1182th Meeting
Held in New York on Monday, 21 December 1964, at 3.00 p.m.
CONTENTS
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1182) …………………….pg. 1
Adoption of the agenda ……………………………….pg. 1
The Palestine question:
(a) Letter dated 14 November 1964 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/6044);
(b) Letter dated 15 November 1964 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/6046)…..Pg.1
NOTE
Relevant documents of the Security Council are published in quarterly supplements to the Official Records.
Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.
President: Mr. Fernando ORTIZ SANZ (Bolivia).
Present: The representatives of the following States: Bolivia, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Norway, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1182)
1 Adoption of the agenda
2. The Palestine question:
(a) Letter dated 14 November 1964 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/6044);
(b) Letter dated 15 November 1964 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/6046).
Adoption of the agenda
The agenda was adopted.
The Palestine question
(a) Letter dated 14 November 1964 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/6044);
(b) Letter dated 15 November 1964 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/6046)
1. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): In accordance with the decision taken previously, I shall invite the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel to take places at the Council table in order to participate, without vote, in the discussion.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rafik Asha (Syria), and Mr. Michael S. Comay (Israel), took places at the Council table.
2. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Council will resume its discussion concerning the complaints submitted on 14 and 15 November 1964 by the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel respectively.
3. Mr. YOST (United States of America): As I stated last Thursday afternoon [1179th meeting], we are appreciative of the spirit of conciliation which motivated the representative of Morocco to submit certain amendments [S/6116] 1/ to the joint United Kingdom and United States draft resolution [S/6113]. 2/ But as we noted then, these amendments, with the exception, of course, of the third, to which we see no objection, do raise one general difficulty in that they involve the very elements which were the subject of prolonged and extensive consultations undertaken by a number of delegations in the hope of reaching a satisfactory consensus. However, these were in fact the most intractable points, the points on which the greatest divergence was apparent. To introduce them into the draft resolution before us would reopen the entire subject of controversy.
4. Since efforts to work out an acceptable consensus were not successful, we sought in our draft resolution to deal very briefly in a non-controversial fashion with the incident of 13 November 1964 and to concentrate the Council's action on approval of the constructive recommendations made by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine in his report of August 1963, [S/5401 and Add.1-4] 3/ and his most recent report [S/6061 and Add.1 ]. 4/
5. Thus, my delegation, as a sponsor of the draft resolution, while fully appreciative, I repeat, of the conciliatory intentions of the Moroccan delegation, could not in good faith support these amendments, and will therefore abstain when they are put to the vote.
6. Mr, SIDI BABA (Morocco) (translated from French): The amendments my delegation submitted to the Council with a view to modifying somewhat the draft resolution submitted by the United States of America and the United Kingdom deal with a number of questions which, as the United States representative has just said, were the subject of conversations, I would say difficult conversations, during the last few weeks. I have already expressed regret over the failure of these conversations. It is for this reason that my delegation has submitted its amendments following the failure of the efforts made by the delegations in the Security Council, in the first place by the Moroccan delegation, particularly when it submitted a draft resolution on this matter [S/6085/ Rev.1 ]. 5/
7. I should also like to say that there seem to be slight differences of meaning, which the latest translation has not entirely removed, between the English and French texts of these amendments. To the extent that these differences, which I must say are slight, might lead to confusion, I should like to say that members should refer to the original text, which is the French text.
8. Having said this and in order to make it easier for members of the Council to decide on each amendment, I should like, if the President agrees, to request a separate vote on each amendment. I hope that this will enable the members of the Council to vote, according to their opinion, on each amendment separately.
9. Mr. MOROZOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): We should like to express our regret that the sponsors of the draft resolution in document S/6113 have not taken advantage of the suspension of our ,debate on this item to reconsider their position in the light of the constructive proposals and new steps towards a positive solution to this question which have been put forward by the Moroccan delegation in the amendments it has submitted to the Council.
10. In view of the refusal of the United States delegation-with, apparently, the concurrence of the United Kingdom delegation-to accept the Moroccan amendments, the USSR delegation considers it necessary to make the following observations.
11. The Soviet Union's position on the substance of the question before the Council was, as we pointed out at our last meeting on Thursday [1179th meeting], explained at the Council's meeting of 3 December 1964 [1167th meeting]. At that time, the USSR delegation stressed that the essence of the issue which has arisen lies in the fact that Israel is continuing its practice of taking unilateral action in matters and in areas where the Syrian point of view must be taken into account. This, in turn, has led to increased tension in the area as a whole and has given rise to further dangerous incidents.
12. We also stated that, in the events which occurred spontaneously on 13 November, the Israel side not only provoked the subsequent dangerous developments by its provocative actions but also, by taking large-scale aggressive action against Syria, including the aerial bombing of Syrian populated points, violated the agreement on the cease-fire.
13. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet delegation pointed out that this act of aggression by Israel must be resolutely condemned by the Security Council. We also stated that, since this is not the first time that aggressive actions of this type have been engaged in by Israel, it should be made perfectly clear in the Security Council's resolution that the Council has firmly and inflexibly decided to put an end to such actions by Israel.
14. However, the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council by the United Kingdom and the United States [S/6113] contains provisions which are completely at variance with the facts of the case and, what is more, tend to put the victim of aggression and the aggressor on the same footing. This is true, for example, of operative paragraph 1 of this draft resolution which reads:
15. Since it is not made clear in any of the other paragraphs of the draft resolution who is responsible for this loss of life, this regret seems hypocritical -although, naturally, no one here in the Security Council wishes to see blood spilled or people killed anywhere in the world. But, unfortunately, in this context and in the light of the circumstances which we have gone into in some detail, the passage which I have just quoted and which constitutes operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution proposed by the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States, sounds, I repeat, hypocritical. It does nothing to prevent a recurrence of dangerous incidents, such as those which took place on 13 November of this year and for which Israel is responsible.)
16. That is why the second proposed amendment [see S/6116], which proposes to take note at least of the "subsequent unjustified resort by Israel to aerial action" is the very minimum, the mildest possible thing, that can be said in the present case, since the best decision the Council could have taken would have been to adopt a text assessing the events which occurred on 13 November of this year, as was done in the draft resolution submitted by the Moroccan delegation [S/6085/Rev.l]. The Moroccan delegation even went so far as to submit the most moderate statement possible, simply mentioning the fact, but even this, it seems, was unfortunately unacceptable to the sponsors of this draft resolution.
17. We strongly support all the amendments submitted by the Moroccan delegation, including the amendment, to which I have just referred, to operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, and we shall vote for that amendment and for all the rest.
18. I do not wish to take the time to comment on all the amendments submitted by the Moroccan delegation, but I should like to underscore the importance of one other amendment-not that the rest are not important too-proposed by Morocco to the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution. This is the amendment concerning the work to be done in connexion with the Armistice Demarcation Line. This Moroccan amendment is designed, again in the most moderate terms, to put the case in such a way that the Council would be giving instructions which would be of practical use in preventing any future recurrence of incidents like those of 13 November 1964,
19. If not even this much is said, if the Council rejects even this mild and moderate amendment, the Council will be refusing a prior to adopt a resolution which would have a prophylactic preventive effect and which, as many speakers have stressed, would spare the Council the necessity of considering over and over again breaches of the peace in this region committed by Israel.
20. As I have already said, we shall support all the other amendments submitted by the Moroccan delegation. Without these amendments-and I should like to make this perfectly clear and definite, so that there will not be the slightest doubt in anyone's mind on this point-the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States, will be totally unacceptable to my delegation.
21. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Does any other speaker wish to take the floor? Since there are no more speakers, I shall put to a vote the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States of America [S/6113], and, first of all, the amendments to the draft resolution submitted by the Moroccan delegation [S/6116]. The amendments will be voted upon separately.
22. I shall put to the vote the first amendment, which reads as follows:
23. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish) I shall now put to the vote the second amendment, which reads as follows:
24. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We shall now proceed to vote on the third amendment, which reads as follows:
25. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Council will now proceed to vote on the fourth amendment, which reads as follows:
26. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Council will proceed to vote on the fifth amendment, which reads as follows:
27. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Council will now vote on the text submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States, as amended, as a whole.
28. Mr. SIDI BABA (Morocco) (translated from French): My delegation would like fist to thank very sincerely those delegations which were kind enough to support some of the amendments I introduced. In view of the results obtained, and in order to enable my delegation to express its opinion on the draft resolution before us, I should like, if possible and if procedure allows, to request the President to suspend the meeting for ten minutes. When the meeting resumes we shall be in a position to vote on the draft resolution as amended by the Council.
29. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): If there is no objection, I shall accede to the Moroccan representative's request and the meeting will be suspended for ten minutes.
The meeting was suspended at 4.20 p.m. and resumed at 4.30 p.m.
30. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We are about to vote on the joint draft resolution…I give the floor to the representative of Morocco.
31. Mr. SIDI BABA (Morocco) (translated from French): I should like first to express my delegation's gratitude to the President and members of the Council for having kindly acceded to my request for a suspension of the meeting.
32. My delegation considers that this suspension was very useful because it enabled us to hold consultations and to reflect a little before defining our position with respect to the draft resolution submitted by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, in the light of the vote just taken on the amendments I introduced.
33. My delegation wishes first to repeat that it greatly appreciates the wide support given by members of the Council to some of these amendments.
I am thinking in particular of my fifth amendment which invites Israel as well as Syria to participate fully in the meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission. This amendment was adopted by 7 votes to none, with 4 abstentions. We consider-and we want to say this for the record-that this appeal by the Security Council is particularly important because we are dealing with a Mixed Armistice Commission, an extremely important body which the Israelis have taken it upon themselves to boycott systematically for a number of years.
34. I must say, however, that the other principal amendments I submitted relate-and I should like to make this clear-to the incident of 13 November (because my fifth amendment deals with the need, for the parties concerned, to participate fully in the meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission, something which is clearly desirable but which nevertheless has no direct bearing on the incident of 13 November). These amendments, which are directly connected with the incident of 13 November-one saying that the Israel military patrol violated the Armistice Demarcation Line in the area of Tel-El-Qadi which, contrary to the instructions of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, had not been surveyed; another emphasizing that Israel's resort to aerial action against Syrian territory was absolutely unjustified; and still another asking that topographical surveys should be made "along the entire Armistice Demarcation Line, including the area of Tel-El-Qadi and the three sectors of the Demilitarized Zone, in fulfilment of the recommendations of the Chief of Staff's reports of 24 August 1963 and 24 November 1964" -all these points. which relate directly to the incident of 13 November and which, may I recall, were the subject of protracted negotiations and conversations between various members of the Council, have unfortunately not been taken into consideration by the Council.
35. I feel that Syria, which is the plaintiff, which is the victim and which has appealed to the Security Council for justice, is thus placed in an extremely difficult position. We consider that the Security Council should have paid particular attention to this situation, which results not only from the incident of 13 November but also from the heavy bombing of Syrian territory by the Israel air force, which constitutes a definite and unjustified act of aggression.
36. This leads me to note that the United States and the United Kingdom delegations-whose laudable efforts in this difficult period and during these last few weeks we appreciate-have unfortunately not been able to take account of the indispensable minimum with respect to this incident.
37. I also recall that the Security Council began discussing this question on 16 November. Today is 21 December. This question has therefore been before the Security Council for over a month. The Syrian delegation has thus demonstrated remarkable patience and a strong spirit of conciliation, both in its dealings with various delegations and in the way in which it has conformed to the procedure and the programme of work the Security Council has chosen for the examination of this question.
38. Bearing all these considerations in mind, my delegation regrets to say that it is unable to support the draft resolution, S/6113, even as it now reads after the adoption of certain amendments by the Security Council. I wanted to make our position clear because my delegation feels that the aerial action of 13 November was a real tragedy for Syria and a real blow to peace and security in the region. It thinks, moreover, that there is no justification, either military or political, for this action; but there may be a desire to force Syria, as pointed out in General Bull's report, to come to terms with Israel.
39. In these circumstances, my delegation-I repeat-will be unable to vote in favour of the joint draft resolution, and, if the President decides to put it to the vote, I shall indicate how my delegation's' vote will be cast.
40. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Does any other speaker wish to take the floor before we proceed to vote?
41. The Security Council will proceed to vote on the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States of America [S/6113], as amended, as a whole.
42. Mr. SE YDOUX (France) (translated from French): In view of the statement made by the French delegation at our meeting of 17 December [1179th meeting], a few words will suffice to explain its votes today. My delegation voted in favour of the text as a whole because it corresponds to the recommendations we made on 30 November [1166th meeting]. It seemed to us essential to give effect to the suggestions submitted by General Bull in order to limit the chances of friction in the future.
43. This text also had the merit of avoiding the controversies to which the description of the incident of 13 November had given rise during the unofficial conversations aimed at reaching agreement. The circumstances of this incident are accurately recounted in the Chief of Staff's report, to which reference was made and which shows clearly that the wrongs are not on one side only.
44. Finally, this text-and I am referring here to paragraph 2 (b) in particular-evidenced the intention to take due account of the unofficial exchanges of view of these last few weeks and to reconcile so far as possible the positions of the two parties concerned on a particularly complicated question.
45. These are also the reasons why, while accepting the third and fifth amendments submitted by the representative of Morocco, which did not alter the balance of the draft, my delegation was unable to support the first, second and fourth amendments.
46. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now give the floor to the representative of Israel.
47. Mr. COMAY (Israel): My delegation, together with the eight members of the Council who voted for the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution, unreservedly regrets the renewal of military action on the Israel-Syrian border and the loss of lives on both sides, At previous meetings of the Security Council, we have fully stated the views of the Israel Government on Syria's responsibility for initiating the exchange of fire and for creating the exchange by an artillery bombardment of Israel civilian villages. It was in order to halt that shelling that the use of Israel aircraft became inevitable.
48. But the one over-riding lesson of this debate is the danger and, in fact, the recklessness involved on that border by the opening of fire from Syrian positions at Israel activities anywhere in the border area. If General Bull could now get the Syrian authorities to accept finally and unconditionally that such opening of fire is outlawed, it would remove the most serious and constant source of incidents on that border. The General Armistice Agreement itself guarantees the right to security from fear of attack, and it even bans a threat of aggressive action, and these guarantees must be respected.
49. In conclusion, Mr. President, permit me to express our appreciation for the eloquent appeal for peace that you made at the Council's meeting last Thursday [1179th meeting], when you spoke in your capacity as the representative of Bolivia. The Armistice Agreement itself stipulates that the establishment of an armistice is only a step towards the return of permanent peace, and this view was specifically endorsed by the Security Council.
50. The Armistice was never designed to be a substitute for normal and peaceful relations between two neighbouring States, but only a short transitional stage towards those relations. It is my Government's earnest hope that in the spirit of your appeal and in accordance with the relevant provision of the Armistice Agreement and the decisions of the Security Council, the Government of Syria will come to understand that it is in the interests of the two countries and peoples, and of Middle East peace, to resolve its conflict with Israel by negotiation, that is, by the same fruitful process of dialogue to which the representative of the Ivory Coast referred.
51. Mr. ASHA (Syria): Allow me to comment briefly on the draft resolution [S/6085/Rev,1] submitted by the representative of Morocco, the adoption of which was blocked by the manoeuvres of some permanent members of the Security Council. We deeply regret that this action also prevented the Security Council from formally condemning Israel after all the facts had been so clearly stated. These facts, as well as the objective and unbiased statements of a number of members of the Security Council and the evidence contained in the report of General Bull, condemned this wanton and premeditated aggression committed by Israel against my country.
52. The draft resolution did not introduce any new language which the Security Council has not used on several previous occasions to deplore similar acts of aggression committed by Israel against the territories of Arab countries. We believe that it was the duty of the Security Council to endorse formally and in strong terms the statements of those members who found Israel guilty of this crime.
53. Although the Council was prevented from adopting the Moroccan draft resolution, this document, in the view of my delegation, will always remain a living proof of Israel's aggression, as well as a flagrant example of the injustice and bias displayed by certain permanent members.
54. The Syrian delegation would be failing in its duty if it did not express once again its deep appreciation to the representatives of Morocco, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia for the sense of justice and fairness displayed in their statements and in their voting last week and today. These members have shown their complete awareness of the gravity of the situation arising from this brutal air attack on our territory.
55. The Syrian delegation also wishes to express its thanks to those members whose constructive and pertinent contributions to this debate have called attention to the seriousness of the aggression on the part of Israel and who have warned against its repetition.
56. Although somewhat belatedly, I am in duty bound to express my thanks to the Minister for External Relations of Brazil for his kind reference [1167th meeting] to Brazil's strong and long-standing ties of friendship with the Syrian people, ties which my country and people reciprocate. I can assure the Minister for External Relations of Brazil, and I would ask the representative of Brazil to convey this sentiment to him, that these strong and long-standing ties are a source of inspiration and satisfaction to the people in Syria, as well as to the Syrians who have adopted Brazil as their permanent home. I am confident that Brazil, whose people and leaders are imbued with a strong sense of justice and fairness, will fully appreciate the seriousness of Israel's aggression against Syria.
57. Our thanks are also due to those members who exerted every effort in their attempt to reach a formula acceptable to the Security Council. Unfortunately, their sincere endeavours did not meet with success because of the rigid, and uncompromising stand of certain members of the Security Council. For our part, we displayed at all times our readiness to accept a number of suggestions as an expression of our goodwill. To our regret, Israel, in its usual manner, was able to find in some permanent members a willingness to assist her in obstructing those efforts. By so doing, these permanent members put their hidden veto in the service of a party that has committed a flagrant act of aggression against Syria.
58. Some permanent members might have felt embarrassed at condemning Israel's air attack in this particular instance, in view of the fact that a resort to such action, in which these members were involved, took place in the recent past. I must say that these permanent members did not surprise us in the least by their stand, whereby they favoured the Israel point of view during the debate in order to minimize the gravity of the situation. Their attitude has once again confirmed the true link which binds them to Israel, the instrument of colonialism in our region.
59. Their attempt to belittle the latest crimes committed by Israel is an additional eye opener offered to those countries which might still believe that Israel is acting alone. In our opinion, this imperialist strategy is not confined to our area, and it should be examined in its global context. The aggression by Israel on Syrian territory must be viewed with concern in the light of the intervention in the Congo and the aggression being committed in Southern Arabia, as well as in other parts of the world.
60. We have considered the statements made during the debate and the affirmative votes of a number of members today and the positive vote on the Moroccan draft resolution of one permanent member and two others, as a condemnation of Israel's air attack against my country. Naturally, we would have preferred the Council to formally adopt the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Morocco, by which Israel would have been rightly condemned for its aggression.
61. In point of fact, the Israel air attack which took place on 13 November 1964 was not an escalation of the incidents of the same day but a premeditated act of war resorted to by the Israel armed forces after a cease-fire agreement had been reached between the Syrian and the Israel sides through the good offices of the United Nations machinery.
62. My delegation feels that it is of the utmost urgency that the Security Council should take the necessary measures which would deal effectively with the persistent defiance by Israel of the authority of the United Nations. It is in the interests of stability and tranquillity not only in our area but also everywhere in the world that such acts of aggression should be stopped and their authors censured: An air attack on the territory of another country could set a serious precedent. The aggression which took place against our territory could, if unchecked, easily be repeated in Africa, in Asia, in Latin America or anywhere else in the world.
63. Should Israel continue to flout the authority of the United Nations and violate the Armistice Agreement, the Council should consider what further measures it should take, under the Charter of the United Nations, such as those provided for in Article 41, to put an end to Israel provocation and aggression.
64. In one of my statements before the Council I said the following:
The survey should include the area of Tel-El-Qadi and should be carried out to completion simultaneously on the whole length of the Armistice Demarcation Line, provided also that the western limits of the demilitarized zone as indicated in the Armistice Agreement be included in the survey.
65. The conditional acceptance by Israel of the delimitation of the northern sector of the Armistice Demarcation Line does not alter its obstructive attitude which is contrary to the recommendation contained in the report of the Chief of Staff regarding the delimitation of all the Armistice Demarcation Lines, including the demilitarized zone. We rightly feel that the delimitation of one sector only will not prevent border incidents from recurring, and will not ensure the kind of stability which the Council should be seeking. We are therefore of the firm opinion that the delimitation should be carried out simultaneously along the whole length of the Armistice Demarcation Line.
66. Mr. President, I should like, with your permission, to refer once more to the fact that the boycott of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission by Israel is duly confirmed by the report of General Bull and those of his predecessors, but this fact will not discourage us from continuing, as we have done in the past, to co-operate fully with the United Nations.
67. We feel that the normal place for the discussion of all disputes between the two parties is the Mixed Armistice Commission. I think that the voting today on the Moroccan amendments has clearly shown that seven members have called on Israel to vote, to attend and to participate in the meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission. My delegation wishes to thank those members that supported that proposal.
68. Tranquillity can be maintained on the Armistice Demarcation Line only if the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement are fully enforced. To do things by half-measures and piecemeal, as suggested by certain members, would merely provide a palliative which would easily be ignored when the Israelis consider it to their advantage to disturb the peace of the area, as they have so often done, and the Council will find itself burdened with this problem once again.
69. I should like now to say a few words on the draft resolution submitted by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. In my statement to the Council on 3 December 1964 [1168th meeting], I had occasion to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the contradiction in the attitude of certain members during the discussion of the present case and their attitude last year. In this connexion, I should like to refer again to the statements made in 1963 by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway with regard to their interpretation of the functions of the Security Council when the Almagor case was under discussion. These representatives considered then that the functions of the Security Council were twofold. The representative of the United Kingdom, however, Lord Caradon, said, in the course of his intervention in the Council [1165th meeting] that we were gathered not to condemn but to conciliate. He seems to have overlooked what his colleague, Mr. Jackling, who is sitting with us today, said in the Security Council on 28 August 1963. I should like to quote what Mr. Jackling said:
Mr. Jackling went on to say:
70. Lord Caradon seems also to have overlooked the fact that this attitude is shared by the representative of the United States, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, who stated the following on 28 August 1963:
71. I should like to ask the following question of the representatives of the United Kingdom: is there a double yardstick which applies in one case and not in the other? The representative of the United Kingdom considered the incident of August 1963 as a very grave incident which deserved the strongest condemnation. This time we did not hear about any condemnation from him, We heard of conciliation. But the case before us is far more serious that the one of August 1963.
72. The representative of the United Kingdom should also be reminded that these views were shared by the representative of Norway, Mr. Nielsen, who said on 30 August 1963:
73. In the light of the draft resolution which was tabled last week by the United Kingdom and the United States [S/6013], it seems that what was true last year is no longer true this year. The draft resolution entirely omitted all reference to the first function attributed by the co-sponsors to this Council, namely, the assessment of responsibility for the incident of 13 November 1964 and the judgement of those responsible for this act of aggression, by evading completely the determination of responsibility and the pronouncing of judgement.
74. The language and formulation of this draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States are also in complete contradiction with the position taken in September 1963 by the representative of the United States, Mr. Yost. Mr. Yost was then of the opinion that the Council should call upon the parties to co-operate with the Chief of Staff, but, at the same time, to allow him full discretion in his consultations with the parties concerned. This was considered by Mr. Yost the better way to achieve progress rather than attempting to prejudge which issue or issues should receive the most or the first attention" [1063rd meeting, para. 21]. I am at a loss to understand the reasons which prompted the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States to devise a new approach to the case before the Council. By using words such as "Takes special note" and "recommends specifically" in paragraph 2, this draft resolution is prejudging precisely what issue or issues should receive the Council's most or first attention.
75. If I am not mistaken, I heard Mr. Yost say today that his delegation had no objection to the third amendment proposed by the representative of Morocco; but when a vote was taken, the United States delegation abstained from voting on that, particular amendment.
76. The representative of the United States said that the draft resolution co-sponsored by his country and the United Kingdom dealt with the recommendations contained in the report of the Chief of Staff and did not concern itself with the incident of 13 November 1964. This statement, I must say, is completely contradicted by the facts, since the draft resolution formulated a number of observations which contained a judgement in that they mentioned only certain aspects of the incident of 13 November 1964 in a manner detrimental to Syria's position so clearly stated before the Council, and in that they omitted certain other aspects of the incident entailing the clear responsibility of Israel.
77. The representative of the United Kingdom, on the other hand, by restricting the delimitation to the area of Tel-El-Qadi alone as an urgent and immediate matter, and postponing indefinitely the delimitation of the other sectors, has clearly and unambiguously laid open before the Council the obvious intention of the authors of the draft resolution. These authors are doing their best to give satisfaction to Israel without committing themselves to or binding Israel by the recommendations contained in the Chief of Staff's reports.
78. For the reasons that I have just stated, it is to be deeply regretted that the amendments presented by the representative of Morocco, and supported in their entirety by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, and which were meant to correct the serious shortcomings of the two-power draft resolution, were not adopted.
79. All these basic defects in the two-power draft resolution have prompted my delegation to deduce that, behind the manoeuvres used by its authors and others to exonerate Israel from all responsibility for the incident of 13 November 1964, is concealed a far-reaching and ominous desire to make Israel feel that it could embark with impunity on military aggression of this nature. The Council would do well to ponder the grave consequences that would ensue from such an unwise and highly dangerous course of action.
80. I need not repeat the number of acts of aggression committed by Israel against the Arab countries, nor the number of resolutions adopted by this Council condemning in strong terms Israel's criminal behaviour. We believe that the maintenance of tranquillity and stability in our part of the world is of vital importance to all of us. We therefore appeal to those members whose attitude has been a source of encouragement to Israel to refrain, and to use their influence to induce the Israel authorities to adhere strictly to the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and to co-operate fully with the United Nations machinery.
81. In conclusion, this draft resolution, which was not adopted and which was not acceptable to us contained the following main defects.
82. First, it totally ignored reference to the first act of provocation by Israel in encroachment on Syrian territory by an Israel military vehicle. It also ignored the fact that Israel resumed work on the eastern part of the road, in spite of the instructions given by the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to the contrary.
83. Secondly, it kept silent on the very serious and unjustified aerial aggression by Israel against Syria, which could set a precedent not only in our area, but anywhere in the world. I have already stressed the fact that a cease-fire agreement was reached with the assistance of the Truce Supervision Organization before the launching of the air attack.
84. Thirdly, it has adopted the Israel point of view in calling for the re-marking of one small part of the northern sector of the Armistice Demarcation Line instead of recommending the full re-marking of the three sectors of the line, in conformity with the recommendations of the Chief of Staff. This made the draft resolution an expression of an unjustified bias fraught with endless danger to the stability of the area. The remarking of other sectors is urgently called for in view of the fact that it would be alarming to restrict our remarking to one small part.
85. Fourthly, the resolution should have called on Israel, and Israel alone, to put an end to its boycott of the Syria-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, since Syria has been and is still collaborating fully with the United Nations machinery.
86. Before ending, I should like to express the deep thanks of my delegation to the representatives of Morocco, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia for their understanding and for their evaluation of the gravity of the aggression committed against us. I should like also to thank the representatives of Bolivia and Brazil for their positive vote on one of the amendments submitted by the representative of Morocco. The fact that the second amendment presented by Morocco received the support of five members is a sufficient proof of the unjustified air attack carried out by Israel against us.
87. Mr, President, may I conclude by saying that I am thankful to you and to the members of the Council. I am thankful to you, Mr. President, because you have understood our problem. I am thankful to the representatives of the Council for being patient with us and for having allowed my delegation to participate in this debate. I trust that they will have realized by this time how much injustice has been done to my country.
88. Mr. YOST (United States of America): It is a little late to reopen the debate on this subject which we have been considering for so many days and I do not propose to say more than a few words. The Council is generally familiar with the extensive consultations and negotiations which were held over a period of weeks in which a number of permanent members and a number of non-permanent members, and the parties, made efforts to arrive at a consensus. They endeavoured to deal, in the first instance, in an unbiased and generally acceptable way with the incident of 13 November. That did not prove possible. I think some of the reasons why it was not possible have emerged in our discussion this afternoon.
89. As the Council is well aware, there are, in the long history of unhappy incidents along the Armistice Demarcation Line, cases in which the majority of the Council feels that the blame should be attributed rather clearly to one side or the other. This apparently was a case in which the majority of the Council did not feel so and that is the reason why it was impossible to reach a generally acceptable consensus. However, my delegation does very much regret that the Council, because of the exercise of the veto, has been unable to endorse at least the constructive recommendations of the Chief of Staff in regard to the continued maintenance of peace along the Demarcation Line.
90. We believe that the draft resolution presented by the United Kingdom and ourselves [S/6113] did reflect the Council's best judgement as to how it might continue its long-standing responsibility in the maintenance of peaceful conditions between Israel and Syria. Obviously, it was impossible to give perfect satisfaction to any of us, but these were constructive steps, based squarely on the recommendations of the Chief of Staff, which it certainly would have seemed to us worthwhile to approve. We note that in its statement before the Council on 3 December [1167th meeting], the Soviet delegation did not make any constructive suggestions. It limited itself to dealing, in what seemed to us a partial manner, with the immediate incident. Other delegations, however, in referring to the Chief of Staff's report, commented favourably and generally supported the proposals offered by the Chief of Staff in paragraphs 24 to 27 of his report.
91. I may say in this connexion that the clause in paragraph 2 (b) of the draft resolution which we submitted, which dealt with the survey and demarcation of the Armistice Line, was based on the reports of General Bull of August 1963 and November 1964, and provided clearly, while commencing in the area of Tel-El-Qadi, for proceeding thereafter to completion of the full survey.
92. It is heartening to note that the majority of the Council are in favour of a continued strengthening of the United Nation's peace-keeping role in this crucial area and that a majority do endorse the Chief of Staff's efforts to improve the present situation.
93. Further, and finally, we should like to stress that lack of unanimity on the part of the permanent members of the Council in this matter derogates in no way from the responsibility of the parties to carry out, in co-operation with General Bull, the terms of the General Armistice Agreement. We consider the vote which has just taken place on this draft resolution to represent a strong consensus on the part of the Council and we firmly believe that, in carrying out the recommendations approved by the majority of the Council, the parties would be setting their feet on a path that would lead to more peaceful conditions in the area. We earnestly hope that they will do so.
94. Mr. JACKLING (United Kingdom): I had hoped that the representative of Syria had noted my earlier statement as to the distinction in the view of my delegation between the question which the Council had to decide in the Almagor case and the questions in this case. I do not think it is necessary to recall that statement, I can only regret that Mr. Asha has repeated charges of partiality which are unfounded.
95 My delegation still believes that an impartial survey of the Tel-El-Qadi area is necessary. Perhaps in view of one suggestion which the representative of Syria made, which seemed to my mind, at least, to point to a misunderstanding of the purpose of the draft resolution which was introduced by the United Kingdom and the United States, I might be allowed to remind him of a statement that I made on 17 December, when speaking of that draft and referring to the independent survey which we deemed necessary:
96. Perhaps I might add this: my delegation believes that impartiality is essential on the part of its members if they are properly to fulfil the function of this Council, and my delegation will continue to be guided by that consideration to the best of its ability.
97. Mr. NIELSEN (Norway): The Norwegian delegation voted for the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States, because that draft resolution picked up and recommended for approval by the Security Council the specific issues suggested by the Chief of Staff designed to avoid future regrettable and deplorable incidents like the one which occurred on the Armistice Demarcation Line between Syria and Israel in November.
98. We also voted for two of the amendments proposed to us by the representative of Morocco as we considered these two amendments to be improvements to the joint draft resolution.
99. We were, however, unable to vote for the other amendments suggested by Morocco. We did not vote for the first one because, in our reading of the report concerning the circumstances of the incident of 13 November, the report, based on thorough investigations by the Truce Supervision Organization, did not bring out clearly that an Israel military patrol had violated the Armistice Demarcation Line in the area of Tel-El-Qadi.
100. We regret that we were also unable to vote for the second amendment by which the Council would have deplored the resort by Israel to aerial action. Of course, we do deplore the resort to aerial action by Israel; therefore, it is not for this reason that we did not vote for that suggested amendment; but the reason is that there was no mention of the intervening escalation of the use of military means by both sides after the first incident and up to the aerial action which was taken by Israel.
101. The abstention by the Norwegian delegation on the fourth Moroccan amendment was simply due to the fact that we felt, first, that the text, as submitted jointly by the United Kingdom and the United States, was better inasmuch as it made direct reference to the relevant paragraph of the recommendation by the Chief of Staff in his report of 24 August 1963, and secondly, that it would be natural to commence the survey and demarcation in the area where incidents had occurred in order to avoid repetition of incidents in an area where the lack of demarcation apparently had already led to incidents.
102. We have noted that no delegation has disassociated itself from the specific recommendations which were made by the Chief of Staff. We hope earnestly and sincerely that that will weigh heavily both with Syria and with Israel so that even though the Council, in this instance, was unable to pass a resolution, either as originally proposed or as amended, nevertheless they will co-operate with the United Nations machinery in the area in order that the appropriate recommendations by the Chief of Staff can be carried out.
103. The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Since there are no other speakers, I shall adjourn the meeting. I would remind the members of the Council that we shall meet tomorrow, at 10.30 a.m., to continue our discussion concerning the question of the Congo.
The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.
1/ 1179th meeting, para. 37,
2/ See Official Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1964.
3/ Ibid., Eighteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1963.
4/ Ibid., Nineteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1964.
5/ Ibid.
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Document Type: Meeting record, Provisional verbatim record
Document Sources: Security Council
Subject: Armed conflict, Ceasefire, Golan Heights, Incidents, Middle East situation
Publication Date: 21/12/1964