Israeli nuclear armament – SecGen report

ISRAELI NUCLEAR ARMAMENT

Report of the Secretary-General

1. At its forty-eighth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/78 of 16 December 1993 entitled "Israeli nuclear armament", the operative part of which, inter alia, reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"…

"1. Calls upon Israel to renounce possession of nuclear weapons and to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 1/

"2.  Calls upon the States of the region to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly on the implementation of the present resolution;

"…  ."

2. This report is being submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 of the above resolution.  Apart from the materials forwarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (see annexes below), the Secretary-General has not received any additional information since the submission of his last report on the subject (A/48/494) to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session.

Notes

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.

ANNEX I

Resolution GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21 of 23 September 1994 of the General

Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East

The General Conference,

(a) Recognizing the importance of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons – both globally and regionally – in enhancing international peace and security,

(b) Mindful of the usefulness of the Agency's safeguards system as a reliable means of verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

(c) Concerned by the grave consequences, endangering peace and security, of the presence in the Middle East region of nuclear activities not wholly devoted to peaceful purposes,

(d) Welcoming the initiatives regarding the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, in the Middle East and recent initiatives regarding arms control in the region,

(e) Recognizing that full realization of these objectives would be promoted by participation of all States of the region,

(f) Commending the efforts of the Agency concerning the application of safeguards in the Middle East, and the positive response of some States in concluding a full-scope safeguards agreement, and

(g) Recalling its resolution GC(XXXVII)/RES/627,

1. Takes note of the Director General's report in document GOV/2757-GC(XXXVIII)/18;

2. Affirms the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities as an important confidence-building measure among all States in the region and as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ);

3. Calls upon all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable NWFZ in the region, and invites the countries concerned to adhere to international non-proliferation regimes, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as a means of complementing participation in a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and of strengthening peace and security in the region;

4. Takes note of the importance of the ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, including establishment of a NWFZ, and calls on the Director General, as requested by the participants, to render all necessary assistance to the working group in promoting that objective;

5. Requests the Director General to continue consultations with the States of the Middle East to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region as relevant to the preparation of model agreements, as a necessary step towards the establishment of a NWFZ in the region, referred to in resolution GC(XXXVII)/RES/627;

6. Calls upon all States in the region to extend their fullest cooperation to the Director General in the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to him in the preceding paragraph;

7. Further calls upon all States in the region to take measures, including confidence-building and verification measures, aimed at establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East;

8. Calls upon all other States, especially those with a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to render all assistance to the Director General by facilitating the implementation of this resolution; and

9. Requests the Director General to submit to the Board of Governors and the General Conference at its thirty-ninth regular session a report on the implementation of this resolution and to include in the provisional agenda for that session an item entitled "Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East".


ANNEX II

Report of the Director General on application of IAEA

safeguards in the Middle East

1. In its resolution GC(XXXVII)/RES/627 of 1 October 1993, a/ the General Conference requested the Director General, on the basis of his report contained in document GOV/2682-GC(XXXVII)/1072,

"to continue consultations with the States of the Middle East to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region as relevant to the preparation of model agreements, as a necessary step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the region, referred to in resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601".

2. In that resolution, the General Conference took note of the importance of the ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and called upon the Director General, as requested by the participants, "to render all necessary assistance to the working group in promoting that objective".

3. The Director General was further requested "to submit to the Board of Governors and to the General Conference at its thirty-eighth regular session a report on the implementation of this resolution …".

4. In paragraph 18 of his 1993 report (GOV/2682-GC(XXXVII)/1072), the Director General said that, to assist him in implementing the mandate conferred upon him by the General Conference in its resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601 of 25 September 1992, b/ it would be helpful if States which had not yet done so were to respond to his request for views on the material obligations that could be included in a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement and on specific verification requirements and modalities as described in his 1992 report to the General Conference (GC(XXXVI)/1019).  He had requested those views in his letters of November 1992 to the Governments of States in the Middle East.  By the time of the 1993 General Conference, only six States in the Middle East had responded.  Several of these replies were only of a general nature and did not address substantively the specific issues raised.  Despite the call upon States in the region, in resolution GC(XXXVII)/RES/627, to extend their fullest cooperation to the Director General in the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to him, no additional views have yet been received in writing.

5. In this general connection however, and as foreshadowed by paragraph 19 of his 1993 report, the Director General has continued his consultations with States of the Middle East, including further visits to the Middle East region. Since the report was issued he has visited the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Lebanon and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

6. During these visits, the Director General highlighted the importance of verification for a nuclear-weapon-free zone and again explained the different options and modalities available in that respect.  He also continued to emphasize the importance of nuclear transparency and active cooperation as important confidence-building measures in any nuclear-weapon-free zone, and listened to the views of the relevant States on their concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and on the requirements and modalities for verifying compliance in any such zone.

7. All the States visited continued to emphasize the need for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the importance of effective and credible verification of the obligations assumed by the parties to any such zone.  The view was also expressed that, as a preliminary step towards the conclusion of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, all States concerned should accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. c/

8. In paragraph 11 of his 1993 report, the Director General explained that, with the objective of helping to familiarize regional experts with the type of issues and options relevant to verification which would have to be examined and decided upon in any negotiations on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, the Secretariat had participated, as part of the United Nations delegation, in the 3rd meeting of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security held in Washington from 18 to 20 May 1993.

9. Since then, and in fulfilment of the mandate conferred upon the Director General in resolution GC(XXXVII)/RES/627, the Secretariat has participated, also as part of the United Nations delegation, in meetings of the Working Group held in Moscow on 3 and 4 November 1993 and at Doha from 2 to 5 May 1994.

10. Twenty-five regional and extraregional delegations participated in the Moscow meeting, which took place against the backdrop of important developments in the bilateral peace process, namely the signing of the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles d/ and the Israel-Jordan Common Agenda. e/  The Working Group, inter alia, reviewed and welcomed the constructive work which had been accomplished since its meeting in Washington in the area of practical activities designed ultimately to lead to the formulation of specific confidence-building measures for the Middle East region.  At its 4th plenary meeting, in Moscow, motivated by breakthroughs in the bilateral track of the peace negotiations and the wish to build effectively on the achievements of the preceding inter-sessional period, the Working Group endorsed further and accelerated follow-up activities.  These included, inter alia, specific activities related to verification.

11. Following this, an Agency expert was invited to make one of three presentations on verification at a workshop held in Cairo from 31 January to 3 February 1994 within the framework of the "conceptual basket" of arms control and regional security.  The presentation, entitled "Detecting prohibited nuclear activities:  IAEA experience", was given by the Assistant Director General for External Relations.  The workshop provided a useful opportunity for an exchange of views between participants.

12. At its 5th plenary meeting, at Doha, the Working Group continued to consider verification issues and proposals for further work in this area.  In the light of the mandate conferred upon the Director General by the General Conference in its resolution GC(XXXVII)/RES/627 to render assistance to the Working Group, a specific proposal was put forward for a practical activity, already being considered by the Secretariat as a follow-up to the workshop held at Vienna from 4 to 7 May 1993 on the modalities for the application of safeguards in a future nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

13. As now envisaged in the context of the Working Group's activities, the proposal would involve a visit by regional participants in its deliberations to a nuclear power plant in Europe.  The aims of such a visit would be to give representatives of Middle East States a practical demonstration of verification techniques and to acquaint them more fully with the ways in which regional verification structures and activities complement international verification efforts in Europe.  The Secretariat considers that such a proposal could be a further example of the Agency's potential, within its mandate, to render assistance to States of the Middle East, as requested.

14. The Director General intends to continue to pursue his consultations with States of the Middle East through visits to the region and at Vienna.  It is to be hoped that through additional written replies, these consultations and the Agency's participation in the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, the views of the States concerned on the material obligations to be assumed with regard to a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone will crystallize to an extent that could enable the Director General to prepare the model verification agreements envisaged in resolutions GC(XXXVI)/RES/601 and GC(XXXVII)/RES/627.

Notes

a/ See International Atomic Energy Agency, Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference, Thirty-seventh Regular Session, 27 September-1 October 1993 (GC(XXXVII)/RESOLUTIONS(1993)).

b/ Ibid., Thirty-sixth Regular Session, 21-25 September 1992 (GC(XXXVI)/RESOLUTIONS(1992)).

c/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.

d/ Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, including its Annexes and Agreed Minutes, by the Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization on 13 September 1993 in Washington, D.C.

e/ Common Agenda between Israel and Jordan, done in Washington, D.C., 14 September 1993.

—–


Document symbol: A/49/652
Document Type: Report
Document Sources: General Assembly, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Subject: Agenda Item, Arms control and regional security issues
Publication Date: 08/11/1994
2019-03-11T21:29:05-04:00
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