YEARBOOK
OF THE
UNITED NATIONS
1956
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
Political and Security Questions
CHAPTER I
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST
THE PALESTINE QUESTION (DECEMBER 1955-OCTOBER 1956)
INCIDENTS ON LAKE TIBERIAS
In January 1956 the Security Council completed consideration of the Syrian complaint that Israel armed forces had attacked Syrian regular army forces on Syrian territory east of Lake Tiberias on the night of 11/12 December 1955.1/ Under the Syrian draft resolution introduced on 22 December 1955, the Security Council would: (1) condemn Israel for the "outrageous attack"; (2) decide that the attack constituted aggression under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter; (3) call upon Members to apply economic sanctions and to expel Israel from the United Nations; and (4) decide that Israel should pay adequate compensation.
On 9 January, the USSR submitted amendments to replace paragraphs (2) and (3) with paragraphs calling upon Israel to take all necessary measures to prevent such actions and warning Israel that their recurrence would require the Security Council to consider the application of Article 39 of the Charter.
On 11 January 1956, France, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted a draft resolution, by which the Security Council would note that, according to the reports of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the attack by Israel armed forces deliberately violated the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, including those relating to the Demilitarized Zone. It would also note that there had been interference by the Syrian authorities with Israeli activities on Lake Tiberias, in contravention of the Armistice Agreement. By the operative part of this draft resolution, the Council would: (1) remind Israel that it had already condemned military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreements, whether or not undertaken by way of retaliation, and had called upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent such actions; (2) condemn the attack of 11 December 1955 as a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of its resolution of 15 July 1948, of the terms of the Armistice Agreement, and of Israel's obligations under the Charter; (3) express its grave concern at Israel's failure to comply with its obligations; (4) call upon Israel to do so in the future, in default of which the Council would have to consider what further measures were required to maintain or restore peace; (5) call upon the parties to comply with their obligations under article V of the General Armistice Agreement to respect the Armistice Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone; (6) request the Chief of Staff to pursue his suggestions for improving the situation in the area of Lake Tiberias; and (7) call upon both parties to co-operate with the Chief of Staff in this and all other respects, to carry out the provisions of the Armistice Agreement in good faith, and in particular to make full use of the Mixed Armistice Commission's machinery in the interpretation and application of its provisions.
On 12 January 1956, Iran proposed amending the three-Power draft resolution. This was in order to: delete the reference in the preamble about Syrian interference on Lake Tiberias; replace paragraph (4) of the operative part by a paragraph declaring that committing such actions in the future would constitute a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter requiring consideration by the Security Council of the measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter; delete paragraph (5); and add a new paragraph whereby the Council would decide that Israel should pay adequate compensation for the loss of and damage to life and property caused by the attack.
The sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution revised their text on 17 January, and again on 18 January. New paragraphs were added whereby the Council would hold that the Syrian interference with Israel activities on Lake Tiberias in no way justified the Israel action, and whereby the Council would call upon the parties to arrange with the Chief of Staff for an immediate exchange of all military prisoners.
On 18 January, another draft resolution was submitted, by Yugoslavia. By this, the Security Council would: (1) condemn the attack of 11-12 December 1955 as a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of its resolution of 15 July 1948, of the Armistice Agreement between Syria and Israel, and Israel's obligations under the Charter; (2) call upon Israel to refrain from such military action in the future; (3) consider that an established violation of the Armistice Agreement entailed payment of compensation by the party responsible and that therefore in this case Syria was entitled to compensation; and (4) request the Chief of Staff to take appropriate steps for the release of prisoners taken in this action.
In the course of the discussion, all members of the Council condemned the attack launched by Israel against Syria on 11 December 1955, criticized Israel's policy of retaliation and warned Israel that another transgression would compel the Council to consider what further measures under the Charter were required to maintain or restore the peace. Australia, China, Cuba, France and the United Kingdom considered that Israel's attack of 11 December was not justified, even though, according to the report of the Chief of Staff, there had undoubtedly been illegal Syrian interference with Israel activities in the area of Lake Tiberias prior to the recent incident. Iran, the USSR and Yugoslavia took the view that the Council would not be justified in shifting some of the blame for the Tiberias incident to Syria, even in a disguised form, by referring to Syrian interference in the area of Lake Tiberias, since the Chief of Staff's report had not referred to such interference prior to the incidents under debate. The USSR representative noted, too, that the three-Power text left out the question of compensation, although the majority of the Council's members did not question Syria's right to such compensation. The representatives of Belgium, Cuba, France, Peru, the United Kingdom and the United States could not support any proposal on the point of compensation because of the legal and practical difficulties involved in applying the principle equitably and enforcing it on the parties concerned. The representative of Iran, in order to obtain a unanimous decision, did not press his amendment on this point. He had no doubt about Israel's responsibility for the attack of 11 December, and hoped Israel would of its own volition propose to pay appropriate compensation, as suggested by the representative of China.
The Council decided, by 8 votes to 2, with 1 abstention, to grant priority in voting to the revised three-Power draft resolution, which it adopted unanimously on 19 January. The Council did not vote on the other draft resolutions.
STATUS OF COMPLIANCE WITH ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS:
CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL AND REPORTS OF
SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CHIEF OF STAFF
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 4 APRIL 1956
On 20 March 1956, the United States requested an early meeting of the Security Council to consider "The Palestine question: status of compliance given to the General Armistice Agreements and the resolutions of the Security Council adopted during the past year". The United States stated that it had become increasingly concerned over recent developments in the Palestine area. Information about the build-up of armed forces on either side of the Armistice Demarcation Line in Palestine had led it to believe that the parties might not be fully complying with the provisions of their Armistice Agreements.
The Security Council discussed the question at six meetings held between 26 March and 4 April 1956. The representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria took part in the discussion.
On 21 March 1956, the United States submitted a draft resolution. By the preamble to this, the Security Council would recall its requests, under its resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956, that the Chief of Staff and the parties concerned undertake certain specific steps for the purpose of ensuring that the tensions along the Armistice Lines should be reduced. It would also note with grave concern that despite the efforts of the Chief of Staff, the proposed steps had not been carried out. By the operative part, the Council would: (1) consider that the situation then prevailing between the parties concerning the enforcement of the Armistice Agreements and the compliance given to the above-mentioned resolutions was such that its continuation was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security; (2) request the Secretary-General to undertake, as a matter of urgent concern, a survey of the various aspects of enforcement of and compliance with the four General Armistice Agreements and the Council's resolutions under reference; (3) request the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for the adoption of any measures which, after discussion with the parties and with the Chief of Staff, he considered would reduce existing tensions along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, including the following points: (a) withdrawal of their forces from the Armistice Demarcation Lines; (b) full freedom of movement for the observers along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, in the Demilitarized Zones and in the Defensive Areas; (c) establishment of local arrangements for the prevention of incidents and the prompt detection of any violation of the Armistice Agreements; (4) call upon the parties to the Armistice Agreements to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution; and (5) request the Secretary-General to report to the Council in order to assist the Council in considering what further action might be required.
The United States representative, in introducing the draft resolution, stated that, in order to arrest and reverse the deteriorating situation, United Nations efforts should, in the first instance, be concentrated on securing full compliance with the General Armistice Agreements concluded by the parties and on the carrying out in detail of the Council resolutions of 30 March and 8 September 1955 and 19 January 1956. He stressed that, in requesting the Secretary-General to undertake a personal investigation, the draft resolution was not intended in any way to derogate from the over-all responsibilities of the Security Council in the Palestine question.
The United States initiative was welcomed and supported by the representatives of France, Australia, Peru, the United Kingdom, Cuba and Belgium.
During the discussion, the representative of Egypt sought clarification of operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution and noted that the measures to be recommended by the Secretary-General would be within the framework of the General Armistice Agreement concluded between Egypt and Israel in February 1949. The provisions of sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of operative paragraph 3 were not applicable to all the Armistice Agreements, he said. Operative paragraph 5 of the United States draft resolution also required clarification, for it raised the question of what further action the Council would have to take after examination of the Secretary-General's report. It appeared to the representative of Egypt that the aim of the sponsor of the draft resolution was to find ways, within the framework of the Armistice Agreements, to eliminate tension prevailing on the Armistice Lines.
The representative of Syria, while welcoming a survey of the extent of compliance with the Armistice Agreements and the resolutions of the Council adopted during the past year, wished to know the scope of the Secretary-General's assignment. He drew a distinction between ascertaining the extent of compliance and investigation of means of settling problems standing in the way of peace. He pointed out that the expression "various aspects" of enforcement of the General Armistice Agreements, which operative paragraph 2 requested the Secretary-General to survey, could cover problems of a political, economic or financial nature.
The representatives of Jordan and Lebanon also sought clarification. The representative of Jordan stated that Jordanian forces had taken their positions along the front lines not only for defensive purposes but also to carry out their obligations under the General Armistice Agreement and to keep order and discipline on the Demarcation Line. This fact should be taken into consideration before any suggestion for a withdrawal of forces was contemplated. His Government, he said, favoured any attempt to reduce tension on the Demarcation Lines within the framework of the Armistice Agreement.
The representative of Lebanon said that the draft resolution had appeared at first to be open to interpretations not in keeping with the purposes which it was intended to achieve. His understanding was that the Secretary-General's mission would not go beyond the Armistice Agreements and would be limited to the technical requirements for their application. Also, any measures which the Secretary-General might contemplate would be adopted only with the agreement of the parties concerned.
The United States representative replied that securing compliance with the General Armistice Agreements and the Council's resolutions referred to in the draft resolution was necessary to relieve tension and to promote peace. The draft resolution envisaged that the Secretary-General should arrange, after discussion with the parties and the Chief of Staff, for measures entirely within the framework of the General Armistice Agreements and the resolutions under reference. The references in the draft resolution to the Demilitarized Zones and Defensive Areas were to those defined in the Armistice Agreements. The various aspects of compliance with the Armistice Agreements which the Secretary-General would be requested to survey referred only to matters which would come within the natural purview of the armistice machinery and the Truce Supervision Organization. The arrangements referred to in paragraph 3(c) would be arrangements as agreed between the parties and the Secretary-General.
In conclusion, he said that the Council would have to consider whether any further action was required, in the light of the Secretary-General's report and the situation then prevailing.
Israel's view, stated on 3 April, was that more than what was envisaged in the draft resolution was necessary to preserve security in the Middle East, although the draft resolution would serve as a valuable contribution. Israel advocated early measures to restore the operation of the General Armistice Agreements to their full integrity. It outlined a number of problems arising from imperfections in the observance of these Agreements to which it would draw the attention of the Secretary-General. Thus, was it fully understood that signatory governments were responsible for preventing crossings of the Demarcation Lines for any purpose whatsoever? Were any practices being maintained by any party on land or by sea which the Security Council had defined to be in violation of the General Armistice Agreements? Were all parties fully aware of their mandatory obligations under the articles calling for conferences on revision or review of the Armistice Agreements? Had adequate facilities been provided for access to the Holy Places and to cultural and educational centres? Were there any concentrations of troops in any Defensive Areas which might have exceeded the limits prescribed in the Armistice Agreements?
The USSR representative had no objection to the idea expressed in the United States draft resolution provided that it was basically acceptable to all parties concerned. He added that all measures to relieve the existing tensions in the Palestine area should be carried out by agreement with the parties concerned and with due regard to their interests. No decisions affecting peace and security in that area should be taken outside the United Nations.
On 4 April, the Council unanimously adopted the United States draft resolution after rejecting amendments to it submitted by the USSR.
After the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General said that he shared the grave concern of the Council about the problems of the Middle East and felt that, under the circumstances, he should not hesitate to assume the responsibility which the Council had wished to put on his office. The specific responsibility placed on him by the request neither detracted from nor added to the authority of the Secretary-General under the Charter. He trusted that all those who were interested in a good outcome of the efforts but were not parties to the conflict would assist the parties and himself by restraint in word and action.
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 9 MAY 1956
Between 10 April and 3 May 1956, the Secretary-General visited the countries concerned in the Middle East to consult with their Governments on the questions raised in the Council resolution of 4 April.
In a progress report dated 2 May, he explained that, in addition to surveying and reporting on the state of compliance with the four General Armistice Agreements and the resolutions referred to in the Council's resolution of 4 April and arranging with the parties for the adoption of measures to reduce tension along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, he regarded his mandate to include negotiations on his part to get the parties to re-establish fullest possible compliance with the Armistice Agreements. The basic requirement for this was that all parties concerned should reaffirm their obligations to observe a cease-fire and carry out steps successfully to maintain it. The Secretary-General also reported that, during his stay in the Middle East, his negotiations had in all cases been concluded with positive results.
In a full report to the Council on 9 May, the Secretary-General, by way of general observation, noted that the present state of non-compliance was caused not by an unwillingness on the part of the Governments to carry out their obligations, but by political and practical circumstances and, to a measure, uncertainty as to the scope of the obligations under the Armistice Agreements. The very logic of the Armistice Agreements showed that infringements of other articles could not serve as a justification for an infringement of the cease-fire article. Compliance with the cease-fire article could be conditioned only by similar compliance of the other party. He had, therefore, asked the Governments concerned for assurances — which he received in every case — that they would observe the obligations under the cease-fire clause unconditionally provided the other party complied with that same clause, reserving only their right to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.
All concerned had agreed that the target for the present effort should be general and full compliance with the Armistice Agreements in their entirety. The cease-fire clauses had been accepted as establishing independent obligations within the framework of the various Agreements. A basis had thus been laid for the study of a balanced return to the full implementation of other clauses and — through that process and thereafter — for the protection of compliance. As to the status of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and its functions, the Secretary-General observed that all the Governments concerned had stated their intention to consider favourably the Chief of Staff's proposals about the activities of the observers for facilitating compliance with the General Armistice Agreements. In specific cases and for specific regions, arrangements for the freedom of action and movement for the observers had been agreed upon with the Governments concerned. The Governments concerned had agreed to consider favourably proposals by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for local arrangements — including separation of forces — where and when he considered such arrangements to be called for.
The Secretary-General also explained his understanding of the unconditional nature of the cease-fire assurances given by the Governments concerned. Such assurances, he stated, gave a basis for strict orders on 18 April 1956 by Egypt and Israel which served to relieve the situation along the Gaza Armistice Demarcation Line. The assurances he had received were all given within the general framework of the Charter, and their unconditional nature was restricted only by the reservation for self-defence. A party which had given such an assurance, he considered, could invoke the right of self-defence only if and when the non-compliance by the other party with its obligations under the Charter and the Armistice Agreements was of such a nature as to meet the condition set forth in Article 51 of the Charter for invoking the right of self-defence. The Security Council alone could decide whether such a condition had actually occurred. Furthermore, it was made clear that reservations for self-defence did not permit acts of retaliation. On the latter point, the Security Council, too, had in numerous resolutions condemned retaliation as a policy.
The Secretary-General recognized that the cease-fire arrangements depended not only upon the reaffirmation of the legal obligations but also on the development of a state of mind and policies on each side of the Armistice Demarcation Line whereby no single incident would appear as a threat to the maintenance of the cease-fire policy as a whole. Accordingly, he had appealed to the Governments concerned to do their best to keep the situation under such control as to minimize or eliminate the risk of further incidents and in particular to avoid giving such an interpretation to incidents as would, without justification, weaken faith in the cease-fire or discredit the good will of the other party.
On the question of general compliance, the Secretary-General reported that he had received assurances from all the Governments concerned of their will to comply fully with all the clauses of the Armistice Agreements, on the basis of reciprocity, but recognizing the independent position of the cease-fire clause.
On two points of high importance within the framework of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel, the two Governments gave specific assurances to the Secretary-General. The first point related to all cases of crossings of the Demarcation Line and related acts of violence. On that point, the Secretary-General had asked for and received assurances that active measures would be taken by the parties to prevent such occurrences. The Government of Jordan gave similar assurances of its intention to enforce active measures to prevent all crossings of the Demarcation Line and actions of violence connected therewith. The second point (discussed below) referred to the state of continuing non-compliance with the Armistice Agreement on the part of both sides which prevailed in the so-called El-Auja area and the Defensive Areas, the status of which was established by articles VII and VIII of the Armistice Agreement.
The time sequence between various steps in the direction of full compliance with the Armistice Agreements had been studied and questions arising had been discussed with Governments. Once the cease-fire proved effective, and as the stands of all sides were clarified, the Secretary-General felt, it was essentially a question of co-ordinated unilateral moves inspired by greater confidence in the possibility of a peaceful development, each of them provoked by and, maybe, provoking similar unilateral moves on the other side.
As to procedural measures to help achieve full compliance with the Armistice Agreements, the Secretary-General reported that there was not in all cases an adequate functioning machinery for resolving disputes about the interpretation, or implementation, of the obligations assumed by the parties under the Agreements. A further weakness was that no procedure had been established for handling conflicts covered by the general clauses in the Armistice Agreements.
As to the state of continuing non-compliance with articles VII and VIII of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel, the Secretary-General reported that in the Demilitarized Zone centred on El-Auja and in the area between the line El Quseima-Abu Aweigila and the Demilitarized Zone, forces of Israel and Egypt, respectively, were present or reported to be in occupation, and the position was that both parties were or must be presumed to be, to a greater or lesser extent, violating articles VII and VIII. During his mission, he had received specific assurances from both sides of their willingness to establish full compliance with articles VII and VIII, within the framework of a full return to the state of affairs envisaged in the Armistice Agreement. Included in the report was a plan for the re-establishment of compliance with the two articles which had been prepared by the Chief of Staff and to which, as such, no objection had been made by the parties.
The Secretary-General also outlined a number of proposals made by the Chief of Staff on local arrangements needed to observe and assist compliance with the substantive provisions of the Armistice Agreements. The proposals had, in considerable measure, been accepted by the Governments concerned. Among other things, they involved freedom of movement for observers, the establishment of fixed observer posts manned by United Nations military observers, Local Commanders' Agreements, separation of forces and marking of boundaries. The Chief of Staff's proposals were immediately important mainly in three areas, namely, along the Demarcation Line in the Gaza area, the El-Auja Demilitarized Zone and the Defensive Areas of the western front, and Lake Tiberias. It was hoped that soon a Local Commanders' Agreement between Jordan and Israel would be negotiated. Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon gave assurances that, apart from the El-Auja, Gaza and Lake Tiberias areas, for which special arrangements had been negotiated, freedom of movement for military observers within the relevant areas would be fully recognized. Israel's position was that it would continue to afford United Nations observers the same degree of freedom of movement inside Israel which all residents or visitors to Israel normally enjoyed, and also such freedom of movement as might be required in respect to specific posts and patrols around the Gaza area.
The Secretary-General drew attention to two special questions that confronted him during his mission.
One, raised by Israel, concerned the question of Egyptian interference with Israel shipping through the Suez Canal as treated by the Security Council in a resolution, of 1 September 1951, and also the question of interference in the Straits of Tiran. On this, the attitude of the Secretary-General had been that the Suez question, as adjudicated by the Council, was not a question of compliance with the Armistice Agreement in the sense of his mandate. He recognized, however, that in an approach looking beyond the immediate problems which — as he understood the resolution of 4 April — the Council had in mind, the question raised by Israel should be considered in the light of the Council's finding of 1 September 1951 that the blockade was incompatible with the Armistice régime, because that régime put an end to a state in which Egypt could avail itself of beligerent rights.
The other question drawn to the Secretary-General's attention was Israel's scheme for the diversion of the Jordan River. The Secretary-General had found that his formal stand under the terms of his mandate must be to request the parties to abide by decisions on the matter taken by the Security Council or those taken under the Armistice Agreement between Syria and Israel. He also emphasized that in cases of differing views on the interpretation of a Council resolution, the Security Council alone could interpret its resolution. Apart from legal considerations, the Secretary-General found that the strain feared in case of a resumption of the Jordan River diversion work should not be permitted to endanger the cease-fire, and that it was the duty of the parties to the present effort to avoid any action that might create an added strain.
In concluding his report, the Secretary-General stated that he had devoted all his attention to the limited task — as called for by his mandate — of re-establishing, first of all, a cease-fire, and then, based on the cease-fire, a state of full compliance with the Armistice Agreements. This meant that he had left aside those fundamental issues which so deeply influenced the situation in the Middle East. His own view, confirmed by the discussions he had had in the region, was that the re-establishment of full compliance with the Armistice Agreements represented a stage that had to be passed in order to make progress possible on the main issues, which he had considered to be outside his mandate.
Following on the efforts made during his mission, the initiative now lay in the hands of the Governments parties to the Armistice Agreements. The Secretary-General felt that there was a general will to peace, which should be fostered and encouraged, not by attempts to impose from outside solutions to problems of vital significance to everyone in the region but by a co-operation which facilitated for the Governments concerned the taking unilaterally of steps to increase confidence and to demonstrate their wish for peaceful conditions. The value of the efforts and their effect would depend, first, on the good will and the actions taken by the Governments directly concerned, and, second, on the support given to those Governments by others and by the world community, as represented by the United Nations.
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 4 JUNE 1956
The Secretary-General's report submitted on 9 May 1956 was discussed by the Council at six meetings between 29 May and 4 June 1956.
Before the Council was a draft resolution by the United Kingdom, first circulated on 25 May and then revised on 29 May. Noting the need to create conditions in which a peaceful settlement, on a mutually acceptable basis, of the dispute between the parties could be made, the Council would thereby: (1) commend the Secretary-General and the parties for the progress already achieved; (2) declare that the parties should speedily carry out the measures already agreed upon with the Secretary-General and put into effect the further proposals of the Secretary-General and of the Chief of Staff; (3) declare that the full freedom of movement of United Nations observers must be respected in all areas along the Demarcation Lines, in the Demilitarized Zones and in the Defensive Areas; (4) endorse the Secretary-General's view that the re-establishment of full compliance with the Armistice Agreements represented a stage which had to be passed in order to make progress possible on the main issues between the parties; (5) request the Chief of Staff to continue his observations of the cease-fire pursuant to the Council's resolution of 11 August 1949; (6) call upon the parties to the Armistice Agreement to take steps necessary to carry out this resolution; and (7) request the Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties and to report to the Council as appropriate.
The draft resolution was supported by the representatives of Australia, Belgium, France and the United States. The latter considered the draft resolution to be fully in accord and consistent with the resolution of 4 April, the United States position on which remained unchanged. The representatives of Cuba and Peru supported the draft resolution in principle. The representative of China felt that no new resolution was necessary, as the mandate conferred on the Secretary-General had not expired, but said he would support the United Kingdom draft resolution in so far as it aimed at consolidating the results of the Secretary-General's mission.
The representatives of Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon stressed the importance of the reservations made by their Governments (in letters giving assurances about the cease-fire) on the question of the diversion of the River Jordan. They criticized a number of points in the United Kingdom draft resolution as attempts to go beyond the mission of the Secretary-General and the resolution of the Security Council. They strongly opposed the paragraph in the preamble (paragraph 6 of the draft resolution) on the need to create conditions in which a peaceful settlement, on a mutually acceptable basis, of the dispute between the parties could be made. This was far removed, in their opinion, from the premises of the resolution of 4 April, which was limited in its scope and which dealt with specific measures. Adopting the paragraph in question would be tantamount to writing off previous Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Palestine which provided the only basis on which peace could be secured.
They also objected to: operative paragraph 3, because by using the phrase "in all areas" it departed from the wording of the resolution of 4 April; operative paragraph 4, because it singled out for endorsement one aspect of the Secretary-General's report which was an integral entity; operative paragraph 7, because it did not limit the good offices of the Secretary-General strictly to the framework of the Security Council resolution of 4 April 1956.
The representative of Israel could not accept the Arab reservation on the question of the River Jordan. Moreover, a cease-fire agreement, indispensable as it was, could not be regarded as an adequate substitute for peaceful conditions; local arrangements were subordinate to the political decisions of the parties to maintain the Armistice and to prevent unauthorized crossings of the Demarcation Line. Full compliance with the Armistice Agreements was incompatible with the invocation of a state of war. It also involved the obligation to extend the scope of the Agreements by negotiation of a final settlement. Israel aspired to a peaceful settlement with its neighbours on a mutually acceptable basis and was prepared to negotiate at the highest level to that end.
The USSR representative stated that there was every possibility of avoiding an armed conflict in the Middle East if the parties observed the undertakings they assumed. However, the Security Council should continue its efforts until a lasting and peaceful settlement of the whole Palestine problem had been achieved. The USSR was ready to assist the United Nations in achieving a peaceful settlement between the Arab States and Israel, on the understanding that measures to relax the tension in the Palestine area would be taken with due regard for the wishes of the States of the Middle East and without interference in their domestic affairs.
The representative of Iran, who had previously declared his support for measures designed to secure full compliance with the Armistice Agreements, submitted an amendment to delete the paragraph in the preamble criticized by the representatives of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. No resolution, he explained, could be satisfactorily implemented unless it was acceptable to the parties concerned. The resolution should be adopted unanimously. Otherwise it would compromise the favourable results of the Secretary-General's mission.
The USSR, Yugoslavia and China supported this amendment. The paragraph of the preamble in question (paragraph 6), it was contended, went beyond the scope of the resolution of 4 April 1956, and it would be contradictory to promote a peaceful settlement on a mutually acceptable basis by a resolution not mutually accepted by the parties.
On 1 June, the United Kingdom representative again revised his draft resolution. The revision deleted, in operative paragraph 3, the words "in all areas", and inserted, in operative paragraph 7, the words "with a view to full implementation of the Council's resolution of 4 April 1956 and full compliance with the Armistice Agreement." The effect of the phrase "on a mutually acceptable basis" in paragraph 6 in the preamble, he emphasized, was to bring out the fact that any eventual settlement should be one arrived at through agreement and should not be imposed. It was not concerned with the nature of any future settlement. On 4 June, however, he accepted the Iranian amendment to delete this paragraph.
The representatives of Iran and the USSR welcomed the conciliatory spirit shown by the United Kingdom in accepting the deletion of the paragraph, but the representatives of the United States, France and others regretted its deletion. The representative of France stressed that its suppression could not mean the rejection of a solution based on the principle conveyed. The United States representative hoped that unanimous action in the Council would bring about further co-operative action in the areas towards a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem.
On 4 June 1956, the United Kingdom draft resolution, as revised and amended, was unanimously adopted.
FURTHER REPORTS OF SECRETARY-GENERAL AND CHIEF OF STAFF
The Secretary-General's report of 9 May sought to clarify the basic issues involved and indicate certain lines of action which, if followed by the parties in co-operation with the United Nations organs established for the purpose, could lead to a state of full compliance with the Armistice Agreements. The general endorsement of that report by the Security Council in its resolution of 4 June represented a new stage in the development of the Palestine question.
During the period between 9 May and the attack by Israel armed forces on Egypt on 29 October 1956, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and the Secretary-General, under his mandates from the Security Council of 4 April and 4 June, were concerned with efforts to implement specific proposals designed to support the ceasefire. The Secretary-General again visited the area between 18 and 23 July and submitted to the Security Council a number of reports by himself and by the Chief of Staff. Some of the proposals and developments in regard to them are briefly described below.
The Governments of Egypt and Israel accepted the proposal put forward in April 1956 for the establishment of a number of United Nations observation posts on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line. Israel, however, set a time limit of six months, i.e., until 31 October 1956, for the operation of the system. The United Nations posts were to be supported by patrols of the Truce Supervision Organization, and the observers were promised free access to those positions at any time. Twelve posts were established at selected locations, six on each side of the Armistice Demarcation Line.
Conditions along the Demarcation Line surrounding the Gaza Strip, stable for a period of nearly two and a half months, began to deteriorate about the middle of July. In a report of 5 September, the Chief of Staff stated that the presence of the observers had not always deterred the parties from opening fire across the Demarcation Line or from crossing it. In his view, the additional measures proposed but not implemented might have gone far towards preventing so many breaches of the cease-fire.
In his report of 9 May, the Secretary-General stated that both parties had agreed to UNTSO placing conspicuous markers along the Demarcation Line surrounding the Gaza Strip. Work had been arranged to begin on 20 June. On 19 June, the senior Israel delegate to the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission stated that Israel did not agree to the United Nations military observers doing the marking and suggested alternative arrangements. The Egyptian Government, however, saw no reason for changing the arrangement which had been accepted earlier by both parties.
In the negotiations in April, the Secretary-General's report pointed out, the Egyptian Government had agreed that the parties should withdraw their armed forces from the Demarcation Line to a distance sufficient to eliminate or greatly reduce risks of violations of the cease-fire. Israel indicated its intention of refraining from sending patrols up to the Demarcation Line except when it proved essential. In practice, the Chief of Staff reported on 9 September, the Israel arrangements did not prove sufficiently firm.
Articles VII and VIII of the Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement established a Demilitarized Zone centred on El-Auja, forbade the presence of armed forces therein, prohibited Egypt from maintaining defensive positions in an adjoining area west of the Demilitarized Zone, and limited the arms and troops in the Defensive Areas on both sides of the Line. Both Egypt and Israel had indicated to the Secretary-General their willingness to comply fully with these two articles, within the framework of a full return to the state of affairs envisaged in the Armistice Agreement. However, the Secretary-General noted the view expressed during the negotiations that such implementation had to find its place in relation to other steps in fulfilment of the aims of the Armistice Agreement.
Since 21 September 1955, when the Demilitarized Zone was occupied by Israel armed forces, the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff had engaged in efforts to secure the implementation of a plan for withdrawal of Israel armed forces and removal of prohibited Egyptian positions. The Israel Government gave assurances of its full acceptance in principle of the plan. The agreed withdrawal, however, never took place.
The Chief of Staff noted that under article X of the Armistice Agreement the village of El-Auja was also the headquarters of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. Because of its occupation of the Zone, Israel at first limited access to El-Auja by the Egyptian members of the Commission and subsequently refused it altogether. In addition, Israel placed restrictions on access by United Nations military observers through the Demilitarized Zone to the Mixed Armistice Commission headquarters and upon their activities. The Chief of Staff drew attention to the importance of maintaining observers in the Demilitarized Zone, with freedom to move and to send messages to the Chairman of the Commission and UNTSO by the speediest means. The strategic importance of the roads radiating from El-Auja, he stated, was such that, if one side or the other should contemplate aggression on a large scale against the territory of the other, primary or secondary lines of operations would certainly be established through the Demilitarized Zone. The presence of United Nations military observers, therefore, was a deterrent against aggression.
On 3 September 1956, at a meeting with the Chief of Staff, Mr. Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel, repeated his refusal to allow meetings of the Commission in El-Auja. He stated that the relevant articles of the General Armistice Agreement were "in suspension" owing to Egypt's non-compliance with article I and with the Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951 about interference with the passage through the Suez Canal of shipping bound for Israel.
In a report submitted on 27 September 1956 (S/3659) the Secretary-General commented on the argument advanced by Israel that all the Agreements constituted an indivisible whole. On that basis, what one party found to be a lack of compliance by the other party to the Armistice Agreements, especially with their basic article I, was considered to give the party who found its interests jeopardized freedom from its obligations under the Armistice Agreement (apart from the cease-fire obligation), including its obligation to the United Nations in connexion with the observer operations as envisaged in the Agreements. While recognizing that the Armistice Agreements were formally bilateral agreements, the Secretary-General noted that the Agreements had, with the consent of the parties, been endorsed by the Security Council and that they must be considered as establishing the equivalent of an international undertaking. This placed very serious limitations on the application of the theory of "indivisibility" to the Armistice Agreements.
As to the situation on the Jordan-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line, the Secretary-General reported that negotiations to establish Local Commanders' Agreements covering the whole of the Line had reached an advanced stage in the third quarter of 1955. Views about the presence of United Nations observers differed. In April 1956, agreement had been reached on a clause specifying that a United Nations military observer should be present at meetings of local commanders when desired by either party, but the Local Commanders' Agreements had never been signed.
The proposal for the establishment of observation posts on the eastern and north-eastern shores of Lake Tiberias was accepted by Syria and implemented in May 1956. The Chief of Staff reported on 5 September that Israel had rejected a suggestion for a United Nations boat on the Lake and, after deferring decision on the proposal for observation posts until a later date, finally rejected the proposal, after a number of reminders, in September 1956.
In incidents in the Negev and Gaza Strip areas, on 14 and 16 August 1956, reported on by the Chief of Staff on 20 August, an Israel truck and a civilian vehicle were blown up by mines and an Israel bus and jeep were attacked. Four Israeli citizens died and eight others were wounded. The Secretary-General made a statement (in S/3638) reminding the Governments of Egypt and Israel of their duty to observe strictly the cease-fire and also their obligations "to take active measures against the crossing of the Demarcation Line and acts of violence in connexion therewith". The following day, he made another statement in regard to two new incidents in which an Egyptian car with medical personnel was ambushed in Egyptian-controlled territory and nine Egyptians were killed. He warned that the party which resorted to such acts, whether starting or prolonging a chain of disturbances, assumed a great responsibility. The difference in the degree of responsibility borne by those found to have initiated such a chain of disturbances and by the other party did not remove the responsibility of the latter for a resort to acts of violence in contravention of the rules of the Charter.
On 27 September 1956 the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council on developments since 4 June 1956. The immediate reasons for the report, the Secretary-General stated, were continued incidents along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, particularly those complained of by Israel and Egypt near the Gaza Strip and the El-Auja Demilitarized Zone, and the temporary suspension of discussions on various local arrangements.
In this report, he reviewed the significance of the re-establishment, during the negotiations in April 1956, of a general and independent cease-fire obligation. He stated that the assurances of unconditional observance of the ceasefire clauses given to the United Nations made the United Nations itself a party to the ceasefire obligations, thereby again clearly establishing its right to take steps for securing the implementation of those obligations.
Possibilities still remained open, he said, for constructive steps on such matters as abstention from repeated threats, compliance by both Egypt and Israel with the Articles of the Armistice Agreement relating to the El-Auja Demilitarized Zone and the adjacent Defensive Areas, the re-establishment of freedom of navigation for Israel ships in the Suez Canal in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of 1 September 1951, and other matters such as the repatriation and resettlement of refugees or the utilization of Jordan waters, where United Nations decisions had for long been neglected or even challenged.
The Secretary-General felt that the Governments of the region, upon whom rested the main responsibility in efforts to turn the tide, had so far failed to carry through a discipline sufficiently firm to forestall incidents which, step by step, must necessarily undermine the cease-fire. Acts of violence, which were supposed to have been staged by one party, had been immediately followed by acts of violence which must be supposed to have been staged by persons on the other side in "self-defence" as part of a policy of retaliation. Even when the acts of violence might have seemed to be limited to a pattern of "short-term reciprocity", there was a permanent risk that the incidents might release a chain of events such as that which prevailed at the time of the cease-fire arrangements in the middle of April. That fact in itself, the Secretary-General held, fully justified the stand of the Security Council on all acts of violence, including those which reflected a policy of retaliation.
In an annex to the Secretary-General's report of 9 May 1956, the Chief of Staff pointed out that the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission had ceased holding either emergency or regular meetings since 1951. Syria had complained of violations by Israel of article V of the Armistice Agreement which established a Demilitarized Zone and gave to the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission certain clearly defined responsibilities in connexion with it. Israel had maintained that violations of article V were matters between the Israel delegation and the Chairman. The refusal of Israel to agree to submit to the Mixed Armistice Commission the interpretation of article V for a decision as to the Commission's competence in the Demilitarized Zone had made it impossible to resume regular meetings of the Commission.
On 7 August Syria informed the Security Council (S/3634) that, despite numerous complaints submitted to the Syrian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, the Israelis had continued their aggressive activity in the Demilitarized Zone, disregarding the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement and ignoring the orders of the Truce Supervision Organization. Among the more serious violations mentioned in the Syrian letter were: deployment in the Zone of a regular Israel police force instead of local police; construction of military fortifications and settlements within the Demilitarized Zone; and preventing, from time to time, the UNTSO observers from moving freely in the Zone.
On 5 September 1956, the Chief of Staff reported that extensive fortifications, comprising fire and shelter trenches, concrete bunkers and barbed wire entanglements, had been erected by Israel near Hagovrim and Susita, inside the Demilitarized Zone. In his opinion, these went beyond what was needed for the protection of the civilian population. In spite of his request that the works be dismantled, Israel had continued to extend the fortifications in the area. The Israel delegation had complained that certain Syrian fortifications encroached upon the Demilitarized Zone. The Syrian authorities, when requested by the Chief of Staff to demolish them, replied that they were ready to do so when the Israelis demolished the permanent fortifications referred to above.
At a meeting with the Chief of Staff on 3 September, the Prime Minister of Israel stated that Israel could not comply with the request to destroy these fortifications, on the ground that Syria was violating article I of the General Armistice Agreement.
In letters addressed to the Security Council on 16 and 26 July 1956, Israel said that the security situation along the Israel-Jordan border had seriously deteriorated since the unconditional cease-fire assurance given by Jordan to the Secretary-General on 26 April. Attention was drawn to the gravity of the situation which had resulted from the attacks described. It was declared that Israel could not be expected to submit to the calculated terrorism pursued by Jordan.
On 24 and 25 July, two incidents took place in the Sheikh Abd el Aziz area and on Mount Scopus near Jerusalem involving extensive exchanges of fire across the Armistice Demarcation Line. These incidents, as the Secretary-General reported on 3 August 1956 (S/3632), represented "a greater threat to the policy of cease-fire than had so far arisen". Annexed to his report was a survey of incidents on the Israel-Jordan Demarcation Line up to 28 July, prepared by the Chief of Staff.
On 26 September, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the most recent events along that Line had brought to a culmination a development which had been progressing for a few months. If the Governments concerned did not bring the situation rapidly under control, the Council should take the matter up.
On the same day, the Chief of Staff reported (S/3660) on the increasingly serious incidents along the Jordan-Israel Demarcation Line which had taken place between 29 July and 25 September. The major incidents involved: groups of armed persons crossing from Israel into Jordan; groups of armed men crossing from Jordan into Israel and an attack on a bus; exchanges of fire between patrols; shooting by machine-gun from a Jordanian position at a group of members of an archaeological congress inspecting a site at Ramat Rahel in the Jerusalem area; shooting across the Demarcation Line; and attacks by Israel armed forces on three police posts — at Rahwa on 11 September, Gharandal on 13 September, and Sharafi near Husan village on 25-26 September.
On 8 October, the representatives of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria informed the Council that the attack on the Sharafi police post in the Husan region had been a premeditated act of aggression by regular Israel armed forces and had been taken as reprisal against Jordan. That act, added to such particularly serious acts as the attacks on Qibya and Nahalin villages in October 1953 and March 1954, respectively, and the raids on the Jordan police posts of Rahwa and Gharandal on 11 and 13 September 1956, respectively, had convinced their Governments that the Israel authorities were trying by provocation to drag the Arab States into a general war.
On 11 October, in a report on subsequent developments (S/3670), the Chief of Staff stated that the Israel delegation had walked out of a meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission on 1 October, because the Chairman had indicated his intention of voting, on the basis of the evidence, in favour of a Jordanian amendment modifying an Israel draft resolution to condemn Jordan for the incident at Ramat Rahel. Representatives of both parties had at different times, on previous occasions, walked out of meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission. On that occasion, however, the Israel delegation, in reply to the Chief of Staff, who had drawn the attention of the Commission to the desirability of holding an emergency meeting, had stated that the Government of Israel could not agree to United Nations military observers investigating this incident. It was already being investigated by the Israel authorities. Until further notice, the policy of the Israel Government would be not to have United Nations military observers investigate Israel's complaints. Since then, the Chief of Staff reported, the Israel authorities had carried out their own investigations of incidents on their own side of the Demarcation Line.
In another report, on 17 October (S/3685), the Chief of Staff described the attack carried out by Israel forces on the night of 10-11 October on the village of Qalqiliya, in which a police post was demolished with explosives and heavy casualties were inflicted. Annexed to the report was a compilation of available statistics on casualties of the parties under the General Armistice Agreements in Palestine for the year 1955 and the first nine months of 1956. Transmitting this report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General drew attention to the comment in the Chief of Staff's report of 11 October that at present the situation was that one of the parties to the General Armistice Agreements had made its own investigations (which were not, and could not be, subject to check or confirmation by United Nations military observers), had published the results of such investigations, had drawn its own conclusions from them and had undertaken actions by its military forces on that basis. The Secretary-General endorsed the view of the Chief of Staff that that was a dangerous negation of vital elements of the Armistice Agreements and represented a further step towards limiting the functions of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, already indicated in his report of 27 September.
SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF COMPLAINTS BY JORDAN AND ISRAEL
On 15 October, Jordan requested a Security Council meeting to consider the serious situation on the Jordan-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line. On 17 October, the representative of Israel asked the Council to consider a complaint by Israel about persistent violations by Jordan of the Jordan-Israel General Armistice Agreement.
On 19 October, when the Council agreed to take up both items, the representative of Jordan drew attention to unprovoked and premeditated attacks across the Demarcation Line by Israel armed forces, in detachments up to brigade group strength, on the villages of Rahwa, Gharandal, Wadi Fukin, Husan, Qalqiliya, Habla, Sufin, Jayyus and Nabi Ilyas. The latest incident at Qalqiliya was, in his view, an act of aggression that was not a border incident, but "actual war". The minor complaints by Israel against Jordan as listed in the Chief of Staff's report of 26 September, could never be a reason for either party to mobilize its regular army against the other. The theory of retaliation had been condemned by the Security Council. He attributed the organized retaliation to the expansionist policy of the Israel Government and accused Israel of timing the attacks in such a way as to weaken the combined efforts of the Arab States to solve the Suez Canal problem peacefully and amicably with the Western Powers. He asked the Council to apply sanctions against Israel under Article 41 of the Charter as a deterrent against future Israel aggression.
On 25 October, Israel's representative accused Jordan in the Council of persistent violations of the General Armistice Agreement, accompanied and stimulated by the utterances of the King and political and military leaders of Jordan, setting the destruction of Israel as their aim. Reviewing incidents from which Israel had suffered since May 1956, he said that the Mixed Armistice Commission's repeated condemnations of Jordan had had no effect. He also described the activities of fedayeen gangs, which he considered a part of the Jordan military establishment. Egypt and Jordan, in his view, were jointly responsible for this part of the attack upon Israel from Jordan territory. Any Government in the position of Israel would have acted as Israel had, and possibly sooner, he asserted, adding that the Security Council, the Secretary-General, UNTSO and the Mixed Armistice Commission had not been able to make the life of any single Israeli citizen safer than it would otherwise have been. Consequently, his Government did not attach primary importance to "routines of verbal condemnations and of investigations". He asserted that Israel was prepared faithfully to observe the cease-fire so long as it was faithfully observed by the other side. Israel would start no war. It would initiate no violence.
(Consideration of this question was not resumed in the period covered by the present Yearbook.)
ACTIVITIES OF CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE
In its fifteenth progress report to the General Assembly covering the period 1 January 1955 to 30 September 1956 and submitted on 4 October 1956, the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine said it had continued to concentrate on certain concrete problems on which it felt progress could be made.
On the question of Arab refugee bank accounts blocked in Israel, the Commission reported that approximately four-fifths of the funds in question had been released and that considerable progress had also been made with regard to the transfer of safe deposit and safe custody items to their refugee owners.
As to the question of the identification of Arab refugee property holdings in Israel, the Commission estimated that, by the middle of 1957, it would have in its possession a detailed record of refugee-owned land in Israel and any information from official sources which might indicate its value.
In reply to an enquiry by the Commission on its declared policy to offer compensation for abandoned Arab lands in Israel, the Government of Israel had stated, on 11 March 1956, that the problem of compensation could not be considered in disregard of the general context of Arab-Israel relations.
In a letter of 28 September 1956, the Commission had expressed its disappointment over Israel's apparent withdrawal from its previous position on the over-all question of compensation, and requested a reply to its enquiries as to the administration of Arab refugee property in Israel.
DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES
INCIDENTS ON LAKE TIBERIAS
SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 710-715.
S/3519. Syria draft resolution.
S/3528. Letter of 9 January 1956 from representative of USSR, with
amendments to S/3519.
S/3530 and Corr.1, Revs.2 and 3. France, United Kingdom, United States joint
draft resolution.
S/3532. Iran amendments to joint draft resolution, S/3530.
S/3536. Yugoslavia draft resolution.
S/3537. Iran amendments to revised joint draft resolution,
S/3530/Rev.2.
S/3538. Resolution, as proposed by France, United Kingdom and
United States,
S/3530/Rev.3, adopted unanimously by Security Council on
19 January 1956, meeting 715.
"The Security Council,
"Recalling its resolutions of 15 July 1948, 11 August 1949, 18 May 1951, 24 November 1953, and 29 March 1955,
"Taking into consideration the statements of the representatives of Syria and Israel and the reports of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization on the Syrian complaint that an attack was committed by Israel regular army forces against Syrian regular army forces on Syrian territory on 11 December 1955,
"Noting the report of the Chief of Staff that this Israel action was a deliberate violation of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, including those relating to the demilitarized zone, which was crossed by the Israel forces which entered Syria,
"Noting also, without prejudice to the ultimate rights, claims and positions of the parties, that according to the reports of the Chief of Staff there has been interference by the Syrian authorities with Israel activities on Lake Tiberias, in contravention of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria,
"1. Holds that this interference in no way justifies the Israel action;
"2. Reminds the Government of Israel that the Council has already condemned military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreements, whether or not undertaken by way of retaliation, and has called upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent such actions;
"3. Condemns the attack of 11 December 1955 as a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of its resolution of 15 July 1948, of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, and of Israel's obligations under the Charter;
"4. Expresses its grave concern at the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with its obligations;
"5. Calls upon the Government of Israel to do so in the future, in default of which the Council will have to consider what further measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peace;
"6. Calls upon the parties to comply with their obligations under article V of the General Armistice Agreement to respect the armistice demarcation line and the demilitarized zone;
"7. Requests the Chief of Staff to pursue his suggestions for improving the situation in the area of Lake Tiberias without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of the parties and to report to the Council as appropriate on the success of his efforts;
"8. Calls upon the parties to arrange with the Chief of Staff for an immediate exchange of all military prisoners;
"9. Calls upon both parties to co-operate with the Chief of Staff in this and all other respects, to carry out the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement in good faith, and in particular to make full use of the Mixed Armistice Commission's machinery in the interpretation and application of its provisions."
STATUS OF COMPLIANCE WITH ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS
SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 717-728.
S/3554, S/3559. Letters of 20 January and 6 and 13 March 1956 from
representative of Israel.
S/3555. Letter of 8 March 1956 from representative of Syria.
S/3558. Report of 12 March 1956 by Chief of Staff of UNTSO to
Secretary-General on incident of 4 March 1956 in vicinity of
Moussadiya close to north-eastern shore of Lake Tiberias.
S/3561. Letter of 20 March 1956 from Permanent Representative of
United States.
S/3562 and Corr.1. United States draft resolution. S/3574. USSR
amendments to United States draft resolution, S/3562.
S/3575. Resolution, as proposed by United States, S/3562 and
Corr.1, adopted unanimously by Security Council on 4 April 1956,
meeting 722.
"The Security Council,
"Recalling its resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956,
"Recalling that in each of these resolutions the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the parties to the General Armistice Agreements concerned were requested by the Council to undertake certain specific steps for the purpose of ensuring that the tensions along the armistice demarcation lines should be reduced,
"Noting with grave concern that despite the efforts of the Chief of Staff the proposed steps have not been carried out,
"1. Considers that the situation now prevailing between the parties concerning the enforcement of the armistice agreements and the compliance given to the above-mentioned resolutions of the Council is such that its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;
"2. Requests the Secretary-General to undertake as a matter of urgent concern, a survey of the various aspects of enforcement of and compliance with the four General Armistice Agreements and the Council's resolutions under reference;
"3. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for the adoption of any measures which, after discussion with the parties and with the Chief of Staff, he considers would reduce existing tensions along the armistice demarcation lines, including the following points:
"(a) Withdrawal of their forces from the armistice demarcation lines;
"(b) Full freedom of movement for observers along the armistice demarcation lines, in the demilitarized zones and in the defensive areas;
"(c) Establishment of local arrangements for the prevention of incidents and the prompt detection of any violations of the armistice agreements;
"4. Calls upon the parties to the general armistice agreements to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;
"5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council in his discretion but not later than one month from this date on the implementation given to this resolution in order to assist the Council in considering what further action may be required."
S/3577 and Corr.1, S/3580 and Corr.l, S/3581 – S/3583, S/3585,
S/3603. Letters of 6, 9, 10, 11 and 12 April and 31 May 1956
from representative of Israel.
S/3579 and Rev.1. Letter of 9 April 1956 from Permanent
Representative of Egypt.
S/3584, S/3586, S/3587. Communications of 12, 13 and 16 April 1956
circulated at request of Secretary-General.
S/3594. Progress report of 2 May 1956 from Secretary-General.
S/3596. Report of Secretary-General of 9 May 1956, pursuant to
Council resolution of 4 April 1956.
S/3600 and Revs. I and 2. United Kingdom draft resolution of
25 May, and revisions of 29 May and I June 1956.
S/3602. Iran amendment to United Kingdom revised draft resolution,
S/3600/Rev.2.
S/3605. Resolution, as submitted by United Kingdom, S/3600/Rev.2,
as amended, adopted unanimously by Security Council on 4 June
1956, meeting 728.
"Recalling its resolutions of 4 April 1956 [S/3575] and 11 August 1949,
"Having received the report of the Secretary-General on his recent mission on behalf of the Security Council [S/3596],
"Noting those passages of the report (section III and annexes 1-4) which refer to the assurances given to the Secretary-General by all the parties to the general armistice agreements unconditionally to observe the cease-fire,
"Noting also that progress has been made towards the adoption of the specific measures set out in operative paragraph 3 of the Security Council's resolution of 4 April 1956,
"Noting however that full compliance with the General Armistice Agreements and with the Council's resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955 and 19 January 1956 is not yet effected, and that the measures called for in operative paragraph 3 of its resolution of 4 April 1956 have been neither completely agreed upon nor put fully into effect,
"Believing that further progress should now be made in consolidating the gains resulting from the Secretary-General's mission and towards full implementation by the parties of the armistice agreements,
"1. Commends the Secretary-General and the parties on the progress already achieved;
"2. Declares that the parties to the armistice agreements should speedily carry out the measures already agreed upon with the Secretary-General, and should co-operate with the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to put into effect their further practical proposals, pursuant to the resolution of 4 April 1956, with a view to full implementation of that resolution and full compliance with the armistice agreements;
"3. Declares that full freedom of movement of United Nations observers must be respected along the armistice demarcation lines, in the demilitarized zones and in the defensive areas, as defined in the armistice agreements, to enable them to fulfil their functions;
"4. Endorses the Secretary-General's view that the re-establishment of full compliance with the armistice agreements represents a stage which has to be passed in order to make progress possible on the main issues between the parties;
"5. Requests the Chief of Staff to continue to carry out his observation of the cease-fire pursuant to the Security Council's resolution of 11 August 1949 and to report to the Council whenever any action undertaken by one party to an armistice agreement constitutes a serious violation of that agreement or of the cease-fire, which in his opinion requires immediate consideration by the Council;
"6. Calls upon the parties to the armistice agreements to take the steps necessary to carry out this resolution, thereby increasing confidence and demonstrating their wish for peaceful conditions;
"7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties, with a view to full implementation of the Council's resolution of 4 April 1956 and full compliance with the armistice agreements, and to report to the Security Council as appropriate."
S/3621, S/3628. Letters of 16 and 26 July 1956 from representative
of Israel.
S/3632, S/3659. Reports of Secretary-General of 3 August and
27 September 1956 pursuant to Council's resolutions of 4 April
and 4 June 1956.
S/3634. Letter of 7 August 1956 from representative of Syria.
S/3658. Letter of 26 September 1956 from Secretary General.
S/3638, S/3660, S/3670, S/3685 and Corr.1. Reports of Chief of
Staff of UNTSO, dated 20 August, 26 September, 11 October and
17 October 1956.
SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF COMPLAINTS BY JORDAN AND ISRAEL
SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 744, 745.
S/3678. Letter of 15 October 1956 from representative of Jordan.
S/3682. Letter of 17 October 1956 from representative of Israel.
(See also S/3621, S/3628, S/3632, S/3638, S/3658, S/3659, S/3660,
S/3670, S/3685 and Corr.1, details about which are given above.)
ACTIVITIES OF CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE
A/3199. Fifteenth progress report.
THE SUEZ CANAL QUESTION (JULY-OCTOBER 1956)
On 26 July 1956, Egypt proclaimed the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and placed in the hands of an Egyptian operating authority management of the Canal traffic which, in 1955, amounted to some 14,000 ships with a net tonnage of some 107 million tons. The decree provided for compensation on the basis of the market value of the shares on 25 July upon receipt of all the assets and property of the Canal Company.
Nationalization of the Canal Company was followed by a series of events which included lengthy negotiations over how to settle the Suez question, the further deterioration of the situation, especially along the Egyptian-Israel and Jordan-Israel Armistice Demarcation Lines in September and October, and military action in Egypt by Israel and Anglo-French forces. After eventually successful efforts by the United Nations to obtain the withdrawal of those forces, involving the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force and clearance of the blocked Suez Canal under United Nations auspices, there came renewed negotiations concerning the Canal and renewed efforts to promote peaceful conditions in the area by re-establishing full compliance with the Armictice Agreement.
After the nationalization of the Canal in July 1956, France, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed, in talks at London between 29 July and 2 August 1956, that the Egyptian action threatened "the freedom and security of the Canal as guaranteed by the Convention of 1888", and the United Kingdom issued invitations to a conference in London of parties to the 1888 Convention and of other nations largely concerned with the use of the Canal. The announced purpose was to consider steps to establish operating arrangements, consistent with legitimate Egyptian interests, under an international system designed to assure operation of the Canal as guaranteed by the Convention.
Meanwhile, Egypt had seized the Canal, its installations and all property of the Canal Company in Egypt. France and the United Kingdom countered by refusing to pay tolls to the new Egyptian authority. Together with the United States, they blocked all Egyptian accounts, including those of the Canal Company.
Egypt refused to attend the London Conference, stating that it had been convened without consulting Egypt to discuss the future of an integral part of that nation's territory. Egypt proposed instead a conference of the 45 users of the Canal to reconsider the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and to confirm and guarantee freedom of navigation through the Canal.
At the London Suez Conference held between 16 and 24 August 1956, 18 of the 22 Powers who attended agreed on proposals to be presented to Egypt. The 18 Powers proposed a definite system to guarantee at all times and for all Powers free use of the Canal, with due regard to the sovereign rights of Egypt. The system was to assure: (1) efficient operation and development of the Canal and a free, open and secure international waterway; (2) insulation of that operation from the politics of any nation; (3) an equitable financial return to Egypt, increasing as the Canal was enlarged and used by more shipping; and (4) Canal dues as low as was consistent with the above provisions. To achieve those results, a Suez Canal Board was to operate, maintain and develop the Canal, the Board to include Egypt and to make periodic reports to the United Nations. There would be an arbitral commission to settle disputes and effective sanctions which would treat any use or threat of force to interfere with the operating of the Canal as a threat to peace and violation of the Charter.
At the Conference, India offered a compromise solution between the position of the majority and that of exclusive control and management of the operation and development of the Canal by Egypt. It proposed a consultative body which would advise Egypt in accordance with the interest of the users of the Canal and would maintain contacts with the United Nations. This proposal was supported by Ceylon, Indonesia and the USSR.
The 18-Power plan was presented to the Egyptian Government in Cairo on 3 September 1956, by a five-nation Committee headed by the Prime Minister of Australia. On 9 September, the Committee reported rejection of the plan by the Government of Egypt which, it stated, resisted any control or management of the operation and development of the Canal by anybody other than itself. In a memorandum of 10 September, Egypt stated that the essence of the proposals was the establishment of international, in place of Egyptian, control over the Canal and stipulations for sanctions. Egypt proposed instead the establishment of a negotiating body representative of the different user views to seek solutions for questions relating to freedom of navigation of the Canal, its development and equitable tolls. This proposal, which Egypt announced had been accepted by 21 States, was considered by the second London Suez Conference, held between 19 and 21 September by the supporters of the 18-Power plan, as too imprecise to afford a useful basis for discussion.
On 12 September, the representatives of France and the United Kingdom informed the Security Council that the situation created by the action of Egypt in attempting unilaterally to bring to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal which was confirmed and completed by the Convention of 1888 might endanger the free and open passage of shipping through the Canal. The refusal of Egypt to negotiate on the 18-Power proposals which, in their opinion, offered means for a just and equitable solution, was regarded by them as an aggravation of the situation which, if allowed to continue, would constitute a manifest danger to peace and security.
On the same day, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom announced that, in agreement with France and the United States, an association would be set up to enable the users of the Canal to exercise their rights. The second London Suez Conference provided for a voluntary Suez Canal Users Association, a body originally suggested by the United States. The Association, of which 15 of the 18 conferring nations became members, was an interim formula, pending a more permanent solution, designed to assist its members in the exercise of their rights as users of the Canal in consonance with the 1888 Convention, with due regard for the rights of Egypt.
Meanwhile, on 15 September, a statement by the USSR, transmitted to the Security Council, declared that military preparations of the United Kingdom and France, conducted with the support of the United States, for the purpose of exerting pressure on Egypt over the Suez question, were grossly at variance with the principles of the Charter and could not be regarded otherwise than an act of aggression against Egypt, which had exercised its legitimate rights as a sovereign State in nationalizing the private Suez Canal Company. The whole plan of the 18-Power proposals and the Users Association was aimed at removing administration of the Canal from the hands of Egypt and transferring it to a foreign administration, although plainly such a plan could only be implemented by force. To impose a solution of the Suez Canal issue by force of arms risked immense destruction in the Suez Canal and in the oil fields and pipelines "in the countries of the Arab East". A foreign invasion of Egypt would rouse the peoples of Asia and Africa, who were aware that no forces were capable of stopping the historical development leading toward liquidation of colonialism. In an age of destructive atomic and hydrogen weapons, it was useless to threaten in a manner characteristic of past colonial conquests. The USSR was convinced that the important questions of freedom of navigation and normal functioning of the Canal could and must be solved by peaceful means and expressed support for the Egyptian proposals of 10 September. The USSR could not stand aside from the Suez problem because any violation of peace in the area could not but affect its security.
On 17 September, Egypt informed the Council by letter that the claim in the Anglo-French letter of 12 September that the Company was part of the system established by the Convention of 1888 was considered devoid of any legal, historical or moral foundation. The act of nationalization had been taken by Egypt in the full exercise of its sovereign rights and Egypt had simultaneously reaffirmed its determination to continue to guarantee the freedom of passage through the Canal in conformity with the 1888 Convention, which did not in any way deprive Egypt of its right to administer the Canal. Reviewing threats of force and hostile economic measures taken by France and the United Kingdom, the letter contrasted Egypt's proposals for a negotiating body with the proposed Suez Canal Users Association, which was declared incompatible with the sovereign rights of Egypt and a violation of the 1888 Convention. Such acts, it concluded, were aimed, particularly by France and the United Kingdom, at taking virtual possession of the Canal and destroying the very independence of Egypt.
The proposed Association was especially unjustifiable in view of the fact that for nearly 60 days, and in spite of the difficulties created by France, the United Kingdom and the former Suez Canal Company, the traffic had been going on with regularity and efficiency, with more ships passing than during the corresponding period of 1955.
After these developments and negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations had failed to produce a solution, the parties principally concerned brought the problem before the Organization. On 23 September, France and the United Kingdom requested the convening of the Security Council to consider the situation brought to the Council's attention by their letter of 12 September. On 24 September, Egypt requested an urgent meeting to consider actions against Egypt by some Powers, particularly France and the United Kingdom, which constituted a danger to international peace and security and were serious violations of the Charter of the United Nations.
On 26 September, the Council included both items in its agenda and decided to give priority to the discussion of the item submitted jointly by the United Kingdom and France. The question was discussed at seven open meetings and three closed meetings held between then and 13 October, in which the representative of Egypt took part.
The representative of Israel and the representatives of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen also sought to participate in the discussion of the item proposed but action on their requests was postponed. In accordance with an invitation extended by the Security Council on 13 October, all these representatives, however, submitted their views on the question by letter.
The Council, at its next meeting, on 5 October, had before it a draft resolution submitted by France and the United Kingdom. By this the Council, recognizing that, in subjecting the operation of an international public service to exclusive Egyptian control, the Egyptian Government had created a situation likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, would: (1) reaffirm the principle of freedom of navigation of the Suez Canal in accordance with the Suez Canal Convention of 1888; (2) endorse the proposals advanced by 18 of the 22 States which had attended the August conference in London, as suitably designed to bring about a solution of the question by peaceful means and in conformity with justice; (3) recommend that the Government of Egypt should co-operate by negotiation in working out, on the basis of those proposals, a system of operation to be applied to the Canal and should co-operate with the Suez Canal Users Association established at the second London Conference in September to assist its members in the exercise of their rights.
Discussion in the Council ranged over the history of the Canal and the legal status of the Suez Canal Company, the economic importance of the Canal, particularly its role in the transport of Middle Eastern oil, and the political background and implications of nationalization of the Canal. It was said that the crux of the problem was to bring Egypt's sovereign rights with regard to the Suez Canal into harmony with the legitimate interests of the world community in obtaining adequate assurances regarding the freedom and security of navigation established by the Convention of 1888 through a waterway of exceptional international importance.
While no supporter of the Anglo-French draft resolution questioned Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal or the principle of the right of nationalization, it was urged that Egyptian sovereignty did not mean absence of international rights, and some maintained that nationalization of the Suez Canal Company was illegal. The character of the Canal as an international waterway dedicated to the free passage of the vessels of all nations had been guaranteed for all time by the 1888 Convention. The act of nationalization had upset the balance of the system of the concessions, the Turkish declaration of 1873 regarding tolls and the Constantinople Convention of 1888, which had safeguarded the rights of Egypt and the users.
The real issue, it was said, was respect for international obligations. Emphasizing the great blow which international confidence had suffered through the behaviour of Egypt, with no resulting protection of the real interests of the Egyptian people, and stressing that apprehensions had increased to the point of justifying precautionary moves, speakers drew attention to the following factors, among others: the summary cancellation without notice of the Company's concession that ran until 1968, after Egypt had reaffirmed the 1888 Convention in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 19 October 1954; the repudiation of an agreement of 10 June 1956 under which the Company was to invest in Egypt large sums of money; statements to the effect that the action was a form of political retaliation for the negative attitude the United States had adopted towards financing the Aswan Dam and that the revenues of the Canal would be used to build the Dam; and the possible consequences of Egypt's action upon the international flow of capital to underdeveloped countries.
Not only were the economic future and vital interests of many countries east and west of the Canal at stake, but so was the system of operation which was likely to bring the greatest material benefits to the people of Egypt. If the Canal could be used as an instrument of national policy by any Government which physically controlled it, no nation depending on the Canal could feel secure. An instance of discrimination was the refusal of Egypt to allow passage of Israel vessels in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 1 September 1951.2/
Adequate guarantees of the rights of users must, it was maintained, be more than promises. Egypt could not require user countries to accept a purely Egyptian authority for operation of the Canal. The 18-Power proposals were designed to ensure that the international aspects of the system for the operation of the Canal should be preserved in the future. All emphasized the need of a settlement which was not only a peaceful one but one in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. Justice, it was said, required that operation of this international utility should be insulated from the politics of any nation. The problem could not, said another, be solved just by halfway measures which related only to peace.
Opponents of the Anglo-French draft resolution, on the other hand, maintained that nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, an Egyptian company which had amortized its capital many times over, was a legitimate act of Egyptian sovereignty. The claim that the Canal Company was part of the system established by the Convention of 1888 was wholly unwarranted. The question of ownership and operation of the Canal, which was under Egyptian jurisdiction, had nothing to do with Egypt's international obligations under the 1888 Convention to ensure free passage, it was said. Egypt had been faithfully discharging those obligations. Despite many obstructions put in the way, navigation through the Canal had been proceeding with perfect efficiency, and nationalization of the Canal Company could not conceivably endanger international peace and security.
The different plans of the Western Powers for settling the Suez problem, including the Anglo-French draft resolution, were violating Egypt's sovereignty by interfering in its internal affairs and imposing an international authority as the master of the Canal.
The problem, it was recognized, was of vital interest to a large number of user countries, but of at least equal interest to Egypt, as the sovereign Government concerned. Emphasis was laid on Egypt's offers to negotiate on equal terms a peaceful and just solution. What Egypt refused, it was said, was not negotiation but dictation.
On 8 October, the representative of Egypt restated his Government's willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement on the basis of the 1888 Convention principle of guaranteeing for all and for all time the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal with a view to: (1) establishing a system of co-operation between the Egyptian operating authority and the users, taking into account the sovereignty and rights of Egypt and the interests of the users; (2) establishing an equitable system of tolls; and (3) allotting a reasonable percentage of the Canal revenues for improvements.
After the general debate, the Council discussed the problem in three closed meetings held between 9 and 12 October. As the meetings proceeded, exploratory conversations on the question were held by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, France and the United Kingdom in the presence of the Secretary-General. At the next open meeting of the Council, on 13 October, the United Kingdom and France submitted another draft resolution. By this, as amended on the suggestion of Iran, the Council, noting the account of the Secretary-General on these exploratory conversations, would: (1) agree that any settlement of the Suez question should meet the following six requirements: (i) there should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert — this covered both political and technical aspects; (ii) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected; (iii) the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country; (iv) the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users; (v) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development; and (vi) in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due; (2) consider that the 18-Power proposals corresponded to those requirements, while recognizing that other proposals, corresponding to the same requirements, might be submitted by the Egyptian Government; (3) note that that Government, while declaring its readiness to accept the principle of organized collaboration between an Egyptian Authority and the users, had not yet formulated sufficiently precise proposals to meet those requirements; (4) invite the Governments of Egypt, France and the United Kingdom to continue their interchanges and, in this connexion, invite the Egyptian Government to make known promptly its proposals for a system meeting those requirements; and (5) consider that, meanwhile, the Suez Canal Users Association, which had been qualified to receive the dues payable by ships belonging to its members, and the competent Egyptian authorities, should co-operate to ensure the satisfactory operation of the Canal and free and open transit through the Canal in accordance with the 1888 Convention.
The representative of Egypt hoped that the Council would adopt the first part of the new draft resolution which outlined the six basic principles which had been presented to the Council by the Secretary-General. He thought the expression of the third principle, insulation of the Canal from politics, allowed scope for contradictory interpretations and that its purpose would best be guaranteed by renewal or reaffirmation of the 1888 Convention. He said that the practical approach to a peaceful settlement was by negotiation on the concrete proposals made by Egypt on 8 October and at the six recent meetings of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, the United Kingdom and Egypt in the presence of the Secretary-General. The approach outlined in the second part of the draft resolution would make the Canal the prey of the politics of many nations.
The representative of Yugoslavia opposed the second part of the Anglo-French draft resolution, because it offered no basis for agreement. He submitted a draft resolution which included the six requirements of the first operative paragraph of the two-Power draft and also recommended that the negotiations should be continued, requested the Secretary-General to offer, if necessary, his assistance, and called on all the parties concerned to abstain from measures which might impair the negotiations.
On 13 October, the Council voted on the amended Anglo-French draft resolution in two parts. The first part outlining the six requirements was adopted unanimously. The second, which received 9 votes in favour to 2 against (USSR, Yugoslavia), was not adopted since one of the negative votes was that of a permanent member. The representative of Yugoslavia did not press for a vote on his draft resolution.
On 15 October, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt drew the Council's attention to the statement made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on 13 October, after Egypt had accepted the six principles of the Council's resolution of that date and had not pressed for consideration of the next agenda item in view of the importance of providing the proper atmosphere for future negotiations. That statement had announced a continuation of military measures in the Eastern Mediterranean and had added that force was the last resort but could not be excluded.
Between 13 and 19 October, the Secretary-General held private talks with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and, on 24 October, set out in a confidential letter to him his conclusions on possible arrangements for meeting the six "requirements" which would have to be studied if exploratory talks between the three Governments directly concerned were to be resumed. The Secretary-General stated that he understood that there should be no difficulty as regards (1) legal reaffirmation of all the obligations under the 1888 Convention and widening those obligations to cover the question of maximum of tolls; maintenance and development, and reporting to the United Nations; (2) the Canal Code and regulations, with revisions to be subject to consultation; (3) the question of tolls and charges and the reservation of a proportion for development, both of which would be subject to agreement; (4) the question of disputes between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government, which seemed fairly well covered by the sixth principle; and (5) the principle of organized co-operation between an Egyptian authority and the users. "Organized co-operation" required provision for necessary joint meetings between an organ on the Egyptian side and a representation of the users entitled to raise all matters affecting the users' rights or interests, for discussion and consultation or by way of complaint, but exercising its functions so as not to interfere with the administrative functions of the operating organ. Such organized co-operation would not give satisfaction to the first three "requirements" unless completed with arrangements for fact-finding, reconciliation, recourse to appropriate juridical settlement of possible disputes, and guarantees for execution of the results thereof. Suggested methods of juridical settlement included a standing local organ for arbitration, the International Court of Justice, the jurisdiction of which should in this case be mandatory, and the Security Council. Normal rules should apply concerning implementation of findings of a United Nations organ. The parties should undertake to carry out in good faith awards of organs of arbitration. "In case of a complaint because of alleged non-compliance with an award, the same arbitration organ which gave the award should register the fact of noncompliance. Such a 'constatation' would give the complaining party access to all normal forms of redress, but also the right to certain steps in self-protection, the possible scope of which would be subject to an agreement in principle."
If there were no objection in principle to that set of arrangements, the Secretary-General would, from a legal and technical point of view, consider the framework sufficiently wide to make a further exploration of a possible basis for negotiations along the lines indicated worth trying.
On 2 November, the Secretary-General received a reply to his letter of 24 October. In his reply the Egyptian Foreign Minister declared that, with the exception of the part referring to entitlement to certain action in self-protection quoted above, he shared the view of the Secretary-General that the framework was sufficiently wide for the purpose expressed.
On 3 November the Secretary-General circulated these letters, which represented in his opinion a significant further development in the consideration of the matter as initiated by the Security Council.
DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES
SECURITY COUNCIL., meetings 734-743 (meetings 739741 held in
private) .
S/3606, S/3611, S/3642. Letters of 6 and 28 June and 5 September 1956 from representative of Israel.
S/3645. Letters of 12 and 23 September 1956 from representatives of France and United Kingdom.
S/3648. Identical letters of 17 September 1956 from representatives of Lebanon and Syria.
S/3649. Letter of 15 September 1956 from representative of the USSR.
S/3650. Letter of 17 September 1956 from representative of Egypt.
S/3651. Letter of 17 September 1956 from Acting Permanent Representative of Jordan.
S/3652, S/3653. Letters of 19 and 20 September 1956 from Permanent Representative of Israel.
S/3654. Letter of 23 September 1956 from representatives of France and United Kingdom.
S/3656. Letter of 24 September 1956 from representative of Egypt.
S/3657, S/3663. Letters of 26 September and 3 October 1956 from representative of Israel.
S/3664. Letter of 4 October 1956 from representatives of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen;
S/3665. Letter of 5 October 1956 from representative of United Kingdom enclosing text of proposals of 18 Governments adopted at London Conference on 21 August 1956.
S/3666. France and United Kingdom draft resolution.
S/3668- Letter of 8 October 1956 from Secretary of State of United States.
S/3671. France and United Kingdom draft resolution.
S/3672. Yugoslavia draft resolution.
S/3673. Letter of 13 October 1956 from representative of Israel transmitting written statement.
S/3674. Letter of 13 October 1956 from representative of Syria transmitting written statement.
S/3675. Resolution, consisting of first part of draft resolution proposed by France and United Kingdom, S/3671, adopted unanimously by Council on 13 October 1956, meeting 743, after second part of draft, as amended orally, failed of adoption.
"The Security Council,
"Noting the declarations made before it and the accounts of the development of the exploratory conversations on the Suez question given by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, France and the United Kingdom "Agrees that any settlement of the Suez question should meet the following requirements:
(1) there should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert — this covers both political and technical aspects;
(2) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected
(3) the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country;
(4) the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users;
(5) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development;
(6) in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due."
S/3676. Letter of 13 October 1956 from representative of Saudi
Arabia transmitting written statement.
S/3679. Letter of 15 October 1956 from Foreign Minister of Egypt.
S/3680. Letter of 15 October 1956 from representative of Jordan
transmitting written statement.
S/3681. Letter of 15 October 1956 from representative of Yemen
transmitting written statement.
S/3683. Letter of 15 October 1956 from representative of Lebanon
transmitting written statement.
S/3684. Letter of 17 October 1956 from representative of Libya
transmitting written statement.
S/3728. Exchange of correspondence dated 3 November 1956 between
Secretary-General and Foreign Minister of Egypt.
INTERVENTION BY ISRAEL AND BY FRANCE AND UNITED KINGDOM IN
EGYPT: ACTION BY SECURITY COUNCIL AND FIRST EMERGENCY
SPECIAL SESSION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY
CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL (29-31 OCTOBER 1956)
On 29 October 1956, the United States informed the Security Council by letter that armed forces of Israel had penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation of the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt and requested an immediate meeting to consider "The Palestine question: Steps for the immediate cessation of the military action of Israel in Egypt". The Council considered the question at four meetings, between 30 October and 1 November, in which the representatives of Egypt and Israel participated.
The representative of the United States opened the morning meeting on 30 October by stating that his Government believed it imperative that the Council should act in the promptest manner to determine that a breach of the peace had occurred, to order that the military action undertaken by Israel should cease immediately and to make clear its view that the Israel armed forces should immediately withdraw behind the established Armistice Lines.
The Secretary-General then reported that, according to the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), Israel troops had crossed the international frontier and had occupied positions in Sinai in violation of the General Armistice Agreement and the Council's cease-fire order of 11 August 1949. The Chief of Staff had that morning requested the withdrawal of the troops and also a ceasefire, in which the concurrence of Egypt had been asked.
At the same meeting, the representative of Egypt stated that Israel had committed the most serious act of armed aggression since the conclusion of the Armistice Agreements between the Arab countries and Israel. He emphasized that the armed and unprovoked attack on Egypt, after Israel had ordered general mobilization, constituted an act of war and demonstrated beyond any doubt the aggressive and expansionist aims of Israel's policy.
The representative of Israel then stated that fedayeen units from Egypt had-creat d the latest breach of the peace by invading the territory of Israel from Egypt. On the evening of 29 October, Israel had taken security measures to eliminate the Egyptian fedayeen bases in the Sinai peninsula.
In a later intervention, he asserted that in recent months it had become apparent that the Arab Governments, and especially Egypt, had come to regard the fedayeen weapon, initially used in 1955, as an instrument not for mere harassment but for Israel's destruction. He rejected charges of aggression and asserted the sovereign right of self-defence.
The representative of the United Kingdom opened the 749th meeting on the afternoon of 30 October with a statement based upon remarks made that morning before the House of Commons by the British Prime Minister. Describing the tension that for some time past had been increasing on the frontiers of Israel, and pointing out that, unless hostilities could quickly be stopped, free passage through the Suez Canal would be jeopardized, he informed the Council that the United Kingdom and French Governments had that afternoon addressed urgent communications to Egypt and Israel, calling upon both sides to stop all warlike action by land, sea and air forthwith and to withdraw their military forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal. They had asked the Egyptian Government to agree that Anglo-French forces should move temporarily into key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. If, on the expiration of twelve hours, either or both Governments had not undertaken to comply with these requirements, British and French forces would intervene in whatever strength might be necessary to secure compliance.
Since the time limit was to expire the next morning, 31 October, the representative of Egypt requested an evening meeting of the Council to consider the act of aggression involved in the Anglo-French threat of force and the imminent danger of occupation of Egyptian territory.
Before the Council at the time was a draft resolution submitted by the United States whereby the Council would: (1) call for an immediate Israel withdrawal behind the established Armistice Lines; (2) call upon all Members to refrain from the use of force or threat of force in the area, to assist the United Nations in ensuring the integrity of the Armistice Agreements and to refrain from giving any military, economic or financial assistance to Israel so long as it had not complied with the resolution; and (3) request the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on compliance with the resolution and to make recommendations for the maintenance of international peace and security in the area.
The United States representative urged adoption of this draft resolution without delay to meet the situation created by the present military penetration of Egypt. He accepted a change suggested by several members to add another paragraph at the beginning of the text, whereby the Council would call upon "Israel and Egypt immediately to cease fire".
The majority of speakers welcomed the initiative of the United States representative and considered that it was the Council's urgent task to secure a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Israel forces from Egyptian territory.
The representative of France, however, opposed the draft resolution, and said that the Council could not condemn Israel in view of the openly affirmed Egyptian policy of annihilation of Israel, the expansion of Egyptian imperialism, open intervention in French internal affairs, direct material assistance to rebellious citizens and Egypt's illegal seizure of an essential international waterway. The French-British communications to Egypt and Israel were designed, he said, to secure effective separation of the belligerents and to guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal.
The United States draft resolution, as amended, received 7 votes in favour, 2 against, with 2 abstentions, but was not adopted because of the negative votes cast by two permanent members of the Council, France and the United Kingdom. (For voting details, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)
The USSR representative then introduced a draft resolution by which the Council would call upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind the established Armistice Lines. He accepted an amendment, proposed by China, adding a paragraph calling upon Israel and Egypt immediately to cease fire.
At the 750th meeting in the evening of 30 October, the USSR draft resolution, as amended, received 7 votes in favour, 2 against, with 2 abstentions, but was not adopted, owing to negative votes cast by two permanent members, France and the United Kingdom. (For voting details, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)
The Council, at that meeting, also had on its agenda a letter dated 30 October from the representative of Egypt about the communication of that date presented to Egypt by France and the United Kingdom. He declared that its authors seemed to have lost sight of the fact that the Suez Canal area and the Canal itself were an integral part of Egypt. Egypt had been the victim of Israel aggression, its territory had been invaded, and it had been obliged to use force. For the French and United Kingdom Governments to try unilaterally to settle a question already brought before the Security Council was an entirely unjustifiable violation of the Charter. Until the Council took the necessary measures, Egypt had no choice but to defend itself and to protect its rights against aggression.
Before the meeting adjourned, the representative of Yugoslavia suggested the possibility of calling an emergency session of the General Assembly under the terms of Assembly resolution 377 (V) on "Uniting for Peace", since the use of the veto had rendered the Council powerless in the face of a situation deteriorating by the minute.
When the Council resumed discussion the next afternoon, 31 October, reports had been received that French and British aircraft had begun air attacks against military targets in Egypt. The Suez Canal subsequently was blocked when Egypt sank ships in the Canal, closing it to navigation. The Secretary-General was the first speaker at the meeting. Stating that he would himself have called for a meeting of the Council had not the initiative already been taken, he declared that, as a servant of the Organization, he had the duty to maintain his usefulness by avoiding public stands on conflicts between Member nations unless and until such an action could help to resolve the conflict. However, the discretion and impartiality imposed on the Secretary-General by the character of his immediate task could not degenerate into a policy of expediency. He had also to be a servant of the principles of the Charter, and its aims must ultimately determine what for him was right and wrong. For that he must stand. He stated further that a Secretary-General could not serve on any other assumption than that — within the necessary limits of human frailty and honest differences of opinion — all Member nations honoured their pledge to observe all Articles of the Charter. He should also be able to assume that those organs which were charged with the task of upholding the Charter would be in a position to fulfil their task. He concluded that, were the Members to consider that another view of the duties of the Secretary-General than the one stated would better serve the interests of the Organization, it was their obvious right to act accordingly.
The representatives of France and the United Kingdom stated that the Egyptian Government had rejected the Franco-British communication of 30 October. As a consequence, the United Kingdom and French Governments had intervened. The action being taken was strictly limited to military targets, primarily airfields. The intervention had as its overriding purposes the safeguarding of the Suez Canal and the restoration of peaceful conditions in the Middle East. The intervention was a temporary measure. It was not aimed at the sovereignty of Egypt. The representative of the United Kingdom emphasized that he did not condone any Israel action aimed at the occupation of positions in Egyptian territory. In his view, Israel should withdraw its forces as soon as that could be satisfactorily arranged.
Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution whereby the Security Council, taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at its 749th and 750th meetings had prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, would call an emergency special session of the General Assembly, as provided in the Assembly's "Uniting for Peace" resolution (377(V)), in order to make appropriate recommendations.
The representatives of France and the United Kingdom both held that the draft resolution was out of order. The latter argued that no resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter on the substance of the item then before the Council had been submitted and voted upon, and therefore it could not be determined that the Council had failed to take a decision owing to the lack of unanimity of the permanent members, thus establishing the pre-condition of invoking the procedure of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. He also declared that neither of the two resolutions voted upon at the previous meetings could be invoked to support the Yugoslav proposal. After rejecting, by 6 votes to 4, with 1 abstention, the proposal of the United Kingdom that the draft resolution should be ruled out of order, the Council voted upon the Yugoslav draft resolution and adopted it by 7 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions.
ACTION AT GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S FIRST EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION
(31 OCTOBER-5 NOVEMBER 1956)
On 31 October 1956, the Secretary-General informed Member States of the Security Council's decision on that day to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly under the terms of Assembly resolution 377 (V). The Assembly convened on 1 November and adopted, by 62 votes to 2, with 7 abstentions, the agenda of the session: "Question considered by the Security Council at its 749th and 750th meetings held on 30 October 1956". The Assembly considered the question at seven plenary meetings between 1 and 10 November.
At the first meeting, the United States introduced a draft resolution according to which the General Assembly, inter alia, would: (1) urge as a matter of priority that all parties involved in hostilities in the area should agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area; (2) urge the parties to the Armistice Agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the Armistice Line, to desist from raids across the Armistice Line into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the Armistice Agreements; (3) recommend that all Member States should refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and, in general, refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution; (4) urge that, upon the cease-fire being effective, steps should be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation; (5) request the Secretary-General to observe and report promptly on compliance with the resolution to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, for such further action as they might deem appropriate in accordance with the Charter.
In the early hours of 2 November, the Assembly, by a roll-call vote of 64 to 5, with 6 abstentions, adopted the United States draft resolution as resolution 997 (ES-I).
In pursuance of paragraph 5 of this resolution, the Secretary-General reported, on 3 November, that the Egyptian Government had accepted the resolution, stating that it could not implement the resolution in case attacking armies continued their aggression. He reported, further, that the Governments of France and the United Kingdom continued to maintain their view that police action must be carried through urgently to stop the hostilities which were now threatening the Suez Canal, to prevent a resumption of those hostilities and to pave the way for a definitive settlement of the Arab-Israel war which threatened the legitimate interests of so many countries. They would stop military action provided that, among other things, the Egyptian and the Israel Governments agreed to accept a United Nations force to keep the peace, the Force to be established and maintained until an Arab-Israel peace settlement was reached and satisfactory arrangements agreed upon in regard to the Suez Canal, both agreements to be guaranteed by the United Nations. The Secretary-General reported further that the Gaza Strip and the Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sinafir had been occupied by Israel military forces, and that air operations over Egyptian territory had continued without interruption.
At the same meeting, the representative of Israel declared that his Government had empowered him to announce that Israel agreed to an immediate cease-fire provided a similar answer was forthcoming from Egypt.
India, jointly with 18 other African and Asian countries, submitted a draft resolution according to which the General Assembly, noting with regret that not all the parties concerned had yet agreed to comply with resolution 997 (ES-I), would: (1) reaffirm that resolution and once again call upon the parties immediately to comply with its provisions; (2) authorize the Secretary-General immediately to arrange with the parties concerned for the implementation of the cease-fire and the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area and request him to report compliance, not later than twelve hours from the time of adoption of the resolution; (3) request the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Chief of Staff and the members of UNTSO, to obtain compliance of the withdrawal of all forces behind the Armistice Lines.
Canada also submitted a draft resolution, by which, as amended, the Assembly, bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with resolution 997 (ES-I), would request the Secretary-General to submit within 48 hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of that resolution.
Earlier in the evening of 3 November, the United States representative had submitted two comprehensive draft resolutions, one regarding the settlement of the major problems outstanding between the Arab States and Israel, and the other regarding the settlement of the Suez Canal question. Since these were long-range questions, he now asked that priority should be given to the Canadian draft resolution concerning an emergency international force.
The Canadian and the 19-Power draft resolutions were put to the vote in the early morning of 4 November. The former was adopted by 57 votes to 0, with 19 abstentions, as resolution 998(ES-I); the latter was adopted by 59 votes to 5, with 12 abstentions, as resolution 999 (ES-I).
On 4 November, the Secretary-General, reporting on implementation of the resolutions of 2 and 4 November 1956, stated that, in response to demarches made on the basis of resolution 999(ES-I), he had as yet received a reply from only one of the four Governments directly concerned, the Government of Egypt, which said it accepted the cease-fire resolution of 4 November 1956.
The Secretary-General also reported that the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had advised that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Israel had informed him, on 4 November, that the General Armistice Agreement no longer had validity and that he had been asked to order UNTSO personnel out of the Gaza area. Such an order would have been contrary to the instructions he had from the Secretary-General.
In a reply to the Secretary-General, on the same day, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel requested clarification on whether the Government of Egypt: (1) had unequivocally agreed to a cease-fire; (2) still maintained that it was in a state of war with Israel; (3) was prepared to negotiate with Israel with a view to the establishment of peace; (4) agreed to cease its economic boycott against Israel; and (5) agreed to recall the fedayeen gangs under its control in other Arab countries.
Also on 4 November, the Secretary-General submitted a first report on the plan for an emergency international United Nations force requested in resolution 998 (ES-I). He reported his conclusion that, without waiting for his final report, the Assembly should decide that a United Nations Command for "an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms" of its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956 should be established; that the Assembly should further appoint, on an emergency basis, Major-General Burns, at present Chief of Staff of UNTSO, to be Chief of the new Command; that General Burns, in that capacity, should be authorized immediately to organize the necessary staff of officers by recruitment from the observer corps of UNTSO and, in consultation with the Secretary-General, from various Member States, drawn from countries which were not permanent members of the Security Council. In the continuing consultations on setting up a United Nations force, he would endeavour to develop a plan by which, as a matter of principle, troops should not be drawn from countries which were permanent members of the Council.
A draft resolution was submitted the same day by Canada, Colombia and Norway whereby the General Assembly would note with satisfaction this first report of the Secretary-General and establish a United Nations Command for an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November, and authorize immediate recruitment of officers by General Burns, who was appointed Commander. The draft resolution was adopted the next day, 5 November, by 57 votes to 0, with 19 abstentions, as resolution 1000 (ES–I).
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION OF 2 NOVEMBER 1956;
USSR REQUEST FOR COUNCIL CONSIDERATION
On 5 November 1956, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council to discuss "Non-compliance by the United Kingdom, France and Israel with the decision of the emergency special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 2 November 1956 and immediate steps to halt the aggression of the aforesaid States against Egypt". He submitted a draft resolution whereby the Council, noting the fact that resolution 997 (ES-I) of the emergency special session of 2 November 1956 had not been observed by the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and Israel, and proposing that the aforesaid Governments should immediately and not later than twelve hours after the adoption of the resolution cease all military action against Egypt and withdraw within three days their troops from Egypt, would, in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter, consider it essential that all Members of the United Nations, especially the United States and the USSR, as permanent members of the Security Council having powerful air and naval forces at their disposal, should give military and other assistance to Egypt by sending armed forces, volunteers, military instructors and other forms of assistance, if the United Kingdom, France and Israel failed to carry out that resolution within the stated time limits.
Before the Council convened that same evening, the Governments of France and the United Kingdom had informed the Secretary-General, in replies to the request for a cease-fire, that they warmly welcomed the idea of interposing an international force between Israel and Egypt to prevent the continuance of hostilities between them, to secure the speedy withdrawal of Israel forces, to take the necessary measures to remove obstructions and restore traffic through the Canal, and to promote a settlement of the problems of the area. As soon as the Israel and Egyptian Governments signified acceptance of, and the United Nations endorsed a plan for, an international force with the above functions, the two Governments, it was stated, would cease all military action.
At the opening of the evening meeting, the Secretary-General informed the Council on the status of his efforts to achieve a cease-fire, which he considered of significance to its considerations. After referring to the United Kingdom and French replies mentioned above, he stated that, by the adoption of resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November, providing for the establishment of a United Nations Command, the Assembly had taken the first decisive step in the implementation of its previous acceptance in principle of a United Nations force to secure cessation of hostilities under all the terms established in resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November on that subject. The Government of Egypt had accepted the Assembly's resolution of 5 November, and might thus be considered as having accepted the establishment of an international force under terms fixed by the United Nations. The Government of Egypt had further accepted the request for a cease-fire without any attached conditions. He added that he had received a further statement from the Government of Israel to the effect that, in the light of Egypt's declaration of willingness to cease fire, Israel wished to confirm its readiness to agree to a cease-fire. The conditions for a general cease-fire would thus, it seemed to him, depend on the possibility of an agreement concerning the plan for an international force. He hoped to present such a plan to the Assembly the next day.
After a brief discussion on the question of the adoption of the agenda, the Council rejected, by 4 votes (Australia, France, United Kingdom, United States) to 3 (Iran, USSR, Yugoslavia), with 4 abstentions (Belgium, China, Cuba, Peru), the adoption of the item proposed by the USSR.
After the vote, several representatives referred to the military action undertaken by the USSR against the people of Hungary and termed the USSR proposal unthinkable. The representatives of Belgium, China, Cuba, Peru and the United States shared the view that consideration of that proposal would only hamper the peace-making process in Egypt which the Assembly in special emergency session had initiated and which was being actively dealt with by the Assembly and the Secretary-General.
FURTHER ASSEMBLY ACTION (5-10 NOVEMBER 1956)
In a further communication of 5 November, Israel informed the Secretary-General that it agreed unconditionally to cease fire and that, since morning, all fighting had ceased between Israel and Egyptian forces.
By 2 November, virtually the whole Sinai peninsula had come under Israel control, Gaza having been occupied on 1 November. The Israel armed forces had occupied the Egyptian positions at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba on 4-5 November.
On the morning of the same day, Anglo-French landings had taken place in the Port Said area at the northern entrance to the Canal. Before the Security Council meeting on 5 November the Secretary-General had, in the light of the other developments, addressed an aide-mémoire to the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, regarding an Anglo-French cease-fire. Replies to this aide-mémoire were received on 6 November. In those replies, the representatives of the United Kingdom and France stated that their Governments would agree to stop further military operations if the Secretary-General would confirm that Israel and Egypt had accepted an unconditional cease-fire, and that the international force to be set up would be competent to secure the objectives of resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November. They proposed that technicians accompanying the Franco-British force should begin at once the urgent task of clearing the Canal. Pending confirmation, their forces, unless attacked, would be ordered to cease fire at midnight 6-7 November.
In a letter of 7 November, the Secretary-General gave the assurances requested in their communications. A cease-fire had then taken effect, after the Anglo-French forces had occupied Port Said and Port Fuad. In his letter, the Secretary-General called attention to a reported statement by the Prime Minister of Israel on that date that the Armistice Lines between Israel and Egypt had no validity and that Israel would not agree to the stationing of a foreign force, no matter how called, in its territory or in any of the areas occupied by it. Regarding the Suez Canal, the Secretary-General added that he was exploring the possibility of having the work carried out under United Nations auspices.
At the meeting of the Assembly on 7 November, the Secretary-General submitted his second report on the requested plan for an emergency international United Nations Force. In its decision on the establishment of the United Nations Command on 5 November 1956, the Assembly had decided, the Secretary-General noted, that a force should be set up on the basis of principles reflected in the constitution of the United Nations itself, with its responsible officers appointed, like the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, by the United Nations and fully independent of the policies of any nation.
The recruitment procedure for officers authorized in resolution 1000 (ES-I) afforded an important indication of the character of the Force to be set up. On the one hand, the independence of the Chief of Command in recruiting officers had been recognized. On the other hand, the principle had been established that the Force should be recruited from Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council. Analysis of the concept of the United Nations Force also indicated that the Assembly intended that the Force should be of a temporary nature, the length of its assignment being determined by the needs arising out of the present conflict. It was further clear that the General Assembly, in its resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956, by the reference to its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November, had wished to reserve for itself the full determination of the tasks of the Emergency Force, and of the legal basis on which it must function. It followed from its terms of reference that there was no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the present conflict and, thereby, the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict. By the establishment of the Force, therefore, the General Assembly had not taken a stand in relation to aims other than those which were clearly and fully indicated in its resolution 997 ES-I) of 2 November.
Functioning, as it would, on the basis of a decision reached under the terms of resolution 337 (V), on "Uniting for Peace", the stationing and operations of the Force, if established, would be limited to the extent that consent of the Governments of the countries concerned was required under generally recognized international law. The Secretary-General stated, further, that there was an obvious difference between establishing the Force in order to secure the cessation of hostilities, with a withdrawal of forces, and establishing such a Force with a view to enforcing a withdrawal of forces.
As to the functions of the Force, the Secretary-General stated that in accordance with resolution 997 (ES-I) they would be, when a cease-fire was established, to enter Egyptian territory, with the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in that resolution. The Force obviously should have no rights other than those necessary for the execution of its functions, in co-operation with local authorities. It would be more than an observers' corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it was stationed; nor, moreover, should the Force have military functions exceeding those necessary to secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that the parties to the conflict took all necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly. Its functions could, on that basis, be assumed to cover an area extending roughly from the Suez Canal to the Armistice Demarcation Lines established in the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel.
Referring to the questions of size and organization of the Force, the Secretary-General reported that general experience seemed to indicate that it was desirable that countries participating in the Force should provide self-contained units in order to avoid the loss of time and efficiency which was unavoidable when new units were set up through joining together small groups of different nationalities. Initially, the Force would have to be composed of a few units of battalion strength. It was his endeavour in the approaches to Governments to build a panel sufficiently broad to permit such a choice of units as would provide for a balanced composition. Attached to the Secretary-General's report as annexes were offers of participation in the Force from six Member States. Subsequently, eighteen other such offers of participation were made in addition to three offers of logistical support.
As regards the question of financing the Force, the Secretary-General reported that it required further study, but a basic rule which, at least, could be applied provisionally would be that a nation providing a unit would be responsible for all costs for equipment and salaries, while all other costs should be financed outside the normal budget of the United Nations.
Finally, the Secretary-General suggested that an advisory committee to the Secretary-General should be established to consider matters left open and for questions relating to the operations.
The Secretary-General later replied to requests for clarification made during the debate. The representative of Syria had expressed the fear that, in case of non-compliance by Israel with the request for the withdrawal of forces behind the Armistice Demarcation Line, there might arise, on the basis of the position taken in his report, a situation where Egypt would be presented with a fait accompli, as the United Nations Force was not at present established with a view to enforcing the withdrawal of forces. The Secretary-General replied that, were that unfortunate situation to arise, he would consider it his duty to bring it at once to the attention of the General Assembly or of the Security Council.
In reply to a further question, the Secretary-General stated that it followed, in his view, from resolution 997 (ES-I) that all non-Egyptian forces — with the exception of the United Nations Force, which would be there with the consent of the Egyptian Government — had to withdraw from Egyptian territory, "Egyptian territory" in that context being understood in the sense which followed from international law and the Armistice Agreement.
As to his indication of the area within which the United Nations Force would have to operate, he had meant that the Force would have to come in at what was at present the dividing line between the Egyptian and Israel forces. It was at whatever might come to be the dividing line that it would have to function. That meant that United Nations activities would have to start close to the Suez Canal, but that after the expected compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly they would end up at the Armistice Demarcation Line.
At the same meeting, Denmark introduced a draft resolution in the name of Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia and Sweden, according to which, as later amended, the General Assembly, recalling its resolutions of 2, 4 and 5 November 1956, and noting with appreciation the second and final report of the Secretary-General, would: (1) express its approval of the guiding principles for the organization and functioning of the Force as expounded in that report; (2) concur in the definition of the functions of the Force as stated; (3) invite the Secretary-General to continue discussions with Member Governments concerning offers of participation in the Force, toward the objective of its balanced composition; (4) request the Chief of Command, in consultation with the Secretary-General as regards size and composition, to proceed forthwith with the full organization of the Force; (5) approve, provisionally, the basic rule concerning the financing of the Force laid down in the report; (6) establish an Advisory Committee composed of one representative from each of the following countries: Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan, and request the Committee, whose Chairman should be the Secretary-General, to undertake the development of those aspects of the planning for the Force and its operation not already dealt with by the Assembly and which did not fall within the area of the direct responsibility of the Chief of Command; (7) authorize the Secretary-General to issue all regulations and instructions which might be essential to the effective functioning of the Force, following consultation with the Advisory Committee, and to take all other necessary administrative and executive actions; (8) determine that, following the fulfilment of the immediate responsibilities defined for it in points (6) and (7), the Advisory Committee should continue to assist the Secretary-General in the responsibilities falling to him under the present and other relevant resolutions; (9) decide that the Advisory Committee, in the performance of its duties, should be empowered to request, through the usual procedure, the convening of the Assembly and to report to it whenever matters arose which, in its opinion, were of such urgency and importance as to require their consideration; and (10) request all Member States to afford assistance as necessary to the United Nations Command in the performance of its functions, including arrangements for passage to and from the area involved.
Poland proposed the inclusion of Czechoslovakia in the list of members of the Advisory Committee. The Polish amendment was rejected by 31 votes to 23, with 14 abstentions.
The seven-Power draft resolution, as amended, was adopted on 7 November by 64 votes to 0, with 12 abstentions, as resolution 1001 (ES-I).
The representative of the USSR, in explaining his vote, commented that, as regards the creation and stationing on Egyptian territory of an international police force, the Soviet delegation was obliged to point out that the Force was being created in violation of the United Nations Charter. He cited Chapter VII of the Charter as empowering only the Security Council, not the General Assembly, to set up an international armed force and to take such action as it deemed necessary.
Another draft resolution was introduced on 7 November by the representative of Ceylon on behalf of nineteen African-Asian nations, whereby the Assembly would: (1) reaffirm its resolutions of 2, 4 and 5 November; (2) call upon Israel once again to withdraw immediately all its forces behind the armistice lines established by the Armistice Agreement; (3) call upon the United Kingdom and France once again immediately to withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory, consistently with the above-mentioned resolutions; (4) and request the Secretary-General promptly to report on compliance with the resolution.
The 19-Power draft resolution was adopted on the same day by a roll-call vote of 65 to 1, with 10 abstentions, as resolution 1002 (ES-I).
By a letter dated 8 November, the representative of Israel informed the Secretary-General that his Government would withdraw its forces from Egypt immediately after the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connection with the Emergency International Force, while at the same time urgently requesting the United Nations to call upon Egypt for an affirmative response to the last four questions posed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel in her reply of 4 November to the Secretary-General.
On 10 November, a draft resolution by the United States was circulated whereby the General Assembly would: (1) decide to place on the provisional agenda of the eleventh regular session (to open on 12 November) as a matter of priority the question on the agenda of its first emergency special session; (2) refer to that session for its consideration the records of the meetings and the documents of the first emergency special session; and (3) request it to give urgent consideration to the United States draft resolutions on the Palestine and Suez Canal questions. The draft resolution, as amended by the United States representative to delete point (3), was adopted by a roll-call vote of 66 to 0, with 2 abstentions, as resolution 1003 (ES-I) .
DOCUMENTATARY REFERENCES
CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL (29-31 OCTOBER 1966)
SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 748-751.
S/3706. Letter of 29 October 1956 from representative of United States.
S/3707. Cable of 30 October 1956 from Permanent Representative of Jordan.
S/3710. United States draft resolution. Failed to be adopted by Council, 30 October 1956, meeting 749, owing to negative votes of permanent members. The vote was 7 in favour, 2 against, with 2 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: China, Cuba, Iran, Peru, USSR, United States,
Yugoslavia.
Against: France, United Kingdom.
Abstaining: Australia, Belgium.
S/3711. Letter of 30 October 1956 from representative of United Kingdom, transmitting text of statement by Sir Anthony Eden.
S/3712. Letter of 30 October 1956 from representative of Egypt.
S/3717 and Rev.1. USSR draft resolution and revision. Failed to be adopted by Council, 30 October 1956, meeting 750, owing to negative votes of permanent members. The vote was 7 in favour, 2 against, with 2 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Australia, China, Cuba, Iran, Peru USSR, Yugoslavia.
Against: France, United Kingdom.
Abstaining: Belgium, United States.
S/3718. Letter of 31 October 1956 from representative of Norway.
S/3719. Yugoslavia draft resolution.
S/3720. Letter of 31 October 1956 from representative of India.
S/3721. Resolution as submitted by Yugoslavia S/3719, adopted by Security Council on 31 October, meeting 751, by 7 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: China, Cuba, Iran, Peru, USSR, United States,
Yugoslavia.
Against: France, United Kingdom.
Abstaining: Australia, Belgium.
"The Security Council
"Considering that a grave situation has been created by action undertaken against Egypt;
"Taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at the 749th and 750th meetings of the Security Council has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;
"Decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly as provided in the General Assembly's resolution 377 (V) in order to make appropriate recommendations."
ACTION AT GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S FIRST EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION
(31 OCTOBER – 5 NOVEMBER 1956 )
GENERAL ASSEMBLY – IST EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION
PLENARY MEETINGS, 561-563, 565.
A/3213. Note by Secretary-General. Summoning of 1st emergency special session of Assembly.
A/3214. Provisional agenda.
A/3215-3250, A/3252-3255, A/3257-3265, A/3271. Letters and cables of 31 October and I November 1956 from following Governments: Argentina, Guatemala, Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, Pakistan, Ceylon, Iran, India, Egypt, Lebanon, Greece, Yugoslavia, Nicaragua, Jordan, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Poland, Sweden, Nepal, Costa Rica, Paraguay USSR, Norway, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Syria, Romania, Albania, United States, Liberia Bulgaria, Philippines, Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia Burma, Ecuador, Honduras, Uruguay, Ethiopia Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Mexico, Thailand, Hungary, Haiti, Panama.
A/3256. United States draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 997 (ES-l), as proposed by United States, A/3256, adopted by Assembly on 2 November 1956, meeting 662, by roll-call vote of 64 to 5, with 6 abstentions. The vote was as follows:
"The General Assembly,
"Noting the disregard on many occasions by parties to the Israel-Arab armistice agreements of 1949 of the terms of such agreements, and that the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949,
"Noting that armed forces of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are conducting military operations against Egyptian territory,
"Noting that traffic through the Suez Canal is now interrupted to the serious prejudice of many nations,
"Expressing its grave concern over these developments
"1. Urges as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area;
"2. Urges the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements;
"3. Recommends that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution;
"4. Urges that, upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation;
"5. Requests the Secretary-General to observe and report promptly on the compliance with the present resolution to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, for such further action as they may deem appropriate in accordance with the Charter;
"6. Decides to remain in emergency session pending compliance with the present resolution."
A/3266. Aide-mémoire of 2 November 1956 from Permanent
Representative of Egypt.
A/3267. Report of Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of
resolution 997 (ES-I). Annex: communication from representative
of UNTSO in Cairo.
A/3268. Letter of 3 November 1956 from Alternate Permanent
Representative of France.
A/3269. Letter of 3 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of
United Kingdom.
A/3270. Note by Secretary-General, transmitting text of identical
communications from Permanent Representative of Egypt.
A/3272. United States draft resolution.
A/3273. United States draft resolution.
A/3274. Letter of 3 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of
United Kingdom, and statement issued by Ministry of Defence in
London on 3 November 1956.
A/3275. Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Yemen draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 999 (ES-I), as submitted by 19 Powers, A/3275, adopted by Assembly on 4 November 1956, meeting 563, by roll-call vote of 59 to 5, with 12 abstentions, as follows:
"The General Assembly,
"Noting with regret that not all the parties concerned have yet agreed to comply with the provisions of its resolution 997(ES-I) of 2 November 1956,
"Noting the special priority given in that resolution to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, to the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area,
"Noting further that the resolution urged the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements,
"1. Reaffirms its resolution 997(ES-I), and once again calls upon the parties immediately to comply with the provisions of the said resolution;
"2. Authorizes the Secretary-General immediately to arrange with the parties concerned for the implementation of the cease-fire and the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area, and requests him to report compliance forthwith and, in any case, not later than twelve hours from the time of adoption of the present resolution;
"3. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Chief of Staff and the members of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, to obtain compliance of the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines;
"4. Decides to meet again immediately on receipt of the Secretary-General's report referred to in paragraph 2 of the present resolution."
A/3276. Canada draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 998 (ES-1), as submitted by Canada, A/3276, adopted by Assembly on 4 November 1956, meeting 563, by roll-call vote of 57 to 0, with 19 abstentions, as follows:
"The General Assembly,
"Bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with its resolution 997( ES-I) of 2 November 1956,
"Requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned resolution."
A/3277. Letter of 3 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of
Israel.
A/3278. Letter of 3 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of
Syria.
A/3279. Aide-mémoire of 3 November 1956 from Permanent
Representative of Israel.
A/3282. Letter of 4 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of
United Kingdom.
A/3283. Cable of 4 November 1956 from Director General of UNRWA.
A/3284. Second report of Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of resolution 997 (ES-I).
A/3287. Report of Secretary-General on communications with the four Governments on implementation of resolutions 997(ES-I) and 999(ES-I) of 2 and 4 November 1956, respectively. Annexes I-IV: Cables of I November 1956 from Secretary-General to Egypt, France, Israel and United Kingdom, and reply of Egypt, 4 November 1956.
A/3288. Letter of 4 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of Egypt.
A/3289. First report of Secretary-General on plan for emergency international United Nations force requested in resolution 998(ES-I) of 4 November 1956.
A/3290. Canada, Colombia, Norway draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 1000 (ES-I), as submitted by three Powers, A/3290, adopted by Assembly on 5 November 1956, meeting 565, by roll-call vote of 57 to 0 with 19 abstentions, as follows:
"The General Assembly,
"Having requested the Secretary-General, in its resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956, to submit to it a plan for an emergency international United Nations Force, for the purposes stated,
"Noting with satisfaction the first report of the Secretary-General on the plan, and having in mind particularly paragraph 4 of that report,
"1. Establishes a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-1) of 2 November 1956:
"2. Appoints, on an emergency basis, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Major-General E. L. M. Burns, as Chief of the Command;
"3. Authorizes the Chief of the Command immediately to recruit, from the observer corps of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, a limited number of officers who shall be nationals of countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council, and further authorizes him, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to undertake the recruitment directly, from various Member States other than the permanent members of the Security Council, of the additional number of officers needed;
"4. Invites the Secretary-General to take such administrative measures as may be necessary for the prompt execution of the actions envisaged in the present resolution."
A/3317. Confirmation of appointment of Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns as Chief of United Nations Command for Emergency International Force.
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION; USSR REQUEST FOR
COUNCIL CONSIDERATION
A/3291. Letter of 4 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of Israel.
A/3293. Letter of 5 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of United Kingdom.
A/3294. Letter of 5 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of France.
A/3295. Cable of 5 November 1956 from Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt.
A/3296. Third report of Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of resolution 997(ES-I). Annex: Cable of 5 November 1956 from General Burns.
A/3297. Letter of 5 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of Israel.
A/3298. Letter of 5 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of USSR, transmitting note of 4 November 1956 from USSR Government to United Kingdom.
SECURITY COUNCIL, meeting 755.
S/3736. Cable of 5 November from Minister of Foreign Affairs of USSR, and draft resolution (rejected).
FURTHER ASSEMBLY ACTION (5-10 NOVEMBER 1956)
GENERAL ASSEMBLY – 1ST EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION
PLENARY MEETINGS, 566, 567, 572.
A/3292. Letter of 5 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of Egypt.
A/3299. Letter of 5 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of United Kingdom.
A/3301. Letter of 5 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of Israel.
A/3303. Letter of 6 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia.
A/3304, A/3305. Letters of 6 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of Egypt.
A/3306. Letter of 6 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of United Kingdom.
A/3307 Letter of 6 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of France.
A/3310. Note by Secretary-General circulating aide-mémoire (communication referred to in first paragraph of messages received by Secretary-General on 6 November, A/3306 and A/3307).
A/3312. Cable of 7 November 1956 from Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt.
A/3313. Letter of 7 November 1956 from Secretary-General to Minister of Foreign Affairs of France.
A/3314. Letter of 7 November from Secretary-General to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of United Kingdom.
A/3302 and Add.1-30 and Add.4/Rev.1. Second and final report of Secretary-General on plan for emergency international United Nations force requested in resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956. Annexes and addenda giving replies of following Governments: Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Finland, Ceylon, India, Czechoslovakia, Romania, New Zealand, United States, Burma, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Iran, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Ecuador, Philippines, Peru, Afghanistan, Laos, Chile, Switzerland, Italy.
A/3308. Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Sweden draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 1001 (ES-I), as submitted by seven Powers, A/3308, and with amendments proposed by Australia, Iran and Denmark, adopted by Assembly on 7 November 1956, meeting 567, by roll-call vote of 64 to 0, with 12 abstentions, as follows:
"The General Assembly,
"Recalling its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956 concerning the cease-fire, withdrawal of troops and other matters related to the military operations in Egyptian territory, as well as its resolution 998(ES-I) of 4 November 1956 concerning the request to the Secretary-General to submit a plan for an emergency international United Nations Force,
"Having established by its resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force, having appointed the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization as Chief of the Command with authorization to him to begin the recruitment of officers for the Command, and having invited the Secretary-General to take administrative measures necessary for the prompt execution of that resolution,
"Noting with appreciation the second and final report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an emergency international United Nations Force as requested in General Assembly resolution 998 (ES-I), and having examined that plan,
"1. Expresses its approval of the guiding principles for the organization and functioning of the emergency international United Nations Force as expounded in paragraphs 6 to 9 of the Secretary-General's report;
"2. Concurs in the definition of the functions of the Force as stated in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report;
"3. Invites the Secretary-General to continue discussions with Governments of Member States concerning offers of participation in the Force, toward the objective of its balanced composition;
"4. Requests the Chief of the Command, in consultation with the Secretary-General as regards size and composition, to proceed forthwith with the full organization of the Force;
"5. Approves provisionally the basic rule concerning the financing of the Force laid down in paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's report;
"6. Establishes an Advisory Committee composed of one representative from each of the following countries: Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway, and Pakistan, and requests this Committee, whose Chairman shall be the Secretary-General, to undertake the development of those aspects of the planning for the Force and its operation not already dealt with by the General Assembly and which do not fall within the area of the direct responsibility of the Chief of the Command;
"7. Authorizes the Secretary-General to issue all regulations and instructions which may be essential to the effective functioning of the Force, following consultation with the Committee aforementioned, and to take all other necessary administrative and executive action;
"8. Determines that, following the fulfilment of the immediate responsibilities defined for it in operative paragraphs 6 and 7 above, the Advisory Committee shall continue to assist the Secretary-General in the responsibilities falling to him under the present and other relevant resolutions;
"9. Decides that the Advisory Committee, in the performance of its duties, shall be empowered to request, through the usual procedures, the convening of the General Assembly and to report to the Assembly whenever matters arise which, in its opinion, are of such urgency and importance as to require consideration by the General Assembly itself;
"10. Requests all Member States to afford assistance as necessary to the United Nations Command in the performance of its functions, including arrangements for passage to and from the area involved."
A/3309. Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Yemen draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 1002 (ES-I), as submitted by 19 Powers, A/3309, adopted by Assembly on 7 November 1956, meeting 567, by roll-call vote of 65 to 1, with 10 abstentions, as follows:
"The General Assembly,
"Recalling its resolutions 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, 998 (ES-I) and 999 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956 and 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956, adopted by overwhelming majorities,
"Noting in particular that the General Assembly, by its resolution 1000 (ES-I), established a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in acordance with all the terms of its resolution 997 (ES-I),
"1. Reaffirms the above-mentioned resolutions;
"2. Calls once again upon Israel immediately to withdraw all its forces behind the armistice lines established by the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949;
"3. Calls once again upon the United Kingdom and France immediately to withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory, consistently with the above-mentioned resolutions;
"4. Urges the Secretary-General to communicate the present resolution to the parties concerned, and requests him promptly to report to the General Assembly on the compliance with this resolution."
A/3320. Letter of 8 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of Israel transmitting message from Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel.
A/3329. United States draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 1003 (ES-I), as submitted by United States, A/3329, and as amended by sponsor, adopted by Assembly on 10 November 1956, meeting 572, by 66 votes to 0, with 2 abstentions.
"The General Assembly,
"1. Decides to place on the provisional agenda of its eleventh regular session, as a matter of priority, the question on the agenda of its first emergency special session;
"2. Refers to its eleventh regular session, for consideration, the records of the meetings and the documents of its first emergency special session;
"3. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraph 1 above, the first emergency special session may continue to consider the question, if necessary, prior to the eleventh regular session of the Assembly."
ACTION AT GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S ELEVENTH SESSION FOR WITHDRAWAL
OF ISRAELI FRENCH AND UNITED KINGDOM FORCES AND FOR
PROMOTING PEACEFUL CONDITIONS IN PALESTINE AREA
RENEWED CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL, 24 NOVEMBER 1956
On 13 November, the General Assembly decided, without objection, to consider directly in plenary meeting the question considered by its first emergecy special session between 1 and 10 November. The Assembly discussed various phases of the question at four groups of meetings between 23 November 1956 and 8 March 1957: seven meetings between 23 and 27 November; five between 18 and 21 December 1956; twelve meetings between 17 January and 2 February 1957; and nine between 22 February and 8 March.
Between 15 and 18 November 1956, the Secretary-General visited Italy and Egypt and held conversations in Cairo with the President and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt. The results of these conversations were put before the Assembly on 23 November in reports to which further reference is made below. An aide-mémoire from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt of 17 November noted that in the conversations in Cairo attention had been called to the fact that, 13 days after the latest Assembly resolution calling for withdrawal, the armed forces of France, the United Kingdom and Israel had not only not withdrawn from Egyptian territory but had consolidated their positions. Attention had also been called to provocative acts by those forces in the Port Said and Suez Canal area. A letter from the representative of Egypt dated 21 November subsequently drew attention to continuing actions by the Anglo-French forces against the civilian population of Port Said.
The Secretary-General, in a report dated 21 November, stated that, in compliance with resolutions 997 and 1002 (ES-I), he had on 19 November orally requested the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and Israel to inform him of the status of their compliance with those resolutions. While all three Governments had reported that they were strictly observing the cease-fire despite certain breaches by Egypt, France had reported on 21 November a partial withdrawal and expressed readiness to withdraw when the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was in a position to function. The United Kingdom reply, of the same date, had stated that no significant withdrawal had yet taken place, though it had been agreed that a unit of UNEF would that day enter Port Said and, as an indication of its intentions, the United Kingdom Government was withdrawing at once one infantry battalion from Port Said. As UNEF became effective, other withdrawals would take place. Israel had reported withdrawal of its forces for varying distances, along the entire Egyptian front, and also the withdrawal since 7 November of the equivalent of two infantry brigades from Egyptian territory into Israel. Israel had reiterated its position of 8 November that it would withdraw from Egypt immediately upon the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements in connexion with the international Force, those arrangements to include insurance of Israel's security against the danger of attack and acts of belligerency, and satisfactory information on the method proposed for the discharge of all the functions of UNEF. Israel had stated that it had not yet had the opportunity of discussing those arrangements with the United Nations.
On 21 November, 22 Asian-African States, in view of the reported deteriorating situation in the Gaza Strip, requested urgent action to secure the withdrawal of Israel forces and to provide relief to the population of the area. In an enquiry to Israel on the situation, the Secretary-General repeated an earlier request that observers from UNEF should be permitted to function as authorized by the Assembly within the Gaza area. Israel stated, in reply, that on 10 and 12 November Egyptian-instigated riots had taken place in Gaza resulting in casualties, but that tranquillity had been restored and civilian services, including relief activities, were functioning normally. The Secretary-General accepted an invitation to send a personal representative to Gaza to report on the situation.
Before the Assembly began its discussion of the problem on 23 November, the Secretary-General had, on the basis of his conversations in Cairo, submitted three reports on problems connected with UNEF and on arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal. These reports are discussed below.
The Assembly had before it on 23 November a draft resolution sponsored by 21 Asian-African Powers under which, having received the Secretary-General's report on compliance with the resolutions of 2 and 7 November (A/3384), the Assembly would: (1) note with grave concern that its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawal had not been complied with; and (2) reiterate its call for compliance forthwith. A revision was introduced on 24 November on behalf of the same sponsors except Egypt, in which the original first operative paragraph was replaced by one whereby the Assembly would note with regret that two-thirds of the French forces remained in Egyptian territory, that all the United Kingdom forces remained, although arrangements were being made for the withdrawal of one battalion, and that no Israel forces had been withdrawn behind the Armistice Lines though a considerable time had elapsed.
After a Belgian amendment had been rejected, the Assembly adopted the revised 20-Power draft resolution the same day by 63 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions, as resolution 1120 (XI).
During the discussion, many representatives emphasized the possibly serious consequences of any delay in the withdrawa1 and declared that it could not be made dependent on conditions such as linking it with the competence of UNEF. Clearing the Suez Canal was an urgent necessity and withdrawa1 was a prerequisite to clearance operations, and indeed to the solution of other basic problems. Some did not believe that the beginning of the clearing process must await completion of the withdrawals which, in their understanding, would be phased with the arrival of UNEF.
The representative of Egypt demanded immediate unconditional withdrawal within a very few days and declared it was impossible to conceive of any Canal clearance so long as the invading Powers remained in Egypt. He said that the Government of Egypt would, with the assistance of the United Nations, assume the clearance work in pursuance of Assembly resolution 1121 (ES-I) of 24 November and of the agreements which would be concluded between the Secretary-General and the Government of Egypt. Commenting on the importance of the precedent being created by UNEF, he declared his Government's understanding that UNEF could operate in Egypt only with Egypt's consent. The Force was in Egypt to put an end to the aggression and to the presence of invading forces in Egyptian territory; it was not there as an occupation force, nor to clear the Canal of obstructions, nor to resolve any question or settle any problem, be it in relation to the Suez Canal, to Palestine or to any other matter.
The United Kingdom representative declared that the principal reason for the British action on 29 and 30 October had been the failure of the United Nations to keep the peace or to secure compliance with its resolutions or to pave the way for final settlement as far as the Middle East was concerned. The Anglo-French intervention was of a temporary character designed to prevent the spread of hostilities. British forces would withdraw as soon as possible, as UNEF became effective and competent to discharge its functions. British withdrawal had begun; it seemed reasonable that the clearance of the Canal should also begin.
The representative of Israel declared his Government had found no reason to revise its view that its action on 29 October was the only alternative to early destruction by the concerted aggressive action of Egypt and its neighbours. His Government stood on its undertaking on 8 November to withdraw its forces from Egypt but the process should be integrated with the plans for UNEF, and carried out in a way to avoid a return to the status quo of belligerency and to prevent a recurrence of the conflict and give a chance of peace.
DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE
Immediately after the adoption of resolutions 1000 (ES-I) and 1001 (ES-I) of 5 and 7 November 1956 concerning the establishment of UNEF, the Secretary-General approached the Government of Egypt to prepare for their prompt implementation. Following clarifying interpretations by the Secretary-General of those resolutions in reply to questions from Egypt regarding the functions of the Force, Egypt consented to the arrival of UNEF. The Advisory Committee of seven Members approved the interpretations and recommended that the Secretary-General should start transferring the Force to Egypt.
At this time, there began a series of meetings between the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee on various aspects of the planning for, and operations of, the Force. All important policy decisions were taken with that Committee's concurrence.
In direct response to resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November, the following 24 Member States offered to participate in the Force: Afghanistan, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Laos, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Constant consultation took place between the Secretary-General and General Burns about the selection of units to meet his needs. Offers of troop units were finally activated from 10 States: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. The offers from the other 14 States remained outstanding and available for activation as need might develop. The Secretary-General stated, on 12 November, that he had refused no contribution but that practical considerations had made necessary a selection in order to arrive at the required balanced composition with a reasonably limited and representative number of participants. In addition, logistical support offered by Italy, Switzerland and the United States facilitated the speedy assembling, transporting and supplying of UNEF.
The first troop contingent having reached the staging area at Capodichino Airport, Italy, on 10 November, and the first 10 observers from UNTSO having been transferred for service in Egypt on 12 November, the first UNEF unit was flown to Abu Suweir, near Ismailia on the Canal, on 15 November. By 20 November, 696 men had arrived there.
Between 16 and 18 November, the Secretary-General held talks in Cairo with the President and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt. As one result, he stated, in an aide-mémoire, their understanding on three basic points for the presence and functioning of UNEF in Egypt: (1) The Government of Egypt declared that, when exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it would be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November; (2) the United Nations declared that the activities of UNEF would be guided, in good faith, by the task established for the Force in the relevant resolutions and, understanding this to correspond to the wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirmed its willingness to maintain UNEF until its task had been completed; and (3) the Government of Egypt and the Secretary-General declared their intention to proceed forthwith to explore jointly concrete aspects of the functioning of UNEF; the Government of Egypt, confirming its intention to facilitate the functioning of UNEF, and the United Nations were agreed to expedite the implementation of guiding principles so arrived at.
The Secretary-General reported these preliminary steps to the General Assembly on 20 November (A/3375). In its resolution 1121 (XI) of 24 November, the Assembly noted with approval the content of the aide-mémoire.
In a second report dated 21 November on administrative and financial arrangements for the establishment and operation of UNEF (A/3383), the Secretary-General outlined provisional arrangements concerning the Chief of Command's personnel, administrative and logistical responsibilities, and noted the final authority of the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee, for all administrative and financial operations of the Force, including arrangements with Governments contributing troop units, supplies or services required by the Force. The report also raised certain policy questions and proposed arrangements for financing the Force.
On the latter question the Assembly, on 26 November, by 52 votes to 9, with 13 abstentions, adopted a draft resolution submitted by the Secretary-General, providing for interim measures for financing UNEF outside the normal budget of the United Nations pending recommendations from the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (resolution 1122 (XI)).
By the time the Assembly resumed discussion of the Middle East question between 18 and 21 December, the strength and organization, as well as the activities, of UNEF had developed substantially. On 28 November, the Secretary-General stated that the Force would, by 12 December, be an "organized military force", with adequate staff and supporting troops. By 30 November, nearly 2,500 men had reached Egypt and, by 13 December, at the end of the fourth week of the airlift, more than 3,700 men from eight Member States were on duty in Egypt. By early February 1957, the arrival of the Indonesian and Brazilian contingents had brought the total strength of UNEF in Egypt to nearly its full complement of some 6,000 officers and men from 10 Member States.
As its strength grew, UNEF gradually undertook its functional role. On 21 November 1956, the first United Nations troops moved from their base at Abu Suweir across the cease-fire line and entered Port Said; on 30 November, UNEF elements crossed the Suez Canal to El Cap on the east bank and, on 3 December, took up positions between the Israel and Egyptian lines. On 21 December, UNEF supervised in the buffer zone the exchange of 472 British civilian internees (Suez Base personnel) and 375 Egyptian service personnel and civilian detainees, prior to assuming temporary control of Port Said on 22 December, when the Anglo-French forces completed their withdrawal. As the Israel forces were gradually withdrawn between December 1956 and 8 March 1957, under circumstances described below, UNEF followed, proceeding from its initial position close to the Canal to its present position along the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Demarcation Line, with Headquarters at Gaza, which it entered on 7 March. Between 28 January and 6 February, it had effected the exchange of Israeli and Egyptian prisoners of war.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR UNEF
Meanwhile, in pursuance of resolution 1122 (XI) of 26 November, the Administrative and Budgetary (Fifth) Committee of the Assembly had considered various administrative and financial arrangements for UNEF. Regarding the method of assessment, the Secretary-General had concluded that such expenses should be shared by Member States in accordance with the regular 1957 budget scale of assessments. The Assembly had established the Force as a United Nations instrument fully independent of the policies of any one nation; hence, the United Nations must assume full responsibility for its functioning. Expenses other than those assumed voluntarily by individual Governments were United Nations expenditures within the general scope and interest of Article 17 of the Charter, which stated that the Organization's expenses should be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly. On 21 December, the Assembly adopted, by 62 votes to 8, with 7 abstentions, a resolution recommended by the Fifth Committee by which it decided: (1) that the expenses of UNEF other than for items furnished without charge by Member States should be apportioned among the Member States to the extent of $10 million in accordance with the ordinary 1957 budget scale of assessments for contributions; (2) that the decision would be without prejudice to the subsequent apportionment of any expenses in excess of $10 million incurred in connexion with UNEF; (3) to establish a Committee composed of Canada, Ceylon, Chile, El Salvador, India, Liberia, Sweden, the USSR and the United States of America to examine the question of apportionment of expenses in excess of $10 million and to report as soon as possible (resolutoin 1089 (XII)).
During discussions of the financing of UNEF a number of Members took the position that the cost of maintaining the Force should be borne by the States that had undertaken the action against Egypt.
In the next two months, the original arrangements for UNEF were more fully developed by an agreement with Egypt defining its status there, by issuing Regulations for the Force and by further providing for its finances.
In a report dated 8 February (A/3526), the Secretary-General stated that, as authorized by resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956, he had, in consultation with the Advisory Committee established under that resolution, negotiated arrangements with the Government of Egypt about the status of UNEF in Egypt. The report submitted to the Assembly for approval an exchange of letters constituting an agreement on arrangements defining certain of the conditions necessary for the effective discharge of the functions of UNEF while it remained in Egypt. In his letter of agreement, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt recalled his Government's declaration that, when exercising its sovereign power on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it would be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of the Assembly resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November.
The agreement, stated the Secretary-General, was based on Article 105 of the Charter, the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, to which Egypt had acceded in September 1948, and the resolutions providing for UNEF. Among other things, it provided for: (a) arrangements respecting criminal and civil jurisdiction, having regard to the special functions of the Force and to the interests of the United Nations; (b) the enjoyment by UNEF, as a subsidiary organ, of the status, privileges and immunities of the Organization; and (c) dealing with all differences arising out of the interpretation or application of the arrangements, either according to the Convention, if applicable, or by reference for final settlement to a tribunal of three arbitrators. The agreement was to remain in force until the departure of the Force from Egypt, the effective date of that departure to be defined by the Secretary-General and the Government of Egypt. On 22 February, the Assembly adopted a draft resolution, sponsored by the 10 Members that had furnished contingents to UNEF, noting with approval this report by the Secretary-General on arrangements concerning the status of UNEF in Egypt (resolution 1126 (XI)).
On the previous day, the Secretary-General had circulated for the information of the Assembly the "Regulations for the United Nations Emergency Force", which he had issued pursuant to resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956 and following consultation with the Advisory Committee and the participating States. The Regulations affirmed the international character of the Force as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly.
On 27 February 1957, the Assembly adopted a resolution (1090 (XI)) on the question of the finances of UNEF, by 52 votes to 8, with 3 abstentions. This resolution was recommended by the Assembly's Fifth Committee and had been prepared by the Committee of nine appointed under resolution 1089 (XI) of 21 December 1956. It dealt with the expenses for UNEF, which the Secretary-General had estimated would exceed the $10 million which resolution 1122 (XI) of 26 November 1956 had authorized him to commit. By the resolution of 27 February, the Assembly noted that UNEF expenses already approved for 1957 represented a grave increase in assessments placed on Member States. Acknowledging that certain Governments had borne certain UNEF expenses without charge, such as pay, equipment, supplies and services, it authorized the Secretary-General to incur, through December 1957, expenses for UNEF up to a total of $16.5 million and invited Member States to make voluntary contributions to meet the sum of $6.5 million so as to ease the financial burden for 1957 on the membership as a whole. It also authorized the Secretary-General, pending receipt of contributions to the Special Account, to advance sums required from the Working Capital Fund or, where necessary, to arrange for loans to the Special Account from other appropriate funds under his control, provided that such loans should not affect current operational programmes. In addition, the Assembly decided to consider, at its twelfth session, the basis for financing any cost of UNEF in excess of the $10 million not covered by voluntary contributions.
TREATMENT OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NATIONALS AND JEWISH
COMMUNITY IN EGYPT
Between 21 November and 14 December 1956, the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and Israel drew the attention of the United Nations to charges of mistreatment by the Government of Egypt of French and British nationals and the Jewish community in Egypt. That question was discussed at five meetings of the Assembly between 18 and 21 December.
The main charges concerned the expulsion from Egypt of a number of British and French nationals and of Jews and the sequestration of British-, French- and Jewish-owned property. The substance of the Egyptian reply was that, subjected to unprovoked aggression, Egypt had been constrained to take certain measures to avoid jeopardizing its security through the presence of foreigners and had exercised its sovereign right of sequestrating the property of enemy aliens.
A draft resolution was submitted on 21 December by Egypt, whereby the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General: (1) to arrange to assess the total damage caused by the military operations against Egypt by Israel, France and the United Kingdom, in particular the casualties, the destruction in Egyptian areas, the damage to and interruption of navigation in the Canal; and (2) to report on the required assessment as a basis for the payment of adequate compensation to Egypt. No action was taken on this draft resolution.
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ORAL REPORT OF 21 DECEMBER 1956
ON WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM EGYPT
On 21 December 1956, the Secretary-General replied in the General Assembly to certain questions asked by the representative of Jordan in the course of the latter's remarks on non-compliance with resolution 1120 (XI) calling for withdrawal forthwith of French, British and Israel forces from Egypt, which was impeding the advance of UNEF to a position astride the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line.
The Secretary-General stated that the representative of Israel had informed him, on 1 December, that Israel forces would, on 3 December, be removed from a wide belt of territory (about 50 kilometres) in proximity to the Suez Canal along its entire length. Elements of UNEF had immediately entered the area east of the Canal between the Egyptian and Israel lines, although progress had been impeded because of mine fields and destroyed roads. After the representative of Israel had informed him on 11 December that Israel was ready to effect further withdrawals in the Sinai peninsula, General Burns, the Commander of UNEF, had, on instructions, conferred with the Israel Commander on 16 December, had accepted certain specific withdrawal arrangements for 18-19 December, but had expressed the view that the proposed withdrawal rate of 25 kilometres per week would not be acceptable to the Secretary-General. On 17 December, it had been confirmed to the Israel delegation that such a schedule, which would have meant the lapse of from four to six weeks before withdrawal "behind the Armistice Lines", would not be acceptable to the Secretary-General. Further proposals for withdrawal by Israel made on that day had been declared inadequate by General Burns and, after discussion of other proposals, the representative of Israel had been informed on 20 December that a schedule of withdrawal which had no completion date was inconsistent with the resolution of the Assembly and unsatisfactory. On that day (21 December), the representative of Israel had presented a new schedule envisaging withdrawal in two phases. In the first phase, no Israel forces would be "west of El Arish" after the first week in January, although Israel occupation of Sharm el Sheikh and Tiran would continue. The second phase would involve full Israel withdrawal, understood to mean behind the Armistice Lines, at an unstated date.
The position concerning French and British troops was that their withdrawal from Port Said was now nearing completion. Previously, on 3 December, the Secretary-General had transmitted communications from the United Kingdom and France in which, noting that an effective United Nations force was now arriving and that the Secretary-General had accepted responsibility for organizing the task of clearing the Canal, and that free transit would be re-established when clear in accordance with the resolution of 2 November, the two Governments had confirmed their decision to continue their withdrawal without delay. It was later announced that the Anglo-French forces completed their withdrawal on 22 December, with UNEF contingents moving in and taking up positions.
REPORTS ON GAZA STRIP
On 10 January 1957 the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) submitted a report on the effects of military operations on the Gaza refugees between 1 November and mid-December 1956, and, on the same day, the Secretary-General issued a report dated 3 December 1956 by a staff officer of UNEF, who had been designated as his personal representative, and who had visited the Gaza Strip from 27 to 30 November.
The Director of UNRWA reported on incidents involving the killing of civilians by Israel troops during the occupation of Khan Yunis on 3 November. On 12 November, another serious incident had occurred at the Agency's camp at Rafah during a screening operation by Israel troops to find former members of the "Palestine Brigade" and of fedayeen units. To an Agency protest against these actions, the Israel Government had replied that it was taking urgent steps to establish the facts and was doing its best to ensure that there would be no repetition of such incidents. At the end of November, the Director stated that he had found relative calm in the Gaza Strip.
The report of the Secretary-General's representative was limited to the investigation of conditions as they existed at the time of his visit from 27 to 30 November. The situation was reported as calm. The report concluded by noting that some administrative measures appeared to indicate a trend toward facilitating the permanency of the existing situation achieved through military action by Israel.
FURTHER ASSEMBLY ACTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES
AND REPORTS OF SECRETARY-GENERAL
(22 DECEMBER 1956 – 8 MARCH 1957)
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 15 JANUARY 1957
AND ASSEMBLY CALL OF 19 JANUARY FOR WITHDRAWAL WITHIN
FIVE DAYS
When the General Assembly, at the request of Egypt, resumed debate on the Middle East question between 17 January and 2 February 1957, it had before it a report from the Secretary-General dated 15 January covering developments since his oral report to the Assembly on 21 December 1956 about compliance with the requirements for withdrawal of forces defined in resolutions 997 (ES-I), 999 (ES-I), 1002 (ES-I) and 1120 (XI) of 2, 4, 7 and 24 November 1956 respectively. Since the complete withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces on 22 December, only Israel troops had been involved. In the course of his extensive discussions with representatives of Israel seeking compliance by the earliest possible date, Israel representatives had announced further withdrawals, following the initial one on 24 November, as follows: (1) on 3 December 1956, withdrawal eastward to a distance of some 50 kilometres from the Canal; (2) on 2-8 January 1957, withdrawal to a north-south line leaving no Israel forces west of El Arish, some 40 kilometres from the southern edge of the Gaza Strip; (3) on 15 January, withdrawal eastward another 25-30 kilometres, except in the Sharm el Sheikh area. On 14 January, an intended further withdrawal had been announced which, by 22 January, would leave the Sinai desert entirely evacuated except for the Sharm el Sheikh area which, it was stated, at present ensured freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba. In connexion with the evacuation of that area, Israel had stated that it was prepared to enter forthwith into conversation with him.
That area and the islands opposite Sharm el Sheikh were, the Secretary-General noted, Egyptian territory, or territory under Egyptian jurisdiction. Under the Assembly resolution, the forces should be withdrawn from those territories. The Secretary-General added that the international significance of the Gulf of Aqaba might be considered to justify the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf in accordance with recognized rules of international law. He stated that he had not considered discussion of the matter, and its possible relation to the action requested in the Assembly resolutions, to fall within the mandate established for him in resolution 999 (ES-I) of 4 November.
His discussions had been based on resolution 999 (ES-I), asking him to obtain the withdrawal of all forces behind the Armistice Lines. The basic resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November on the Middle East crisis not only urged prompt withdrawal behind the Armistice Lines, but also covered two other points of significance: the parties were urged to desist from raids across the Lines and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the Armistice Agreements. The three points, the Secretary-General noted, were not linked together conditionally.
When, on 22 January, in consequence of the intended Israel withdrawal, UNEF reached the Armistice Line wherever it followed the northeastern boundary of the "Sinai Desert", those two other points, he reported, would assume added importance. They made it clear that the Israel withdrawal must be behind the Armistice Line established in the Egypt-Israel Agreement. The latest Israel communication had been silent about withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, which fell on the Egyptian side of the line. The representative of Israel had orally stated that his Government was prepared at an early stage to discuss proposals for arrangements for the Gaza Strip.
The Secretary-General noted further that the Assembly's call for scrupulous observance of the Armistice Agreements reinforced the specific request to the parties to desist from raids. The cease-fire assurance given to him by the parties in April and May 1956 lent further legal solemnity to the relevant articles in the Agreements. A main duty of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was to assist in the prevention of incursions and raids. The parties should give UNTSO the support necessary to make it fully effective. Liaison should also be established between UNTSO and UNEF, and consideration might have to be given to the question of how far the Force might have to assume responsibilities of UNTSO. It would also be of assistance if the parties formally reaffirmed their undertakings to desist from raids and to take active steps to prevent incursions.
Like the cease-fire, withdrawal was an essential preliminary to development of a stable basis for peaceful conditions. The basic function of UNEF, "to help maintain quiet", gave the Force great value as a background for efforts toward resolving the other aims of the Assembly, which had to be achieved to improve on the conditions prevailing before the crisis. It was essential, he concluded, that Governments should be enabled to turn to the constructive tasks to which a prompt conclusion of the first phase of implementation of the Assembly resolution would open the way.
On 17 January 1957,therepresentativeofCeylon submitted a joint draft resolution on behalf of 25 Members. By this, the General Assembly, recalling its resolutions 997 ES-I), 998 (ES-I), 999 (ES-I), 1002 (ES-I) and 1120 (XI), and noting the report of the Secretary-General of 15 January, would: (1) note with regret and concern the failure of Israel to comply with those resolutions; and (2) request the Secretary-General to continue his efforts for securing the complete withdrawal of Israel in pursuance thereof and to report on such completion within five days. On 19 January, the Assembly adopted the draft resolution by 74 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions, as resolution 1123 (XI).
In the debate, the representative of Israel noted that while Israel had for weeks co-operated actively with the United Nations in a phased withdrawal of troops, there had been no single act of compliance by Egypt with such other recommendations in the 2 November resolution as the injunction to desist from raids across the Armistice Lines into neighbouring territory and urging that, "upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Canal and restore freedom of navigation". The problem of the Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza areas had been reserved for discussion at a later stage in the withdrawal process because they touched Israel's security at its most sensitive point. It was necessary for the withdrawal to be accompanied by related steps which would in the case of the Gulf of Aqaba guarantee freedom of navigation and the absence of hostile acts and in the case of Gaza guarantee the maintenance of order and the prevention of a recrudescence of border warfare.
Many speakers emphasized that, two and a half months having passed, the Assembly must now secure unconditional compliance by Israel with the Assembly resolutions. Otherwise there might be serious consequences. The time for considering constructively any other problems concerning Israel and her Arab neighbours would not arrive until complete withdrawal behind the Armistice Line had established the correct atmosphere.
Several representatives, while recognizing the need for priority for the task of achieving complete Israel withdrawal, expressed concern about a return to conditions which had helped provoke the military action and suggested that UNEF should be deployed in the Gaza and Gulf of Aqaba areas in some way to prevent a recurrence of hostile activities pending that political settlement which could alone establish lasting peace in the area. Some Members, however, were opposed to any extension of the functions of UNEF and to its deployment in the Gaza and Aqaba areas.
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 24 JANUARY: STATUS or COMPLIANCE AND MEASURES TO PROMOTE PEACEFUL CONDITIONS
During discussions with the Secretary-General on withdrawal in pursuance of resolution 1123 (XI) of 19 January 1957, Israel submitted on 23 January 1957 an aide-mémoire outlining its view on the Israel position in the Sharm el Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip. Israel's approach was stated to be influenced primarily by the policy of belligerency maintained by Egypt for six years. In the face of this, Israel was concerned that its withdrawal from Egypt should not strengthen the serious likelihood of warlike acts against it. Withdrawal from the Sharm el Sheikh area needed to be accompanied by related measures ensuring free navigation in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, which had the character of international waterways in which the right of innocent passage existed. Egypt's refusal to comply with the basic decision of the Security Council of 1 September 1951 about the Suez Canal made it imperative to ensure that the Egyptian blockade was never restored to the Gulf of Aqaba. UNEF could be a factor in the solution of the problem if it were to hold Israel-evacuated positions and remain there until, by a peace settlement or by other international instruments, another effective means were agreed upon for ensuring permanent freedom of navigation and the absence of belligerent acts. For such a purpose more precise definition was needed of UNEF's functions, particularly the duration of its tenure and the conditions for the termination of its assignments As for the Gaza Strip, Israel suggested, in view of the situation there since 1948, and its use as a springboard for assaults against Israel, that no Israel military forces should remain there but that Israel should continue to perform the functions of administration and security, the latter by the Israel police. Its plan did not envisage entry of UNEF into the area. Israel was ready to work out with the United Nations a suitable relationship with respect to the Strip.
On 24 January, the Secretary-General reported (A/3512) that, at the expiration of the five-day time limit set by resolution 1123 (XI), Israel had not fully complied with the Assembly's requests for withdrawal. A map attached to the report showed that Israel had not withdrawn from the Gaza Strip and from a strip along the west shore of the Gulf of Aqaba.
In contributing towards peaceful conditions in the area, the Secretary-General reported, positive and effective United Nations measures had to be developed within the following limits: (1) The United Nations could not condone a change of the status juris resulting from military action contrary to the Charter. The Assembly resolutions on withdrawal reflected that point. (2) The use of military force by the United Nations other than that under Chapter VII of the Charter required the consent of the States in which the Force was to operate and must not serve as a means to force settlement, in the interest of one party, of political or legal issues recognized as controversial. (During the Assembly debate described below, the Secretary-General clarified the principle by stating that, in practice, the consent obviously must be qualified in such a way as to provide a reasonable basis for the operations of the United Nations Force, as Egypt's consent had been qualified in the case of UNEF.) (3) There must be full respect, the report continued, for the rights of Member Governments recognized in the Charter and for international agreements concluded in exercise of those rights.
The Secretary-General pointed out that the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement had resulted in a de facto situation by which the administration and security in the Gaza Strip were left in the hands of Egypt, as the power having "control". That situation could be legally changed only through settlement between the parties, and the United Nations could not assist in the maintenance of a situation contrary to the one created by the Armistice Agreement, such as the suggested acceptance of Israel control, even of a non-military character. Furthermore, any function for UNEF in the Gaza area broader than that authorized in the Assembly resolutions or a widening of United Nations administrative responsibilities beyond those involving the refugees would require the consent of Egypt.
Article I of the Armistice Agreement assimilated that Agreement to a non-aggression pact. Restoration of more stable relations than those prevailing between the parties could be based on a reaffirmation which should naturally extend to such other clauses as articles VII and VIII. The restrictions of those articles on the deployment of the military forces of both parties along both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Lines were not being fulfilled at the beginning of the crisis. That condition of affairs should not be permitted to return. Full implementation would reduce tension and had a positive bearing on other problems in the region. Under those articles Egyptian and Israel "defensive forces" only might be maintained in the area of the western front under their respective control, and the area around El-Auja was to be demilitarized, with the headquarters of the Mixed Armistice Commission to be maintained there. UNEF, now on the dividing line between the forces of Israel and Egypt, would eventually be deployed, in accordance with the Assembly's concurrence with the Secretary-General's second report on UNEF, only on the Egyptian side of the Armistice Line in the Gaza area and opposite El-Auja. With demilitarization of the El-Auja Zone in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, it might be indicated that units of the Force should be stationed also on the Israel side of the line, at least in that Zone. Such deployment, which would require a new decision by the Assembly, would have the advantage of the Force being in a position to assume all the supervisory duties of UNTSO relating to the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Line, a new arrangement not foreseen by the Armistice Agreement and therefore requiring the consent of the two parties.
Regarding co-operation between UNEF and UNTSO in the prevention of incursions and raids, discussed in his previous report, the Secretary-General had since then been informed of Egypt's desire for such assistance in order that all raids and incursions, in both directions, be brought to an end.
As to the longer-term problem, not directly related to the present crisis, of freedom of passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, military action by Israel should not influence the solution. A legal controversy existed as to the extent of the right of innocent passage through those waters. Whatever rights there might be should be exercised with restraint on all sides. The Security Council's resolution of 1 September 1951 calling upon Egypt to terminate restrictions on Suez Canal shipping had a direct bearing on the present question. The armistice regime, on which the resolution was based, had been subjected to ever-widening non-compliance in later years. However, that regime might be considered as operative, at least in part, provided forces were withdrawn behind the Armistice Lines, even if there were continued non-compliance with other armistice clauses. Were articles VII and VIII in particular again to be implemented, the case against all acts of belligerency would gain full cogency and the parties should then give assurances not to assert any belligerent rights, including such rights in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran.
Upon withdrawal of Israel troops from the Sharm el Sheikh area, UNEF would follow them in the same way as in other parts of Sinai. The duties of the Force in respect of the cease-fire and the withdrawal would determine its movements. However, if it were recognized that there was need for such an arrangement, it might be agreed that UNEF units would assist in maintaining quiet in the area beyond what followed from this general principle. In accordance with the general legal principles, recognized as decisive for the deployment of UNEF, the Force should not be used so as to prejudice the solution of the controversial questions involved. UNEF, thus, was not to be deployed in such a way as to protect any special position on these questions, although, at least transitionally, it might function in support of mutual restraint.
ASSEMBLY CALLS OF 2 FEBRUARY 1957 FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL AND
PROVISIONS FOR MEASURES TO PROMOTE PEACEFUL CONDITIONS
During its renewed discussion of Israel's noncompliance at seven meetings between 28 January and 2 February 1957, the General Assembly had before it the aide-mémoire of Israel, the Secretary-General's report and two draft resolutions submitted on 1 February by Brazil Colombia, India, Indonesia, Norway, the United States and Yugoslavia.
Under the first draft resolution the Assembly would: (1) deplore the non-compliance of Israel with the Assembly's repeated requests to it to complete its withdrawal behind the Armistice Demarcation Line; (2) call upon Israel to complete its withdrawal without further delay. Under the second, which dealt with the measures set forth in the Secretary-General's report, the Assembly, recognizing that Israel's withdrawal must be followed by action which would assure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions, would: (1) note with appreciation the Secretary-General's report of 24 January and the measures therein to be carried out upon Israel's complete withdrawal; (2) call upon Egypt and Israel scrupulously to observe the 1949 Armistice Agreement; (3) consider that scrupulous maintenance of that Agreement, after full withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza areas, required placing UNEF on the Armistice Demarcation Line and the implementation of other measures as proposed in the report, with due regard to the considerations set out therein with a view to assist in achieving situations conductive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area; and (4) request the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties concerned, to take steps to carry out those measures and to report, as appropriate, to the Assembly.
In the course of the debate, several Members expressed the view that, as an essential prerequisite to any further measures on the Middle East situation, Israel must withdraw its forces forthwith behind the Armistice Line, and that such withdrawal must not be conditional upon the prior provision of certain guarantees by the United Nations. A number, who warned of the serious consequences if Israel persisted in its stand, considered the first draft resolution as far from adequate, and proposed condemnation of and sanctions against Israel. To submit to Israel's attempt to impose conditions outlined in its aide-mémoire and to change UNEF functions without Egypt's consent would be, they said, to reward aggression.
While primary emphasis was laid on the issue of withdrawal, it was also recognized that, to avoid a return to the conditions prevailing in October 1956, there was a need for further action which would represent concrete progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions in the Middle East.
Much attention was paid to the disputed question of the right of "innocent passage" and the right of a coastal State to take the necessary steps for defending its security in the narrow waters of the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba leading to the Israel port of Eilat, and on the development of the situation in the Gaza Strip and along the Armistice Line. Several said that the right place for resolving the question of free passage was the International Court of Justice.
Many felt that, following Israel's withdrawal, units of UNEF should move in, not only, as previously, in order to ensure the implementation of resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, but also to be deployed in the sensitive areas of the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh pending a settlement of the particular problems involved. They stressed the need to restore and revitalize the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement of 1949 and endorsed the Secretary-General's premise that UNEF should co-operate with UNTSO and be deployed on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line to guarantee respect for the Armistice obligations, including, some declared, that of not exercising belligerent rights. It was suggested by some that the United Nations should be associated with steps to replace the present civil administration of the Gaza Strip to ensure that it would not again be used as a base for raids.
Some held it essential to station UNEF at the Straits of Tiran, without prejudice to any ultimate determination of legal questions involved, to achieve there the separation of Egyptian and Israel land and sea forces until it was clear that the non-exercise of belligerent rights had established in practice the peaceful conditions which must govern navigation in waters having such an international interest.
Other Members, expressing concern over any enlarged UNEF functions, declared that such proposals implied advantages for the aggressors and held that its temporary task would be finished once Israel completed its withdrawal. UNEF must not become a force occupying key areas indefinitely, nor be used to exercise pressure in a new attempt to intervene in Egypt's domestic affairs. It was said that the second draft resolution envisaged fulfilment of Israel demands on Egypt as pre-conditions for the evacuation of Egyptian territory and that its plans for the use of UNEF were contrary to the Charter and in violation of the sovereign rights of Egypt.
The representative of Egypt, who had earlier stated his Government's readiness to implement fully the Armistice Agreement, declared at the end of the debate that his Government's position was based on immediate withdrawal by Israel, followed by UNEF taking positions exclusively on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line. He expressed confidence that it was the Assembly's intent to keep UNEF within the bounds of legality.
The representative of Israel stood on the position set forth in Israel's aide-mémoire and stated that the Armistice Agreement, which the Prime Minister of Israel had, on 23 January, declared violated and broken and beyond repair, did not offer a framework for establishing peaceful Israel-Egyptian relations. It had foundered on the rock of belligerency. Mutual renunciation of belligerency in all its forms was the prerequisite for any orderly relationship between Egypt and Israel.
On 2 February, the General Assembly, after rejecting a motion by the USSR representative to defer voting on the second draft resolution until 5 February, adopted the first draft resolution by 74 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions, as resolution 1124 (XI), and thereafter adopted the second draft resolution by 56 votes to 0, with 22 abstentions, as resolution 1125 (XI).
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 11 FEBRUARY 1957
In a report dated 11 February 1957 (A/3527), the Secretary-General described his efforts to carry out the measures envisaged in resolution 1125 (XI) of 2 February.
In an aide-mémoire presented on 4 February, the representative of Israel had: (1) requested the Secretary-General to enquire whether Egypt had agreed to a mutual and full abstention from belligerent acts, by land, air and sea, on withdrawal of Israel troops; (2) asked whether, immediately upon Israel withdrawal from the Sharm el Sheikh area, UNEF would be stationed along the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba as a restraint against hostile acts, and would remain so deployed until another effective means was agreed upon between the parties concerned for ensuring permanent freedom of navigation and the absence of belligerent acts in the Straits of Tiran and the (Gulf of Aqaba.
Both questions, in effect, reported the Secretary-General, requested action in implementation of resolution 1125 (XI) which, although closely related to resolution 1124 (XI), had, at least, full and unconditional acceptance of the withdrawal demand in the latter as its prerequisite. The second question, in view of the position of the General Assembly, would require Egyptian consent and make it important to know whether Israel itself consented, in principle, to UNEF deployment on its territory.
Consequently, the Secretary-General had sought clarification: on the withdrawal issue, whether, with regard to Gaza, Israel understood that the withdrawal must cover Israel's civil administration and police as well as its armed forces; and, on the question of the stationing of UNEF, whether, as a question of principle, Israel agreed to stationing of the Force on the Israel side of the Armistice Demarcation Line.
In his reply, the representative of Israel, reiterating the questions raised in the Israel aide-mémoire, stated that Israel would formulate its position on all outstanding questions in the light of whether or not Egypt would exercise belligerency after the withdrawal of Israel forces. His Government felt that it was not equitable to ask it to discuss its attitude on any concrete question affecting its security unless it knew whether its answer must be based on the assumption of war or on the assumption of progress to peace.
The Secretary-General stated that his position had been based upon the Assembly's recognition that progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions in the area required, first, full withdrawal of Israel and, second, various measures within the framework of scrupulous observance of the Armistice Agreement, which, in its first article, established the right of each party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other.
In regard to the General Armistice Agreement, he reported that Egypt had reaffirmed its intent to observe fully its provisions, as indicated earlier in its acceptance of resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November, on the assumption, of course, that observance would be reciprocal.
The position of Israel, the Secretary-General stated, was that the General Armistice Agreement had, since 1949, been consistently violated by Egypt's attack against and blockade of Israel and its central purpose of non-belligerency and its character as a transition to a peaceful settlement had been constantly repudiated. Egypt's action, in the view of Israel, had brought the Agreement to nought, with the result that a new system of relationships must now be constructed.
ASSEMBLY DISCUSSION ON SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORTS AND
WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES (22 FEBRUARY – 8 MARCH)
The Assembly resumed discussion of the Middle East question at nine meetings between 22 February and 8 March 1957. When it adjourned, on the latter date, complete withdrawal of Israel forces behind the Egypt-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line had taken place.
On 22 February, the Secretary-General supplemented orally his report of 11 February on the problem of withdrawal. He said he could state with confidence that it was the desire of Egypt that the take-over of Gaza from the military and civilian control of Israel — which, as had been the case, in the first instance would be exclusively by UNEF — would be orderly and safe, as it had been elsewhere. Recognizing the present special complexities of the Gaza area and the responsibility of the United Nations there for the Arab refugees, and having in mind also the objectives and obligations of the Armistice Agreement, Egypt was ready to make special and helpful arrangements With the United Nations and some of its auxiliary bodies, such as UNRWA and UNEF. Arrangements for the use of UNEF should ensure its deployment on the Armistice Line at the Gaza Strip and its effective interposition between the armed forces of Egypt and Israel. The assistance of the United Nations would be enrolled toward putting a definite end to all incursions and raids across the border from either side. Furthermore, with reference to the period of transition, such other arrangements with the United Nations might be made as would contribute toward safeguarding life and property In the area by providing efficient and effective police protection; as would guarantee good civilian administration; as would assure maximum assistance to the United Nations refugee programme; and as would protect and foster the economic development of the territory and its people.
In a subsequent report, of 26 February (A/3563) summarizing a further exchange of views with the representative of Israel, it was stated that the Secretary-General — in reply to a question of whether a de facto United Nations administration in Gaza as outlined above would exclude Egypt's return to the area — had declared that he had intended to indicate practical arrangements, envisaged within the framework of Egyptian control of the territory under the terms of the Agreement. He had not expressed an opinion on the possible de facto development which depended on decisions to be taken after Israel withdrawal from the Gaza area, a withdrawal which had to be unconditional according to the decisions of the Assembly.
On 22 February, the representative of Lebanon introduced a draft resolution sponsored by Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan and Sudan. By this, the General Assembly would: (1) condemn Israel for its non-compliance with resolutions 997(ES-I), 998 (ES-I), 999 (ES-1) and 1002 (ES-I) of the first emergency session and resolutions 1120 (XI), 1123 (XI) and 1124 (XI) of the eleventh session; (2) call upon all States to deny all military, economic or financial assistance and facilities to Israel; (3 request all States to provide the Secretary-General with information on their implementation of the present resolution; and (4) request the Secretary-General to report again on the implementation of the present and previous resolutions.
The representative of Lebanon declared that, while Israel maintained it would not withdraw without certain guarantees against the return to the situation before the attack, which it alleged was the immediate cause of its invasion of Egypt, the Arab view was that that situation was the consequence of Israel's disregard of decisions of the United Nations. Reviewing the record with regard to the Armistice Agreement, he contrasted the numerous condemnations of Israel by the Security Council with the fact that Egypt had not once been condemned for such acts. It was absurd, he declared, for Israel to accuse Egpyt of not observing one particular Security Council resolution, of 1 September 1951, when it had persistently violated many crucial resolutions of the Council and the Assembly, including those to which Israel owed its existence.
The Arab States were not prepared, he continued, to compromise on the principle of immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Withdrawal must precede all action to be taken by the United Nations to improve the situation. Failure to maintain its stand against aggression would confirm Israel in its belief that only a policy of force paid and that it could settle its problems with its Arab neighbours by force. In such a situation when the rule of law had collapsed, a country which felt the need for outside help, military or economic, might seek it wherever it could find it and thus induce a conflict which might extend far beyond the area.
The representative of Canada declared that the problem was basically one of fear by Israel of extermination by its unremittingly hostile neighbours and fear by the Arab States that the new State established in their midst, with displacement of Arab population, would yield to expansionist ambitions. Those fears on both sides prevented moderation. In the circumstances, he believed the priority objective of withdrawal of Israel troops must be associated with the not unrelated objective of arrangements which would minimize the possibility of having the same problem a year or two later. He put forward detailed proposals including: (1) a firm pledge by Israel and Egypt of scrupulous observance of the 1949 Armistice Agreement, including exclusion of their armed forces from the El-Auja Demilitarized Zone; (2) deployment of UNEF on the Armistice Demarcation Line and its assumption of UNTSO duties there; (3) affirmation by the Assembly that there should be no interference with innocent passage or any assertion of belligerent rights in the Straits of Tiran, and deployment of UNEF in the Sharm el Sheikh area, after Israel withdrawal, to assist in maintaining quiet; (4) UNEF deployment in the Gaza Strip, upon Israel withdrawal, and United Nations assumption of responsibility, by agreement with Egypt, for replacing Israel civil administration by an effective United Nations civil administration, with Egyptian armed forces not to return there.
Support for the six-Power draft resolution was expressed by a number of Members, who also opposed the Canadian proposals, particularly the transformation of UNEF into what might amount to an occupation force. The policy of satisfying Israel demands was linked, they said, to a policy of forgetting the basic issues of the Palestine problem which remained unsettled because United Nations demands had not been implemented. The representative of Egypt declared that Israel's withdrawal must not be the result of a bargain, which neither Egypt nor the United Nations could possibly recognize.
On 1 March, Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs announced to the Assembly that Israel was prepared to withdraw its forces from the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran in the confidence that there would be continued freedom of navigation there for international and Israel shipping. Recalling statements by the United States representative about maintaining UNEF there until peaceful conditions were assured, she said it was generally recognized that the function of UNEF in the Straits of Tiran included the prevention of belligerent acts. Concerned about the possibly premature withdrawal of UNEF from the area, her Government had noted the assurance in the Secretary General's report of 26 February 1957 (A/3563) that any proposal for its withdrawal would first come to the Advisory Committee, which represented the Assembly in the implementation of its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, and that the Assembly would have an opportunity to ensure that no precipitate changes were made which would increase the possibility of belligerent acts. Israel intended to exercise its full rights of free and innocent passage and was prepared to join with others to secure universal respect of those rights. It had learned with gratification that other leading maritime Powers subscribed to the views set forth by the United States on 11 February on the subject and had a similar intention to exercise their rights of free and innocent passage in the Gulf and the Straits. Interference with ships of Israel flag would be regarded by Israel as an attack entitling it to exercise its inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.
Israel, she continued, was making a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip on the following assumptions: (1) UNEF would be deployed in Gaza and the take-over from the military and civilian control of Israel would be exclusively by UNEF; (2) UNEF would carry out the functions there enumerated in the Secretary-General's statement of 22 February; and (3) the responsibility of the United Nations in the administration of Gaza would be maintained until there was a peace settlement or a definitive agreement on the future of the Gaza Strip. If conditions were created there indicating a return to the conditions of deterioration which existed previously, Israel reserved its freedom to act to defend its rights.
The United States representative declared that the views of his Government, most recently set forth by President Eisenhower on 20 February, had remained steadfast in seeking a solution based on justice which would take into account the legitimate interests of all the parties. His Government understood the Israel announcement to mean that withdrawal in accordance with resolution 997(ES-I) would be immediate. It did not consider that the accompanying declarations made the withdrawal "conditional". They constituted re-statements of what had already been said by the Assembly or by the Secretary-General in his reports, or hopes and expectations which seemed not unreasonable in the light of the prior actions of the Assembly. After quoting in full the Secretary-General's statement of 22 February, he stated that, regarding the United Nations measures contemplated for the Gaza Strip, it was the view of his Government that from a juridical standpoint the future of the Strip must, as the Secretary-General had said, be worked out within the framework of the Armistice Agreement. His Government hoped that the suggested United Nations measure might continue until there was a definitive settlement respecting the Gaza Strip. Once Israel had completed its withdrawal, and in view of the measures taken by the United Nations to deal with the situation, there was no basis for either party to the Armistice Agreement to assert or exercise any belligerent rights.
On 4 March, the Secretary-General informed the Assembly that the Commander of UNEF had reached agreement with Israel's Commander-in-Chief on technical arrangements for the withdrawal. General Burns had been instructed to arrange for full and unconditional withdrawal, with initial take-over exclusively by UNEF.
On 8 March, the Secretary-General reported full compliance by Israel with resolution 1124 (XI) of 2 February and stated that, on 7 March, the population of Gaza had been notified that UNEF, with the consent of Egypt, was being deployed in the area to maintain quiet during and after the Israel withdrawal.
The Secretary-General declared that he would now devote his attention, in consultation with the parties concerned, to carrying out the measures referred to in resolution 1125 (XI) about action to follow withdrawal. He noted that paragraph 3 of that resolution indicated that the Assembly wished to leave the choice of the "other measures" to be decided in the light of further study and consultations.
THE SUEZ CANAL CLEARANCE OPERATION
In response to resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, in which the General Assembly urged that, "upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to re-open the Suez Canal", the Secretary-General immediately began exploring the possibilities of engaging the service of private firms in the clearance operation. On 8 November, the Secretary-General made approaches to Dutch and Danish salvage firms which had been suggested by the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of Denmark in reply to previous queries. These firms, Smit and Svitzer, indicated their agreement to assist as required in the salvage operation. Concurrently, the Secretary-General engaged the services of Lieutenant-General Raymond A. Wheeler to serve as his special representative in the clearing operation. Mr. John J. McCloy agreed to advise him on the financial problems arising in connexion with the operation.
In a report dated 20 November (A/3376), the Secretary-General proposed that the Assembly should authorize him to negotiate agreements for clearing operations with firms in countries outside the present conflict, the question of how costs should be shared to be reserved until approximate costs had been estimated. Although it was not proposed to begin the work until after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces from the Port Said and the Canal areas, the negotiations and survey work, in agreement with Egypt, could be pursued without delay.
The General Assembly, on 24 November, adopted by 65 votes to 0, with 9 abstentions, a draft resolution submitted by Canada, Colombia, India, Norway, the United States and Yugoslavia in which the Assembly noted with approval the progress so far made by the Secretary-General in arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal and authorized him to proceed with the exploration of practical arrangements and the negotiation of agreements, so that the clearing operations might be speedily and effectively undertaken (resolution 1121 (XI)).
On the same day, the Secretary-General requested the two contracting firms to dispatch to the scene such salvage ships and other equipment as had been earmarked or put in readiness and to activate arrangements for supplementing their own craft by contracting with other salvage concerns in different countries outside the conflict. A salvage fleet of 32 ships was quickly contracted for through the major contractors, with assistance from United Nations Headquarters and General Wheeler. The ships were drawn from Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Yugoslavia. General Wheeler meanwhile proceeded to Egypt on 8 December with a team of salvage surveyors, after the official announcement of the Governments of France and the United Kingdom on 3 December of their intention to withdraw their forces.
In response to offers of technical assistance by the Governments of France and the United Kingdom on 6 November, the Secretary-General had replied that he was exploring the possibility of having the work carried out under United Nations auspices by agents from countries not involved in the conflict. Some days later both France and the United Kingdom expressed support for the Secretary-General's efforts to organize a salvage team under the auspices of the United Nations, and drew attention to various acts of sabotage by the Egyptian authorities to block the Canal. The United Kingdom was willing to release for the clearance work any of the 36 salvage ships it had under charter and informed him that work in Port Said harbour was already under way. On 24 November, the representative of the United Kingdom declared in the Assembly that his Government would do everything in its power to help and was ready to lend its resources and to work in any way desired in the task. Since the withdrawal of British forces had begun, it seemed reasonable, he said, that clearance should also begin.
During his mid-November visit to Cairo, the Secretary-General had assured the Government of Egypt in principle that the United Nations would seek to provide the assistance it requested in the clearing of obstructions which that Government considered should begin immediately after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian forces from Port Said and the Canal area.
As stated in a report by the Secretary-General to the Assembly, dated 10 January, early in December 1956 it had been felt desirable, in order to prevent unjustified delay or expense, that a limited number of Anglo-French salvage vessels should be incorporated into the United Nations fleet for completing specific salvage tasks on which they were engaged, as required by General Wheeler, on the understanding that each vessel so retained would be phased out when it had completed the work in hand. In addition, the Governments of Egypt, France and the United Kingdom had been advised of the possible need of six selected vessels from the Anglo-Frcnch salvage fleet, to be manned by non-British United Nations crews, for use south of El Cap for the purpose of supplementing available United Nations salvage resources.
Upon the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces on 22 December, the United Nations had taken over responsibility for practically all the Anglo-French salvage ships then in Port Said. At that time, General Wheeler had proposed a re-disposal of the resources available, using vessels from private firms down the Canal instead of the previously intended six selected ships, while reserving the Anglo-French snips to assist in Port Said harbour in bringing to the speediest conclusion specific salvage projects initiated on individual vessels prior to the withdrawal. On 27 December, General Wheeler announced that the Egyptian Government had agreed that the United Nations salvage fleet should immediately start clearing the Canal at its southern mouth at Suez. The salvage operation had started there on 28 December, and at the northern end on 31 December 1956.
The operations were based on a three-stage plan, approved by the Egyptian authorities, for making possible resumption of normal traffic. It included the clearance of obstructions from the Canal and its ports and harbourages, rehabilitation of workshops, lighting and telecommunication services, and any essential dredging. In addition to the 32 vessels in the United Nations salvage fleet, there were 11 Anglo-French craft and four supply vessels which were used in the salvage operation at Port Said, and which were phased out during the month of January upon completion of their work.
The Secretary-General's report also carried an exchange of letters dated 8 January 1957 between the Secretary-General and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt which, after approval by the Advisory Committee, constituted the necessary agreement for co-operation in the clearance task. Under its terms, the United Nations was to assist the Government of Egypt by undertaking the task, the plans to be approved by that Government. It was confirmed that the Secretary-General was free to use the equipment available which he found necessary for the operation. The undertaking would be a United Nations enterprise, with the property and persons engaged in the operation covered by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The Government of Egypt would give its fullest co-operation and assistance to the operation.
On the question of finance, the Secretary-General reported that, pending complete cost estimates, proposals regarding how the costs should be covered had been referred to the Advisory Committee. Meanwhile, he had approached all Member Governments, suggesting, so that operations might proceed without interruption, that they should provide on a loan basis interim financing needed to meet current obligations to the extent of not less than $10 million The Secretary-General believed that sufficient funds would be in hand in January 1957 for financing the initial stage of the United Nations Canal clearance operations.
The clearance task consisted of the removal, in addition to the collapsed El Ferdan bridge, of 44 other obstructions. Of these, seven had been cleared by the Anglo-French fleet prior to the United Nations operation.
Between 27 December 1956, when clearance started, and 4 March 1957, the entire Canal south of Port Said had been cleared except for two sunken ships in the southern reaches of the Canal, the tug Edgar Bonnet and the Egyptian frigate Abukir, on which work could not be started because of the reported presence of explosives which the Egyptian authorities had indicated they would themselves remove. On 12 and 22 March respectively, work began on those last two ships. The clearance operation was reported completed by mid-April, six weeks ahead of the original schedule, with the telecommunications system restored and the lighting system and essential workshops reinstated except for delivery of certain equipment on order. Three weeks later, the salvage fleet was finally phased out.
On 12 April the Secretary-General announced receipt of loans for the Canal clearance operation, totalling nearly $11 million from Canada, Sweden, Liberia, Ceylon, Australia, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands and a pledge from Italy, which was subsequently paid. It was estimated that the advances would be sufficient to cover the costs.
ADJOURNMENT OF DEBATE AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
On 8 March 1957, the General Assembly adopted, by 65 votes to 0, with 6 abstentions, a seven-Power draft resolution whereby the Assembly decided to adjourn its eleventh session temporarily and to authorize its President, in consultation with the Secretary-General and with the Member States the representatives of which were serving on the General Committee during the session, to reconvene the Assembly as necessary in order to consider further the agenda item under consideration or that concerning the situation in Hungary (resolution 1119 (XI)).
Following its entry into the Gaza Strip on the night of 6-7 March 1957 and into the Sharm el Sheikh area on 8 March, the United Nations Emergency Force, in addition to deploying along the Demarcation Line, undertook, in the absence of any civil authority, a number of security functions, including the guarding of stores and depots of UNRWA, the railroad and railroad stations and road junctions, and the protection of order in the communities. At the same time, UNRWA health, relief, welfare and educational assistance was made available to the entire population of the Strip. With the exception of one incident, on 10 March, UNEF found the Gaza population friendly, and order and quiet were maintained without great difficulty. Co-operation of local officials and leaders in the conduct of civil administration was largely withheld, however, and there was apparent demand for the return of Egyptian administration. In the prevailing circumstances Gaza's courts, non-refugee schools and post offices could not be opened. Shops began to open soon after the entry of UNEF. The citrus crop was just being harvested and a market for it had to be quickly found or the economy of the Strip would be further hard hit. On 11 March, the Egyptian Government announced the appointment of an Administrative Governor of Gaza, who, with a limited staff, arrived in Gaza and took up his duties on 14 March. There was no return of Egyptian military forces to the Gaza Strip. A transfer to the Gaza administration of the security functions initially undertaken by UNEF took place gradually, extending over a period of weeks. The basic UNEF function of maintaining quiet, through deployment along the Demarcation Line, continued, and though there were occasional incidents, some serious, the operation, on the whole, was successful during the period covered by this Yearbook.
DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES
GENERAL ASSEMBLY – 11TH SESSION
PLENARY MEETINGS, 576, 591-597, 624, 629-632 638-642, 644-646, 649-652, 659-662, 664-668.
RENEWED CALL FOR W1THDRAWAL, 24 NOVEMBER 1956
S/3711, S/3742. Letters of 13 and 15 November 1956 from representative of Israel.
S/3745, S/3747. Letters of 19 and 21 November 1956 from representative of Syria.
A/3370. Aide-mémoire of 17 November 1956 from Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt.
A/3380. Letter of 21 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of Egypt.
A/3378, A/3109. Telegrams of 21 November and 1 December 1956 from Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria.
A/3381. Note verbale of 21 November 1956 from Permanent Delegations of France and United Kingdom.
A/3388, A/3411. Notes by Secretary-General transmitting communication and report from Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO.
A/3384 and Add. 1,2. Report of Secretary-General on compliance with General Assembly resolutions of 2 and 7 November 1 956. Annexes I -3: Replies of Governments of France, Israel and United Kingdom; Annexes 4,5: Exchange of letters between Secretary-General and Foreign Minister of Israel. Annex 6: Letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel.
A/3389 and Add.1. Letters of 24 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of Israel.
A/3391. Letter of 21 November 1956 from Permanent Representatives of Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia and Yemen.
A/3385. Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen draft resolution.
A/3385/Rev.1. Revised draft resolution with same sponsors as above except for Egypt.
A/L.215. Belgium amendment to 20-Power revised draft resolution (A/3385/Rev.l).
RESOLUTION 1120 (XI), as submitted by 20 Powers A/3385/Rev.l, adopted by the Assembly on 24 November 1956, meeting 594, by roll-call vote of 63 to 5, with 10 abstentions, as follows:
"The General Assembly,
"Having received the report of the Secretary-General on compliance with General Assembly resolutions 997(ES-I) and 1002(ES-I) of 2 and 7 November 1956,
"Recalling that its resolution 1002(ES-I) called upon Israel immediately to withdraw its forces behind the demarcation line established by the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949,
"Recalling further that the above-mentioned resolution also called upon France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland immediately to withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory, in conformity with previous resolutions,
"1. Notes with regret that, according to the communications received by the Secretary-General, two-thirds of the French forces remain, all the United Kingdom forces remain although it has been announced that arrangements are being made for the withdrawal of one battalion, and no Israel forces have been withdrawn behind the armistice line although a considerable time has elapsed since the adoption of the relevant General Assembly resolutions;
"2. Reiterates its call to France, Israel and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to comply forthwith with resolutions 997(ES-I) and 1002(ES-I) of 2 and 7 November 1956;
"3. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to communicate the present resolution to the parties concerned, and to report without delay to the General Assembly on the implementation thereof."
DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE
A/3342. Letter of 11 November 1956 from Secretary General to Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel.
A/3375. Report of Secretary-General on basic points for presence and functioning in Egypt of UNEF.
A/3386. Canada, Colombia, India, Norway, United States, Yugoslavia draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 1121 (Xl), as submitted by 6 Powers, A/3386, adopted by Assembly on 24 November 1956, meeting 594, by 65 votes to 0, with 9 abstentions.
"The General Assembly,
"Having received the report of the Secretary-General on basic points for the presence and functioning in Egypt of the United Nations Emergency Force,
"Having received also the report of the Secretary-General on arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal,
"1. Notes with approval the contents of the aide-mémoire on the basis for the presence and functioning of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, as annexed to the report of the Secretary-General;
"2. Notes with approval the progress so far made by the Secretary-General in connexion with arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal, as set forth in his report;
"3. Authorizes the Secretary-General to proceed with the exploration of practical arrangements and the negotiation of agreements so that the clearing operations may be speedily and effectively undertaken."
A/3395 Exchange of letters of 26 November 1956 between Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Israel and Secretary-General.
A/3526 Report of Secretary-General on arrangements concerning
status of UNEF in Egypt.
A/3542. Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India,
Indonesia,
Norway, Sweden, Yugoslavia draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 1126 (, as submitted by 10 Powers, A/3542, adopted by Assembly on 22 February 1957, meeting 659, by 67 votes to 0, with 7 abstentions.
"The General Assembly,
"Bearing in mind its resolutions 1000 (ES-I) and 1001 (ES-I) of 5 and 7 November 1956 concerning the United Nations Emergency Force,
"Having received the report of the Secretary-General of 8 February 1957 on arrangements concerning the status of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt,
"Notes with approval this report."
A/3552. Regulations for UNEF (ST/SGB/UNEF/11.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR UNEF
PLENARY MEETINGS, 596, 632, 662.
FIFTH COMMITTEE, meetings 538, 540, 541, 544-547, 553, 555, 557, 558, 560, 594, 596.
A/3383. Report of Secretary-General on administrative and financial arrangements for UNEF. Annex: draft resolution.
A/3383(Annex)Rev.l Revised draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 1122 (XI), as submitted by Secretary-General A/3383(Annex)Rev.l, adopted by Assembly on 26 November 1956, meeting 596, by roll-call vote of 52 to 9, with 13 abstentions. as follows:
"Having decided, in resolutions 1000 (ES-I) and 1001 (ES-I) of 5 and 7 November 1956, to establish an emergency international United Nations Force (hereafter to be known as the United Nations Emergency Force) under a Chief of Command (hereafter to be known as the Commander),
"Having considered and provisionally approved the recommendations made by the Secretary-General concerning the financing of the Force in paragraph 15 of his report of 6 November 1956,
"1. Authorizes the Secretary-General to establish a United Nations Emergency Force Special Account to which funds received by the United Nations, outside the regular budget, for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the Force shall be credited, and from which payments for this purpose shall be made;
"2. Decides that the Special Account shall be established in an initial amount of $10 million;
"3. Authorizes the Secretary-General, pending the receipt of funds for the Special Account, to advance from the Working Capital Fund such sums as the Special Account may require to meet any expenses chargeable to it;
"4. Requests the Secretary-General to establish such rules and procedures for the Special Account and make such administrative arrangements as he may consider necessary to ensure effective financial administration and control of that Account;
"5. Requests the Fifth Committee and, as appropriate, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to consider and, as soon as possible, to report on further arrangements that need to be adopted regarding the cost of maintaining the Force."
A/C.5/683, A/C.5/687. Statements made on 27 November and 3 December 1956 by representative of Secretary-General before Fifth Committee.
A/C.5/684. Statement of 27 November 1956 by Chairman of Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
A/3402. Report of Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
A/3456. Report of Advisory Commitee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on possible claims in respect of death or disability attributable to service with Emergency Force.
A/C.5/L.410. Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen draft resolution.
A/C.5/L.411 and Add.1. Canada, Norway, United States, Finland amendments to 19-Power draft resolution.
A/C.5/L.420. Guatemala amendment to 19-Power draft resolution.
A/C.5/L.426. Afghanistan, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Finland, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United States, Yemen draft resolution, incorporating A/C.5/L.410, with amendments suggested in A/C.5/L.411 and A/C.5/L.420, and amendments by Cambodia and India, adopted by roll-call vote of 57 to 8, with 9 abstentions, following a series of paragraph votes. The roll-call vote on the resolution as a whole was as follows:
RESOLUTION 1089 (XI), as recommended by Fifth Committee, A/3560, adopted by Assembly on 21 December, meeting 632, by 62 votes to 8, with 7 abstentions.
"The General Assembly,
"Recalling its resolutions 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956 and 1122 (XI) of 26 November 1956,
"Emphasizing the fact that expenses incurred by the Secretary-General under the resolutions of the General Assembly are without prejudice to any subsequent determinations as to responsibilities for situations leading to the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force and to ultimate determination as to claims established as a result of expenses arising in connexion therewith,
"Considering that the Secretary-General, in his report of 4 November 1956, particularly in paragraph 15, has stated that the question of how the Force should be financed requires further study,
"Considering that the Secretary-General, in his reports dated 21 November and 3 December 1956, has recommended that the expenses relating to the Force should be apportioned in the same manner as the expenses of the Organization,
"Considering further that several divergent views, not yet reconciled, have been held by various Member States on contributions or on the method suggested by the Secretary-General for obtaining such contributions,
"Considering that the Secretary-General has already been authorized to enter into commitments for the expenses of the Force up to an amount of $10 million.
"Considering further that the matter of allocation of the expenses of the Force beyond $10 million necessitates further study in all its aspects,
"1. Decides that the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force, other than for such pay, equipment, supplies and services as may be furnished without charge by Governments of Member States, shall be borne by the United Nations and shall be apportioned among the Member States, to the extent of $10 million, in accordance with the scale of assessments adopted by the General Assembly for contributions to the annual budget of the Organization for the financial year 1957;
"2. Decides further that this decision shall be without prejudice to the subsequent apportionment of any expenses in excess of $10 million which may be incurred in connexion with the Force;
"3. Decides to establish a Committee composed of Canada, Ceylon, Chile, El Salvador, India, Liberia, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to examine the question of the apportionment of the expenses of the Force in excess of $10 million. This Committee shall take into consideration, among other things, the discussions on this matter at the General Assembly, and shall study the question in all its aspects, including the possibility of voluntary contributions, the fixing of maximum amounts for the expenses of the Emergency Force that, with prior approval by the General Assembly, could be established on each occasion, and the principle or the formulation of scales of contributions different from the scale of contributions by Member States to the ordinary budget for 1957. The Committee will present its report as soon as possible."
A/C.5/707. Report of Committee appointed under resolution 1089 (XI), and draft resolution, adopted, as amended by United States,
by 42 votes to 7 with 5 abstentions.
A/3560/Add.I. Report of Fifth Committee. Annex: Report of
Committee appointed under resolution 1089 (XI).
RESOLUTION 1090 (XI), as recommended by Fifth Committee,
A/3560/Add.l, adopted by Assembly on 27 February 1957, meeting
662, by 52 votes to 8, with 3 abstentions.
"The General Assembly,
"Recalling its resolution 1122 (XI) of 26 November 1956 authorizing the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force Special Account in an initial amount of $10 million and its resolution 1089 (XI) of 21 December 1956 apportioning its initial $10 million among the Member States in accordance with the scale of assessments adopted by the General Assembly for contributions to the annual budget of the Organization for 1957,
"Noting that the expenses of the Force already approved for 1957 represent a sizable increase in assessments placed on Member States, causing a grave unanticipated financial burden for many Governments,
"Acknowledging that certain Governments have borne without charge certain of the expenses of the Force, such as pay, equipment, supplies and services,
"Noting nevertheless that the Secretary-General estimates that the expenses of the Force for 1957 will exceed the $10 million previously assessed,
"Noting the request of the Secretary-General for authority to enter into commitments for the Force up to a total of $16.5 million,
"1. Authorizes the Secretary-General to incur expenses for the United Nations Emergency Force up to a total of $16.5 million in respect of the period to 31 December 1957;
"2. Invites Member States to make voluntary contributions to meet the sum of $6.5 million so as to ease the financial burden for 1957 on the membership as a whole:
"3. Authorizes the Secretary-General, pending receipt of contributions to the United Nations Emergency Force Special Account:
(a) To advance from the Working Capital Fund such sums as the Special Account may require to meet any expenses chargeable to it;
(b) Where necessary, to arrange for loans to the Special Account from appropriate sources, including other funds under the control of the Secretary-General, provided that the repayment of any such advances of loans to the Special Account shall constitute a first charge against contributions as they are received, and further provided that such loans shall not affect current operational programmes;
"4. Decides that the General Assembly, at its twelfth session, shall consider the basis for financing any costs of the Force in excess of $ 10 million not covered by voluntary contributions."
DISCUSSIONS AT FIRST EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION
(See also, especially for voting details and texts of resolutions, DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES above for sections on ACTION AT GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S FIRST EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION [31 OCTOBER-5 NOVEMBER 1956] and FURTHER ASSEMBLY ACTION [5-10 NOVEMBER 1956] under INTERVENTION BY ISRAEL AND BY FRANCE AND UNITED KINGDOM IN EGYPT.)
A/3276. Canada draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 998 (ES-l), as submitted by Canada, A/3276, adopted by Assembly on 4 November 1956, meeting 563, by roll-call vote of 57 to 0, with 19 abstentions.
A/3289. First report of Secretary-General on plan for emergency international United Nations force requested by Assembly on 4 November 1956.
A/3290. Canada, Colombia, Norway draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 1000 (ES-I), as submitted by three Powers, A/3290, adopted by Assembly on 5 November 1956, meeting 565, by roll-call vote of 57 to 0, with 19 abstentions.
A/3202 and Add.1-30 and Add.4/Rev.1. Second and final report of Secretary-General on plan for emergency international United Nations force requested in resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956. Annexes and addenda giving replies of following Governments: Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Finland, Ceylon, India, Czechoslovakia, Romania, New Zealand, United States, Burma, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Iran, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Ecuador, Philippines, Peru, Afghanistan, Laos, Chile, Switzerland, Italy.
A/3308. Argentina, Burma, Ceylon Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Sweden draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 1001 (ES-I), as submitted by seven Powers, A/3308, and with amendments proposed by Australia, Iran and Denmark, adopted by Assembly on 7 November 1956, meeting 567, by roll-call vote of 64 to 0, with 12 abstentions.
A/3317. Confirmation of appointment of Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns as Chief of United Nations Command for Emergency International Force.
TREATMENT OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NATIONALS AND JEWISH
COMMUNITY IN EGYPT
A/3400. Letter of 27 November 1956 from Chairman of French delegation.
A/3400/Add.1. Aide-mémoire of 21 November 1956 from Permanent Mission of France.
A/3399. Letter of 27 November 1956 from Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of United Kingdom.
A/3444. Letter of 10 December 1956 from Chairman of French delegation.
A/3398, A/3412. Letters of 27 and 30 November 1956 from Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel.
A/3457. Letter of 13 December 1956 from Chairman of Israel delegation.
A/3445. Letter of 11 December 1956 from Permanent Representative of United Kingdom.
A/3471. Egypt draft resolution concerning compensation for damage resulting from military operations.
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ORAL REPORT OF 21 DECEMBER 1956
ON WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM EGYPT
A/3410, A/3425, A/3474, A/3483. Letters of 1, 3, 18 and 31 December 1956 from Permanent Representative of Israel.
A/3415. Notes verbales of 3 December 1956 from Permanent Representatives of United Kingdom and France.
A/3458. Letter of 14 December 1956 from Chairmen of Missions of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen.
A/3465, A/3466, A/3495. Memoranda of 16 and 17 December 1956 and letter of 11 January 1957 from Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt.
A/3478. Letter of 21 December 1956 from representative of Jordan.
A/3453. Note by Secretary-General, transmitting letter of 12 December 1956 from Permanent Representative of Israel.
REPORTS ON GAZA STRIP
A/3392. Note of 24 November 1956 by Secretary-General.
A/3491. Note by Secretary-General, transmitting report dated 3 December 1956 by Lt. Col. K. R. Nelson.
A/3212/Add.1. Special report of Director of UNRWA for period 1 November to mid-December 1956.
FURTHER ASSEMBLY ACTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES AND REPORTS OF SECRETARY-GENERAL (22 DECEMBER. 1956-8 MARCH 1957)
A/3499. Letter of 14 January 1957 from Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia.
A/3500 and Add.1. Note by Secretary-General on compliance with General Assembly resolutions calling for withdrawal of troops and other measures, covering period 21 December 1956-14 January 1957.
A/3506. Note by Secretary-General on report from Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO in Palestine.
A/3501 /Rev. l. Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 1123 (Xl), as submitted by 25 Powers, A/3501/Rev.l, adopted by Assembly on 19 January 1957, meeting 642, by roll-call vote of 74 to 2, with 2 abstentions, as follows:
"Recalling its resolutions 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, 998 (ES-I) and 999 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956, 1002 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956 and 1120 (XI) of 24 November 1956,
"Noting the report of the Secretary-General of 15 January 1957,
"1. Notes with regret and concern the failure of Israel to comply with the terms of the above-mentioned resolutions;
"2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts for securing the complete withdrawal of Israel in pursuance of the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report on such completion to the General Assembly, within five days."
A/3511. Note by Secretary-General transmitting aide-mémoire on Israel position on Sharm el Sheikh area and Gaza Strip.
A/3512. Report by Secretary-General in pursuance of resolution of General Assembly of 19 January 1957. A/3517, A/3518 Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Norway, United States, Yugoslavia draft resolutions
RESOLUTION 1124 (XI), as submitted by seven Powers A/3517, adopted by the Assembly on 2 February 1957, meeting 652, by roll-call vote of 74 to 2, with 2 abstentions, as follows:
"Recalling its resolutions 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, 998 (ES-I) and 999 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956, 1002 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956, 1120 (XI) of 24 November 1956 and 1123 (XI) of 19 January 1957,
"1. Deplores the non-compliance of Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line despite the repeated requests of the General Assembly;
"2. Calls upon Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line without further delay."
RESOLUTION 1125 (XI), as submitted by seven Powers A/3518, adopted by Assembly on 2 February 1957, meeting 652, by roll-call vote of 56 to 0, with 22 abstentions, as follows:
"The General Assembly,
"Having received the report of the Secretary-General of 24 January 1957,
"Recognizing that withdrawal by Israel must be followed by action which would assure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions,
"1. Notes with appreciation the Secretary-General's report and the measures therein to be carried out upon Israel's complete withdrawal;
"2. Calls upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949;
"3. Considers that, after full withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza areas, the scrupulous maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line and the implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary-General's report with due regard to the considerations set out therein with a view to assist in achieving situations conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area;
"4. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties concerned, to take steps to carry out these measures and to report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly."
A/3527. Report of Secretary-General in pursuance of resolution 1125(XI) of General Assembly of 2 February 1957. Annexes I-V: Aide-mémoire of 4 February and letter of 5 February 1957 from Permanent Representative of Israel; Letter of 6 February from Secretary-General to Permanent Representative of Israel; Letters of 10 February and 25 January 1957 from Permanent Representative of Israel.
A/3563. Note by Secretary-General, and Annex: Memorandum of important points in discussion between representative of Israel and Secretary-General on 25 February 1957.
A/3557. Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sudan draft resolution.
A/3568. Report of Secretary-General in pursuance of resolutions 1124 (XI) and 1125 (XI), adopted by Assembly on 2 February 1957.
THE SUEZ CANAL CLEARANCE OPERATION
A/3376. Report of Secretary-General on arrangements for clearing Suez Canal
A/3306. Letter of 6 November 1956 from representative of United Kingdom.
A/3307. Letter of 6 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of France.
A/3313. Letter of 7 November 1956 from Secretary-General to Minister of Foreign Affairs of France.
A/3314. Letter of 7 November 1956 from Secretary-General to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of United Kingdom.
A/3377. Letter of 19 November 1956 from representative of France.
A/3382. Note verbale of 11 November 1956 from Permanent Representative of United Kingdom.
A/3386. Canada, Colombia, India, Norway, United States, Yugoslavia draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 1121(XI), as submitted by six Powers, A/3386, adopted by Assembly on 24 November 1956, meeting 594, by 65 votes to 0, with 9 abstentions. (For text, see above, under DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE.)
A/3492. Second report of Secretary-General on clearing of Suez Canal. Annex I: Summary of plan of work and of resources; Annex II: Agreement between United Nations and Egypt regarding clearance of Suez Canal; Annex III: Note by Secretary-General to Member Governments on interim advances to Fund for clearance of Suez Canal.
ADJOURNMENT OF DEBATE
A/3570. Brazil, Canada, Colombia, United States, Iran, Japan, Norway draft resolution.
RESOLUTION 1119 (XI), as submitted by seven Powers A/3570, adopted by Assembly on 8 March 1957, meeting 668, by 65 votes to 0, with 6 abstentions.
"The General Assembly,
"Recalling resolution 1109 (XI) of 15 February 1957 concerning the progress of the work of the eleventh session and the closing date of the session,
"Having completed consideration of all the item of its agenda with the exception of items 66 and 67,
"Decides, in accordance with rule 6 of the rule of procedure, to adjourn its eleventh session temporarily and to authorize the President of the General Assembly, in consultation with the Secretary-General and with the Member States the representatives of which are serving on the General Committee during the session, to reconvene the General Assembly as necessary in order to consider further items 66 or 67."
ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINE REFUGEES
REPORTS OF DIRECTOR AND ADVISORY COMMISSION
The Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) submitted to the General Assembly's eleventh session his annual report for the period 1 July 1955-30 June 1956 and a special report on the Agency's activities from 1 November to mid-December 1956 resulting directly from the crisis in the Near East. Also before the Assembly was a special report from the Agency's Advisory Commission.
The Director's annual report showed that progress in the long-term task of helping refugees to become self-supporting had been slow and fragmentary. Relief work had been as satisfactory as local conditions and funds permitted. The Agency's ability to continue its work in all fields would depend upon the funds made available, upon the attitude and co-operation of both the refugees and the host Governments, and upon political conditions in the area of operations.
The annual report drew the following conclusions: (1) The work of the Agency must be considered against the political background of the Palestine question, to which the refugee problem was inextricably linked. The continuing demand of the great mass of the refugees for return to their homes was supported by the Arab Governments. The refugees remained opposed to the development of large-scale projects for self-support, which they erroneously linked with permanent resettlement and abandonment of repatriation. Limited progress, how. ever, had been achieved in that field. (2) Regardless of future political developments, the need for relief would continue beyond the term of the Agency's mandate. The longer a political solution was delayed, the longer would relief be required. (3) If the Assembly wished the Agency to continue its services, it must review the extent and scope of those services in the light of the Agency's financial and other operational difficulties, decide on the desirable extent of UNRWA's responsibilities and provide clear directives for the future. Those directives should cover such matters as the standards of relief services to be provided, the extent of the education programme, a possible programme of public and other work for the Gaza Strip, the possible extension of the Agency's mandate so as to permit it to encourage the general economic development of the host countries in ways that would indirectly benefit the refugees and the possible expansion of the rolls to include needy, hitherto ineligible, categories of claimants for relief who had remained unaided because of lack of funds. (4) It was of the utmost importance both that the Assembly should make available, in sufficient time, adequate funds to enable the Agency to carry out its future responsibilities and that the host Governments should give their full and open cooperation to the Agency.
An account of the relief activities was also given m the annual report. Approximately 922,000 refugees, half of whom were children under 15, were on the Agency's register, an increase of some 16,000 over the pervious year, the report pointed out. There were 216,971 refugees in the Gaza Strip; 512,706 in Jordan; 102,623 in Lebanon; and 89,977 in Syria.
Rations were being provided for about 1,600 calories daily in winter and 1,500 calories in summer. Pregnant and nursing women received a supplementary ration. Further, an average of 190,000 babies, children under 15, pregnant and nursing women and sick persons received daily milk rations. As to shelter, the aims were, first, to replace tents with huts in existing camps and to build new camps to replace unsuitable accommodation and, second, to provide accommodation in camps, the population of which had increased from 37.1 per cent of the total registered refugees to 38.9 per cent. The number of huts had risen from 63,000 to 83,000; the number of tents remained at about 14,000. The Agency also wished to provide new shelter for the first time for some 65,000 refugee families who had always been inadequately housed or whose resources were now exhausted.
Higher standards of care in preventive health services were considered necessary on account of the overcrowding and living conditions in the camps. Health in general continued to be satisfactory, although more hospital facilities for tuberculosis patients and more maternal and child health care services were needed.
As an experiment, it was planned that some of the handicapped children would enter existing institutions for specialized training and placement. If successful, this experiment would be extended, thus leading to the rehabilitation of several thousand refugees who would otherwise remain a permanent burden on their countries of residence. For the first time, some new clothes were being provided by the Agency for refugee children. This did not, however, diminish the need for clothing and shoes collected by voluntary agencies.
The present standards of feeding, shelter and health services were satisfactory neither to the Agency the refugees, nor to the host Governments, though they had improved since the start of the Agency's work.
The annual report pointed out, too, that large numbers of refugees were willing to work and many had found part- or full-time work. But opportunities were scarce in the Gaza Strip and Jordan, where most of the refugees lived. The willingness of individuals to work would not therefore make the mass of the refugees self-supporting. The refugees as a whole continued to resist large-scale projects with permanent implications. The Agency thus considered it advisable to pursue with vigour those rehabilitation activities in which the refugees and host Governments were prepared to co-operate, and to make plans for the time when it might be possible to move ahead to larger-scale constructive enterprises.
In the absence of wider and bolder political decisions about the entire refugee problem, there should be no optimism about solving it, the annual report cautioned.
Next to relief services, it pointed out, the educational system was the part of the Agency's programme most acceptable to refugees and host Governments. The Agency had instituted a system of teacher training and introduced a new salary scale. The technical training programme had not developed rapidly because of local political disturbances and the difficulty of finding sites for centres. The handicraft-training experiment in Gaza had proved a success, and it was planned to extend the programme to Jordan. Children leaving elementary schools in the Gaza Strip were generally unable to find work. To keep them occupied, the Agency had, at the urging of the Egyptian authorities, allowed a larger number than originally contemplated to attend secondary school. This, however, only postponed the issue and could only lead to increased frustration and social unrest in the absence of increased opportunities for work in Gaza and other parts of the Near East. The report added that UNRWA had been unable to meet the full costs of subsidizing refugee education in government, mission and other schools, particularly as more children entered secondary schools.
The Agency's placement service had found employment for nearly 20,000 persons during the year. Most jobs were short-term or seasonal and did not result in permanent self-support. The service also gave travel grants to 1,040 refugees who had obtained visas on their own initiative for purposes of emigration. The Agency had a number of projects under execution or contemplation, mostly in agriculture. The two major projects, the Yarmuk-Jordan Valley and the Sinai projects, could not be implemented. Although the engineering and feasibility reports for the former had been completed, work could not begin until agreement was reached between the Governments concerned. As to the Sinai project, the Egyptian Government had stated that there was not enough water from current resources for it.
The completion of smaller agricultural, housing, irrigation and afforestation projects led to the settlement of some families. The individual grants programme for refugees in Syria engaged in small commercial enterprises continued. Loans and grants were increased in Jordan to assist the development of various enterprises, including housebuilding. Political opposition to the programme continued, but on a smaller scale. Larger enterprises were assisted in Jordan by the Jordan Development Bank, the Agency subscribing the greater part of the Bank's capital.
The Director's special report described the effects of the recent hostilities in the Near East on the refugees and the emergency actions taken by UNRWA, particularly in the Gaza Strip, as a result of the military operations. It listed additional costs incurred, up to mid-December, of $465,000, and urged Members to make adequate contributions, lest the Agency be forced to reduce its meagre services to the detriment of the refugees.
In its special report, the Advisory Commission of the Agency hoped the Assembly would be able to resolve the conflict of views between the Agency and the host Governments on relief and rehabilitation by restating the Agency's mandate. While the contributing governments deemed relief dependent on the extent of available contributions, the host Governments had tended to consider that the United Nations had a responsibility to establish the necessary standards and that the Member States should meet the necessary expenses. Regarding rehabilitation, the contributing governments emphasized the need of rendering the refugees self-supporting through large-scale works and investments, whereas the host Governments regarded such projects as implying the permanent resettlement of refugees in contravention of their right of repatriation. Hence, the work of the Agency concerning rehabilitation had remained confined to a few minor projects. As to finances, the report stated that the difficulties arising from inadequate funds, unpaid pledges and the recent emergency situation might bring about severe cuts in the services provided by the Agency if additional contributions were not made immediately. The relief budget of $43.4 million, established for the fiscal period 1 July 1956-31 December 1957, was inadequate to meet the basic needs of the refugees. The Agency would enter the new calendar year 1957 with funds of $4.9 million, sufficient only for two months.
CONSIDERATION BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY
The question of assistance to Palestine refugees was considered at the General Assembly's eleventh session by the Special Political Committee between 11 and 23 February 1957.
At the outset of discussions, the Director of UNRWA stated that the longer the problem of Palestine refugees remained unsolved, the more dangerous would be the consequences for the countries of the Near East, as well as for other Members of the United Nations. He also said that unless the refugees were given the choice between repatriation or compensation as provided by Assembly resolution 194 (III) or unless some other political settlement of the Pales-: tine problem could be reached, the Assembly would be unable to implement the resolution of the Assembly calling for the reintegration of f the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or by resettlement.
In the course of the discussion, some Arab representatives took the view that the main obstacle to the solution of the refugee problem was Israel's refusal to comply with United Nations resolutions concerning repatriation or compensation. It was essential for the United Nations to exert efforts to restore to the refugees their rights to repatriation or compensation. Suggestions for resettlement and rehabilitation of the refugees, as advanced by Israel, for instance, as the only acceptable solution. were considered unrealistic, since the refugees' desire for repatriation remained unabated. The rehabilitation projects, even if implemented, could provide for only a portion of them. No Arab State could co-operate with the Agency regarding the resettlement or rehabilitation of refugees until a political settlement had been attempted. The host Governments, they said, had co-operated with the Agency and they pledged continued support in the future.
The representative of Israel observed that the only practicable solution of the refugee problem was resettlement and not repatriation. By keeping alive the refugees' illusions about recreating an Arab Palestine at the expense of Israel, the refugees had been instigated to resist resettlement. However, some progress had already taken place with respect to the reintegration of refugees in some Arab countries. While Israel could not solve the problem through repatriation, on account of vital demographic, security and social reasons, it stood by its offer to pay compensation for abandoned Arab property, although that offer could not be implemented as long as the economic warfare by Arab States against Israel persisted.
At the request of the representative of Iraq, the Special Political Committee also heard a statement by Dr. Izzat Tannous, a Palestine refugee, Secretary-General of the Arab Palestine Office for Refugees in Beirut.
On 22 February 1957, Argentina, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted a joint draft resolution. This was twice revised the following day, with the same sponsors, except the Netherlands. By the final revised text, the Assembly would direct the Agency to pursue its programmes for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees, bearing in mind the limitation imposed upon it by the extent of the contributions for the fiscal year; request the host Government to co-operate with the Agency in carrying out its functions; request the Governments of the area, without prejudice to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), in cooperation with the Director of the Agency, to plan and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees. The Assembly would also ask the Agency to continue its consultation with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best reference of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). It would decide to retain the rehabilitation fund and authorize the Director in his discretion to disburse such monies as might be available to the individual host Governments for general economic development projects, subject to agreement by any such Government that within a fixed period of time it would assume financial responsibility for an agreed number of refugees, such number to be commensurate with the cost of the project without prejudice to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III). In addition, the Assembly would reiterate its appeal to private organizations and governments to assist in meeting the serious needs of other lain ants for relief. It would also urge all governments to contribute to the extent necessary to fulfil the Agency's programmes, and it would note with approval the Agency's programme for he refugees in the Gaza Strip.
The co-sponsors of the draft resolution, recalling the difficulties involved in the solution of the refugee question, stated that it could be resolved only through a genuine co-operation between the parties. Israel should do its utmost regarding the issue of repatriation, they also felt, and the Arab States should co-operate with the refugees for the implementation of the reintegration and development projects.
At the conclusion of the debate, the Director of UNRWA expressed satisfaction at the fact that the host Governments had given assurances of co-operation with the Agency. This meant that problems which had arisen or might arise could be solved or avoided. He stressed how serious it would be if the Agency did not receive adequate funds, and he appealed for pledges and prompt payments from former contributors and new Member Governments as well as from all those who had not yet contributed. It was his understanding that if sufficient funds were not made available, priority should be given to basic rations, medical services, shelter and clothing.
The draft resolution, as revised, was adopted by the Special Political Committee on 23 February by a roll-call vote of 66 votes to 0, with 1 abstention (Iraq), after separate votes on individual paragraphs. Five days later, the General Assembly approved it as resolution 1018 (XI) at a plenary meeting by 68 votes to 0, with 1 abstention.
DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES
GENERAL ASSEMBLY – 11TH SESSION
PLENARY MEETING 663.
SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE meetings 23-25.
A/3212. Annual report of Director of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in Near East, covering period 1 July 1955-30 June 1956.
A/3212/Add.1. Special report of Director of UNRWA, covering period 1 November 1956 to mid-December 1956.
A/3498. Special report of Advisory Commission of UNRWA.
A/SPC/9, A/SPC/13. Statements by Director of UNRWA before Special Political Committee on 11 and 23 February 1957.
A/SPC/11. Letter of 11 February 1957 from Chairman of delegation of Iraq to Chairman of Special Political Committee.
A/SPC/L.l3 and Rev.1. Argentina, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, United Kingdom, United States draft resolution and revision.
A/SPC/L.13/Rev.2. Argentina, New Zealand, Philippines, United Kingdom, United States revised draft resolution, adopted by the Special Political Committee on 23 February 1957, by roll-call vote of 66 to 0, with I abstention (Iraq).
A/3562. Report of Special Political Committee.
RESOLUTION 1018 (XI), as recommended by Special Political Committee, A/3562, adopted by Assembly on 28 February 1957, meeting 663, by 68 votes to 0, with 1 abstention.
"The General Assembly,
"Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (1X) of 4 December 1954 and 916 (X) of 3 December 1955,
"Noting the annual report and the special report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the report of the Advisory Commission of the Agency,
"Having reviewed the budget for relief and rehabilitation prepared by the Director of the Agency,
"Noting with concern that contributions to that budget are not yet sufficient,
"Noting that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,
"Noting that the host Governments have expressed the wish that the Agency continue to carry out its mandate in their respective countries or territories and have expressed their wish to co-operate fully with the Agency and to extend to it every appropriate assistance in carrying out its functions, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations, the terms of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the contents of paragraph 17 of resolution 302 (IV) and the terms of the agreements with the host Governments,
"1. Directs the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to pursue its programme for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees, bearing in mind the limitation imposed upon it by the extent of the contributions for the fiscal year;
"2. Requests the host Governments to co-operate fully with the Agency and with its personnel and to extend to the Agency every appropriate assistance in carrying out its functions;
"3. Requests the Governments of the area, without prejudice to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, in cooperation with the Director of the Agency, to plan and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees;
"4. Requests the Agency to continue its consultations with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interest of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 1 94 (III);
"5. Decides to retain the rehabilitation fund and authorizes the Director of the Agency, at his discretion, to disburse such monies as may be available to the individual host Governments for general economic development projects, subject to agreement by any such Government that, within a fixed period of time, it will assume financial responsibility for an agreed number of refugees, such number to be commensurate with the cost of the project, without prejudice to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);
"6. Reiterates its appeal to private organizations and Governments to assist in meeting the serious needs of other claimants for relief as referred to in paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 916 (X) of 3 December 1955;
"7. Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds, after receipt of the requests for contributions from the Director of the Agency, to seek from the Members of the United Nations the financial assistance needed;
"8. Urges all Governments to contribute or to increase their contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to fulfilment the Agency's relief and rehabilitation programmes;
"9. Notes with approval the action of the Agency in continuing to carry out its programme for the refugees in the Gaza Strip;
"10. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out its mandate, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees;
"11. Notes that the Agency is changing its financial period from a fiscal to a calendar year basis and that, consequently, the current budgets cover an eighteen-month period from I July 1956 to 31 December 1957, and that special arrangements for the audit of funds in this period are being made with the United Nations Board of Auditors;
"12. Requests the Director of the Agency to continue to submit the reports referred to in paragraph 21 of General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, as modified by paragraph 11 above."
1/ See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1955, pp. 34-35. (The Yearbook is cited hereafter as Y.U.N.)
2/ In a series of letters between June and September 1956, Israel had protested to the Security Council that Egypt had prevented the passage of the Greek ship Panagia bound from Haifa to Eilat, Israel, and had confiscated the Israel vessel Bat Galim, which had been seized in September 1954.
emspecsess1.56
Document Type: Yearbook
Document Sources: General Assembly 1st Emergency Special Session, United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI)
Subject: Closures/Curfews/Blockades, Expulsions and deportations, Gaza Strip, History, Water
Publication Date: 31/12/1956