Mideast situation – SRSG Gunnar Jarring’s mission – SecGen further report

                                                      Distr

                                                    GENERAL

   

                                              S/10070/Add.2

                                               5 March 1971

   

                                          ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

   

   

   

    FURTHER REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ACTIVITIES

      OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MIDDLE EAST

   

   1.   On 1 February 1971 I submitted to the Security Council a report

   (S/10070/Add.1) on the activities of Ambassador Jarring, my Special

   Representative to the Middle East, since the resumption on 5 January

   1971 of the discussions under his auspices with the parties to the

   Middle East conflict for the purpose of reaching agreement on a just

   and lasting peace between them. In that report, I found grounds for

   cautious optimism in the fact that there had been some progress in the

   definition of the position of the parties and I appealed to them to

   pursue their role in the discussions in a constructive manner, to

   co-operate with Ambassador Jarring with a view to the carrying out of

   Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and, in that very difficult and

   crucial stage of the discussions, to withhold fire, to exercise

   military restraint and to maintain the quiet which had prevailed in

   the area since August 1970.

   

   2.   In response to that appeal, the Foreign Ministry of Israel, in a

   communiqué released in Jerusalem on 2 February, announced that Israel

   would preserve the cease-fire on a mutual basis; in a speech to the

   National Assembly on 4 February, the President of the United Arab

   Republic declared the decision of the United Arab Republic to refrain

   from opening fire for a period of thirty days ending on 7 March.

   

   3.   In pursuing his mandate to promote agreement between the parties,

   Ambassador Jarring, while sharing my cautious optimism that the

   parties were seriously defining their positions and wished to move

   forward to a permanent peace, noted with growing concern that each

   side was insisting that the other should make certain commitments

   before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the

   provisions of a final peace settlement.

   

   4.   On the Israeli side there was insistence that the United Arab

   Republic should give specific, direct and reciprocal commitments

   towards Israel that it would be ready to enter into a peace agreement

   with Israel and to make towards Israel the various undertakings

   referred to in paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242

   (1967). When agreement was reached on those points, it would be

   possible to discuss others, including the refugee problem; such items

   as secure and recognized boundaries, withdrawal and additional

   arrangements for ensuring security should be discussed in due course.

   

   5.   The United Arab Republic continued to regard the Security Council

   resolution as containing provisions to be implemented by the parties

   and to express its readiness to carry out its obligations under the

   resolution in full, provided that Israel did likewise. However it held

   that Israel persisted in its refusal to implement the Security Council

   resolution, since it would not commit itself to withdraw from all Arab

   territories occupied in June 1967. Furthermore in the view of the

   United Arab Republic Israel had not committed itself to the

   implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to a just

   settlement to the refugee problem.

   

   6.   The papers received by Ambassador Jarring from Israel and Jordan

   relating to peace between these two countries showed a similar

   divergence of views. Israel stressed the importance of Jordan's giving

   an undertaking to enter into a peace agreement with it which would

   specify the direct and reciprocal obligations undertaken by each of

   them. Jordan emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of

   territory by war and expressed the view that the essential first step

   towards peace lay in an Israeli commitment to evacuate all Arab

   territories.

   

   7.   Ambassador Jarring felt that at this stage of the talks he should

   make clear his views on what he believed to be the necessary steps to

   be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in

   accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council

   resolution 242 (1967), which the parties had agreed to carry out in

   all its parts. He reached the conclusion, which I shared, that the

   only possibility to break the imminent deadlock arising from the

   differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the

   priority to be given to commitments and undertakings – which seemed to

   him to be the real cause for the existing immobility in the talks –

   was for him to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous

   commitments which seemed to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual

   peace settlement between them. It should thereafter be possible to

   proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace

   agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but

   with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee

   question.

   

   8.   In identical aide-mémoires handed to the representatives of the

   United Arab Republic and Israel on 8 February 1971 Ambassador Jarring

   requested those Governments to make to him certain prior commitments.

   Ambassador Jarring's initiative was on the basis that the commitments

   should be made simultaneously and reciprocally and subject to the

   eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace

   settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee

   problem. Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from

   occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international

   boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine. The

   United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace

   agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a

   reciprocal basis, various undertakings and acknowledgements arising

   directly or indirectly from paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council

   resolution 242 (1967).

   

   9.   On 15 February, Ambassador Jarring received from the

   representative of the United Arab Republic an aide-mémoire in which it

   was indicated that the United Arab Republic would accept the specific

   commitments requested of it, as well as other commitments arising

   directly or indirectly from Security Council resolution 242 (1967). If

   Israel would give, likewise, commitments covering its own obligations

   under the Security Council resolution, including commitments for the

   withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip and for

   the achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem in

   accordance with United Nations resolutions, the United Arab Republic

   would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Finally

   the United Arab Republic expressed the view that a just and lasting

   peace could not be realized without the full and scrupulous

   implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the

   withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories

   occupied since 5 June 1967.

   

   10.  On 17 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the Israeli

   representative of the contents of the United Arab Republic reply to

   his aide-mémoire.

   

   11.  On 26 February, Ambassador Jarring received a paper from the

   representative of Israel, in which, without specific reference to the

   commitment which he had sought from that Government, Israel stated

   that it viewed favourably "the expression by the United Arab Republic

   of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel" and

   reiterated that it was prepared for meaningful negotiations on all

   subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries.

   Israel gave details of the undertakings which in its opinion should be

   given by the two countries in such a peace agreement, which should be

   expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international

   law and precedent. Israel considered that both parties having

   presented their basic positions should now pursue the negotiations in

   a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions.

   

   12.  On the crucial question of withdrawal on which Ambassador Jarring

   had sought a commitment from Israel, the Israel position was that it

   would give an undertaking covering withdrawal of Israeli armed forces

   from "the Israeli-United Arab Republic cease-fire line" to the secure,

   recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace

   agreement; Israel would not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines.

   

   13.  On 28 February, Ambassador Jarring informed the United Arab

   Republic representative of the contents of the Israeli paper.

   

   14.  Ambassador Jarring has been very active over the past month and

   some further progress has been made towards a peaceful solution of the

   Middle East question. The problems to be settled have been more

   clearly identified and on some there is general agreement. I wish

   moreover to note with satisfaction the positive reply given by the

   United Arab Republic to Ambassador Jarring's initiative. However, the

   Government of Israel has so far not responded to the request of

   Ambassador Jarring that it should give a commitment on withdrawal to

   the international boundary of the United Arab Republic.

   

   15.  While I still consider that the situation has considerable

   elements of promise, it is a matter for increasing concern that

   Ambassador Jarring's attempt to break the deadlock has not so far been

   successful. I appeal, therefore, to the Government of Israel to give

   further consideration to this question and to respond favourably to

   Ambassador Jarring's initiative.

   

   16.  To give time for further consideration and in the hope that the

   way forward may be reopened, I once more appeal to the parties to

   withhold fire, to exercise military restraint and to maintain the

   quiet which has prevailed in the area since August 1970.