Economic and social repercussion of the Israeli occupation – ESCWA report

Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan

Note by the Secretary-General***

In its resolution 2003/59 of 24 July 2003, the Economic and Social Council requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session, through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The Assembly, in its resolution 58/229 of 23 December 2003, also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its fifty-ninth session. The annexed report, which has been prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), is submitted in response to the two resolutions. A report of the Secretary-General on assistance to the Palestinian people is also being submitted to the Assembly through the Council, as requested in Assembly resolution 58/113 of 17 December 2003. The annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) provides information, inter alia, on the socio-economic conditions of the registered population in the occupied Palestinian territory.

04-37944 (E)    300604

* A/59/50 and Corr.1.

** E/2004/100.

*** A longer period for clearance was required for extensive consultations within the various United Nations entities at Headquarters and in the field. The report annexed to the present note was therefore delayed three weeks for processing.

Annex

Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia on the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan*

* The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to acknowledge with appreciation the substantive contributions to the present report of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (OCHA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO) as well as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 2003/59 of 24 July 2003, the Economic and Social Council stressed the importance of reviving the Middle East peace process on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of

22 October 1973, 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978 and 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, and the principle of land for peace as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people. In the same resolution, the Economic and Social Council reaffirmed the applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of

12 August 1949,1 to the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967; stressed the need to preserve the territorial integrity of all of the occupied Palestinian territory and to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods in the territory, including the removal of restrictions on travel to East Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement to and from the outside world; reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the Syrian Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and called upon Israel not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of those resources; also reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, were illegal and an obstacle to economic and social development; and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly, through the Council, a report on the implementation of the resolution.

2. In its resolution 58/229 of 23 December 2003, the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources, including land and water; and called upon Israel, the occupying power, not to exploit, cause loss or depletion of or endanger the natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan. In the same resolution, the Assembly noted the detrimental impact on Palestinian natural resources of the wall being constructed by Israel inside the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and of its grave effect on the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people; recognized the right of the Palestinian people to claim restitution as a result of any exploitation, loss or depletion of, or danger to, their natural resources, and expressed the hope that that issue would be dealt with in the framework of the final status negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides; and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its fifty-ninth session on the implementation of the resolution.

II. Occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem

Deaths and injuries

3. Between 1 December 2002 and 31 December 2003, 785 Palestinian fatalities as well as 5,130 injuries were recorded.2 Children bear a particular brunt of the conflict. Since September 2000, 512 Palestinian children have been killed, and more than 9,000 have been injured.3

4. Israel has intensified its policy of extrajudicial killings of Palestinians suspected of involvement in armed attacks against Israelis, which culminated in the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin on 22 March 2004 and of Abdelaziz Rantissi on 17 April 2004. From October 2000 to 1 March 2004, Israeli army extrajudicial killings/attempts resulted in the deaths of 349 Palestinians, including at least 137 bystanders, among them 35 children and 25 women.4 The Secretary-General repeatedly expressed his apprehension that extrajudicial killings would lead to further bloodshed and death and acts of revenge and retaliation, reiterating that these acts were against international law and calling upon the Government of Israel immediately to end that practice.5

5. While the purpose of the present report is to describe the effects of the Israeli occupation on the Palestinian people, it is important to point out that, since September 2000, 946 Israelis have been killed and injured as a result of the conflict. The Secretary-General has condemned acts of terrorism and has called upon the Palestinian Authority to bring to justice those who plan, facilitate and carry out attacks on Israeli civilians.

Arbitrary arrests and detentions

6. Approximately 8,000 Palestinians remain in Israeli prisons and detention centres,6 including 70 women and 175 juveniles as young as 12 years of age.7 Some 800 persons remain in administrative detention, without any charge or judicial procedure.8

7. At least for the first half of 2003, “hundreds of Palestinians have been subjected to one degree or another of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, at the hands of the GSS (General Security Service) and bodies working on its behalf”.9 This is in addition to other forms of abuse, including harsh solitary confinement and neglect of Palestinian prisoners’ medical needs, which has resulted in deaths.10

8. Responding to an August 2003 High Court petition, the Israeli Government admitted the existence of a secret military prison (Camp 1391). Prisoners, their lawyers and their families do not know the prison’s location, and Israeli authorities have censored the media’s publication of the prison’s location, or prisoners’ names or conditions. The Israeli Government has banned the International Committee of the Red Cross, Knesset members and media access to the facility. On 1 December, the High Court ordered the Israeli Government to release information on this prison by 20 February 2004; however, it remains secret.11

Population displacement

9. Israel transferred at least 19 Palestinians from their residence in the West Bank to Gaza in 2003. The Israeli High Court dismissed all of their appeals.12 In December, Israel denied entry to three Palestinians deported from abroad to the West Bank and Gaza, returning them to the deporting country, where they currently reside as stateless persons.13

10. Israel’s confiscation and destruction of Palestinian homes and lands swelled the numbers of homeless and internally displaced Palestinians by 13,000-16,000 persons in 2003,14 without their recognition as refugees eligible for international relief and protection. This has been in addition to some 2 per cent of the Palestinian population already forced to change their place of residence during October 2000-May 2001 owing to Israeli house demolitions and incursions.15

Property destruction and confiscation

11. Home demolition is among the most destructive Israeli practices in socio-economic terms. Some 28,000 Palestinian homes remain under threat of demolition at any moment.16 The violence accompanying these demolitions was dramatized on 16 March 2003, when an Israeli bulldozer crushed to death United States solidarity worker Rachel Corrie while she tried to defend a Palestinian home in Gaza from destruction.17 From 1 December 2002 to 31 December 2003, the Israeli army demolished 511 homes in the West Bank, of which 77 were shelters of refugees whom Israeli forces had previously dispossessed. In the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army completely or partially demolished at least 858 homes in 2003, of which 776 were refugee shelters.18 In largely refugee neighbourhoods of Rafah, southern Gaza, Israel has totally demolished 961 homes, leaving 9,434 people homeless.19

12. In the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army bulldozed 1,107 acres of land with their 132,840 trees, and destroyed five water wells, while also demolishing houses during 2003. Cumulatively, Israeli forces have levelled 10 per cent of Gaza’s arable land.20 However, Israel conducted most 2003 confiscations in the path of the barrier in the West Bank. From 29 September 2000 to 31 May 2003, Israeli army and settlers uprooted hundreds of thousands of olive, citrus and other fruit trees, destroyed 806 wells and 296 agricultural warehouses, tore up 2,000 roads and blocked thousands of others with concrete and dirt mounds.21 According to the World Bank, damage inflicted on agriculture reached $217 million in 2003.22

13. Israeli military ordnance and equipment, as well as Israeli soldiers and settlers, have damaged or destroyed both private and public Palestinian infrastructure. Deterioration of equipment and infrastructure was calculated at $700 million-

$800 million towards a combined value of $1.7 billion lost at the beginning of 2003. Calculable physical damage to the Palestinian economy from September 2002 through April 2003 stands at $370 million, cumulatively totalling $1.1 billion since October 2000.23 This indicates sharp reductions in existing capital stock, thereby contracting domestic supply capacities. Israel’s destruction of Palestinian-built environment and infrastructure contrasts with its simultaneous build-up of settlements and related infrastructure facilitating illegal population transfer.

Mobility restrictions and closure policies

14. Restricting movement of goods and persons exacerbates the humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory by deepening unemployment and poverty, preventing health care, interrupting education and generally humiliating the Palestinian people individually and collectively. Curfews in 2003 generally were less severe than in 2002. An average of 390,000 civilians were under curfew in November 2002-April 2003, compared with 520,000 in the second half of 2002. However, inhabitants of Hebron, Jenin and parts of Gaza came under tighter and more continuous curfew during 2003.24

15. Since March 2003, the construction of 85 new checkpoints, 538 different types of trenches and ditches, 47 road gates and blockades, and innumerable “flying” (mobile) checkpoints has effectively dissected the entire occupied territory into more discontiguous, isolated pockets.25

16. Between December 2002 and December 2003, the Israeli army closed the Erez Checkpoint (Gaza) for 138 days, the Erez Industrial Zone for 15 days, and the main commercial crossing at Karni, Gaza, for 57 days, plus 51 partial days, with the southern Gaza checkpoint at Sufa closed for 141 days. The Israeli army completely closed the Rafah crossing, on the Egyptian border, and closed the border to 15-35 year-old Palestinian males for 105 days. Within the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army prevented passage on the main north-south access road at Gush Qatif settlement for 336 partial days, and entirely for two days, while fully foreclosing all traffic through Gaza’s north-south artery at Netzarim Junction for 342 days. Israeli occupation forces maintained the complete closure of the Gaza Airport throughout the period, and allowed no effort towards its repair or operation.26

Israeli settlements

17. Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, deemed illegal by the international community, continue to fuel the conflict, with detrimental repercussions on the living conditions of the Palestinian people. In the West Bank, Israel has more than 136 settlements with 236,000 settlers. In the Gaza Strip, 17 settlements house some 7,000 settlers. About 180,000 settlers live in occupied East Jerusalem. Some of the settlements are now completely developed towns and villages, as is the case for the Ariel (population 17,000), in the West Bank, and Ma’aleh Edumim (East Jerusalem), with a population of 28,000.27

18. There is no “freeze” on the construction or growth of settlements, as the road map of the Quartet (S/2003/529, annex) demanded. All settlement categories remain a significant portion of Israel’s public investment28 and new building in settlements actually increased in 2003 by 35 per cent.29 In 2003, the Israeli Government budgeted 1.9 billion Israeli new shequalim (NIS) for settlements,30 while construction activity inside Israel itself has fallen to its lowest level in more than a decade.31 Moreover, settlement population growth is increasing 16 per cent under the current government, compared with 1.8 per cent in Israel. In Gaza, Kfar Darom grew 52 per cent, and Netzarim 24 per cent in the last three years. In the West Bank, Tupuach increased by 50 per cent, Yitzhar by 30 per cent and Hebron settlements grew 15 per cent.32

19. More significant than the numbers of settlers is the land area exclusively allotted to settlements. The planning zone for Ma’aleh Edumim extends from the Palestinian village of al-`Azariyya to the outskirts of Jericho, nearly the entire width of the West Bank at that point. Already in 2002, the settler planning zones had absorbed 41.9 per cent of West Bank land.33 A 400-metre-wide “sterile zone” surrounds most of them, while bypass roads and other infrastructure linking settlements to each other and to Israel strategically consume Palestinians’ land.34

20. The total area confiscated for settlements, or designated as military zones in the Gaza Strip, amounts to 165.04 square kilometres (km2), or 45 per cent of the Gaza territory, benefiting 7,000 settlers. This compares with the situation of over

1 million Palestinians eking out a living on the remaining 55 per cent of land. Gaza’s Palestinian population density is one of the world’s highest, and almost 100 times that of Israeli settlers.35

21. The Israeli Government’s settlement entrenchment is symbiotic with the West Bank separation barrier, which has led to the confiscation and fragmentation of Palestinian land. Such a policy has given rise to serious concerns about the future possibility of establishing an independent, contiguous and viable Palestinian State. Official Israeli perseverance manifests in generous allocation of military and financial resources to settlements and the barrier.

22. Despite Israel’s official budget commitment to settlements, a July 2003 Israeli poll revealed that 74 per cent of the settlers in the occupied territory would leave their settlements in return for compensation.36

Barrier

23. The barrier is a complex of 8-metre-high walls, trenches up to 4 metres deep, earthen and concrete mounds, double walls, fences with electronic sensors, asphalt two-lane patrol roads, a trace strip to detect footprints and a stack of six barbed-wire coils. The barrier also features several “depth barriers”, ancillary structures 150 metres long, placed a few kilometres further east, apparently to channel traffic flows towards five checkpoints. In addition, 26 “agricultural checkpoints” were planned in the first phase.37

24. With a total length — both planned and built — of 638 km,38 the barrier’s design incorporates 975 km2 (16.6 per cent) of occupied land on the side towards Israel. This constitutes the occupied territory inhabited by 320,000 settlers, including those in occupied Jerusalem.39

25. Only 6 per cent of the barrier lies within 100 metres of the Green Line. It deviates up to 22 km inside the West Bank.40 Approximately, 191,000 acres — or about 13.5 per cent — of West Bank land (excluding East Jerusalem) will lie between the barrier and the Green Line, according to Israeli government projections. This will include 39,000 acres enclosed in a series of enclaves and 152,000 acres in closed areas between the Green Line and the barrier. This land, some of the most fertile in the West Bank, is currently the home of more than 189,000 Palestinians living in 100 villages and towns. Of these people, 20,000 will live in closed areas — areas between the barrier and the Green Line. Another 169,000 will live in nine enclaves — totally surrounded by the barrier. The barrier will also affect those people living east of it who need to have access to their farms, jobs and services.41

26. With the barrier, Israel effectively will annex most of the western aquifer system (which provides 51 per cent of the West Bank’s water resources). It severs communities from their land and water, leaving them without other means of subsistence, and forcing many Palestinians living in these areas to leave, as has already been the case with 6,000-8,000 Qalqiliya residents. Reportedly, some 600 shops and enterprises have closed in Qalqiliya as a result.42 Israeli military forces accompanying the process have destroyed homes and commercial structures in their course, as in the town of Nazlat Issa, to the north of Qalqiliya, where Israeli forces demolished at least 7 homes and 125 shops to make way for the barrier wall.43 In Aqaba village (West Bank), 12 out of its 18 structures face demolition. Israel has destroyed many thousands of fruit and olive trees in pursuance of the construction.44

27. To acquire land for the barrier, Israel’s West Bank Military Commander has issued military orders, requisitioning private property. Similarly in Jerusalem, the Ministry of Defence has issued requisitioning orders for land.45 Confiscation orders become operative when signed, whether or not they are served to the owner. The owner generally has one week from the signature date to appeal the requisition. Some such orders are retroactive. However, most of the petitions to the Appeals Committee or the High Court have been denied, although some confiscations have been delayed and reduced under appeal46 and the High Court has urged negotiations with affected villages regarding the route. The speed with which the occupying Power is building the barrier, working 24 hours a day, makes any proper judicial process difficult. The Government of Israel has announced that it will change the route of the barrier so that it will be closer to the Green Line.

28. On 2 October, Israel’s Military Government in the occupied territory issued a series of Military Orders determining that “no person will enter the ‘seam zone’ and no one will remain there”. These directives affect 73 km2 and some 5,300 Palestinians living in 15 communities. Indigenous residents so far have been able to obtain permits to remain in their homes at considerable expenditure of time and resources, but only for incremental periods of one, three or six months. According to the Israeli army, there are 27 gates (out of a total 46 gates) through the barrier open to Palestinians with the correct permit, although the Palestinians claim only 19 can be used. In some agricultural areas, crossings are open for 15-30 minutes, three times a day, or according to Israeli soldiers’ arbitrary criteria.47

Natural resources, water and environment

29. On average, Palestinians use 70 litres of water per capita daily. Israelis in the settlements use 350 litres (or 500 per cent of Palestinian consumption).48 Israel extracts more than 85 per cent of its water from occupied Palestinian territory aquifers and inequitable Israeli distribution has created a serious water shortage in the occupied territory, despite local resources. Under the system of checkpoints and closures, water tankers cannot always reach villages, leaving some communities without water for days at a time.49 The situation is desperate for some 280 rural communities in the occupied territory with no access to wells or running water, who depend completely on municipal or private water deliveries. Under present economic and trade dependence, Palestinian tanker services have typically purchased water from the Israeli national water carrier at 80 per cent inflation after September 2000,50 and 60 per cent of Palestinian families depend on tanker water, which costs 17-40 per cent of household incomes in summer months.51

30. In the first phase of the barrier construction, Palestinians lost 29 wells with a total annual yield of 3,880,000 cubic metres (m3).52 In Abu Nujaym (Bethlehem area), the Israeli army severed the water delivery system by digging up and destroying the pipelines.53 Physical damage to the occupied territory water and waste-water sector from Israeli military actions is valued at about $140 million.54

Food

31. Occupation policies and practices have depleted Palestinians’ food consumption by 25-30 per cent since September 2000, and Palestinians are now consuming less protein-rich foods.55 The main cause is job loss and curfews.56 The occupied Palestinian territory is not currently self-sufficient in food: much of the cereals, sugar and oils, making up 65 per cent of current dietary calories, are imported. Some 1.4 million people (40 per cent of the population) live with food insecurity, and another 1.1 million (30 per cent) face imminent threat of food insecurity if present conditions continue.57 As of 2003, 13.2 per cent of children in the Gaza Strip under age 5, and 4.3 per cent of children in the West Bank, suffered from acute malnutrition. Chronic malnutrition now afflicts 17.5 per cent of children in the Gaza Strip and 7.9 per cent of children in the West Bank.58

32. The United Nations and other international and non-governmental organizations provide food aid to the Palestinians. However, food aid offers no sustainable solution. Relief food supplies provide 80 per cent of the total dietary energy supplies (mainly wheat flour). Domestic production is essential in augmenting this diet.59

Housing

33. Overcrowding has resulted from the waves of population transfer. New and expanding settlements have severely depleted Palestinian housing and housing prospects, especially around hill-top settlements.60 With a current population of 3.3 million Palestinians in the occupied territory, and a projected total of 4.0 million by 2010, natural growth now places housing needs at 151,000 units over 2001-2010, or roughly 15,000 units per year.61 In addition to Israel’s seizure of Palestinian habitat, prohibitive economic conditions under closure, and current Palestinian institutional capacity (producing under 10,000 units per year) prefigure an increased housing deficit and still greater density. High density of housing is a source of a range of family-level problems, from skin ailments to domestic violence.62

34. Besides destruction and confiscation of Palestinian habitat, there is the increasingly prohibitive cost of building needed homes. Building restrictions have depleted the potential housing supply, pushing up housing prices in time of crisis. Closure has also inflated the cost of transportation and building materials, having raised housing costs by 12 per cent during the first 15 months after September 2000.63

35. At the level of the Palestinian Authority, housing finance institutions do not provide appropriate solutions for the neediest segments of the population, and the Palestinian Housing Ministry has developed no housing policy to date. The essence of the challenge lies in the lack of Palestinian control over land and resources.64

Public health

36. Checkpoints and curfews have lowered health standards by preventing access to hospitals and clinics, impeding health-care programmes (for example, vaccinations) and leading to untreated psychological trauma arising from the physical, economic and social consequences of occupation.65 Despite constrained capacity, budget and movement, the demand for UNRWA medical services increased 40.3 per cent in the West Bank, and 45.1 per cent in Gaza, totalling 4.4 million visits during the period from mid-2002 to mid-2003.66 With the increase in demand, the quality of service has declined, especially with most facilities operating with reduced staff and inadequate transport, water, electricity and medical supplies under Israeli-imposed restrictions.67

37. The accessibility, affordability, availability and quality of reproductive health have deteriorated. Anaemia afflicted 48 per cent in 2003, up from 31.5 per cent in 2002 and 23.4 per cent in 2001. The percentage of birth deliveries in hospital has declined annually. Only 33 per cent of mothers received antenatal care, and just 19 per cent received any post-natal care last year.68 Owing to deteriorating water quality, dysentery and intestinal parasites have increased significantly.69

38. The Palestinian birth rate in the occupied territory is estimated at 3.6 per cent, but low birth weight cases increased by 25 per cent in 2003, and infant weight monitoring declined by 5 per cent.70 The 36 per cent decline in the numbers of infants immunized on schedule prefigures disease outbreaks, including cross-border infections.71

39. The barrier is likely to further aggravate public-health conditions and services, leaving 73.7 per cent of the people to its west without access to a health facility. Medical personnel will be obstructed from reaching 76.4 per cent of them, and resulting economic destitution will leave 69 per cent unable to pay for services, including 65 per cent without any maternal care.72

Youth and education

40. In the occupied territory, 67 per cent of the population are aged 24 years or younger. The psychological effects of the conflict on children and youth derive from exposure to political violence, disruption of family life, loss of educational opportunities or other productive outlets, and general decline of living conditions. Most of the 9,000 children injured are adolescents (aged 13-18), a group more vulnerable to aggression, rebellion, risky behaviour, helplessness, frustration, depression and withdrawal. They manifest symptoms of sleeplessness, emotional problems, headaches, loss of appetite and volatility, running greater risk of mental disorder, domestic violence and self-destructive behaviour. About 75 per cent of adults report that children are experiencing more and greater emotional problems than one year ago.73 Hypertension is the principal psychological symptom among student-age children, who account for a quarter of all cases.74 The long-term consequences include the loss of confidence in adults, lack of respect for authority institutions, acceptance of violence as a means of solving problems, and diminished hopes or belief in a just or meaningful future.75

41. A decade of effort to improve the educational system has been lost with the closures and mobility restrictions, affecting nearly 1 million students and over 39,000 teachers in 1,900 schools. In the West Bank, 68 per cent of students reported obstacles to reaching their institutions in November 2002-November 2003.76 At least 498 schools closed during the 2002-2003 scholastic year, owing to movement restrictions that confined children to their homes. Israeli forces destroyed or damaged at least 269 schools.77

42. Palestinian students’ overall success rate dropped by 14.5 per cent in scholastic year 2002-2003, compared with scholastic year 2001-2002.78

Economic and social indicators

43. During 1998-2000, the occupied Palestinian territory’s economy had shown a steady 5 per cent annual growth. However, closure and curfew in 2003 led to losses and trade stagnation, raising unemployment and poverty.79 These conditions drove Palestine’s economy to be heavily dependent on informal sector activity, and petty commercial and rent-seeking services. Agriculture, forming the base of the Palestinian economy, is still practised, but under extremely repressive conditions. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has begun to refer to Palestine as a “war-torn economy”, because it shares the structural factors, external constraints, fiscal constraints and private sector performance common to other war-torn countries.80

44. Three years of economic decline have accumulated losses in the key indicators. In real terms, the Palestinian economy has lost all the growth it achieved in the preceding 15 years, with real gross domestic product (GDP) now below its 1986 level.81 The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of Finance point to an estimated growth rate of 4.5 per cent which, when matched with the population growth rate, indicates that per capita income remained constant in 2003. However, as a result of mobility restrictions, Palestinians still cannot resume normal, regular economic and trade relations, either inside the West Bank or with Israel — a prerequisite of economic recovery.82

45. The annual unemployment rate declined in the fourth quarter of 2003 to 26 per cent according to the International Labour Organization (ILO) definition, compared with a rate of 31 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2002. However, unemployment remained well above the pre-crisis (third quarter of 2000) level of 10 per cent. In 2003, jobs were recovered across various sectors of the economy: but according to Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics data, Palestinians increasingly are self-employed and working at unpaid labour. They are also turning to low productivity sectors like agriculture and commerce to find work, often creating disguised unemployment. That more Palestinians are now employed in agriculture than in construction, once a major source of jobs, is indicative of significant structural change in the economy. This change has been partly due to loss of jobs in Israel, which declined from 135,000 before the crisis to 57,000 in 2003.83

46. Israel resumed its payment of some clearance revenues owed to the Palestinian Authority, amounting to some $130 million in January-September 2003.84 However, the downward trend in most other indicators persisted. The political uncertainty, Israel’s cessation of clearance revenue payments, decreasing donor disbursements, Palestinian losses arising from the progressive construction of Israel’s West Bank barrier, breakdown of the ceasefire, and tougher Israeli restrictions on movement contributed to the net decline in macroeconomic indicators.85

47. By end-March 2003, household median income had plummeted to its lowest point, decreasing by 44 per cent since October 2000.86 About 47 per cent of households had lost more than 50 per cent of their income in the same period. Taking into consideration the 13 per cent growth in the population and the over 46 per cent drop in real incomes since 1999, poverty is increasing, with the rate having risen to 60 per cent, in 200287 and to 63 per cent, in mid-2003. Calculated as living on less than $2.1 per day, this rate of absolute poverty now afflicts 2 million food-dependent Palestinians.88

48. Combined factors brought unprecedented economic hardship and poverty in 2003. Salaries and social services to be provided by the Palestinian Authority (49 per cent of total household wage income) were not delivered.89 Moreover, Israeli army and settlers prevented farmers from accessing their fields to plant, tend, harvest or market produce. Most Palestinian workers in Israel — many originating from expelled and dispossessed communities inside the Green Line — lost their wages owing to closure, and unemployment which had been 10 per cent in 200090 reached 70 per cent in some areas.91

49. Households cope by drastically reducing consumption and expenditures for basic needs. Food consumption is down by 86 per cent92 and utility payments are delayed by 60 per cent. While 63 per cent of families have resorted to informal borrowing from friends and relatives to make ends meet, 20 per cent of families have had to sell assets such as jewellery and other belongings as a kind of “erosive coping strategy”, irreversibly depleting their subsistence base.93 By March 2003, 42 per cent of families were destitute and dependent upon humanitarian assistance.94 Child labour, having doubled over 2001-2002 and now at 3.1 per cent,95 forecloses educational opportunities, reduces future productivity and depresses livelihoods across generations.

50. The most vulnerable fall into two categories: the chronic poor (social hardship cases) and the “new poor”. The former category typically comprises households with a high proportion of women, elderly and children, having no savings, enduring poor living conditions and with no stable source of income. The new poor are those who have recently lost their homes, income, assets or livelihood and have a limited capacity to recover. This category includes, especially, many farmers who have experienced the destruction, confiscation or foreclosure of access to land, water, crops, other means of production and markets by Israeli settlers and/or the military. Gaza fisherfolk, Bedouins, and daily wage earners denied access to job markets exemplify those belonging to this category. Those with stable incomes have to support a greater number of persons. Dependency ratios have increased from 5.9 to 6.6 in the West Bank and to 7.5 in Gaza.96

51. The occupied Palestinian territory started 2003 with foreign investment down by 90 per cent, from about $1.45 billion in 1999, to some $150 million in 2002.97 When the gap between actual investment and that projected in the absence of conflict was calculated, the loss came to $3.2 billion.98 The foreign investment lost, combined with the raw physical damage and deterioration of infrastructure, resulted in a $1 billion (or 19 per cent in real per capita terms) decline in productive capital stock at the beginning of 2003.99

52. Commercial banking in the occupied Palestinian territory has been relatively new, emerging only in the past nine years with the Oslo process. On 25 February 2004, the Israeli army raided four bank branches in Ramallah, seizing cash worth between $8.6 million and $9 million, equivalent to what Israel security sources claimed were the holdings of “suspect accounts”. Observers recognized that these actions “risk destabilizing the Palestinian banking system”.100

53. Under occupation, the economy of the occupied territory largely depends upon Israel, to such an extent that 96 per cent of Palestinian exports and some 25 per cent of labour were destined for Israel.101 With Palestinian domestic demand at about 150 per cent of GDP, the excessive leakage of economic resources indicates that approximately 71 per cent of the overall Palestinian trade deficit lies currently with Israel. Of foreign borrowing by Palestine (mostly donor support funds) to finance trade, 70 per cent goes to pay for Israeli imports. With the deficit at 45 per cent of GDP through 2002, the current period began with 45 cents of each domestically produced dollar channelled into the Israeli economy.102 That trend appeared to continue; for example, the second quarter 2003 trade figures indicated a 17 per cent increase in imports from Israel and a decrease of 3.4 per cent in exports to Israel as compared with second quarter 2002.103

54. Most Palestinian enterprises (90 per cent) are microscale units (having less than five employees) with limited capacity to withstand the present adversity, but they employ 56 per cent of domestic labour. Medium-scale enterprises (20-50 employees) constitute only 1 per cent of firms.104 Employment and compensation levels fell in all sectors, except for medium-scale firms producing food and beverages. Their 13 per cent increase in employment and 36 per cent rise in compensation are attributable to increased demand for local products that replaced Israeli imports. Larger firms’ ability to withstand the crisis did not compensate for the loss in employment across the sector. In 2003, 75 per cent of Palestinian firms operated at one-third capacity, and 43 per cent of industrial enterprises have shut down since September 2000.105

55. The occupation and resulting conflict have also altered the very structure of the economy. The number of microenterprises has increased significantly (28 per cent as of 2002), while the number of small enterprises has decreased in similar proportion. Likewise, the numbers of medium-sized and large enterprises also have decreased significantly (49 per cent and 48 per cent, respectively).106 Firms have tried to adjust by decreasing working hours and productive capacity, or by using Israeli-registered vehicles for transport; but these strategies have also increased already inflated production costs.107

56. Israel continues to withhold clearance to revenues belonging to the Palestinian Authority. Israel’s timely transfer of these revenues is one economic measure set out in the Quartet’s road map. At end-2003, Israel continued to hold $299.47 million belonging to the Palestinian Authority.108 The ministries and other assets of the Palestinian Authority also have been targets of Israeli military strikes, impeding public services. The damage of Israeli forces to Palestinian public infrastructure, including the “widespread ransacking of Palestinian Authority ministry buildings and municipal offices”, approximates $251 million.109

Status of women

57. Gender inequality and inequity typically become more pronounced under crisis conditions. Women’s family and social roles expand, while economic hardships mount and supportive resources shrink, or become inaccessible. The result includes additional stress and crushing psychological burden on women.110

58. The death, imprisonment and unemployment of adult male members of the community — approaching 80 per cent in some areas of the occupied territory — have increased poverty and social burdens that contribute to increased domestic violence and stress. Violence in the environment exacerbates the occurrence of abuse at home: children’s and parents’ exposure to political violence is the strongest predictor of violence in the family, whether between spouses, against the children or among siblings.111

Access to humanitarian assistance

59. The August 2002 visit of the Secretary-General’s Personal Humanitarian Envoy was intended to secure commitments from the Israeli Government to facilitate access to humanitarian aid. Although some improvements resulted, the commitments are still far from being fully respected.112 Israeli forces and authorities frequently impeded humanitarian organizations or denied their access through checkpoints and closures, and subjected them to the “back-to-back” cargo system.

60. The obstruction of ambulances at checkpoints remains a serious problem. In the past year, the Israeli army detained some 60 ambulances per month at checkpoints, of which a quarter were denied passage. In March 2003 alone, Israeli forces fired on 15 ambulances.113 In June 2003, UNRWA reported 231 instances of excessive delay or denial of passage at checkpoints.114 UNRWA medical personnel operated under dangerous conditions during military operations and movement restrictions. From mid-2002 to mid-2003, UNRWA lost 7,881 health staff hours in the West Bank alone.115 During the full closure on Gaza, from 16 to 27 April 2003, Israeli forces denied access for the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNRWA. Israel’s Ashdod Port and army also imposed dilatory procedures for humanitarian and development material, exacerbating financial costs and delays for most operations.116

61. The barrier promises to further prevent access to internationally supported humanitarian aid and other social services, including denial of refugee access to UNRWA-contracted health services in Jerusalem hospitals and the prevention of pupils’ access to UNRWA schools, as in the case of the UNRWA school in Sur Bahir (Jerusalem), lying in the barrier’s intended path.117

62. Israeli restrictions on UNRWA movement created a cumulative cost of some $24 million from October 2000 to November 2003. During most of 2003, the Israeli military government in the occupied territory denied permits to enter Jerusalem118 to 47 per cent of UNRWA staff.

63. Israel completely bans the movement of humanitarian goods through the main Erez crossing into Gaza, leaving the Karni crossing as the sole transit point, where Israeli authorities operate the back-to-back haulage system. Israel has also imposed transport fees on humanitarian goods, costing UNRWA $260,000 annually.119 On 30 March 2004, UNRWA announced that Israeli-imposed obstructions and unacceptable security risks, coupled with underfunding, had forced it to stop food aid to Gaza.120 UNRWA recommenced the distribution of emergency food aid to the some 600,000 refugees that it serves in the Gaza Strip on 21 April 2004.

III. Occupied Syrian Golan

64. Israel now maintains some 40 settlements on the Golan Heights, housing 15,700 Israelis.121

65. Israeli authorities have appropriated most of the Syrian Golan land for military use and settlement. According to local sources, the remaining 18,000 indigenous Syrian Arabs maintain control over only about 6 per cent of the original territory under occupation.122

66. In 2004, Israel’s Ministerial Committee on Settlement Affairs decided to double the Israeli Government’s investment in the Golan, in addition to long-standing funding from various organizations.123 In 2004, Israeli occupation forces confiscated 354 dunums of village land, and announced the construction of 9 new settlements, and 900 settler-housing units, and the intention of doubling Israel’s settler population.124

67. Golan is primarily an agricultural region. However, Syrians are unable to cultivate their land to capacity while Israel prohibits them from building needed water infrastructure and levies heavy taxes on their water use, land and transportation.125 Israeli forces incrementally confiscate land and uproot trees, as attested, for example, by the March 2004 uprooting of 50 apples trees in Arab villages by the “Israel Land Circle”.126

68. As vestiges of previous wars, landmines with no military purpose today remain a hazard for the local population that occasionally claims life and limb.127 Of the victims, 50 per cent have been under age 17.128 Landmines are a life-threatening feature in 19 agriculture and grazing areas in the occupied Golan.129 Whereas landmine clearance was a priority two years ago, other security concerns have intervened, prolonging the risks to the Syrian population in the Golan.130 On 22 February 2003, heavy rains caused the erosion of a minefield in the town of Majdal Shams, where landmines slid downhill to the back of houses, forcing inhabitants to seek refuge elsewhere.131

69. As has been the case for the occupation of Palestinian territory, occupation of the Syrian Golan has resulted in the dismemberment of families in the Golan. Young Syrian graduates from the Golan and from Syrian universities have only limited access to job opportunities back home. If they visit their families once a year in the Syrian Golan during their studies, Israel refuses them re-entry.132

70. School facilities remain inadequate to cover the needs of all Syrian children of school age. A rapidly rising school dropout rate has been responsible for the entry of children into the labour market in Israel, where they receive a lower salary than others doing the same job. There remains also a shortage of health centres and services.133

IV. Conclusion

71. The present review period demonstrates mounting economic and social damage under military occupation. Most social and economic data show marked deterioration of living conditions for the Palestinian people, including new forms of dispossession and destruction of private and public assets of all kinds. The accumulated consequences have newly brought the occupied Palestinian territory to “war-torn economy” status.  Humanitarian assistance is not sufficient to ensure a sustainable life with dignity and rights for the Palestinian civilians under occupation. The sustainable option for addressing the current economic and social deprivation lies in lifting the occupation of the Palestinian territory, as well as the Syrian Golan.

Notes

1 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, No. 973.

2 Contribution to the report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 15 February 2004.

3 Contribution to the report of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 26 March 2004.

4 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, submitted in accordance with Commission resolution 1993/2 A (E/CN.4/2004/6), p. 11, paras. 24-25 (over 230 victims up until April 2003), updated at Palestine Monitor, available from http://www.

palestinemonitor.org/factsheet/Palestinian_intifada_fact_sheet.htm; and Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR), “Statistics of Al Aqsa intifada: September 29, 2000-April 07, 2004”, available from http://www.pchrgaza.org/special/statistics_intifada.htm.

5  Press release  SG/SM/9210 of 22 March 2004.

6 United States Department of State (“Israel and the occupied territories”, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington, D.C., United States Department of State, 25 February 2003); sect. 1.d) places this number at 8,400.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Back to a Routine of Torture: Torture and Ill-Treatment of Palestinian Detainees during Arrest, Detention and Interrogation, September 2001-April 2003 (Jerusalem, Public Committee against Torture in Israel (PCATI), 2003), p. 11.

10 “Israel and the occupied territories,” …, sect. I.a; 2.d; and sect. II.c.

11 “Israel and the occupied territories” …, sect. 1.c; and Ha’aretz, 6 April 2004.

12 “Israel and the occupied territories” …, sect. II.d.

13 Ibid.

14 The number displaced by the barrier construction was 6,000-8,000 (UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004); plus 6,875-8,214 from at least 1,369 house demolitions (“Statistics of Al Aqsa intifada …”).

15 UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004; also UNFPA, “Input to the Secretary-General’s note” (2003), pp. 6-7, citing Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) (2001) and University of Geneva study.

16 UN-Habitat, “Housing situation and the establishment of a human settlements fund for the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories” (HSP/GC/19/2/Add.3), 17 March 2003, p. 8, table 2.

17 “Israel and the occupied territories” …, sect. 4; BBC, 17 March 2003, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2856433.stm.

18 UNRWA contribution to report, 15 February 2004.

19 “Statistics of Al Aqsa intifada …”.

20 OCHA, “Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Humanitarian Appeal 2004 for the occupied Palestinian territory”, 18 November 2003, p. 16, table: “Evolution of Israeli security measures”.

21 See Roubina Ghattas, Nader Hrimat and Jad Isaac, Forests in Palestine (Jerusalem, Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem (ARIJ), 2004), available from http://www.arij.org/pub/Forests per cent20in per cent20Palestine/index-1.htm#Abstract. See also Palestinian National Information Centre (PNIC), “Palestinian economic losses due the Israeli siege, closures and aggressions (Sept. 29, 2000 to May 31, 2003)”, available from http://www.ipc.gov.ps/ipc_e/

ipc_e-1/e_News Reports/2003/reports-012.html.

22 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months — Intifada, Closures and the Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment (Jerusalem, World Bank, May 2003), p. 46.

23 UNCTAD, “Report on UNCTAD’s assistance to the Palestinian people” (TD/B/50/4) of 28 July 2003 (hereinafter referred to as  “UNCTAD report”), p. 6.

24 Dugard, loc. cit., para. 18.

25 World Food Programme contribution to report, 5 February 2004.

26 UNRWA contribution to report, 15 February 2004.

27 Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP), “Settlement Database”, web site at http://www.fmep.

org/database/westbank.html.  

28 “New report on illegal outposts prompts calls for probe of WZO”, Forward (2 January 2004); and Ha’aretz, 3 April 2004.

29 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics figures, in James Reynolds, “New building in Jewish settlements on occupied land grew substantially in 2003”, BBC News (2 March 2004), available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/3526791.stm.  

30 Ha’aretz, 26 December 2003.

31 Tikva Honig-Parnass, “All’s clear for full-scale war against the Palestinians”, Between the Lines, June 2003, p. 6.

32 Israel Defense Forces Radio (30 December 2003), cited in Peace Now, Middle East Report, vol. 5, Issue 23 (5 January 2004).

33 Yehezkel Lein with Eyal Weizman, Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank (Jerusalem, B’Tselem, May 2002), p. 93, table 9.

34 Ha’aretz, 16 April 2004.

35 Report of the Special Rapporteur, Jean Ziegler, on the right to food: mission to the Occupied Palestinian Territories (E/CN.4/2004/10/Add.2), para. 47 (31 October 2004).

36 Ha’aretz, 23 July 2003, on Peace Now web site: http://www.peacenow.org/PNintheN/

haaretz29.html.

37 According to Israeli military plans submitted to the Israeli High Court. Cited in Humanitarian and Emergency Policy Group of the Local Aid Coordination Committee, “The impact of Israel’s separation barrier on affected West Bank communities” (4 May 2003), available from  http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/29F7516E5E08750385256D1D00699A70, p. 2.

38 OCHA, “Humanitarian implications of the new barrier projections”, available from http://

www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/docs/UN/OCHA/Barrierprojections_Jan04%20_25Feb04_eng.pdf.

39 Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/13 (A/ES-10/248) of 24 November 2003, p. 3, para. 8.

40 Ibid., p. 3, para. 7.

41 OCHA, “Analysis of Humanitarian Impact”, January 2004.

42 Ziegler, loc. cit., para. 51.

43 See report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution

ES-10/13 …, p. 6, para. 24.

44 The Palestinian National Information Center (PNIC) reported that, between 29 September 2000 and 31 May 2003, the occupying forces uprooted hundreds of thousands of olive, citrus and other fruit trees, cited in Ziegler, loc. cit., para. 45.

45 In Jerusalem, the legal instrument used is the Land Seizure Act in Emergency Time (1949).

46 Dugard, loc. cit., para. 9.

47 See report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution

ES-10/13 …, p. 5, paras. 19-21; Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and International Organizations, “Israeli separation wall activity since United Nations General Assembly request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice”, 24 February 2004, p. 2; and OCHA contribution to this report, 3 June 2004.

48 B’Tselem, “Not even a drop: the water crisis in Palestinian villages without a water network” (July 2001), p. 4.

49 OCHA, “Humanitarian Monitoring Report on the ‘Bertini Commitments’” (June 2003).

50 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months …, p. 47.

51 Ali Sha`ar, Patrick Kelley and Eckhard Kleinau, “Environmental Health Assessment: Phase II (USAID Village Water and Sanitation Program, West Bank)” (Washington, D.C., USAID, June 2003), cited in “Coordinated Appeals Process (CAP) …”, p. 19.

52 ARIJ, Wall and Water in Palestine (Powerpoint presentation), available from http://www.arij.

org/pub/Water per cent20in per cent20Palestine/Wall per cent20and per cent20Water per cent20in per cent20Palestine.zip.

53 OCHA, “Humanitarian Monitoring Report …”.

54 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months …, p. 46.

55 WFP contribution to report, 5 February 2004.

56 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months …, p. 36; Riccardo Bocco and others, Palestinian Public Perceptions on their Living Conditions (Geneva, December 2002), p. 51.

57 FAO, “Summary of the Executive Report of the Food Security Assessment West Bank and Gaza Strip” (Rome, FAO and WFP, 2003), pp. 1 and 3.

58 UNRWA contribution to report, 15 February 2004.

59 FAO, “Summary of the Executive Report …”, p. 3.

60 Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, Mr. Miloon Kothari: addendum: visit to the occupied Palestinian territories (5-10 January 2002) (E/CN.4/2003/5/Add.1), 12 June 2002.

61 UN-Habitat, “Housing situation …”, p. 4, and p. 5, table 1. Projections are based on an average 35 annual population growth, with 2.6 per cent growth projected for the West Bank and 3.75 per cent for the Gaza Strip.

62 See World Health Organization, Health Principles of Housing (Geneva, WHO, 1989).

63 Cited in UN-Habitat, “Housing situation …”, p. 2, para. 11.

64 Ibid., p. 3, para. 15.

65 WFP contribution to report, 5 February 2004; and Dugard, loc. cit, para. 21.

66 UNRWA contribution to report, 15 February 2004.

67 Ibid.

68 UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004.

69 UNICEF contribution to report, 26 March 2004; OCHA, “Humanitarian Monitoring Report …”; also Ziegler, loc. cit., para. 14.

70 UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004.

71 UNRWA contribution to report, 15 February 2004.

72 PCBS and UNFPA, “The impact of the separation wall on the socio-economic conditions of Palestinian households in the localities in which the separation wall passes through”, cited in UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004.

73 UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004; and http://www.ecwbg.info/

BudgetGovType.asp.

74 UNICEF contribution to report, 26 March 2004.

75 Findings of PCBS, Canaan Institute and Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs, cited in UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004.

76 UNICEF contribution to report, 26 March 2004.

77 UNRWA figure. Palestinian Ministry of Education (MoE) cites 282 schools damaged by rocket and tank shelling since the breakout of the crisis (“The effect of the Israeli occupation on education from 28 September 2000 to 16 January 2004”, assessment 8 (Gaza, MoE, 2004), p. 3).

78 UNRWA, Department of Education West Bank, “Emergency appeal, 6 June-December 2003”, (December 2003), table 24; cited in UNICEF contribution to report, 26 March 2004.

79 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months …, chap. 2, p. 8, para. 2.5.

80 For elaboration of these factors, see UNCTAD report, p. 4.

81 On the basis of the UNCTAD Palestinian integrated database, estimated 2002 real GDP in 1997 US dollars was 2,514 million, and 2,390 million in 1986 (UNCTAD report, p. 4, note 6).

82 UNSCO contribution to this report, 27 February 2004.

83 Ibid.

84 Preliminary data on the Palestinian Ministry of Finance web site: http://www.mof.gov.ps/.   

85 World Bank, “Closure/curfew and economic/fiscal monitoring indicators”, Report No. 11, 31 January 2004, p. 4, table: “Summary of economic indicators”.

86 UNCTAD report, p. 9.

87 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months …, pp. xi and 31.

88 Consisting of 54 per cent in the West Bank and 84 per cent in Gaza (“Israel and the occupied territories” …, sect. II). The World Bank has issued the 2002 figure of 60 per cent living below the poverty line, defined as those living on less than $2.1 per day. The 2003 figure of 63 per cent is calculated as income of $390 per month for a six-person household (circa $2.16/day) (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), “Impact of the Israeli measures on the economic conditions of Palestinian households: 5th round: April-May 2003” (Ramallah, PCBS, 2003), cited in UNCTAD report, p. 9).

89 WFP contribution to the report, 5 February 2004.

90 Including discouraged workers, the rate was 20 per cent. UNSCO contribution to present report, 27 February 2004, para. 3.

91 ILO contribution to present report, 16 February 2004, p. 1, para. 1.

92 Reflecting the March 2000-March 2003 period (PCBS, “Impact of the Israeli measures …”, p. 9).

93 Ibid.

94 UNCTAD report, p. 10.

95 Institute for Palestinian Studies (IPS) and Palestine News Agency (WAFA), “Bad economy”, (6 April 2004), available from http://www.ipc.gov.ps/ipc_e/ipc_e-1/e_News/news2004/2004_04/

038.html.

96 OCHA, “Coordinated Appeals Process (CAP) …”, p. 17, table: “Economic indicators”, and pp. 23-24.

97 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months …, p. xi.

98 Ibid., p. 8.

99 Ibid., p. xi.

100 United States Department of State spokesman Richard Boucher quoted in “Israel seizes Palestinian cash”, CBS News (25 February 2004), available from http://www.cbsnews.com/

stories/2004/02/22/world/printable601538.shtml; “Israeli raids threaten stability of Palestinian banks: US”, Sydney Morning Herald (27 February 2004), available from http://www.smh.com.

au/articles/2004/02/26/1077676900789.html.

101 World Bank, Long-term Policy Options for the Palestinian Economy (Jerusalem, World Bank, July 2002).

102 UNCTAD report, p. 8, para. 14.

103  World Bank, “Closure/curfew and economic/fiscal monitoring indicators”, Report No. 11, p. 12, Economic appendix table 5a: Indicators: Palestinian imports from, and exports to, Israel ($ million).

104  PCBS, “Number of establishments and employees by employment size category in the Palestinian Territory” (unpublished), cited in UNCTAD report, p. 11.

105 Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and International Organizations, “Briefing on the current economic situation”, 25 February 2004.

106 UNCTAD report, p. 11.

107 Ibid., pp. 9-13.

108 Ibid., p. 9, para. 16

109 World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months …, p. 19.

110 Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), “Focus Group Study” (Jerusalem, WCLAC, 2002), cited in UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004, p. 2, para 5.

111 Ha’aretz, 1 December 2003, cited in UNFPA contribution to report, 4 February 2004.

112 Ziegler, loc. cit., para. 20. See also OCHA, “Humanitarian Monitoring Report”…

113 Dugard, loc. cit., para. 20.

114 One hundred eighty-six incidents of delay, 41 incidents where access was denied and 4 incidents in which staff members were detained (OCHA, “Humanitarian Monitoring Report” …).

115 UNRWA contribution to report, 15 February 2004.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid.; and “UNRWA suspends emergency food aid in Gaza”, (UNRWA press release (HQG/06/2004), 1 April 2004), available from http://www.un.org/unrwa/news/releases/pr-2004/hqg06-04.pdf.

120 Agence France Presse, 30 March 2004.

121 FMEP, “Settlement database” …

122 Jawlan Development Organization, “Facts and figures” (Arabic), available from http://www.

jawlan.org/golan/facts.htm.

123 Ha’aretz, 3 April 2004.

124 Ayman Abu Jabal, “Syria Asks the Security Council to Stop Assaults”, al-Safir (20 March 2004), available from http://www.jawlan.org/news/news.asp?sn=64.

125 ILO contribution to report, 16 February 2004.

126 Ibid.

127 “Mine laying in the Israel Defense Forces”, Israeli State Comptroller’s Report No. 50 A, for the year 1999 (Jerusalem, Israel Government Printing Office, 1999).

128 Al-Ahram Weekly, 20-26 April 2000, available from http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/

2000/478/re7.htm.

129 According to al-Haq: Law in the Service of Man, cited in Landmine Monitor Report: Israel (2003), available from http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/syria.html.

130 Interview with Maavarim President Ben Steinberg and staffer Dror Schimmel, Jerusalem, 5 January 2003, in Landmine Monitor Report: Israel (2003), available from http://www.icbl.org/

lm/2003/israel.html – fn4899.

131  “Israel”, Landmine Monitor (2003), available from http://www.icbl.org/lm/2003/israel.html.

132 Note by the Secretary-General of 22 August 2003 transmitting the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (A/58/311), para. 83.

133 Document A/58/75-E/2003/21, p. 15, para. 78.