The Humanitarian Monitor: OPT (June 2012) – OCHA report

The Monthly Humanitarian Monitor

 June 2012

One of the few positive developments in Gaza in recent years was the reopening of the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt in June 2010, which has allowed for some increase in the number of people exiting Gaza to the outside world. Despite a five day closure in June due to security considerations and the Egyptian elections there was an 11 per cent increase in travelers. However, Palestinians crossing in 2012 , only represent 67 per cent of those who crossed in the first half of 2006, before the Rafah crossing was restricted, and improvements in the crossing have not succeeded in facilitating movement between Gaza and the West Bank.

In the West Bank, the forced displacement of Palestinians continued in June, due to the Israeli authorities’ demolition of Palestinian-owned structures lacking Israeli-issued building permits. During the first six months of 2012, the monthly average of such demolitions increased by over 20 per cent in comparison with the monthly average for 2011. The structures demolished included residential shelters, animal barracks and water cisterns, funded by international donors providing basic humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations in the West Bank.

In addition, in June, scores of families in Area C were displaced, for varying time periods during training exercises conducted by the Israeli military. Some 18 per cent of the West Bank is designated as “firing zones,” closed military areas for military training. Approximately 5,000 Palestinians reside in these areas, predominantly herders, who rely on access to grazing land for their livelihood. Many of the communities have sustained multiple waves of displacement and property destruction while humanitarian agencies face restrictions in meeting the basic needs of these communities: humanitarian assistance given in response to demolitions has been destroyed or confiscated by the Israeli authorities.

As the occupying power, Israel has an obligation to protect the Palestinian population. IHL explicitly prohibits the destruction of civilian property, unless such destruction is absolutely necessary for military reasons, as well as the forcible transfer or displacement of individuals or communities. Under IHL, the occupying power is also obliged to facilitate the operations of international organizations delivering humanitarian assistance. In the past three months the access of humanitarian staff in various parts of the oPt has been characterized by mixed trends (see new Quarterly section). In the West Bank, there were rising demands for searches of UN vehicles at checkpoints between Bethlehem and Jerusalem, in contravention to the UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities. On the other hand, the average processing time for Gaza permits for INGO international staff dropped from 32 to 11 days compared to the previous quarter. Additionally the Israeli authorities have approved 60 3-month long permits for UN Gaza staff and the overall approval rate has remained above 80 per cent.

THE HUMAN COST OF ARMED CONFLICT

June 2012 witnessed the most significant increase in armed hostilities between the Israeli military and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza since March. The escalation began on 1 June, following a clash between an armed Palestinian man and Israeli soldiers near the Gaza- Israel separation fence that left the Palestinian and an Israeli soldier dead.

Following the incident, between 1- 23 June, 17 Palestinians were killed (including six civilians), and 73 others, including 61 civilians (five women) were injured. In addition, one Israeli soldier was killed (see above), and another was injured. The majority of the Palestinian casualties were from Israeli air strikes, tank shelling, and gunfire from observation posts. The air strikes targeted armed groups, military training bases, open fields, metal shops, and a number of commercial structures. In the same period, Palestinian armed groups fired 187 projectiles including Grad rockets and mortar shells from Gaza Strip at Israeli military positions and into southern Israel.

CAUGHT IN THE CONFLICT

Of particular concern, the armed hostilities resulted in the deaths of four Palestinian children and the injury of 20 others. Two children were killed and 14 others injured as a result of Israeli airstrikes, and two Palestinian children killed, and four others injured, as a result of Palestinian rockets that fell short of their targets.

Human rights groups reported some 35 civilian houses and several public facilities, including two schools, damaged as a result of Israeli airstrikes. A number of residential buildings were reported to have sustained damage as a result of these projectiles. The escalation continued until 23 June, when a tacit truce, or “Calm”, was mediated by Egyptian interlocutors between the armed Palestinian groups and Israel.

DEMOLITIONS AND DISPLACEMENT ON THE RISE

Scores of families displaced or otherwise affected during short-term military training

The Israeli authorities’ demolition of Palestinian-owned structures in the West Bank is again on the rise. Among those structures affected are residential shelters and structures related to families’ livelihoods, such as animal barracks and water cisterns, as well as donor-funded humanitarian assistance provided to vulnerable families.

During the first six months of 2012, the monthly average of Palestinian-owned structures (63) demolished by the Israeli authorities increased by over 20 per cent, compared to the monthly average in 2011 (52), and increased by 70 per cent compared to 2010 (37). The monthly average of persons displaced in 2012 (103) also rose, by 13 per cent, compared to the previous year’s average (91), and by 102 per cent compared to 2010 (51). Most demolitions in 2012 (94 per cent) and all of the displacements occurred in Area C of the West Bank, which is administered by Israel. The structures were demolished on the grounds that they lack Israeli-issued building permits, which are virtually impossible to obtain for Palestinian residents of the West Bank.

Among structures demolished in Area C in 2012 were 44 structures funded by international donors. In 2011, over 110 such structures were demolished by the Israeli authorities. Since the beginning of 2011, 44 per cent of the demolished assistance structures were of basic residential shelters (e.g. tents) provided to vulnerable families, while the majority of the other structures were intended to support livelihoods or improved access to basic services. OCHA has also recorded in 2012 at least 15 incidents in which supplies intended for vulnerable communities were confiscated by the Israeli authorities, including at least five incidents where donor-funded assistance was seized. Among the materials confiscated were 12 tanks providing water to water-scarce communities. All of the water tankers were confiscated after the onset of higher temperatures in May and June 2012, when the need for water in these communities, which rely heavily on tankered water, increases.

Also in June, scores of families in Area C of the northern Jordan Valley were displaced, for varying time periods, or otherwise affected during training exercises conducted by the Israeli military. In early June, 28 families from the community of Hammamat lMaleh-al Meiteh, as well as from the community of ‘Ein al Hilwa – Wad al Faw area,¹ were forced to temporarily relocate, with most families staying overnight in tractor trailers with their children and some belongings. The families reported that there was a general atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, particularly amongst children. The families all returned to their original site within 48 hours, upon the completion of military training.² Two other communities in the same area, ‘Ein Al Hilwa and Yarza, were ordered by the Israeli military later in the month to temporarily relocate within 48 hours in advance of a military training exercise. Only the residents of Yarza left the area and remained in nearby communities for one day, returning after the training ended. See box herein for background on the “firing zones” and their humanitarian impact on Palestinian communities.

Two other communities in the northern Jordan Valley, Al ‘Aqrabaniya and ‘Ein Shibli (Nablus), were seriously affected by another military training exercise carried out by Israeli forces during the month.³ Unlike the above mentioned communities, most of Al ‘Aqrabaniya is located in Area B, west of the Jordan Valley, and is not designated as a “firing zone”. The village council reported that the firing of sound and light bombs inside the village spread panic among residents, particularly children. In ‘Ein Shibli, an Area C Bedouin community not in a “firing zone”, Israeli tanks damaged infrastructure around a water spring, which serves several communities in the area as a water source for domestic and livelihood needs.

BARRIER UPDATE: AL WALAJA

The Israeli Barrier is under active construction in Al Walaja (southwest of Jerusalem), which will further undermine the village’s access to its agricultural lands. The latest official Barrier route, approved in 2006, cuts off Al Walaja from the Bethlehem urban area and also encloses the village within its own ‘inner barrier.’ A map distributed by the Israeli Civil Administration in June, appears to amend the total enclosure plan, by replacing part of the planned barrier with a ‘safety fence.’ The implications of this are unclear: it is also uncertain how access will be maintained between Al Walaja and Bethlehem/Beit Jala, and from there to the remainder of the West Bank.

The original village of Al Walaja fell to Israeli forces in the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and was incorporated into Israel and subsequently demolished. The village’s residents, now refugees, established new Al Walaja on village land which ended up on the Jordanian side of the 1949 Armistice Line (Green Line).

In 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank, and incorporated part of ‘new’ Al Walaja into the unilaterally expanded municipal boundaries of Jerusalem. Restrictive zoning and planning policies have resulted in multiple demolitions and demolition orders over the years. Al Walaja has lost land to the settlements of Gilo and Har Gilo: Earlier this year, the Jerusalem Municipalitly District Planning Committee announced plans to declare some 1,200 dunams of Al Walaja’s lands a ‘national park.’

IMPROVED FLOW OF PEOPLE THROUGH RAFAH CROSSING

Despite ongoing obstacles to free movement through the Rafah crossing, which included the closure of the crossing for 5 days this month, the overall volume of Palestinians departing through Rafah increased by 11 per cent compared to the previous month. This month, roughly 18,900 travelers, primarily medical patients and students, exited Gaza via Rafah compared to 16,700 in May. The increase in volume occurred despite the exceptional closing of the crossing for 5 days due to increased security concerns from Egyptian authorities as a result of the presidential elections that took place on 15-16 June.

The growth in passenger volume was in part the result of Egyptian attempts to facilitate the movement of travelers following the closure, yet despite this effort, a total of 1,800 Palestinians were turned back at the crossing due to claims of security issues, twice as many compared to the previous month. The increase, however, also reflects a wider trend since 2010 towards increased flows of movement through Rafah. From a monthly average of 5,600 passengers in 2009, the volume steadily increased to a monthly average of over 26,000 in the first six months of 2012. Despite the marked improvement, Palestinians crossing in 2012 still only represent 67 per cent of those crossing in the first half of 2006 (roughly 240,000), before the crossing was restricted following the Hamas capture of the Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit.

The constrained volume of movement through the Rafah crossing (since 2007) is the result of ongoing access restrictions stemming from both Egyptian and Palestinian authorities in Gaza. Egypt has placed restrictions on those between 18 to 40 years old, who must apply for a visa before leaving and whose names are checked against a ‘black list’ of passengers banned from entering Egypt. For passengers outside of that age range, medical patients and students are given priority, and those wishing to travel must register 10 days in advance with Hamas authorities at Rafah and are later informed if and when they are scheduled to cross.

The ongoing conflict between Palestinian authorities in Gaza and the West Bank and Israel’s ongoing control over the Palestinian population registrar have also created obstacles to obtaining the necessary travel documents that would allow one to travel to/through Egypt via Rafah. The PA Ministry of Interior in Ramallah has been slow to issue passports to Gazan applicants, many of whom claim their applications are refused on the basis of their political affiliation with Hamas and other groups in Gaza. While Hamas authorities claim to need 10,000 passports per month, only 18,000 have been issued since August 2008. As a temporary measure, in 2011 Egypt began recognizing travel documents renewed by Hamas authorities that would allow Gazans to enter Egypt but not travel onto other countries. In addition, an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 Palestinians in Gaza are not registered as residents in Gaza and therefore are ineligible to apply for a travel document from there. Until now, Israel has resisted changing their place of residency to Gaza. Notwithstanding the ongoing Egyptian efforts to increase access through Rafah, the combined impact of these restrictions continues to limit travel to basic humanitarian cases, leaving the majority of the Gazan population locked-in without the ability to travel.

INCREASE IN FUEL FROM THE TUNNELS DOES LITTLE
TO ALLEVIATE ONGOING ELECTRICITY CRISIS

This month saw the start of industrial fuel transfers donated by the Qatari government and an increase in fuel through the tunnels. However, a fuel purchases from the PA in the West Bank and the private sector in Gaza concurrently decreased, resulting in only an 11 per cent increase in the volume of fuel available for the running the Gaza Power Plant (GPP). Beginning on 7 June and continuing over the course of the month, a total of 2.6 million litres of industrial fuel donated by Qatar and destined for the GPP were transferred from Suez seaport in Egypt to Gaza via the Nitzana and Kerem Shalom crossings.

The Qatari fuel was meant to provide a temporary measure of relief for the Gaza electricity crisis, but delays in its transfer limited the intended impact: to improve humanitarian conditions through an immediate and significant reduction in power cuts in Gaza. 30 million litres of fuel donated by Qatar arrived in Suez in late April, which Israel agreed to transfer within three months, a sufficient volume to allow the GPP to run at full capacity during that time. However, Egypt and Israel could not reach an arrangement to transfer the fuel directly via Kerem Shalom, and eventually agreed to move the fuel to Israel via the Nitzana crossing before entering Gaza at Kerem Shalom, increasing the shipping distance by over 140km. In addition, instability in the northern Sinai, characterized by several border attacks by militants and an increase in violence and crime, led Egyptian authorities to limit the daily number of trucks allowed to travel between Suez to Nitzana. The time difference between Egypt and Israel, as well as frequent delays in opening the Egyptian side of Nitzana also impacted the time available to transfer the fuel and reach Kerem Shalom within the same day.

IBy the end of June, only nine per cent of the 30 million litres of Qatari fuel reached Gaza. At this rate, it would take 10 months to deliver the entire 30 million litres. At the same time, the amount of fuel for the GPP purchased by the PA in the West Bank decreased by 44 per cent this month, from 4.5 million litres to 2.6 million. The PA initially agreed in April to begin purchasing fuel from Israel for the GPP, but the financial crisis within the PA and the failure of Hamas authorities to improve tax collection from electricity users (part of the agreement concluded in April) and transfer these funds to the PA in the West Bank, led to a weakening of this arrangement. As of the end of the month, the GPP had only received roughly five million litres of fuel, 47 per cent of the required amount, allowing the plant to run at 30 MW rather than its regular 85 MW.

A further estimated 8 million litres of fuel entered via the tunnels with Egypt (6 million litres of petrol and 2 million litres of diesel), twice as much compared to the previous month. Despite the increase, the vast majority of this fuel was destined for the private market with little reaching the GPP. Furthermore, this volume is still below the average 8 to 10 million litres transferred through the tunnels until December 2011, when the fuel crisis began. The private sector also continued to import both petrol and diesel through the tunnels, but in far reduced volumes this month compared to the previous one (158,000 litres of diesel in May compared to 1.2 million litres of petrol and diesel in April).

While the current fuel supplies are providing a limited measure of relief to the fuel and electricity crisis, a long term solution is required to address the current and future electricity demands of the Gaza Strip’s 1.6 million people. The GPP has been able to continue running at 30MW per day, reducing power cuts from 16 hours per day to 12 hours, but the current volume is still only 52 per cent of the demand. Gaza receives 120MV of power from Israel and 22MW from Egypt, bringing the total capacity this month to just 172 MW rather than the required 350 MW. In order to fill this gap, a sustainable and long-term solution must be found for the legitimate transfer of fuel and/or natural gas for the GPP, made increasingly important by the approaching summer, when electricity demand typically increases.

QUARTERLY HUMANITARIAN ACCESS UPDATE

This is the first regular quarterly OCHA report highlighting access trends affecting the international humanitarian organizations in the oPt. This report covers the second quarter of 2012, from April through June.

STAFF ACCESS INCIDENTS

UN staff access in the Jerusalem area is becoming increasingly difficult. There was a 63 per cent increase in reported access incidents in the Jerusalem area this quarter compared to the previous one (from 40 to 84 incidents), primarily the result of requests to search UN vehicles. These incidents accounted for more than half of all incidents this quarter and resulted in the loss of 398 staff hours, or 50 working days. According to the Convention on UN Privileges and Immunities, to which Israel is a signatory, the property and assets of the United Nations are immune from search.⁵

By contrast, incidents at the Erez crossing with Gaza decreased by 69 per cent compared to last quarter, from to 43 to 18 incidents, typically the result of demands for strip searches at the pedestrian terminal. Allenby also remained relatively problematic, with 10 incidents this quarter compared to 13 the previous quarter.

GAZA PERMITS FOR INGO INTERNATIONAL STAFF

The waiting time for a permit to Gaza for INGO international staff decreased by 70 per cent compared to the previous quarter. On average, it took 11 days to receive a permit to Gaza compared to 32 days the first three months of 2012. This reflects a significant improvement over late 2011, when the average processing time was almost 2 months. The approval rate also remained high. Out of 148 permits submitted, 89 per cent were approved by the requested time, 7 per cent were approved but only after the requested travel date, while 3 per cent were cancelled by the staff.

Despite the improvement in international staff permits to Gaza, several INGOs have had their permit requests for West Bank staff access to east Jerusalem or Israel either denied or left pending for several months. On several occasions, INGOs were informed such problems were the result of a quota of 1,700 permits for international organizations. Some organizations also faced delays in receiving B-1 work visas for certain categories of humanitarian workers, but the visas were eventually issued.

UN PERMITS TO/FROM GAZA

This quarter, Israeli authorities issued 60 three-month permits to exit Gaza for UN national staff. This is the first time the UN has received so many long-term permits at one time, improving access for UN Gaza Staff and reducing the time and cost for UN agencies to obtain permits. In the past, staff faced difficulties obtaining long-term permits rather than time-bound permits for specific events/activities, typically valid for several days to a week. An additional request for three-month permits to Gaza for 80 UN staff from the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, is currently under review with Israeli authorities.

The approval of these permits is consistent with a general improvement in the approval rate for UN Gaza permits during the first half of 2012. Similar to the first quarter of 2012, this quarter, out of a total 225 permit requests submitted by UN agencies, 84 per cent were approved, 6 per cent were denied and 10 per cent were left pending.

INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN GAZA

Despite some progress, the approval process for international reconstruction projects continues to present considerable humanitarian challenges for Gaza. On 28 June, Israel approved a USD 3 million project to reconstruct the Beit Hanoun water network, badly damaged during Operation Cast Lead. This project took 26 months to be approved, while on average projects take 8 months to receive approval, impeding the ability of agencies to respond to urgent needs and prolonging the hardship of the affected population.

19 per cent of the UN work programme submitted to Israeli authorities has been pending approval for an average 18 months. A further 8 non-UN Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) projects are awaiting approval for the approval of materials for which Israel restricts entry into Gaza; some of which have been waiting for over a year. Pending projects include a range of housing and infrastructure efforts needed to address damages from on-going hostilities and the impact of 5 years of blockade.

In 2011, the UN spent at least USD 2.3 million on managing the approval and coordination process for bringing construction materials to Gaza, funds which could have otherwise been invested in housing for over 50 families or schools for roughly 2,000 students. At the same time, more than twice as much construction materials enter Gaza through the tunnels than via the Kerem Shalom crossing. However, due to their illegitimate origin, UN agencies cannot benefit from tunnel materials and therefore have been the most heavily affected by the Israeli restrictions.⁶

END NOTES

¹Note that Ein Al Hilwa has three sub-communities/locations: Ein Al Hilwa – Um al Jmal, Ein Al Hilwa –

²For details of the incident, see OCHA oPt Weekly Protection of Civilians Report, for the period 30 May – 5 June 2012, available at: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_weekly_report_2012_06_08_english.

pdf.

³ In the course of the exercise, which lasted for two days, a number of military armored vehicles moved through the builtup area of the village and damaged the asphalt roads, as well as five electricity poles and two trees.

⁴Information on access incidents included in an online OCHA database, updated on a monthly basis based on reports submitted by UN agency and international organization staff to OCHA and UNDSS.

⁵ Convention on the privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 February 1946.

⁶ Each month, 200,000 tons of aggregates, cement and steel bars enter via the tunnels compared to a monthly average of 70,000 tons via Kerem Shalom in 2012.

Annex: Monthly Indicator Tables

Monthly Indicator Notes and Clarifications

Casualties

1. Conflict-related casualties: includes all casualties that occurred in violent incidents immediately related to the Israeli occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as military operations, search and arrest campaigns, clashes during demonstrations, attacks involving Israeli settlers, etc. These figures exclude other related casualties such as those in the context of access delays, the explosion of unexploded ordnance, reckless handling of weapons, collapse of tunnels, and internal Palestinian violence.

2. Civilians: includes people who, according to the information available at the time of publication, did not fulfill a “continuous combatant function” as part of an organized armed group, regardless of the circumstances of their injury or killing. Figures in this category should not be considered comprehensive, as unconfirmed or disputed cases are excluded.

3. Tunnel related casualties: figures in this category may overlap with those under conflict-related casualties, as it includes casualties in the context of Israeli attacks targeting tunnels, as well as those resulting from tunnel collapses and other accidents.

Israeli settler-related violence

4. Incidents resulting in casualties: includes all violent incidents involving Israeli settlers and Palestinians, including those in which the injury was caused by a member of the Israeli security forces during an intervention in such an incident.

5. Incidents resulting in property damage/losses: ibid.

Search and Arrest

6. Palestinians in Israeli custody: includes all Palestinians from the oPt held by the Israeli authorities at the end of each month, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, in connection to an offense related to the Israeli occupation and classified by the Israeli authorities as a “security detainee/prisoner”. Therefore it excludes Palestinians held in connection to a “regular” criminal offense.

7. Administrative detainees: Palestinians held by the Israeli authorities without charge or trial, allegedly for preventive purposes.

Demolitions

8. Structures demolished: includes all Palestinian-owned structures in the oPt demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of their specific use (residential or non-residential) or the grounds on which the demolition was carried out (lack of building permit, military operation or punishment).

9. People displaced due to demolitions: includes all persons that were living in structures demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of the place in which they relocated following the demolition.

10. People affected by demolitions: includes all people that benefited from a demolished structure (as a source of income, to receive a service, etc), excluding those displaced.

Access West Bank

11. Permanently staffed checkpoints: staffed by Israeli security personnel, excluding checkpoints located on the Green Line and ‘agricultural gates’ along the Barrier.

12. Partially staffed checkpoints: checkpoint infrastructure staffed on an ad-hoc basis.

13. Unstaffed obstacles: includes roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers, and trenches. For historical reasons, this figure excludes obstacles located within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (H2).

14. ‘Flying’ or random checkpoints: checkpoints deployed on an ad hoc basis in places without preexisting infrastructure.

Access to health

15. Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez: includes only the applications submitted for travel scheduled within the reporting period.

16. Delayed applications: includes applications regarding which no answer was received by the date of the medical appointment, thus forcing the patient to restart the application process.

Movement of humanitarian staff

17. Incidents of delayed or denied access at a WB checkpoint: includes incidents affecting local or international staff of humanitarian organizations,

both UN and international NGOs.

Imports to Gaza

18. Truckloads by type: for historical reasons this figure excludes truckloads carrying all types of fuel.

Child Protection

19. Attacks include the targeting of schools that cause the total or partial destruction of such facilities. Other interferences to the normal operation of the facility may also be reported, such as the occupation, shelling, targeting for propaganda of, or otherwise causing harm to school facilities or its personnel.