Israel in connexion with the survey to the north.
On 29 January 1968, the Secretary-General expressed to the United Arab Republic the hope that, pending the outcome of his efforts to resolve the question of a northward survey, the survey work to the south would continue, work which might establish that all ships could be evacuated southwards. The shooting broke out on 30 January 1968, before receipt on 31 January of Israel's reply to the Secretary-General, stating that the United Arab Republic was responsible for provoking the incident, knowing that Israel had not agreed to any northward survey. Israel added that any northward evacuation proposal and relevant preparatory survey would have to be considered as a separate question. Israel, the note concluded, still favoured and would facilitate the agreed southward release of the stranded vessels.
In concluding his report, the Secretary-General said that the difficulties encountered by the operation demonstrated graphically the complexities and hazards involved in seeking solutions even to relatively non-controversial matters on which the parties themselves were agreed in principle. The United Arab Republic authorities had halted the whole operation for evacuating the ships and the future possibilities for its completion were in serious doubt.
On 1 February 1968, the United Arab Republic transmitted the text of a statement issued on 30 January by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concerning Israel's obstruction of the operation undertaken by the Suez Canal Authority for the release of the stranded ships. The statement gave an account of the plan and denied the existence of a so-called agreement prohibiting navigation in the Suez Canal, as claimed by Israel, affirming that letters exchanged with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO clearly stated that the Canal Authority should continue to move its boats for the safety of the stranded ships in the Canal. The statement added that in view of Israel's use of force on 30 January to resist the release of the ships, the Canal Authority had been compelled to discontinue the operation.
On 7 February 1968, Israel denied the charges and, in turn, accused the United Arab Republic of resorting to distortions and pretexts to sabotage the release of the ships. The letter stated that until the Canal was opened to free navigation for ships of all nations, Israel must insist that the conditions created in the Suez Canal under the cease-fire and the arrangements concerning navigation in the Canal, reached in mid-1967, be fully respected. The letter declared that those arrangements, which had been set out in documents dated 10 and 28 August 1967, 24/ prohibited the movement of boats and craft in and into the Canal, except for supplying the stranded ships. Israel, the letter pointed out, had agreed to Mr. Jarring's proposal to allow the southward exit of the stranded ships as a one-time operation without prejudice to the existing arrangement on mutual abstention from navigation. The sending of boats northward into the Canal had been an act of deliberate provocation on the part of the United Arab Republic, calculated to sabotage the evacuation of the ships.
Reports of the United Nations military observers relating to exchanges of fire in the Suez Canal sector on 27 April, 22 May, 14, 15 and 23 June and 8 July 1968 were circulated by the Secretary-General. They gave details on breaches of the cease-fire by both parties and on efforts by United Nations observers to arrange cease-fires.
On 10 July 1968, the United Arab Republic charged that on 8 July Israeli armed forces had opened artillery fire on the city of Suez causing heavy casualties among the civilian population–46 killed and 67 wounded. Replying on 16 July, Israel stated that the charge completely disregarded the findings of the United Nations military observers which showed, it was stated, that Israel had acted in self-defence with considerable restraint, opening fire to silence attacking Egyptian artillery 40 minutes after the Egyptian barrage began. Israel deplored the Egyptian firing from positions in residential areas, a practice which was directly responsible for the civilian casualties.
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL
DURING PERIOD 28 AUGUST-18 SEPTEMBER 1968
On 28 August 1968, Israel charged that on 26 August two Israeli jeeps had been ambushed by an Egyptian platoon while on patrol along the Suez Canal south of Lake Timsah. Mines planted on the patrol route, it was stated, had exploded under one jeep and the attackers had opened fire, killing two Israeli soldiers; a third one, probably wounded, had been kidnapped.
On 29 August, the UNTSO Chief of Staff reported the results of the inquiry conducted by United Nations military observers on the incident of the night of 26 August, of which the United Nations military observers had been informed at 0600 on 27 August. The report stated that the observers had found that an Israeli patrol had been mined and physical evidence indicated that it had been ambushed. It also stated that Israel's Defence Minister had requested the return of one missing soldier but that the United Arab Republic authorities had denied any involvement of their forces in the incident and any knowledge of the missing soldier. When the observers had asked to see the bodies of the Israeli soldiers reported killed, they were told that the bodies had been removed for burial. However, blood stains and three damaged helmets had been seen at the scene of the incident, as well as marks indicating that a body could have been dragged in the sand near the Canal's edge.
On 2 September 1968, Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the deliberate and planned military attack by the United Arab Republic against Israel forces on 26 August in flagrant violation of the cease-fire. It added that the seriousness of the attack had been aggravated by the negative reply of the United Arab Republic to representations made through UNTSO's Chief of Staff, General Odd Bull.
The Security Council considered the Israeli complaint at two meetings on 4 and 5 September and invited the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic, at their request, to participate in the discussion.
The representative of Israel said his Government had brought the incident before the Council because the United Arab Republic had denied to General Bull any knowledge of the attack on 26 August 1968. The facts, however, were clear. In violation of the cease-fire and in breach of the July and August 1967 arrangements prohibiting all movement of boats and all military activities in the Suez Canal, a well-planned attack had been carried out against Israel by Egyptian forces operating from the west bank. This development–the first Egyptian crossing of the Canal and the first attack on Israeli forces–was fraught with the gravest dangers for maintenance of the cease-fire. No attempts to disclaim responsibility or to confuse the problem by introducing irrelevant allegations could alter the basic fact that Egypt could have prevented that attack since it had, until then, prevented such incursions. As Israel had informed General Bull, it might be inferred that from the nature of the operation it was not meant to be an isolated incident but the initiation of a new policy of military aggression in the Canal area. Israel, he concluded, expected the Council to take steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation, to condemn the attack and to secure the return of the captured soldier.
The representative of the United Arab Republic reiterated the results of his Government's own inquiry, as conveyed to General Bull: United Arab Republic forces had not taken part in any actions east of the Suez Canal and had no knowledge of the missing Israeli soldier. At the same time, his Government had assured the Chief of Staff of its continued observance of the cease-fire. In submitting that the report of General Bull lent no credence to the fabricated Israeli charges, he noted the lapse of time between the alleged event and the request for an inquiry, the inaction of the Israeli lieutenant, if really present, to try to save his kidnapped colleague and the fact that the bodies of the two soldiers allegedly killed had not been examined in time by the military observers.
The United Arab Republic suggested that the Council consider whether Israel's motives for bringing to it a groundless accusation might not be to create a pretext for military operations against the United Arab Republic or Jordan or to justify continued illegal occupation of Arab territories. If there were any violations in the Suez Canal sector, the United Arab Republic representative said, Israel had committed them. Since its aggression in June 1967, Israel had consistently followed a brutal policy of wanton shelling of densely populated west bank cities, killing 332 and wounding 767 civilians. That policy of terror was bound to fail. The attempt of Israel to hold every Arab Government responsible for acts of patriotism on the part of their oppressed population should not be taken seriously; the Government of the United Arab Republic would not forsake its support for all liberation movements in Africa and Asia. The Security Council should not be diverted from the real issues of Israel's crimes against the population of areas, its defiance of the Council's resolutions and the danger of its expansionist policy.
The representative of Israel replied that the simple, though extremely grave, matter before the Council required a simple response. Under its cease-fire obligations, the United Arab Republic was responsible for preventing incursions or attacks from its side against Israeli forces or civilians and for observance of the arrangements prohibiting all activity on the Canal. Was the United Arab Republic ready, he asked, to prevent such attacks in the future and to free the Israeli soldier abducted on 26 August? Israel was defending itself against attacks from military positions established inside the cities along the west bank of the Canal; the one way to avert damage and suffering on the west bank was to end aggression from that bank.
The United Kingdom representative said that his Government, having always condemned violence and reprisal, welcomed Israel's decision to bring this matter to the Council. Having the advantage of a report from General Odd Bull and his observers on which it could rely, the Council must accept the findings of the report and deplore and condemn such an act of violence. It was unfortunate, he said, that no report was made to the United Nations authorities until the morning after the event; an immediate report would have made the evidence fuller and more valuable. On the other hand, the contention of the United Arab Republic that it had neither knowledge of nor responsibility in the matter could not be accepted, as it was its positive responsibility to maintain the cease-fire. However, he welcomed the assurance given to General Bull of the unqualified adherence of the United Arab Republic to the cease-fire and to the agreed arrangements to give effect to it on the Canal.
Although the Council had been called upon to deal with one event–the attack on the Israeli patrol–there were wider considerations, the United Kingdom representative said. The principles of a final settlement had been agreed to. There was no other basis for peace. Violence only jeopardized a just peace. Therefore, he said, all must concentrate on giving practical effect to those agreed principles through co-operation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
The spokesman for Denmark said his Government deplored all violations of the cease-fire and particularly regretted the incident under discussion. Denmark welcomed the fact that Israel had brought the matter to the Council and hoped that the outcome would help end the vicious circle of attack and counter-attack and underline the obligation on the parties to prevent all violations of the cease-fire. All efforts must now be concentrated on facilitating the mission of Mr. Jarring. In this connexion, the Danish representative referred to the appeal on 4 September 1968 by the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden to the parties to the conflict to ensure that the mission would lead to results conducive to peace.
The United States representative said the Council would be justified in accepting Israel's statement, taking into account the substantial circumstantial support for Israel's allegations provided by General Bull's investigation and the limited denial by the United Arab Republic, which had simply said that none of its forces took part in the action and that its authorities had no knowledge of the missing soldier. The evidence clearly pointed to an unprovoked attack by a substantial number of armed men with at least acquiescence by the Government of the United Arab Republic.
The United States representative went on to say that every Government was responsible for the control of its own population and that responsibility was not limited to the actions of its regular armed forces. The United States strongly deplored the incident and felt that the Government of the United Arab Republic should be held strictly accountable for observing the requirements of the cease-fire which it had asserted it continued to support. The Council had repeatedly and properly taken a strong line against military reprisals. If the Council failed to treat violations of the cease-fire evenhandedly and condemned acts of terror and violence against one side while ignoring them against the other side, it would not only promote terror but destroy the alternative to reprisal and discourage resort to the Council. In conclusion, he urged the parties to the conflict to use the instrumentality provided in the person of Mr. Jarring to start the kind of dialogue which could lead to a peaceful solution of the Middle East problem.
The USSR representative said that the Council had been convened to consider a complaint against the United Arab Republic, a country against which Israel had committed armed aggression and a considerable part of which it to occupy with its troops. Israel had not made the long-expected statement to the effect that it would implement previous Council decisions–in particular the resolution of 22 November 1967–and withdraw from the occupied Arab territories. Instead, the representative of Israel had spoken about an incident which allegedly took place on 26 August 1968 on territory of the United Arab Republic occupied by Israel, charging the United Arab Republic with responsibility for that incident. That the so-called complaint was groundless, the USSR representative said, was shown by the information received from the UNTSO Chief of Staff, which did not once mention the United Arab Republic as a country against which charges might be laid. Moreover, serious doubts had been cast on the reliability and plausibility of the Israeli assertions by the information about Israel's refusal to show the military observers the corpses of the two soldiers allegedly killed. The facts prompted the question whether Israel had submitted the clumsy complaint in order to carry out another routine military action under the pretext of retaliation, which the Council had repeatedly condemned in the past. Even if the Israeli charge were not a fabrication, and the incident had taken place as a result of action by Arab freedom fighters, the United Arab Republic could not be held responsible for what happened in Israel-occupied territory. From resentment at Israel's aggressive actions, there would irresistibly emerge a liberation struggle on the part of the Arabs. Continuation of that policy was fraught with serious dangers for the destiny of the Israeli people. While the Arab States had accepted the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 and were ready to work for a political settlement, Israel–counting on the support of certain Western countries, primarily the United States–was refusing to do so, was putting forward unrealistic demands to cover up its aggressive and expansionist policies and was paralysing Mr. Jarring's mission. The USSR, he said, was doing all it could to attain a political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the November 1967 resolution.
The representative of Israel, in reply, said that the United Arab Republic had taken a highly cynical attitude towards serious discussion in the Council of the need to avert deterioration of the cease-fire. He asked how the fact that the inquiry had been made in daylight and not at night could justify aspersions on the report's findings. As for the two soldiers killed, their bodies had been removed in accordance with Jewish religious law. He added that the cease-fire established by the Council was not Israel's choice. Israel was prepared at any time to conclude peace with the United Arab Republic and to establish secure and recognized boundaries. At the moment, however, the cease-fire was the only basis for relations between the two countries.
On 5 September 1968, the Council adjourned its discussion of Israel's complaint without taking a decision.
In a letter of 8 September 1968 to the Security Council, Israel charged that armed forces of the United Arab Republic had violated the cease-fire on that date in the Suez Canal sector and, in the light of that violation, it requested an immediate resumption of the Security Council's meetings adjourned on 5 September. In a letter of the same date, the United Arab Republic charged that Israel had shelled the cities of Port Tawfiq, Suez, Ismailia and Kantara and, in view of the gravity of the situation, requested an urgent meeting of the Council. –
In consequence, the President convened the Council on 8 September 1968. At four meetings, the Council considered both the Israeli complaint of 28 August and the 8 September complaints of Israel and the United Arab Republic. Those countries' representatives were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion.
The Secretary-General informed the Council that messages from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO that afternoon had informed him of heavy and prolonged exchange of fire that day across the Suez Canal and its cessation at 1650 hours GMT. In the absence of messages about further firing, it was safe to conclude that the cease-fire arranged by United Nations observers was holding. The Secretary-General read out a further message on details of the firing, the weapons used, the attempts made to secure a cease-fire, the damage to UNTSO installations and the wounding of a United Nations military observer.
The representative of Israel said that on 8 September 1968 Egyptian forces had opened fire a few minutes after the detonation by Israeli sappers of a mine discovered on the east bank of the Canal, and very soon thereafter Egyptian artillery had begun an attack along the entire front from Kantara to Port Tawfiq. These facts, he said, clearly indicated that the attack of 8 September was a premeditated and large-scale one, in flagrant violation of the cease-fire.
He then recalled that in his statement to the Council on 4 September he had expressed his Governments concern that the Egyptian attack of 26 August 1968 might be a prelude to a renewed campaign of violence along the cease-fire line. That concern had been strengthened by the repeated planting of anti-vehicle mines in the same place, within sight of Egyptian army positions only 200 to 300 metres distant. From these developments, it was obvious that the United Arab Republic was trying to undermine the cease-fire and create a situation of grave danger in the area. It was incumbent upon the Security Council to take steps to halt these acts of aggression and to help maintain the cease-fire.
The representative of the United Arab Republic referred to his statement to the Council on 4 September, in which he had said that Israel's groundless accusation of 26 August 1968 was a pretext for starting a full-scale military operation. He asserted that Israel had again resorted to the same tactics. It had returned to its normal routine of first using force and only then submitting a complaint. On 8 September, he said, Israel had opened fire in the area of Port Tawfiq and then extended the shelling to the cities of Ismailia and Kantara. The United Arab Republic forces had been obliged to return the fire in self-defence in order to ensure the safety of the civilian population.
The USSR representative said that logically Israel should have informed the United Nations observers before detonating the mine. The explosion, in the existing tension, was responsible for beginning the incident. Appropriate action by Israel could have avoided the serious incident with its distressing consequences.
After a recess for consultations, proposed by the United Kingdom, the President of the Council said he was authorized to declare that the Security Council deeply regretted the loss of life and required the parties strictly to observe the cease-fire called for by the Council's resolutions.
At the Security Council's next meeting, on 10 September 1968, the President of the Council drew attention to further information received from General Odd Bull on the 8 September incident. The UNTSO Chief of Staff stated that he had not been informed on 8 September of the mine to be exploded, but that on 9 September the Israeli Liaison Officer had reported that the mine had been exploded some minutes after 1500 hours local time, two hours after discovery, because it could not safely be removed. The report added that the observers were unable to indicate what caused the initial explosions seen by observers in the area on both sides of the Canal between 1506 and 1517 local time, the first having been seen on the east side of the Canal at 1506 local time.
The representative of Israel stated that a double standard was being employed by some members of the Council towards Israel. Although in the past they had approved Israel's recourse to the Council, they now frowned on it and sought to thwart a just decision by the Council on Israel's complaint.
The facts regarding the 26 August incident had been buttressed, he said, by an Egyptian soldier who had deserted to Israel's forces on 7 1968 and who had stated to the press that he had heard his battalion commander, through the telephone network, announce that a special force of the 118th Brigade had crossed the Canal and ambushed an Israeli patrol, killing two Israeli soldiers and capturing a third who was wounded. As for the incident of 8 September, the representative of Israel added, a careful analysis of the reports of the UNTSO Chief of Staff, General Odd Bull, confirmed the Egyptian responsibility. Ten Israeli soldiers had been killed and 14 wounded. The initiation of the attack and its immediate extension along a wide front, with the co-ordinated use of artillery, mortars, tanks and machine-guns, left no doubt about the premeditated character of the operation. He cited Egyptian press statements as indicating the premeditated nature of the attack, following a Government decision on 8 September to undertake preventive military operations against Israel.
Ethiopia's representative stated that the interminable recurrence of cease-fire violations was jeopardizing the delicate peace mission in progress and, if not checked, could result in large-scale warfare. In the absence of complete information, his delegation would not now attempt to pass judgement. Meanwhile, the Council should focus attention on the important question of the general maintenance of the cease-fire in all sectors. He suggested, in the spirit of the unanimous resolution of 22 November 1967, a renewed call for restraint, for strict observance of the cease-fire resolution and for co-operation with United Nations representatives in the area in order to create a better climate for Ambassador Jarring's mission.
Brazil said that the Security Council should not ignore the report of the inquiry by UNTSO which had stated in clear terms that, from physical evidence observed, an Israeli patrol had been mined and ambushed on 26 August. However, the Council could not go on indefinitely limiting itself merely to fact-finding exercises on complaints submitted to it, or even to a routine allotment of blame, while the vital questions affecting the situation, such as the arms race between the parties, remained untackled. If both parties were to show an equal degree of adherence to the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, and co-operate unreservedly with the Secretary-General's Special Representative, an equitable solution of the Middle East situation could be found.
The representative of the United Arab Republic stated that the report of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO clearly indicated that Israel had initiated the firing on 8 September which had caused property damage, the death of 17 persons and the injury of 93. Israel should be severely condemned for its act of aggression. As for the case of the allegedly abducted Israeli soldier, he reiterated his Government's denial of any knowledge of it. His Government, he said, regretted that the United States, in its enthusiastic support for Israel, should uphold the notion that Arab States were responsible for the actions of Arabs living under Israeli occupation. As for the Israeli statement that the cease-fire was the only basis for relations between the two countries, the United Arab Republic representative pointed out that the cease-fire was only a preliminary step towards the cessation of hostilities. Further steps should have been taken promptly to liquidate the aggression, particularly the military occupation. While the United Arab Republic Government had repeatedly declared its acceptance of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, Israel had continued to evade a direct acceptance of its implementation.
The spokesman for Hungary said that the reports of UNTSO did not confirm Israel's accusation that United Arab Republic forces had violated the cease-fire on 26 August 1968, but they left no doubt that Israel had indiscriminately shelled several Egyptian cities on 8 September. His delegation deplored attempts in the name of even-handedness to have the Council adopt a stand totally unrelated to the facts. In spite of the long occupation of its territories and destruction of its cities, the United Arab Republic had adhered to the cease-fire and had worked in favour of a political solution based on the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. 25/ That resolution, stipulating the withdrawal of Israeli forces, had never been accepted, let alone implemented, by Israel. The Israeli Government continued to put forward, as conditions, demands not contained in the resolution and was responsible for the continuing tension.
Algeria's representative said that Israel's real objective in resorting to the Council with a baseless complaint was to create a façade of peaceful intentions before the world, while hiding its real designs for future aggression. As long as the Arab territories remained occupied by enemy forces, the duty of the inhabitants was to fight on all fronts by all available means. Israel's aggression on 8 September was a direct consequence of the Council's tolerance towards the occupation of territories of sovereign United Nations Member States. The Council must condemn Israel's act of force and assume its responsibility for ending the Israeli occupation and restoring to the people of Palestine their legitimate national rights.
The representative of France stated that his delegation, which had condemned reprisals in the past, had interpreted Israel's decision to refer the 26 August incident to the Council as a sign of a favourable evolution which it hoped would be confirmed. France deplored the ambush and the grave consequences of the heavy exchange of fire across the Suez Canal on 8 September. Only a political solution could end the repetition of such incidents which raised the possibility of a new conflagration in the Middle East. The Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 remained the only basis for the desired settlement; all its clauses must be implemented as a whole, among others the end of the occupation.
Canada said that the incidents of 26 August and 8 September 1968 had given rise to grave concern because of the increase of tension and the grievous loss of life and damage to property on both sides. The Security Council had the responsibility to demand that the cease-fire be fully respected. Canada urged both parties to observe the cease-fire scrupulously until the goal of a peaceful and accepted settlement had been reached. That goal was the only way out of the vicious circle of violence.
At the next Council meeting, on 11 September 1968, the Security Council had before it two supplemental reports from UNTSO concerning further incidents in the Canal sector, including two firing incidents initiated by United Arab Republic forces.
The representative of Pakistan said that the Council did not have an agreed version of the basic facts of the 26 August incident but that evidence on the 8 September incident was clearer. The UNTSO report indicated that Israeli forces initiated the firing after certain explosions had been observed on both sides of the Canal. Sustained exchange of fire followed until the cease-fire was arranged. The issues involved in the situation should be clearly identified, namely, incidents which could properly be called cease-fire violations and incidents which were the natural consequences of foreign aggression. It was well known that foreign occupation gave rise to resistance.
Senegal's representative said that the information before the Council did not make it possible to establish the degree of responsibility on each side for the incidents. In the circumstances, the United Arab Republic could not be held responsible for incidents in areas under Israeli occupation. Both Pakistan and Senegal believed that restoration of peace in the area depended on the success of Ambassador Jarring's mission and the implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, including the evacuation of Israeli forces from all occupied territories.
The representative of the United States suggested that the recent incidents might foreshadow a more dangerous situation in which the parties to the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector would not show the measure of restraint shown in recent months. It was clearly the responsibility of both Governments to implement without qualification their stated intention to adhere scrupulously to the cease-fire as well as to co-operate fully with UNTSO. A cease-fire should not, however, be confused with peace. The Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 had provided a set of principles on which a just peace could be erected. Yet Ambassador Jarring, in spite of his skilful and tireless efforts, had not been able to translate those principles into perceptible progress towards peace. Under those circumstances, Council members should examine what they could most usefully do.
The USSR representative said that the event of 8 September 1968 was a new act of provocation by Israel's armed forces against the United Arab Republic. Its meaning went far beyond simple violation of the cease-fire. The recent sequence of military and political events showed that the Security Council was faced with a pre-meditated policy of aggression intended to the situation in the Near East. Israel's responsibility had been fully confirmed by the report of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. It was the Council's duty to condemn and end Israel's acts of aggression and provocation and to secure full implementation of resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, the first principle of which was Israel's withdrawal from all occupied territories. It must be recalled that Israel had not yet declared its intention to carry out the provisions of that resolution.
Following an adjournment on 11 September 1968 for seven days of consultations, the Council met again on 18 September and the President read out the text of a draft resolution which, he said, reflected the agreement obtainable among the greatest possible number of Council members.
By this resolution, the Security Council, recalling the declaration of its President on 9 September 1968, gravely concerned with the deteriorating situation and convinced that all United Nations Members should co-operate towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, would: (1) insist that the cease-fire ordered by the Council in its resolutions must be rigorously and (2) reaffirm its resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 and urge all the parties to extend their fullest co-operation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the speedy fulfilment of the mandate thereby entrusted to him.
The text to this effect was adopted on 18 September 1968 by 14 votes to 0, with 1 abstention (Algeria) as resolution 258 (1968). (For text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)
In subsequent statements, the representatives of Brazil, Denmark, Paraguay, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States explained their support of the resolution. The representative of Pakistan said that his delegation had voted in favour of the resolution although it reflected only a part of the desirable action. Each time that the Council failed to insist on a speedy implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, the best hope of a durable peace, it only prolonged the agony of the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories.
Algeria stated that it had abstained because it was convinced that no real solution to the Middle East tragedy could be found as long as the Council refrained from tackling the root of the evil, and as long as it did not demand an end to Israeli occupation of the Arab territories and the restoration to the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights.
The United Arab Republic stated that it had become clear that the policies of Israel had two main objectives: the first was to inflame the already tense situation in the area by embarking on a series of pre-planned attacks which, coupled with the continued occupation of Arab territories, could only aggravate the situation further; the second was a tactical campaign with the avowed aim of confusing the issues and distorting the facts. Under those circumstances, it was incumbent on the Council to discharge its responsibilities and request, forthwith, compliance by Israel with the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.
The representative of Israel said that his delegation had come to the Council on 2 September 1968 with a simple request: to condemn the military attacks on Israel, to call on the United Arab Republic to prevent their recurrence and to ascertain the fate of the abducted Israeli soldier. He regretted that the resolution just adopted did not reflect the gravity of the United Arab Republic's aggression. It ignored the clear facts and was another expression of the double standard that marred the work of the Council on the Middle East question. The resolution could under no circumstances be regarded as a satisfactory response to Israel's just complaint. Israel would continue to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring toward the attainment of agreement on a just and lasting peace and would scrupulously observe the cease-fire with the United Arab Republic on a basis of reciprocity.
Supplemental information submitted on 17 September 1968 by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO gave the texts of letters addressed to the Israeli and United Arab Republic authorities on 16 September protesting damage to UNTSO installations hit during the 8 September incident in such a way that possibility of error is most unlikely. In its reply on 17 September the United Arab Republic, while expressing regret at the damage, stated that the protest should have been addressed only to Israel which had violated the cease-fire by initiating the firing and that it was inconceivable that United Arab Republic forces, in returning fire, could have chosen the observation posts as targets. On 19 September Israel expressed regret at the damage and stated that if any such damage was caused by firing from the Israel side, it was wholly unintentional and stringent precautions had been ordered to avoid any similar occurrence.
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL
DURING PERIOD 23 SEPTEMBER-4 NOVEMBER 1968
On 23 September 1968, Israel charged that on 22 September an Egyptian unit had crossed the Suez Canal and attached an Israeli unit, and that on 25 September an Israeli half-track had been blown up by an anti-vehicle mine east of the Canal. Supplemental information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported on inquiries by United Nations military observers; in both instances, they had seen footprints to and from the scene of the incident and the Canal bank.
Between 25 September and 29 November 1968, reports from the Chief of Staff furnished up-to-date information concerning the name and locations of the 19 observation posts established by UNTSO for its cease-fire operations in the Suez Canal sector.
Further information from the Chief of Staff reported observed crossing of the Canal on 23 October by planes in both directions and an aerial battle over Ismailia between Israeli and United Arab Republic planes.
On 26 October 1968, Israel complained that on that day United Arab Republic forces had opened heavy artillery fire across the entire length of the Canal on Israeli positions and had made two attempts to cross the Canal, one south of Little Bitter Lake and one in the vicinity of Port Tawfiq. Fire had been exchanged. On 29 October, Israel called attention to the report that Algerian forces had participated in the above attacks and said that the information was particularly grave because Algeria had ignored the Security Council cease-fire resolutions and was, by its own admission, pursuing an active role against Israel. On 30 October, Israel charged that the 26 October attack, which had resulted in 15 Israeli soldiers killed and 34 wounded, was the climax of a series of premeditated attacks in pursuance of the announced United Arab Republic policy of so-called preventive military operations first applied on 26 August l968.
On 26 October 1968, the United Arab Republic charged that on that date Israeli forces in the Suez Canal area had launched a rocket attack against the city of Port Tawfiq, resulting in the loss of lives and damage to property. Fire had been returned.
A summary of the exchange of fire on 26 October was contained in a report from the Chief of Staff issued on 27 October. Another report stated that on 27 October the United Arab Republic authorities had shown United Nations military observers a weapon at Port Tawfiq, allegedly one of the missiles fired by Israel on 26 October. The weapon was described as being made of heavy metal, cylindrical, containing a high explosive and having stabilizing fins.
In further supplemental information reports issued between 28 October and 1 November 1968, the Chief of Staff reported on investigations made, following complaints of mines laid by United Arab Republic forces along the east bank of the Canal. Investigating observers had observed, inter alia, damaged vehicles, craters, anti-tank mines and footprints leading to the east bank of the Canal.
On 1 November 1968, the United Arab Republic charged that on the night of 31 October Israeli aircraft had penetrated deep into the Nag Hamadi area inside the United Arab Republic, bombing civilian targets, including a bridge and power station. It requested an urgent meeting of the Council.
On the same day, Israel also requested an urgent meeting to consider the 26 October attack and subsequent acts of aggression by the United Arab Republic already brought to the Council's attention by Israel and recorded in relevant reports of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO.
On 1 November 1968, the Security Council included in its agenda the complaints by the United Arab Republic and Israel and invited the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Israel, and, later, the representative of Saudi Arabia, pursuant to their requests, to participate in the discussion.
The representative of the United Arab Republic said that Israel's latest act of aggression was ominous not only because of its premeditated nature but because it had been openly admitted by responsible Israeli leaders. The selection of civilian installations, far from the cease-fire area, for bombing showed that Israel aimed at paralysing the economy of the United Arab Republic. At the same time, Israel was conducting a propaganda campaign about its peaceful intentions and constructive approaches. Yet Israel had so far refused to declare its acceptance of, and willingness to implement, the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, and that fact spoke more eloquently about its true intentions. The Council, which had already condemned Israel by its resolutions 248 of 24 March 1968 (see page 198) and 256 of 16 August 1968 (see page 212), must, in the present far graver circumstances, not just verbally condemn Israel but must apply sanctions, under Chapter VII 26/ of the Charter, which would end Israel's aggression.
Israel's representative said that although the Security Council, as far back as 1948 and more recently on 22 November 1967, had called upon the parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to conclude a permanent peace settlement, the United Arab Republic had continued in its policy of belligerency. Sanctimonious declarations of acceptance of the Council's 22 November 1967 resolution remained valueless when accompanied by refusal to make peace, by rejection of agreement with Israel and by unabated warfare. The United Arab Republic had now initiated a new policy of so-called preventive defence, under which it had begun a series of aggressive acts against Israel, acts substantiated by General Odd Bull's reports. That policy had been started at a time when Ambassador Jarring, was doing his best to promote an agreement between the parties for the establishment of a just and lasting peace. As a result, Israel had been left with no choice but to act unilaterally in self-defence. Thus, the blowing up of the power station and the two bridges in upper Egypt, carefully avoiding populated areas and Egyptian troops, was meant to persuade the United Arab Republic to stop its flagrant violations of the cease-fire agreement.
The representative of the United States said that the latest violations of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector again showed that the parties, instead of complying with the Council's decisions, were engaged in their so-called policies of preventive or protective defence and reprisal or retaliation. While the cease-fire was not in itself a substitute for peace, the Council must insist on its scrupulous observance as a necessary condition to the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative to transform the cease-fire into a just and lasting peace, in accordance with the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967.
Algeria's representative stated that the so far west of the Suez Canal by the Israeli commandos implied a grave threat to the safety of the Aswan Dam itself and could lead to a general conflagration. He reiterated that the real problem of the Middle East was that of Palestine and of the occupied territories. He urged the Council to tackle immediately the political problem created by the presence of Israel in the Middle East rather than vainly call again for the observance of a cease-fire that resolved nothing.
The USSR representative said that the occupation of Arab lands by Israel was a constant source of tension and the main reason for new military incidents. The latest premeditated act of provocation by Israel against the United Arab Republic could not be justified, and it was the duty of the Council to condemn Israel and to demand the implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, as the Arab States had agreed to do, so that a political settlement could be achieved.
The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the only way to break the vicious circle of violence in the Middle East was to make an urgent advance towards a political settlement. Since there was already an agreement on the purposes and principles on which a settlement in the area must be based, the Security Council must give every support to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in his talks with the Foreign Ministers of the parties concerned, with a view to giving practical effect to the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. It should not be forgotten that the worst sufferers from violence were innocent people. Facing the hardships of another winter were more than 300,000 refugees in the hills of eastern Jordan who had homes to which they could return immediately. Those families should come first in the Council's compassion and in its priorities of action.
In the opinion of Saudi Arabia, the real problem in the Middle East was the expulsion of the indigenous people of Palestine and the settling there of eastern European Jews, who sought to create a religious State under the banner of Zionism. More than 100 million Arabs, though they felt no hatred for the Jews as such, were nevertheless united in pressing for the rights of the Palestine refugees to their homeland and would not be intimidated by the announced intention of the United States Government to sell Phantom jets to Israel. The only solution to the problem was for the Zionists to relinquish the dream of gathering the Jews of the whole world into Palestine and to look forward to living in Palestine, as a people of the area, in brotherhood with the Arabs. The Security Council, instead of adopting ineffective resolutions, should devise a new approach and prevail upon the Zionists to re-examine their presence in the Middle East.
On 4 November, the representative of France stated that in view of the increasingly large-scale escalation of violence it would not be enough to protest against violations of the cease-fire or to increase the means of detecting its observance. Rather, it was necessary to remove the evil by its roots by securing the full implementation of the Council's unanimous resolution of 22 November 1967. His delegation greatly regretted that application of that resolution had not been accepted in equal fashion by both parties to the dispute, but he hoped that Israel would make an effort, comparable to that recently shown by the United Arab Republic, to facilitate the work of Ambassador Jarring.
In reply to the representative of Israel, the representative of the United Arab Republic stated that Israel's arrogant justification for bombing civilian targets in the United Arab Republic was not only defiance of the Security Council but an ultimatum to the whole world. The protective defence measures undertaken by his country, on the other hand, were aimed at protecting the lives of citizens in the Suez Canal cities where civilian targets were being systematically shelled by Israeli forces stationed on the east side of the Canal. Israel's lip-service to the cease-fire resolution was but a subterfuge designed to obstruct the implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. Moreover, the cease-fire injunctions were only a first, though essential, step that was to be followed by the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories and the establishment of a just and peaceful settlement. On that basis, the United Arab Republic, unlike Israel, had accepted and adhered to the Council's cease-fire resolutions and its resolution 242 of 22 November 1967.
The representative of Brazil stated that the recent acts of aggression and retaliation by the parties to the dispute signified a lack of will to compose differences and forgo violence. Their repeated challenges to the authority of the Security Council required more than merely another stereotyped resolution from a Council which, in the case of the Middle East, was neither blocked nor paralysed: it was inoperative. The Council must strive for a political solution based on its resolution of 22 November 1967 while, particularly among the big powers, the unanimity with which it had been adopted–but which did not extend to its interpretation–still lasted. His delegation again contended that a solution might lie in checking the arms race in the Middle East and regretted that the major powers had not seriously exerted their necessary influence. On the other hand, it was obvious that before the parties concerned agreed to a permanent settlement, they would demand guarantees of the stability of its terms which only the major powers would be in a position to offer.
Hungary's representative said that Israel, contrary to the Council's resolution 248 of 24 March 1968 (see page 198), claimed the right of military reprisals whenever it felt or said that it had been wronged. Unfortunately, the Council had been prevented from taking effective measures by those members who had protected Israel from the application of Chapter VII of the Charter. Attempts were being made by Israel and its protectors to place Israel and the Arab victims of its aggression on an equal footing, with the objective of enabling Israel to maintain its occupation over the Arab territories. To use the cease-fire for such a purpose ran counter to the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Whatever military activities had occurred in the Middle East since June 1967 had taken place on Arab territory; Israel could not therefore claim to be defending itself. By its latest act, Israel had extended its aggression to targets deep in the territory of the United Arab Republic. Condemnation by the Council of that wanton aggression would help Ambassador Jarring's mission by indicating that solution of the problems created by Israel's aggression should be expected not through the policy of terror but through peaceful political means.
The representative of Canada deplored the recent interrelated violations of the cease-fire, by both the United Arab Republic and Israel, all of which must be condemned. In the cycle of retaliation begetting retaliation, there could be no winners. Both parties must be held responsible for the maintenance of the cease-fire. Its significance lay in the intended development of an atmosphere in which serious steps towards a peaceful settlement could be taken. Repeated acts of violence sprang from frustrations at the absence of a settlement and further delayed it. He endorsed the warning of Brazil regarding the dangers of an unlimited escalating arms race in the Middle East and stated that the Council must consider how to solve that problem. Most important to recognize was that the parties carried the main responsibility in seeking a peaceful settlement. Ambassador Jarring could assist them but he needed their full co-operation at the present fateful moment in his efforts.
Ethiopia said that the recent events had dampened the hopes of the international community for peace-building in the Middle East at a time when such hopes had been enhanced by the Security Council's resolution 258 of 18 September 1968 (see page 223) and by the presence in New York of the two Foreign Ministers concerned and the Secretary-General's Special Representative. The Council should insist that no violation of the cease-fire and no military retaliation should be allowed to occur; otherwise a continued cycle of violence and counter-violence might lead inevitably to further escalation of the conflict. The only hopeful way of solving the problem had already been defined in the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967.
The representative of Algeria reiterated that the substance of the problem in the Middle East was the recognition of the right of the people of Palestine to self-determination and their right to nationhood. Regarding the cease-fire, he said that, according to the experience of Algeria itself and of Viet-Nam, a cease-fire invariably emerged from a political settlement, and not vice versa. He added that if Algeria had fought alongside the United Arab Republic it was because of a natural solidarity with fighters for national liberty, within the context of Arab and African fellowship.
In the United Kingdom's view, the efforts towards achieving a settlement in the Middle East had reached a critical stage and if the Security Council were to fail in 1968 to give effect to its unanimous agreement reached in 1967, then 1969 would be the year of retribution, when hate, fear, hopelessness and the horror of another war might become a terrible certainty. Noting that the Foreign Ministers of the parties concerned were currently engaged in discussions, he suggested that at this stage the Council might adjourn.
Following a procedural discussion, the President announced that the Council would adjourn until 7 November 1968; the Council, however, did not resume consideration of the aforementioned complaints on its agenda.
COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL
(4 NOVEMBER-16 DECEMBER 1968)
During November 1968, the Secretary-General circulated supplemental information from the Chief of Staff on 4, 27 and 29 November, relating to overflights of the Suez Canal, a mine explosion and exchange of fire across the Canal.
On 16 December 1960, Israel charged that on 28 and 29 November, and again on 11 December, United Arab Republic forces had opened fire across the Canal. A report from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO on 11 December related to the firing of single shots across the Canal by United Arab Republic forces on that date.
COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND LEBANON
COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL
(MAY–NOVEMBER 1968)
On 12 May 1968, Lebanon charged that, in violation of the Israel-Lebanon Armistice Agreement, Israelis had without provocation shelled the village of Hula on the night of 11-12 May, causing civilian casualties and heavy damage.
In reply, on 14 May 1968, Israel charged that Lebanon had joined other Arab Governments in pursuing a policy of belligerency against Israel, having allowed the use of its territory for terrorist warfare. Israeli villages had been shelled on the nights of 7 and 12 May; in self-defence, fire had been returned on 12 May.
In turn, Lebanon, on 20 May 1968, denied Israel's charges, stating that it was taking all necessary measures to prevent incidents on the southern borders of Lebanon, as well as infiltration across those borders, and was not responsible if Israel was unable to stop acts of Arab resistance inside Israel. Israel's aggressive acts, Lebanon stated, followed declarations by high Israeli officials uncovering expansionist ambitions for Lebanese waters and southern Lebanon. On 11 July 1968, Lebanon transmitted the report of the investigation on 12 May 1968 by a United Nations military observer of Lebanon's complaint of the same date concerning the shelling of Hula. The report had been submitted by the observer to the Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) on 17 May.
On 15 June 1968, Israel charged that Lebanon had breached the cease-fire when, on 1 and 14 June, mortar fire had been opened from Lebanese territory on Israeli villages. Replying, on 15 June, Lebanon charged that on 14 June Israeli armed forces had crossed the Lebanese border and shelled a village, an act of aggression not preceded, as alleged by Israel, by any firing nor by any infiltration from Lebanon.
On 28 and 29 October 1968, Lebanon complained that Israeli armed forces had, without provocation, on 27 October, shelled a Lebanese village from occupied Syrian territory and, on 28 October, two Lebanese border positions.
Inquiries on these complaints were conducted by United Nations military observers at the request of the Lebanese delegation to ILMAC. Summaries of these inquiries, during which mortar craters were observed in each case, were transmitted to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and circulated to members of the Security Council on 30 October.
In its reply of 6 November, Israel stressed the responsibility of Lebanon for preventing armed action against Israel and said that when Lebanon violated the cease-fire, Israel must reserve the right to take appropriate defensive measures.
CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL
(29-31 DECEMBER 1968)
On 29 December 1968, Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider an act of aggression committed by Israel against Lebanon by the attack on the civilian international airport of Beirut on 28 December for which, the letter added, the Israeli authorities had admitted responsibility.
Also on 29 December, Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the constant violation by Lebanon of the Council's cease-fire resolutions by assisting acts of warfare and terror by irregular forces operating from Lebanon against Israel and, in particular, against Israeli civil aviation.
The Secretary-General circulated to the members of the Council, on 29 December, two reports received from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO concerning investigation by the Chairman of ILMAC of the Lebanese complaint about the attack on the Beirut international airport by Israeli helicopter-borne troops. The United Nation military observers had interrogated witnesses to the attack and had seen 13 destroyed aircraft at the airport.
On 29 December, the Security Council met to consider the complaints of Lebanon and Israel. The representatives of the two countries, and, subsequently, the representative of Saudi Arabia were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion to which three meetings were devoted.
The representative of Lebanon stated that his country had become the latest victim of Israel's aggression when, on 28 December 1968, units of Israel's Air Force had made a surprise night attack on installations of the defenceless Beirut international airport and had destroyed the main portion of Lebanon's civilian aircraft fleet. The Security Council should go beyond the usual condemnatory resolutions and take effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. 27/ After full assessment of the damage, Lebanon would request the Council to take the necessary measures against Israel to compensate Lebanon for that damage. Referring to a complaint by Israel about the incident at Athens (Greece) airport (see below), the Lebanese representative said Lebanon could not be held responsible for acts committed outside its territory and without its knowledge by two uprooted Palestine refugees. Lebanon, he stated, gave no refuge to commando organizations.
Israel's representative stated that on 26 December 1968 an Israeli civil airliner had been attacked by bombs and machine-guns at Athens international airport by two Arab members of the terrorist Palestine Liberation Front who had come from Beirut for that purpose. By permitting major Arab terrorist organizations to set up headquarters in Beirut and to maintain training bases in Lebanon, and by officially encouraging warfare by terror against Israel, the Lebanese Government had assumed responsibility for the activities of the terrorist groups.
Any attack against an Israeli civil aircraft, wherever it might be, was as much a violation of the Council's cease-fire resolutions as any attack on Israeli territory and entitled Israel to exercise its right of self-defence, Israel's representative added. Two attacks on Israeli aircraft within six months, by the same terrorist group based in Beirut, showed that the objective was to disrupt Israeli civil aviation. The Israeli commando unit attack on 28 December at Beirut airport, which had not caused any loss of life, had been taken to show that Israel's rights on land and sea and in the air could not be trampled on with impunity. The complaint had to be seen in the broader context of continued active warfare against Israel by the use of irregular forces, armed, trained and financed by the Arab States.
Israel hoped that the Security Council would clearly indicate that it could no longer tolerate the continuation of warfare under the guise of terrorist activities, and that it would hold the Arab States to their cease-fire duties. The activities of the terrorist organizations seriously undermined the patient efforts of Ambassador Jarring. Peace, as called for in the Council's 22 November 1967 resolution, could only be achieved by agreement between Israel and the Arab States. Peace could not be attained if warfare continued while the Arab States disclaimed responsibility for it.
The United States strongly condemned Israel's attack on the Beirut airport. While sharing Israel's concern over increasing interference with international air travel, the attack on 26 December 1968 at Athens airport on an Israeli aircraft did not, the United States representative said, justify retaliation of any kind against Lebanon which, he was convinced, was not responsible for the occurrence at Athens. Lebanon had been doing its best to live in peace with all other States in the area. The magnitude of the military attack on Beirut airport was also entirely disproportionate to the act of individual terrorists which preceded it, the United States representative added. The attack on Beirut international airport had introduced new dangers into the already alarming situation in the Middle East. The Security Council had a responsibility to help break the pattern of increasing violence, and the principal parties in the area, as well as Council members, must redouble their efforts in support of the Jarring mission. A meaningful arms limitation agreement in the area should not await a political settlement.
The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government condemned, as particularly reprehensible, the attack on Beirut airport just as it deplored all violations of existing cease-fire arrangements. What prevented the desperately needed political settlement–the principles and purposes of which had been defined by the Council more than a year ago–was such mistrust and bitterness, hate and fear between the two sides that they would not move to carry it out. Peace would not be won by a spiral of violence and reprisal. The Council must require that the violence cease. The course of peace would be the acceptance, without further prevarication, of a genuine readiness to implement the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967; it would be to let the new refugees go home at once and to start negotiations, through Ambassador Jarring, to end the tragedy of the old refugees.
The representatives of Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Paraguay and Senegal, with varying language and emphasis, condemned the attack on the Beirut airport and rejected in principle all acts of reprisal. A few added that the attack was out of proportion to any provocation offered, and others regretted that it had been undertaken against a country like Lebanon that stood for moderation. In the face of the dangers of the spreading cycle of violence, all spoke of the need for action by the Security Council. Some stated that a satisfactory settlement could result only from putting into effect the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, while others mentioned working for a settlement along those lines and supporting Ambassador Jarring's efforts. A few urged, in addition, joint action by Member States, especially those with particular responsibility.
The USSR representative stated that Israel's military action against Lebanon was a brutal violation of the cease-fire which could not be justified in any way. The Israeli Government's official approval of the aggressive raid on the Beirut airport proved that Israel's inadmissible practice of reprisal and military provocation had become official policy. The action expressed a premeditated decision to create further complications in the Middle East, to prepare the ground for perpetuating the results of the 1967 aggression and to undermine United Nations efforts, in particular those of Ambassador Jarring, to achieve a political settlement. Counting on the moral and political support of certain circles in the West, the Israeli extremists were broadening their aggression and threatening international peace. Putting a stop to Israel's aggression depended very much on whether the United States, eschewing verbal condemnation, was prepared to use its influence, jointly with Security Council members and with other States, to exert the necessary pressure on Israel to achieve a political settlement. The United Kingdom could also take measures with a definite impact on Israel. The Security Council must decisively condemn Israel's criminal action and take appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to force Israel to respect the Council and General Assembly decisions.
The Algerian and Hungarian representatives said that Israel's unprovoked aggression showed its systematic rejection of Charter principles against the use of force. The complaint of Israel, a vain pretext to justify its policy, did not belong on the agenda since no direct relation existed between the perpetrators of the sabotage at Athens and the Government of Lebanon. Verbal condemnation of Israel by some States was inconsistent with the encouragement and assistance offered to Israel, such as the decision by the United States to supply it with Phantom fighter planes. The Security Council must condemn Israel's attack, provide for compensation and take effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter to end Israel's policy of systematic aggression.
India stated that it was the Council's duty to condemn the unprovoked attack, take suitable measures under the relevant provisions of the Charter to prevent the repetition of such wanton acts and demand from Israel the payment of compensation. Incidents in occupied territories or individual acts against Israeli property had been cited as justification for the recent recrudescence of tension. While deploring all violent incidents, the Indian delegation could not accept that they justified recent massive attacks by Israel on Arab property or were relevant to the military attack on Beirut airport. That action was a serious setback to a political settlement through implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.
The representative of Pakistan said that the Beirut attack was the culmination of a systematic Israeli policy based on reliance on indiscriminate use of force. The attack required reassertion of the Council's authority by condemnation of Israel, in stronger terms than hitherto, and by reparation for the damages. For Ambassador Jarring's mission to have any hope of success in the face of the worsening crisis in the Middle East, a balance must be introduced into the situation by the imposition of some restraint on Israel's reckless course. Such a balance could be introduced only if the four permanent members of the Security Council concerted their efforts for peace so as to bring about the conditions necessary for the implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.
The Saudi Arabian representative said that the Charter was quite explicit about what could be done to stop an aggressive State. Chapter VII of the Charter spoke of sanctions. If the two great powers did not ensure reparations for Lebanon, under threat of sanctions, the Council's work would be in vain. He also recalled his warning that the question of Palestine was no longer one between the Arab States and Israel, but, indeed, between the Palestinian people, who had been denied the right of self-determination, and those who had robbed them of their homeland.
On 31 December, the President stated that after intensive consultations the members of the Council had been able to reach agreement on the text of a draft resolution. On the same day, the Council adopted the draft text unanimously as resolution 262 (1968).
By the preambular part of the resolution, the Security Council, among other things, observed that the military action by the armed forces of Israel against the civil international airport of Beirut was premeditated and of a large scale and carefully planned nature and expressed its grave concern about the deteriorating situation resulting from this violation of Council resolutions and its deep concern about the need to assure free uninterrupted international civil air traffic.
By the operative part of the resolution, the Security Council: (1) condemned Israel for its premeditated military action (against the Beirut airport) in violation of its obligations under the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions; (2) considered that such premeditated acts of violence endangered the maintenance of the peace; (3) issued a solemn warning to Israel that if such acts were to be repeated, the Council would have to consider further steps to give effect to its decision; and (4) considered that Lebanon was entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it had suffered, responsibility for which had been acknowledged by Israel. (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)
Explaining his vote, the representative of Canada said that, in supporting the resolution, his delegation wished to emphasize that neither the Israeli attack at Beirut nor other incidents could be taken out of the context of the background of growing violence throughout the area; otherwise they were inexplicable. The incidents at the Athens and Beirut airports must be understood as expressions of extreme feelings of frustration and anger provoked by a state of mutual hostility. There could be no peace unless both sides felt free to develop their national life free from the threat of violence.
Denmark's representative stated that his Government would have preferred the resolution to deal more directly with the act of terror against the Israeli aircraft at Athens. However, the final preambular paragraph should leave no doubt that the Security Council insisted that all undue interference with international civil air traffic be discontinued.
The United Kingdom said that in condemning a specific action, the Council must recognize that such acts were part of a tragic pattern of violent acts and violent reactions that emerged from the unsolved problems of the Middle East.
The representative of France said that the contents of the resolution, although not entirely satisfactory, met the main concerns of his Government. In particular, the French vote reflected a feeling of justice towards a friend of France whose moderating role had been recognized by the international community. He hoped that the unanimous vote would guarantee concerted action by permanent members of the Council to achieve a settlement of the Middle East conflict.
The United States representative dissociated his delegation from sweeping denunciations of Israel for alleged policies and acts not currently under the Council's consideration: Israel was not being asked to defend its right to exist. Although the resolution did not quite suit his Government's thinking on the matter, the United States had supported the resolution and endorsed its condemnation of Israel's action against Beirut airport. His Government also believed, the United States representative continued, that the United Nations should be in the forefront of an effort to give to civilian airports a special status that would provide for appropriate examination of every situation in which that status was disregarded. It remained for the Security Council or other appropriate agencies to deal with the matter soon so as to make it clear that no pretext whatever justified interference with international civil aviation. Regarding allegations in the debate that his Government, in supporting the resolution, had exhibited inconsistency, it should be noted, the United States representative said, that its policies were governed by principles with which its friends sometimes disagreed.
The representatives of Hungary and the USSR said that the compromise resolution was weak and inadequate and did not meet the requirements of the dangerous situation and Israel's aggression. Unfortunately, some members of the Council, while strongly condemning Israel, had not matched words with deeds but had watered down the draft resolution to free Israel from the sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter which should have been applied by the Council. In the USSR's opinion, the resolution might produce some useful results only if all Council members, and in particular its permanent members, took the necessary measures to prevent a repetition of aggressive acts by Israel against the Arab States. The USSR stressed that in voting for the resolution, it had done so with very serious reservations because the resolution was weak and inadequate.
The representative of Israel said that the resolution could not be considered as applicable. By ignoring Israel's right under the cease-fire to be free from attack, it reflected the moral, political and juridical bankruptcy of the Security Council with respect to the Middle East situation. It was not Council resolutions, but the attitude and actions of Governments in the area which would determine the destiny of the area. Israel's action in Beirut, taken in defence of its rights, should bring the Arab Governments to understand the full depth of Israel's determination to ensure its right to peace and security. When the Arab States appreciated that determination, there would be peace in the Middle East.
Lebanon's representative stated that in its resolution the Council had not drawn the logical conclusions and had hesitated to apply Chapter VII of the Charter. Israel, which had deliberately attacked Beirut airport, aware that it was violating international law, the Armistice Agreements and cease-fire decisions, was not likely to heed the Council's platonic warning. Lebanon hoped that the Council's decision committed it in the future to respond to Israel's aggressions by sanctions; otherwise, its warning would be futile.
Concluding the debate, the President (Ethiopia) expressed the view that the effectiveness of the Organization would be enhanced by periodic meetings, within the framework of the United Nations, of the major powers, who were permanent members of the Council, in view of their special responsibility for obliging respect for the Charter. In view of their common support for the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, the Middle East could perhaps be the first of the problems on which such consultations could be profitably conducted.
COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS CONCERNING ISRAEL AND SYRIA
In the Israel-Syria cease-fire sector, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) maintained 16 observation posts for its cease-fire observation operations.
Supplemental information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, issued on 3 and 4 September 1968, reported on two firing incidents in the Israel-Syria sector on 30 August and 2 September in which fire had been initiated by Israel. A Syrian complaint, charging that two Syrian soldiers had been killed and one wounded on 2 September, requested an inquiry but later that request was cancelled.
On 5 September 1968, Israel referred to these two incidents in a letter charging that Syrian soldiers and saboteurs had frequently crossed the cease-fire lines in recent months in attempts to carry out mine laying and sabotage activities. In both cases, the letter stated, Israeli cease-fire positions, in accordance with orders, had fired warning shots in the air towards persons seen advancing in no-man's land. Refusal of Syria to allow United Nations observers access to the site of the 2 September incident showed, it was said, Syrian responsibility for violation of the cease-fire.
Further firing incidents were reported on 13 and 14 September in which fire was initiated by Israel and returned by Syria.
On 9 October 1968, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported on two firing incidents on 5 October. The first concerned a Syrian complaint that Israeli positions had opened fire across the Israeli cease-fire position, killing one woman. The second concerned Syrian and Israeli complaints about an incident in which two Syrian soldiers were killed.
Syria charged that the two soldiers, part of a routine patrol, had been ambushed by Israeli forces when they lost their way.
Israel charged that three Syrian soldiers had crossed into Israel-held territory and opened fire at an Israeli patrol; in the exchange of fire, two Syrian soldiers had been killed.
A further exchange of fire was reported on 30 October 1968. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO also reported on an inquiry into a Syrian complaint that one Syrian civilian had been killed and two had disappeared while looking for livestock on 19 November 1968. A United Nations observation post had reported hearing firing and seeing men advancing westwards towards the Syrian Forward Defended Localities. The inquiry team was shown two dead bodies allegedly found in the area and saw cartridges with Hebrew markings at the alleged scene of the incident.
COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING ISRAEL AND IRAQ
During discussion in the Security Council of complaints by Israel and Jordan relating to the cease-fire, occasional references had been made relating to alleged participation of Iraq in acts of aggression against Israel.
In a letter dated 23 April 1968, Israel stated that, as had been established in the Security Council's deliberations, Arab Governments had assigned units of their regular armies to participate in operations of terror and sabotage against Israel.
Those units, it was charged, used the East Bank of the Jordan as their base. Training camps, it was said, continued to function in Egypt, Syria and Algeria, in addition to camps in Jordanian territory organized by the Jordanian and Iraqi military forces and by the United Arab Republic Embassy in Amman.
Replying on 24 April 1968, Jordan emphasized that Iraqi military forces were in Jordan on the invitation of the Government to help in defending the territory against continued Israeli aggression and repeated massive military attacks.
On 5 November 1968, Israel charged that examination of the area of Ashdot-Yaacov, following an attack on 16-17 October 1968, had revealed that shells had been fired by Iraqi army artillery units from the East Bank of the Jordan. The cease-fire, it further charged, had thus been violated.
When Iraqi forces in Jordan were involved in an action against Israel, the letter stated, the Governments of both Jordan and Iraq bore the responsibility.
On 8 November 1968, Iraq replied, categorically denying involvement of Iraqi forces in Jordan in the shelling incident. Iraqi forces were stationed far from the cease-fire line. Iraq's reply also maintained that it was Israel that had fired long-range shells on the Iraqi positions, as had happened on the night of 27-28 October.
The Iraqi forces, Iraq added, were in Jordan at the latter's request and were under the joint command, whose attitude towards the cease-fire was governed by the position of both Jordan and the United Arab Republic.
On 18 November 1968, Israel replied that the Iraqi reply showed the evasive attitude of the Government of Iraq towards the Security Council's cease-fire resolution.
DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES
COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND JORDAN
COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL
(1 JANUARY-11 MARCH 1968)
S/8321 (A/7032). Letter of 2 January 1968 from Jordan.
S/8328 (A/7035), S/8329. Letters of 5 and 8 January 1968 from Israel.
S/8334. Letter of 10 January 1968 from Jordan.
S/8340, S/8359, S/8364. Letters of 15, 25 and 26 January 1968 from Israel.
S/8361 (A/7046), S/8368 (A/7047). Letters of 26 and 30 January 1968 from Jordan.
S/8397 (A/7050), S/8387. Letters of 2 and 8 February 1968 from Israel.
S/8391 (A/7055). Letter of 9 February 1968 from Jordan.
S/8392, S/8395. Letters of 9 and 11 February 1968 from Israel.
S/8400, S/8409. Letters of 13 and 15 February 1968 from Jordan.
S/8404, S/8405, S/8412. Letters of 15 February 1968 from Israel.
S/8419, S/8423, S/8453 (A/7068). Letters of 16 and 19 February and 11 March 1968 from Jordan.
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION
BY SECURITY COUNCIL DURING PERIOD 1825 MARCH 1968
SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1401-1407.
S/7930/Add.64,65. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 21 March 1968.
S/8470 (A/7071), S/8475. Letters of 18 March 1968 from Israel.
S/8478, S/8482, S/8483 (A/7075). Letters of 19 and 20 March 1968 from Jordan.
S/8484. Letter of 21 March 1968 from Jordan (request to convene Council).
S/8486. Letter of 21 March 1968 from Israel (request to convene Council).
S/8487-S/8491, S/8499. Letters dated 21-23 March 1968 by Israel, United Arab Republic, Iraq, Morocco, Syria and Saudi Arabia (requests to participate in Council's discussion).
S/8495. Letter of 22 March 1968 from USSR (transmitting statement by Soviet Government).
S/8496 (A/7077). Letter of 22 March 1968 from Libya.
S/8501 (A/7078). Letter of 25 March 1968 from Mongolia (transmitting message by Chairman of Presidium dated 23 March 1968 addressed to King of Jordan).
S/8498. India, Pakistan, Senegal: draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 248 (1968), as proposed by Council members, adopted unanimously by Council on 24 March 1968, meeting 1407.
"The Security Council,
"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel,
"Having noted the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representatives of Jordan and Israel in documents S/8470, S/8475, S/8478, S/8483, S/8484 and S/8486,
"Having noted further the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization as contained in documents S/7930/Add.64 and Add.65,
"Recalling resolution 236 (1967) by which the Security Council condemned any and all violations of the cease-fire,
"Observing that the military action by the armed forces of Israel on the territory of Jordan was of a large-scale and carefully planned nature,
"Considering that all violent incidents and other violations of the cease-fire should be prevented and not overlooking past incidents of this nature,
"Recalling further resolution 237(1967) which called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place,
"1. Deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property;
"2. Condemns the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions;
"3. Deplores all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire and declares that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts;
"4. Calls upon Israel to desist from acts or activities in contravention of resolution 237(1967);
"5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review and to report to the Security Council as appropriate."
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL
DURING PERIOD 27 MARCH-6 MAY 1968
SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1409-1412.
S/7930/Add.66. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 30 March 1968.
S/8505, S/8512. Letters of 27 and 29 March 1968 from Jordan.
S/8510, S/8511, S/8515. Letters of 29 March 1968 from Israel.
S/8516. Letter of 29 March 1968 from Jordan (request to convene Council).
S/8517. Letter of 29 March 1968 from Israel (request to convene Council).
S/8518, S/8522, S/8526, S/8527, S/8530. Letters dated 29 March-4 April 1968 from Israel, Syria, United Arab Republic, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (requests to participate in Council's discussion).
S/8528. Letter of 2 April 1968 from Italy.
S/8533. Letter of 8 April 1968 from Jordan.
S/8535. Letter of 8 April 1968 from Israel.
S/8578 (A/7094), S/8579 (A/7095). Letters of 6 May 1968 from Jordan.
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL
DURING PERIOD 4 JUNE-16 AUGUST 1968
SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1429, 1434-1440.
S/8613. Letter of 4 June 1968 from Jordan.
S/8614, S/8615. Letters of 4 June 1968 from Israel.
S/8616. Letter of 5 June 1968 from Jordan (request to convene Council).
S/8617. Letter of 5 June 1968 from Israel (request to convene Council).
S/8618. Letter of 5 June 1968 from Israel (request to participate in Council's discussion).
S/8649 (A/7112). Letter of 21 June 1968 from Jordan.
S/8651. Letter of 24 June 1968 from Israel.
S/8698. Letter of 29 July 1968 from Jordan.
S/8701 (A/7158), S/8716. Letters of 31 July and 2 August 1968 from Israel.
S/8719. Letter of 4 August 1968 from Jordan.
S/8720. Letter of 4 August 1968 from Israel.
S/8721. Letter of 5 August 1968 from Jordan (request to convene Council).
S/8724. Letter of 5 August 1968 from Israel (request to convene Council).
S/8725-S/8727, S/8730, S/8733. Letters dated 5-7 August 1968 from Israel, United Arab Republic, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia (requests to participate in Council's discussion).
S/8739. Letter of 8 August 1968 from Jordan.
RESOLUTION 256 (1968), as proposed by Council members, adopted unanimously by Council on 16 August 1968, meeting 1440.
"The Security Council,
"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel,
"Having noted the contents of the letters of the representatives of Jordan and Israel in documents S/8616, S/8617, S/8721 and S/8724,
"Recalling its previous resolution 248 (1968) condemning the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions and deploring all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire,
"Considering that all violations of the cease-fire should be prevented,
"Observing that both massive air attacks by Israel on Jordanian territory were of a large-scale and carefully planned nature in violation of resolution 248 (1968),
"Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting therefrom,
"1. Reaffirms its resolution 248(1968) which, inter alia, declares that grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts;
"2. Deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property,
"3. Considers that premeditated and repeated military attacks endanger the maintenance of the peace;
"4. Condemns the further military attacks launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and resolution 248 (1968) and warns that if such attacks were to be repeated the Council would duly take account of the failure to comply with the present resolution."
COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL
(AUGUST-DECEMBER 1968)
S/8741. Letter of 9 August 1968 from Jordan.
S/8755, S/8773. Letters of 21 and 26 August 1968 from Jordan.
S/8774. Letter of 26 August 1968 from Israel.
S/8787. Letter of 28 August 1968 from Jordan.
S/8793, S/8818. Letters of 30 August and 17 September 1968 from Israel.
S/8817, S/8845 (A/7262), S/8856 (A/7274). Letters of 17 September and 10 and 15 October 1968 from Jordan.
S/8862 (A/7282), S/8865, S/8884, S/8912. Letters of 21 and 23 October, 3 November and 2 December 1968 from Israel.
S/8911, S/8916. Letters of 2 and 3 December 1968 from Jordan.
S/8917, S/8919. Letters of 3 and 4 December 1968 from Israel.
S/8918, S/8935 (A/7450), S/8951. Letters of 4, 18 and 30 December 1968 from Jordan.
COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS
(1 JANUARY-16 JULY 1968)
S/7930/Add.62, 63 and Corr.1,2, 67-71, 72 and Corr.1, 73. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 26 and 31 January, 27 April, 22 May, 14, 17 and 24 June and 9 July 1968.
S/8369, S/8378. Letters of 30 January and 1 February 1968 from United Arab Republic.
S/8385. Letter of 7 February 1968 from Israel.
S/8677 and Corr.1. Letter of 10 July 1968 from United Arab Republic.
S/8681. Letter of 16 July 1968 from Israel.
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL
DURING PERIOD 28 AUGUST-18 SEPTEMBER 1968
SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1446-1449, 1451,1452.
S/7930/Add.74 and Corr.1, 76, 78-84, 86, 87, 89. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 29 and 30 August and 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 17 and 25 September 1968.
S/8788. Letter of 28 August 1968 from Israel.
S/8794. Letter of 2 September 1968 from Israel (request to convene Council).
S/8797, S/8799. Letters dated 3 September 1968 from Israel and United Arab Republic (requests to participate in Council's discussion).
S/8805. Letter of 8 September 1968 from Israel (request to resume Council meetings).
S/8806. Letter of 8 September 1968 from United Arab Republic (request to convene Council).
RESOLUTION 258 (1968), as proposed by Council members, adopted by Council on 18 September 1968, meeting 1452, by 14 votes to 0, with 1 abstention (Algeria).
"The Security Council,
"Recalling the declaration of the President of the Security Council of 9 September 1968, as made at the 1448th meeting of the Council,
"Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation in the Middle East,
"Convinced that all Members of the United Nations should co-operate towards a peaceful settlement in the Middle East,
"1. Insists that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council in its resolutions must be rigorously respected;
"2. Reaffirms its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, and urges all the parties to extend their fullest co-operation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the speedy fulfilment of the mandate entrusted to him under that resolution."
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL
DURING PERIOD 23 SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1968
SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1456, 1457.
S/7930/Add.88, 90 and Corr.1, 2, 91, 92, 94, 95 and Corr.l, 96-100. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 24, 25 and 26 September, 23, 27, 28, 30 and 31 October and 1 November 1968.
S/8830, S/8831, S/8868, S/8869. Letters of 23 and 25 September and 26 October 1968 from Israel.
S/8870. Letter of 26 October 1968 from United Arab Republic.
S/8875, S/8877. Letters of 29 and 30 October 1968 from Israel.
S/8878. Letter of 1 November 1968 from United Arab Republic (request to convene Council).
S/8879. Letter of 1 November 1968 from Israel (request to convene Council).
S/8880, S/8882. Letters dated 1 November 1968 from Israel and Saudi Arabia (requests to participate in Council's discussion).
COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL
(4 NOVEMBER-16 DECEMBER 1968)
S/7930/Add.101, 103, 104, 106. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 4, 27 and 29 November and 11 December 1968.
S/8934. Letter of 16 December 1968 from Israel.
COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND LEBANON
COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL
(MAY-NOVEMBER 1968)
S/7930/Add.96, 98. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 28 and 31 October 1968.
S/8583. Letter of 12 May 1968 from Lebanon.
S/8585. Letter of 14 May 1968 from Israel.
S/8591. Letter of 20 May 1968 from Lebanon.
S/8637. Letter of 15 June 1968 from Israel.
S/8638 (A/7108). Letter of 15 June 1968 from Lebanon.
S/8678. Letter of 11 July 1968 from Lebanon (transmitting text of report of 17 May 1968 to Chairman, Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, of investigation conducted on 12 May 1968 in connexion with Lebanese complaint of 12 May 1968).
S/8872 (A/7298), S/8874 (A/7299). Letters of 28 and 29 October 1968 from Lebanon.
S/8891. Letter of 6 November 1968 from Israel.
CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL
(29-31 DECEMBER 1968)
SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1460-1462.
S/7930/Add.107, 108. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 29 December 1968.
S/8945. Letter of 29 December 1968 from Lebanon (request to convene Council).
S/8946. Letter of 29 December 1968 from Israel (request to convene Council).
S/8947, S/8955. Letters dated 29 and 30 December 1968 from Israel and Saudi Arabia (requests to participate in Council's discussion).
S/8952. Letter of 30 December 1968 from Lebanon.
RESOLUTION 262 (1968), as proposed by Council members, adopted unanimously by Council on 31 December 1968, meeting 1462.
"The Security Council,
"Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1462,
"Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/8945),
"Having noted the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization contained in documents S/7930/Add.107 and Add.108,
"Having heard the statements of the representative of Lebanon and of the representative of Israel concerning the grave attack committed against the civil International Airport of Beirut,
"Observing that the military action by the armed forces of Israel against the civil International Airport of Beirut was premeditated and of a large scale and carefully planned nature,
"Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting from this violation of the Security Council resolutions,
"Deeply concerned about the need to assure free uninterrupted international civil air traffic,
"1. Condemns Israel for its premeditated military action in violation of its obligations under the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions;
"2. Considers that such premeditated acts of violence endanger the maintenance of the peace;
"3. Issues a solemn warning to Israel that if such acts were to be repeated, the Council would have to consider further steps to give effect to its decisions;
"4. Considers that Lebanon is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered, responsibility for which has been acknowledged by Israel."
COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS CONCERNING ISRAEL AND SYRIA
S/7930/Add.75, 77, 84, 85, 90 and Corr.2, 93, 97, 102, 105. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 3, 4, 13, 14 and 25 September, 9 and 30 October and 25 and 30 November 1968.
S/8804. Letter of 5 September 1968 from Israel.
COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING ISRAEL AND IRAQ
S/8556. Letter of 23 April 1968 from Israel.
S/8559. Letter of 24 April 1968 from Jordan.
S/8886. Letter of 5 November 1968 from Israel.
S/8894. Letter of 8 November 1968 from Iraq.
S/8902, S/8919. Letters of 18 November and 4 December 1968 from Israel.
QUESTIONS CONCERNING TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS IN
ISRAEL-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND CHANGES IN THESE TERRITORIES
During 1968, the Security Council received numerous communications concerning the treatment of civilian populations in territories under Israeli occupation (see also pp. 251-96.) Communications from Arab States complained about Israel's policies in those territories, alleging the arrest, detention and torture, dispossession and expulsion of Arab civilians from their homes, the destruction of Arab villages and houses and the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied areas. Israel rejected the charges of the Arab States and made counter-charges regarding the treatment of Jews in certain Arab States (see also pp. 268-69.) The Secretary-General submitted notes and a report on his efforts to send a representative to the Middle East to enable him to meet his reporting obligations under the Security Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 28/ concerning humanitarian questions. His report was discussed by the Council at two meetings in September 1968.
COMMUNICATIONS FROM ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL
(JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 1968)
Between January and March 1968, the United Arab Republic and Lebanon–the latter in its capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group of States–charged that Israel's forces in the occupied territories–contrary to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in defiance of the Security Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 29/ and the General Assembly's resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 30/ and 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967 31/–were carrying out military operations and acts of violence aimed at terrifying and coercing the civilian populations in those areas, in particular Palestinian refugees, and forcing or inducing them to flee or to acquiesce in accepting the foreign occupation of Israel. These actions, including long curfews, arrests, collective punishments and demolition of homes were aimed, it was stated, at de-Arabization of those territories and their annexation in order to establish the "Greater Israel."
Israel denied the charges, stating that Arab Governments were encouraging belligerency and sabotage by terrorist organizations. Israel was taking normal administrative measures to protect life and property, maintain public order and foster economic development in the areas under its control.
In March 1968, Jordan and Morocco, the latter as Chairman of the Arab Group of States, protested against an Israeli decree of 29 February 1968, by which Israel declared that it no longer regarded the occupied Arab territories as "enemy territories" and had established in those territories customs and civilian control posts for official entry into and exit from "Israel." They charged that those measures constituted proof of Israel's plan for expansion and annexation of the occupied areas in defiance of the Charter and United Nations resolutions.
On 2 March 1968, the Secretary-General circulated a note, in pursuance of the General Assembly's resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and the Security Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 on humanitarian assistance, appealing to all Governments to contribute to meet the new emergency situation facing the Government of Jordan and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Attached to the note was a special report from the Commissioner-General of UNRWA on the exodus from the East Bank of the Jordan valley of some 5,000 civilians, which had followed military incidents on 8 and 15 February 1968.
On 18 April 1968, Syria charged that Israel, having destroyed 30 villages and expelled 115,000 civilians, was forcing the few remaining Syrians to leave their villages while continuing to establish "Nahal" soldier-farmer settlements in the occupied territory for expansionist purposes. All this was in violation of the Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967. On 24 April 1968, Israel termed the charges false, stating that Syria's active belligerency created grave security problems. The Nahal corps were military units designed to help ensure the security of the area and the maintenance of the cease-fire.
On 10 May 1968, a copy of a resolution, adopted on 7 May 1968 by the International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran, Iran, was transmitted to the Security Council by Jordan. The resolution expressed grave concern over the violation of human rights in occupied Arab territories, called on Israel to desist from destroying Arab homes and affirmed the right of inhabitants, who had left their homes as a result of the hostilities, to return and resume normal life, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
On 8 and 16 May 1968, the United Arab Republic charged that Israel continued to violate the Geneva Conventions and United Nations resolutions through mass destruction of homes and eviction of 35,000 inhabitants from the Gaza Strip during February, undermining the work of UNRWA and imposing long curfews with a view "to empty the Strip."
On 3 June 1968, Jordan protested against attempts of 80 Orthodox Jews to settle in Hebron, with the support of Israeli officials and against the wishes of its inhabitants. On 7 June, Israel replied that the Jordanian letter distorted the matter: a small group of pious Jews had taken up residence in Hebron where there was no good reason why their neighbours should not live peacefully with them.
On 18 and 27 June 1968, Jordan transmitted to the Secretary-General foreign press reports concerning demolition of villages and expropriation of property in towns and villages in occupied areas since 5 June 1967 and the destruction of civilian life in the Jordan Valley by premeditated Israeli attacks, in particular those on Shuneh and Irbid on 4 June. Replying on 1 July 1968, Israel stated that the 4 June incident referred to was a large-scale Jordanian artillery attack on Israeli villages to which Israel's forces had been compelled to react in self-defence. Responsibility for tension and loss of life and property in the Jordan valley sector, the letter charged, rested with Jordan which pursued warfare in violation of the cease-fire.
On 18 June 1968, Syria charged Israel with continuation of its systematic policy of colonization in occupied Syrian territories through the establishment of Israeli settlements and pressure on remaining Syrians to leave. In reply, Israel charged on 27 June that Syria's persistence in warfare and its support of terror organizations against Israel necessitated measures undertaken with the assistance of Nahal units of the Israel Defence Forces, to ensure the maintenance of the cease-fire and to protect Israel from Syrian attacks.
On 18 July 1968, Jordan drew attention to a map circulated at the World Zionist Congress, held in Jerusalem in June 1968, depicting the locations of some 35 new Jewish settlements; the majority of these paramilitary fortified settlements were to be established in occupied Arab territory. This policy of colonization confirmed, the letter said, the belligerent intransigence of Israel in disregard of United Nations resolutions. In reply, Israel, stated on 28 July, that of the 35 settlements referred to, only 14 were in occupied areas, and nearly all had been in existence for some time. The letter added that the recent sharp increase of armed attacks and sabotage raids from Jordanian territory underlined the importance of these Nahal outposts. On 2 August, Jordan rejected Israel's explanation and stated that Israel's policy of consolidating its June 1967 aggression had become obvious: aggression, territorial acquisition, expulsion of the indigenous population and demolition of their villages, expropriation of Arab land and establishment of Israeli settlements with Jewish immigrants.
On 24 July 1968, Jordan drew attention to the deteriorating conditions of more than 400,000 refugees and displaced persons forced to flee from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the East Bank of Jordan. Jordan charged that, owing to Israel's intransigence in implementing Council and Assembly resolutions, only some 14,000 had been allowed to return. In letters of 25 and 26 July, Jordan and Sudan, the latter as Chairman of the Arab Group of States, charged that Israel intended to expel another 50,000 refugees from the Gaza Strip to the East Bank and was systematically persecuting the Arabs in the occupied territories in order to further its policy of altering the demographic character of those territories. On 29 July, Jordan protested against an Israeli attempt to implement the expulsion by forcing refugees across the King Hussein bridge, an action that had resulted in a firing incident.
In a letter of 30 July 1968, Israel rejected the expulsion charge, stating that "no pressure is exerted on Gaza residents to leave nor are they prevented from leaving." In a further letter of 1 August 1968, Israel, in reply to Jordan's letter of 24 July, said that it was Jordan that had failed to produce, for return to their homes, 3,000 refugees a day, following a humanitarian agreement signed by the two countries on 6 August 1967. 32/ Replying on 2 August 1968 to Israel's letter of 30 July 1968, Jordan stated that neither the so-called agreements nor other distortions would justify the obstacles that Israel had placed in the way of the return of the refugees. On 5 August, Jordan transmitted to the Secretary-General a copy of a protest, sent to the Director of UNRWA in the Gaza Strip, against Israel's premeditated plan for the expulsion and deportation of the refugees.
On 25 July 1968, Syria charged that Israeli forces were systematically continuing their ruthless colonization of occupied Arab territories–as evidenced by Israeli statements and press reports–and their inhuman treatment of the Arab civilian population. These allegations were rejected by Israel on 1 August in a letter which also charged continued oppression of Syrian Jews and rejection by Syria of all United Nations efforts towards peace in the Middle East. In further letters of 9 and 16 August, Syria quoted reports and statements in support of its charges that Israel was integrating, into Israel, occupied Syrian territory on the Golan Heights.
On 19 August 1968, Jordan charged that on 18 August, hundreds of Israeli youths had poured into Arab Jerusalem and attacked Arab residents for over an hour. These lawless acts made imperative the dispatch of a Special Representative by the Secretary-General to undertake on-the-spot investigations. In a letter dated 21 August, Israel stated that Jordan's letter of 19 August had deliberately omitted to mention that the incident had begun with three premeditated terror attacks in Jerusalem, carried out by terror organizations operating from Jordan, and causing injuries to 10 persons. The Jerusalem authorities had condemned the outburst of some Jewish youths incensed by the terror attacks, arrested some and taken immediate steps to prevent recurrence of the turbulence.
On 29 August 1968, Jordan transmitted to the Secretary-General a letter dated 25 July from the former inhabitants of villages near Latrun who charged that, following their forced evacuation in the six-day war, their villages had been destroyed and they had been rendered destitute.
On 18 September 1968, Jordan transmitted protests to Israeli officials by Arab leaders and inhabitants of occupied territories against inhuman and other arbitrary measures taken by the Israeli authorities against innocent people in the occupied territories. One document called for an end to Israeli occupation.
NOTES BY SECRETARY-GENERAL
(APRIL AND JULY 1968)
In a note circulated to the members of the Security Council on 19 April 1968, the Secretary-General stated that concern about humanitarian questions in the Middle Eastern area had been frequently brought to his attention, but that since the termination of the mission of his Special Representative, Nils Göran Gussing, in 1967, 33/ there had been no United Nations source of first-hand information on those problems. In view of this, the Secretary-General, in late February, had addressed messages to the Permanent Representatives of Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic, informing them in similar terms of his intention to send a fact-finding representative to the area, to enable him to meet his continuing reporting obligations under Security Council resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, and asking for the co-operation of the Governments concerned. Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic had agreed to the proposals. Israel's reply stated that it regarded its willingness to co-operate with such an exclusively fact-finding mission as a continuation of its co-operation with Mr. Gussing and noted the Secretary-General's assurance that his representative would look into and report on the situation of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries situated in the area of conflict. On 19 April 1968, in a reply noting the reference to an "assurance," the Secretary-General stated that the scope of activities of his representative would fall strictly within the context of the Security Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 34/ and the General Assembly's resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July l967. 35/ The Security Council's resolution specifically had called upon Israel "to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled since the outbreak of hostilities," and it had recommended to the Governments concerned scrupulous respect for the humanitarian principles contained in the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
On 31 July 1968, the Secretary-General submitted a further note to the Security Council setting forth the communications between the Secretary-General and the parties, from May to July 1968, relating to his proposal to send a representative to the Middle East. In letters of 2 and 20 May 1968, the Permanent Representative of Syria had emphasized his Government's understanding that the humanitarian resolutions, under which the proposed special representative would be appointed, referred exclusively to the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place, that they did not apply, as claimed by Israel, to the Jewish communities in the Arab countries situated in the area of conflict, and that the mission of the representative would be confined to reporting under those resolutions. In on 23 May, and in written communications of 12 and 26 June and 8 July 1968, the Permanent Representative of Israel had stated to the Security Council his Government's view that the mission of the representative should cover the situation of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries, including Iraq and Lebanon, a situation which, in certain Arab countries involved in the hostilities, Mr. Gussing had unsuccessfully sought to investigate. Israel maintained that the relevant resolutions related to the condition of the civilian population throughout the Middle East area of conflict and not only in Israel-held territories. It was clear that Iraq was one of the States directly concerned because of its participation in the war. Although Lebanon did not fully participate in the fighting, anxiety was felt about the Jewish community there, and there was no logical reason why Lebanon should be excluded from the scope of the mission.
In replies to Israel, the Secretary-General stated–orally on 23 May and in written communications on 18 and 27 June and 15 July 1968–that the proposed extension of the terms of reference to cover the treatment of the Jewish communities in Iraq and Lebanon was unacceptable; he regretted that the question had been raised, particularly at such a late stage. The second humanitarian mission would have the same terms of reference and general scope as the first (Gussing) mission, and the suggested extension had not been raised at that time. The Secretary-General expressed his deep concern for the situation of the Jewish communities in the Arab States and said that he had been dealing directly with the question of the treatment of the Jewish community in Iraq through that country's Permanent Representative and would continue to do so. He added that there was no indication that a problem existed concerning the treatment of the Jewish community in Lebanon. The Secretary-General then pointed out that it was only by the broadest possible humanitarian interpretation of the provisions of the relevant resolutions that it had been possible, in the case of the Gussing mission, to include humanitarian inquiries concerning Jewish persons in Syria and in the United Arab Republic as ancillary to the investigation of the condition and treatment of the inhabitants of occupied territories. The Security Council resolution could not, by legal interpretation, be regarded as applying to the Jewish communities in Iraq and Lebanon. Attached to the Secretary-General's letter of 15 July was a brief legal analysis concerning the application and scope of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. The Secretary-General stated that he regretfully had to conclude that the points raised by Israel were to be taken as conditions which had to be met, if the proposed mission was to be able to proceed and have the necessary access to the areas with which it was concerned.
The Secretary-General went on to state that he had communicated the position of Israel to Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic. The replies from the representatives of Syria and Jordan on 23 July, and the United Arab Republic on 25 July, confirmed that their Governments would welcome the Secretary-General's special representative, whose terms of reference, they stated, had been clearly indicated in the Security Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 and the General Assembly's resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967. The obstacles placed by Israel to the proposed second mission and Israel's arbitrary demands were aimed, it was stated, at perpetuating the tragedy of the Arab inhabitants expelled by the Israeli occupation authorities and at continuing the inhuman treatment of the civilian population under Israeli rule in occupied Arab territories. The representatives of the Arab States hoped that the Secretary-General would see that the two resolutions were effectively and fully implemented.
Attached to the Secretary-General's note was a reply dated 29 July 1968, transmitted from the Foreign Minister of Israel, stating, inter alia, that Israel was not imposing "conditions" but was asking only that the mission should have an equal opportunity to investigate the situation of Jewish communities in Arab countries since the recent conflict. This was, Israel believed, clearly within the scope of the relevant resolution, which had made plain that United Nations humanitarian concern extended to civilians in the whole Middle East area. It was, therefore, the Foreign Minister had said, the unwillingness of the Arab Governments to co-operate in that respect which was delaying the mission. He had also said that the Secretariat's legal analysis was "open to severe criticism" and had expressed regret that it should seek to disengage itself from the Secretary-General's correct instruction to Mr. Gussing that the provisions of resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 "might properly be interpreted as having application to the treatment, at the time of the recent war and as a result of that war, of both Jewish and Arab persons in the States which are directly concerned because of their participation in the war." Israel's Foreign Minister had requested that the Secretary-General also inform Iraq and Lebanon about Israel's position since they were also directly involved in the conflict, and an inquiry needed to be made into the situation of their Jewish communities.
Summing up his report of 31 July 1968, the Secretary-General stated that there was currently no basis on which the mission could proceed, since it required the co-operation of the parties concerned and the necessary assured access. The difficulties arose from an attempt to broaden the scope and terms of reference of the new mission beyond those applying to the Gussing mission, which went as far as the relevant resolutions would permit. There was no question of discrimination; approaches had been made to the Governments concerned, including the Government of Iraq, regarding the treatment of Jewish communities, and there appeared to be no problem regarding the Jewish community in Lebanon. The Secretary-General held that on the legal level the resolution could not be stretched to cover Iraq and Lebanon, and he had not approached them regarding the question of the acceptance of the mission. He pointed out that the Security Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 had referred to "the area of conflict," not the territory of States parties to the conflict, and that the records of the discussions preceding the adoption of the resolution also showed that what motivated the resolution was concern for the inhabitants of the occupied areas or of the areas where military operations have taken place." The proposed mission would be concerned exclusively with humanitarian matters. The Secretary-General considered it unfortunate that considerations involving the well-being of a great many people should not be regarded as being of sufficient urgency to override the obstacles that the projected mission was facing.
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL
DURING PERIOD 17-27 SEPTEMBER 1968
By letter dated 17 September 1968, the representatives of Pakistan and Senegal requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the Secretary-General's note of 31 July 1968.
On 20 September, the Council placed the letter on its agenda and considered the question at two meetings. Representatives of Israel, Jordan, the United Arab Republic and, subsequently, Syria were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion.
Also on 20 September, Pakistan and Senegal introduced a draft resolution whereby the Security Council, concerned at the reports on the conditions of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel, following the hostilities of 5 June 1967, would: (1) deplore the refusal of Israel to receive a special representative of the Secretary-General; (2) request the Secretary-General urgently to dispatch a special representative to the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel following the hostilities of 5 June 1967, and to report on the implementation of the Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967; and (3) request Israel to receive the special representative, to co-operate with him and to facilitate his work.
The representative of Senegal stated that Israel, by introducing into the question elements which were entirely alien, in fact as well as in law, to the humanitarian procedure which the Secretary-General wished to follow, had hindered the implementation of the Security Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967. That resolution, he continued, related solely to the civilian populations in the areas where hostilities had taken place and which were subsequently occupied by Israel; the resolution had nothing to do with the protection of ethnic minorities in other countries.
The representative of Pakistan added that his delegation was entirely in agreement with the Secretary-General's interpretation of the Council's resolution of 14 June 1967. It was the clear duty of the Council to ensure that, pending final settlement of the political issues, the people who had been left under Israeli military occupation were not denied their fundamental human rights.
In Jordan's view, the issue before the Security Council was whether or not Israel should be permitted to defy the Council's injunction calling for the security, welfare and safety of the inhabitants of the occupied territories. Israel, Jordan's representative said, was resisting an impartial investigation because that would uncover Israel's criminal acts and lawless behaviour. He charged that the Israelis had: (1) denied the right of the inhabitants of the occupied areas to protection, safety, welfare and security; (2) unlawfully interfered in the religious rights of the inhabitants; (3) forced prisoners of war to take part in military production, which would be used in war operations against their country; (4) arbitrarily arrested many innocent individuals without trial, and tortured many others; (5) expelled thousands of Palestinians, including many of their leaders, from Sinai and the Gaza Strip and from the West Bank of Jordan to the East Bank; (6) ignored the laws of the occupied territories, changed the status of officials and judges, and promulgated Israeli laws in direct violation of international law and practice; (7) destroyed Arab houses and confiscated Arab property; (8) settled Jewish groups on Arab land in occupied territories; (9) imposed harsh and discriminatory economic measures on the inhabitants of the occupied territories; and (10) committed acts leading to systematic destruction of the essential foundations of the life of the Palestinian people.
Should Israel deny these charges, the representative of Jordan said, that would reinforce the fact that the only way to find out the truth was by on-the-spot investigation. To substantiate his charges, the representative of Jordan cited numerous communications previously addressed to the Council.
Israel's representative stated that the complaint before the Security Council was but a reflection of continued Arab hostility and intransigence. Far from contributing to the promotion of understanding, it heightened tension and did not assist the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It was regrettable that the Arab Governments were delaying the process by which the current situation of cease-fire lines and military administration could be replaced, through agreement and peace, by recognized boundaries and normal government. Israel had conveyed its willingness to the Secretary-General to co-operate with a second representative on a fact-finding mission within the context of the Security Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 36/ and the General Assembly's resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967. 37/ Israel had co-operated with Mr. Gussing's mission; it asked only that a second mission should have an equal opportunity to investigate the situation of Jewish communities cruelly persecuted in the Arab countries since the recent conflict. The Arab refusal to permit such investigation was contrary to the relevant resolutions and contrary to the Secretary-General's interpretation of the scope of the Gussing mission.
The Council's resolution of 14 June 1967, Israel's representative claimed, was addressed to the Governments concerned, not to one Government. The text of that resolution made it clear that international concern extended over the whole Middle East region, he maintained, citing specifically the preamble to the resolution and one of its operative paragraphs. (The preamble stated, inter alia, the Council's view that there was an urgent need to spare the civilian populations and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict in the Middle East additional sufferings, as well as its view that all the obligations of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 on the treatment of prisoners of war should be complied with by the parties involved in the conflict. By the operative paragraph cited, the Council recommended to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.)
Continuing, the representative of Israel stated that the visit of any Security Council member to the territories under Israel's control would be facilitated so that he could form his own impressions. What Israel could not accept was deliberate disregard for the fate of Jews who were in distress. The meeting in occupied territories between Arabs and Israelis, for the first time since 1948, showed that peaceful coexistence between the two peoples was possible, since both wanted peace; the normalcy of the situation had been commented upon by neutral observers. The real humanitarian problem in the Middle East concerned the people of Jewish faith in Arab countries. The representative of Israel charged that in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, Jews had been subjected to discrimination, oppression and inhuman treatment: their only crime was in being Jews.
On 27 September 1968, following informal consultations, a revised version of the Pakistan-Senegal draft resolution was placed before the Council.
By the preambular paragraphs of this revised text, the Security Council would: express its concern with the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants under military occupation by Israel following the hostilities of 5 June 1967; recall its resolution 237 of 14 June 1967; note the Secretary-General's report of 31 July 1968 and express appreciation for his efforts in this connexion; and deplore the delay in implementing the Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 because of the conditions still being set by Israel for receiving a special representative of the Secretary-General.
By the operative provisions of the draft text, the Council would: (1) request the Secretary-General urgently to dispatch a special representative to the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel following the hostilities of 5 June 1967, and to report on the implementation of the Council resolution of 14 June 1967; (2) request the Government of Israel to receive the Secretary-General's special representative and co-operate with him in his work; and (3) recommend that the Secretary-General be afforded all co-operation in his efforts to bring about the implementation of the current resolution and Council resolution 237 (1967).
The representative of the United Kingdom expressed concern that humanitarian action, in accordance with the clear purposes of the Security Council unanimously expressed after the June 1967 hostilities, had been so long delayed. Referring to the accusation of discrimination as a "serious charge" and a matter for concern, the United Kingdom representative said the Council must not lay itself open to any such accusation. The General Assembly and the Council, in adopting the humanitarian resolutions, had been concerned about all civilians in the area of conflict. The Secretary-General had explained that by a broad humanitarian interpretation it was possible to stretch the terms of the resolutions to include humanitarian inquiries concerning Jewish persons in Syria and the United Arab Republic as ancillary to the investigation of the condition of the inhabitants of the occupied territories; he had also explained why it was not possible to extend the inquiries to Lebanon and Iraq. While it might be possible to contend that the Secretary-General had gone beyond the strict interpretation of the resolutions, the United Kingdom representative went on, he had done so for humanitarian reasons which should be respected; no charge of discrimination could be made against him. What was needed was effective action, without delay, through a unanimous decision to assist those who had been suffering too long.
To reach that objective, the United Kingdom had put forward in the consultations certain detailed proposals because it wanted to see the Council's humanitarian resolution of 14 June 1967 given full effect, because it wished to enable the Secretary-General to dispatch his special representative to the area without further delay and because it wished to make clear that no obstacles and no conditions should stand in the way.
The United Kingdom representative appealed on humanitarian grounds for every support to be given to the Secretary-General and his representative.
France regretted that certain obstacles had made it impossible for the Secretary-General to send a new representative to enable him to report, in accordance with the relevant resolutions, on the many problems continuing to arise on the humanitarian level. The Secretary-General had stated that the second mission would have the same scope as the first; that mission had caused no particular difficulties. France, for obvious humanitarian motives, had been gratified by the broad interpretation placed by the Secretary-General on the resolutions concerning the Gussing mission's area of activity. Why should new and unacceptable conditions be imposed? The resolutions were aimed at those areas which were currently occupied territories. France had always urged a speedy end to that occupation; meanwhile the Council must be informed with regard to the conditions prevailing there.
The representative of the United Arab Republic said that the continued illegal occupation of the Arab lands and the mistreatment of the inhabitants were a constant violation of international principles, including those of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, for regulating the behaviour of States in time of war and the protection of civilians. Among Israel's most flagrant crimes were: the inhumane practice of indiscriminately demolishing houses as a means of suppressing the legitimate aspirations of the civilian inhabitants; the appropriation of lands owned individually or collectively by Arabs, especially in Jerusalem; and intimidation, coercion and massive deportation aimed at changing the ethnic and demographic structure of the occupied Arab territories. That established policy of repression, the United Arab Republic continued, explained why Israel was adamant in its refusal to co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and had put obstacles in the way of the implementation of the Council's resolution of 14 June 1967. Israel's violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories had been recognized by the Teheran Conference on Human Rights. The resolution adopted by that Conference, expressing its grave concern at such violations, had made it imperative for the Secretary-General not to delay the dispatch of his special representative
Syria's spokesman stated that the Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 and the Assembly's resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 had been completely disregarded by Israel, which had committed, and was still committing, war crimes and crimes against humanity in the occupied Arab territories, as could be seen from various United Nations documents and in the writings of Israeli, as well as American and other Western authors. While the humanitarian aspect of the problem should guide the Council's deliberations, that aspect should not override legal considerations, as the Secretary-General had made clear. The members of the Jewish community in Syria were Syrian citizens with full, equal rights and duties; those who were concerned about ethnic or religious minorities in Arab countries could seek assurances from the International Red Cross Committee, whose representative had paid tribute to Syrian efforts to protect its Jewish citizens. Swelling the number of refugees, who were increasing daily, the occupied areas of Syria had been almost completely emptied of their inhabitants, and over 40 villages there had been levelled by Israeli bulldozers. As the Commissioner-General of UNRWA had pointed out in his 29 April 1968 report to the International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran, Iran, UNRWA had not been able to provide the refugees with an adequate standard of living nor to accord them the full measure of their human rights.
The Syrian representative cited previous communications he had addressed to the Council charging the Israeli occupying authorities with violations of human rights and of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including intimidation and expulsion of indigenous inhabitants, burning of crops, seizure of innocent individuals, looting and bulldozing of villages. There were now 38 new Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories, nine of which were on Syrian soil. The resolutions adopted by the Economic and Social Council (see pp. 553-54), the Commission on Human Rights (see pp. 552-53) and the Teheran Conference (see page 540) relating to the treatment of the Arab civilian populations in the Israel-occupied territories should remind the Security Council of the gravity and dimensions of the human problem involved.
The representative of Israel said that the Arab delegations and their supporters had tried by devious arguments to dismiss the problem of oppression of Jews in the Arab States in the wake of the June 1967 hostilities; it was not the first time that they had proposed in the Council that justice and law be one-sided. He cited foreign reports relating to the situation of Jews in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The situation had been considered grave enough for the Secretary-General's first representative on humanitarian matters to concern himself with it, the Israeli representative said, and the situation of Jews in Iraq woeful enough for the Secretary-General to take it up repeatedly with the Government of Iraq. Yet the Arab delegations and the sponsors of the draft resolution before the Council would have the situation ignored. The Arab Governments by continuing to wage war against Israel were, he charged, responsible for the security actions Israel was compelled to take. The Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 was being implemented by Israel, which was fully discharging its responsibility for the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of all Israel-held territories.
The USSR representative said that the question of the dispatch to the Middle East of a special representative of the Secretary-General, for humanitarian purposes, was an inalienable part of the problem of the speedy liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression against the Arab States. Israel had not heeded the warning contained in the Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 38/ but had continued to commit acts of lawlessness in the occupied Arab territories and had established there a regime of arbitrary oppression, expropriating Arab lands, expelling the Arab inhabitants, and destroying Arab villages. Because Israel feared exposure, it was therefore hindering the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. What was happening in the occupied Arab territories emphasized the need for the earliest possible withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territories and a political settlement in the Middle East through the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. 39/ The draft resolution currently before the Council (see page 244), despite its inadequacy, responded on the whole to the needs of the situation.
The representative of Algeria said that Israel had set conditions which it knew in advance were unacceptable for the fulfilment of the humanitarian mission, in order to avoid having to account for the conditions of life of the displaced populations following on its expansionist policies. There was only a slight chance that Israel would eliminate the obstacles it had imposed, because its unavowed aim in posing as the champion of minorities all over the world was to provoke dissension within States and create an atmosphere of suspicion towards their minorities. Israel, Algeria claimed, was seeking to foster a flow of emigrants who would, out of fear and hatred, be forced out and thus allow Israel to increase its population and colonize the newly conquered territories. Israel's policy strengthened Palestinian resistance. Instead of admitting its responsibility for the non-implementation of the Council's resolution of 14 June 1967, Israel had preferred to cast blame on the Arab countries. The humanitarian mission must be maintained as precisely interpreted by the Security Council and the Secretary-General.
Ethiopia's representative said that, in sponsoring the Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967, his delegation's primary purpose had been to ensure the safety and welfare of peoples who had been directly affected by the military conflict of June 1967 and, more particularly, those inhabiting the territories which had come under Israel's military control during, and subsequent to, the conflict. In requesting the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the Council's resolution, Ethiopia had taken special care not to specify any rigid course of action which would make it difficult for him to carry out his mandate; it commended his efforts and hoped that they would continue. The Ethiopian delegation could not share Israel's interpretation of the Council's resolution of 14 June 1967 nor accept the conditions advanced by Israel with regard to the scope of that resolution.
India stressed that the scope of the inquiry was limited to the occupied areas. This had been made quite clear by the language of the first operative paragraph of the Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 (which called upon Israel "to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities" ) . The task of the special representative was simple and unambiguous: to gather full information on the basis of which the Secretary-General could report to the Security Council on the implementation of that resolution. In the light of the Secretary-General's report, it must be concluded that the purposes and principles of the resolution had not yet been fulfilled. Deeply concerned about the plight of the Arab civilians under foreign occupation, India urged Israel to co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
Hungary said that the Security Council should not tolerate attempts by Israel to widen the scope of the debate to include issues outside the framework of the subject-matter. The representatives of Algeria, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic had produced a large number of facts in favour of the urgency of a visit of the Special Representative to occupied Arab territories. The wording, "areas where military operations have taken place," contained in the Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967, clearly referred only to the areas of the Arab States illegally occupied by Israel. Israel was responsible for implementing that resolution. Hungary said, as well as the resolution which the Council might adopt as a result of the current discussion, regarding the humanitarian conditions of the Arab citizens in the occupied areas whatever their religious beliefs. The draft resolution before the Council was very modest in form and careful in wording and should be adopted unanimously.
Statements in exercise of the right of reply were made by the representatives of Israel, Syria and the USSR referring to conditions of Christians, Jews and Kurds in Syria, Jews in the USSR and Arabs in the occupied areas in Syria and the Gaza Strip.
After a procedural discussion during which the United Kingdom had suggested postponement of a vote and Pakistan and the USSR had opposed it, the Security Council, on 27 September 1968, adopted the revised draft resolution sponsored by Pakistan and Senegal by 12 votes in favour to 0 against, with 3 abstentions (Canada, Denmark, the United States), as resolution 259(1968). (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)
Following adoption of the resolution the Secretary-General stated that the Special Representative could be on his way with minimum delay, once there was assurance that he would have the access and co-operation indispensable to the fulfilment of his mission.
The representative of Denmark expressed regret that conditions had been laid down and obstacles raised to the dispatch of a second Special Representative. His delegation had abstained on the draft resolution because it feared that the approach adopted might not serve the purpose. In Denmark's opinion, the Council should rather have expressed its full support of the efforts of the Secretary-General fully to implement the Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967, including the dispatch of a further Special Representative, and it should have called for full and unconditional co-operation from those concerned. That would have stood a better chance of leading to constructive steps of benefit to the populations in question.
The United States representative stated that his delegation's abstention did not mean decreased humanitarian concern for the plight of the civilian populations in the area of the 1967 conflict. The United States would have been pleased to vote for a proposal along the lines outlined by Denmark. The sponsors of the draft resolution had found that unacceptable. It also appeared that the sponsors wished to dissociate the Council from the fate of the Jewish minorities in the area of the conflict. The resolution seemed to narrow the terms of reference of the Special Representative and was thus not designed to achieve practical results. n the basis of the scope of the Council's resolution of 14 June 1967, as applied by the Secretary-General in dispatching Mr. Gussing–a basis which produced practical results–his delegation believed that further progress was most likely to be made.
The United Kingdom believed that the form of the resolution just adopted (resolution 259 (1968)) was not likely to facilitate the implementation of the Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967. It therefore regretted the rejection of its alternative proposals. On the other hand, the United Kingdom strongly supported the purposes of the Council's resolution of 14 June 1967 and the dispatch of a special representative to the Middle East. It had always argued for implementation of that humanitarian resolution without conditions. For that reason, while the United Kingdom did not accept certain sections of the resolution just adopted (259 (1968)), it agreed whole-heartedly with the last operative paragraph whereby the Security Council recommended that the Secretary-General be afforded all co-operation in his efforts to bring about implementation of that resolution, as well as the Council's resolution of 14 June 1967. The United Kingdom, therefore, had voted for the current resolution.
The representative of Canada said that his Government shared the deep and general concern about the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants in the area of conflict in the Middle East and supported the efforts of the Secretary-General to send another Special Representative on humanitarian questions to the Middle East. Canada would have accepted the suggestions in the Secretary-General's report that the second mission should have the same scope and terms of reference as the first, and that the broadest possible humanitarian interpretation should be given to the terms of reference. Unfortunately, the resolution took a restrictive view of the mission and was therefore unlikely to achieve its primary purpose, the dispatch of another Special Representative. Since Canada was concerned that Security Council resolutions should be so drafted as to be carried out, it had been obliged to abstain.
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 14 OCTOBER 1968
On 14 October 1968, the Secretary-General submitted a report in pursuance of the first operative paragraph of Security Council resolution 259 of 27 September 1968, which had requested him urgently to dispatch a Special Representative to the Arab territories under Israeli military occupation. The report contained the texts of letters exchanged by the Secretary-General with the representatives of Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic. On 28 September, the Secretary-General had addressed a letter to the representative of Israel, seeking assurance that the Government of Israel would receive, co-operate with and facilitate the work of the Special Representative to be designated by him. On the same day, he had also written to the representatives of the three Arab States seeking assurance of the co-operation of their Governments with the mission of his Special Representative.
In their replies, the representatives of Jordan and the United Arab Republic had given assurances of their Governments' fullest co-operation with the Special Representative. The representative of Syria, after stating his Government's understanding that under the Council's resolutions 237 of 14 June 1967 40/ and 259 of 27 September 1968 (see page 250 for text) the Special Representative had no mandate over Syrian citizens of Jewish faith, had also assured the Secretary-General that his Special Representative would be afforded all co-operation in his efforts. The representative of Israel had reiterated his Government's stand that the task of the Special Representative should, in accordance with Israel's interpretation of the Council's resolution of 14 June 1967, include the question of treatment of both Arab and Jewish persons in the States which were directly concerned because of their participation in the June l967 war. He had added that, as soon as the Secretary-General had received assurances from the Arab Governments which had participated in the June war that the Special Representative would have the access and co-operation indispensable to the fulfilment of his mission concerning the Jewish minorities in their countries, the Government of Israel would be ready to discuss the arrangements for the mission.
In his reply to the representative of Israel, the Secretary-General pointed out that his request for co-operation was made under the Security Council's resolution 259 of 27 September 1968 which, in its first operative paragraph, referred exclusively to "Arab territories under military occupation by Israel," and, in its second operative paragraph, made a request of Israel which envisaged implementation without conditions. The Secretary-General concluded that since Israel's reply did not afford him a basis on which to dispatch the Special Representative, he had no alternative but to report to the Security Council accordingly.
In conclusion, the Secretary-General stated that, as would be seen from the correspondence, he had not been able to give effect to the Security Council's decision.
FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS
(OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1968)
Between October and December 1968, further communications were received from Syria and Jordan charging violation of human rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions in the occupied Arab territories.
In letters of 15 October and 7 and 21 November 1968, Syria charged that, starting on 18 September with the village of Souraman on the Golan Heights, Israel was demolishing the houses of that village and those of Ahmediye in order to build fortifications and evict the few remaining Syrian inhabitants. In its reply of 21 October to the first letter, Israel stated that Syria had magnified out of proportion the demolition of some abandoned and damaged houses in danger of collapse.
On 12 December 1968, Syria drew attention to a report by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency concerning Israel's plans for establishing 25 Israeli settlements, with a population of 12,000, on the Golan Heights. The letter charged that this arrogant policy of colonizing the occupied territories threatened the peace of the area.
On 28 October and 5 November 1968, Syria communicated charges by various Syrian organizations of violations by Israel of human rights and of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in occupied Arab territories, in particular the Gaza Strip. On 30 October, Israel rejected the Syrian charges and accused Syria of oppressing Syrian Jews and other minorities. Syria, in rejecting on 6 November 1968 the Israeli charges, quoted an open letter from 85 Israeli intellectuals calling for a stop to the violation of human rights in the occupied territories.
In addition to protests relating to Jerusalem and the treatment of its population (see pp. 251-65), Jordan complained during this period, in five letters dated 17 September, and 9, 12 and 13 December 1968, of oppressive measures against Jordanian citizens in the occupied areas, in particular of arbitrary arrests, imprisonments and deportations. In this connexion, Jordan transmitted resolutions adopted by the Arab Regional Conference on Human Rights–held in Beirut, Lebanon, on 4 December 1968–and a memorandum signed by mayors and members of the professions and of women's organizations on the West Bank.
DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES
COMMUNICATIONS FROM ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL
(JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 1968)
S/8344 (A/7039). Letter of 18 January 1968 from Permanent Representative of United Arab Republic to Secretary-General.
S/8346 (A/7040). Letter of 19 January 1968 from Secretary-General to Permanent Representative of United Arab Republic.
S/8349 (A/7041). Letter of 22 January 1968 from Permanent Representative of Israel to Secretary-General.
S/8352 (A/7042). Letter of 22 January 1968 from Secretary-General to Permanent Representative of Israel.
S/8354 (A/7044). Letter of 23 January 1968 from Charge d'affaires of Lebanon to Secretary-General. S/8371. Letter of 31 January 1968 from Israel.
S/8373 and Corr.l (A/7048 and Corr.1). Letter of 31 January 1968 from Permanent Representative of United Arab Republic to Secretary-General.
S/8380 (A/7051). Letter of 2 February 1968 from United Arab Republic.
S/8382 (A/7052). Letter of 5 February 1968 from Secretary-General to Charge d'affaires of Lebanon.
S/8383 (A/7053). Letter of 6 February 1968 from Israel.
S/8384 (A/7054). Letter of 5 February 1968 from Secretary-General to Permanent Representative of United Arab Republic.
S/8434 (A/7059). Letter of 29 February 1968 from United Arab Republic.
S/8435 (A/7060). Note by Secretary-General, dated 2 March 1968, under Security Council resolution 237(1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V)
S/8436. Letter of 4 March 1968 from United Arab Republic.
S/8451 (A/7066). Letter of 11 March 1968 from Israel.
S/8458 (A/7069). Note verbale of 10 March 1968 from Jordan.
S/8459 (A/7070). Letter of 13 March 1968 from Morocco.
S/8550. Letter of 18 April 1968 from Syria.
S/8558. Letter of 24 April 1968 from Israel.
S/8581. Letter of 8 May 1968 from United Arab Republic.
S/8586. Letter of 10 May 1968 from Jordan (transmitting text of resolution I adopted by International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, Iran, on 7 May 1968).
S/8588 (A/7099). Letter of 16 May 1968 from United Arab Republic.
S/8609 (A/7103). Letter of 3 June 1968 from Jordan.
S/8626 (A/7105). Letter of 7 June 1968 from Israel.
S/8642 (A/7109). Letter of 18 June 1968 from Jordan.
S/8643 (A/7110). Letter of 18 June 1968 from Syria.
S/8650 (A/7113). Letter of 21 June 1968 from United Arab Republic.
S/8654 (A/7115). Letter of 27 June 1968 from Israel.
S/8656 (A/7116). Letter of 27 June 1968 from Jordan.
S/8659 (A/7119), S/8663 (A/7130). Letters of 28 June and 1 July 1968 from Israel.
S/8674 (A/7135). Letter of 8 July 1968 from Jordan.
S/8683 (A/7137). Letter of 17 July 1968 from Israel.
S/8685 (A/7139), S/8690 (A/7143), S/8691 (A/7144). Letters of 18, 24 and 25 July 1968 from Jordan.
S/8689 (A/7142). Letter of 25 July 1968 from Syria.
S/8693 (A/7145). Letter of 26 July 1968 from Sudan.
S/8696 (A/7147). Letter of 28 July 1968 from Israel.
S/8698. Letter of 29 July 1968 from Jordan.
S/8700 (A/7157), S/8701, S/8708 (A/7159), S/8711 (A/7160). Letters of 30 and 31 July and 1 August 1968 from Israel.
S/8717 (A/7162), S/8722 (A/7166). Letters of 2 and 5 August 1968 from Jordan.
S/8742 (A/7173), S/8749 (A/7179). Letters of 9 and 16 August 1968 from Syria.
S/8750 (A/7180). Letter of 19 August 1968 from Jordan.
S/8756 (A/7191). Letter of 21 August 1968 from Israel.
S/8789 (A/7188), S/8817, S/8820 (A/7234). Letters of 29 August and 17 and 18 September 1968 from Jordan.
NOTES BY SECRETARY-GENERAL
(APRIL AND JULY 1968)
S/8553 (A/7085), S/8699 (A/7149). Notes by Secretary-General, dated 19 April and 31 July 1968, under Security Council resolution 237(1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252(ES-V).
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL
DURING PERIOD 17-27 SEPTEMBER 1968
SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1453, 1454.
S/8699 (A/7149). Note of 31 July 1968 by Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V).
S/8819. Letter of 17 September 1968 from Pakistan and Senegal (request to convene Council).
S/8822, S/8823, S/8826, S/8829. Letters dated 18-23 September 1968 from Jordan, Israel, United Arab Republic and Syria (requests to participate in Council's discussion).
S/8825 and Rev.1,2. Pakistan and Senegal: draft resolution and revisions.
RESOLUTION 259 (1968), as proposed by Pakistan and Senegal, S/8825/Rev.2, adopted by Council on 27 September 1968, meeting 1454, by 12 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions (Canada, Denmark, United States).
"The Security Council,
"Concerned with the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel following the hostilities of 5 June 1967,
"Recalling its resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,
"Noting the report by the Secretary-General, contained in document S/8699, and appreciating his efforts in this connexion,
"Deploring the delay in the implementation of resolution 237 (1967) because of the conditions still being set by Israel for receiving a Special Representative of the Secretary-General,
"1. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to dispatch a Special Representative to the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel following the hostilities of 5 June 1967, and to report on the implementation of resolution 237 (1967);
"2. Requests the Government of Israel to receive the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to co-operate with him and to facilitate his work;
"3. Recommends that the Secretary-General be afforded all co-operation in his efforts to bring about the implementation of the present resolution and resolution 237 (1967)."
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 14 OCTOBER 1968
S/8851. Report by Secretary-General, dated 14 October 1968, in accordance with Security Council resolution 259 (1968).
FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS (OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1968)
S/8857 (A/7275). Letter of 15 October 1968 from Syria.
S/8863 (A/7283). Letter of 21 October 1968 from Israel.
S/8873 (A/7297). Letter of 28 October 1968 from Syria.
S/8876 (A/7300). Letter of 30 October 1968 from Israel.
S/8887 (A/7307), S/8892 (A/7315), S/8893 (A/7316), S/8904 (A/7346). Letters of 5, 6, 7 and 21 November 1968 from Syria.
S/8923 (A/7382). Letter of 9 December 1968 from Jordan.
S/8928 (A/7390). Letter of 12 December 1968 from Syria.
S/8929 (A/7391), S/8930 (A/7392), S/8932 (A/7399). Letters of 12 and 13 December 1968 from Jordan.
THE SITUATION IN AND AROUND JERUSALEM AND ITS HOLY PLACES
COMMUNICATIONS FROM JORDAN AND ISRAEL
(FEBRUARY-APRIL 1968)
Between February and April 1968, measures taken by Israel within the occupied Old City of Jerusalem were the subject of letters from Jordan and Israel.
By letters dated 23 and 28 February and 28 March 1968, Jordan charged that recent Israeli bulldozing of Arab property in the Magharba Quarter and the planned enlargement of the area west of the Wailing Wall amounted to naked aggression and made a mockery of the two resolutions on the status of Jerusalem adopted at the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly in 1967. 41/ Equally, Jordan protested the expropriation of 838 acres of the areas adjacent to the Old City, for housing projects for Jewish immigrants, as another attempt to uproot the Arab inhabitants. Both measures had been vehemently protested by Arab leaders of Jerusalem who considered that Israel was proceeding with its plans of annexation in utter disregard of resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.
Jordan transmitted to the Council the text of a report issued in 1930 by the Commission appointed by the United Kingdom Government, with the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, to determine the rights and claims of Moslems and Jews in connexion with the Western or Wailing Wall at Jerusalem. The report, Jordan noted, had established that the Wall, as an integral part of the Al-Haram-Esh-Sharif area, the adjacent pavement and the bulldozed Magharba Quarter buildings were Moslem property.
Rejecting the charges by Jordan, Israel in a letter dated 5 March 1968 asserted that the allegations were without foundation but followed logically on the destructive attitude adopted by the Jordanian authorities towards the City of Jerusalem and its Holy Places during the period it was under Jordanian control. It was Jordan which had relentlessly set about destroying the Jewish Quarter, including its synagogues and places of learning and the cemetery on the Mount of Olives, and which had denied free access to the Jewish Holy Places. Those acts of desecration had been described fully in a document published by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Israel, a copy of which was submitted to the Council. The Western Wall, it was added, occupied a unique place in the history and faith of the Jewish people and no Arab conquest of Palestine had effected any change whatsoever in the sacredness of the Wall to the Jewish people.
The letter reiterated Israel's policy: the Holy Places should be protected from desecration, and any other violation, and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places. In pursuance of that policy, the different Holy Places of Judaism, Christianity and Islam were administered under the responsibility of the respective religious authorities which held them sacred.
As for Jordan's charges concerning expropriation, Israel maintained that the plans called for construction of new housing in the modern part of Jerusalem on vacant land, of which about two thirds was public domain or belonged to Jews. Only one third was owned by Arabs who would receive compensation in accordance with the law.
Jordan, on 16 April 1968, rejected the Israeli allegation that two thirds of the illegally expropriated land was public domain, stating that all the land was Arab property except for 52 acres, Jewish claims to which were pending before the courts. An attached map showed, the letter said, the strategic location of the area where a Jewish community was to be established to serve as a barrier between the residents of the northern and southern sections of the West Bank.
On 19 April 1968, Jordan, referring to charges of desecration made in Israel's letter of 5 March, stated that it was the Israelis who wilfully desecrated the Christian and Moslem Holy Places. A study attached to the letter documented with photographs the desecration of Christian cemeteries and church property on Mount Sion in Israel.
On 7 March 1968, Jordan charged Israel with arbitrarily deporting Rouhi El-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem, in flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 237 of 14 June 1967. 42/ That resolution called on Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of all the inhabitants of the occupied territories. The Jordanian letter added that this and other acts of expulsion of Jordanian citizens by Israeli authorities were designed to break the will of the people and were part of Israel's plan to change the national character of the city of Jerusalem and the occupied territories. In a reply, dated 11 March, Israel claimed that Mr. El-Khatib had been an agent of the Jordanian Government in promoting tension and public unrest behind the cease-fire lines and, because of those activities and the threats to public order and security which they posed, he had been ordered to cross the cease-fire lines to Jordan.
COMPLAINT BY JORDAN AND CONSIDERATION BY COUNCIL
IN PERIOD 18 APRIL-21 MAY 1968
By letter of 18 April 1968, Jordan drew the Council's attention to Israel's decision to hold a military parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968. Nearly half of the route was shown in an attached map to be in occupied Arab Jerusalem. The parade, Jordan charged, would flagrantly violate the General Armistice Agreement, Security Council resolution 162 of 11 April 1961 43/ endorsing the Mixed Armistice Commission's decision of 20 March 1961 which condemned such parades, and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, respectively. 44/
By its resolutions of 4 and 14 July, the Assembly, inter alia, called upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken, and to desist from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem.
In a further letter of 25 April 1968, Jordan stated that since the Assembly's adoption of the resolutions of 4 and 14 July 1967, Israel had continued to carry out its plans for annexation and illegal appropriation of Arab lands in Jerusalem and had persisted in projects calculated to change drastically the national and historical character of the Holy City. Jordan charged that those violations were culminating in the parade planned for 2 May 1968, which, because of its nature and the heavy equipment to be used, constituted a serious provocation which would lead to further deterioration in an already explosive situation. Jordan therefore requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider that development and the situation in Jerusalem and to take measures to remedy the situation.
In a note of 26 April 1968, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council and the General Assembly of a note he had addressed to the Government of Israel on 20 April 1968, expressing his concern about plans to hold a military parade on Israel's Independence Day, on 2 May, with much of the parade, it appeared, to be on the east side of the Armistice Demarcation Line and in part of what was known as the Old City of Jerusalem. The Secretary-General had emphasized that such a parade in that area at that time would almost surely cause an increase of tension in the Near East and could well have an adverse effect on the efforts then going forward to find a peaceful settlement of the problems of the area. No reply, the note stated, had been received from Israel.
The complaint submitted by Jordan was considered by the Security Council at 11 meetings between 27 April and 21 May 1968. The first five meetings, held between 27 April and 2 May, dealt, in particular, with the problem of the parade; the six meetings, held between 3 and 21 May, dealt with the situation in Jerusalem as a whole. The representatives of Israel and Jordan were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion.
The representative of Jordan stated that the meeting had been requested to forestall a dangerous situation, which might have repercussions beyond the immediate area. The planned parade, he said, was only one visible aspect of Israel's plan to face the United Nations with another fait accompli and to annex Jerusalem in defiance of the General Assembly resolutions of 4 and 14 July 1967. Those resolutions had declared invalid the measures taken by Israel to change the status of Jerusalem and had called upon Israel to rescind such measures and to desist forthwith from any action altering the status of Jerusalem. Jordan quoted passages from the Secretary-General's report of 12 September 1967, 45/ on the situation in Jerusalem, to the effect that Israeli authorities had made clear that they were taking every step to place under Israel's sovereignty those parts of Jerusalem not controlled by Israel before June 1967, and had stated that the process of integration was "irreversible and not negotiable." The Israeli authorities had consolidated their gains by applying repressive measures against the Arab inhabitants, expropriating and bulldozing Arab property, uprooting thousands of Arabs from their homes and constructing settlement units for Jews only. The Jordanian representative went on to say that Arabs from all walks of life had protested the measures and rejected the steps taken to annex the Arab city of Jerusalem. The planned parade, with heavy military equipment in excess of that allowed by the Armistice Agreement, was a provocative act in violation of the Security Council's resolution 162 of 11 April 1961. He hoped the Council would take more effective measures on this occasion and, as a first step, call on Israel not to hold the parade.
Israel's representative asserted that Jordan's complaint was an attempt to create new tension and misunderstanding. It was, in effect, a complaint about the celebration of Israel's independence, the reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem destroyed by Jordan and the restoration of the Western Wall of King Solomon's temple.
Jordan's objection, Israel said, was not to the parade but to what the parade stood for: Israel's existence, its liberty and its defeat of Arab aggression. Instead of joining in the United Nations efforts to guide the nations of the Middle East towards a just peace, Jordan was asking, as a screen for further warfare against Israel, for a return to the 1949 Armistice Agreements which no longer existed because the Arabs had destroyed them with their attack on Israel in June 1967. Israel's relations with the Arab States were now regulated by the cease-fire established by the Security Council. Within the cease-fire area, Israeli forces were free to move, to act and to parade as they saw fit. The General Assembly's resolutions of 4 and 14 July 1967 had referred to legislation adopted by Israel in June 1967 and were not aimed at preventing military parades nor intended to paralyse construction in Jerusalem.
Continuing, the representative of Israel charged Jordan with concocting unfounded allegations about housing development in Jerusalem. Most of the land involved in the reconstruction projects, he stated, was Jewish-owned or in the public domain, and the undertaking was one of normal urban development. Divided for 19 years because of Jordanian aggression, Jerusalem was again united, the Holy Places were protected, restoration was in progress and life was normal and peaceful in a city where a quarter of a million Jews and 70,000 Arabs mingled in ever-growing understanding. In conclusion Israel's representative said that the present situation called for a clear, unequivocal summons to disavow belligerence, terminate warfare and move onwards to peace.
Jordan, in reply to Israel, stated that no one shared the Israeli view of the Armistice Agreements. The Secretary-General had stated that neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly had indicated that the validity of the Armistice Agreements had been changed. He had stated further that there was no provision in the Armistice Agreements for unilateral termination of their application.
Twelve Council members participated in the ensuing debate. The United Kingdom representative said that his Government stood by its position on the future of Jerusalem. It applied only one test to the military parade: whether or not it would increase tension and adversely affect current efforts to find a peaceful settlement. In the opinion of the United Kingdom, the Security Council should discourage any action which made a peaceful settlement more difficult or which might lead to increased bitterness.
Canada reiterated its position of July 1967 that the question of Jerusalem and the Holy Places could not be resolved as an isolated issue. Canada was opposed to any unilateral action which would prejudice the legitimate international concern about that city, the preservation of special spiritual and religious interests there or the peaceful and agreed settlement sought by the Secretary-General's Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring. Canada regretted Israel's decision to hold the parade which, in the circumstances, was inevitably provocative and seemed to prejudice the future of Jerusalem.
France said that while Israel's wish to commemorate its independence was understandable, the programme planned for the parade–through a sector of occupied Jerusalem–went much further than the demonstration condemned by the Security Council in 1961 and could not but be considered as part of a policy which, since the June 1967 conflict, had been characterized by similar actions. In supporting the General Assembly's resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V), of 4 and 14 July 1967, 46/ France had stated that it could not recognize measures taken by Israel in defiance of those resolutions. Such actions seemed illegal and could only aggravate tension and make more complex a problem that must be solved peacefully. The basic question, the French representative continued, was that of sovereignty. Jerusalem's future could not be determined unilaterally. Jordan itself was concerned, as well as the international community as a whole.
China, Denmark, Ethiopia and Paraguay were of the opinion that the planned parade would increase tension and hamper Ambassador Jarring's important peace mission. They therefore called on Israel to refrain from holding the parade.
Algeria and Hungary stated that the planned military parade was the latest provocative challenge to the United Nations by Israel in pursuing its aggressive policy of annexing Jerusalem. Israel's action was in violation of the Charter, the General Armistice Agreement, and resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Israel's contemptuous attitude towards its international obligations could not be tolerated by the Security Council. The Council should condemn Israel's policy and demand that Israel accept and implement, without delay, the Armistice Agreement, the earlier resolutions of the Council–especially Council resolution 162 (1961) 47/–and Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V), and that it desist from any action that might violate those decisions. Algeria said that the gravest consequence of the planned military parade came from the fact that Zionism, basing its ambitions largely on a fanciful interpretation of the Bible, gave a religious turn to this step towards complete annexation. Adding a religious conflict to a grave political-military situation would make the present conflict implacable. Israel, Algeria added, would want peace only when it had satisfied its territorial ambitions and had filled the annexed territories with immigrants. In this perspective, the understandable and legitimate reaction of the people of Palestine was an attitude of self-defence in order to avoid extermination. Hungary said that the argument advanced by Israel, that the Armistice Agreement and, apparently, all resolutions based on that Agreement, were null and void, could not be accepted by any Member of the United Nations. According to one provision of the Agreement, only by mutual consent might the parties to that Agreement revise or suspend its provisions. Israel, the representative of Hungary said, had never stated that the parties to the Agreement had availed themselves of that provision.
Senegal and India believed that withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territories would be a first step towards peace in the Middle East. They considered that the proposed military parade would exacerbate existing tensions and they called upon Israel not to hold the parade.
Pakistan considered it the Council's duty to reinforce the Secretary-General's efforts since the parade would certainly aggravate tensions and set back the process of achieving a peaceful Middle East settlement.
Accordingly, Pakistan submitted, on behalf of India, Pakistan and Senegal, a draft resolution, as an interim measure.
By this draft, the Security Council, having considered the Secretary-General's note of 26 April 1968 (see page 252), recalling its resolution 162 of 11 April 1961, and considering that the holding of a military parade in Jerusalem would aggravate tensions in the area and have an adverse effect on a peaceful settlement of the problems in the area, would: (1) call upon Israel to refrain from holding the military parade in Jerusalem which was contemplated for 2 May 1968 and (2) request the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution.
The USSR said that the provocative intent of Israel to hold a military parade in Jerusalem was yet another confirmation of its expansionist policies and an attempt to support, by display of military might, its illegal aspirations to the Arab part of Jerusalem in new defiance of the United Nations. Israel continued to ignore the Security Council's resolution 162 of 11 April 1961 and the General Assembly's resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, and by its actions, in particular the proposed parade, had demonstrated it was not even thinking of leaving Arab Jerusalem. The Secretary-General's note of 26 April 1968 reflected the overwhelming concern of the Members of the United Nations. The USSR delegation would support the three-power draft resolution. Should Israel not comply, further measures would have to be considered. Events in Jerusalem and in other occupied Arab lands were signs of the grave situation which Israel was creating in the Middle East, as well as one more confirmation of the fact that so long as Israeli troops did not leave the occupied territories, in accordance with the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, 48/ there would be no peace in the region.
After a brief recess for consultations on the draft resolution, at the request of the United States, the preambular paragraph referring to the Secretary-General's note (of 26 April 1968) was modified so as to make the point also that the Council had considered "particularly his note to the Permanent Representative of Israel." The preambular paragraph by which the Council would recall resolution 162 of 11 April 1961 was deleted.
On 27 April 1968, the draft resolution, as modified, was adopted unanimously as 250 (1968). (For text, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)
Following the vote, the representative of Israel stated that his delegation could not accept the resolution advising Israel not to hold a military parade because under the cease-fire the matter fell within Israel's internal jurisdiction.
The representative of Jordan expressed satisfaction at the Council's prompt action on the first part of its complaint and said that the Council was still seized of the second part which was the situation in Jerusalem.
In a letter of 30 April 1968 to the Secretary-General, the Foreign Minister of Israel stated that, after giving careful attention to the Secretary-General's report of 26 April 1968 and the Security Council's resolution 250 of 27 April 1968, it was his Government's considered opinion that the ceremony of 2 May 1968 need not, and would not, have the adverse effects predicted in some quarters. Jordan's objections, he asserted, were based on implacable hostility, not on disinterested concern for world peace, and its aim was to create, not to alleviate, tension. The tension in the area sprang not from peaceful ceremonies within the cease-fire line, but from terrorist acts across it.
In a letter of 1 May 1968 to the Secretary-General, the representative of Jordan complained that Israeli policemen had mistreated a group of Arab women in Jerusalem who were trying to submit a petition to the Israeli authorities protesting against the proposed military parade.
On 1 May 1968, the Security Council, on the suggestion of Algeria, agreed to add to the agenda the report of the Secretary-General dated 12 September 196749 submitted under General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967 relating to Jerusalem.
The representative of Jordan said that his Government had urgently requested him to inform the Council that it had irrefutable evidence of Israel's intent to hold the military parade despite the Council's resolution 250 of 27 April 1968. His Government appealed to the Council and to the Secretary-General to prevent further deterioration of the already explosive situation Israel's defiance made clear that it was premeditatedly obstructing all efforts to find a peaceful settlement of the area's problems. Yet, he asserted, some powers, for reasons of political expediency, were reluctant to help the Council take adequate measures. If the efforts of Mr. Jarring were to be strengthened, violations leading to a change of the status quo in Jerusalem must be prevented.
Israel's representative, after reading the letter of Israel's Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 30 April 1968 (see above), suggested that the representative of Jordan might advise the Security Council as to why it should attach greater significance to the resolution on the parade than to its resolutions and those of the General Assembly on vital questions of peace and security in the Middle East, which Jordan and other Arab States had refused to implement.
Algeria said that the Council must decide on measures to prevent a fait accompli in Jerusalem; by one gradual measure after another, the Tel Aviv authorities were imposing what, in their view, should be the final status of Jerusalem. It would be deplorable if the Council reacted only when the Zionist authorities annexed the city. The Council must ensure respect for its decisions. It must condemn Israel for its defiance of the 27 April 1968 resolution and then consider what further measures should be taken.
The USSR representative thought that none of the Council members voting for the Council's resolution 250 of 27 April 1968 would agree with the Foreign Minister of Israel, who had attempted to justify the military parade by stating it would take place at a considerable distance from the cease-fire line and would not intensify tension in that area. Consideration of the cease-fire line as a final frontier between Israel and Jordan could only be viewed as a new instance of the expansionist policy of Israel which considered occupied Jerusalem as Israeli territory. On the basis of the General Assembly's resolutions 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967, 50/ the Security Council must reject such an interpretation. It should demand that Israel stop its lawless actions in Jerusalem and abide by United Nations resolutions. The USSR, he said, was ready to take part in any measures which the Council as a whole, including its permanent members, might find necessary to take to curb the aggressor.
The representative of the United States said that his Government had repeatedly expressed its concern about the status of Jerusalem and had pointed out that a just settlement of the city's status was inseparably linked to other aspects of the problem which still defied solution. That, he said, was the clear import of the Council's resolution 242 unanimously adopted on 22 November 1967. Peace would not and could not be achieved by a patchwork of resolutions dealing with one or another symptom of tension and discord in the Middle East. Such a piecemeal approach had been tried time and again, and it had failed. He feared the Council was on the verge of drifting again into the same situation. The main concern of the Council should be to foster the success of Mr. Jarring's mission to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The Council could not impose the terms of a peace settlement on the parties; it was the parties themselves, as envisaged in the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, which should engage in a peacemaking process with the help of a United Nations representative. Only thus could the Council succeed in replacing relations based on the premise of a temporary respite in hostilities by relations based on mutual tolerance and willingness to accept one another and to live in permanent peace.
Jordan's representative, exercising the right of reply, reaffirmed his Government's adherence to all United Nations resolutions. He asked Israel to show by deed its adherence to all resolutions without exception, including the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 which he had challenged Israel to accept and to implement.
In reply, the representative of Israel said that his Government, in statements to Ambassador Jarring, had declared its acceptance of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 by the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and durable peace. He reaffirmed that Israel was willing to seek agreement with each Arab State on all matters included in that resolution. It had accepted Mr. Jarring's proposal for a meeting with each of its neighbours under his auspices. No Arab State had yet accepted that proposal; instead, they still subscribed to the Khartoum declaration: "No negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no peace with Israel."
In a report dated 2 May 1968, submitted in compliance with the Council's resolution 250 of 27 April 1968 (see page 264 for text), the Secretary-General informed the Council, with regret, that the parade had taken place in Jerusalem on 2 May as scheduled, having been held in the area east of the Armistice Demarcation Line for approximately two hours and ten minutes. As far as he knew, there had been no incidents, but in the absence of United Nations observers, it was not possible to provide fully verified information. However, from information received from various sources, the main equipment and personnel for the parade were said to have been concentrated in the eastern part of Jerusalem, as were the main reviewing stand and the spectators' stands.
At a Security Council meeting on 2 May 1968, the President read out the text of a draft resolution which had resulted from consultations among the members of the Council. On the same day, the Council adopted this text unanimously as resolution 251 (1968).
By this resolution, the Council, noting the Secretary-General's reports of 26 April and 2 May 1968 and recalling its resolution 250 of 27 April 1968, deeply deplored the holding by Israel of the military parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968 in disregard of the unanimous decision adopted by the Council on 27 April 1968. (For text of resolution 251(1968), see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)
The representative of Israel stated that the parade had not violated any principle of international law, had created no new situation and had endangered no lives. It had been a parade of thanksgiving and deliverance after 20 years of Arab aggression.
On 3 May 1968, the United Arab Republic transmitted to the Security Council a letter of 2 May addressed by its Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General. It that letter, the Foreign Minister stated that Israel's "illegal" act of holding the parade jeopardized the efforts of Mr. Jarring to achieve a peaceful settlement. The continued challenge by Israel of United Nations resolutions, the letter concluded, proved Israel's resolve to pursue a policy of force, in order to achieve territorial expansion, and its determination to usurp the inherent rights of the Palestinian people.
In a letter of 9 May, Israel informed the Secretary-General that the allegations made by the United Arab Republic Foreign Minister on 2 May had been replied to in the course of the recent Security Council debate. Israel charged the United Arab Republic with continuous violations of United Nations resolutions as it pursued its policy of belligerency and active warfare against Israel by various means. The letter also charged the United Arab Republic with responsibility for the June 1967 war and with subsequent repeated violations of Security Council cease-fire resolutions. After citing statements by the President of the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abdel Nasser, to support the charge of the policy of belligerency manifested by the United Arab Republic, the letter further stated that misrepresentation of the clear purport of the provisions of the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 had most seriously obstructed the progress of Mr. Jarring's mission.
Between 3 and 21 May 1968, the Security Council continued its discussion of the Jordanian complaint of 25 April 1968 and held six meetings on the situation in Jerusalem.
On 3 May 1968, following a request from Jordan on 2 May that Rouhi El-Khatib, the elected Mayor of Jerusalem, be heard by the Security Council, under rule 39 51/ of its provisional rules of procedure, the President, in the name of the Council, invited Mr. El-Khatib to take a place at the Council table and address the Council.
Mr. El-Khatib charged that during the first three weeks of the occupation, the Israeli authorities had spread terror through the city, looting, mistreating anyone expressing dissatisfaction, and arbitrarily gaoling hundreds for unlimited periods in order to create fear and force people to leave. In the Magharba Quarter, a Waqf religious endowment, 135 houses had been bulldozed, causing the inhabitants to scatter. The Israeli authorities and religious bodies had also directed a campaign against the Arab inhabitants of the area adjacent to the Western Wall of the Al-Aqsa mosque, later extended to wider areas in the heart of the Moslem quarters and, to some extent, to the old Jewish quarter, 80 per cent of which was Arab property. Inhabitants had been given notice to evacuate in three days. On 27 June 1967, the Israeli authorities had issued a decree of death to the Arab status of Jerusalem by passing an act annexing Arab Jerusalem to Israel; on 29 June 1967, they had dissolved the Arab Municipal Council and dismissed the Mayor.
Since then, Mr. El-Khatib continued, the situation in Arab Jerusalem had deteriorated as the Israeli authorities executed one carefully planned measure after another, such as: the desecration of Holy Places; the imposition of Israeli civil laws and regulations and school curricula; the application of the "Law of the Properties of Absentees", authorizing confiscation of all property of so-called "absentee Arabs"; the refusal to permit Arabs to go back to their homes in Jerusalem; the expulsion of many Arab dignitaries; the building of new Jewish settlements on expropriated land belonging almost entirely to Arabs, with the purpose of separating Jerusalem Arabs from the Arab towns to the north of Jerusalem; the closing of Arab banks; and the closing down of the Jerusalem airport. Consequently, there had also been a drop in the tourist industry. All these political and economic pressures had made the Arabs feel insecure: 8,000 had to leave their city–Jerusalem. Their only choice, Mr. El-Khatib said, had been to stay and live in misery or leave. The Arab inhabitants had protested these measures taken in violation of United Nations resolutions. Such measures, he charged, were designed to change the identity and character of Jerusalem, to turn what is Arab into Jewish and Israeli and to constitute a fait accompli, not subject to reversal or appeal, namely, the "unification" of the two sectors of Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty.
The representative of Israel stated that Jerusalem had always remained the capital of the Jewish people and was now again a living city in its freedom and unity, with some 200,000 Jews, about 60,000 Arabs and 6,000 persons of other nationalities. He questioned whether a conquest in defiance of the United Nations, a 19-year occupation in a reign of vandalism, gave Jordan the right to oppose Jerusalem's revival in integrity, and whether the presence of 54,000 Moslems and 4,000 Christians in addition to more than 200,000 Jews necessitated a bisection of the city. Rejecting the Jordanian charges, Israel's representative referred to the report of 12 September 1967 by the Secretary-General, on the situation in the Jerusalem area and its Holy Places, based on information gathered by the Secretary-General's Personal Representative, Ambassador Ernesto A. Thalmann of Switzerland. 52/ The Israeli representative cited Mr. Thalmann's statement that he had been struck by the great activity and the mingling of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem where uniforms were few and weapons fewer. He had also reported absorption of the Arab personnel of the Old City into the equivalent departments in the Israeli municipality.
Since that report, the representative of Israel continued, the situation had further improved. Public services and schools were operating normally. In private schools, there had been no change in curriculum; in municipal schools, the curriculum current in Israel's Arab schools was followed. All Moslem and Christian institutions were pursuing their activities, without hindrance, under the same leadership, and Israel, deeply aware of the universal interest in Jerusalem, had reaffirmed its willingness to work for formal settlements satisfactory to the Christian, Moslem and Jewish faiths.
As for Mr. El-Khatib, the Israeli representative said, he was a member of the National Council of the Liberation Army and, as an agent of the Jordanian Government, he had continued to promote public unrest and had been ordered to cross the cease-fire line, as had three others for similar activities. The Israeli representative also pointed out that the plan to develop the Jewish Quarter involved an area which Jordan had destroyed in 1948 and allowed to degenerate into a slum. Most of the land involved in other development projects was Jewish property or public domain, and all private claimants would be compensated.
In conclusion, he stated that Israel would pursue its aim of peace with its neighbours. That aim could be achieved, but only if warfare by terror, warfare by threat and warfare in the international organizations ceased.
The representative of Jordan declared that the representative of Israel had used diversionary tactics to distract attention from the only issue before the Security Council: violations by Israel of Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967,53/ which emphasized the inadmissibility of territorial gains by force, and of two General Assembly resolutions declaring that the status of Jerusalem should not be changed.
As for the question of the national character of Jerusalem, raised by Israel in connexion with building projects, the Jordanian representative noted that, on the eve of partition in 1947, United Nations records testified that only 26 per cent of the property in Jerusalem was Jewish-owned and that, through carefully planned military operations, the Zionists had occupied 84 per cent of the city in 1948, and many of the inhabitants had become refugees.
Regarding the Israeli charge that the West Bank of Jordan was taken by Jordan by conquest, Jordan's representative said that the will of the Arab people of Jerusalem had been expressed in numerous statements, demonstrations and protests which called for rescission of the annexation of Jerusalem, the immediate withdrawal of Israel and re-establishment of the unity of Jordan. The refusal of the Municipal Council to recognize the annexation and to co-operate with the usurping regime was sufficient proof. The punitive measures taken by the Israeli authorities against the Arab population answered all the falsifications made by the representative of Israel concerning the happiness of the people of Jerusalem and the adjacent area.
The representative of Jordan went on to cite the Security Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 which called upon Israel to ensure the safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the area and to facilitate the return of those who had fled since the outbreak of hostilities. He said that Israel's representative had referred to the partition of Jerusalem. But who, he then asked, was responsible for the partition of the whole of Palestine? Not the Palestinians, nor the Arab States, who opposed partition and fought for the unity of Palestine, but the Zionists from Europe.
In conclusion, the representative of Jordan stated that he had not brought the question of Jerusalem or other aspects of the situation in the Middle East before the Council for an over-all solution. His Government sought certain interim measures to stop the continued violations by Israel of the Assembly's resolutions 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967, 54/ which, if continued, would make future consideration and implementation of the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 difficult.
Israel's representative said that while the Council debate went on, Jordanian artillery was shelling Israeli villages and farms, and sabotage raids continued with even larger commando units. Israel came to the Council to plead with it to stop those persistent violations of the cease-fire which were a direct threat to the hopes for a peaceful settlement. The present Jordanian complaint was but another expression of active belligerency, an attempt to thwart Israel-Arab understanding. Jerusalem was now being rejuvenated after 19 years of artificial division, and all its inhabitants were gradually joining together to rebuild it. Every stage of development since last June had been misrepresented, every action by Israel misconstrued by Jordan. There was only one way to judge conditions in East Jerusalem, he said, and that was to listen to the people, not to the bellicose pronouncements of hostile Governments and disgruntled agents of Jordanian rule. The Arab residents of Jerusalem had rejected all attempts by outside elements to prevent Israel-Arab co-operation in the administration of the city. Concerning statistical aspects of urban development projects, the credibility of Jordan claims could be illustrated by one instance: instead of the alleged evacuation of 3,000 persons from the Jewish Quarter, the true figure was 700, who were moved out of synagogue ruins; all had received alternative housing and compensation. He added that out of 8,000 houses in eastern Jerusalem, only 160 were considered as absentee property.
In conclusion, he said that Israel did not suggest that Jerusalem's problems had been solved. It was too much to expect that the 60,000 Arabs would love the 200,000 Jews in Jerusalem, but both groups were better off than before. Jerusalem was now a venture in coexistence.
Hungary's representative reiterated that the status of Jerusalem was regulated by the General Armistice Agreement. It was to be regretted that in its invalid unilateral renunciation of that Agreement, Israel sought the support of a great power which had openly espoused the maintenance of the territorial integrity of all Middle Eastern States. Israel had tried to change the status of Jerusalem by war and to justify its anachronistic approach by claims about acquired rights to Jerusalem on historic grounds. What were the criteria for choosing Israel as the rightful owner over other peoples who had controlled Jerusalem before or after the Jewish State of 2,000 years ago? What would happen if such standards were applied to determine the territory of modern States? He rejected Israel's claim to speak on behalf of the "Jewish people" and stressed that no representative was entitled to speak on behalf of citizens of other States. His delegation was convinced that compliance with the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 and with the two Assembly resolutions on Jerusalem, which excluded territorial aggrandizement, was the only possible way to a political settlement of the problems of the Middle East.
The USSR representative said that information before the Security Council showed Israel's continued policy of arbitrariness and violence towards the Arab population in occupied Jerusalem. In defiance of the United Nations, Israel had issued statements demonstrating its intention to carry out an "Israelization" of the occupied part of Jerusalem and to deprive the city of its Arab personality; it had followed the statements by the actions described by the Mayor of Jerusalem. The occupation and the persecution of the Arab population were acts of aggression; they must cease. The rulers of Israel and its imperialist protectors were responsible for the delay in reaching a political settlement in the Middle East. The Council should take all necessary measures to eliminate the obstacles to such a settlement, the primary condition for which was immediate Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories in accordance with the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967.
The representative of Pakistan said that the General Armistice Agreement of 3 April 1949 55/ and the General Assembly's resolutions 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 303 (IV) of 9 December 1949, 56/ and 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967 prohibited any attempt by Israel to establish sovereignty over Jerusalem. Those instruments were reinforced by the expressed will of the population of the Old City as stated in the Secretary-General's report of 12 September 1967. 57/ Israel, he said, was trying to obfuscate the legal and political aspects of the situation in Jerusalem by a wholly subjective interpretation and by injecting into the discussion the elements of a mystique and the assertion of an exclusive primordial right. It was impermissible to cite religion and culture to justify wholly illegal acts. The representative of Israel had tried to show that Jerusalem had not been Arab. What else had it been since the seventh century? The issues of international peace and security posed by the situation in Jerusalem demanded effective measures by the Security Council to halt the drift towards disaster. It must call on Israel to respect the Assembly's resolutions concerning Jerusalem, rescind all measures to alter its status and refrain from such actions in the future.
The United States said that his Government's position on Jerusalem was well known. It did not recognize unilateral actions by any State in the area as altering the status of Jerusalem. Such measures, including land expropriation and administrative action by Israel, could not be considered other than provisional and could not affect the final status of the city. The important issue of Jerusalem could not, he stated, be realistically solved apart from other aspects of the situation in the Middle East, dealt with in the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, 58/ nor could it be excluded from the scope of that resolution. In achieving a peaceful and accepted settlement of all aspects of the Middle East problem, the parties themselves must necessarily be engaged and the legitimate interests of all taken into account. The United States continued to support the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 unreservedly, in its entirety and in all its parts. The best way for the Council to support that unanimous resolution was to support the peacemaking efforts of the Special Representative, to call on all parties to refrain from actions prejudicial to Mr. Jarring's efforts and to extend to him full co-operation.
On 20 May 1968, introducing a draft resolution co-sponsored by Pakistan and Senegal, the representative of Pakistan stated that the draft was the product of prolonged consultations among the seven Asian, African and Latin American members of the Security Council. It was essentially a proposal of an interim nature which did not in any way embody a decision regarding the disposition of the city of Jerusalem but sought only to reaffirm the General Assembly's resolutions on the subject. Therefore, it did not include a call for Israeli withdrawal from the city but simply sought to preclude actions attempting to change that city's status, which would complicate the conflict and render its resolution more difficult.
By the preamble to the text proposed by Pakistan and Senegal, the Security Council would, among other things, note that since the adoption of General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, respectively, Israel had taken further measures and actions in contravention of those resolutions; it would also reaffirm the established principle under the United Nations Charter that acquisition of territory by military conquest was inadmissible.
By the operative part, the Security Council would: (1) deplore the failure of Israel to comply with those resolutions; (2) consider that the legislative and administrative measures and actions, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, taken by Israel were invalid and could not change the status of Jerusalem; (3) urgently call upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action tending to change the status of Jerusalem; (4) request the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Council on Israel's implementation of the current resolution; and (5) decide to remain seized of the matter and to consider it further in the light of the Secretary-General's report.
On 21 May 1968, the representative of Pakistan submitted a revised draft resolution which, among other things, omitted the operative paragraphs in the original text by which the Council would have requested an urgent report of the Secretary-General on Israel's implementation of the resolution and decided to remain seized of this matter. Instead, the new text would ask the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution.
The United States regretted that it had been impossible to preserve the unanimity characteristic of the Council's work since June 1967. Although sharing many of the concerns of those who supported the draft resolution, his delegation could not support it. Unfortunately the United States representative said, the Pakistan-Senegal draft would work in the direction of isolating one particular aspect of the Middle East situation, the question of Jerusalem. In the view of the United States, the future of Jerusalem was a problem which fell within the purview of the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. Thus, the draft text before the Council might prejudice efforts to achieve a lasting peace in the area. Further, the United States could not vote for a text which contained specific–and selective–references to two General Assembly resolutions on which it had previously abstained. It also considered it incomprehensible that an expression of support for Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 had been excluded. The United States had been prepared, he said, to declare that unilateral actions by Israel could not be recognized as altering or prejudging the status of Jerusalem and to call upon Israel to refrain from such actions. At the same time, the United States had considered it essential for the Council to call upon all parties to avoid all acts prejudicial to efforts to achieve a peace and to express support for Mr. Jarring's efforts.
Canada said that nothing should be done to disturb the equitable balance of obligations embodied in the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 as the basis for an accepted settlement. Canada could not condone any steps which would either alter, or attempt to alter, unilaterally, the status of Jerusalem or endanger the prospects for a settlement. In its view the status of Jerusalem could not, in practical terms, be resolved as an isolated issue. It had been clear from the beginning that a draft resolution such as the one proposed by Pakistan and Senegal, currently before the Council, could not command unanimous support. If adopted, this draft resolution would be the first resolution adopted without unanimity since the passage by the Council of resolution 242 on 22 November 1967. It would be self-defeating, the representative of Canada said, to divide the Council by adopting a resolution that dealt with only one of the problems covered by the resolution of 22 November 1967. Its adoption would also mean starting along the road towards the application of sanctions, if Israel did not comply. His delegation thought it unwise to pursue that course when it was fully committed to a diplomatic approach. It would therefore abstain in the vote.
The representative of Brazil said that his country had consistently supported the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem, and had not recognized any unilateral actions by Jordan or Israel to change the city's status. The Jerusalem problem should be solved within the context of the organic solution of the Middle East problem contemplated in the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. However, that did not mean that the Council should take no action or that any action on permanent principles would necessarily prejudice the work of the Secretary- General's Special Representative, Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring.
The representative of the USSR said that his delegation would vote for the draft although it considered that the draft should be strengthened by a more decisive condemnation of the illegal expansionist acts by Israel in the Arab part of Jerusalem. He stated that most members of the Council, including the USSR, considered that by its annexationist measures in the Arab part of Jerusalem, Israel had flagrantly violated the principle that the acquisition of territory by military conquest was inadmissible and contrary to the United Nations Charter. Others, notably the United States, were attempting to present the situation in such a way that the Council need not demand the rescinding of those measures, because, in their view, the measures were temporary and, therefore, would not affect the status of Jerusalem either now or in the future. Attempts to cover up the illegal activities of the aggressor, the representative of the USSR said, amounted to encouraging it to commit further acts of aggression. The argument that adoption of the draft resolution might hinder the implementation of the Jarring mission was artificial. The only obstacle to a political settlement was the policy of Israel and its supporters.
On 21 May 1968, the Security Council adopted the revised two-power text by 13 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions (Canada and the United States) as resolution 252 (1968).
By the preamble to this resolution, the Security Council, among other things, noted that since the adoption of the General Assembly's resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967, Israel had taken further measures and actions in contravention of those resolutions. Bearing in mind the need to work for a just and lasting peace, it also reaffirmed that acquisition of territory by military conquest was inadmissible.
By the operative part of the resolution, the Council: (1) deplored Israel's failure to comply with the General Assembly resolutions mentioned above; (2) considered that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tended to change the legal status of Jerusalem were invalid and could not change that status; (3) urgently called upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action tending to change Jerusalem's status; and (4) requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on implementation of the current resolution. (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)
After the vote, the representative of Paraguay said that his delegation had voted for the resolution because it contributed to the preservation of the international status of Jerusalem in accordance with General Assembly resolutions.
The representative of Denmark said that, while doubting the political expediency of adopting a resolution without unanimity, his delegation had voted for it because Denmark could not, in principle, disagree with its contents. Denmark did not believe, he said, that the adoption of such resolutions on isolated questions was the proper way to accelerate a solution of the Middle East problem, which must be a comprehensive solution in accordance with the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967.
Israel declared that the resolution was neither practical nor reasonable. It disregarded Israel's basic rights, sought to violate the natural unity of Jerusalem and overlooked the interests of its inhabitants. He maintained that the resolution neither changed nor added to the pattern of the Security Council's resolutions on the Middle East situation.
The United Kingdom representative said that he had directed every effort to having the Council proceed in unity on the common ground of general agreement. That common ground existed, limited but firm, and the Council could have proceeded on that basis. He felt that not all members had put first the pursuit of an ultimate settlement. However, he trusted that the Council could now turn to facilitating efforts to put agreed provisions and principles into practical effect.
FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS
(JUNE-NOVEMBER 1968)
Subsequent to the Security Council discussion of Jerusalem and its Holy Places, further communications on the subject were addressed to the Council.
On 12 June 1968, Jordan drew attention to an Order of the Israel Finance Ministry, dated 12 April 1968, by which more Arab lands and buildings in the Old City were expropriated–all of which, it was claimed, were 100 per cent Arab-owned–with a view to replacing the expelled Arabs with Jewish residents. Israel replied on 28 June that renewed discussion of those questions would not serve the interests of peace and that only agreement between the parties could resolve their outstanding differences.
On 3 July 1968, Jordan brought to the attention of the Secretary-General a United States press report concerning a resettlement project in the Arab area of Jerusalem which the Israelis were rushing to completion.
On 11 October 1968, Syria transmitted to the Secretary-General a message from religious leaders in Syria condemning the desecration of the Holy City of Jerusalem by the Israeli occupying authorities. On 22 October, Kuwait transmitted 40 photographs, together with explanatory notes, which related to alleged desecration by Israeli authorities of Moslem and Christian Holy Places in and around Jerusalem and the destruction of Arab houses in the city.
On 6 November 1968, in a letter to the Secretary-General, Jordan charged Israel with continuous acts of demolition and change of character of historical and religious buildings in Jerusalem and attached a letter from the Mayor of Jerusalem containing an account of the "lawless" Israeli measures.
DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES
COMMUNICATIONS FROM JORDAN AND ISRAEL
(FEBRUARY-APRIL 1968)
S/8427 and Add.1 (A/7057 and Add.1). Letter of 23 February 1968 from Jordan (transmitting report of Commission appointed by His Majesty's Government in United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, with approval of Council of League of Nations, to determine rights and claims of Moslems and Jews in connexion with Western or Wailing Wall at Jerusalem; London, December 1930).
S/8433 (A/7058). Letter of 28 February 1968 from Jordan.
S/8439 and Add.1 (7064 and Add.1). Letter of March 1968 from Israel.
S/8445 (A/7065). Letter of 7 March 1968 from Jordan.
S/8452 (A/7067). Letter of 11 March 1968 from Israel.
S/8507 (A/7079), S/8546 (A/7081), S/8552 (A/7084). Letters of 28 March and 16 and 19 April 1968 from Jordan.
COMPLAINT BY JORDAN AND CONSIDERATION BY COUNCIL
IN PERIOD 18 APRIL-21 MAY 1968
SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1416, 1417.
S/8549 (A/7082). Letter of 18 April 1968 from Jordan.
S/8560. Letter of 25 April 1968 from Jordan (request to convene Council).
S/8561 (A/7087). Note by Secretary-General dated 26 April 1968.
S/8562. Letter dated 26 April l968 from Israel (request to participate in Council's discussion).
S/8563. India, Pakistan, Senegal: draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 250 (1968), as proposed by India, Pakistan and Senegal, S/8563, and as modified by consultations among Council members, adopted unanimously by Council on 27 April 1968, meeting 1417.
"The Security Council,
"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel,
"Having considered the Secretary-General's note (S/8561), particularly his note to the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations,
"Considering that the holding of a military parade in Jerusalem will aggravate tensions in the area and have an adverse effect on a peaceful settlement of the problems in the area,
"1. Calls upon Israel to refrain from holding the military parade in Jerusalem which is contemplated for 2 May 1968;
"2. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution."
SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1418-1420.
S/8146 (A/6793). Report of Secretary-General, dated 17 September 1967, under General Assembly resolution 2254 (ES-V) relating to Jerusalem.
S/8565 (A/7089). Letter of 30 April 1968 from Israel.
S/8567. Report dated 2 May 1968 by Secretary-General in pursuance of Security Council resolution 250 (1968).
S/8568 (A/7092). Letter of 1 May 1968 from Jordan.
RESOLUTION 251 (1968), as proposed by Council members, adopted unanimously by Council on 2 May 1968, meeting 1420.
"The Security Council,
"Noting the Secretary-General's reports of 26 April (S/8561) and 2 May 1968 (S/8567),
"Recalling resolution 250 (1968) of 27 April 1968,
"Deeply deplores the holding by Israel of the military parade in Jerusalem on 2 May 1968 in disregard of the unanimous decision adopted by the Council on 27 April 1968."
SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1421-1426.
S/8570. Letter of 2 May 1968 from Jordan (request "to invite . . . elected Mayor of Jerusalem" to address Council).
S/8571 (A/7093). Letter of 3 May 1968 from United Arab Republic.
S/8582 (A/7097). Letter of 9 May 1968 from Israel.
S/8590 and Rev.1,2. Pakistan and Senegal: draft resolution and revisions.
RESOLUTION 252 (1968), as proposed by Pakistan and Senegal, S/8590/Rev.2, adopted by Council on 21 May 1968, meeting 1426, by 13 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions (Canada and United States).
"The Security Council,
"Recalling General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2254 (ES-V) of 14 July 1967,
"Having considered the letter of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem (S/8560) and the report of the Secretary-General ( S/8146),
"Having heard the statements made before the Council,
"Noting that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions Israel has taken further measures and actions in contravention of those resolutions,
"Bearing in mind the need to work for a just and lasting peace,
"Reaffirming that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,
"1. Deplores the failure of Israel to comply with the General Assembly resolutions mentioned above;
"2. Considers that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status;
"3. Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem;
"4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution."
FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS
(JUNE-NOVEMBER 1968)
S/8634 (A/7107). Letter of 12 June 1968 from Jordan.
S/8661 (A/7128). Letter of 28 June 1968 from Israel.
S/8666 (A/7132), S/8667 (A/7133). Letters of 3 July 1968 from Jordan.
S/8847 (A/7266). Letter of 11 October 1968 from Syria.
S/8864 (A/7287). Letter of 22 October 1958 from Kuwait.
S/8890 (A/7309). Letter of 6 November 1968 from Jordan.
OTHER MATTERS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
REPORTS ON PROGRESS OF EFFORTS OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF SECRETARY-GENERAL AND RELATED COMMUNICATIONS
On 22 December 1967, the Secretary-General submitted a first report, 59/ in pursuance of an operative paragraph of the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, 60/ which asked him to report to the Council on the progress of the efforts of his Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring. Four further progress reports were submitted by the Secretary-General in 1968.
During that year, in communications to the Security Council and in the Council's discussion of various aspects of the Middle East situation, frequent comments were made on the attitudes of the parties directly concerned, as well as on the attitudes of other Governments, towards the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 and Mr. Jarring's mission. [Since these comments were generally related to other aspects of the situation in the Middle East, they are described below in the context that save rise to them.]
The second progress report was submitted on 17 January 1968. In this report, the Secretary- General set forth the itinerary which his Special Representative had followed in his consultations with the Governments in the area, and described in general terms the types of questions dealt with in his talks. The Secretary-General considered that it was premature to report on the substance of these discussions, since they had not reached the stage at which any conclusions could be drawn. The questions discussed by the Special Representative were of two types, the Secretary-General reported. The first related to the large and fundamental problems referred to in the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. The second type of questions related to secondary problems, the solution of which would contribute to an improvement of the general atmosphere by relieving certain unnecessary hardships which had resulted from the June 1967 hostilities, including the release of stranded ships, the exchange of prisoners of war and certain measures of a humanitarian character.
The Secretary-General noted that the Governments visited had continued to extend courtesy and to show willingness to co-operate. All had expressed positive reactions concerning the desirability of continued steps to improve the general atmosphere while searching for solutions to the fundamental problems.
On 19 March 1968, the United Arab Republic transmitted a statement made by its Minister for Foreign Affairs on 13 March. The Minister had said that statements by the Foreign Minister of Israel demonstrated Israel's attempt to cover up its aggressive position, its expansionist policy and its occupation of the Arab territories. As examples of Israel's policy, he referred to the administrative annexation of the occupied Arab territories, the annexation of Jerusalem, the acquisition by force of Arab lands in Jerusalem with a view to replacing the Arabs by Israelis, and the destruction of houses, forcing 400,000 Arabs to flee their homes. Israel, he had said, could no longer deceive world public opinion by its talk of peace when its Foreign Minister's statements were aimed at undermining Mr. Jarring's mission. The basic fact was Israel's refusal to implement the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. The United Arab Republic, on its part, had informed Mr. Jarring of its willingness to implement that resolution. Israel's current demand for negotiation was the one which the Council had rejected when it adopted its resolution of 22 November 1967 and called upon the parties to implement it through Mr. Jarring.
Replying on 21 March 1968, Israel transmitted a statement made by its Minister for Foreign Affairs on 12 March. Therein the Israeli Foreign Minister had stated that the United Arab Republic was responsible for there having been no progress towards peace. That country's hint of a willingness to implement the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 was, he said, a confidence trick. On the one hand, the statement continued, Israel's policy was to seek replacement of the cease-fire arrangements by permanent peace, negotiated, accepted and contractually ratified by the States concerned in accordance with normal international practice. On the other hand, Egyptian official spokesmen had let it be known that the United Arab Republic rejected the United Nations proposal to convene the United Arab Republic and Israel for a conference to negotiate a mutually accepted peace settlement. The United Arab Republic position, Israel's Foreign Minister had said, was that Israel should return to the positions of 4 June 1967 without a peace treaty, without agreement on secure and recognized boundaries, without negotiation of matters at issue, face to face, without eliminating the maritime blockade. That unrealistic position had been rejected by Israel, by international organizations and by world opinion.
In a third progress report dated 29 March 1968, the Secretary-General reviewed Ambassador Jarring's further visits to the Middle East. Mr. Jarring, the Secretary-General noted, had found a basic difference of outlook between the United Arab Republic and Jordan on the one hand and Israel on the other, a difference which had been described in some detail by the parties themselves in Security Council documents and at Council meetings held in March. Mr. Jarring's efforts, the Secretary-General continued, had been directed towards obtaining an agreed statement of position concerning the implementation of the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, which could then be followed by meetings between the parties, under his auspices. So far, those efforts had not resulted in agreement. They had, moreover, been interrupted by events during the latter part of March. Contacts were being renewed and a further report would be submitted when the results of the contacts were known.
On 23 April 1968, Israel stated in a letter to the Security Council that the Arab Governments continued, in contravention of the cease-fire, to wage active warfare against Israel by means of armed incursions and sabotage raids. In addition to referring to evidence presented in the course of recent Security Council debates, Israel's letter cited policy statements by officials of Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic to prove their support of, and their direct political and military engagement in, the organization, training, supply and direction of the terror operations. This continuation of active warfare, Israel alleged, constituted aggression; it was the gravest factor in the Middle East conflict–particularly in view of the Arab Governments' avowed aim to bring about Israel's destruction–and it impeded all efforts towards a peaceful and accepted settlement.
On 24 April 1968, Jordan replied that Israel's unfounded allegations had been dealt with in detail before the Security Council by Arab delegations and could not divert attention from the continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories by force, in defiance of United Nations resolutions. So long as that illegal occupation continued, Jordan said, all freedom-loving peoples appreciated that self-defence and national resistance were the only answer.
Replying on 8 May 1968 to Israel's communication of 23 April 1968, the United Arab Republic, in a letter to the Secretary-General, said that Israel had complained against the people of Palestine for exercising their right to resist foreign occupation imposed by Israel's aggression in June 1967. The United Arab Republic listed acts which, it said, demonstrated Israel's persistence in its policy of continued aggression: expropriation of Arab property; expansionist designs vis-à-vis the Arab land, as evidenced by declarations of Israeli officials before and after 5 June 1967; and a policy of erasing the identity of the occupied territories by expelling the Arab inhabitants and replacing them with new Israeli settlers. That policy, the letter of the United Arab Republic continued, fully justified the legitimate resistance of the Palestinian people and explained Israel's adamant refusal to implement the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. Consequently, the letter concluded, responsibility for obstructing peace efforts in the Middle East lay solely on Israel.
On 26 May 1968, Israel stated that the United Arab Republic, in its letter of 8 May, had tried to shift responsibility to the Palestinian Arabs for the unabating aggressive acts against Israel, in violation of the cease-fire, by regular and irregular forces of the United Arab Republic and other Arab Governments. The Israeli letter charged that Egypt had for 20 years exploited and victimized the Palestinian Arabs during its occupation of the Gaza Strip. The familiar United Arab Republic charges concerning conditions in areas administered by Israel had been exposed as groundless. The United Arab Republic would prefer, Israel's letter continued, that the situation in those areas should not be better than it was during the United Arab Republic's occupation. Israel, however, would do everything possible to ensure normal life and development and to prevent violations of law and order which, it charged, were incited by the United Arab Republic. As for the reference by the United Arab Republic to the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, no verbal hoax could conceal the basic fact that the United Arab Republic's policy remained the policy of the Khartoum Conference (held from 1 to 6 August 1967)–no peace, no negotiation, no recognition of Israel. As long as the Khartoum decisions continued to express Egypt's attitude, the Israeli letter concluded, Egypt, in effect, barred the road to any peaceful agreement.
On 29 July 1968, the Secretary-General submitted a fourth report covering the efforts of his Special Representative, after 29 March 1968. During that period, Ambassador Jarring had held discussions with the Governments of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic and had reported to the Secretary-General regularly on those meetings. Ambassador Jarring also had met the Secretary-General at Teheran, Iran, on 22 April 1968. At that time, it was agreed that Mr. Jarring would return to New York for further consultations. During his stay in New York between 15 May and 21 June 1968, he held consultations with the Secretary-General and the permanent representatives of the parties concerned.
During the period between 21 June, when he left for Europe, and 22 July, when he returned to New York, Ambassador Jarring met with officials of some of the parties in various cities of Europe. In the light of his discussions, he had arrived at the conclusion–which the Secretary-General said he fully endorsed–that it would be advisable for him to extend further his contacts with the parties, and for that purpose he would return to the Middle East.
On 3 December 1968, the Secretary-General submitted a fifth report on the mission of Ambassador Jarring, covering the latter's activities after 29 July. On 15 August, Mr. Jarring had arrived in Nicosia, Cyprus, for a further round of discussions with the Governments concerned. On 23 September, he had arrived at United Nations Headquarters, where the Foreign Ministers of the parties had gathered for the twenty-third session of the General Assembly. Ambassador Jarring met with them, first informally and later formally, and concluded his discussions with them by receiving written communications from the Foreign Ministers of Israel and the United Arab Republic which restated the positions of their respective Governments.
The Secretary-General noted further in his report that before the Foreign Ministers returned to their countries, they indicated the readiness of their Governments to continue to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring.
In a letter dated 26 November 1968, included in the report, Ambassador Jarring informed the Secretary-General that, as agreed, he was leaving New York on 27 November for a further round of talks with the parties, and that he intended to invite them to a new round of discussions in the middle of January 1969. Replying on 27 November 1968, the Secretary-General concurred in the programme of his Special Representative and expressed gratification at Ambassador Jarring's willingness to continue his efforts with the parties, towards a peaceful settlement. The Secretary-General again recorded his appreciation of the wisdom, tact and patience shown by Ambassador Jarring in the task entrusted to him.
COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING TREATMENT OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN ARAB STATES
The treatment of Jews in Arab States was the subject of incidental comment in connexion with communications and discussion on the treatment of civilian populations in Israel-occupied territories (see above, pp. 237-51).
In a letter of 31 May 1968, Israel charged that discrimination and persecution of Jews in Arab States was continuing, especially in Iraq, Syria and the United Arab Republic. Since the of June 1967, the letter stated, the Jews who remained in Iraq had been subjected to even greater restrictions and deprivations. Iraq was said to have passed laws denying Jews their civil liberties, their freedom of movement and the possibility of employment, and intensifying the process of seizing Jewish property which began after the 1948 war.
In its reply of 3 June 1968, Iraq protested to the Secretary-General that the contents of the Israeli letter of 31 May were entirely outside the scope of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East," currently on the agenda of both the Security Council and the General Assembly. Iraq stated that Israel's allegations regarding the situation of Jews remaining in Iraq after 1967 were completely false and that the Jews in Iraq enjoyed complete equality with other citizens. The Iraqi letter charged that Israel was attempting to divert attention from the problem of direct concern to the United Nations–namely, the plight of the Arab population in territories occupied by Israel.
On 25 June 1968, Israel, in reply, reiterated to the Secretary-General charges of discriminatory treatment and oppression of Jews in Iraq. Fanatical incitement against the Jewish community by the Iraqi governmental press, radio and television was alleged. It was also stated that many of the Jews detained after the June 1967 hostilities still remained under arrest. The grave situation, the letter concluded, could not be left without international action.
On 27 June 1968, Iraq protested the publication of Israel's letter of 25 June as an official document, charging that Israel's concern was not the welfare of the Jews but the objective of resettlement of emigrant Jews in the Arab territories occupied after 5 June 1967.
In a letter of 25 July 1968, Syria referred to an Israeli letter of 27 June 1968, in which Israel had commented on Syria's refusal to allow the investigation by the United Nations of Syria's Jewish community subjected since June 1967 to ever-growing oppression. Syria stated that this allegation had no other purpose than to cover up for the inhuman treatment of the Arab civilian populations in the occupied Arab territories where Israel had refused to accept a second representative of the Secretary-General in implementation of Security Council resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 61/ and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967. 62/ As to the Jewish community in Syria, the letter maintained that Jews, Christians and Moslems were equal citizens and that no discrimination existed because of faith or on any other basis.
On 1 August 1968, Israel charged that the continued oppression of Syrian Jews and disabilities imposed on other minorities in Syria deprived the Syrian Government of any standing in matters of human rights. Syria's letter, Israel said, could not draw the curtain on its refusal to allow a representative of the Secretary-General to investigate the tragic situation of Jews in Syria, nor could it conceal Syria's continued rejection of all United Nations efforts towards peace in the Middle East.
On 30 September 1968, Iraq protested, as interference in its internal affairs, the discussion in the Security Council regarding the treatment of Jews in Iraq (see pp. 243-44) and denied the allegations made by Israel in that debate. The Iraqi letter added that the Israeli claim that the Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 covered Iraqi Jews had been rejected by the Secretary-General as well as by the Security Council by its vote on resolution 259 of 27 September 1968 (see page 250 for text of resolution).
On 9 October 1968, Israel reaffirmed its position that the situation of the Iraqi Jews should be the subject of a fact-finding mission by a representative of the Secretary-General, as provided in the Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967.
In a further letter, dated 11 October 1968, Israel drew attention to a cable of 1 October to the Secretary-General from associations of Jews from Egypt, Iraq and Syria, in Israel, expressing concern at the condition of Jews in Arab countries. The letter also stated that evidence of the grave nature of the problem appeared in reports published in different countries. One report, the letter continued, established that the United Arab Republic had decided to ban the departure from Egypt of all Jews, thus apparently holding them as hostages, and that about one quarter of the remaining estimated 1,000 Jews of Egypt were in prison, having been kept in detention, without charges, since the June 1967 war.
DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES
REPORTS ON PROGRESS OF EFFORTS OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF SECRETARY-GENERAL AND RELATED COMMUNICATIONS
S/8309 and Add. 1-4. Reports by Secretary-General, dated 22 December 1967, 17 January, 29 March, 29 July and 3 December 1968, on progress of efforts of Special Representative to Middle East.
S/8479 (A/7074). Letter of 19 March 1968 from United Arab Republic.
S/8494 (A/7076), S/8556. Letters of 21 March and 23 April 1968 from Israel.
S/8559. Letter of 24 April 1968 from Jordan.
S/8581 (A/7096). Letter of 8 May 1968 from United Arab Republic.
S/8596 (A/7100). Letter of 26 May 1968 from Israel.
COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING TREATMENT OF
JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN ARAB STATES
S/8607 (A/7102). Letter of 31 May 1968 from Israel.
S/8610 (A/7104). Letter of 3 June 1968 from Iraq.
S/8653 (A/7114). Letter of 25 June 1968 from Israel.
S/8657 (A/7117). Letter of 27 June 1968 from Iraq.
S/8689 (A/7142). Letter of 25 July 1968 from Syria.
S/8708 (A/7159). Letter of 1 August 1968 from Israel.
S/8837. Letter of 30 September 1968 from Iraq.
S/8844, S/8848 (A/7267). Letters of 9 and 11 October 1968 from Israel.
DISCUSSION ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION
IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
The item "The situation in the Middle East" appeared on the agenda of the General Assembly's twenty-second session, which took place from 19 September to 19 December 1967, and from 24 April to 12 June and 23 September 1968, respectively.
The matter was not, however, debated in detail. On 23 September 1968, the Assembly, at the close of its twenty-second session, deferred consideration of the matter to its next session which was due to open on 24 September 1968.
In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization, dated 24 September 1968 and presented to the General Assembly's twenty-third session which opened on 24 September 1968, the Secretary-General stated that the year since the war of June 1967 had been one of high tension and great frustration in the Middle East. The cease-fire demanded by the Security Council had often been broken, especially in the Israel-Jordan and the Suez Canal sectors. The machinery of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) had been an important factor in preventing escalation of the fighting, especially by limiting the scope of incidents and by securing on-the-spot cease-fires. In the Israel-Jordan cease-fire sector, where, because of the lack of agreement by the parties, it had not been possible to station United Nations observers, incidents of fighting had tended to be more frequent and serious.
In considering the background for the many and regrettable breaches of the cease-fire, the Secretary-General noted that, on one side, the cease-fire sectors were almost entirely areas under military occupation. History showed, the Secretary-General said, that such situations tended to give rise to a more than ordinary incidence of acts of violence.
In the light of the situation in the area, and especially in the occupied territories, the Secretary-General had proposed a second humanitarian mission to the Middle East for the purpose of meeting his reporting obligations under the Security Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 63/ and the General Assembly's resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 64/ concerning humanitarian questions. He stated that it was with great disappointment that he had had to report on 31 July 1968 (see pp. 240-42) that his efforts had been unavailing.
Hope for progress towards easing tensions in the Middle East, the Secretary-General continued, had centred on the efforts of his Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring. By their very nature, those efforts had to be confidential and discreet. Mr. Jarring's policy had been to make no public pronouncements or even substantive reports; it would be equally inadvisable for him, the Secretary-General said, to discuss substantive questions relating to the Jarring mission.
It might, however, be useful, the Secretary-General said, to comment on that mission in the context of the Middle East situation and also in the larger context of the United Nations involvement in it.
The Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 65/, he stated, was in itself a considerable achievement and provided a basis for a constructive and peaceful approach, both by the parties and by the international community, to the bitter problems of the Middle East. The role for his Special Representative constituted a heavy responsibility for one man to undertake. The Secretary-General said that he did not find it surprising, although it was disappointing, that despite Ambassador Jarring's unceasing efforts the basic situation in the Middle East, in relation even to the beginnings of a settlement, remained much the same as it had been eight months before. The one point of common agreement had been that the Ambassador should continue his efforts. This was a personal tribute to Ambassador Jarring and, the Secretary-General stated, it might be hoped that it was also an expression of a genuine desire of the parties to find a peaceful solution. Given the very great urgency of achieving a peaceful settlement, the United Nations could not tolerate an indefinite lack of progress.
Ambassador Jarring's efforts to promote agreement among the parties to the Middle East dispute had been impeded by disagreement on the procedure for taking up the substantive questions. One party had insisted upon "direct negotiations" by which was meant, apparently, a face-to-face confrontation of the two sides; the other side had rejected, initially at any rate, the direct procedure but had been willing to carry on substantive talks concerning implementation of the resolution indirectly, with Ambassador Jarring as intermediary. The latter's efforts would be unavailing, the Secretary-General continued, unless he was able to carry on some form of dialogue with the two sides involving matters of substance.
The key to a peaceful settlement of issues dividing States and peoples which led to armed conflict, or threatened to do so, was negotiation. Negotiations might, the Secretary-General stated, be undertaken in different ways. As a general rule, the emphasis should be on the results rather than on the procedure. The Secretary-General then referred to three different sets of peace negotiations, currently under way, each differing from the others in the procedure being followed: the talks on Viet-Nam, the talks on Cyprus and the talks on the Middle East. It was often said, by parties to conflicts, that while the United Nations had achieved a measure of success in keeping the peace in areas of conflict, it had failed to resolve the political problems at the root of those conflicts. Such views, the Secretary-General concluded, tended to overlook the fact that the primary responsibility for peaceful settlement of conflicts must inevitably rest with the parties themselves, and that without their co-operation and effort no peace mission of the United Nations could hope to succeed.
On 27 September 1968, at its twenty-third session, the General Assembly decided to place the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East" on its agenda as a matter of priority. Several speakers referred to the questions involved during the General Debate which took place in the opening phases of the Assembly's session. The item itself, however, was not discussed, as such, in detail. On 21 December 1968, the Assembly decided to defer the item and place the item on the provisional agenda for its twenty-fourth session (due to open in September 1969).
Views expressed by various Members in the course of the General Debate at the Assembly's twenty-third session are summarized below.
On 4 October 1968, the Foreign Minister of Jordan stated that nearly a year and a half had passed since Israel's armed aggression had placed half of Jordan's population under foreign military occupation and reduced a quarter of its population to the status of refugees. Since the failure of the General Assembly in June and July 1967 to act in the right direction, he said, one potentially effective decision had been taken–the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution (242 (1967)) of 22 November 1967. The essence of that resolution was the demand for the withdrawal of the occupying forces of Israel from Jordan and the two sister Arab countries attacked, and the restoration of conditions of peace in the area. The big powers, the Foreign Minister said, had pledged to throw their weight behind its implementation.
For a year Jordan had been co-operating with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in accordance with the Security Council's resolution, the Foreign Minister continued. The Arab position regarding its implementation had been flexible and objective, positive and constructive. In detailed talks with Mr. Jarring, practical possibilities for implementing all the provisions of the Council's resolution were reviewed and it was indicated that a timetable could be drawn up for their simultaneous implementation, a time-table to be presented by the Special Representative, or arranged by the Security Council or worked out by its permanent members.
Israel, the Foreign Minister of Jordan claimed, had left no opening for Mr. Jarring's efforts nor any hope that it would change its intransigent mood of aggression. It had avoided discussing substantial issues. Its repeated slogan of direct negotiations or bilateral agreements was but another tactical manoeuvre designed to break away from the obligations stipulated in the resolution. The attitude of friends of Israel, he said, had helped create its present mood of arrogance and indifference to United Nations resolutions. The big powers, as well as the whole United Nations, should realize that breaking the deadlock in the Middle East required pressing heavily on the aggressive party and tempering its military arrogance, the Foreign Minister added.
Israel, he went on to say, had been able neither to define nor declare its position on withdrawal, the key point in the issue of peace, because territorial expansion was the guiding force among all Israeli leaders, no matter the differences in their points of view. The slogan of secure boundaries, which Israel kept raising as an excuse for its failure to accept withdrawal, was in the Israeli mind a vague and undefined concept.
While resorting to procedural tactics to avoid the issue, Israel had wasted no time in consolidating its occupation by planting Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories, by systematically expelling hundreds of thousands of their Arab inhabitants, by bulldozing Arab villages, by taking drastic measures to swallow the Holy City of Jerusalem, by persecuting thousands of Arabs in the occupied areas and by stepping up attacks against Jordan in particular, in the hope that such attacks would break Jordan's spirit of resistance. By these measures and by stockpiling weapons it was becoming more obvious every day, the Jordanian Foreign Minister charged, that Israel's design was to become a principal power in the Middle East at the expense of the rights, security and future of the peoples of the region. The Arabs had been defeated in June 1967 by a surprise attack, but they were fully determined not to be defeated in their principles and rights. The young men meeting their deaths in occupied lands were not terrorists but young patriots resisting occupation. The absence of positive achievements towards peace based on justice might mean a final commitment to a course that some might call too destructive but which the Arab people would find inevitable, having no alternative left. However, the Jordanian Foreign Minister concluded, the Arab Governments would continue their endeavours to achieve peace.
On 8 October 1968, the Foreign Minister of Israel stated that Israel's deadly peril in June 1967 had been the climax of a 20-year war waged by the Arab States with the hope of Israel's extinction. To prevent renewal of the dangers which confronted Israel in 1967 was the first law of Israel's policy. Those responsible for Israel's survival could have nothing to do with ambiguous solutions falling short of authentic and lasting peace. That resolve remained the determinant of Israeli policy.
A new stage had been marked by the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, presented to Israel not as a self-executing agreement but as a list of principles on which the parties could base their agreement. On that understanding, the Foreign Minister said, Israel's co-operation with Ambassador Jarring had been sought and obtained. At every stage, it had been evident that the two conditions prerequisite to movement in the peacemaking process were the establishment of a permanent peace and an agreement for the first time on the delineation of secure and mutually recognized boundaries. If these problems were solved, all the other issues mentioned in the resolution would fall into place.
Continuing, the Foreign Minister of Israel outlined various Israeli initiatives communicated through Ambassador Jarring to the United Arab Republic and Jordan, between December 1967 and June 1968. There had been no response, he said, to Israel's endeavours to bring together its own representatives and those of Jordan and the United Arab Republic to exchange views leading to bilateral contractual commitments on the integrally linked and interdependent principles of Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, although Israel had indicated its willingness to negotiate and seek agreement on all matters, including the establishment of boundaries. Israel's Foreign Minister recalled that on 1 May 1968, Israel's representative had, in the Security Council, accepted the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace. The Israeli representative had also reaffirmed, in the Council, Israel's acceptance of Mr. Jarring's suggestion to bring about meetings between Israel and its neighbours, under his auspices in fulfilment of his mandate, in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement.
As to the detailed proposals on the implications of "a just and final peace," communicated to the United Arab Republic by Israel in August and September 1968, Israel's Foreign Minister noted that the United Arab Republic had limited itself to a declaration of acceptance of the resolution without specifying how it proposed to reach concrete agreements. Meanwhile, he said, President Nasser on 23 June 1968 had expressed willingness to attempt "a political solution" on condition that certain principles of Egyptian policy be recognized, namely: (1) no negotiations with Israel; (2) no peace with Israel; (3) no recognition of Israel; and (4) no transactions to be made at the expense of Palestinian territories or the Palestinian people.
Peace, the Israeli Foreign Minister went on to say, could not be advanced by declarations accompanied by a refusal to negotiate viable agreements. Israel held that the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 should be implemented through negotiation, agreement on all the principles mentioned in the resolution, and the joint signature and application of appropriate instruments.
Stating that the cease-fire agreements must be maintained and respected until there was peace, Israel's Foreign Minister said that his Government intended to make a new effort to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring in his task of promoting agreement on the establishment of peace. He then enumerated nine principles by which peace could be achieved.
First, Israel's Foreign Minister said, the situation to follow the cease-fire must not be just the elimination of belligerency but a just and lasting peace, duly negotiated and contractually expressed in treaty form, laying down the precise conditions of coexistence and including an agreed map of the secure and recognized boundary. Second, within the framework of peace, the cease-fire lines would be replaced by permanent, secure and recognized boundaries between Israel and each of the neighbouring States and the disposition of forces would be carried out in full accordance with the boundaries under the final peace. Third, in addition to agreed boundaries other agreed security arrangements should be discussed to avoid the kind of vulnerable situation that caused the breakdown of the peace in 1967; the instruments establishing peace should contain a pledge of mutual non-aggression. The fourth principle, Israel's Foreign Minister continued, was the principle of an open frontier, to include free port facilities for Jordan on Israel's Mediterranean coast and mutual access to places of religious and historic associations. Fifth, arrangements for guaranteeing freedom of navigation should be unreserved, precise and founded on absolute equality of rights and obligations between Israel and other littoral States. Sixth, a conference of Middle Eastern States should be convened, together with the Governments contributing to refugee relief and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, to chart a five-year plan to solve the refugee problem; the conference could be called in advance of peace negotiations. Under the peace settlement, joint refugee integration and rehabilitation commissions should be established by the signatories to approve agreed projects for refugee integration in the Middle East, with regional and international aid.
The seventh principle, the Israeli Foreign Minister said, referred to Jerusalem. Israel's policy was that the Christian and Moslem Holy Places should come under the responsibility of those who hold them in reverence; Israel would like to discuss appropriate agreements with those traditionally concerned. The eighth principle–the acknowledgement and recognition of sovereignty, integrity and the right to national life–should be fulfilled through specific contractual agreements to be made by the Governments of Israel and of each Arab State, with each other, by name. The ninth principle, the Foreign Minister of Israel stated, was regional co-operation.
He went on to say that the process of exploring peace terms should follow normal precedents. For the parties concerned to meet officially to effect a transition in their relationships would mean nothing new. Meanwhile, Israel was ready to exchange ideas on certain matters of substance, through Ambassador Jarring, with any Arab Government willing to establish peace with Israel. The Foreign Minister added that the idea of a solution imposed on the parties by a concert of powers was most unrealistic. The Middle East was no longer an international protectorate but an area of sovereign States which had the responsibility of determining the conditions of their coexistence. When the parties had reached agreement, it would be natural for their agreement to receive international endorsement and support.
On 10 October 1968, the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic said that ever since the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 had reaffirmed the Charter principle prohibiting the acquisition of territory by force, Israel had followed a policy of obstructing implementation of the peaceful settlement laid down by the Council. Israel had refused to withdraw from the Arab territories occupied by aggression. It had followed a policy of expansion, manifested not only in statements of Israeli officials but also by annexation of some Arab territory. It had refused to recognize the rights of the refugees as stated in United Nations resolutions. It had continued to expel Arab citizens with the aim of establishing Israeli settlements. It had obstructed the return of the refugees and displaced persons to their homes, refusing to comply with United Nations resolutions. It had resisted the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General charged with examining the conditions of the Arab population in the occupied territories. It had defied resolutions on Jerusalem by declaring its annexation "irreversible and not negotiable" and had unilaterally renounced the General Armistice Agreements as it found they limited what it considered its right of territorial expansion. At the same time, the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic said, Israel had continued its aggression against the civilian population and installations of the United Arab Republic in the Suez Canal area and against the civilian population and refugees in Jordan. Israel's policy in the occupied areas constituted the most obvious form of Israeli racist colonialism, he charged.
Meanwhile, he continued, Israel claimed a desire for peace but relied upon its occupation of Arab territories to impose surrender upon the Arab States. The entire international community should reject Israel's policy of imposing a fait accompli based on force and aggression, a policy which, the United Arab Republic Foreign Minister said, Israel could not have continued without the political and material support of the United States. Any attempt to impose a solution by force and occupation was not peace.
There was no precedent for Israel's policy in the Middle East, he stated, except that of Nazi Germany against the peoples of Europe.
The Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic went on to say that Israel had also followed a policy of defiance of the United Nations with regard to the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 and the peace mission of Ambassador Jarring. It had not accepted nor had it undertaken to implement that resolution. Nor had Israel entered into serious and substantive talks with Mr. Jarring for its implementation. On the other hand, the United Arab Republic had informed Mr. Jarring, from the beginning, of its full acceptance of the Council's resolution and its readiness to implement it. The United Arab Republic, its Foreign Minister said, had set forth its detailed views on the substance, the form and the timing for implementation of all provisions of the Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. It had also proposed to Mr. Jarring that he set up a time-table as a framework within which all provisions of the Council's resolution would be implemented. Israel, he said, had refused to consider with Mr. Jarring any programme of implementation.
Continuing, he stated that the United Arab Republic Government considered it necessary for the Security Council to undertake the supervision and guarantee the implementation of its resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. In addition, he said, the big powers, which bore the responsibility for the decisions of the Organization on the Palestine question, continued to be bound to the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people and to putting an end to Israel's aggression against those rights. The people of Palestine, who were currently engaged, under the most difficult circumstances, in a struggle against a new stage of Israeli aggression deserved the support of all peoples who had struggled against aggression, racism and tyranny.
In conclusion, the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic stated that the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from every inch of the occupied Arab territories was one of the most sacred of international obligations. The people of his country considered peace a basic necessity but were committed to the recovery of every square inch of the territory occupied by the forces of aggression of Israel.
On 22 October 1968, the Permanent Representative of Syria stated that any assessment of the Middle East crisis, especially in the absence of the people directly concerned, the Arab people of Palestine, must be based on an understanding that the Israeli war of June 1967, was the culmination of Western colonial domination which the United States had inherited through the retrogressive policies of its Government. In their legitimate struggle for liberation, the Arabs had been confronted with the radically anti-democratic and destructive policy of the United States. Israel was but one of the means the United States had been using to achieve its ends. The Syrian representative referred to the "unblushing support" that the United States had given Israel. It had, he said, initiated negotiations to give Phantom jets, which were offensive arms, to Israel with the objective of pressuring the Arabs to accept the diktat of Israel. It had flagrantly supported the continued occupation of Arab lands. It had permitted tax-free help, amounting to billions of dollars, to the Jewish Agency to colonize and exploit such occupied territories as the Syrian Golan Heights, which had been annexed by Israel, and it had systematically fought every effort in the United Nations to safeguard Arab property rights in Palestine.
The Syrian representative said that the so-called nine principles for peace, set forth by Israel's Foreign Minister on 8 October 1968, resolved themselves into two main problems: (1) secure and recognized boundaries and (2) the Arab refugee problem.
He went on to say that, against the background of sharp divisions inside the coalition Government of Israel, the Israeli Foreign Minister, while giving the impression of being specific in detail, had been indeed nothing but too general. The crux of the division, the Syrian representative said, was not what territories to return to the Arabs, but how much to hold. What the Foreign Minister had said boiled down to the fact that Israel would never return to the 4 June 1967 Armistice Lines. On 10 October 1968, two days after the speech with its refrain about peace, the Syrian representative added, Israeli demolition teams had bulldozed a village in occupied Syrian territory.
Syria's representative drew attention to a series of maps and said that these maps showed the expansion of Israel from the Partition Plan boundaries of 1947 to the areas occupied by Israel after the wars of 1948 and 1967 and the still unfulfilled claims voiced by Israel and Zionist leaders in 196O against the Arab lands and Arab people. Israel's concept of "secure and agreed upon" boundaries amounted to acceptance by the Arabs of another fait accompli and of the diktat of Israel.
Concerning the humanitarian aspect of the Palestine tragedy and the Arab refugee problem, the representative of Syria stated that Israel had not respected the Security Council's resolutions 237 of 14 June 1967 66/ and 259 of 27 September 1968 (see page 250) nor General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967. 67/ It had not facilitated the return of the over half a million newly displaced Arabs in addition to the old refugees, nor had it permitted a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to go to the area in implementation of the three resolutions. Israel, Syria charged, was still continuing its nazi-like policy against the Arabs in occupied Arab territories in violation of Articles 31, 32, 33 and 53 of the 1949 Geneva Convention of which it was a signatory.
In addition, the Syrian representative said, Israel had ignored 21 General Assembly resolutions affirming the right of refugees to return to their homes in accordance with paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948. 68/ Israel had also frustrated the work of the Palestine Conciliation Commission created to implement that resolution.
The points made by the Foreign Minister of Israel concerning the refugees amounted to a liquidation of the Palestine problem, the Syrian representative said. But that problem would persist as long as the legitimate right of the Arab people of Palestine to self-determination, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter, remained denied to them by international intrigues and brutal force. The Arabs of Palestine refused Israel's verdict as well as the verdict of Zionism and its protectors to commit collective suicide. One irreducible fact had to be reckoned with: there were two and a half million Arab Palestinians who constituted a people and a nation. From 1921, when the British mandate was imposed upon them, their history had been one of continuous struggle to secure their rights.
The problem of Palestine was not only a political problem, the Syrian representative said, it was fundamentally a moral problem. Nothing but catastrophe would result unless and until the rights of the Palestinian people were understood and recognized.
DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES
GENERAL ASSEMBLY–22ND SESSION (RESUMED)
Plenary Meeting 1673.
A/7032 (S/8321). Letter of 2 January 1968 from Jordan.
A/7035 (S/8328). Letter of 5 January 1968 from Israel.
A/7039 (S/8344). Letter of 18 January 1968 from Permanent Representative of United Arab Republic to Secretary-General.
A/7040 (S/8346). Letter of 19 January 1968 from Secretary-General to Permanent Representative of United Arab Republic.
A/7041 (S/8349). Letter of 22 January 1968 from Permanent Representative of Israel to Secretary- General.
A/7042 (S/8352). Letter of 22 January 1968 from Secretary-General to Permanent Representative of Israel.
A/7044 (S/8354). Letter of 23 January 1968 from Charge d'affaires of Lebanon to Secretary-General.
A/7046 (S/8361), A/7047 (S/8368). Letters of 26 and 30 January 1968 from Jordan.
A/7048 and Corr.l (S/8373 and Corr.l). Letter of 31 January 1968 from Permanent Representative of United Arab Republic to Secretary-General.
A/7050 (S/8379). Letter of 2 February 1968 from Israel.
A/7051 (S/8380). Letter of 2 February 1968 from United Arab Republic.
A/7052 (S/8382). Letter of 5 February 1968 from Secretary-General to Charge d'affaires of Lebanon.
A/7053 (S/8383). Letter of 6 February 1968 from Israel.
A/7054 (S/8384). Letter of 5 February 1968 from Secretary-General to Permanent Representative of United Arab Republic.
A/7055 (S/8391). Letter of 9 February 1968 from Jordan.
A/7057 and Add.1 (S/8427 and Add.1). Letter of 23 February 1968 from Jordan (transmitting report of Commission appointed by His Majesty's Government in United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, with approval of Council of League of Nations, to determine rights and claims of Moslems and Jews in connexion with Western or Wailing Wall at Jerusalem; London, December 1930).
A/7058 (S/8433). Letter of 28 February 1968 from Jordan.
A/7059 (S/8434). Letter of 29 February 1968 from UNITED Arab Republic.
A/7060 (S/8435). Note by Secretary-General, dated 2 March 1968, under Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V)
A/7064 and Add.1 (S/8439 and Add.1). Letter of 5 March 1968 from Israel.
A/7065 (S/8445), A/7068 (S/8453), A/7069 ( S/8458). Letters of 7 and 11 March and
note verbale of 10 March 1968 from Jordan.
A/7066 (S/8451), A/7067 (S/8452). Letters of 11 March 1968 from Israel.
A/7070 (S/8459). Letter of 13 March 1968 from Morocco.
A/7071 (S/8470). Letter of 18 March 1968 from Israel.
A/7074 (S/8479). Letter of 19 March 1968 from United Arab Republic.
A/7075 (S/8483). Letter of 20 March 1968 from Jordan.
A/7076 (S/8494). Letter of 21 March 1968 from Israel.
A/7077 (S/8496). Letter of 22 March 1968 from Libya.
A/7078 (S/8501). Letter of 25 March 1968 from Mongolia (transmitting message by Chairman of Presidium dated 23 March 1968 addressed to King of Jordan).
A/7079 (S/8507), A/7081 (S/8546), A/7082 (S/8549), A/7084 (S/8552). Letters of 28 March and 16, 18 and 19 April 1968 from Jordan.
A/7085 (S/8553). Note by Secretary-General, dated 19 April 1968, under Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V).
A/7087 (S/8561). Note by Secretary-General dated 26 April 1968.
A/7089 (S/8565). Letter of 30 April 1968 from Israel.
A/7092 (S/8568). Letter of 1 May 1968 from Jordan.
A/7093 (S/8571). Letter of 3 May 1968 from United Arab Republic.
A/7094 (S/8578), A/7095 (S/8579). Letters of 6 May 1968 from Jordan.
A/7096 (S/8581). Letter of 8 May 1968 from United Arab Republic.
A/7097 (S/8582). Letter of 9 May 1968 from Israel.
A/7098. Telegram of 8 May 1968 from President of International Conference on Human Rights to President of General Assembly (transmitting text of resolution I, adopted on 7 May 1968 by International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, Iran, 22 April-13 May 1968).
A/7099 (S/8588). Letter of 16 May 1968 from United Arab Republic.
A/7100 (S/8596), A/7102 (S/8607). Letters of 26 and 31 May 1968 from Israel.
A/7103 (S/8609). Letter of 3 June 1968 from Jordan.
A/7104 (S/8610). Letter of 3 June 1968 from Iraq.
A/7105 (S/8626). Letter of 7 June 1968 from Israel.
A/7107 (S/8634). Letter of 12 June 1968 from Jordan.
A/7108 (S/8638). Letter of 15 June from Lebanon.
A/7109 (S/8642). Letter of 18 June from Jordan.
A/7110 (S/8643). Letter of 18 June from Syria.
A/7112 (S/8649). Letter of 21 June from Jordan.
A/7113 (S/8650). Letter of 21 June from United Arab Republic.
A/7114 (S/8653), A/7115 (S/8654). Letters of 25 and 27 June 1968 from Israel.
A/7116 (S/8656). Letter of 27 June 1968 from Jordan.
A/7117 (S/8657). Letter of 27 June 1968 from Iraq.
A/7119 (S/8659), A/7128 (S/7661), A/7130 (S/8663). Letters of 28 June and 1 July 1968 from Israel.
A/7132 (S/8666), A/7133 (S/8667), A/7135 (S/8674). Letters of 3 and 8 July 1968 from Jordan.
A/7137 (S/8683). Letter of 17 July 1968 from Israel.
A/7139 (S/8685), A/7143 (S/8690), A/7144 (S/8691). Letters of 18, 24 and 25 July 1968 from Jordan.
A/7142 (S/8689). Letter of 25 July 1968 from Syria.
A/7145 (S/8693). Letter of 26 July 1968 from Sudan.
A/7147 (S/8696). Letter of 28 July 1968 from Israel.
A/7148. Letter of 29 July 1968 from Jordan.
A/7149 (S/8699). Note by Secretary-General, dated 31 July 1968, under Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V).
A/7157 (S/8700), A/7158 (S/8701), A/7159 (S/8708), A/7160 (S/8711). Letters of 30 and 31 July and 1 August 1968 from Israel.
A/7162 (S/8717), A/7166 (S/8722). Letters of 2 and 5 August 1968 from Jordan.
A/7173 (S/8742), A/7179 (S/8749). Letters of 9 and 16 August 1968 from Syria.
A/7180 (S/8750), A/7188 (S/8789). Letters of 19 and 29 August 1968 from Jordan.
A/7191 ( S/8756). Letter of 21 August 1968 from Israel.
A/7192. Note verbale of 21 August 1968 from USSR.
A/7196. Note verbale of 30 August 1968 from Israel.
A/7201/Add.1. Introduction to Annual Report of Secretary-General to General Assembly, September 1968, Chapter IV.
A/7233. Note verbale of 10 September 1968 from Poland.
A/7234 (S/8820). Letter of 18 September 1968 from Jordan.
A/7616/Add.1. Resolutions adopted by General Assembly during its 22nd session, Vol. II, 24 April-12 June and 23 September 1968, p. 3.
GENERAL ASSEMBLY–23RD SESSION
Plenary Meetings 1682, 1686, 1689, 1702, 1752.
A/7202. Report of Security Council to General Assembly, 16 July 1967-15 July 1968, Chapter 1.
A/7262 (S/8845). Letter of 10 October 1968 from Jordan.
A/7266 (S/8847). Letter of 11 October 1968 from Syria.
A/7267 (S/8848). Letter of 11 October 1968 from Israel.
A/7274 (S/8856). Letter of 15 October 1968 from Jordan.
A/7275 (S/8857). Letter of Syria.
A/7282 (S/8862), A/7283 (S/8863). Letters of 21 October 1968 from Israel.
A/7287 (S/8864). Letter of 22 October 1968 from Kuwait.
A/7292. Letter of 22 October 1968 from Bulgaria.
A/7297 (S/8873). Letter of 28 October 1968 from Syria.
A/7298 (S/8872), A/7299 (S/8874). Letters of 28 and 29 October 1968 from Lebanon.
A/7300 (S/8876). Letter of 30 October 1968 from Israel.
A/7307 (S/8887). Letter of 5 November 1968 from Syria.
A/7309 (S/8890). Letter of 6 November 1968 from Jordan.
A/7315 (S/8892), A/7316 (S/8893), A/7346 (S/8904). Letters of 6, 7 and 21 November 1968 from Syria.
A/7362 (S/8909). Note verbale of 28 November 1968 from Sudan.
A/7382 (S/8923). Letter of 9 December 1968 from Jordan.
A/7390 (S/8928). Letter of 12 December 1968 from Syria.
A/7391 (S/8929), A/7392 (S/89301, A/7399 (S/8932), A/7450 (S/8935). Letters of 12, 13 and 18 December 1968 from Jordan.
A/7218. Resolutions adopted by General Assembly during its 23rd session, 24 September – 21 December 1968, p. 8.
ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST
During 1968, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) continued to assist Arab refugees in east Jordan, on the West Bank of Jordan, in Lebanon, Syria and the Gaza Strip, providing them with relief and health services, education and vocational training.
On 31 December 1968, the number of refugees registered with the Agency was 1,375,915, of whom 478,369 were in east Jordan, 269,065 on the West Bank, 307,824 in the Gaza Strip, 168,927 in Lebanon and 151,730 in Syria.
On 19 December 1968, the General Assembly with the adoption of resolution 2452 (XXIII), again reaffirmed its resolution of 4 July 1967 69/ endorsing UNRWA's action in providing "humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure" to newly displaced persons in serious need, even if they had not been UNRWA-registered refugees before June 1967. (This mandate was also reaffirmed by the Assembly on 19 December 1967.) 70/
By mid-1968, when the Jordanian Government stopped the entry of people from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, mass movement eastward had virtually ceased.
Several thousand persons returned from east Jordan to the West Bank in 1968 under a family reunion scheme, and several thousand more left east Jordan to seek work elsewhere in the Arab world. By the end of 1968, the total number of displaced persons in east Jordan from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was estimated at approximately 400,000, nearly half of whom were UNRWA-registered refugees from 1948.
ACTIVITIES IN 1968
The assistance provided by UNRWA on a basis of eligibility and need included shelter, food, health services and education, including vocational training.
Until June 1967, there were 54 hutted UNRWA camps which sheltered about 517,000 (or 40 per cent) of the refugees. Following the June 1967 hostilities, the population of the camps in the West Bank and in Gaza were reduced, but 10 emergency camps had to be established: four in Syria, sheltering some 8,000 of the 17,000 Palestine refugees who had fled from the southwest (Golan Heights) area in 1967, and six in Jordan, sheltering over 75,000 refugees and newly displaced persons by mid-1968. By agreement between UNRWA and the Jordanian Government in August 1968, and with the use of funds specially donated for the purpose, a major construction programme was started in the autumn of 1968 to replace tents with more solid temporary shelters.
Rations supplying a daily average per recipient of 1,500 to 1,600 calories were distributed to some 62 per cent of the refugees, or 825,679 persons, as at 31 December 1968. Including special emergency issues, the total of rations distributed was for 844,497 persons. UNRWA's normal supplementary feeding programme provided daily hot meals, milk issues and monthly extra rations to especially vulnerable groups. Since June 1967, UNRWA maintained an emergency feeding programme (including protein-rich food) for displaced UNRWA-registered refugees living in or out of emergency tented camps in east Jordan and Syria, and for special hardship cases and other categories in the West Bank and Gaza.
Environmental sanitation services were maintained and improved in the emergency camps. Medical care was provided at 116 locations and 1,806 hospital beds were available through UNRWA.
In October 1968, 208,870 refugee children were enrolled in the 466 primary and preparatory schools operated by UNRWA with the technical co-operation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. A further 56,000 children, most of them assisted financially by UNRWA, attended government or private schools. Of these, 15,000 were receiving secondary education. Two major school construction programmes financed by special contributions were undertaken to improve teaching conditions and relieve the problem of double shifts, particularly in Syria and east Jordan. University scholarships were awarded to 1,255 refugee students, about half of them being financed by special donations. At the end of 1968, 1,545 UNRWA teachers were enrolled for the in-service training course provided by the UNRWA/UNESCO Institute of Education.
Thirty-seven different courses were open to refugee students in UNRWA's vocational training centres which. together with teacher-training centres, offered 3,600 places for students. This capacity was to be increased by 50 per cent with special donations earmarked for that purpose. In 1968, about 1,400 young men and women were graduated, a slightly lower number than usual, owing to disruptions resulting from the 1967 hostilities. There were 100 graduates who went to Europe for on-the-job training. Except for those residing in Gaza, nearly all who completed their training in 1968 found suitable employment by the end of that year.
CONSIDERATION BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY
REPORT OF COMMISSIONER-GENERAL
In his annual report to the General Assembly's twenty-third (1968) session covering the period from 1 July 1967 to 30 Tune 1968, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA described the plight of the refugees in the year following the hostilities of June 1967, reviewed the Agency's efforts to re-establish and maintain its basic relief, health and education services, as well as to meet urgent new needs, and directed attention to the Agency's critical financial situation.
The Commissioner-General stated that unless the Agency received 10 per cent additional contributions, a reduction in services to the refugee population would be inescapable, with resulting human hardship and suffering and the likelihood that the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring, appointed under Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 71/ would be jeopardized.
All refugees, he said, were subject to economic difficulties. Those who remained in the Israel- occupied areas felt the psychological stress of living under an occupying authority; others, in the Jordan Valley, were exposed to the physical danger of military action. For all refugees, the future remained uncertain as they anxiously awaited the measures that might follow the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, calling for a just and lasting peace and including as one of its elements a "just settlement of the refugee problem."
It was the Commissioner-General's opinion, following upon his contacts with the Arab Governments concerned and with the refugees, that implementation of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly's resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 providing for repatriation or compensation of the Palestine refugees, 72/ upon which the refugees had for so long built their hopes, remained of crucial importance to them.
In the event that the General Assembly should decide to prolong UNRWA's mandate beyond June 1969, the report added, the situation of the refugees required the Agency not only to maintain but also to expand its services, and it would do so to the extent that funds permitted
The report also gave an account of the Agency's activities and the measures taken in endeavouring to overcome the operational difficulties arising from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East, and included information about the Agency's efforts to carry out the wider mandate entrusted to it under the General Assembly's resolution of 4 July 1967 (see page 277).
In Lebanon, the Agency's services continued to function normally throughout the year. The number of refugees registered at the end of June 1968 was 166,264 of whom 103,727 were receiving rations. The Agency had received effective co-operation from the Lebanese authorities in completing a review of the ration entitlements of all families on the ration lists
Applications for reinstatement on the ration rolls on grounds of having lost the capacity for self-support had increased markedly since the June 1967 hostilities.
In Syria, services functioned more or less normally. Registered refugees totalled 149,537 with 100,503 receiving rations, including 4,583 added as a result of the emergency. The most urgent task during the year had been the provision of temporary shelters for the registered refugees uprooted from the Quneitra area occupied by Israel. In June 1968, 7,746 refugees were living in tented camps. The Syrian Government had taken care of an estimated 100,000 Syrians displaced from the southern area.
After the exodus to east Jordan, the number of registered refugees on the West Bank was estimated by UNRWA at 245,000 and the number in east Jordan at 455,500, plus some 38,000 refugees from Gaza. Adding some 237,500 displaced persons from the West Bank and about 8,500 from Gaza, registered by the Government of Jordan, the total of refugees and displaced persons living in east Jordan was 740,000 of whom 590,000 received rations.
In spite of the problems imposed by the continuing emergency in east Jordan, the report added, the Agency's relief and health services, in close co-operation with the Government and with voluntary agencies, had operated without serious interruption and, in general, in a normal and regular manner. At the request of the Jordanian Government, UNRWA had, in addition, assumed the whole responsibility for ration distribution, against reimbursement by the Jordanian Government, to the 240,000 Government-registered displaced persons. Also, at Jordan's request, UNRWA had accepted responsibility for running six tented camps housing 78,000 in east Jordan.
Stating that the number of persons who had been enabled to return to the West Bank under arrangements made in July and August 1967 had been exceeded by the flow to east Jordan, the Commissioner-General reiterated that the Agency's capacity to help would be much greater if, in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of 14 June 1967, 73/ subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly on 4 July 1967, 74/ the inhabitants who had fled were allowed to return to what had been their places of residence prior to the June 1967 hostilities. Such a return to occupied territories where UNRWA's installations and facilities already existed would, in his opinion, conform to the wishes of the majority of the refugees concerned and ought to be considered without waiting for the achievement of the "just settlement of the refugee problem" to which the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 referred.
In Gaza, the aftermath of the hostilities had been painful and prolonged, the Commissioner-General added, and the Agency's services had felt the effects of the succession of incidents and security measures and the slump in economic activity. UNRWA had to undertake a considerable amount of replacement or repair of refugee shelters and other UNRWA installations which had been demolished or damaged in action taken by the military authorities. With some 40,000 to 45,000 persons believed to have left Gaza since the hostilities, 265,000 registered refugees remained, of whom some 209,000 received rations.
In the United Arab Republic, UNRWA had met the cost of relief support provided by that Government's authorities for some 3,000 registered refugees from Gaza. Those authorities estimated the total number of refugees and displaced persons from Gaza in the United Arab Republic at 13,000.
The report described disruption in school attendance in the UNRWA/UNESCO educational system in the West Bank, in east Jordan and in Gaza consequent upon the hostilities. Although all schools had resumed classes, they continued to be handicapped by difficulties consequent upon the banning by Israel in the occupied areas of certain textbooks which Israel had criticized as giving a distorted account of Israel and as tending to breed hatred of Israel in their users. The textbooks employed in UNRWA/UNESCO schools had, in the past, been those prescribed by the host Governments for their own national systems of education. For the West Bank and Gaza schools, as a temporary substitute for these prohibited textbooks, the Agency used its own, not wholly satisfactory, cyclostyled teaching notes. As a temporary measure, the banned books were still being employed in the other schools.
Meanwhile, the report added, UNESCO had set up a commission to examine the textbooks used in all UNRWA/UNESCO schools and to make recommendations thereon in accordance with principles established by the UNESCO Executive Board. The Arab Governments concerned had vigorously protested the suspension, pending the UNESCO review, of the use in their countries of books banned in the occupied territories, an action which they considered could constitute an infringement of their sovereignty.
According to the Commissioner-General's report, the year which followed the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East was one of new hardships and anxieties for the Palestine refugees. Those who became refugees for a second time (about 175,000) together with most of the 350,000 or more other persons newly displaced from the occupied areas of southern Syria, the West Bank, Gaza and Sinai, were in need of the very essentials of physical survival–food, water, shelter, blankets, clothing and health care–and, scarcely less important, education for their children. Thanks to the concerted efforts of Governments, inter-governmental organizations, voluntary agencies and UNRWA, neither famine nor epidemic had been added to the refugees' plight.
However, while help from many quarters came immediately and generously after the hostilities, with the passage of time, interest and aid would almost inevitably begin to dwindle, the report noted. The situation of the displaced was thus likely to worsen rather than improve. UNRWA's capacity to help was reduced by the fact that some of its best camps, schools, clinics and other facilities stood idle on the West Bank, while the former inhabitants eked out a bare subsistence in emergency shelters far removed from those facilities.
The financial position of the Agency, the report noted, necessitated continual restrictions on the number of ration recipients: by June 1968, 300,000 children one year of age and over received no rations.
As to the future of the Agency, the report stated that whatever stage might be reached in the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (see pp. 265-68), under the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, 75/ an extension of UNRWA's mandate beyond 30 June 1968 was absolutely essential.
UNRWA, the Commissioner-General stated, was determined to carry out its mandate to the maximum limits possible within its budgetary capabilities. Although the generous response of contributors to the Agency's appeal for funds to meet the 1967 emergency more than covered those needs in 1967, the excess would quickly be absorbed in meeting those needs in 1968. Even allowing for the carry-over, there would be a deficit of $1.2 million in 1968, and UNRWA's working capital would fall to its lowest point. To carry on the current programmes in 1969, the Agency would require $42.5 million, while income was not expected to exceed $37.6 million.
The Commissioner-General warned that it would be neither feasible nor realistic to attempt a solution by reducing services to the refugees–provided at an average cost of less than $40 per refugee per year–as any such attempt would have a disastrous effect on people already suffering severe hardships and psychological tensions.
Accordingly, the Commissioner-General urgently requested the General Assembly to assure UNRWA adequate financial resources to carry out the humanitarian mandate which the Assembly had entrusted to the Agency.
GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISCUSSIONS
The Commissioner-General's annual report was referred for discussion to the General Assembly's Special Political Committee which dealt with the questions it raised at 21 meetings between 11 November and 13 December 1968.
The Secretary-General made a statement to the Special Political Committee on the extension of UNRWA's mandate and the need for increased contributions.
He observed that this was the first time a Secretary-General had addressed the Committee during its consideration of UNRWA's report. He deplored the inability of the General Assembly to take any significant step, in 20 years, towards a real solution of the tragic problem of the more than one million Palestine refugees who still had no homeland, no future and no hope. The Secretary-General considered it his duty to call special attention to certain acute situations requiring urgent action, and certain vital needs, which, in his opinion, were an international responsibility.
First, he said, the mandate of UNRWA must be renewed. The international community could not abandon this large group of people for whose plight the United Nations must bear a considerable measure of responsibility. The refugees must be cared for until a final settlement of the refugee problem was achieved. He appealed to Governments to afford his Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, all possible co-operation in finding a long-term solution to the problem.
Second, if the Assembly were to continue UNRWA, the Agency must be provided with the means to meet the increased demands placed on it since June 1967 and to meet the requirements of its humanitarian responsibility for both the newly displaced persons and the existing refugees. There were Agency's income would be as much as $5 million less than the estimated Secretary-General appealed contributions.
Finally, the Secretary-General recalled resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly relating to humanitarian questions, and, in particular, the Council's resolution of 14 June 1967 which, among other things, asked that the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities be facilitated. 76/ The number who had actually returned had been relatively small. If the refugee camps in the West Bank could again serve their original purpose and the displaced persons could return to their homes, the Secretary-General said, the hardships faced by a large number of refugees would be reduced and the financial burdens on the Agency alleviated. He realized, however, that a major factor in the settlement of the situation and a possible obstacle to the re-establishment of the status quo ante was the continuing occupation by Israeli forces of the area concerned and the lack of any indication as to when that occupation would be terminated and peaceful conditions prevail.
In presenting his annual report, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, said that the human needs of the Palestine refugees, and of the other persons displaced since the hostilities of June 1967, were great and pressing. Many thousands were living in extremely precarious conditions, particularly those who sought shelter in the new emergency camps in Jordan and Syria, where winter would bring cold, severe winds and heavy rains. About 8,000 persons were living in tented camps in Syria, and arrangements were being made to accommodate 2,000 more. Work was under way to improve those camps, as well as those in Jordan where 75,000 persons were living in tents. Non-governmental organizations were providing sturdier shelters, and it was hoped that more would be provided by Governments to get as many shelters as possible erected before the worst of the winter.
The Commissioner-General said that the need for food, health services and education had increased during the period under review; the number of children in UNRWA schools rose by 25,000, bringing the total number in UNRWA/UNESCO schools to more than 200,000. Demands for technical and vocational training had also increased. The Commissioner-General said that the importance of education could not be over-emphasized, since half the refugees registered with UNRWA were under 18 years of age. Concerning the curriculum in the UNRWA/UNESCO schools and the textbooks in use, the Commissioner-General said that, at the direction of the UNESCO Executive Board, a commission of outside experts had been set up and had started examining the books.
UNRWA would continue to do its utmost, within the means available, to meet the needs of the Palestine refugees who were in a large measure dependent upon it. The Commissioner-General emphasized that UNRWA could provide better care, at less cost, if the newly displaced refugees could return to the homes and camps where they were living before the hostilities, as envisaged in General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.
Turning to the question of finances, the Commissioner-General stated that the level of UNRWA expenditures for its normal programme stayed at about $37.5 million annually from 1964 through 1967. During this period, increased costs had been offset by reducing the number of the international staff and by administrative and budgetary economics. Developments during the past year, however, had added materially to UNRWA's financial problem. Additional expenses resulting from the emergency had been met in 1967, and to a large extent in 1968, from special contributions. There would be a shortfall in income in 1968 and UNRWA would have to draw on its working capital. Part of the additional costs was due to the increased expense of assisting newly displaced refugees under emergency conditions, he added.
Continuation of the present programme, at the estimated increased cost of $42.5 million, included very little provision for the persons displaced after hostilities who had not been previously registered with UNRWA. Responsibility for those persons had been taken almost entirely by the Governments concerned. The Commissioner-General earnestly hoped that, should UNRWA's mandate be renewed, the United Nations would respond to the Secretary-General's plea for the necessary funds to cover the anticipated 1969 deficit of about $5 million, and thus avoid the agonizing but otherwise inescapable reduction in services to the refugee population.
On 11 November 1968, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia requested that "the Palestine Arab Delegation" be heard by the Committee. On 18 November, 14 States–Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and Yemen–requested that "the delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization" be heard. On 18 and 19 November, respectively, the Special Political Committee decided to authorize persons constituting such delegations to speak in the Committee, on the understanding that such authorization did not imply recognition of the organization represented.
During the Special Political Committee's general debate, the Commissioner- General and the staff of UNRWA were generally praised for their handling of the Agency's increasingly difficult tasks. Many speakers referred with appreciation to the action of the Secretary-General in drawing special attention to the seriousness of the refugee problem. All representatives dealt with its humanitarian aspects. Western countries concentrated on those aspects and endorsed Ambassador Jarring's efforts to promote a peace settlement in accordance with the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. 77/ Representatives of Arab States, as well as African-Asian States and Eastern European countries placed greatest emphasis on such political aspects of the problem as its origins, the implementation of the General Assembly's resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 78/ and the Security Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967, and the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories. Nevertheless, there was unanimous support for prolonging UNRWA's mandate as the only practical means of providing necessary assistance to the refugees, and for contributing generously to its work. The representative of Israel did not agree that there should be a call for the return without delay to their homes and camps of the inhabitants who had fled the Israel-occupied areas since the outbreak of the June 1967 hostilities.
Several representatives, including those of Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Republic and Yemen, indicated in varying terms that the question of the Palestine refugees was the tragedy of a whole people who had been the victims of an international conspiracy and whose drama was now being magnified by a camouflaged neo-colonialism. The Jewish historical connexion with Palestine had been neither exclusive nor unique and could not be advanced as a basis for political claims. Israel's legal and political claims to Palestine were based on the Balfour Declaration and on General Assembly resolution 181 (II) A of 29 November 1947, 79/ which set out the plan of partition. Neither of these was valid, it was contended. The former was a promise which the United Kingdom had neither the moral nor the legal right to make and the latter violated a basic principle of the United Nations Charter. Partition had been the result of pressures exerted by the Zionists on the major powers, especially the United States, and the Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947 had left many of its supporters with guilty consciences.
The refugee problem, it was argued, was the result of the Zionist programme to occupy Palestine and establish an exclusively or at least predominantly Jewish State. Zionism was a racist concept. The pattern and purpose of Israel-Zionist expansionism, it was maintained, was the expulsion of the Arabs to make room for new Jewish settlements and immigrants from all over the world.
Representatives of Arab States agreed that the refugee problem was the result of aggressive military actions by the Israeli forces, both in 1948 and 1967. The mass exodus of the refugees, it was claimed, was not the result of the military intervention of Arab States in Palestine in May 1948; the bulk of the refugees had fled during the two previous months as a result of the action of the Zionist forces. The Israeli aggression of June 1967 had greatly increased the refugee problem.
While Israel's policy was responsible for the problem, the United Nations could not escape responsibility for its solution, for rendering justice to the Palestinian people–who had every right to statehood–because the United Nations had created Israel in defiance of the right of self-determination. Of all the peoples who had lived in the former mandated territories, only those of Palestine had been denied the right to choose their own future in accordance with the Charter, the representatives of Arab States added.
The representative of Saudi Arabia, among others, emphasized the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to recover their land, and their responsibility for doing so, with or without the support of the Arab Governments. The representative of Yemen said that the Palestinians were determined to liberate their country and that their national liberation movement enjoyed the moral support of all freedom-loving peoples. Peace would come to the region, he said, and the United Nations could close its file on the problem, only when all Palestinians would again find their ancestral homeland and when all citizens of the Holy Land were represented in their national entity, whether they were Jews, Moslems or Christians.
Representatives of Arab States, as well as a number of other speakers, including the representatives of Afghanistan, Indonesia, Libya, Pakistan and Sudan, stressed the right of the Palestine refugees to repatriation or compensation as provided for under paragraph 11 of the General Assembly's resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948; 80/ a number of them pointed out that for 20 years the refugees had waited in vain for the international community to implement that oft-reiterated resolution. Israel, it was charged, had flouted that resolution.
Representatives of Arab States declared that until the great injustice that had been done to the Arabs of Palestine by the creation of Israel in 1948 was finally settled by recognizing the refugees' legitimate right to return to their homeland and to self-determination, the question would continue to be a source of tension which might degenerate into a new conflagration. The Palestinians would never accept a compromise. They had no choice but to resist in view of Israel's refusal to withdraw from the occupied areas, its acts of repression in those areas and its annexation of Jerusalem.
The representatives of Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic stressed that action must be taken to ensure the immediate return to their homes and camps of refugees and other persons displaced by the 1967 hostilities. Because of Israel's continued refusal to implement the Security Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 196781 and its defiance of other United Nations resolutions, they maintained, Israel bore a heavy responsibility for the deterioration in the Middle East situation.
As to Israel's claim that Jordan was promoting violence within the occupied areas, Jordan's representative stated that his Government would not take forcible measures to prevent the people from challenging Israel's occupation. The inaction of the United Nations, Israel's refusal to withdraw, its acts of repression and colonization, its annexation of Jerusalem and its policy of ruthlessness left no choice to the people of Palestine but to exercise the right of resistance–which was the right of every people subjected to foreign occupation.
The representative of the United Arab Republic emphasized that the refugee problem could not be viewed simply as a humanitarian or financial issue: it was fundamentally a political issue involving the right of self-determination. No solution to the problem of ending the cruel misery of 1,500,000 innocent people could ever be found if the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people were disregarded.
Syria's representative said that the suffering Arabs of Palestine had never abandoned their sacred human rights, which had been trampled underfoot by the Israeli Zionist conquerors. These rights were: the right to self-determination as enshrined in the Charter; the right of sovereignty over Palestine; the right to nationality; the right to individual property and to compensation for property arbitrarily expropriated or taken by force; the right to return to their former homes; civil and religious rights, and the rights of Palestinians inside Palestine. He considered it fallacious to claim that there had been an exchange of population between the Arabs of Palestine and the Arab-Jewish communities in the Arab countries. The difference was clear: the Palestine refugees had been expelled from their country. Therefore, he said, United Nations resolutions concerning the legal rights of the Arab refugees were still valid and these resolutions should not be allowed to fall into oblivion.
Referring to the nine-point peace proposal made by the Foreign Minister of Israel in the General Assembly on 8 October 1968 (see pp. 272-73) the representative of Syria stated that Israel's approach to a solution of the refugee problem amounted to a rejection of numerous resolutions of the Assembly affirming the right of the Arab refugees either to repatriation or compensation. It was, of course, in Israel's interest to forget the past. The Arabs would not forget they legally owned the land of Palestine; conquest would not terminate that legal right, he said. If the problems of the refugees were allowed to continue, the situation in the Middle East would remain explosive. Peace would not be achieved by Israel refusing to vacate the occupied territories and insisting on peace on its own terms.
The Syrian representative added that the Jarring mission was being used by Israel as a smoke-screen to hide its attempt to eject the civilian population from the occupied territories and to violate their human rights and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
The representative of Tunisia said the clash of two nationalisms in the same area was the basis of the tragedy. There were two possible solutions: either the two nationalisms would coexist on the same territory, or, more realistically, accept, as the United Nations had unjustifiably decided in 1947, the partition of Palestine. The Arab States had established that they could not liberate Palestine. A new factor in this region, he continued, was the assumption by the Palestinian people of increasing responsibility for the struggle to recover their rights in their own country. Tunisia would support that just struggle, convinced that it would lead to a lasting solution which could only be a compromise between the aspirations and the rights of both parties, based on the will of each to resist and survive.
Such a compromise, between Palestinian Arabs liberated from their illusions and Jewish nationalists divested of the superiority complex inherent in the racist doctrine of Zionism, would mean acceptance by each of the right of the other to existence and security, he added. While there was no question of the Arabs accepting the State of Israel as it was today, the Arabs did not dream of denying a Jewish presence in the area.
On the issue of the refugees, representatives of Arab States considered that the first step to take was the return to their homelands of refugees and other persons displaced by the June 1967 hostilities. They contended that the many resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights, the Economic and Social Council, the International Conference on Human Rights and the World Health Organization had gone unheeded. The Committee must take effective action to ensure the immediate implementation by Israel of the Security Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967, and the General Assembly's resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967. 82/ Israel's willingness to authorize the return of a small number of persons had been a tactical move to blunt criticism and an ill-disguised rejection, said the representatives of Kuwait and Syria. Implementation did not depend on the solution of problems relating to Israel's security. Return could not be made contingent, as Israel wished, upon the solution of the Palestine problem in the wider context. Israel's motives were the same in 1967 as in 1948; to expand as far as possible, with the Arab population kept to a minimum. Although colonization of occupied territory was contrary to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, said Kuwait, Israel had set up 23 colonies since 1967.
Spokesmen of the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Palestine Liberation Organization declared that the Palestine problem was not simply a question of refugees; its essence was that a homeland had been forcibly usurped. The 1947 partition resolution 83/ had been a flagrant injustice. Nothing would weaken Palestinian resistance against Zionism and the presence of expansionist Israel. The theory that Israel was an established fact was unacceptable. Like the struggle of the various Afro-Asian peoples against colonialism and foreign occupation, the armed struggle of the Arab people of Palestine to liberate their homeland was legitimate. At the current stage, they counted on the Arab States to facilitate their task. The Arabs of Palestine were the sole masters of their destiny and no one could barter their rights away.
Numerous Arab and other States, among them Indonesia, Mauritania and Pakistan, favoured the view that the United Nations had the competence, and should appoint a custodian, to protect and administer Arab property assets in Israel. In advancing this proposal, the representative of Pakistan said that pending their repatriation, as provided for under paragraph 11 of the Assembly's resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 84/ the refugees should receive income from the property they had left behind in Israel, in order to enable them to live their lives in dignity on their own income. His proposal to appoint a custodian, he said, was based on the pertinent provisions of the Assembly's resolution 394 (V) of 14 December 1950 85/ on the repatriation, resettlement and compensation of Palestine refugees, as well as on established principles governing claims for restitution of property or payment of compensation. The United Nations could not afford to go back on the pledge it had made to the Palestine refugees.
A representative of the Palestine Arab Delegation said that Palestine Arab refugees rejected in toto the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 on the Middle East. The refugees, he said, were determined to resist any settlement depriving them of their inalienable right to self-determination and of their right to return to their ancestral homeland. The plight of many refugees would unquestionably be relieved by their immediate return to the homes and camps which they previously occupied–a view which, he said, was strongly supported by all representatives in the Special Political Committee except the representative of "the invaders of Palestine." The Palestine Arab Delegation, he said, proposed a 10-point programme for a just and peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem. As a part of the programme, the delegation proposed that the General Assembly should set up three United Nations commissions. The first would facilitate the repatriation of the Palestine Jewish immigrants to their homes or to any other country that would accept them. The second would facilitate the return of the Palestinians to their homes and assist them in regaining possession of their property. The third commission would supervise the reconstruction of Palestine, either as an independent State or in federation with Jordan, and supervise the election of a democratic government by the indigenous Moslem, Christian and Jewish peoples. The United Nations would also guarantee freedom of access to the Holy Places in Palestine to Christians, Moslems and Jews.
The representative of Israel said that his Government's prime concern was to achieve a peace settlement ending the Israeli-Arab conflict and to adopt a constructive approach to the resulting problems of human displacement. The three wars spawned by Arab hostility to Israel had produced death, destruction and displacement on both sides.
The 1948 war had not destroyed Israel but it had launched an unplanned two-way population movement. More than 500.000 Arabs had moved from areas under Israeli control to adjacent Arab areas, and some 500,000 Jews uprooted from Arab countries had moved into Israel and been absorbed. The Arab countries had made no such effort to absorb Arab refugees from Palestine, Israel's representative stated.
The Arab attitude, he continued, reflected the view that Israel, a Member of the United Nations, had no right to exist. The Palestine refugees had been cast in the role of a political and military spearhead in an armed struggle, with the support of the Arab States, for the dissolution of Israel. It had soon become a sterile exercise to invoke paragraph 11 of the General Assembly's resolution 194 (III) of 1948, which dealt with repatriation, compensation and resettlement in the context of a resolution calling for a final negotiated settlement of all Arab-Israeli issues. Because of Arab political resistance, UNRWA had lost its original purpose of effecting regional economic integration of refugees and had become a permanent relief agency.
As to the education of the refugees, the representative of Israel said that books inciting students to hatred were no longer used in the areas held by Israel, but that the suppression of those books had entailed no interference with the children's religious or cultural education. Arab arguments about the texts begged the real question: whether United Nations agencies should be responsible for teaching children hatred of another State or people.
The time had come, the representative of Israel continued, to take a fresh look at the problem and prepare the way for a constructive settlement in the framework of peace and regional and international co-operation. The Security Council resolution of 22 November 196786 had placed the refugee problem once more in the broad context of peace-making and had wisely refrained from tying its settlement to previous United Nations resolutions.
Pending an over-all solution of the problem, it was obvious that UNRWA should continue to operate. Israel's Government would continue to extend full co-operation to the Agency in all Israel-held areas. For the year under review its total contribution had been $3.5 million. Commenting on the Agency report's reference to the impact on the refugees of the economic dislocation caused by the war, he stated that economic activity in Israel-held areas was at least at pre-war levels. Describing Israel's policy of the "open frontier" across the Jordan River, he stated that the two-way passage of almost 200,000 persons, and truck traffic, much the same as before June 1967, had not only lessened present difficulties but widened population contacts and might increase the prospect of peaceful coexistence. The Israeli Government, he said, intended to make a special contribution of one million Israeli pounds to make camps more habitable for refugees facing a severe winter, and meanwhile it had been encouraging the transport of goods and mail, and permitting the movement of thousands of Arabs back and forth across the Jordan.
As to the return of persons displaced as a result of the 1967 hostilities to their former homes and camps, the Israeli Government had accepted the relevant resolutions, was acutely conscious of the human aspects of that question, and was trying to reconcile their return with its responsibility for the safety, welfare and security of the local population and of the State itself. The Government of Jordan, Israel's representative said, was making large-scale repatriation as difficult as possible by supporting continuous border warfare and efforts to promote violence within Israel-held areas.
During the past year, the representative of Israel continued, 14,000 persons had been repatriated in one project and 3,000 more under the family reunion scheme. The processing of family reunion and hardship cases was being accelerated and a further 7,000 persons were to be admitted on the basis of return permits not used. The estimated figure of 400,000 eastward migrants was grossly exaggerated; his Government believed the total was under 250,000. Systematic expulsion of Arabs had never been Israel's policy. Inhabitants who had fled during the fighting had done so before Israeli troops had reached their homes; after occupation there had been no panic flight but only an orderly migration of persons of their own free will. His Government had not felt entitled to retain any against their will.
The representative of Israel said he wished to clarify certain points in connexion with Security Council and General Assembly resolutions concerning the return of newly displaced persons. First, he said, those resolutions had called upon Israel to facilitate the return of such persons, but did not demand their immediate and unconditional return regardless of continuing difficulties in the area where military operations took place. Secondly, the return of the displaced persons had been deliberately linked to the need to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants where military operations had taken place; in fact, all the inhabitants of Israel were living in the area of hostilities.
With regard to the permanent solution of the Arab refugee problem as a whole, the Israeli representative added, no response had been received from the Arab States to the suggestions made by the Foreign Minister of Israel on 8 October 1968 in the General Assembly (see pp. 272-73). His Government thought the refugee problem should include a reintegration and compensation fund, to which he reaffirmed his Government's willingness to give substantial support. The practical aspects of a solution should not be unduly formidable. The picture of 1.3 million refugees eking out a precarious existence on charity was fictitious as there had been substantial economic absorption. Since in most areas the distinction between refugees and non-refugees had become blurred, a practical solution would consist of speeding up the existing process of integration, ensuring a productive life for all refugees willing and able to work.
Concerning the proposal for a custodian of Arab property in Israel, the representative of Israel said that there were no grounds on which the United Nations could appoint such a custodian or directly intervene with regard to private property claims within the territory of a sovereign Member State. Suggestions that that principle did not apply in the case of Israel had no foundation. The proposal was prejudicial to the peace-making efforts of Ambassador Jarring, since the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 included a reference to the refugee problem as one of the elements of a peace agreement. Arab countries which had taken over confiscated Jewish property had never made a compensation offer such as that made by Israel in respect of abandoned Arab properties.
Reviewing statements of Arab representatives on the historical and political origins of the refugee problem, the representative of Israel described them as sterile attempts to rewrite the history of the most complex question in the history of the United Nations. Arab Governments shrank from the inescapable truth that in 1948 they had assumed the heavy responsibility of going to war, and the refugee problem was its bitter fruit. The 1948 pattern had repeated itself in 1967: a pattern of auto-intoxication before the war and self-pity after it and a pattern of evading moral responsibility for one's own actions. One of the essential conditions of a peace was that the Arab world should abandon the belief that the Israeli-Arab conflict could be settled by the sword and that the State of Israel could be forced to disappear.
The representative of Israel said his country's belief in the possibility of harmonious coexistence with its neighbours should not be dismissed as mere wishful thinking. There were positive aspects in the present situation, he added, including the fact that the majority of Palestinian Arabs were in daily contact with the Israelis and that the barriers between them were beginning to go down despite every attempt to disrupt that growing coexistence.
The United States representative said that despite 20 years of resolutions, the United Nations had made no substantial progress towards repatriating the Palestine refugees or compensating them for their lost property. His Government would continue to do all it could to contribute to the goal of justice for those refugees. As President Lyndon B. Johnson had said on 10 September 1968, the plight of the refugees was a symbol in the minds of the Arab peoples of a wrong that must be made right before 20 years of war could end. No basic solution of the refugee problem was likely to take place outside the context of an agreed settlement in accordance with the framework provided by the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. Hope for such a settlement now lay with the continuing efforts of Ambassador Jarring to carry out his mandate under that resolution, the United States representative said. His Government intended to do everything possible to help Ambassador Jarring in his task. The Special Political Committee could also help by doing all that was possible in the absence of a settlement to ameliorate the conditions under which the refugees lived and to provide for their rehabilitation and integration into a productive life.
In the present circumstances and with its humanitarian tasks increased by the events of the past year, the activities of UNRWA must continue, the United States representative said. His Government shared the Commissioner-General's concern over the projected budget deficit for 1969. The United States had supported UNRWA faithfully over the years by contributing approximately $425 million, almost 70 per cent of the $640 million UNRWA had required for its work. It would continue to do so. Private American agencies had contributed some $10 million since June 1967, he added.
Concerning the flood of refugees and other persons displaced from their homes and camps in the occupied territories consequent upon the 1967 hostilities, the representative of the United States stated that his Government considered the return from the East Bank of the approximately 20,000 persons whom Israel had allowed back was an inadequate response to the appeal of the Security Council. The United States had welcomed the assurance, given by the Israeli Foreign Minister to the General Assembly on 8 October 1968 (see pp. 272-73), to implement new measures to deal with hardship cases and unutilized return permits. However, the Government of Israel had not yet carried out the provision of the Security Council's resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 87/ which called upon Israel to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the area where military operations had taken place. His Government had asked, and the United Nations had the right to expect, the United States representative said, that Israel take the appropriate steps to carry out the provisions of that resolution.
The representative of the United Kingdom considered that the solution of the main refugee problem was part of the just and lasting settlement which was the object of the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. He wished to direct the attention of the Special Political Committee to the immediate aim: the speedy return to their homes, before the rigours of winter, of the more than a quarter of a million displaced persons who had crossed over to the east bank of the Jordan River during and after the hostilities of June 1967. He appealed to the Government of Israel to make the magnanimous and courageous gesture of permitting their return to their homes and UNRWA camps.
Consideration of the financial aspects of the Commissioner-General's report, the United Kingdom representative said, led him to agree with the need for increased expenditure by the Agency in 1969. Pointing out that 90 per cent of UNRWA's expenses had been borne by a handful of countries, he stated his delegation's belief that the traditional contributors should be joined by countries that had expressed great concern but contributed little or nothing.
The representative of France said that the existence of the problem of the Palestine refugees for two decades and the further dimension it had acquired as a result of the events of June 1967 surely made it one of the most poignant problems the world had ever faced. The successive military actions initiated since the end of the conflict had, moreover, extended the unfortunate effects, and the movement of refugees from the West Bank of Jordan had been complicated during recent months by a steady flow of refugees from Gaza. His Government attached particular importance to the return of displaced persons to their homes or camps and joined with those who had called for action by Israel that might perhaps be a gesture of "generosity and confidence," but would especially be an act of justice.
Stating that his Government had made every effort, within the limits of its financial capabilities, to give increased support to UNRWA, the representative of France added that a true and lasting solution to the problem of the refugees could not be brought about through any actions of UNRWA. It was the Security Council's resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, he stated, that defined the elements of a political solution of the Middle East question; its implementation would make possible a just and durable peace and finally end the human tragedy of the refugees.
In addition to calling for the return of newly displaced refugees to their homes or camps, both France and Belgium expressed support for the extension of UNRWA's mandate, but opposed a suggestion to incorporate the Agency's administrative expenses in the regular United Nations budget. This would have the result of making those expenses mandatory for all United Nations Member States; the General Assembly, they said, had provided that the Agency should be financed only by voluntary contributions.
The representative of Canada, endorsing the call for a return of the refugees, said that the Agency's mandate should be extended and necessary resources provided for its operation, but without committing the Agency to a permanency incompatible with its original purpose. He expressed belief that the General Assembly should renew the mandate annually.
The USSR representative said that the of the Palestine refugees, although being considered in the Special Political Committee from the humanitarian point of view, was in fact a major political question, both in origin and in essence, and was intimately linked with the aggressive policy of Israel against the Arab States. The more than a million victims of Israel's expansionist ambitions could not be left to their fate. The USSR was providing Arab States with support in their struggle for a just settlement of the Middle East conflict. Assistance was also being provided, on a bilateral basis, to the peoples of the Arab countries who had suffered as a result of Israel's aggression.
Measures of assistance to the Palestine refugees, however necessary, were not designed to lead to a genuine solution of the problem, the USSR representative added. The only correct solution, formulated in the General Assembly's resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 88/ provided for granting to the refugees their lawful right to repatriation or compensation for lost property at the earliest practicable date. Yet two decades had elapsed and the tragedy had been intensified when the new aggression of Israel in June 1967 resulted in more hundreds of thousands of Arabs becoming refugees and displaced persons. The forced flight from their camps in the spring of 1968 of tens of thousands of refugees was directly connected with continuing armed provocations by Israel against Arab countries. The terrorist policy in the occupied territories and measures for taking over Arab lands had led to a further increase in the number of refugees.
However much Israel might attempt to represent the expulsion of Arabs from Palestine soil in 1948, 1967 and 1968 as faits accomplis, the USSR representative added, such assertions had no political or legal validity. Responsibility for the lack of a solution to the refugee problem lay in Israel's aggressive policy and stubborn refusal to carry out the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.
As to the problem of the refugees, he added, the primary task was the adoption of appropriate action to ensure immediate implementation of the mandatory instruction in the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967,89/ calling upon Israel to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities.
The representative of the USSR rejected Israel's position on the refugee problem. The final solution of the problem, he concluded, had become a component of the over-all political settlement in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. The Arab States had indicated they were prepared to implement all that resolution's provisions; the Government of Israel had refused to state clearly that it was prepared to do so. There was no other way to peace, the USSR representative stated, than through implementation of that resolution.
Representatives of Eastern European States expressed views similar to those of the USSR and called for unconditional implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.
The representative of Hungary said that statements of Israel's representative were an open admission that Israel had no intention of implementing the Council's resolution of 14 June 1967 90/ any more than it would abide by the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, which it treated as a subject to be argued rather than implemented. The support provided by the socialist countries to the Arab peoples fighting for their independence and sovereignty, the representative of Hungary observed, had to a great extent prevented the occupation of more Arab territories and an increase in refugees. The principle set forth in the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 that the acquisition of territory by war was inadmissible must be strictly adhered to.
Bulgaria's representative called for unconditional restoration to all refugees of their lands, homes and property, and thus the elimination of the consequences of Israel's aggression. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR said that without the support of certain capitalist countries, the extremist circles in Israel could not have so obstinately disregarded United Nations decisions.
Romania's representative said that any solution other than repatriation or compensation would be a mere palliative. The interests of the people of the Middle East required the restoration of normal relations of coexistence and co-operation, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories and respect for the security and independence of all States in the region.
The Ukrainian SSR said it was the duty of peace-loving States to compel Israel to implement Security Council and General Assembly resolutions calling for settlement by repatriation or compensation. He added that the Ukrainian SSR, with other socialist countries, was providing, and would continue to provide, all necessary economic and political assistance to the Arab States bearing the brunt of the burden of caring for the refugees.
The representative of Albania said the United States and the USSR were co-ordinating their actions in the Middle East: the United States was supporting Israel against the Palestinian and other Arab peoples; the USSR, while pretending to befriend the Arab peoples, was in fact co-operating with the United States to carry out concerted plans of aggression against them. He said the Palestinian people's decision to struggle against the Zionist usurpers was the only means of ensuring their return to their homeland and the recovery of their sovereign rights.
In his statement at the close of the general debate in the Special Political Committee, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA said that since he had addressed the Committee on 11 November 1968, additional funds had been received by UNRWA to build sturdier shelters in the emergency camps in Jordan. The total number of shelters to be provided would thus amount to 10,000 units which would house 50,000 people.
The Commissioner-General emphasized that after the Pledging Conference for pledges of contributions to UNRWA, held on 6 December 1968, the outlook for the financial year remained a matter of great anxiety, with income still estimated as $5 million short of the amount needed to maintain the Agency's present activities. Should hopes for further contributions not materialize, reduction of the Agency's expenditure by $5 million would require: reduction of the basic ration to flour and cooking oil only, with issues of rice, pulses, sugar and soap discontinued; curtailment by 35 per cent of the supplementary feeding programme for especially vulnerable groups such as expectant and nursing mothers and curtailment by 10 per cent of medical services and environmental sanitation; elimination from the regular budget of all construction of shelter, roads, building and equipment for health and sanitation; a 50 per cent reduction in university scholarships and discontinuance of all educational subsidies to Governments and private schools for refugee children. That, he concluded, was the stark reality of the situation.
DECISIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Four draft resolutions were submitted to the Special Political Committee.
By one draft resolution, introduced by the United States, the General Assembly would: (1) note with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 91/ had not been effected, that no substantial progress had been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of Assembly resolution 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 92/ for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continued to be a matter of serious concern; (2) express its thanks to the Commissioner-General and the staff of UNRWA for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their assistance; (3) direct the Commissioner-General to continue his efforts in taking such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need; (4) note with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means to achieve progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), and request the Commission to exert continued efforts towards its implementation; (5) direct attention to the continuing crucial financial position of UNRWA; (6) note with concern that, despite successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions continued to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements; (7) call upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of UNRWA, particularly in light of the projected budgetary deficit, and therefore urge non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions; and (8) decide to extend until 30 June 1972, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), the mandate of UNRWA.
A second draft resolution was sponsored by Argentina, Iran, Pakistan, Senegal, Turkey and Yugoslavia.
By the preambular paragraphs of this six-power text, the Assembly would, among other things: reaffirm its resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967; take note of the appeal made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the Special Political Committee on 11 November 1968; express conviction that the plight of the displaced persons could best be relieved by their speedy return to their homes and to the camps which they formerly occupied; and emphasize, consequently, the requirement for their speedy return.
By the operative paragraphs of this six-power draft text, the General Assembly would: (1) call upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities; and (2) request the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly.
A third draft resolution was submitted by Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and Yugoslavia.
By this 17-power draft resolution, the General Assembly, expressing concern about the continued human suffering resulting from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East, would: (1) reaffirm its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967; (2) endorse, bearing in mind the objectives of these resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who were currently displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities; and (3) strongly appeal to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to UNRWA and to the other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.
The fourth draft resolution was submitted by Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Somalia.
By the preamble to this five-power draft, the General Assembly would: state the view that the Palestine Arab refugees were entitled to their property and to the income derived from their property in conformity with the principles of justice and equity; and recall its resolution 394 (V) 93/ of 14 December 1950, which directed the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in consultation with the parties concerned to prescribe measures for the protection of the rights, property and interests of the Palestine Arab refugees.
By the operative part of the five-power text, the Assembly would: (1) request the Secretary-General to take all appropriate steps to have a custodian appointed to protect and administer Arab property, assets and property rights in Israel and to receive income derived therefrom on behalf of the rightful owners; (2) call upon the Governments concerned to render all facilities and assistance to the Secretary-General to render the task and functioning of the custodian effective; and (3) request the custodian to report to the General Assembly in 1969 on the fulfilment of his tasks.
On 11 December 1968, the Special Political Committee, after deciding to give priority to the six-power draft, adopted it by a roll-call vote of 91 to 1, with 9 abstentions. On the same day, the United States draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 101 to 0, with 1 abstention.
On 12 December, the 17-power draft resolution was adopted unanimously by the Committee by a roll-call vote of 88 to 0.
The five-power draft resolution was rejected by the Special Political Committee on 13 December by a roll-call vote of 42 in favour to 44 against, with 27 abstentions.
On 19 December 1968, the three draft resolutions recommended by the Special Political Committee were voted on at a plenary meeting of the Assembly.
The first draft resolution, sponsored in the Special Political Committee by Argentina, Iran, Pakistan, Senegal, Turkey and Yugoslavia, was adopted by 101 votes to 1, with 6 abstentions, resolution 2452 A (XXIII).
The second draft resolution, which had been proposed in the Special Political Committee by the United States, was adopted by 105 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions, as resolution 2452 B (XXIII).
The Assembly adopted the third draft resolution, originally submitted in the Special Political Committee by 17 powers, unanimously, as resolution 2452 C (XXIII).
(For texts of resolutions 2452 A-C SEE DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)
PLEDGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA
FOR YEAR ENDING 31 DECEMBER 1968
(Showing equivalent in U.S. dollars of pledges
and contributions in cash, kind and services)
|
Pledging Government |
Pledge |
Contributions Received |
|
Abu Dhabi |
40,000 |
40,000 |
|
Argentina |
2,000 |
– |
|
Australia |
201,600 |
201,600 |
|
Austria |
10,000 |
10,000 |
|
Belgium |
35,000 |
35,000 |
|
Canada |
1,709,445 |
1,709,445 |
|
Ceylon |
800 |
800 |
|
Chile |
1,000 |
– |
|
China |
30,000 |
– |
|
Cyprus |
240 |
240 |
|
Denmark |
691,333 |
644,666 |
|
Federal Republic of Germany |
2,149,263 |
1,011,763 |
|
Finland |
60,000 |
60,000 |
|
France |
1,128,457 |
108,049 |
|
Gaza Authorities |
107,152 |
107,152 |
|
Ghana |
3,000 |
– |
|
Greece |
15,000 |
15,000 |
|
Holy See |
12,500 |
12,500 |
|
India |
13,333 |
– |
|
Iran |
7,120 |
1,120 |
|
Iraq |
100,000 |
– |
|
Ireland |
40,000 |
40,000 |
|
Israel |
591,629 |
592,629 |
|
Italy |
160,871 |
160,871 |
|
Japan |
40,000 |
40,000 |
|
Jordan |
146,477 |
146,477 |
|
Kuwait |
220,000 |
220,000 |
|
Lebanon |
43,253 |
43,253 |
|
Libya |
100,000 |
100,000 |
|
Luxembourg |
3,000 |
– |
|
Malaysia |
1,500 |
1,500 |
|
Mexico |
20,000 |
20,000 |
|
Monaco |
204 |
204 |
|
Morocco |
25,000 |
25,000 |
|
Netherlands |
110,193 |
110,193 |
|
New Zealand |
67,200 |
67,200 |
|
Niger |
2,500 |
2,500 |
|
Nigeria |
5,000 |
– |
|
Norway |
91,000 |
91,000 |
|
Pakistan |
20,969 |
20,969 |
|
Philippines |
1,250 |
– |
|
Qatar |
10,000 |
10,000 |
|
Saudi Arabia |
297,778 |
297,778 |
|
Sweden |
2,222,369 |
2,222,369 |
|
Switzerland |
196,760 |
196,760 |
|
Syria |
88,770 |
88,770 |
|
Trinidad and Tobago |
1,500 |
1,500 |
|
Tunisia |
4,000 |
4,000 |
|
Turkey |
10,000 |
10,000 |
|
United Arab Republic |
1,845 |
1,845 |
|
United Kingdom |
4,500,000 |
4,500,000 |
|
United States |
22,200,000* |
15,163,750 |
|
Yugoslavia |
20,000 |
– |
|
_______________ |
_______________ |
|
|
Total |
37,561,311 |
28,135,903 |
*Pledge payable in accordance with a condition that the amount contributed by the United States Government should not at any time constitute more than 70 per cent of the total of all governmental contributions received. The pledge for 1968 comprised half the pledge for the fiscal year 1967-1968 ($22,200,000) plus half the pledge for 1968-69 ($22,200,000).
DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES
GENERAL ASSEMBLY–23RD SESSION
Special Political Committee, meetings 612, 616-635.
Plenary Meeting 1749.
Ad Hoc Committee for Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in Near East (UNRWA), meeting 1.
A/7213. Report of Commissioner-General of UNRWA (for period 1 July 1967-30 June 1968).
A/SPC/126. Letter of 11 November 1968 from Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (requesting hearing for Palestine Arab Delegation).
A/SPC/127. Letter of 18 November 1968 from Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen (requesting hearing for "Palestine Liberation Organization").
A/SPC/L.166 and Add.1. Argentina, Iran, Pakistan, Senegal, Turkey, Yugoslavia: draft resolution, adopted by Special Political Committee on 11 December 1968, meeting 633, by roll-call vote of 91 to 1, with 9 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldive Islands, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Yemen, Yugoslavia.
Against: Israel.
Abstaining: Botswana, Colombia, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Rwanda, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela.
A/7411. Report of Special Political Committee, draft resolution A.
RESOLUTION 2452 A (XXIII), as proposed by Special Political Committee, A/7411, adopted by Assembly on 19 December 1968, meeting 1749, by 101 votes to 1, with 6 abstentions.
"The General Assembly,
"Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,
"Reaffirming its resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,
"Taking note of the appeal made by the Secretary-General in the Special Political Committee on 11 November 1968,
"Convinced that the plight of the displaced persons could best be relieved by their speedy return to their homes and to the camps which they formerly occupied,
"Emphasizing, consequently, the requirement for their speedy return,
"1. Calls upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;
"2. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly."
A/SPC/L.165. United States: draft resolution, adopted by Special Political Committee on 11 December 1966, meeting 633, by roll-call vote of 101 to 0, with 1 abstention, as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldive Islands, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia.
Against: None.
Abstaining: Israel.
A/7411. Report of Special Political Committee, draft resolution B.
RESOLUTION 2452 (XXIII), as proposed by Special Political Committee, A/7411, adopted by Assembly on 19 December 1968, meeting 1749, by 105 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions.
"The General Assembly,
"Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963, 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965, 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965, 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966 and 2341 (XXII) of 19 December 1967,
"Noting the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from I July 1967 to 30 June 1968,
"1. Notes with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;
"2. Expresses its thanks to the Commissioner-General and the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;
"3. Directs the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue his efforts in taking such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need;
"4. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof;
"5. Directs attention to the continuing critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;
"6. Notes with concern that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements;
"7. Calls upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and therefore urges non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions;
"8. Decides to extend until 30 June 1972, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East."
A/SPC/L.167 and Add.1. Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Nigeria, Norway Sweden, Turkey, Yugoslavia: draft resolution adopted unanimously by Special Political Committee on 12 December 1968, meeting 634, by roll-call vote of 88 to 0, as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Cambia, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldive Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia.
Against: None.
A/7411. Report of Special Political Committee, draft resolution C.
RESOLUTION 2452 C (XXIII), as proposed by Special Political Committee, A/7411, adopted by Assembly on 19 December 1968, meeting 1749, unanimously (106-0).
"The General Assembly,
"Recalling its resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967,
"Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1968,
"Taking note also of the appeal made by the Secretary-General in the Special Political Committee on 11 November 1968,
"Concerned about the continued human suffering as a result of the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,
"1. Reaffirms its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) and 2341 B (XXII);
"2. Endorses, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and are in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;
"3. Strongly appeals to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.
A/SPC/L.168. Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Somalia: draft resolution, rejected by Special Political Committee on 13 December 1968 meeting 635, by roll-call vote of 42 in favour to 44 against, with 27 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Ceylon, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldive Islands, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia.
Against: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay.
Abstaining: Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Zambia.
A/SPC/L.169. Administrative and financial implications of 5-power draft resolution, A/SPC/L.168. Statement by Secretary-General.
A/7411. Report of Special Political Committee, paras. 9 and 15.
Notes
1/ See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 257-58, for text of resolution 242 (1967).
2/ For text of Chapter VII of the Charter, see APPENDIX II.
3/ See Y.U.N., 1966, p. 178, for text of resolution 228 (1966).
4/ See Y.U.N., 1947-48, p. 444, for text of resolution 56 (1948).
5/ See Y.U.N., pp. 171-72.
6/ See Y.U.N. pp. 174-75.
7/ See footnote 1.
8/ See Y.U.N., 1967, p. 190, for text of resolution 236 (1967).
9/ See footnote 2.
10/ See footnote 1.
11/ Article 41 of the Charter states:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.:
Article 42 of the Charter states:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
12/ See footnote 3.
13/ See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 190-91, text of resolution 237 (1967).
14/ See footnote 8.
15/ See footnote 2.
16/ See footnote 1.
17/ Article 25 of the Charter provides that: The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.
18/ See footnote 2.
19/ See footnote 1.
20/ See Y.U.N., 1967, p. 190, for text of resolution 235 (1967).
21/ See footnote 13.
22/ For text of Charter VI of the Charter, concerning pacific settlement of disputes, see APPENDIX II.
23/ See Y.U.N., 1967, p. 229.
24/ Ibid.
25/ See footnote 1.
26/ See footnote 2.
27/ See footnote 2.
28/ See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 190-91, for text of resolution 237 (1967).
29/ Ibid. By the first operative paragraph of resolution 237 (1967), the Security Council called upon Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities.
30/ See Y.U.N., 1967, p. 222, for text of resolution 2252 (ES-V).
31/ See Y.U.N., 1967, p. 268, for text of resolution 2341 B (XXII).
32/ See Y.U.N., 1967, p. 241.
33/ See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 238-43.
34/ See footnote 28.
35/ See footnote 30.
36/ See footnote 28.
37/ See footnote 30.
38/ See footnote 28.
39/ See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 257-58, for text of resolution 242 (1967).
40/ See footnote 28.
41/ See Y.U.N., 1967, p. 221, for text of resolution 2253 (ES-V), and p. 223, for text of resolution 2254 (ES-V).
42/ See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 190-91, for text of resolution 237 (1967).
43/ See Y.U.N., 1961, p. 155, for text of resolution 162 (1961).
44/ See footnote 41.
45/ See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 243-45.
46/ See footnote 41.
47/ See footnote 43.
48/ See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 257-58, for text of resolution 242 (1967).
49/ See footnote 45.
50/ See footnote 41.
51/ Rule 39 of the Security Councils provisional rules of procedure provides that The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.
52/ See footnote 45.
53/ See footnote 48.
54/ See footnote 41.
55/ See Y.U.N., 1948-49, p. 186.
56/ See Y.U.N., 1947-48, pp. 247-56, for text of resolution 181 (II); see Y.U.N., 1948-49, pp. 174-76, for text of resolution 194 (III), and pp. 196-97, for text of resolution 303 (IV).
57/ See footnote 45.
58/ See footnote 48.
59/ See Y.U.N., 1967, p. 255.
60/ Ibid., pp. 257-58, for text of resolution 242 (1967).
61/ See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 190-91, for text of resolution 237 (1967).
62/ See Y.U.N., 1967, p. 221, for text of resolution 2252 (ES-V).
63/ See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 190-91, for text of resolution 237 (1967).
64/ Ibid., pp. 221-22, for text of resolution 2252 (ES-V).
65/ Ibid., pp. 257-58, for text of resolution 242 (1967).
66/ See footnote 62.
67/ See footnote 63.
68/ Paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) provided, inter alia, that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property…. For full text of resolution 194 (III), see Y.U.N., 1948-49, pp. 174-76.
69/ See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 221-22, for text of resolution 2252 (ES-V).
70/ Ibid., p. 268, for text of resolution 2341 B (XXII).
71/ See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 257-58, for text of resolution 242 (1967).
72/ Paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) provided, inter alia, that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property…. For full text of resolution 194 (III), see Y.U.N., 1948-49, pp. 174-76.
73/ See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 190-91, for text of resolution 237 (1967).
74/ See footnote 69.
75/ See footnote 71.
76/ See footnote 73.
77/ See footnote 71.
78/ See Y.U.N., 1948-49, pp. 174-76, text of resolution 194 (III).
79/ See Y.U.N., 1947-48, pp. 247-56, text of resolution 181 (II) A.
80/ See footnote 72.
81/ See footnote 73.
82/ See footnote 69.
83/ See footnote 79.
84/ See footnote 72.
85/ See Y.U.N., 1950, p. 334, for text of resolution 394 (V).
86/ See footnote 71.
87/ See footnote 73.
88/ See footnote 72.
89/ See footnote 71.
90/ See footnote 73.
91/ See footnote 72.
92/ See Y.U.N., 1951, pp. 315-16, for text of resolution 513 (VI).
93/ See footnote 85.
Document Type: Publication
Document Sources: United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI)
Subject: History
Publication Date: 31/12/1968