Mideast situation – SecCo report to the GA (excerpts)

REPORT

OF

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

16 July 1968-15 July 1969

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OFFICIAL RECORDS : TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION

SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/7602)

UNITED NATIONS

New York, 1969

CONTENTS

…/…

INTRODUCTION

The present report 1/ is submitted to the General Assembly by the Security Council in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3, and Article 15, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

Essentially a summary and guide reflecting the broad lines of the debates, the report is not intended as a substitute for the records of the Security Council, which constitute the only comprehensive and authoritative account of its deliberations.

With respect to the membership of the Security Council during the period covered, it will be recalled that the General Assembly at its 1709th plenary meeting on 1 November 1968, elected Colombia, Finland, Nepal, Spain and Zambia as non-permanent members of the Security Council to fill the vacancies resulting from the expiration, on 31 December 1968, of the terms of office of Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia and India.

The period covered in the present report is from 16 July 1968 to 15 July 1969.  The  Council held fifty-two meetings during that period.

1/ This is the twenty-fourth annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. The previous reports were submitted under the symbols A/93, A/366, A/620, A/945, A/1361, A/1873, A/2167, A/2437, A/2712, A/2935, A/3157, A/3648, A/3901, A/4190, A/4494, A/4867, A/5202, A/5502, A/5802, A/6002, A/6302, A/6702 and A/7202.

Part I

QUESTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER ITS RESPONSIBILITY

FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Chapter 1

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A. Communications, reports of the Chief of Staff and discussion

  by the Council concerning the status of the cease-fire

1.  COMPLAINTS BY JORDAN AND ISRAEL

(a) Communications to the Council from 16 July to 5 August 1968 and requests for a meeting

1. In a letter dated 17 July 1968 (S/8683), Israel replied to a Jordanian letter of 8 July (S/8674) charging Israel with an attack on 4 June against concentrations of civilians on the East Bank of the Jordan. The reply stated that Jordan could not continue its attacks against Israel villages and civilians and at the same time claim immunity for military positions and

bases that were purposely established close to inhabited areas.

2. In a letter dated 29 July (S/8698), Jordan charged that Israel, in attempting to force the expulsion of busloads of Arab refugees from Gaza across the King Hussein Bridge to the East Bank of the Jordan River (see section B, below), had fired on Jordanian observation posts, which had foiled the attempt. Later, Israel had conducted an operation under the supervision of the Military Governor of Jericho District and supported by tanks and military units; that mass expulsion, in defiance of Security Council resolutions, was a grave threat to peace and security. In a letter of 31 July (S/8701) Israel replied that Jordan had distorted the facts and that the Jordanian forces had opened fire on Israel military positions on the West Bank without provocation.

3. In a letter dated 2 August (S/8716) Israel submitted to the Security Council charges of continued violation of the cease-fire from Jordanian territory, both by regular Jordanian troops and by paramilitary terror units with the co-operation and encouragement of the Jordanian authorities. Israel enclosed a list of 104 cease-fire violations that it charged had taken place from Jordanian territory between 23 June and 1 August.

4. In a letter dated 4 August (S/8719) Jordan complained to the Security Council that Israel forces had committed another act of aggression on that date when Israel aircraft had bombed areas west and south of the city of Salt, nineteen miles from Amman. In a letter of the same date (S/8720), Israel stated that in view of persistent attacks against Israel from Jordanian territory, it had become necessary for Israel to act in self-defence. Its air attack had been directed exclusively against two terrorist bases in the Salt area, including the central headquarters of the El Fatah organization, stores of ammunition and sabotage equipment, training facilities and barracks. In a subsequent letter of 8 August (S/8739), Jordan charged that Israel aircraft had used napalm bombs in its attack and attached pictures to show that the Israel attack had been aimed at civilians.

5. In a letter dated 5 August (S/8721), Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation "resulting from the continued Israeli acts of  aggression".

6. In a letter dated 5 August (S/8724), Israel also requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to resume consideration of the previous Israel complaint regarding "the grave and continued violations of the cease-fire by Jordan" which had been submitted by his delegation on 5 June 1968 (S/8617).

(b) Consideration by the Council at the 1434th to 1440th meetings (5 to 16 August 1968)

7. At the 1434th meeting, on 5 August, the President of the Council stated that the meeting was convened at the urgent requests of Jordan and Israel and that their previous requests (S/8616 and S/8617), which had been on the provisional agenda on 5 June 1968 when the Council had adjourned its meeting in tribute to the late Senator Robert Kennedy, were also included on the provisional agenda.  The provisional agenda  of  the  1434th  meeting  was then  adopted.

8. The representatives of Jordan, Israel, the United Arab Republic, Iraq and subsequently the representatives of Syria and Saudi Arabia were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without vote.

9. The representative of Jordan stated that Israel's premeditated attack on the previous day, which had included air bombardment and shelling, had been carefully directed against the civilian population of the areas around the city of Salt and had been similar in nature to Israel's earlier attack on 4 June 1968 against civilian centres in Irbid and neighbouring villages. Incomplete reports indicated that thirty-four Jordanians had been killed and eight-two seriously wounded in Israel's latest attack. There could be no doubt that it had been planned at the highest level and Israel officials had been issuing dire warnings to Jordan. It was also clear that the attack was primarily directed against the civilian population, as shown by the large number of civilian casualties and the extensive damage to civilian property. Israel wished to destroy the agriculture of the East Bank of the Jordan River and to terrorize the people of that area. The attack was part of the effort to intimidate Jordan. Having already turned more than 450,000 people into homeless refugees, Israel was trying to do the same to the residents of the northern part of the Jordan Valley on the East Bank. The areas attacked were Jordan's most productive region upon which the country depended for a great part of its agricultural needs. In the past the Security Council, while warning Israel against actions of military reprisal, had at the same time promised to consider more effective measures as envisaged in the Charter. It was therefore incumbent upon the Council to take more effective measures to cope with the problem, otherwise more Israel attacks were to be expected.

10. The representative of Israel said that despite the cease-fire obligations undertaken by the parties warfare against Israel was being continued from Jordanian territory. Israel had repeatedly asked the Council to take effective action to stop Jordanian violations of the cease-fire, and had explained that the cease-fire could not be a screen for Arab aggression and that Israel had to take measures to defend itself. It had also emphasized the impact of Security Council deliberations on the region and had repeatedly stated that the adoption of resolutions lacking in equity would increase intransigence and breed additional violence. The Council's resolution 248 (1968) of 24 March 1968, in spite of its denunciations of cease-fire violations, had promptly been interpreted by Jordan as non-applicable to Arab acts of hostility against Israel. On 4 April, the Security Council had expressed its concern at the deteriorating situation. Since then, military attacks and armed incursions from Jordanian territory had continued unabated. Jordan had become the principal base for Arab aggression against Israel. Special military camps had been established there to train saboteurs and recruiting centres had been opened in Amman. Officers and men of regular Egyptian and Syrian army units had been transferred to Jordan and assigned to terror operations, while Iraqi troops had been given full freedom to operate as they wished. Two types of warfare were being conducted from Jordanian territory: terror raids and armed attacks from military positions, and both were being carried out from across the cease-fire line. Those two methods had been developed because the Arab Governments had been unable to use Arab inhabitants in the areas under Israel control as instruments of war. The shelling of Israel villages had reached a climax in May and June. On 4 June, a large-scale assault had been launched by Jordanian artillery resulting in extensive damage to the villages and to the central part of Beit Shean, as well as civilian casualties. It had therefore become necessary for Israel aircraft to take action. Since Jordan had used inhabited centres, such as Irbid, as locations for its artillery positions, civilian casualties on the Jordanian side had become inevitable. Since then, there had been a change in the Arab warfare tactics. It was currently being carried out more and more by terrorist and sabotage raids which had steadily increased in intensity and had become a daily occurrence. In July alone, ninety-eight acts of aggression had been committed. Israel had repeatedly emphasized Jordan's responsibility for that unabated warfare and had called on its Government to put an end to those attacks, but to no avail. Since Israel's security was in danger and its people were under constant threat, it had no alternative but to take action in self-defence. It was for that reason that on 4 August Israel aircraft had taken action exclusively against two terrorist bases in the Salt area, which included the central headquarters of the El Fatah organization, stores of ammunition and sabotage equipment, training facilities and barracks. Only faithful and reciprocal observance of the cease-fire and an effort by the parties to reason together and work together towards a peaceful agreement could break the vicious circle of the twenty-year war. The Security Council could also help by impressing on Jordan the vital necessity to abide by the cease-fire obligations and to terminate all acts of aggression  from  its territory against Israel.

11. At the same meeting, the representative of Iraq, after expressing the concern of his Government and people over the continued violation of the cease-fire and its effect on the prospects of the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, stated that Israel had advanced the same excuses and justifications for its acts of aggression as it had done in March 1968. The Security Council had then rejected those arguments and, on 24 March, had unanimously adopted resolution 248 (1968) stating that Israel's military action in Jordanian territory had been of a large-scale and carefully planned nature. Israel's latest aggression fell entirely within the scope of the 24 March resolution and confronted the Council with a situation in which it had to act in accordance with its past  decisions.

12. The representative of Algeria stated that the basic problem of the Middle East was the conflict between an aggressive Power which was supported by imperialist interests, and the Palestinian nation which was determined to regain its rights. Any real solution must lie in the implementation of pertinent United Nations resolutions and the general principles of law. The Council's attention had been drawn to the probable intentions of Israel concerning the territories east of the Jordan River and fear had been expressed that in the light of the international situation and the active complicity which Israel could count on, it might show additional greed concerning further territorial acquisitions. Certain friendly nations were currently more concerned with bringing peace to the Middle East in a way that would leave Israel most of the fruits of its conquest than in helping the Security Council to fulfill the mission entrusted to it. Those Powers had stated that a solution must be found, but they now said it must be one that would satisfy all interests at stake. That attitude, based on eternal compromise, could not serve as a guideline for the United Nations or its Members. The United Nations owed it to itself to return to the application of its basic principles and avoid confusion whereby the complaint of the victim

and the statements of the aggressor were placed on an equal footing. Israel's latest act of aggression was aimed at the destruction of the Jordanian region which was its major source of grain supply, thus forcing Jordan to bow to Israel's orders. It was therefore all the more necessary that the Security Council should insist on full implementation of its previous decisions, which could not be implemented under military occupation or under threat of destruction or famine.

13. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recalled that in its resolution 248 (1968) of 24 March 1968 the Security Council had stated that it would be obliged to consider more effective steps in accordance with the Charter in order to ensure that acts of military reprisals did not take place. Israel's latest act of aggression made clear its attitude to Security Council resolutions and its disregard for principles of

international law. Israel's new act of aggression was in effect a continuation of Tel Aviv's policy which was to achieve its imperialist aims in the Middle East, use military blackmail to intimidate neighbouring Arab countries and force them to become reconciled to the results of Israel's military aggression by making cynical use of military strength and flouting all standards of international law. Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories constituted a standing violation of all the principles of the Charter and the people of those territories had every right to resist that occupation. Besides

continuing its aggressive acts, Israel had also continued creating obstacles to a political settlement in the Middle East and preventing implementation of the 22 November 1967 resolution. Israel's latest act of aggression had come precisely at a time when the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, was carrying out the next stage in a series of consultations regarding a peaceful settlement of the Middle East situation. That could only be regarded as a deliberate attempt to disrupt the Jarring mission. The Soviet delegation emphatically urged the Security Council to condemn Israel for its criminal acts against the Arab States and, in accordance with the principles of the Charter, to take such measures to halt and punish the aggressor as would deter the high-handed warriors of Tel Aviv from continuing their military provocations. No one must doubt the Soviet Union's determination to put an end, in collaboration with other peace-loving countries, to Israel aggression, to eliminate all its results, to return to their lawful owners the territories seized as a result of the aggression of 1967, and to bring about the necessary political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence in that region.

14. The representative of the United States of America said that his Government did not condone the major military attack of the previous day by Israel against Jordan but neither did it condone the terrorism and sabotage which had been launched with increasing frequency from Jordan in the past weeks. Those acts should not be judged as isolated events, they were a concerted effort that could not help but have a cumulative impact. The incidents had violated the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions, killed not only military personnel, but also civilians and had fed the tension and fear that had frustrated the search for a peaceful settlement. The Council once again found itself confronted not with facts but with charges and counter-charges, making it impossible for it to fulfil its role with objectivity. That again underlined the need for some mechanism that could enable the Council to act in a truly informed manner when events such as the current incident occurred. It would be helpful if the parties were to reconsider their positions and agree to the presence of United Nations observers in the area. Their presence, while not prejudicing the rights or claims of either side, would serve as a deterrent to further incidents. A solution to the Middle East situation could be found only through the instruments and processes of accommodation and agreement, which were readily available, particularly in the person of Ambassador Jarring.

15. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland stated that his delegation had previously stressed that all acts of violence must be deplored wherever they occurred and in whatever circumstances. His Government strongly deplored the latest serious and deliberate attack, just as it had deplored the acts of violence preceding it. The United Kingdom Government believed that resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and Ambassador Jarring's mission still offered the best basis for a settlement. Currently the Council's efforts must be directed towards breaking the vicious circle of violence and counter-violence and advancing gradually towards a settlement which could be accepted by all.

16. The representative of Jordan said that whenever Jordan had submitted to the Council a situation dangerous to peace in the area, Israel had always attempted to confuse the issue by making counter-charges. Some members of the Council were trying to raise the question of observers. In that respect it might be recalled that there was already machinery in the area, the Mixed Armistice Commission, which should prove effective. One could not ask for observers only on the cease-fire lines while ignoring violations in the occupied territories.  If observers were to be appointed, they should be all along the entire Armistice Demarcation Line, including the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the Syria-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line and Jerusalem. Jordan would favour such deployment of observers.

17. At the 1435th meeting, on 6 August, the representative of the United Arab Republic stated that Israel had put a remarkable emphasis on the cease-fire and its observance. The circumstances that had led to the adoption of resolution 235 (1967) showed that the cease-fire was only a temporary measure. At that time the representative of the United States had clearly stated that his Government considered the cease-fire as a first step towards the establishment of peace in the area. With the adoption of the Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, a second step had been also taken towards that goal. Containing the basic elements of a permanent settlement, that resolution was based on fundamental principles of the United Nations and its Charter. But there was no official indication that Israel had accepted it and was prepared to implement it. A planned military attack by one country against another, whether under a cease-fire régime or not, was clearly a case of aggression. Israel's defiance of the Security Council resolutions undoubtedly constituted a serious threat to international peace and security. Since 24 March, when the Security Council had unanimously adopted resolution 248 (1968), Israel had twice engaged in retaliation and massive reprisals. The time had come, therefore, when it was necessary to consider taking more effective measures as envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter to avoid recurrence of further violations.

18. The representative of France said that his Government had learned with deep concern of the bombing of Salt by the Israel Air Force and deplored the loss of human life and damage to property. It was also seriously alarmed by the repetition of such incidents in spite of the appeals and decisions of the Security Council. The attack on Salt and the earlier attack on Irbid could not be justified by claims of legitimate defence, since they were reprisals, and the very idea of military reprisals was unacceptable to the French Government. It was equally condemned by the United Nations and its Charter. The opposite road to military reprisals –that leading to a peaceful settlement–was shown by resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 which must serve as the basis for a settlement in the Middle East. The French delegation had followed closely the laudable efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, in the fulfilment of his mission. At a moment when Ambassador Jarring was doing his best to accomplish the task entrusted to him, military operations, such as the bombing of Salt, could only render it more difficult. The Security Council, while condemning such actions, should try to prevent their recurrence by ensuring the effective application of the 22 November 1967 resolution.

19. The representative of Canada said that his delegation regretted the military operation in Jordan on 4 August and any loss of life involved in that operation. It appealed to all concerned to observe scrupulously the cease-fire and to avoid positions or undertakings likely to make more unstable the fragile peace which was precariously maintained in the Near East. Such acts of violence, as reported to the Council, could not foster a propitious atmosphere for the task entrusted to the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring. The decision of the Security Council might well have a far-reaching impact on his vital work, which was currently the only hope for a peaceful solution.

20. The representative of Pakistan said that the latest attack of Israel was the fourth large-scale aggression by Israel against Jordan since March 1968 when the Security Council had adopted resolution 248 (1968). While there was general condemnation for that act, one could, however, discern two trends in the discussion which might impede the Council's objectivity and render its deliberations totally fruitless. The first was the tendency to be over-impressed by the fact that the Council was faced with charges and counter-charges and had no independent knowledge of the truth. In the case at hand, confusion was unwarranted, however, as Israel itself had admitted its military action. The second trend was the tendency to equate the military actions of Israel with all other violations of the cease-fire and, in so doing, to strike a posture of justice and even-handedness in disregard of the human realities of the area. To equate the small, sporadic and spontaneous acts of resistance of the people of the occupied territories with the carefully planned and large-scale military operations of the armed forces of Israel was to ignore a startling disparity of magnitude and quality and to confer equal rights on the aggressor and its victim. In the current instance, that would amount to condoning military reprisals. Moreover, it was unrealistic to think that there was a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence between Jordan and Israel for which both parties were equally responsible. There was no means for Jordan, short of waging a war against its own people, to prevent the so-called violations of the cease-fire. To make progress towards a solution of the situation in the Middle East it was necessary that a measure of balance be introduced by first checking Israel's aggressive actions. Pakistan also shared the anxiety of other members of the Council that the latest developments in the area should not adversely affect the progress of the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring.

21. At the 1436th meeting, on 7 August, the representative of Jordan repeated that as long as Israel remained in the Arab territories, there would be resistance, struggle and sacrifices for freedom, as was to be expected in the circumstances. Resistance against occupation had precedents in every country ever occupied. The situation in Angola, Rhodesia and South Africa was no different from the struggle of the Arabs of Palestine. Europeans had resisted Nazi occupation in a similar manner and lost millions of lives in the

struggle to regain their homelands.

22. The representative of Syria said that the latest Israel attack against Jordan was not an isolated incident but a link in a long chain of violence against Arab States. Three important things directly related to the Jordanian complaint and the question of Palestine in general needed to be emphasized. First, that if Israel had not driven out the Arabs of Palestine through terrorism and massacre, it could not have been the exclusive Jewish State its leaders wanted it to be, for the Arab and Jewish populations would have been equal in number. Secondly, that, in accordance with the last report of the Mandatory Power to the United Nations in 1947, Jewish ownership in Palestine had amounted to only 5.66 per cent. The Arab people of Palestine were still the legal owners of the land of Palestine from which they had been forcibly expelled. Thirdly, that the term belligerence could not be applied to a people who were defending their legal rights against a brutal conquest.

23. The representative of Denmark said that his delegation considered that all violations of cease-fire must be deplored unreservedly as such violations, besides resulting in loss of human life, also impeded progress towards peace. The case before the Council was not likely to be solved unless one faced the fact that certain actions by either party might result in counter-action by the other party to the detriment of peace and reason and in contravention of the efforts of the Council and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. It should be brought home to the parties concerned that the Security Council expected them to adhere scrupulously to the cease-fire because further violence in the area might well bring in its train disastrous consequences going far beyond the area. It was necessary that all concerned support the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, because it offered the best hope for a just and lasting peace based on an accepted settlement, as called for in the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

24. The representative of Iraq stated that in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations the Security Council had unanimously condemned acts of military reprisal. It could not but condemn another act of reprisal. However, the Council must determine once and for all that the activities of the so-called infiltrators could not be equated with those of the Israel armed forces. The dangerous implications of equal treatment could not escape anyone, especially the rulers of Israel who would interpret it as a vindication of their stand. There could not but be sympathy and support for a people struggling for their freedom, and their actions could not be compared with the large-scale military action by the regular armed forces of a State. The Security Council could not abdicate its responsibility for taking effective action. Such action alone could meet the needs of the current situation.

25. The representative of Hungary stated that there was no justification for the serious violation of the United Nations Charter which had occurred when Israel military aircraft and shells bombed the territory of Jordan. Israel had advanced the pretext of "self-defence"; however, that argument could not hide the fact that the so-called terror raids were the direct consequence of the illegal occupation of Arab lands and that resistance to that occupation did not entitle Israel to attack its neighbours. The latest act of aggression of the Israel policy-makers and the expulsion of 50,000 Arabs from the Gaza Strip clearly showed that they had no interest in decreasing tension. As to the idea of deploying United Nations observers along a certain line, when Israel felt free to send its aircraft deep inside its neighbour's territory, observers would not be able to fulfil their mission, and to send them in the existing circumstances would only prolong Israel occupation of Arab territories.

26. The representative of Senegal said that a mistaken concept of self-defence could lead to a world conflagration. Leaders in Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa were watching the Security Council's reaction to the Israel interpretation of the concept of self-defence. As his delegation saw it, the victim of aggression must respond immediately and on the same location and with all the means at its disposal. In the light of its delegation's conception of self-defence, Israel's action in bombing two of Jordan's towns could not be interpreted as self-defence. Jordan had been attacked and therefore it was not the aggressor. The basic problem, however, was the settlement of the destiny of the Palestinian refugees and the evacuation by Israel of the territory that it had occupied by force. Senegal placed great hope in Ambassador Jarring's mission for securing implementation of the resolution of 22 November 1967, and condemned the raids and military operations which could only jeopardize his efforts.

27. The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that the rulers of Israel were using religion for political ends. The Zionists had taken Palestine, and the people of Palestine had risen against that occupation. The Palestinians, though displaced and living in refugee camps, were a people with a separate identity of their own. Neither the United Nations nor anybody else, including the Arab Governments, had any right to tell them to forget about their homeland and live elsewhere. There were some 16 million Jews in the world, over 1,000 million Christians and about 600 million Moslems. The Christians and the Moslems held the land as holy to their religion, as did the Jews. The Zionists' claim for exclusive rights to Palestine was unacceptable. Under no circumstances would the people of Saudi Arabia accept Zionist domination of Jerusalem. The situation could be settled only if the Zionists were to agree to live in the State of Palestine, containing both Arab and Jews, without Israel domination, as citizens of the Holy Land under a Palestine banner.

28. At the 1437th meeting, on 9 August, the representative of Paraguay said that strict observance of the Security Council resolutions of 1967 on cease-fire was the minimum condition required to ensure the success of the efforts of the Secretary-General and Ambassador Jarring. No peace could be built on the use of force or the threat of force and the acquisition of territory. The Paraguayan delegation had previously deplored the fact that there was no United Nations presence in the sector where the cease-fire had most often been violated. Such a presence might be helpful in avoiding the recurrence of new acts of violence and in providing the Council with impartial evidence. Whatever decision the Council might adopt, it must appeal to the parties to avoid new violations of the cease-fire.

29. The representative of China said that the Israel action was contrary to the spirit of the Charter and that in the past the Security Council had censured it. At the same time, the Chinese delegation saw no justification for such acts of violence from the other side, since they only led to more violence. The first order of business was therefore to stop violence. The cease-fire must be scrupulously maintained and steps taken to prevent the recurrence of violence. His delegation had previously urged that United Nations observers be deployed in the Israel-Jordan sector. Inasmuch as Security Council resolution 242 (1967) had stressed the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and the eventual "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict", their presence should not have the effect of freezing a temporary situation or hardening the cease-fire lines. On the contrary, the lack of United Nations presence would make it difficult to bring about a climate conducive to a peaceful settlement in conformity with resolution 242 (1967).

30. The representative of India, after expressing his delegation's concern over the bombing of the city of Salt and the heavy loss of life, stated that the incident clearly showed the precarious nature of the cease-fire in the area. Since the adoption of its cease-fire resolution, the Council had had to meet on a number of occasions to consider acts violating those resolutions and to condemn them. The current incident, which was similar to the one that the Council had condemned in March by its resolution 248 (1968), must be similarly condemned. India had held the view that there could be no peace in west Asia until Israel withdrew its armed forces from the occupied territories. That was one of the fundamental principles contained in the 22 November 1967 resolution of the Security Council. The international community should make every effort to see that that resolution was fully implemented. The United Arab Republic and Jordan had already indicated their willingness to implement that resolution in full. Israel was expected to make a similar commitment. In the view of his delegation, the representative of India concluded, the Security Council must condemn violations of its cease-fire resolutions 236 (1967) and 248 (1968) and demand their strict observance. At the same time, it should insist that all parties in the area extend their full and active co-operation to Ambassador Jarring's mission.

31. The President, speaking as the representative of Brazil, stated that his Government viewed the recent incidents with the utmost concern. Those developments were clear and undisguised violations of the cease-fire which, at the same time, showed complete disregard for the Security Council's authority and constituted constant violations of the cease-fire by both sides. The Security Council should place its full weight and prestige behind the efforts of Ambassador Jarring to secure agreement for the implementation of its resolution 242 (1967), which was one of the most positive actions taken by the Council to restore peace and order in the Middle East. Short of enforcement action, the Security Council had gone as far as it could and had laid down the basis for a just and lasting peace. A better political climate would be created if the major Powers harmonized their actions and interests in the area through an understanding on the supply of armaments, either through total cessation of military assistance or through an accorded regulation and balanced limitation on supplies of defensive equipment.

32. At the 1438th meeting, on 12 August, the representative of Jordan said that Israel had often asserted that its military operations and air attacks were directed against what it described as "terrorist bases" and not against civilian installations. That, however, was not the real position. After giving details of Israel's attack of 4 August 1968, the representative of Jordan said that the bombings of a public works camp, coffee shops and farmers and their crops and trucks could not be said to have been directed against the so-called terrorist bases. With regard to Israel's allegations that Jordan had become the principal base for attacks against Israel, he had been instructed by his Government to state that no recruitment centres had ever been opened in Amman, that there were no fedayeen bases or special training camps in his country and that Iraqi army units were in Jordan for defensive purposes against any Israel aggression and that they did not help or train fedayeen. There was also no truth in the Israel allegation that there was co-ordination among the Governments of Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Syria and Iraq, on the one hand, and the fedayeen on the other, or that El Fatah had Iraqi officers. Israel had wanted to convince the world and the Security Council that Palestinians were happy with its usurpation of their rights and their homes and that there was no resistance from them but only from the Arab States.

33. The representative of Israel stated that his Government had decided to release confidential information illustrating the involvement of the Jordan Government in the terror warfare against Israel. This showed that the Jordanian authorities had not limited themselves to general support of the terror operations but had participated directly in those operations. There was full operational co-ordination between the Jordanian Army and the raider commandos to prevent clashes as a result of mistaken identity and for that purpose the commandos were given special guidance concerning the location of Jordanian mine-fields on the East Bank and of Jordanian Army ambushes. The Jordanian Army Command had also issued instructions to its forces to assist the raider units in determining the best timing and route for crossing the cease-fire line as well as military intelligence with regard to Israel mine-fields, defence installations, patrols and posts and by giving them covering fire. Moreover, a supreme co-ordination committee of the Jordanian Army and the terror organizations had recently been established. The raiders were well-trained military commandos, sometimes of Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi origin, frequently transferred to terror operations from the regular army units of the Arab States. Those organizations were artificially maintained and encouraged by the Arab Governments as an expression of their belligerency and would crumble the moment the Arab Governments decided to abide by their cease-fire obligations.

34. The representative of Jordan said that there was no agreement between Jordan and Israel which could be described as a "cease-fire agreement". There was, however, an international agreement, the Mixed Armistice Agreement, that had created the armistice machinery, which the United Nations jurisprudence continued to regard as valid and binding on both Israel and Jordan. With regard to the cease-fire, there was a decision by the Security Council, and Jordan was abiding by that decision. However, Jordan could not be held responsible for the rise of liberation movements inside the occupied territories. The violation of the cease-fire came from Israel's actions in occupied territories.

35. At the 1439th meeting, on 15 August, the representative of Ethiopia said that no appreciable progress had been made since the unanimous adoption of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, despite the dedicated efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, to reach an agreement for the implementation of that resolution. In fact, the situation remained as dangerous as ever, with the prospect of another conflict beginning to loom large. The deplorable and repeated incidents of the previous ten months were the inevitable consequences of the deadlock that had been reached in the progress of those efforts, and the only way to get out of the vicious circle of violence and conflict was for the Security Council to see that its 22 November 1967 decision was faithfully and effectively acted upon. All members should support the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative; the special responsibility of the permanent members in the peace-making efforts was too obvious to require detailed elaboration. Meanwhile, the Council must call for the strictest observance of the cease-fire and censure all violations of it. It should also warn that repeated violations of the cease-fire would call unavoidably for its action under the relevant Chapter of the United Nations Charter.

36. The representative of Israel said that during the current discussion of the Middle East situation resulting from Jordan's aggression and his country's defence action, attacks from Jordan had continued. During the period 5-14 August there was almost daily mortar fire and shelling from Jordanian military positions. In spite of those military actions, the Arab representatives and their supporters had suggested that the Security Council should address itself only to Israel's defence action and provide immunity to the Arab States for their acts of aggression. Such a course would be a miscarriage of justice, and Israel, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, would not accept it. After citing further evidence to show the involvement of Jordan and other Arab States in the activities of the commandos, the representative of Israel said that the situation in the Middle East was likely to become even more grave unless warfare against Israel from Jordanian territory ceased and Jordan ensured the strict  observance  of  the cease-fire.

37. The representative of Jordan said that the representative of Israel had once again described the resistance movement to Israel occupation as acts of terrorism and cited certain so-called evidence to show the involvement of Arab States. In that respect the truth could easily be found by letting the Secretary-General's representative visit the Israel-occupied territories. The implementation of resolution 237 (1967) so far had been held up by Israel.

38. The representative of Israel said that a representative was welcome to come to Israel but that the Arab Governments themselves were barring such a representative from investigating the question of oppression and discrimination to which the Jews in the Arab lands were being subjected.

39. At the 1440th meeting, on 16 August, the President announced that as a result of consultations, agreement had been reached on the text of the following draft resolution:

Decision: At the 1440th meeting on 16 August 1968, the draft resolution was adopted unanimously (resolution 256 (1968)).

40. After the vote, the President of the Council took note of the widespread support that had been expressed for the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Gunnar Jarring, in the mission entrusted to him. With the consent of the Council, he requested the Secretary-General to convey to Ambassador Jarring that expression of support.

41. The representative of the United States said that while his Government could appreciate the difficulties of restraining terrorist elements in the emotional climate that prevailed in the area, every Government there was, nevertheless, responsible for maintaining the cease-fire. Moreover, acts of violence inevitably gave rise to retaliation and repression. The main thrust of the resolution just adopted by the Council was directed against those excessive acts of retaliation undertaken in disregard of its resolution 248 (1968). The Council had also considered that acts of violence and specifically such repeated air attacks endangered peace in the area; this was an expression of concern couched in the language of Chapter VI of the Charter. The United States Government hoped that the parties would do their utmost to abide by the resolution. The way to peace, however, lay through agreement of the parties to implement the resolution of 22 November 1967, which the Council had adopted unanimously.

42. The representative of Algeria said that his delegation regretted that the Council, in balancing the grievances brought before it with so-called counter-grievances, was failing to live up to its obligations under the Charter. The Security Council thus could not respond to the question of Israel aggression with the firmness required of it. That was due to the fact that there were forces whose interests were directly threatened by the national liberation movements, not only in the Middle East but in South-East Asia, Africa and even Latin America. Nevertheless, the Council's unanimous resolution had warned Israel that if those attacks were repeated, the Council would have to contemplate more effective additional steps in accordance with the Charter.

43. The representative of Denmark said that the resolution just adopted by the Council was very explicit in the assessment of Israel's military action and left no doubt that those actions should not be repeated. It was equally clear that all violations of the cease-fire should be prevented. The resolution, however, did not contain any reference to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the important mission which had been entrusted to him. It was, therefore, a great satisfaction to his delegation that the President of the Council had taken note of the support that was extended to the Special Representative in the Council. That expression of support made it clear that it was imperative upon the parties to extend their full and unconditional co-operation to Ambassador Jarring. Only in this context could the Danish delegation support the resolution, which did not meet with all its wishes. It was to be hoped that the vicious circle of violence would be broken so that an atmosphere might prevail conducive to real progress for the efforts to achieve a peaceful and acceptable settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

44. The representative of Pakistan said that the resolution just adopted was a compromise text resulting from intensive consultations and, therefore, not entirely satisfactory to all delegations. His own delegation had expected a resolution which would have been the logical sequel to resolution 248 (1968), in which the Council had pledged itself to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter, to ensure against repetition of premeditated and massive military attacks. Pakistan had, nevertheless, voted for the current resolution because it condemned Israel's military attacks on Jordan and also warned Israel against repeating those attacks. The Security Council considered that their repetition constituted a danger to the maintenance of peace. The Council's responsibilities in that respect had been spelled out in the Charter.

45. The representative of Canada welcomed the fact that the Security Council was sending a message to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General expressing widespread support for his efforts. The full co-operation of all the parties concerned was essential to the success of Ambassador Jarring who could help them to attain a settlement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). The main responsibility for such a settlement lay, however, with the parties directly concerned; the present gravity of the Middle East situation resulted from breaches of the cease-fire on both sides.

46. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that all members of the Council wished to see immediate advance on the basis of the purposes and principles of the resolution unanimously adopted in November 1967; the urgency for pressing ahead with that initiative was made all the more compelling by the recent events.

47. The representative of France said that the French delegation had followed with great interest the activities of Ambassador Jarring under resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. The French delegation paid tribute to Ambassador Jarring's patience and perseverance in the performance of his duties, and hoped that his mission would receive the full support of the Security Council, especially its permanent members.

48. The representative of Senegal said that the resolution just adopted showed that the Council was even more resolved not to tolerate incidents of that sort in the future. In the opinion of his delegation, the Arab delegations had exhibited moderation during the negotiations over the text of the resolution. Israel should realize that it was dangerous to depend on concepts like that of "legitimate defence".

49. The representative of Paraguay observed that the resolution was a compromise which did not entirely coincide with the views of his delegation. Paraguay had voted for the resolution in favour of unanimity. It considered that in prevailing conditions the only real possibilities of a lasting peace in the Middle East were based on the fulfilment of resolution 242 (1967). An essential condition for this was the co-operation of the parties and, as a prerequisite, all the parties must obey the cease-fire ordered by the Council in 1967. The reciprocal respect and respect for the decisions of the Council would give the minimum basis for the success of Ambassador Jarring's mission.

50. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the resolution contained the minimum conditions required. The Soviet delegation had supported the resolution because unanimity in the Council might serve as a barrier to Israel aggression. The resolution, however, lacked a number of important provisions which might have strengthened it and enhanced its significance. The possibility of reaching a political settlement on the basis of the resolution of 22 November 1967 depended on Israel, since the Arab States for their part had stated clearly that they were prepared to accept and fulfil all the provisions of that resolution and to set up a timetable for its implementation. Those States which continued to support Israel and which had even condoned its aggressive actions also bore responsibility for any lack of progress in the implementation of that resolution. The Soviet Union was convinced of the need for a swift settlement to the Middle East problem on the basis of the 22 November resolution and supported the mission of Ambassador Jarring.

51. The President, speaking as the representative of Brazil, observed that the Security Council resolution deplored all violations of the cease-fire while laying stress on the premeditated military attacks of Israel against Jordan. After expressing full support for the efforts of Ambassador Jarring, he added that his delegation wished to reiterate its appeal of 9 August 1968 to the major Powers to reach an understanding on the question of supply of armaments to the parties involved in the crisis of the Middle East.

52. The representative of Iraq expressed the hope that the Security Council resolution would be the last warning to Israel. He noted that the Council had refused to equate the actions of the so-called infiltrators with those of Israel's armed forces. The activities of the Palestinian patriots, which had never been controlled by any Arab Government, could not fall under the cease-fire resolution, which was addressed to Governments. By its actions in the occupied territories, Israel had left the Palestinians no alternative but to fight and resist. They were fighting to preserve their identity as a distinct national Arab community.

53. The representative of Israel said that the debate had shown that the attitude of the Arab States to Israel remained one of intransigence and belligerency and left no doubt of their direct responsibility for the terror warfare. The resolution adopted showed the inadequacy of the Council's handling of the situation. Israel had the inalienable right to defend itself against the continued warfare waged by the Arab States and would discharge its responsibility for the security of the population in territory under its control. If the Arab Governments took action to terminate all military attacks, by regular or irregular forces, against Israel, the cease-fire would be effectively maintained. Israel would pursue its efforts to attain a just and lasting peace through negotiations and agreement and would co-operate with Ambassador Jarring towards that objective. It expected the Arab States to do the same.

54. The representative of Jordan expressed satisfaction at the constructive approach of members of the Council, all of whom had condemned the Israel premeditated large-scale military attacks. As to the question of observers, emphasis should be placed on the withdrawal of Israel forces from the occupied territories not on any idea which might help to freeze the situation. The continued Israel presence and the arbitrary measures being taken in the occupied territories were a grave violation of the cease-fire, which was a temporary arrangement. Moreover, there was no evidence implicating the Government of Jordan in terrorist attacks against Israel but Jordan could not be expected to protect Israel against resistance. Jordan had hoped that the Council this time, besides condemning Israel, would have faced Israel aggression with the only effective remedy–sanctions, especially since the latest attacks were aimed at civilian centres. Leniency by the Council could only encourage Israel and lead to a further deterioration of the situation and a loss of faith in the Security Council. Jordan had co-operated with Ambassador Jarring and would continue to do so. It would continue to accept the 22 November 1967 resolution, while Israel had not accepted that resolution in its entirety.

(c) Communications to the Council between 5 August 1968 and 26 March 1969

55. During August, Jordan continued to make charges of Israel attacks against Jordanian villages and farms. A letter dated 9 August (S/8741) contained a list of twenty-seven such attacks since 17 June 1968. In letters of 21 and 26 August (S/8755 and S/8773), Jordan charged that Israel had, on 20 and 25 August, shelled villages and centres of civilians in the northern part of the Jordan valley resulting in civilian casualties and destruction of a school, a mosque, part of the East Ghor Irrigation Canal and houses in a number of villages. These attacks, it was stated, had taken place only a few days after the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 256 (1968).

56. In a letter dated 26 August (S/8774), Israel charged that a large-scale military attack with mortars and small arms had been carried out on 25 August from Jordanian territory against Israel villages in the Beit Shean and Jordan valleys, and that Israel forces had returned fire. The letter listed fifteen cases of alleged cease-fire violations preceding this attack which had been carried out between 18 and 23 August both by regular and irregular forces from Jordanian territory.

57. In a letter dated 28 August (S/8787), Jordan advised the Security Council that Israel was contemplating and preparing for a large-scale attack against it. Israel on 30 August (S/8793) rejected that charge, stating that it was designed to divert attention from the continued attacks from Jordan's own territory.

58. In a letter dated 17 September (S/8817), Jordan stated that the city of Irbid had been shelled again by Israel heavy artillery; and Israel, in a letter of the same date (S/8818), stated that Jordanian forces had opened fire on Israel forces in the Beit Shean valley which had replied in self-defence. Israel charged that 103 attacks had been made against it from Jordanian territory in the period between 18 August and 17 September, involving small-arms fire, bazookas, mine laying and rocket shellings.

59. In a letter dated 10 October (S/8845), Jordan complained that Israel was embarking on changing the Armistice Demarcation Line in the Aqaba area and was continuing to encroach on Jordanian territory. Moreover, it had refused to attend the emergency meeting requested by Jordan of the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission on the ground that "it does not recognize the continued validity of the General Armistice Agreement of 1949". That, it was stated, showed Israel's disrespect for international agreements. On 21 October Israel replied (S/8862) that there was no factual basis to the Jordanian complaint and that it was incongruous for the Jordanian Government to invoke the Armistice Agreement of 1949, which collapsed when that country had initiated hostilities against Israel on 5 June 1967.

60. In a letter dated 15 October (S/8856), Jordan listed fifty-one military attacks by Israel, most of them directed against Jordanian villages and farms, from 5 August to 29 September.

61. On 23 October Israel complained (S/8865) of more attacks from Jordanian territory on the Israel civilian population and on Israel defence forces, partly by Jordanian forces and partly by terror warfare organizations, and listed 108 Jordanian violations of the cease-fire since 16 September 1968. In a further communication dated 3 November (S/8884) Israel stated that those incidents had culminated on 2 November in the shelling of the city of Elath from across the cease-fire lines. Israel also submitted a list of thirty-six violations of the cease-fire since 23 October.

62. In a letter dated 5 November (S/8886), Israel stated that examination of the area of Ashdot-Yaacov following an attack on 16/17 October had revealed that the shells had been fired by artillery of Iraqi army units on the East Bank of the Jordan. In a letter dated 8 November (S/8894), Iraq categorically denied the involvement of the Iraqi forces stationed in Jordan in the shelling of the Israel-occupied territory on the night of 16/17 October. Iraqi forces, it was stated, were stationed far from the cease-fire lines, and it was Israel which had been firing long-range artillery shells on the Iraqi positions as had happened on the night of 27/28 October. The Iraqi troops were in Jordan at the request of the Government of Jordan and were under the joint command, whose attitude to the cease-fire was governed by the position of both the Governments of Jordan and the United Arab Republic. In a letter dated 18 November (S/8902), Israel replied that the Iraqi letter showed the evasive attitude of the Government of Iraq towards the cease-fire, concerning which the Council's resolution had been officially communicated to it.

63. On 2 December, Jordan complained (S/8911) of several attacks by Israel on the previous day in the north and south of the Jordan valley, that had resulted in casualties, and in particular of an air attack on a Saudi Arabian convoy of six trucks near Al-Hasa on the Amman-Aqaba route, that had resulted in the killing of two and wounding of three Saudi nationals and the destruction of two bridges. In a letter of the same date (S/8912), Israel stated that an Israel commando had blown up two Jordanian bridges because one of its industrial establishments, the Sodom Potash Works, had been shelled on the previous night. The letter complained of continuous attacks from Jordanian

territory.

64. In letters dated 3 December (S/8916 and S/8917), both Jordan and Israel submitted further charges and counter-charges relating to cease-fire violations on that day. Jordan charged that Israel shelling of the villages of Kum, Kufor Asad and Samma had spread to cover the whole northern part of the Jordan valley and that an Israel air attack on Kufor Asad had resulted in loss of life and damage to property. Israel charged that artillery fire had been opened from Jordanian territory on the night of 2-3 December against nine Israel villages in the Beit Shean and Jordan valleys and stated that Israel had had to act in self-defence by returning the fire and employing aircraft.

65. In a letter dated 4 December (S/8918), Jordan stated that the situation had grown more serious as Israel aircraft had on 4 December attacked the positions of Iraqi troops stationed in the Mafraq area as well as Jordanian posts in the northern area, and that the air raids had extended to densely populated villages in the north. Israel replied on the same day (S/8919) that its aircraft had acted in self-defence against Iraqi military positions which had shelled Israel villages the night before.

66. On 18 December Jordan submitted (S/8935) a list of sixty-nine alleged attacks by Israel against centres of civilian population in its territory from 2 October to 15 December. Many of these, it was stated, had been carried out by Israel armed units, some of which had penetrated deep into Jordanian territory. On 3 December, it was charged, more than thirty elderly men, women and children had been killed in the village of Kufor Asad alone as a result of indiscriminate Israel bombing and shelling, and forty houses had been destroyed. On 15 December Israel forces had shelled centres of civilians in Ghor Al Safi, with resulting casualties and destruction of houses. On 30 December Jordan charged (S/8951) that on the previous day Israel had again launched a four-hour artillery attack on Jordanian territory, from which casualties had resulted.

67. In a letter dated 12 February (S/9006), Jordan complained that on the previous day Israel armed forces had shelled the villages of Safi and Fotah, south of the Dead Sea, and that on the same day Israel aircraft had bombed Ghor Al Safi, using napalm bombs and killing six soldiers and wounding ten.

68. In a letter dated 4 March, Jordan further submitted to the Security Council (S/9039) a list of seventy-six Israel attacks against its territory from 11 December to 14 February and charged that Israel jet fighters and helicopters had continued to bomb and strafe Jordanian villages, using missiles and napalm bombs. Israel rejected the Jordanian charge in a letter dated 10 March (S/9065) and stated that in the past two months numerous attacks had been launched from the Jordanian territory by regular and irregular forces and that Israel forces had had to take action in self-defence.

69. Further charges were made by Jordan on 16 and 17 March (S/9083 and Corr.1, S/9085) of air raids by Israel jets on 15, 16 and 17 March on a number of Jordanian villages and civilian centres deep in Jordan territory, resulting in civilian casualties and damage to property. On 17 March Israel replied (S/9089) that the persistent armed attacks against Israel by regular and irregular forces from Jordan had necessitated actions on 15, 16 and 17 March from Israel in self-defence against terror organization camps and bases situated in Jordan territory but outside the centres of population.

(d)  Requests for a meeting and consideration by the Council at its 1466th to

 1473rd meetings (27 March to 1 April 1969)

70. By a letter dated 26 March (S/9113), Jordan complained of an attack that day by Israel jet fighters on Jordanian villages and certain centres in the area of Salt, as a result of which seventeen civilians were killed and twenty-five were wounded. The attack had also caused heavy damage to property and to the main roads linking the villages of the city of Salt. In its letter, Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider that grave and serious violation of the cease-fire and to take more effective

measures to check Israel's acts of aggression. Later, on 31 March, Jordan transmitted (S/9121) to the Council a series of photographs showing civilian casualties and trucks carrying vegetables and fruit damaged as a result of the Israel attack on 26 March.

71. By a letter dated 27 March (S/9114), Israel also requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider grave and continual violations by Jordan of the cease-fire, including armed attacks, armed infiltration and acts of murder and violence by terrorist groups operating from Jordan territory with official support, and also firing across the cease-fire lines by Jordanian forces, including shelling of Israel villages.

72. At the 1466th meeting of the Council, on 27 March 1969, the President, before the adoption of the agenda, stated that the meeting had been convened at the request of the representative of Jordan, whose letter appeared as item 2 on the provisional agenda. However, a few minutes before the meeting, a communication from the representative of Israel had also been received which could be inscribed as item 3 on the provisional agenda.

73. The representative of the United States suggested that in view of the Council's practice since 1967 to inscribe the various communications relating to the various aspects of the Middle East situation under the over-all heading "The situation in the Middle East", the two communications before the Council could be noted under the same heading.

74. The President pointed out that the practice of the Security Council had varied in that respect; for example, on the last such occasion on 29 December 1968 the two items had been dealt with separately. He had therefore suggested that the communication from Israel be noted as item 3 on the provisional agenda.

75. The representative of Algeria stated that as regards the suggestion of combining the two items, he considered that by so doing the Council would be putting on an equal footing the legitimate complaint of Jordan against an act of aggression and Israel's counter-complaint.

76. After some further procedural discussion in which the President and the representatives of Algeria, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States participated, the Council agreed to a suggestion of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the agenda of the Council should consist of the following three items:

"1. Adoption of the agenda

"2. The situation in the Middle East:

"3. The situation in the Middle East:

77. The President stated that it was understood that in their statements speakers could refer to any aspect of the items on the agenda so far as was relevant to the meaningful examination of the problem.

Decision: The agenda, as amended, was adopted.

78. The representatives of Jordan and Israel and, subsequently, of Saudi Arabia were invited to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

79. The representative of Jordan stated that his Government would have brought Israel's continuous acts of aggression to the attention of the Security Council much earlier but for its desire to create conditions conducive to the success of efforts to find a peaceful solution. Israel, however, was not deterred by that attitude. Its shellings of Jordanian villages in the north had become a daily practice that was often escalated by Israel jet fighters carrying out raids deep into Jordanian territory. In previous documents (S/8911, S/8916, S/8935, S/9039, S/9083, S/9085), Jordan had reported to the Council Israel attacks on its territory since the beginning of December. Many of these attacks against civilian targets resulted in severe loss of life and damage to property. They had lately been intensified. The occasion of the current discussion in the Council was Israel's air raid by four jet fighters on rest homes and winter resorts in Ein Hazar, frequently visited by civilian Jordanian citizens and where travellers between the East Bank and West Bank stopped for refreshments before crossing the Jordan River. The raid had killed taxi drivers and many of their passengers, besides destroying several taxis and trucks and six houses in the area. A report in The New York Times had stated that there had been no military installation in the immediate area and that no anti-aircraft fire had been directed against the Israel planes. It appeared that the severe international condemnation of Israel following its raid on Beirut Airport (see section 3, below) had prompted its leaders to think of a new policy under which it could continue its aggression without, however, drawing world public attention to those acts. Israel had found that new policy in the so-called active self-defence. Under that new policy of aggression, Israel would send a few of its jet fighter bombers deep inside Jordanian territory to hit civilian targets in the shortest possible time, ending their indiscriminate bombing by dropping time-bombs that exploded when civilians gathered to carry away their dead. The new Israel attacks had covered almost all populated areas on the East Bank of Jordan, in the north and in the south. In spite of that policy of aggression, Jordan had wished to avoid submitting a new complaint to the Security Council in order not to prejudice the peace efforts of the four permanent members of the Security Council. Jordan had all along supported all efforts towards finding a peaceful solution of the situation in the Middle East and in that respect had co-operated with all representatives of the Secretary-General. Israel, on the other hand, had done everything to frustrate those efforts. That being the case, it was the duty of the Security Council, particularly of its four permanent members, to take measures so that Israel's acts of aggression were discontinued and all its attempts towards frustrating a peaceful solution were checked. It was clear that if the Security Council failed to take effective measures it would have to face more conflicts in the area, because unless adequate measures under Chapter VII were taken, more and more acts of aggression from Israel would follow.

80. The representative of Israel stated that in spite of the Security Council cease-fire resolution calling for an end to "all military actions in the area", Arab military aggression had continued unabated. In the absence of effective United Nations action Israel had no choice but to defend itself, as it had done on 26 March when it took action to disable terrorist bases in Jordanian territory. Since 20 January there had been a marked upsurge in terror warfare against Israel. More than 200 sabotage raids and firing attacks across the cease-fire line had been recorded. The majority of those terror acts had been carried out by El Fatah. During February 1969 alone, those attacks had resulted in eight Israelis being killed and sixty-one being wounded. One United Nations observer had also been injured in the explosion in a supermarket in Jerusalem. Jordan's role in warfare by terror against the people of Israel was a major one, since Jordanian territory served as the main base for attacks against Israel. The main terrorist organizations had their headquarters in Jordan, and their camps, which were located close to the camps of the Jordanian army, were administered and policed by the Jordanian authorities. An agreement had been reached regulating relations between Jordan and the commando organizations, which implicated Jordan in the activities of the commandos to such an extent that its responsibility for violations of the cease-fire could not be denied. The Jordanian papers themselves had reported details about co-ordination between the Jordanian army and the terror organizations. In accordance with its policy of attacking terrorist bases, Israel's action of 26 March had been directed against an El Fatah base at Ein Hazar about three kilometres south of the town of Salt which, he said, was an isolated site quite far from the settlements of the civil population. In Ein Hazar there was a road-block manned by the terrorist squads at which travellers from the West Bank were stopped for control, questioning and instruction. There were also canteens and recreational facilities. Those were the so-called cafés, and in them the persons whom the representative of Jordan had referred to as civilians. Alongside, many vehicles belonging to terrorist organizations were always parked. It was against these centres of terror that Israel had taken action on 26 March. When an end was put to that terror warfare and the Arab States scrupulously maintained the cease-fire to which they had pledged themselves, there would no longer be need for Israel's defence actions. Until then, Israel's right to self-defence remained inalienable and could not be questioned by labelling it reprisal, a concept which had no application to the current Middle East situation.

81. The representative of Israel went on to state that official communiqués concerning the operations of the terror organizations published by Arab States as well as documents which had come into the possession of Israel had given sufficient proof of the direct responsibility of the different Arab Governments for the activity of the terrorists operating from territories under their control since 1955. The terror warfare was generally begun and ended according to the decisions taken by the Arab Governments. This same policy had been followed by the Arab Governments since June 1967, and a decision to this effect had been taken at the Khartoum Conference of the Heads of Arab States in September 1967. Pursuing this policy, Jordan, Egypt and Syria had set up training camps for terror units in which instruction was given by officers of the regular armies of those countries. Training bases also existed in Algeria, and recruitment centres were established in various capitals of the Arab States. The most gruesome aspect of their activity was that it was directed against civilians. Arab terror warfare was a criminal policy, had continually violated the cease-fire and had undermined the peace-making efforts. The Arab Governments must realize that sabotage and killing had not weakened Israel during the last twenty years and was not going to weaken its determination to attain a just and lasting peace.

82. At the 1467th meeting of the Council on 27 March, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the Council had been called once again to consider Israel's latest act of aggression against Jordanian villages, rest homes and other civilian objectives in the Salt area. That act had been taken in clear violation of the cease-fire and the relevant Security Council resolutions. It was this aggressive policy of Israel which had stood in the way of achieving a peaceful settlement of the Middle East situation. The attack of 26 March was the latest in the chain of Israel attempts to continue taking Arab territories by force and strengthening its position there. Quite naturally, there was a resistance and liberation movement against Israel's occupation and appropriation of Arab territories. As the movement grew, Israel had begun launching new military actions which could not be distinguished from naked aggression and could in no way be described as "self-defence". Israel must, however, realize that acts of aggression could not go unpunished and that the struggle of peoples against the aggressors was not only legitimate on the basis of international law but also invincible, deserving support and sympathy on the part of all peace-loving countries. Israel was trying to give the impression to the world, particularly through the statements of its Foreign Minister, that the incidents of cease-fire violations were minor incidents and that, generally speaking, calm and quiet prevailed in the area. In other words, Israel wanted a free hand to assimilate the Arab territories conquered by it. The latest Israel aggression was committed precisely at the time when new efforts were being made to find ways and means to settle the Middle East problem on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. It indicated that Israel wanted to undermine the international efforts towards restoring peace in the Middle East and that its professed declaration of peaceful intent had no basis. In the face of such a challenge, the Security Council could not but condemn Israel's new act of aggression, demand that it observe the Council's previous resolutions concerning the cease-fire and cease any activities designed to subvert efforts towards finding a peaceful settlement.

83. The representative of Nepal stated that it was dismaying to note that the new tensions in the Middle East had occurred at a time when some positive signs of progress had been noticed. His delegation was encouraged by the return to the area of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, by the projected mission of King Hussein of Jordan and by the preparations for the Big Four talks. All those hopeful signs would no doubt receive a setback from the recent premeditated act of violence which was wholly inconsistent with the requirements of self-defence. His delegation deplored all acts of violence and all violations of the cease-fire and expressed its sympathy to the victims. The solution to the Middle East problem did not lie in finding a new formula but in implementing the one contained in the unanimously adopted Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. Nepal believed that a lasting peace in the Middle East was possible only through a settlement, negotiated either bilaterally or within the framework of the United Nations, which should include the withdrawal of troops from occupied territories, termination of all claims of belligerency, respect for the sovereignty and integrity of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

84. The representative of the United States stated that his Government deeply deplored the loss of civilian life in the reported Israel air attack and would make clear once again its firm opposition to attacks of that kind, which formed a flagrant violation of the cease-fire. It would once again urge Israel to avoid such indiscriminate actions involving violations of the Security Council resolutions concerning the cease-fire. However, his Government was well aware that that attack must be seen in the total context of the continuing absence of peace in the Middle East. There had been other equally serious incidents. Thus, while condemning the current Israel air attack, the Security Council could not refrain from condemning the other grave violations from the other side. There were various incidents for which the Arab fedayeen had proclaimed their responsibility. The United States equally deplored those actions, and the Arab Governments could not completely escape responsibility for them. In such a pattern of violence it was therefore all the more necessary that all Governments concerned should scrupulously observe the cease-fire. While considering the current situation concerning cease-fire violations, the Council should not, however, lose sight of some of the hopeful developments. The Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, was in the area and was holding consultations with the Governments concerned. In addition, some of the permanent members of the Security Council were also having talks on ways and means whereby Ambassador Jarring's efforts could best be assisted. To continue with those encouraging developments, it was urgently required that the parties, besides co-operating with Ambassador Jarring, should make every effort to see that all violations of the cease-fire were prevented.

85. The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that in spite of numerous condemnations of Israel, incidents involving violations of the cease-fire had continued and he feared that their continuance might lead to a world-wide conflict. One of the main reasons for those incidents and unrest in the Middle East was that an act of injustice had been done to the people of Palestine when they were denied the right of self-determination in contravention of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Charter. That was the crux of the problem in the Middle East. A people living in their own homeland had been driven away and denied the right of self-determination by another group of people coming from outside, mostly from eastern Europe, with the help of their supporters in the United Kingdom and the United States. It was wrong to say that the Jewish peoples from all parts of the world had a claim over Palestine simply because a Jewish tribe had lived there some 2,000 years ago. The fact was that Zionism was using Judaism for its political and economic ends to exploit the Middle East. The Palestine question, therefore, was not a dispute between the Arab Governments and Israel. It was a struggle of the Palestinian people to regain their lost homeland. The trouble in the Middle East would not be solved until a solution satisfactory to them was found. In all their efforts, the major Powers must keep that factor in mind, because a miscalculation in that respect could result in a great catastrophe involving the whole world.

86. The representative of Israel stated that he would like to submit to the Council additional information which would throw further light on the nature of terrorist bases at Ein Hazar. In the course of Israel action on the previous day, at least fifteen members of a terrorist organization, including two of its commanders, were injured and were hospitalized in the Salt hospital. One of the terrorists belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and captured by an Israel patrol on 27 February 1969, had told his interrogators that he had spent some time in one of the houses in Ein Hazar and that there were thirty other saboteurs there who were dressed in uniforms of the terror organization and were armed with rifles. These places could not be described as mere rest houses or cafés. In accordance with the tenets of international law, which were fundamental and did not depend on the policies of  individual Governments, Jordan, having given assistance and encouragement to terror organizations, could not be absolved of responsibility for continued aggression against Israel. As early as 1948, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at a meeting of the Security Council, had asked that each party should be held responsible for actions of individuals or groups on its territory to ensure that their actions did not violate the truce. Israel maintained that the assistance and encouragement given by Arab Governments to terrorist organizations fell within the terms under which the Soviet representative's statement would hold the Arab Governments responsible for their action. The Soviet Union could help in the search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East by denouncing the actions of the terrorists and, in accordance with its earlier stand, by holding the States from whose territory those acts were committed responsible for them.

87.  The representative of Jordan said that the representative of Israel had expressed doubts with regard to his description of the places bombed by Israeli aircraft as "rest homes" and "cafés". However, reporters for The New York Times and the CBS had stated clearly that the raid by Israel jets had killed a number of taxi drivers and their passengers and that there were no signs of commandos in that area. Those were eyewitness accounts and could not be denied. The Government of Jordan had already invited representatives of the Red Cross and of all members with embassies accredited to Jordan to ascertain for themselves the true facts relating to Israel's air attack on Salt.

88. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that after the representative of Israel's statement it was clearer than ever that Israel's air attack and Israel's position in the Security Council were intended to disrupt the efforts that were being made to find a peaceful solution of the situation in the Middle East. Furthermore, there was never any formula either in international law or in the commentaries of the most authoritative jurists prohibiting the population of occupied territories from resisting the invader. No principle of international law could justify the aggressive acts and terror perpetrated by Israel in the Arab territories occupied by it.

89. At the 1468th meeting, held on 28 March, the representative of Algeria stated that the Israel attack on Ein Hazar was only one of the violent manifestations of the explosive situation prevailing in the Middle East. It was part of a carefully prepared strategy which was intended to destroy the economic resources of the Arab countries and to compel them to accept an imposed solution. Having been put in the midst of the Arab world by the colonialists and inspired by their ideology, Israel was using their tactics to carry out its expansionist ambitions. For twenty years Israel had unjustly deprived a people of their right to self-determination and national existence. Currently, that people was resolutely claiming recognition and resisting oppression and occupation. In order to undermine that struggle, Israel was carrying out repeated attacks against Arab countries neighbouring Palestine under its so-called policy of self-defence. Faced with such an undisguised act of aggression, the Security Council must condemn Israel and must envisage the necessary measures in accordance with the Charter.

90. The representative of Finland, after referring to the charges and counter-charges concerning the attack on Ein Hazar, stated that the Security Council could not accept as valid any arguments put forward to justify unilateral military actions that constituted a breach of the cease-fire. Nor could it consider the current incident or the many others the Security Council had dealt with previously in isolation, as they must be seen as part of the unbroken cycle of violence that was undermining the cease-fire arrangements. The fighting had continued intermittently along the cease-fire lines and inside the countries involved as well, adding to the tragic losses suffered by the civilian populations. The Council must insist, therefore, on strict observance of the cease-fire by the parties, which should refrain from any action which was likely to increase tension in the area. The cease-fire was, however, a temporary arrangement and only a first step towards making peace. It was necessary, therefore, to take the next step and to remove from the area the state of insecurity which gave rise to acts of violence. The Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 had set out the principles on which a just and lasting peace could be established. The Secretary-General's Special Representative was continuing his efforts to promote agreement on the basis of that resolution. At the same time the four permanent members of the Security Council were also moving towards joint talks, which should be welcomed by the international community. In its current discussion the Council should not proceed in such a manner as to make the forthcoming negotiations more difficult. The overriding interest of the Security Council was to promote unity among its members, and particularly among the four major Powers, in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

91. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that for almost two years the Council had had brought to its notice an appalling list of violent acts committed in the Middle East, resulting in the killing of innocent persons and causing widespread destruction of property. His delegation condemned all acts of violence and breaches of the cease-fire. The Security Council would, however, be tinkering with the problem if it were to concentrate on individual incidents, as the time had come when action to settle the fundamental problem could no longer be delayed. In view of the dangers involved, the outside world could not afford to stand by and treat the Middle East situation as a local quarrel. The parties had had long enough time to try and resolve it on their own. It was proper that there should be new initiatives for peace involving, in particular, the four permanent members of the Council. It was encouraging to learn that the four-Power talks were expected to begin soon, and the Council must condemn any action which damaged the prospects of their success. Therefore, while appreciating the concern and feelings of Jordan with regard to the victims of the recent attack on its territory, the United Kingdom delegation would wish it also to reflect on the need for unanimity in the Council in order to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East.

92. The representative of France stated that the recent Israel attack on Ein Hazar, resulting in the death of innocent persons, which was not an isolated bombing, had brought destruction to a country which already had suffered cruelly. Israel's declaration that its repeated aerial attacks were aimed at commando bases and were of the nature of "preventive attacks" could not justify operations which constituted a new escalation of military action about which the Security Council should be duly concerned. On several occasions the French Government had stated that it condemned all violations of the cease-fire and demanded its strict observance. The French Government also believed that the aerial bombings, instead of crushing the terrorist acts as Israel had claimed, tended to increase the animosity among the populations which suffered from those attacks and strengthened the reaction of which the fedayeen were a manifestation. By widening the gap between Arabs and Israelis, those attacks delayed, if not dispelled, the possibility of a settlement which Israel itself sought. He then recalled that in May and June 1967 the French Government had done everything within its power to have the States concerned avoid the outbreak of an armed conflict, but to its regret those efforts had not been successful. In the months that followed, France again tried to limit the consequences of that conflict and have conditions for pacification prevail. It was for that reason that the French delegation had continued to stress that as long as there was no settlement and occupation lasted, incidents were likely to multiply. It therefore asked for rapid implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. In that respect the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, had not so far produced the expected results. On several occasions he had been told that the best means of reaching a settlement was through direct talks between the parties. However, in the current circumstances it appeared that direct talks were not feasible and such a procedure was not realistic. Faced with that situation, the French Government had suggested that the four permanent members of the Security Council should unite their efforts to seek ways and means for the implementation of the 22 November resolution.

93. The representative of Pakistan stated that even if Israel's air attack on rest homes and winter resorts in Ein Hazar had been an isolated incident, it would have, by itself, called for condemnation by the Security Council. But the abundant evidence before the Council, as shown by Israel attacks reported to the Council since the previous December, made it clear that it was part of a systematic pattern of acts by Israel which, exploiting its air superiority in the region, had been inflicting heavy destruction on the neighbouring States. During the Council's discussions of previous military actions, Israel had pleaded the right of reprisal. The Council had, however, rejected that plea because it considered that the acceptance of the theory advanced by Israel would destroy the rule of law embodied in the Charter. In its resolutions 248 (1968), 256 (1968) and 262 (1968), the Security Council had condemned Israel's military attacks, and in its resolution 248 (1968) it had explicitly stated that it would have to consider further and more effective steps if actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire continued. It was obvious that a much more forceful stand by the Security Council was called for in a case where even a pretext to so-called retaliation could not be advanced. The significant feature of the recent Israel attack was that its target was a place having no military installations and where no anti-aircraft fire had been directed against the planes. The recent proclamation by the Israel Government of the doctrine of "active defence" showed that the occurrence was not fortuitous. This doctrine was nothing but the assertion of an unlimited right to attack the territories of Arab States for having given refuge to the uprooted people of Palestine. Israel's military action was not likely to prevent the increase in strength and activities of the resistance movement, which was the inevitable result of and response to occupation. It was likely, however, to hamper efforts towards finding an agreement. The current attack had come precisely at the time when some hope had been aroused by the efforts of the four permanent members of the Security Council to promote a just solution. The Security Council should condemn the attack of 26 March as a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions and issue a final warning to Israel that any repetition of such attacks would result in the adoption of necessary measures under the Charter.

94. The representative of Israel stated that the validity of the views of Member States were dependent on their relationship to the fundamental concepts of international law, the United Nations Charter, equity and justice. Thus, the political views of certain Governments could not affect the basic right of self-defence. Nor could the methods of self-defence used by Israel be prescribed by the aggressor States or their supporters. Israel had every right to defend itself against open and relentless Arab warfare. If a cease-fire implied reciprocal and scrupulous observance by both sides, Israel could not but insist on such observance on the part of the Arab Governments. Similarly, Israel could not be denied the right to live in peace and security. Israel believed that the only way to attain a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict was to ensure the faithful observance of the cease-fire and promote agreement by the parties on a just and lasting peace.

95. The representative of Jordan stated that the representative of Israel had asserted that the views of the members of the Council could not affect the basic right of self-defence, but the conception of self-defence that the representative of Israel had in mind was not the one defined by the jurisprudence of the United Nations but was one of his own definition. The statements by Israel and its attacks on the Security Council should not, however, divert the attention of the Council from the dictates of the Charter and its own previous decisions. The Council had on a number of occasions condemned Israel's acts of aggression, and it was time for it to take effective measures to put an end to Israel's continued and arrogant defiance.

96. At the 1469th meeting of the Council, on the same day, the representative of Spain stated that Israel's attack against civilian centres in Jordan, besides constituting a violation of the Council's cease-fire resolutions, also threatened peace and security not only in the Middle East but in the world at large. That situation had resulted directly from the aggression of 5 June 1967, the subsequent occupation of the territory and the non-compliance with resolution 242 (1967). Without prejudice to the fact that that resolution must be completely implemented, it was obvious that the United Nations Charter did not allow for the occupation of territory by force. The Spanish delegation believed that the violent acts about which Israel had complained could be avoided if it were to withdraw immediately from the territory occupied by it. After Israel's withdrawal, the cause for resistance would disappear. If there were as many fedayeen camps and bases as the representative of Israel had described, one would have to conclude that those were not terrorists but an entire people who had been expelled from their territory and who had revolted against the injustice done to them. However, the most recent Israel military action had been taken at a time when no act of violence had been committed from the other side and also when the four major Powers were endeavouring to find a solution. Quite apart from the general problem of the Middle East, the United Nations could not allow one of its Member States repeatedly to take the law into its own hands, commit aggression and occupy territories in violation of all basic United Nations principles, and must take the most appropriate measures to arrest such a situation and prevent a Member State from continuing its defiance of the Council's resolutions.

97. The representative of Senegal stated that his delegation deplored Israel's military action against civilian populations in the area of the town of Salt at the very time when active consultations were taking place with a view to finding a solution of the Middle East situation. Senegal would urge strict observance of cease-fire so that efforts towards a settlement might meet with success.

98. The representative of Colombia stated that the recent attack by Israel formed part of a tactic of reprisals which was contrary to the principles of the Charter and an act with which no State could associate itself. At the same time, his delegation condemned all violations of the cease-fire and terrorist acts irrespective of their source. In view of the recent violent occurrences in the region, it was all the more necessary that every effort should be made to create an atmosphere conducive to the peaceful solution of the conflict in the Middle East. The principles embodied in resolution 242 (1967) were still valid and their full implementation was the only sure guarantee for restoration of peace in the area. In that respect the efforts of Ambassador Jarring had so far proved fruitless. The four permanent members of the Security Council, with their influence in the region, might be able to obtain the active co-operation of Israel and the Arab States necessary for the implementation of that resolution. Colombia still considered as valid the formula for the Middle East peace that the Latin American Group had first submitted at the emergency session of the General Assembly in June 1967 and which later had formed the basis of resolution 242 (1967). It provided for an overall solution, taking into account the tragic plight of the Palestinian refugees, the withdrawal of the Israel forces from the Arab territories, the recognition of Israel and the ending of the state of belligerency. The Colombian delegation believed that, without neglecting isolated cases of violence, it was necessary to deal with the situation as a whole. It also urged the parties to break the vicious circle of reprisals which was blocking the road to peace.

99. The representative of Zambia stated that while his delegation deplored violence of any kind and regretted the loss of life and property that might have occurred in Israel as a result of the activities of the guerrillas, there did not appear to have been any incident at that time to spur Israel to request a meeting of the Council. Jordan, on the other hand, had been the victim of a premeditated act of aggression executed by the regular forces of Israel. His delegation deplored that attack and urged Israel to refrain from acts that might hamper the efforts of the four major Powers towards peace. It also associated itself with those who believed that the territory of a Member State was inviolable and might not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, and that such territorial acquisition obtained by force could not be recognized.

100. The President, speaking as the representative of Hungary, stated that Israel, by its attack on Jordan on 26 March, had once again violated the sovereignty of that country and the Council's cease-fire resolutions. Israel had maintained that its military action had been defensive in character and was aimed at the maintenance of Israel's security. However, those assertions were not corroborated by Israel's actions. Israel, having occupied militarily large sections of Arab territories, could not demand submission by the people of those territories. The cease-fire ordered by the Security Council could not be used to consolidate Israel's occupation. Its main purpose was to stop further territorial incursions by Israel. The attacks by Israel's armed forces violated not only the laws of peace but also the laws of war, for belligerents were not entitled to attack civilian targets and use against them weapons of mass destruction and chemical weapons like napalm. It was not the security of Israel but that of its Arab neighbours that was threatened by Israel's occupation of their territory. The deteriorating situation in the Middle East was a matter of great concern to the United Nations, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, who, because of that concern, had agreed to hold talks with a view to contributing to the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). Hungary would support every initiative that might lead to a political settlement by a full implementation of that resolution.

101. The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that the main cause of war in Palestine was the uprooting of its indigenous people by the Zionist movement which was alien to the land of Palestine. Until three years ago, the people of Palestine had hoped that countries contiguous with Israel would be able to find a solution to their problem, but those States had failed. The Palestinian people then decided to continue the fight themselves, and even their children were imbued with that spirit. Some of the Palestinian young men were returning to join that fight. It was, therefore, imperative that during the consideration of the question relating to Palestine, the people of Palestine must also be consulted. The core of the situation lay in the realization of the right of self-determination for the people of Palestine. What was needed, therefore, was a new orientation to the problem, not only through the four big Powers but also through a change of heart on the part of the leaders of Israel. As a result of that change of policy, a new Palestine could emerge in which the Arabs and the Israelis could live side by side in a binational state.

102. The representative of the United States stated that in its statements before the Council each side had accused the other of a long series of premeditated acts of violence and had justified its own acts as necessary measures of self-defence. For its part, the United States could not accept as valid any of those acts of violence and believed that the Council should conclude its deliberations by condemning the immediate act of violence submitted to it as well as all other acts which had violated the cease-fire. Such a decision by the Council would preserve a spirit of impartiality which would be most conducive to the success of its efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement.

103. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that up until then the Security Council had made a distinction between the aggressor and its victim. It was important to keep that distinction in mind and to consider that the new act of aggression had been committed at a time when many had thought that new initiatives were possible for a peaceful settlement of the problem of the Middle East.

104. At the 1470th meeting of the Council, on 29 March, the representative of Jordan stated that his Government regretted the tendency on the part of some of the members of the Council to find some justification for Israel's act of aggression against civilian targets and to preoccupy themselves with side issues injected into the debate by Israel with the intention of perpetuating current cease-fire arrangements which of course were temporary in nature. In order to make the four-Power talks fruitful, the Council must check Israel attacks. Any hesitation on the part of the Council in taking effective measures would only result in further deterioration of the situation and would only encourage Israel to continue its aggression.

105. The representative of Paraguay stated that his delegation regretted the loss of life resulting from violations of cease-fire, and also the material damage, particularly since that damage had been inflicted on a developing country like Jordan. It meant greater sacrifices for a people which had been handicapped already by its under-development and by the consequences of a recent war. Paraguay could not condone the violent incidents involving serious violations of the cease-fire; at the same time, it could not accept the theory of the exercise of reprisals whereby a State could arrogate to itself the right to carry out military operations of the kind being considered by the Council. It further regretted that those incidents had taken place at a time when the four permanent members of the Security Council were establishing contacts to intensify the efforts for a just and stable peace on the basis of resolution 242 (1967). It was for that reason that his delegation would urge the parties to comply strictly with the cease-fire resolutions and to help in creating an atmosphere for the success of the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, and also those of the four permanent members of the Security Council.

106. The representative of China stated that while Israel had not denied its attack on Salt, it had claimed that the targets of its attacks were not civilians but centres of armed elements hostile to it. Whatever might be the case, his delegation considered the air raid across national boundaries to be a clear violation of the cease-fire and one to be condemned by the Council. Israel's action could not be characterized as a measure of self-defence, as recognized under Article 51, but rather a punitive action which showed that Israel believed in the effectiveness of armed actions rather than in pursuing conciliatory policies. The Chinese delegation was, however, aware of the fact that acts of violence had become a daily routine, particularly in the Suez Canal area, and considered that all forms of violence were to be deplored. It would urge the parties to give every assistance to the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, in his search for peace in the Middle East.

107. The representative of Israel stated that the Arab States, while continuing their warfare against his country, wished at the same time that it should not take any action in self-defence. A resolution by the Council which would ignore Israel's right of self-defence would be one-sided and inequitable and would only increase tension in the area. The Council already had adopted numerous resolutions of that nature, and they had in no way contributed to a solution of the Middle East problem. Only understanding between the parties themselves could bring about such a solution.

108. The representative of Jordan stated that Israel would wish the Security Council to take its decisions in accordance with Israel's wishes. However, the Council had already adopted numerous resolutions unanimously condemning Israel's aggression. What was needed was that Israel should withdraw its armed forces from the occupied territories. As long as Israel's occupation continued, there would be resistance, which was a natural act on the part of the people who were oppressed.

109. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the tragedies in Palestine were caused by the incursion of alien Zionists who had occupied the land. The current Israel action was aimed at dividing the great Powers on the eve of their discussions aimed at finding some solution. Israel had flouted all the United Nations resolutions, and it was incumbent upon the big Powers to see that these resolutions were obeyed. There could never be peace in the Middle East with an exclusive and aggressive Zionist society.

110. At the 1471st meeting of the Council, on the same day, the President announced that as a result of consultations among members of the Council, a draft resolution had been worked out. However, the sponsors, out of respect for the day of national mourning in the United States (for General Dwight D. Eisenhower, former President of the United States, on 31 March 1969), had decided to introduce it at the Council's next meeting.

111. At the 1472nd meeting, on 1 April, the representative of Pakistan introduced the following draft resolution (S/9120) which was co-sponsored by Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia:

"The Security Council,

112. The representative of Pakistan stated that the draft resolution represented a compromise resulting from prolonged consultations among members of the Council, including the permanent members. His own delegation's view, with which many other members of the Council had agreed, was that the Council, taking into consideration Israel's latest act of aggression, should have followed the logic of its previous resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968) and have taken more effective measures. However, in the interest of agreement and mindful of the necessity of preventing a division among the permanent members of the Council on the eve of the projected four-Power talks, the sponsors had not insisted on their original text. The sponsors, however, could not, as some permanent members had desired in the name of what they considered to be a balance, give equal emphasis to pre-meditated attacks launched by a Government and sporadic violent acts by a resistance movement directed against foreign military occupation.

113. The representative of Zambia stated that while an air attack on civilian targets was certainly deplorable, the Council should look to the future and try to ensure that further violence was not committed against either side. His delegation would wish the Council to take steps to have the rights of the indigenous people of Palestine restored to them, to see that the State of Israel was allowed to exist in peace and that the boundaries of the States in the region should be the same as they existed before 5 June 1967. Unless those goals were attained there could not be peace in the Middle East. Because of its belief that territorial aggrandizement was not conducive to peace and its concern for the welfare and restitution of the rights of the Palestine refugees, Zambia could not but condemn the recent Israel air attack on Jordan, and it hoped that the adoption of the three-Power joint draft resolution (S/9120) would bring about the restraint which was so necessary for efforts towards finding a peaceful solution of the Middle East situation.

114. The representative of the United States, in explanation of his delegation's vote, stated that the three-Power joint draft resolution had concentrated in its operative part exclusively on one kind of violence, ignoring the one which had provoked it. The draft  resolution had thus become unbalanced and was unlikely to move the parties towards a peaceful solution. Had its sponsors been willing to add another operative paragraph condemning or deploring all violations of the cease-fire, his delegation would have been able to support it. The United States abstention, however, should not be interpreted as condoning the kind of violence which the three-Power draft resolution condemned any more than it could condone any other violations of the Council's cease-fire resolutions.

115. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his delegation would have wished to express its strong disapproval of indiscriminate air bombing by voting for a strong condemnatory resolution. However, every action should be judged by its contribution towards forwarding the cause of peace. Consequently, his delegation had considered it necessary that the Council should maintain its unanimity, which was of vital importance at that juncture, and also keep in mind the over-all situation, in the context of which the Council considered individual incidents. In order to avoid a split in the Council, it would have been desirable for the draft to have deplored all violations of the cease-fire. Failing such an addition to the three-Power draft resolution, his delegation would not be in a position to support it.

116. The representative of Jordan recalled that in December 1968 the Security Council had warned that if Israel attacks were repeated, it would consider applying more effective measures to give effect to its decisions. Jordan had expected that this time the Council would, in fact, adopt more effective measures to prevent a repetition of such attacks by applying Chapter VII of the Charter, but in a spirit of compromise it had not insisted on this. It welcomed the initiative leading to the discussions of the Big Four on the Middle East, but their success would depend on their determination to uphold the basic principles of justice in their search for a settlement. The first objective should be the complete elimination of armed aggression; and Jordan doubted if the draft resolution would lead to that result, since Israel opposed any efforts for peace either by the Security Council or by the four Powers.

117. The representative of Israel stated that as long as Jordan continued to glamourize murder by the terrorists and initiated, organized and supported terror warfare against Israel, it must be considered responsible for a continual violation of international law and a crime against humanity. He reiterated that Ein Hazar had been an encampment of the terror organizations. The one-sided draft resolution, by its perversion of the nature of Israel's defence action, its misrepresentation of that action's targets, its disregard of continuing Arab aggression and its distortion of the contents of previous Security Council resolutions, was contrary to truth and equity.

118. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the main conclusion to be drawn from the Council's current consideration was its unanimous condemnation of Israel's policy of aggression against its neighbours, since no member of the Council had spoken out in justification of Israel's policy. Certain members of the Council had, however, attempted to put together questions which were basically different and also to put the aggressor and its victim on the same level. It was also clear that Israel had no serious desire to participate in efforts towards finding a peaceful solution. In fact, its aggression had meant to undermine those efforts. That was the only possible explanation for its latest act of aggression. Some members of the Council had expressed their misgivings with regard to the adoption of the Asian-African draft resolution by stating that it might create division. His delegation did not share those misgivings and felt that the draft resolution should serve as a further warning to those who were attempting to undermine the efforts for a peaceful solution in implementation of Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. He emphasized that the item before the Security Council was in effect the problem of the struggle for national liberation of the Arab peoples, who were fighting against foreign rule and foreign occupation, and were waging a struggle of liberation against foreign aggressors who had seized their territories, and enslaved–though only temporarily–their population. Israel had, in fact, proved to be the instrument used against the Arab world by those endeavouring to arrest the natural process of revolutions for national liberation in the Middle East. But that attempt would be of no avail. He also referred to reports of the deliberate destruction for "preventive" purposes of homes belonging to Arabs in the territory occupied by Israel, and drew attention in that connexion to General Assembly resolution 2443 (XXIII) in which Israel was called upon to desist from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian population in areas occupied by it and which provided for the establishment of a Special Committee to investigate Israeli practices affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, composed of three Member States.

119. At the 1473rd meeting of the Council on the same day, the representative of Pakistan, on behalf of the sponsors, introduced a revised text (S/9120/Rev.1) of the three-Power draft resolution. In the revised text the third preambular paragraph read: "Recalling resolution 236 (1967)" and a new operative paragraph 1 was inserted which read: "Reaffirms resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968)". The former operative paragraphs 1 and 2 were accordingly renumbered as paragraphs 2 and 3.

120. The representative of Paraguay stated that his delegation had supported the Council's earlier resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968), but as the revised text of the three-Power draft resolution (S/9120/Rev.1) had omitted certain parts of those resolutions in which reference had been made to all acts of violation of the cease-fire, his delegation would abstain on the three-Power draft resolution.

121. The representative of France stated that his delegation had wished that the draft resolution before the Council would have commanded unanimous support, particularly of the four permanent members of the Council. The efforts in that respect, in which his delegation had participated, had not succeeded. In the absence of an agreed text, his delegation would vote in favour of the three-Power revised draft resolution (S/9120/Rev.1).

122. The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that the Security Council, in its two earlier resolutions, 248 (1968) and 256 (1968), had condemned Israel's military actions. Those resolutions had been adopted unanimously. The Arab delegations failed to understand the reason for the reluctance to support the new text of the three-Power draft resolution. The United States representative had stated that his delegation would be able to vote for the draft if the guerrilla warfare were taken into consideration in the text. That question of equation was a new usage in the United Nations. However, the destiny of a people could not be weighed in the scales. Justice had to be done to the people of Palestine, and an equation between an aggressor and its victim could not be established.

123. The representative of Colombia stated that his delegation regretted that the efforts to have a generally agreed text of the draft resolution had not succeeded and that its sponsors were not prepared to include a paragraph deploring all other violations of the cease-fire. To his delegation that was indeed a vital point since it believed that the Council was duty-bound to condemn all violations, regardless of their point of origin.

124. The representative of Finland stated that the revised text of the three-Power draft resolution (S/9120/Rev.1) had met to a great extent some of the suggestions made by his delegation to the sponsors of that draft. By reaffirming resolution 248 (1968) in the first operative paragraph, the Council would deplore by implication all incidents violating the cease-fire, as had been done in the past resolutions unanimously adopted by the Council. His delegation regretted that the revised text had not met with the approval of all members of the Council, since that could not but weaken the impact of Council pronouncements on the course of events in the area. That was all the more regrettable in view of the projected four-Power talks.

125. The representative of Hungary stated that, in view of the continued defiance by Israel of the Council's previous decisions, the Council currently should have taken effective measures against further defiance by Israel. However, some members of the Council were still reluctant to adopt those measures, and it was for that reason that the text of the revised draft resolution, although it no doubt condemned the Israel air attack, did not include measures which were necessary.

Decision: At the 1473rd meeting of the Council on 1 April 1969, the three-Power draft resolution (S/9120/Rev.1) was put to the vote and was adopted by 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (Colombia, Paraguay, United Kingdom and United States) as resolution 265 (1969).

126. Following the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom expressed his regret that unanimity had not been reached when the Council had been so close to agreement. Because of the omission of any statement deploring all violations of the cease-fire, the United Kingdom had reluctantly abstained in the vote.

127. The representative of Israel complained that the resolution was one-sided, inequitable and ignored basic established facts and was therefore not a contribution to the advance of peace in the area. Arab terror warfare must be condemned with full force. Israel's policy would remain based on: readiness to conduct negotiations with each of the neighouring States for the purpose of concluding peace treaties; co-operation with Ambassador Jarring, within the framework of the 22 November 1967 resolution; observance of the cease-fire on the basis of reciprocity; and self-defence against armed attacks.

128. The representative of Jordan expressed gratitude to the Council members for condemning in clear terms the most recent premeditated attack by Israel on Jordan villages and populated areas and for rejecting the Israel allegations and counter-complaint which were intended to confuse the issue. Jordan hoped that this would be the last warning given to Israel. The way to peace was for Israel to abide by its old commitments to the Security Council, but its behaviour had been one of war, in which it had received some accommodation from its friends. Members of the United Nations had undertaken to abide by the will of the majority.

(e)  Communications to the Council between 1 April and 15 July 1969

129. In a letter dated 8 April (S/9137), Israel complained to the Security Council that on that day a Katuycha rocket attack had been launched against the city of Elath, resulting in the wounding of thirteen Israeli civilians, and that in self-defence Israel had taken air action to stop the attack which had originated from the area of the city of Aqaba.

130. On the same day Jordan charged (S/9138) that Israel aircraft had raided the city of Aqaba with rockets and bombs and that the raid had resulted in the death of eight civilians and the wounding of several others. Many buildings, including a Catholic church, a girls' high school and the police headquarters were also damaged.

131. In a letter dated 20 April (S/9166 and Corr.1), Israel complained to the Security Council of a series of cease-fire violations by the armed forces of Jordan on 19 and 20 April, including firing attacks on Israel positions in the Golan Heights and on the Jordan and Beit Shean valleys, as well as the interception of saboteur units. Fire had been returned to silence the source of the attacks.

132. In letters dated 21 and 22 April (S/9167, S/9170, S/9173), Jordan called to the attention of the Council intensive Israel attacks against civilian targets in Jordan on 19, 20 and 21 April, including shelling and bombing of villages throughout the northern area and the suburbs of Irbid, causing casualties among civilians and heavy damage to property.

133. In a letter dated 28 April (S/9180), Israel stated that because of the attacks launched on 19 April by regular and irregular forces from Jordan, with the participation of Iraqi artillery and United Arab Republic military bases in Jordan, Israel had been forced in self-defence to take measures against saboteur centres, Jordanian and Iraqi military positions and two United Arab Republic operated radar stations in Jordan.

134. In a letter dated 1 May (S/9187), Jordan complained that on 29 April Israel aircraft had bombed and strafed the areas of Tel Shubeil and Wadi Yabis causing the death of four civilians, and that Israel forces had also shelled the area of Shuna Shamaliya.

135. In a letter dated 16 May (S/9211), Jordan charged that on 14 May Israel aircraft had bombed and strafed the Irbid district, causing the death of six civilians, and that on 9 May an Israel unit had crossed the Jordan River, dynamited five houses and mined the area of Wadi Yabis, causing three civilian casualties. The letter also listed eighty-six cease-fire violations by Israel in the period from 17 February to 9 May. In a further letter of 16 May (S/9212), Jordan charged that Israel forces had been using the farm of an Arab orphanage in the Jericho area to shell Jordanian positions on the other side of the Jordan River and that Jordan forces had had to return fire in self-defence. In its reply, dated 21 May (S/9217), Israel rejected these charges, stating that they were a pretext for Jordanian shelling of civilian targets in the Jericho area and that Israel had no military positions in the area.

  136. In letters dated 22 and 23 May (S/9218 and S/9219), Jordan charged that on 21 May two Israel companies supported by fighters and helicopters had attacked the villages of Safi and Feifa and that on 22 May four Israel jet aircraft had also shelled and strafed the area of Dair Alla in the north. As a result civilians had been killed and wounded, and houses, schools and other buildings destroyed.

137. In a letter dated 24 May (S/9221), Israel charged that on 24 May fire had been opened from Jordan territory on the Ethiopian monastery south of the Allenby Bridge, and that on 23 May an Israel village in the Beit Shean Valley had been shelled from Jordan and an Israel patrol in the same area had come under Jordanian fire. After stating that between 11 and 17 May there had been fifty-seven attacks from Jordan against Israel, the letter added that on the night of 17 May irregular units from Jordan had attacked Israel positions in the central Jordan Valley. It also charged that on 19 May Jordanian forces had attacked Israel patrols between the Dead Sea and Allenby Bridge, and on the same night the potash plant near Sodom had been attacked by Katuycha rocket from Jordan.

138. In a letter dated 28 May (S/9228), Israel charged that the orphanage of the Arab Development Society, its school and farm near Jericho had again been shelled from Jordan. Israel charged that those attacks were part of a series of pre-planned assaults from Jordan on civilian centres, including Arab inhabited localities, as shown by the shelling of the city of Jericho on the night of 27/28 May and again on the night of 28 May.

139. In a letter dated 19 June (S/9271), Jordan charged that on the previous day Israel jets had conducted attacks for seven hours against numerous sites in Jordan, using bombs, strafing, firing rockets and dropping napalm, and that twice on the same date Israel forces had shelled Jordanian positions. In the course of those attacks, it added, nine soldiers had been killed and twenty-three wounded.

140. In a letter dated 23 June (S/9274), Israel charged that the campaign of aggression waged against it by Jordanian regular and irregular forces, as well as by Iraqi troops stationed on Jordanian territory, had been dangerously intensified, as was illustrated by a sharp rise in the number of artillery attacks initiated by regular Jordanian and Iraqi forces independently of operations by terror organizations. The letter stated that during 1969 there had been 600 acts of aggression committed from Jordanian territory, including attacks by artillery, mortars, tanks, rockets and anti-tank and recoilless guns, as well as incidents of mining and attempts to cross the cease-fire line, adding that most of them were directed against civilian targets.

141. In a letter dated 23 June (S/9275), Jordan charged that on the previous day waves of Israel jets had raided several areas on the East Bank of Jordan and added that those indiscriminate raids had resulted in the death of one civilian and the injury of seventeen  persons, six of them soldiers.

142. In a further letter of 23 June (S/9277), Israel charged that Jordan was responsible for a breach of the cease-fire in Jerusalem on 20 June, in which three bombs had been exploded in a narrow street leading to the Western (Wailing) Wall, injuring three Arab and one Israel inhabitants. As proof of Jordan's responsibility, the letter stated that on 21 June the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, with headquarters in Amman, had published a communiqué admitting responsibility for the attack and that it had been disseminated by Jordan's official media of information.

143. In a letter dated 26 June (S/9285), Jordan complained of several attacks by Israel on the previous day, during which, it stated, the Israel army opened fire on Jordanian positions using machine-guns and tank artillery, and Israel jets had strafed the same area, overflown Amman, and bombed and strafed several other areas in the northern part of the Jordan Valley with rockets and machine-guns. The letter added that as a result of those attacks eleven Jordanian soldiers were dead and six others seriously wounded.

2.  COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(a)  Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General from

     16 July to 4 September 1968 and request for a meeting

144. In a letter dated 16 July (S/8681), Israel stated, in reply to a complaint by the United Arab Republic on 10 July (S/8677 and Corr.1) of Israel shelling of the city of Suez on 8 July, that the Israel forces had acted in self-defence, with considerable restraint, and that the United Arab Republic forces had initiated the fire.

145. In a letter dated 28 August (S/8788), Israel stated that on 26 August two Israel jeeps had been ambushed while on patrol along the Suez Canal. As a result of the explosion of mines laid on the patrol route and the subsequent firing on the jeeps, two Israeli soldiers had been killed and a third, probably wounded, had been kidnapped by the Egyptian soldiers. In a further letter dated 2 September (S/8794), Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the "deliberate and planned military attack by the United Arab Republic against Israel forces on 26 August 1968, in flagrant violation of the cease-fire". It added that the seriousness of that attack had been aggravated by the negative reply of the United Arab Republic to representations made by Israel through General Odd Bull for the return of the kidnapped soldier.

146. Supplemental information concerning the incident of 26 August was received from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), General Odd Bull, and made available to the Council by the Secretary-General in two reports. The first, dated 29 August (S/7930/Add.74 and Corr.1), stated that United Nations military observers had reported hearing explosions and observing firing from the west side of the Canal towards the east. Israel on 27 August had complained that on 26 August a patrol car had been ambushed and mined by United Arab Republic forces which had crossed the Canal. An inquiry conducted by United Nations military observers on 27 August had found that an Israel Defence Force patrol had been mined and the physical evidence had indicated that it had been ambushed. Israel had requested the immediate return of the kidnapped soldier, but the United Arab Republic authorities stated that no United Arab Republic forces had taken part in any action on the Israel side of the Suez Canal sector and they had no knowledge of any missing Israel soldier. The second report, dated 4 September (S/7930/Add.76), stated that during the inquiry on 27 August, the observers had asked to see the bodies of the two Israel soldiers reported to have been killed during the incident but had been told that the bodies had been removed from the area for burial that day. The observers could not therefore verify that two Israel soldiers had been killed. However, blood stains and three damaged steel helmets had been seen by the observers at the scene of the incident, and photographs of them had been taken.

(b) Consideration at the 1446th and 1447th meetings (4 and 5 September 1968)

147. At the 1446th meeting, on 4 September, the agenda was adopted without objection. The representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic were invited at their request to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of the question. The President drew attention to the information circulated by the Secretary-General in documents S/7930/Add.74 and Corr.1 and Add.76.

148. The representative of Israel stated that his Government had decided to bring before the Security Council the incident of 26 August 1968 because the United Arab Republic had denied to General Bull any knowledge of the matter. The facts, however, are quite clear. In violation of the cease-fire and in breach of the arrangements prohibiting military activities in the Canal, a well-planned military attack had been carried out against Israel by Egyptian forces operating from the west bank. That was the first time that Egyptian units had crossed the Canal and attacked the Israel forces stationed along its east bank, and that development was fraught with the gravest dangers for the maintenance of the cease-fire. No attempts to disclaim responsibility or to confuse the problem by introducing irrelevant allegations could alter the basic fact that Egypt could have prevented that attack as it had been able to do so until then. As Israel had informed General Bull, it might be inferred from the nature of the operation that it was not meant to be an isolated incident but the initiation of a new policy of military aggression in the area. In bringing this matter before the Security Council, Israel expected that the Council would take steps to arrest further deterioration of the situation, to condemn the military attack carried out in violation of the cease-fire and to secure the return of the captured Israel soldier.

149. The representative of the United Arab Republic stated that his Government had ordered an inquiry as soon as news of the alleged incident had reached it. The findings of that inquiry, which had also been conveyed officially to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, had shown that no United Arab Republic forces had taken part in any action in the territories east of the Suez Canal. At the same time, the United Arab Republic had assured the Chief of Staff of its continued observance of the cease-fire in conformity with the Security Council resolutions. As regards the missing soldier, his Government had had no knowledge of the matter. The Israel charges concerning involvement of the United Arab Republic armed forces in the incident had not been substantiated by the United Nations observers in the area, as shown in the information furnished by General Bull (S/7930/Add.74). It should also be recalled that there had been a lapse of time separating the alleged event from the request addressed to General Bull to undertake the inquiry. The statement of the Israel second lieutenant at that inquiry did not bear close scrutiny, since, if he had been there, he would surely have reacted to save his kidnapped colleague. Moreover, the bodies of the two soldiers had not been examined in time by the United Nations observers. It was clear that in submitting its charges about the alleged incident to the Security Council, Israel was indulging, as previously, in its diversionary tactics. Indeed, any violations in the Suez Canal sector had always been committed by Israel. Since its act of aggression in June 1967, it had consistently followed a brutal and aggressive policy in that area, causing heavy losses in civilian life and massive destruction of civilian buildings. The attempts of Israel to hold every Arab Government responsible for acts of patriotism on the part of the oppressed population in the occupied territories could not convince anybody. The Government of the United Arab Republic had steadfastly supported all liberation movements in Africa and Asia. It was therefore ironic that that Government was now being asked by Israel to negate its policy of supporting freedom fighters and help Israel in suppressing a genuine and rightful liberation movement.

150. The representative of Israel said that the Council was discussing a simple though extremely grave matter which required a simple response. In accordance with its obligations under the cease-fire, Egypt was responsible for the prevention of any incursions or attacks from its side against Israel forces or civilians and for observance of the arrangements prohibiting movements of personnel and of military activity in the Canal.  His Government would like to know whether Egypt was ready to take the necessary measures to prevent attacks of that nature in the future and whether it was prepared to free the Israel soldier abducted in the course of the attack that occurred on 26 August. Israel was defending itself against attacks from military positions established inside the cities along the west bank of the Canal.

151. At the 1447th meeting of the Council, on 5 September, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his Government, which had always condemned violence and reprisal, considered Israel's decision to bring the matter to the Security Council as the right course. In the case at hand, the Council had the advantage of having reports on which it could rely because of its confidence in General Bull and his observers. The Council could accept their findings that the Israel patrol had been mined and that physical evidence had indicated that the patrol had been ambushed. It should deplore and condemn any such acts of violence. At the same time, it was unfortunate that no report of the incident had been made to the United Nations authorities until the morning after the event. Had an immediate report been made, the evidence before the Council would have been fuller and more valuable. On the other hand, the contention of the United Arab Republic that it had neither knowledge nor responsibility in the matter could not be accepted, as it was the positive responsibility of the United Arab Republic to maintain the cease-fire. However, the assurance given to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO that the United Arab Republic would continue to give its unqualified support to the cease-fire and to the agreed practical arrangements to give effect to it on the Canal was most valuable and welcome. The Council had been called to deal with one event, the attack on the Israel patrol, and for the time being it could concentrate on and reach a conclusion in a simple and clear resolution. Nevertheless, every time that the Council met to discuss the situation in the Middle East, it was essential to recall certain wider considerations. The Council had agreed unanimously on the principles of a final settlement which had been accepted by the parties concerned. It therefore followed that, above all, it was necessary to concentrate, through the Secretary-General's Special Representative, on the substance of the principles and purposes to which all had subscribed and on a new urgent effort to prepare practical proposals to implement the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.

152. The representative of Denmark stated that his delegation deplored all violations of the cease-fire, which made progress towards peace more difficult. It was incumbent upon all parties to ensure that the climate of calm should continue in order to further the aims of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). General Bull had presented a report according to which United Nations observers had found that an Israel patrol had been mined and that physical evidence indicated that the patrol had been ambushed. Denmark

welcomed the fact that Israel had chosen to bring before the Council the incident of 26 August, and it hoped that the debate in the Council would help towards putting an end to the vicious circle of attack and counter-attack. The Danish Government was convinced that all efforts must henceforth be concentrated on facilitating the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, and, in that respect, the representative of Denmark referred to a communiqué issued on 4 September 1968 at the Nordic Foreign Ministers' meeting in Stockholm which had appealed to all parties to the Middle East dispute to ensure that Ambassador Jarring's mission led to results conducive to peace.

153. The representative of the United States said that, taking into account the three elements of the matter before the Council, i.e., the allegations of the Israel Government, the substantial circumstantial support for those allegations provided by the investigation of the United Nations military observers and the limited denial by the Government of the United Arab Republic, the Council would be entirely justified in accepting Israel's statement, substantially confirmed by the Chief of Staff, while at the same time taking account of the limited denial of the United Arab Republic. The evidence clearly pointed to a wholly unprovoked attack by a substantial number of armed men with the acquiescence of the Government of the United Arab Republic. Every Government was responsible for the control of its own population, and that responsibility was not limited to the actions of its regular armed forces. The United States Government therefore strongly deplored the incident and felt that the Government of the United Arab Republic was to be held strictly accountable for observing the requirements of the cease-fire, which it had asserted it continued to support. Moreover, it was incumbent on the Council to express its position clearly in an appropriate resolution. The Council had repeatedly and properly taken a strong line against acts of military reprisal, and it should therefore equally condemn acts of terror and violence, as otherwise it would leave no alternative to a policy of reprisal. Finally, the parties to the dispute should avail themselves of the instrumentality represented by Ambassador Jarring, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to start a dialogue which might ultimately lead to a peaceful solution of the Middle East problem.

154. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the Council was meeting to consider a complaint by a country which itself had committed armed aggression against the United Arab Republic and was occupying a considerable portion of its territory. Before submitting its complaint, Israel first should have indicated its intention to abide by the previous decisions of the Security Council, in particular its resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, including the withdrawal of its troops from the occupied Arab territories. Naturally, the question arose as to why Israel had had recourse to the Security Council for such a minor incident, which allegedly had taken place on 26 August 1968 on the territory of the United Arab Republic currently occupied by Israel troops. Moreover, it was quite clear that the complaint was unfounded, as evidenced also by information furnished by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, which had not once mentioned the United Arab Republic as a country against which claims could be made in connexion with the incident reported by Israel. Serious doubts about the reliability and plausibility of the Israel assertions had been cast by the supplementary report, which had clearly shown that Israel had refused to provide the United Nations observers with the opportunity to see the corpses of the two Israel soldiers allegedly killed during the incident. However, even if the incident was not a deliberate fabrication but had actually taken place as a result of action by the Arab freedom fighters, the United Arab Republic could not be held responsible for incidents in Israel-occupied territory. The Soviet Union could not agree with the United States view that the Arab States were responsible for events in the territory under Israel occupation. Resentment against the actions of the occupying forces would inevitably lead to an intensification of the Arab population's struggle for liberation against the aggressor. Israel's aggressive policy was fraught with the most serious dangers for its own people. While the Arab States had accepted the resolution of 22 November 1967 and were ready to work for a political settlement, Israel had refused to do the same and was putting forward unrealistic demands in an effort to cover up its aggressive and expansionist policies. Israel was in practice paralysing the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the main purpose of which was to promote the implementation of the 22 November resolution.

155. The representative of the United States, exercising his right of reply, declared that he had not stated that the United Arab Republic or any other Arab State should be held responsible for events which had taken place on territory that was currently occupied by Israel. Rather, he had suggested that it seemed only elementary that every Government should be held responsible for events which resulted from the actions of its citizens and which were mounted from its territory. He reiterated that according to the statement of the Government of Israel and the evidence that was adduced by the United Nations observers, though it did not fully corroborate Israel's statement in every detail, it was clear that the United Arab Republic had some responsibility  for  the  attack  reported  to  the  Council.

156. The representative of Israel stated that the United Arab Republic had taken a highly cynical attitude towards serious discussion in the Security Council of the need to avert the deterioration of the cease-fire. The relations between Israel and the Arab States were regulated by the cease-fire established by the Security Council. Although the cease-fire was not Israel's choice, Israel was prepared at any time to conclude peace with Egypt and to establish secure and recognized boundaries. However, as long as Egypt refused to abandon the Khartoum decision and rejected peace with Israel, the cease-fire was the only basis for relations between the two countries. Israel had turned to the Council for the purpose of finding in it support for strengthening the fabric of the cease-fire.

157. The President, in adjourning the meeting, declared that the next meeting would be held after members of the Council had had an opportunity to hold consultations among themselves on the matter on the Council's agenda.

(c)  Communications to the Council on 8 September 1968 and requests for a meeting

158. In a letter dated 8 September (S/8805), Israel charged that the United Arab Republic armed forces had violated the cease-fire on that date in the Suez Canal sector and, in the light of that violation, requested an immediate resumption of the meetings of the Security Council adjourned on 5 September. In a letter of the same date (S/8806), the United Arab Republic charged that Israel had shelled the cities of Port Tawfiq, Suez, Ismailia and Kantara and, in view of the gravity of the situation, requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

(d) Consideration at the 1448th, 1449th, 1451st and 1452nd meetings

(8 to 18 September 1968)

159. At the 1448th meeting of the Council, on 8 September 1968, the President stated that he had convened the meeting in response to requests for an urgent meeting received by him that day from the representatives of Israel (S/8805) and the United Arab Republic (S/8806).

160. The representatives of Algeria and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considered that the agenda should contain only the letter from the United Arab Republic (S/8806), as this referred to a new question. The President replied that he had been guided by the rules of procedure, which provided that any item whose consideration had not been completed at a meeting of the Council should, unless it was decided otherwise, be included in the agenda of the next meeting. The agenda as proposed by the President, containing the letters from Israel of 2 and 8 September (S/8794 and S/8805), as well as the letter of 8 September from the United Arab Republic (S/8806), was adopted without further discussion, and the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic were invited, pursuant to their requests, to participate without vote in the discussion.

161. The Secretary-General stated that in three brief cable messages, in the course of that afternoon, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had informed him of the heavy and prolonged exchange of fire that day across the Suez Canal. The third of those messages stated that exchange of fire in the Canal area had ceased. In view of the fact that no messages about further firing had been received, it was safe to conclude that the cease-fire arranged by the United Nations observers had been holding since it became effective at 1650 hours GMT on 8 September. The Secretary-General also read out the text of a report just then received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, which gave details of the exchange of fire observed by the United Nations military observers at different posts along the Canal, the weapons used and the attempts made at securing cease-fire. The report also contained accounts of damage to UNTSO installations and the wounding of a United Nations military observer. (The report was subsequently issued as document S/7930/Add.78.)

62. The representative of Israel stated that the fact that the Egyptian forces had on 8 September opened fire a few minutes after the detonation of a mine and that very soon thereafter the Egyptian artillery had begun an attack along the entire front from Kantara to Port Tawfiq clearly indicated that the 8 September attack was a premeditated and large-scale one in flagrant violation of the cease-fire. He recalled that in his statement to the Council on 4 September he had expressed his Government's concern that the Egyptian attack of 26 August might be a prelude to a renewed campaign of violence along the cease-fire line. That concern had been strengthened by the repeated planting of anti-vehicle mines in the same place, within sight of Egyptian army positions distant only 200 to 300 metres. From these developments it was obvious that the United Arab Republic was trying to undermine the cease-fire and create a situation of grave danger in the area. It was incumbent upon the Security Council that it should take steps to halt Egypt's acts of aggression and help maintain the cease-fire.

163. The representative of the United Arab Republic, after recalling his statement to the Council on 4 September when he had observed that in the past Israel had preferred to use force rather than bring its case to the Security Council, stated that Israel had returned to its normal routine of first using force and then submitting its complaint to the Security Council. On 8 September, Israel had opened fire in the area of Port Tawfiq and had continued it by extending the shelling to the cities of Ismailia and Kantara. There were grounds for believing that missiles had been used by Israel. The United Arab Republic forces were obliged to return the fire in self-defence and to ensure the safety of its civilian population, whose casualty toll had amounted to 332 killed and 767 injured.

164. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that it would have been more appropriate for Israel to have informed the United Nations observers when a mine had been discovered. The explosion of that mine had started off the cross-firing by both sides on 8 September. If the Israel forces had acted appropriately, the incident and its distressing consequences, for which Israel must bear the responsibility, could have been avoided.

165. The representative of the United Kingdom proposed that in view of the urgency of the matter and the gravity of the situation, the Council might recess for a brief period in order to hold consultations on what immediate action it could take.

166. The representative of the United States, supporting the United Kingdom proposal, formally moved, under rule 33 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, that the Council adjourn for a brief period for purposes of consultation.

167. The United States motion was approved without vote.

168. When the Council resumed its meeting the same night, the President of the Council stated that after extensive consultations he was authorized to make the following declaration:

169. At the 1449th meeting of the Council, on 10 September, the President of the Council drew its attention to the further supplemental information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.79). The Chief of Staff stated that he had not been informed on 8 September of a mine to be exploded by the Israel forces, but that in a report received at the UNTSO headquarters on 9 September, the Israel Liaison Officer had reported the discovery of three anti-vehicle mines on 5 September and one anti-vehicle mine on 8 September, which was exploded some two hours later, as it could not be safely removed.

170. The representative of Israel stated that a double standard was being employed by some members of the Council towards Israel. While approving Israel's recourse to the Council, they were at the same time seeking to thwart a just decision by the Council on Israel's complaint. Israel had presented complaints of genuine attacks against it by the Egyptian forces on 26 August and 8 September, whereas the United Arab Republic had merely given traditional and qualified denials, which had been invariably disproved by facts. A careful analysis of the reports submitted by General Bull would confirm the Egyptian responsibility. The initiation of the attack and its immediate extension along a wide front with the co-ordinated use of artillery, mortars, tanks and machine-guns left no doubt about the premeditated and well-prepared character of the operation.

171. The representative of Ethiopia stated that the interminable recurrences of cease-fire violations were jeopardizing the delicate peace mission in progress and if not checked could result in large-scale warfare. The Council should, however, be prepared to look beyond those incidents and focus its attention on the important questions of the maintenance of the cease-fire in all sectors and the peace-making efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative. In the spirit of its unanimous resolution 242 (1967), the Council should appeal to the parties to exercise the utmost restraint, to observe scrupulously the cease-fire resolutions and to co-operate with the United Nations representative in the area. It was necessary to create a favourable climate for the success of the peace-making mission of Ambassador Jarring, Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

172. The representative of Brazil said that the Council should not ignore the report of the inquiry by UNTSO, which had stated in clear terms that, from physical evidence observed, an Israel patrol had been mined and ambushed. However, the Council could not go on indefinitely limiting itself merely to fact-finding exercises on complaints submitted to it, or even to a routine allotment of blame, while the vital questions affecting the situation there, such as the arms race between the parties, remained untackled. If both parties were to show an equal degree of adherence to resolution 242 (1967) and co-operate unreservedly with the Secretary-General's Special Representative, an equitable solution of the Middle East situation could be found.

173. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that his delegation had requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council on 8 September in order to have prompt and effective action by the Council against Israel's act of aggression. The report of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had clearly indicated that Israel had initiated firing on 8 September. Israel's action was not only a flagrant violation of the cease-fire but indicated its ominous designs for the future in the area. The latest Israel aggression had resulted in considerable loss of human life and damage to installations and property on the west bank of the Suez Canal and should be severely condemned by the Council. His Government regretted that the United States, in its enthusiastic support for Israel, should uphold the notion that the Governments of the Arab States were responsible for the actions of the Arab population living under Israel occupation. The representative of the United Arab Republic referred to the Israel statement of 5 September that the cease-fire was the only basis for relations between the two countries. That was a distortion of facts, since the cease-fire was never envisaged as a framework for governing future relations. In fact, in resolution 234 (1967) the Council had called, as a first step, for all measures for an immediate cease-fire and the cessation of military activities in the area. Hence, the cease-fire was only a preliminary step towards the cessation of hostilities. Further steps should have been taken for the prompt liquidation of all traces and consequences of aggression, particularly of the military occupation. The United Arab Republic had repeatedly declared its acceptance and readiness to implement fully resolution 242 (1967) which had been unanimously adopted by the Council on 22 November 1967. Israel, however, continued to evade a direct acceptance of its implementation. Israel's deliberate policy of omitting all references to the Armistice Agreements was a grave matter which deserved the Council's attention. Those Agreements were still valid and must be adhered to meticulously. The United Nations considered those Agreements still valid and applicable, as was clear from the Secretary-General's reference to them in his introduction to his annual report to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly (A/6701/Add.1, paragraph 43).

174. The representative of Hungary stated that the reports of the United Nations military observers (S/7930/Add.74 and Add.76) had not confirmed the Israel accusation that the United Arab Republic forces had violated the cease-fire. In fact, the United Arab Republic, in spite of the long occupation of its territories, the misappropriation of its natural resources, the systematic destruction of its cities and industries and the blocking of the Suez Canal, had rigorously adhered to the cease-fire and had steadfastly worked in favour of a political solution of the Middle East crisis based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. His delegation deplored attempts which were being made in the name of even-handedness to have the Council adopt a stand totally unrelated to the facts of the issue before it. The fact of the matter was that there was an abnormal situation prevailing in the Middle East. The Security Council had adopted a unanimous resolution laying down the basis for a political solution and stipulating the withdrawal of Israel forces from occupied Arab territories, which had not yet been accepted, let alone implemented, by Israel.

175. The representative of Algeria said that Israel's real objective in resorting to the Council with a baseless complaint was to create a façade of peaceful intentions before the world, while hiding its real designs for future aggression. However, as long as the Arab territories remained occupied by enemy forces, the duty of the inhabitants was to fight by all the means available to them, and that resistance had to be pursued on all fronts. The tolerance shown by the Council to Israel's continual occupation of the Arab territories had encouraged that country to continue its aggressive policy towards the Arab States. The Council, therefore, ought to condemn Israel in order to emphasize its disapproval of the use of force, particularly against civilian installations.

176. The representative of France regretted that Israel's commendable decision to appeal to the Security Council on 2 September, instead of resorting to unilateral retaliation, had been marred by the deplorable incident of 8 September, when both sides had exchanged heavy machine-gun and artillery fire. The proximity of important localities on the west bank of the Canal made its consequences even graver. Those recent developments pointed to the urgent need for restoration of peace in the Middle East. His delegation continued to believe that only a political solution could end the incidents, the repetition of which had raised the possibility of a new conflagration in that region. The resolution of 22 November 1967 still remained the only basis for a settlement that members of the Council were seeking, and all clauses of that resolution must be implemented without reservation.

177. The President, speaking as the representative of Canada, said that the incidents of 26 August and 8 September 1968 had given rise to grave concern not only because of the increase of tension in the area but because they had involved grievous loss of life and damage to property on both sides. The Security Council must ask the parties concerned to observe the cease-fire most scrupulously until the goal of a peaceful and accepted settlement was reached. The goal of a peaceful and accepted settlement was the only way out of the vicious circle of violence.

178. The representative of Israel agreed with the representative of the United Arab Republic that the basis for relations between Israel and the Arab countries should be more than the cease-fire, which was only a first step. But as long as the United Arab Republic adhered to the Khartoum decision of "no peace, no negotiations, no recognition of Israel", it was wilfully preventing progress towards a lasting peace.

179. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the representative of the United Arab Republic called upon the representative of Israel to clarify in precise terms the position of the Government of Israel regarding acceptance and implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November.

180. The representative of Israel, in reply to the representative of the USSR, said that his Government's position with regard to the resolution of 22 November had been made very clear at the Security Council meeting on 1 May and could be found in the record of that meeting.

181. At the 1451st meeting of the Council, on 11 September, the President drew the Council's attention to supplemental information (S/7930/Add.80) received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO relating to incidents in the Suez Canal sector on the previous day. The Chief of Staff reported an Israel complaint of a mining incident in which one soldier had been wounded. An explosion had been seen and heard on the east side of the Canal by United Nations observation posts and an inquiry was being conducted. Later, he reported a further Israel complaint that an Israel soldier had been wounded by fire by a United Arab Republic sniper. An observation post had reported a single rifle shot fired by the United Arab Republic across the Canal.

182. The representative of Pakistan said that the Council did not have an agreed version even of the basic facts of the incident of 26 August, but that the evidence for the incident of 8 September was comparatively fuller and clearer. According to General Bull's report, the fire was initiated by Israel forces after certain explosions had been observed on both sides of the Canal. Sustained firing from both sides seemed to have followed until the cease-fire was arranged. The two issues involved in the situation should not be confused, namely, incidents pertaining to cease-fire violations and incidents arising from the natural consequences of foreign occupation. It was well known that foreign occupation gave rise to resistance. His Government believed that restoration of peace and stability in the area depended on the implementation of the Council's resolution 242 (1967) and on a successful completion of the mission of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring.

183. The representative of Senegal said that the information available to the Council did not make it possible to establish the degree of responsibility for the incidents on each side. In those circumstances, the United Arab Republic could in no way be held responsible for incidents which had occurred in areas it no longer controlled and were under military occupation by Israel. His Government believed that forthright co-operation with Ambassador Jarring on the basis of strict implementation of all the provisions of the Security council resolution of 22 November 1967 was the only way that could lead to the establishment of a just and lasting peace.

184. The representative of the United States said that it was encouraging to note that the two Governments concerned had indicated their intention to continue to adhere scrupulously to the cease-fire. To implement these statements of intent fully and without qualification was now clearly their responsibility. The Council must insist not only that both States adhere to the cease-fire but, to that end, that they should issue strict orders to their local commanders against violations or unilateral action that could endanger the cease-fire. At the same time, the States concerned should, as a matter of urgency, give full co-operation at all levels to UNTSO. Cease-fire should not, however, be confused with peace. The resolution of 22 November had provided a set of principles on which a just peace could be erected. Yet Ambassador Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary- General, in spite of his skillful and tireless efforts, had not been able to translate those principles into perceptible progress towards peace. Under those circumstances, the Council must examine what more needed to be done.

185. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the event of 8 September was a new act of provocation by Israel armed forces. It presented a new threat to peace in the Near East and was a gross violation of decisions of the Security Council concerning the cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities in that part of the world. The meaning of the events which had occurred on 8 September in the Suez Canal area went far beyond simple violation of the cease-fire. The recent sequence of military and political events showed that the Security Council was faced with a premeditated aggressive policy intended to inflame the situation in the Near East through acts of provocation by Israel against the United Arab Republic. Israel's responsibility in that respect had been fully confirmed by the report of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. The Security Council should note that the aggressor, who had invaded the territory of the United Arab Republic, blocked the Suez Canal and stopped international navigation on that highly important

waterway of world significance, was intentionally and deliberately going so far as to aggravate the situation in the area still further. In those conditions the United Arab Republic, whose vitally important centres and densely populated areas were in immediate danger and within range of artillery fire and other means of attack by the aggressor, could not help taking legitimate defensive measures to repel possible new acts of provocation by Israel armed forces. It was the duty of the Council to put an end to Israel's acts of aggression and secure a political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of full implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, which provided as a first principle of settlement that Israel forces must withdraw from all territories occupied in the summer of 1967.

186. The President drew the attention of the members of the Council to further supplemental information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO (S/7930/Add.81), which contained a summary of an inquiry into an explosion on the east bank of the Canal on 10 September. United Nations military observers had seen a damaged half-track, a crater at the scene of the incident and four anti-tank mines in the track and various bootmarks on the embankment. In a further report dated 11 September (S/7930/Add.82) the Chief of Staff reported further firing incidents, two initiated by United Arab Republic forces and one from the south-east.

187. At the 1452nd meeting of the Council on 18 September, the President drew the attention of the members of the Council to further supplemental information submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. The first of these reports, dated 13 September (S/7930/ Add.83), gave information received from the United Arab Republic authorities concerning casualties and material damage on the west side of the Canal, as well as damage to UNTSO installations and property resulting from the firing on 8 September. Information had not yet been received from the Israel authorities concerning casualties and material damage on the east side of the Canal resulting from that firing. A further communication of 17 September (S/7930/Add.86) gave the texts of letters addressed to the Israel and United Arab Republic authorities protesting the damage to UNTSO installations and property in that incident (the replies from the two Governments were included in supplemental information dated 25 September (S/7930/Add.89)). Firing incidents were also reported on 13 September, when observation posts reported firing initiated by United Arab Republic forces across the Canal and at Israel jet aircraft (S/7930/Add.84 and Add.87).

188. The President then read out the text of the following draft resolution which, he said, had been the result of intensive consultations among members of the Council:

    "The Security Council,

Decision: At the 1452nd meeting of the Council, on 18 September 1968, the draft resolution was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (Algeria), as resolution 258 (1968).

189. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the obvious and primary duty of the Council was to bring the discussion of the current matter to an early end and open the way to progress towards settlement by concentrating on the immediate aim of restoring and maintaining the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector. For that reason his delegation had no hesitation in supporting the resolution that the Council had just adopted. It was a matter of satisfaction that the Council had received assurances from both sides to respect the cease-fire. The maintenance of cease-fire, in which the United Nations military observers had played a commendable part, was a necessary step if the way were to be clear to go forward without delay to transform declared principles and purposes into the realities of a peaceful settlement.

190. The representative of the United Arab Republic stated that it had become clear that the policies carried out by Israel had two main objectives: the first was to inflame the already tense situation in the area by embarking on a series of pre-planned attacks which, coupled with the continued occupation of Arab territories, could only aggravate the situation further; the second was a tactical campaign with the avowed aim of confusing the issues and distorting the facts. Under those circumstances, it was incumbent on the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities and request forthwith compliance by Israel with resolution 242 (1967). The resolution adopted on 15 September by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity requesting the withdrawal of foreign troops from Arab territories occupied by Israel since 5 June 1967 showed that the world community was becoming apprehensive about the continued occupation.

191. The representative of Paraguay stated that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution because it believed that any appeal to ensure compliance with the cease-fire and to prevent further acts of violence would create a more favourable atmosphere for the productive exchange of ideas which might lead to an end of the conflict. His delegation could not but condemn the incident brought to the attention of the Council by the representative of Israel in his letter of 2 September, which had formed the basis of the Council's deliberations.

192. The representative of Denmark said that his delegation had already emphasized that the cease-fire should be strictly maintained by all concerned, not only in order to avoid loss of lives, human suffering and material damages but because any violation of the cease-fire had an adverse effect upon the efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the problems of the Middle East. His delegation understood operative paragraph 1 to mean that the parties in the Suez Canal Sector should strengthen their co-operation with General Bull and his observers; and it whole-heartedly welcomed the reaffirmation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the call on the parties to extend their fullest co-operation to Ambassador Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

193. The representative of Pakistan said that his delegation had voted in favour of the resolution although it reflected only a part of the action which his delegation would have liked the Council to take. It was in the full, effective and speedy implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 that the best hope of bringing a durable peace to the Middle East lay. Each time that the Council failed to insist on a speedy implementation of that resolution, it only prolonged the agony of the Arab inhabitants of occupied territories. Respect for the observance of the cease-fire, however important, was not an end in itself. In fact, peace-keeping and peace-making were inseparably linked. It was the conspicuous absence of a rational juxtaposition of these two essential elements from the cease-fire resolutions of June 1967 that had led to the existing situation.

194. The representative of Algeria said that his delegation had abstained from voting on the draft resolution because of its conviction that no real solution to the tragedy of the Middle East could be found so long as the Council refrained from tackling the root of the evil and contented itself only with provisional solutions. The real source of tension in the Middle East was Israel's expansionist policy and not the incidents which were only a manifestation of that policy. The time had come for the Council to demand an immediate end to Israel occupation of the Arab territories and to seek the restoration to the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights.

195. The representative of Brazil said that his delegation had voted for the resolution although it would have preferred a more detailed analysis of the complaints submitted to the Council by the parties, a more stringent requirement for respect of the cease-fire and a strengthening of UNTSO under General Odd Bull. However, his delegation hoped that the positive aspects of the resolution would support the task entrusted to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. He stated that his delegation considered that the third preambular paragraph of the resolution adopted entailed, inter alia, an implicit appeal to the major Powers to strive towards a mutual understanding on the all-important question of the supply of armaments and implements of war to the parties of the conflict and that it should serve as basis for further action by the Council on this particular question.

196. The representative of the United States stated that his delegation had considered it essential that the Council must insist, as it did in the resolution just adopted, upon rigorous observance of the cease-fire. The need to arrest a further deterioration in the Middle East through rigorous respect for the cease-fire had become all the more critical and urgent in view of Ambassador Jarring's return to New York and the continuation of his peace-making efforts. The Council could well expect the parties concerned to extend their fullest co-operation to Ambassador Jarring.

197. The President, speaking as the representative of Canada, said that the goal of the Council and of the States concerned in the area was surely to further the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Progress towards that goal through the mission entrusted to the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, was impeded by outbreaks of violence which also increased tension in the area. The cease-fire resolutions adopted by the Council required the prevention by the parties of any and all violations of the cease-fire. It was also incumbent upon the parties to extend the fullest co-operation to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, under whose guidance the United Nations military observers were working with dedication. The reaffirmation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) should be regarded as a renewal by the Security Council of its support for the provisions and principles so carefully outlined in that resolution.

198. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the resolution just adopted by the Council basically met the requirements of the moment. However, there had been an attempt to present the situation as if it were not Israel but the United Arab Republic that bore the primary responsibility for the incidents that had, in fact, been provoked by Israel. It was the duty of the Security Council not only to emphasize the need for strict compliance with the cease-fire decisions but also to place particular stress on the need for the earliest possible implementation of its resolution of 22 November 1967. The most significant aspect of the decision just adopted by the Security Council was that the Council had called for speedy implementation of that resolution. He pointed out that implementation of that resolution, which called for the immediate withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Arab territories occupied as a result of the June 1967 aggression, was the only way of reducing tension and bringing about the necessary conditions for a political settlement in the Middle East. He said that the earliest possible liquidation of the consequences of the Israel aggression against the Arab States, through the immediate implementation of the Security Council's resolution 242 (1967), was called for by the overwhelming majority of countries of the world. The responsibility for the lack of progress in the implementation of that resolution rested not only with Israel but with those countries which were supporting Israel. If they too were prepared to help bring about a political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, such a settlement could become a real fact. The Soviet Union was prepared to do everything possible to that end.

199. The representative of Israel said that his delegation had come to the Council on 2 September with a simple and modest request: to condemn the military attacks on Israel, to call on the United Arab Republic to prevent their recurrence and to ascertain the fate of the abducted Israel soldier. He regretted that the resolution just adopted did not reflect the gravity of the United Arab Republic's attacks and their consequences, in spite of the clear facts of the situation. He declared that Israel would continue to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring and at the same time, it would continue to fulfil its obligations towards its citizens and the territories under its control.

(e) Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General

    between 18 September and 1 November and requests for a meeting

200. In a letter dated 23 September (S/8830), Israel charged that on 22 September an Egyptian unit had crossed the Canal and attacked an Israel force south of the Bitter Lake, hitting a military truck and wounding two soldiers. The Secretary-General submitted supplemental information, dated 24 and 25 September (S/7930/Add.88 and Add.91), from the Chief of Staff, reporting that the observation posts closest to the alleged scene of the incident had heard explosions and that during the subsequent inquiry United Nations military observers had seen mines and other ammunition, a damaged truck and footprints to and from the scene of the incident and the Canal bank.

201. In a letter dated 25 September (S/8831), Israel stated that an Israel half-track had been blown up by an anti-vehicle mine on that day on a track about one kilometre east of the Canal in the Little Bitter Lake area. In supplemental information dated 26 September (S/7930/Add.92), the Chief of Staff reported that, in an inquiry conducted on that day, United Nations military observers had seen the damaged half-track, newly cut barbed wire and footprints to and from the bank of the Bitter Lake.

202. In supplemental information dated 25 September, 1 October and 29 November (S/7930/Add.90 and Corr.1 and 2), the Secretary-General furnished up-to-date information concerning the renaming and relocation of the observation posts established by UNTSO for its cease-fire observation in the Suez Canal sector.

203. In supplemental information dated 23 October (S/7930/Add.94), the Chief of Staff reported that on that day planes had been observed crossing the Canal in both directions and that an aerial battle between three Israel and three United Arab Republic planes had been observed over Ismailia.

204. In a letter dated 26 October (S/8868), Israel complained that on that day United Arab Republic forces had opened artillery fire across the entire length of the Canal on Israel positions on the east bank, and added that a cease-fire had been arranged following two unsuccessful attempts in which cease-fire proposals by United Nations military observers had been observed by Israel but not by the United Arab Republic. In a further letter of the same date (S/8869), Israel complained of two attempts by United Arab Republic forces to cross the Canal, one south of Little Bitter Lake and one in the vicinity of Port Tawfiq. Fire had been exchanged. In a letter of 29 October (S/8875), Israel called attention to the report that the Algerian forces stationed in the Suez Canal zone had participated in the attacks against Israel on 26 October and said that this information was particularly grave because Algeria had ignored the cease-fire resolution and was, on its own admission, pursuing an active role against Israel. On 30 October, Israel charged (S/8877) that the attack of 26 October, which had resulted in fifteen Israel soldiers killed and thirty-four wounded, was the climax of a series of premeditated attacks by the United Arab Republic forces in pursuance of announced United Arab Republic policy of so-called preventive military operations.

205. In a letter dated 26 October (S/8870), the United Arab Republic charged that on that date Israel forces in the Suez Canal area had launched a rocket attack against the city of Tawfiq, resulting in the loss of lives and damage to property. Fire had been returned.

206. A summary of the exchange of fire on 26 October was contained in a report from the Chief of Staff issued on 27 October (S/7930/Add.95 and Corr.1). The Chief of Staff also reported further incidents on 27 October, including ground explosions and over-flying by jet aircraft. In a subsequent report issued on 1 November (S/7930/Add.99), the Chief of Staff stated that on 27 October the United Arab Republic authorities had shown United Nations military observers a weapon at Port Tawfiq which they alleged was one of the missiles fired by Israel on 26 October. The weapon was described as being made of heavy metal,  cylindrical  and  containing  high  explosive.

207. In further supplemental information issued on 28, 30 and 31 October and 1 November (S/7930/Add.96-98 and Add.100), the Chief of Staff reported on investigations made following Israel complaints of mines laid by United Arab Republic forces along the east bank of the Canal. Investigating United Nations military observers had observed, inter alia, damaged vehicles, craters, anti-tank mines and footprints leading to the east bank of the Canal.

208. In a letter dated 1 November (S/8878), the United Arab Republic charged that on the night of 31 October Israel aircraft had penetrated deep into the Nag Hamadi area inside the United Arab Republic bombing civilian targets, among them the Nag Hamadi Bridge, and killing one civilian and wounding two others. It requested an urgent meeting of the Council.

209. On the same day Israel also requested (S/8879) an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the recent acts of aggression by the United Arab Republic against Israel which already had been brought to the Council's attention in previous communications (S/8868, S/8869, S/8875, S/8877) and in the relevant reports by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO.

(f) Consideration by the Council at the 1456th and 1457th meetings (1 and 4 November 1968)

210. At its 1456th meeting, on 1 November, the Security Council included in its agenda the complaints submitted by the United Arab Republic and Israel. The representatives of the United Arab Republic and Israel, and later the representative of Saudi Arabia, were invited, pursuant to their requests, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

211. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that the latest act of aggression against it by Israel was ominous not only because of its premeditated nature but because it had been openly admitted by responsible Israel leaders. The selection of civilian installations for bombing showed that Israel aimed at paralysing the economy of the United Arab Republic. While carrying out those and other destructive acts, Israel was, at the same time, conducting a propaganda campaign about its peaceful intentions and constructive approaches. However, Israel had so far refused to declare its acceptance of, and willingness to implement, the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, and that fact spoke more eloquently about its real intentions. In those circumstances, the Security Council, which had already condemned Israel in its resolutions 248 (1968) of 24 March and 256 (1968) of 16 August 1968, must discharge its authority by invoking the required enforcement measures as envisaged in the Charter.

212. The representative of Israel said that although the Security Council, as far back as 1948 and more recently on 22 November 1967, had called upon the parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to conclude a permanent peace settlement, the United Arab Republic had continued in its policy of belligerency, in pursuance of the Khartoum decision of not recognizing and not making peace with Israel. It had now initiated a new policy of so-called preventive defence, under which it had begun a series of aggressive acts against his country. That policy had been started at a time when Ambassador Jarring was doing his best to promote an agreement between the parties for the establishment of a just and lasting peace. As a result, Israel was left with no choice but to act unilaterally in self-defence. Thus, the blowing up of the power station and the two bridges in upper Egypt, carefully avoiding populated areas and Egyptian troops, was meant to persuade the United Arab Republic to stop its flagrant violations of the cease-fire agreement.

213. The representative of the United States said that the latest violations of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector again showed that the parties, instead of complying with the Council's decisions, were engaged in their so-called policies of preventive defence and reprisal or retaliation. While the cease-fire was not in itself a substitute for peace, its scrupulous observance would strengthen the efforts of the Secretary- General's Special Representative to transform it into a just and lasting peace, in accordance with the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.

214. The representative of Algeria stated that the penetration so far west of the Suez Canal by the Israel commandos implied a grave threat to the safety of the Aswan Dam itself. He reiterated that the real problem of the Middle East was that of Palestine and of the occupied territories, and he urged the Council to tackle immediately the political problem created by the presence of Israel in the Middle East rather than concentrate upon the observance of a precarious cease-fire.

215. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the occupation of Arab lands by Israel was a constant source of tension and the main reason for new military incidents. The latest premeditated act of provocation by Israel against the United Arab Republic could not be justified, and it was the duty of the Council to condemn Israel and to demand its compliance with the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.

216. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the only way to break the vicious circle of violence in the Middle East was to make an urgent advance towards a political settlement. Since there was already an agreement on the purposes and principles on which a settlement in the area should be based, the Council must give every support to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in his talks with the Foreign Ministers of the parties concerned towards finding an agreed formula for the implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. It must also be remembered that while violence not only hampered progress towards a political settlement, its worst sufferers were mainly innocent people. The Council should not forget the civilian populations living in danger and in fear, and the more than 300,000 refugees in the hills of eastern Jordan who had homes to which they could return immediately. That should provide an added impetus for making progress towards a political settlement.

217. The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that, as he had said before, the real problem in the Middle East was the expulsion of the indigenous people of Palestine and the settling there of eastern European Jews, who sought to create a religious State under the banner of Zionism. More than 100 million Arabs, though they felt no hatred for the Jews as such, were nevertheless united in pressing for the rights of the Palestine refugees to their homeland and would not be intimidated by the announced intention of the United States Government to sell Phantom jets to Israel. The only solution to the problem was for the Zionists to relinquish the dream of gathering the Jews of the whole world into Palestine and to look forward instead to an era of brotherhood with the Arabs. The Security Council, instead of adopting resolutions which remained ineffective, should look towards a new approach and urge upon the Zionists to re-examine their presence in the Middle East.

218. At the Council's 1457th meeting, on 4 November, the representative of France stated that in view of the increasingly large-scale incidence of violence it would not be enough to protest against violations of the cease-fire or to increase the means of detecting its observance. Rather, it was necessary to remove the evil by its root by securing the full implementation of the Council's unanimous resolution of 22 November 1967. It was a matter of great regret to his delegation that the application of that resolution had not been accepted in equal fashion by both parties to the dispute, but he hoped that Israel would make an effort, comparable to that recently shown by the United Arab Republic, to facilitate the work of Ambassador Jarring, Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

219. The representative of the United Arab Republic stated that the arrogant admission by Israel of having deliberately bombed civilian targets in the United Arab Republic on the pretext of bringing home the necessity of the maintenance of the cease-fire was not only defiance of the Security Council but an ultimatum to the whole world. The protective defence measures undertaken by his country, on the other hand, were aimed at protecting the lives of citizens in the Suez Canal cities. The Israel forces stationed on the east side of the Suez Canal were systematically shelling civilian targets across the Canal. An unexploded Israel missile had been shown to the United Nations military observers at Port Tawfiq on 27 October 1968. Israel's lip service to the cease-fire resolution was but a subterfuge designed to obstruct the implementation of the resolution of 22 November 1967. Moreover, the cease-fire injunctions were only a first, though essential, step that was to be followed by the withdrawal of Israel forces from the occupied territories and the establishment of a just and peaceful settlement. On that basis the United Arab Republic, unlike Israel, had accepted and adhered to the Council's resolutions of 6 June and 22 November 1967.

220. The representative of Brazil stated that the recent acts of aggression and retaliation by the parties to the dispute signified a lack of will to compose differences and forgo violence. The authority and prestige of the Security Council had been challenged repeatedly, and therefore the current debate called for more than merely another stereotyped resolution. It was necessary to achieve implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 while the unanimity with which it had been adopted, particularly among the big Powers, still lasted. His delegation would again urge upon the major Powers the halting of the arms race in the Middle East and regretted that they had not exerted serious efforts to arrest it. The co-operation of the major Powers in that respect, as well as in securing an agreed implementation of the Council's resolution, was most essential.

221. The representative of Hungary stated that Israel, contrary to the principles of the Charter and to the Council's resolution 248 (1968), claimed the right of military reprisals whenever it felt or said that it had been wronged. Unfortunately, the Council had been prevented from taking effective measures by those members who had protected Israel from the application of Chapter VII of the Charter. Attempts were being made by Israel and its protectors to place Israel and the Arab victims of its aggression on an equal footing, with the objective of enabling Israel to maintain its occupation over the Arab territories. To use the cease-fire for such a purpose ran counter to the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Whatever military activities had occurred in the Middle East since June 1967 had taken place on Arab territory; Israel could not therefore claim to be defending itself. By its latest act, Israel had extended its aggression to targets deep in the territory of the United Arab Republic. Perhaps Israel's real aim was to sabotage the peace mission of Ambassador Jarring. If the Council wished to give support to that mission, it could not but condemn Israel's latest act of aggression.

222. The representative of Canada said that the recent series of incidents in the Suez Canal sector and inside the United Arab Republic had shown once again the precarious nature of the cease-fire. While the cease-fire was not meant to be a permanent solution, it was, nevertheless, important, because it provided for the abandonment of violence for the pursuit of peace. Its value clearly depended on strict observance, and neither party was entitled to interpret its arrangements to its own advantage. All violations of cease-fire must therefore be condemned, and each party bore full responsibility for the maintenance of the cease-fire. The repeated acts of violence further obstructed the achievement of a peaceful and accepted settlement and only resulted in frustration and further acts of hostility. In that respect, Canada endorsed the warning of the representative of Brazil regarding the dangers of an unlimited escalating arms race in the Middle East and hoped that efforts would be directed towards finding a solution of that problem. It must, however, be remembered that the parties themselves carried the main responsibility in the search for a peaceful settlement. The Secretary-General's Special Representative could assist them in that respect, but he needed their fullest co-operation.

223. The representative of Ethiopia said that the events of the last few weeks in the Middle East had dampened the hopes of the international community for peace-building in that troubled region at a time when such hopes had been enhanced by the provisions of the Council's resolution 258 (1968) and by the presence in New York of the two Foreign Ministers concerned and the Secretary-General's Special Representative. The Council should insist that no violation of the cease-fire and no military retaliation should be allowed to occur; otherwise a continued cycle of violence and counter-violence might lead inevitably to further escalation of the conflict. A basis for a solution of the problem had already been provided in the Council's resolution 242 (1967).

224. The representative of Israel stated that he regretted to inform the Council of another cease-fire violation. On 3 November two United Arab Republic aircraft had violated the cease-fire line in the Suez Canal sector, but they had been intercepted and had been driven back by Israel fighter aircraft. That violation plus the incident of 26 October pointed to the fact that the United Arab Republic was intensifying its aggressive policy and making it more difficult to make any advance towards peace in the area. Moreover, the United Arab Republic had not given any indication of willingness to conclude an agreement with Israel for a just and lasting peace, which was the central provision of the resolution of 22 November 1967.

225. The representative of Algeria reiterated that the substance of the problem in the Middle East was the recognition of the right of the people of Palestine to self- determination and their right to nationhood. Regarding the cease-fire, he said that, according to the experience of Algeria itself and of Viet-Nam, a cease-fire invariably emerged from a political settlement, and not vice versa, adding that if Algeria had fought alongside the United Arab Republic, it was because of a natural solidarity with fighters for national liberty within the context of Arab and African fellowship.

226. The representative of Saudi Arabia, referring to the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, said that Israel was not really interested in peace, because it was linking withdrawal from occupied Arab territory with a demand for bilateral peace talks, knowing quite well that no Arab country could talk about a bilateral treaty with Israel. The people of Palestine had as much right of survival as any other people, and the right to regain their homeland could not be denied to them.

227. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the efforts towards achieving a settlement in the Middle East had reached a critical stage and that if the Council were to fail in 1968 to give effect to its unanimous agreement reached in 1967, then 1969 would be the year of retribution, when hate, fear, hopelessness and the horror of another war might become a terrible certainty. Noting that the Foreign Ministers of the parties concerned were currently engaged in discussions, he suggested that the Council at that stage might adjourn.

228. Following a procedural discussion, the President announced that the Council would adjourn until 7 November; the Council, however, did not resume

consideration of the above complaints on its agenda.

(g) Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General on the

    observance of the cease-fire from 4 November 1968 to 15 July 1969

229.  During this period, although the Council did not meet to consider complaints relating to breaches of the cease-fire, there were numerous communications from Israel and the United Arab Republic, each accusing the other of violations of the cease-fire. In addition, frequent, at times daily, breaches of the cease-fire were reported by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and brought to the attention of the Council by the Secretary-General in the series "Supplemental Information" (S/7930/Addenda). These incidents comprised firing over the Canal, ranging from single rifle shots to large-scale heavy artillery, mortar, tank and rocket fire, overflights, aerial attack and the laying of mines in commando operations across the Canal. The Chief of Staff included in his reports summaries of inquiries conducted by United Nations military observers into individual incidents. The number and intensity of the incidents led the Secretary-General, in special reports in April (S/9171) and again in July (S/9316) to draw the Council's attention to the critical situation prevailing in the area and in a report of 2 May (S/9188), to express his concern at the threat to the observation of the cease-fire and the dangers to United Nations military observers and installations.

230. Below is a month-by-month indication of communications received from the parties and reports from the Chief of Staff:

231. During the month of November 1968, the Secretary-General circulated to the Security Council supplemental information from the Chief of Staff issued on 4, 27 and 29 November (S/7930/Add.101, Add.103 and Add.104) relating to an overflight, a mining incident and firing across the Canal.

232. During December the Council received a letter from Israel dated 16 December (S/8934) relating to incidents reported by observers in S/7930/Add.104 and Add.106 and supplementary information from the Chief of Staff issued on 11 December (S/7930/Add. 106) relating to firing of single shots across the Canal by United Arab Republic forces.

233. During the month of January 1969, the Council received a letter from Israel dated 25 January (S/8978) in which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel quoted from a reported statement by the President of the United Arab Republic in support of the "Palestinian resistance forces" and maintained that this statement, which must be regarded as official United Arab Republic policy, had disturbing implications for the maintenance of the cease-fire and the establishment of a just and lasting peace as called for by the Council's resolutions. In addition, supplemental information from the Chief of Staff issued on 2 and 26 January (S/7930/Add.109 and Add.111) related to firing on an Israel patrol and the presence of and firing on Israel motor gun boats on the Canal.

234. In February, the Council received three letters from Israel dated 5, 12 and 13 February (S/8994, S/9004 and S/9009), charging the United Arab Republic with waging terror warfare against Israel, repeated sniping attacks against Israel forces on the east bank of the Canal and the laying of mines at various points on the east bank. It also received a letter from the United Arab Republic dated 13 February (S/9008), in which the Minister for Foreign Affairs charged that Israel had refused to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and that its expansionist plans had been confirmed by statements of its leaders. Thirteen documents containing supplemental information from the Chief of Staff were issued on 5, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 February (S/7930/Add.112, Add.114-117, Add.119-120, Add.122-127) relating to numerous firing incidents with small arms, automatic weapons and machine guns, as well as inquiries into mining incidents.

235. During March, the Council received even letters from Israel dated 8, 9, 11, 13, 18 and 24 March (S/9057, S/9059, S/9062, S/9078, S/9093, S/9106 and S/9109), charging the United Arab Republic with large-scale attacks on those dates along a wide front, sometimes extending throughout the whole Canal sector. Algerian forces, it was charged, had participated in the attacks on 8 and 9 March (S/9076). On 13 March Israel replied (S/9077) to the United Arab Republic letter of 13 February (S/9008), rejecting its charges and stating that, on the contrary, it was the United Arab Republic which had a negative position on resolution 242 (1967), as had been revealed in statements by President Nasser as well as in the artillery, sniping and mining attacks recently carried out along the Suez Canal sector. The Council also received seven letters from the United Arab Republic dated 9, 11, 13, 18 and 24 March (S/9060, S/9061, S/9071, S/9072, S/9080, S/9092, S/9108), charging Israel with large-scale attacks on those dates and the shelling of cities and civilian installations on the west bank.

236. Seventeen documents were circulated by the Secretary-General containing supplemental information from the Chief of Staff issued on 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 24 and 26 March (S/7930/Add.128, Add.130-145) relating to firing incidents, overflights and, in particular, the large-scale incidents of 8, 9, 11, 13, 18 and 24 March.

237. Documents issued during the month of April included a letter from Israel dated 1 April (S/9124), charging that speeches by President Nasser on 27 and 30 March showed the policy of aggression being pursued by the United Arab Republic in disregard of the Charter and the Security Council resolutions, as well as a letter from the United Arab Republic dated 3 April (S/9130), rejecting those charges and stating that the cause of the deteriorating situation in the area was the refusal of Israel to implement United Nations resolutions.

238. The Council also received letters from Israel dated 4, 8, 9, 10, 14 and 21 April (S/9134, S/9140, S/9144, S/9147, S/9156 and S/9172), charging the United Arab Republic with large-scale artillery attacks, sniping, overflights and commando attacks across the Canal on 19 and 21 April.

239. During the same period, the Council received ten letters from the United Arab Republic, dated 4, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 21 and 25 April (S/9132, S/9143, S/9148, S/9152, S/9155, S/9157, S/9159, S/9165, S/9168, S/9178), charging Israel with large-scale artillery and tank-fire attacks, in particular, against cities and civilian installations on the west bank of the Canal, with overflights and with responsibility for the grave situation in the Suez Canal sector because of its expansionist policies and its refusal to implement the resolutions of the Security Council. The Council also received a cable dated 30 April (S/9186) from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, charging an Israel air attack on 29 April on civilian installations in the Naga Hammadi and Idfou areas, hundreds of miles away from the military front.

240. Also during April, the Secretary-General circulated thirty-three documents containing supplemental information from the Chief of Staff issued on 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29 and 30 April (S/7930/Add.147 and Corr.1, Add.148-151, Add.153-164, Add.165 and Corr.1 and Add.166-180), relating to continuous firing incidents, including the major incidents complained of by the parties, and reporting damage to United Nations installations.

241. On 21 April, the Secretary-General submitted a special report (S/9171) on the critical situation in the Suez Canal sector. The Secretary-General said that he felt it necessary to employ the unusual means of a special report from the Secretary-General to the Security Council to call most urgently to the attention of its members the prevailing situation in the Suez Canal sector which, in his view, was grave. After referring to the information submitted by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, the Secretary-General stated that it was clear that observance of the Security Council cease-fire resolutions had been degenerating steadily, particularly since 8 April 1969, and that there had been daily major breaches of the cease-fire for twelve successive days. In numerous instances, the exchange of fire had taken place along most of the length of the Canal. The weapons employed ranged from small arms to heavy mortars, rockets, tank fire and heavy artillery. The United Nations military observers, who were operating under great danger and difficulty, had exerted every effort to bring a quick end to the firing, but in each instance, not later than the following day, firing had erupted again. In those circumstances, the Secretary- General stated, the only conclusion that could be drawn was that the Security Council cease-fire had become almost totally ineffective in the Suez Canal sector and that a virtual state of active war existed there.

242. Referring to this report, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in a letter dated 8 May (S/9196), expressed satisfaction that the Secretary-General had brought that matter to the attention of the Security Council at an opportune moment. The deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, it was stated, which aroused grave concern, was caused by Israel's policy of frustrating the efforts towards a peaceful settlement as provided in the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. That same policy was evident in Israel's attitude towards the Four-Power consultations which could be an effective means of reaching a settlement on the basis of the Council's resolution. If the situation in the area was to be returned to normal, it was necessary that the Security Council resolution on the cease-fire be strictly observed.

243. In a reply dated 15 May (S/9209), Israel rejected the USSR charges as without foundation and stated that the responsibility of the United Arab Republic for the aggravation of this situation in the sector had been clearly shown in General Bull's reports.

244. On 2 May 1969, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report (S/9188), in which he stated that he was increasingly concerned about certain recent developments which threatened the effectiveness of the observation of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector. Those developments exposed United Nations military observers and other United Nations personnel to grave danger and caused heavy damage to United Nations installations, vehicles and equipment. In his report, the Secretary-General included texts of identical letters he had sent to the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic on 21 April, the replies of Israel, dated 23 April, and those of the United Arab Republic, dated 25 and 29 April, as well as the texts of further letters he had addressed to the parties on 1 May.

245. In his letters to the parties on 21 April, the Secretary-General had expressed his anxiety for the safety of the United Nations military observers and supporting Field Service personnel stationed in the Suez Canal sector and referred in this connexion to some of the damage caused to United Nations installations and vehicles in the twenty firing incidents between 8 March and 20 April. Referring to complaints by the Chief of Staff that United Nations installations and facilities, though clearly marked, had been repeatedly fired on by both sides and that United Nations observation posts on both sides of the Canal had been encroached on by military positions of the parties, he requested that instructions be issued urgently to the military forces of the parties to avoid actions which restricted the observation operation and endangered the lives of the United Nations personnel. He also requested that the construction of new shelters for United Nations personnel be completed as a matter of urgency.

246. Both of the parties in their replies gave assurances of their co-operation with General Bull and stated that they were taking the necessary steps, as requested by him, to expedite the construction of shelters for United Nations military observers. Each side blamed the other for the danger to United Nations personnel and damage to United Nations installations.

247. The Secretary-General, in his report, pointed out that since he had addressed his initial letter to the parties, daily exchanges of fire had taken place, encroachment on United Nations observation posts had continued and some of them had been hit. An observer had been wounded when his vehicle struck a mine, and the relief of observers had been delayed owing to continued firing. He endorsed proposals by the Chief of Staff that safe perimeters should be established around United Nations installations and that UNTSO should be provided with a United Nations craft to be used for the relief of United Nations personnel when relief by road was not possible.

248. In a letter dated 17 May (S/9213), referring to this report, Finland expressed appreciation of the Secretary-General's efforts to provide adequate protection to the United Nations military observers, took note of the statements by Israel and the United Arab Republic in response to the Secretary-General's appeal and expressed the hope that the arrangements initiated by the Secretary-General would ensure the effectiveness of UNTSO, which was an indispensable means for maintaining the cease-fire.

249. On 13 May the United Arab Republic informed the Secretary-General (S/9207) of the progress of the steps that had been taken by the United Arab Republic to eliminate the exposure of the observers to Israel fire and to ensure their safety.

250. On 27 June, Israel charged (S/9286) that the United Arab Republic authorities were continuing to obstruct Israel's efforts to assure the safety of United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector by firing on United Nations personnel, installations and vehicles, as evidenced by General Bull's reports, as well as on sites where shelters were under construction by United Nations and Israeli personnel, despite promises not to disrupt that work.

251. Also during May, two letters were received from Israel, dated 7 and 19 May (S/9194 and Corr.1 and S/9214), rejecting the charges contained in communications from the United Arab Republic of 25 and 30 April (S/9178 and S/9186) and of 13 and 15 May (S/9206 and S/9210), and stating that the United Arab Republic was responsible for maintaining tension in the area and initiating breaches of the cease-fire, while Israel had acted only in self-defence.

252. Three letters were received from the United Arab Republic, dated 1, 12 and 15 May (S/9189, S/9206 and S/9210), charging Israel with firing across the Canal, with attempts to cross the Canal and with systematic destruction of civil and economic installations in the area.

253. Every day during May, the Secretary-General received supplemental information from the Chief Staff, which was issued on 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 May (S/7930/Add.181-194, Add.195 and Corr.1, Add.197-209, Add.211, Add.213, Add.215-216), relating to daily incidents of firing across the Canal with weapons ranging from rifles through light and heavy machine-guns and artillery to mortar, tank and rocket fire, aerial activity and anti-aircraft fire, and incidents of firing on United Nations personnel and damage to their installations, as well as proposals for their relocation.

254. During the month of June, Israel addressed two letters to the Council, on 3 and 24 June (S/9254 and S/9278), containing charges that units of the armed forces of Kuwait stationed in the United Arab Republic were collaborating in armed attacks against Israel and that the Kuwaiti Government was assisting Arab terror warfare. On 16 June, Kuwait replied (S/9256) to those charges, asserting that its co-operation with the United Arab Republic was in full accord with Article 51 of the Charter and that its support for the Palestinian resistance movement stemmed from support of the legitimate right of the Palestine people to self-determination.

255. On 25 June, Israel complained (S/9283) that United Arab Republic forces had crossed the Canal and attacked an Israel position on 22/23 June, leaving behind the bodies of five Egyptian soldiers. Despite arrangements which had been made for the return of their bodies by United Nations and Red Cross representatives, their removal was prevented by Egyptian mortar fire.

256. During June also, the Secretary-General continued to circulate, on a daily basis, supplemental information from the Chief of Staff, issued on 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 30 June (S/7930/Add. 217-224, Add.226-242 and Add.244-249), relating to firing incidents in the sector involving small arms, artillery, machine-gun, mortar, tank and rocket fire, and incidents of firing on United Nations personnel and installations with damage to the latter, as well as relocation of some installations and efforts under way to relocate certain others.

257. On 11 July, the United Arab Republic transmitted (S/9325) a communication from a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross concerning difficulties encountered in retrieving the bodies of United Arab Republic soldiers killed on 23 June and charged that Israel authorities had left their bodies to deteriorate in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention.

258. Between 1 and 15 July 1969, the date of closure of this report, the Secretary- General circulated to the Security Council sixteen documents containing supplemental information provided by the Chief of Staff, issued on 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15 July (S/7930/Add.250-257, Add.259-264, Add.265 and Corr.1 and Add.266), relating to daily firing incidents in the Suez Canal sector, in which it was reported that weapons used had included rifles, machine-guns, artillery, mortars, tanks and rockets; aerial activity had included flights by light aircraft and Mirage aircraft, provoking anti-aircraft fire; and one incident, on 10 July, when twelve rubber boats, containing from six to eight men, had crossed from the west bank towards the east bank and had returned approximately one hour later, following which two United Arab Republic flags were observed on the east bank the next morning. On several occasions the reports included information concerning incidents of firing by rifles and machine-guns, and once by mortars, at United Nations personnel and installations, with occasional damage being reported.

259. In a special report dated 5 July (S/9316) the Secretary-General, after recalling his special report of 21 April (S/9171), stated that although there had been some reduction in violence in the Suez Canal sector during the last two weeks of May and the first week of June, the observance of the cease-fire had again deteriorated in the second week of June, with exchanges of heavy-weapons fire initiated almost daily, especially from the west side of the Canal, as reported to the Security Council in the supplemental information reports of the S/7930 series, which had covered firing on eighty-six consecutive days as of 5 July. The fact that many of those activities had been announced by the parties themselves implied a tacit recognition by them that the cease-fire, to all practical intents and purposes, had ceased to be respected in the Suez Canal sector. The Secretary-General, referring also to his report of 2 May (S/9188), in which he had expressed his concern about the danger to which United Nations military observers and installations had been exposed, stated that that risk had increased in the past two weeks. The military observers, although carrying out their duties with a devotion worthy of the highest praise, were doing so under conditions of continuous danger. Messages had been sent by UNTSO to the authorities of the United Arab Republic and, on occasion as necessary, to Israel concerning incidents of firing on United Nations personnel and United Nations observation posts and equipment, but without any noticeable effect. In the month of June alone, there had been twenty-one reported incidents of firing by United Arab Republic forces and five by Israel forces on United Nations personnel or installations. After recalling that the observers were unarmed men doing their best under extraordinary stress and strain to fulfil the task assigned to them by the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that they could not be expected

to serve as what amounted to defenceless targets in a shooting gallery. If they continued to be fired upon, the Secretary-General added, he would have to advise the Council on the future course of action, including even the possibility of withdrawal of the observers.

260. The Secretary-General said that the conclusion was inescapable that throughout the Suez Canal sector open warfare had been resumed. Experience showed that it was virtually impossible to ensure effective observance of a cease-fire for a prolonged and indefinite period in a situation where two hostile forces constantly confronted each other across a narrow no man's land, with one party in military occupation of territory belonging to the other and with no early prospect of the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967.

261. After referring to the worsening situation also in the Israel-Jordan sector, the Secretary-General stated that the level of violence in the Middle East since 1967 had never been higher than it was at the time of his report. He was bringing that situation to the attention of the Security Council fully aware that as Secretary-General he had been unable to improve it, and because if it continued, the situation could soon render vain efforts towards a peaceful settlement and could even be the overture to more general intensive hostilities in the Middle East.

262. The Secretary-General then appealed to all parties in the Middle East to end immediately all offensive military actions, particularly those taking place daily in the Suez Canal sector, and return to observance of the Security Council cease-fire in order to avoid frustrating current efforts to restore peace in the Middle East. He also appealed to the members of the Security Council and to all Members of the United Nations to exert all influence and to take all measures which might be helpful in making the cease-fire effective and the peace efforts successful in the vital interest of the whole world.

263. In a letter dated 10 July (S/9321), the United Arab Republic stated that the full responsibility for the deterioration in the situation, to which attention had been called in the Secretary-General's report, lay with Israel. The Security Council had called for a cease-fire as a first step, and in a second resolution had called upon Israel to withdraw its forces from the occupied territories and had provided for a peaceful settlement. By refusing to accept and implement this resolution and other United Nations resolutions, Israel was obstructing the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement and was therefore responsible for the prevailing state of tension in the area. For its part, the United Arab Republic had exerted all efforts for the success of Ambassador Jarring's mission, had accepted the Security Council's resolution 242 (1967) and had co-operated with the United Nations Command to ensure the safety of the observers in the Suez Canal sector.

264. In a letter dated 11 July (S/9322), Israel stated that it had accepted the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions in June 1967 and had at all times been prepared to adhere to them scrupulously on a reciprocal basis. However, if armed attacks were made across the cease-fire lines from the territory of Arab States, whether by regular or irregular forces, Israel had to take appropriate self-defence measures. It was clear that the responsibility lay with the Arab States; the United Arab Republic was openly proclaiming a policy of initiating fire and of raiding across the Suez Canal,

and the activities of terrorist groups were openly supported by Arab Governments and armies. There were almost daily cases of firing by United Arab

Republic troops at United Nations observers and installations. There was full agreement and co-operation between the Israel military authorities and the United Nations cease-fire machinery for the protection of United Nations personnel on the Israel side; Israel forces were under strict orders to avoid any harm to United Nations observers or installations, and where posts on the Egyptian side might have been hit by shell fragments, that had been an unavoidable result of return fire at Egyptian positions.

3.  COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND LEBANON

(a) Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General on the observance

of the cease-fire between 16 July and 26 December 1968 and requests for a meeting

265. In a letter dated 28 October (S/8872), Lebanon complained that on the night of 26/27 October, Israel forces had shelled the Lebanese village of Almajydiah, and, in a letter dated 29 October (S/8874), further complained that on 28 October, Israel forces had shelled two border positions.

266. With regard to the first of these complaints, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported in supplemental information issued on 28 October (S/7930/Add.96) that in an inquiry into the incident, United Nations military observers had found blood-stains, craters, holes in the roofs of houses and dead livestock. In a subsequent report issued on 31 October (S/7930/Add.98), the Chief of Staff summarized the results of three inquiries into a further Lebanese complaint that on 28/29 October mortar fire had been directed towards the areas of Nabi el Oueida, Houle and Blida; observers had seen craters and mortar tailfins with markings in Hebrew.

267. In its reply of 6 November (S/8891), Israel stated that the cease-fire had been first violated from the Lebanese side and that Israel had had to take appropriate defensive measures.

268. In a letter dated 29 December (S/8945), Lebanon requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider an act of aggression committed by the Israel Air Force against Lebanon by the attack on the Civilian International Airport of Beirut on 28 December 1968, for which, the letter added, the Israel authorities had admitted their responsibility.

269. In a letter of the same date (S/8946), Israel also requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the constant violation by Lebanon of the United Nations Charter and the Council's cease-fire resolutions by assisting and abetting acts of warfare, violence and terror by irregular forces and organizations operating from Lebanon against Israel, particularly against Israel civil aviation.

(b)  Consideration at the 1460th to 1462nd meetings (29 to 31 December 1968)

270. At the 1460th meeting, held on 29 December, the Security Council adopted, without objection, an agenda which listed the letter of 29 December from Lebanon (S/8945) under the general heading of "The situation in the Middle East", followed by the letter of 29 December from Israel (S/8946), again under the same general heading.

271. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that while his delegation had not formally objected to the adoption of the agenda, it reserved its right to come back to that matter, as the second item on the agenda had no direct relationship to the situation in the Middle East, inasmuch as the events had taken place in Athens.

272. The representative of Canada stated that his delegation would wish to have the assurance from the President that, in adopting the agenda, members of the Council had done so without prejudice to the positions they or the parties concerned might take on the substance.

273. The President said that it was his understanding that in their statements members of the Council could refer to any part of the agenda as it stood.

274. The representatives of Lebanon and Israel and, subsequently, of Saudi Arabia, were invited, at their request, to participate without vote in the discussion.

275. The President drew the attention of members of the Council to information relating to the question received from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO and contained in documents S/7930/Add.107 and Add.108.

276. The first report, issued on 29 December (S/7930/Add.107), stated that on that morning the Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission had received a complaint from the Lebanese delegation that on the previous evening Israel heliborne troops had destroyed thirteen civilian aircraft at the Beirut International Airport. An immediate inquiry had been requested and was being conducted. The report added that in discussion with the Chief Operations Officer of UNTSO, the Assistant Israel Liaison Officer had stated that fourteen aircraft had been destroyed or damaged. The second report (S/7930/Add.108), containing the summary of inquiry, stated that eleven witnesses had been interrogated, who provided an account of the attack at the Beirut International Airport, the physical damage caused and injury to one of the personnel at the airport. The United Nations military observers had seen thirteen destroyed aircraft, damage to the main terminal building, explosive charges and a grenade with Hebrew markings.

277. The representative of Lebanon said that his country and people, which had always been ardent supporters of the principles and purposes of the Charter, had become the latest victim of Israel's aggression on 28 December 1968. The defenceless Civilian International Airport of Beirut had become a target of Israel's aggressive designs. Units of the Israel Air Force had staged a surprise and treacherous attack on its installations and on civilian aircraft which had been in the hangars and on the ground of the airport. The airplanes destroyed in that attack constituted the main portion of Lebanon's civilian aircraft fleet. Hangars, repair shops and fuel depots were also hit and destroyed. The buildings of the air terminal also suffered extensive damage. The aggressive act committed against Lebanon was a flagrant violation of the principles and objectives of the Charter. The Security Council should go beyond the usual condemnatory resolutions and take effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Lebanese Government would, at a later stage, after having fully assessed the damage suffered, request the Council to take the necessary measures against Israel in order to compensate Lebanon fully for such damages.

278. The representative of Israel stated that on 26 December an Israel civil airliner, en route to New York on a regular, scheduled commercial flight, had been attacked by bombs and machine-guns at the Athens International Airport. The assailants had come from Beirut. They had opened fire indiscriminately with sub-machine-guns against the passengers and the crew, killing one passenger.

279. Speaking on a point of order, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the representative of Israel was involving the Security Council in the consideration of events which had taken place in Athens and related to the sovereignty and competence of the Greek Government. In dealing with that matter, the Greek Government had not appealed to the Security Council. The question before the Council related to a completely different matter arising out of Israel's aggression against a peaceful country, Lebanon.

280. The representative of Israel, resuming his statement, stated that it was in Beirut that the major Arab terrorist organizations had established their headquarters and had set up their international networks; by permitting them to do so, the Lebanese Government had assumed responsibility for their activities. Lebanon had, however, undertaken obligations towards Israel under the Security Council cease-fire resolution, and any attack against an Israel civil aircraft, wherever it might be, was as much a violation of the cease-fire as any attack on Israel territory and entitled the Israel Government to exercise its right of self-defence. Two attacks on Israel aircraft within the last year by the same commando group based in Beirut showed that the objective was to disrupt Israel civil aviation. On 28 December a commando unit of the Israel defence forces had landed at Beirut airport and had struck at a number of aircraft belonging to Arab airlines parked in the airport. There was no loss of life. The action was taken to uphold Israel's basic right to free navigation in international skies. The complaint had to be seen in the broader context of the continuation by the Arab States of active warfare against Israel through irregular forces, armed, trained and financed by them. The activities of the terrorist organizations seriously undermined the patient efforts of Ambassador Jarring towards a settlement. Israel hoped that the Security Council would clearly indicate that it could no longer tolerate the continuation of warfare under the guise of terrorist activities and would demand from the Arab States, including Lebanon, full adherence to their obligations under the Charter and the cease-fire.

281. The representative of the United States said that the Council was meeting to deal with a most regrettable Israel action which his Government strongly condemned. It shared the concern of Israel over the increasing interference with the right of unimpeded air travel between States, but felt the Israel action of 28 December was unjustified. It saw no justification for retaliation of any kind against Lebanon. Lebanon was a country which clearly had been doing its best to live in peace with all other States in the area. Furthermore, such a military attack upon an international airport was an unacceptable form of international behaviour. In magnitude it was entirely disproportionate to the act which had preceded it. It was disproportionate in two ways: first, in the degree of destruction involved; secondly, in a more fundamental way, in the difference between the acts of two individual terrorists and those of a sizable military force operating openly and directly under Government orders. The attack on the Civilian International Airport of Beirut had introduced new dangers into the already alarming situation in the Middle East. The Security Council and every Member of the United Nations owed it to itself to help break the pattern of violence in the Middle East. For its part the United States was prepared to support prompt action by the Security Council to condemn the latest Israel action.

282. The representative of the United Kingdom emphasized the profound concern of his Government at the action of the Israel Government in sending forces to commit dangerous and deplorable acts of violence at the Beirut International Airport. The Council must necessarily look at events not in a vacuum but against the background of past violence in the context of the situation in the Middle East. The Council could not ignore the dangers to peaceful international air travel posed by such acts as the hijacking of aircraft and the machine-gunning at Athens airport. However, the scale and intensity of the Israel action stood out exceptionally, even against that sombre background, involving as it did the traditionally peace-loving Lebanon. The events of 28 December were also a setback to efforts for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East situation.

283. The representative of France expressed serious concern over the Israel raid and especially regretted that the Israel attack was directed against a country which had always shown respect for the principles of the Charter. On many previous occasions the French delegation had stated that the very idea of reprisals was unacceptable. From that point of view the raid of 28 December was inadmissible and therefore deserved condemnation. A satisfactory settlement could result only from putting into effect the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. Joint action by Member States, and especially those with particular responsibility, was now indispensable and urgent.

284. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the Israel military action against Lebanon represented a very serious violation of the Security Council cease-fire decision. The new aggressive act by Israel could not be justified in any way and could be regarded only as the expression of a pre-planned decision to create further complications in order to undermine the United Nations efforts, in particular those of Ambassador Jarring, to achieve a political settlement. In spite of the fact that Israel's responsibility for the attack on the Beirut Airport was clearly established, certain representatives, and particularly the representative of the United States, had attempted to put the aggressor and its victim on the same level. Counting on the moral and political support of certain circles in the West, the Israel extremists were broadening their aggression and threatening international peace. The Security Council must first of all condemn in the most decisive manner the criminal military adventure of Israel directed against Lebanon and take appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, in order to force Israel to respect the Security Council and the General Assembly decisions and the Charter of the United Nations.

285. The representative of India said that from all information available to the Council it was clear beyond any doubt that the Israel military action against the International Airport at Beirut was unprovoked, unnecessary and a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. It was the duty of the Council to condemn it and to take suitable measures under the relevant provisions of the Charter to prevent the repetition of such acts. At the same time the Council should demand of Israel the payment of compensation to Lebanon for the damage caused in the action. The incidents in occupied Arab territories of individual acts against Israel property had been cited as justification for the recent recrudescence of tensions. While his delegation deplored all violent incidents leading to loss of life and property, it could not, however, accept that those incidents could justify in any way the massive attacks launched by Israel on Arab civilian property. That action was a serious set-back to the achievement of a political settlement.

286. The representative of Hungary stated that while the complaint of Lebanon clearly belonged within the competence of the Security Council, Israel's letter was meant to be a pretext to justify its aggressive policy. By its attacks against civilian installations, Israel aimed at terrorizing the civilian population and undermining the economy of the Arab States. All States should exert their influence to have the Government of Israel discontinue the series of deliberate destructive acts committed against its neighbours and compensate the victims for the losses suffered. The Hungarian delegation was strongly convinced that it was time to take resolute action against Israel and it would, therefore, co-operate with other members of the Security Council in considering the application of the measures as envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter.

287. The representative of Algeria stated that his delegation had accepted the agenda to facilitate consideration of the Lebanese complaint. It considered that the Israel complaint did not fall within the purview of the Council. Israel's act of aggression had been carefully premeditated and undertaken in defiance of the international community. That behaviour stemmed from the encouragement and assistance which Israel was receiving from certain major Powers as shown by the recent decision of the United States to supply Israel with modern fighter planes, which, in the light of the events in Beirut, had sinister implications in the eyes of Arab countries and world public opinion. Peace in the area would become a reality only when solutions were found which took into account the vital interests of the Palestinian people. In view of the latest act of aggression by Israel, his delegation believed that the Security Council must unequivocally condemn it and must see to it that, in addition to necessary compensation, effective measures were taken under Chapter VII of the Charter to put an end to the policy of systematic aggression pursued by Israel.

288. The representative of Senegal said that the raid on the Beirut Airport by Israel troops, which had been interpreted as an act of reprisal, had caused concern in the world and had contributed to increased tension in the area. Such acts made the prospect for peace even more remote. They damaged the efforts of Ambassador Jarring to find a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Senegal condemned all acts of reprisal, including the recent attack against Lebanon. In view of the increase in acts of violence, the Security Council must agree to achieve the implementation of its resolution of 22 November 1967.

289. The representative of Brazil stated that the unjustifiable and premeditated attack by Israel against the Civilian Airport of Lebanon had clearly shown how close the situation was to open warfare. The authority and prestige of the Security Council had been challenged. His delegation wished to reiterate its conviction that such violent acts as that under consideration by the Council should not be ignored. It was imperative that the Security Council should act promptly by discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Brazil would be prepared to join in any effort to uphold the authority of the Council under the Charter.

290. At the 1461st meeting on 30 December, the representative of Lebanon stated that the Armistice Agreements and the Council's cease-fire decisions had always been scrupulously respected by his country. From the point of view of international law, a State could not be held responsible for acts committed by inhabitants of the State acting outside its territory on their own initiative. In that respect, the attitude of Israel itself could be cited when Argentina had submitted its complaint to the Security Council concerning the Eichmann case. Moreover, the persons responsible for the Athens airport incident were Palestinians, who had come to Beirut only two days before the Athens operation. After having committed a premeditated act of aggression, Israel had sought to justify it by submitting a contrived complaint of its own against Lebanon, a complaint which it had not filed at the time the incident occurred. Lebanon, however, could not be held responsible for acts of Palestinians whose intentions were not known to it and who, being refugees as a result of Israel action, held strong feelings for their cause. The representative concluded by quoting the diplomatic note which had been sent by the President of the Republic of Lebanon to certain States.

291. The representative of Denmark said that his Government deplored all violent incidents arising out of the conflict in the Middle East and condemned the Israel attack on the Beirut International Airport, which was particularly deplorable, as it extended the area of conflict to Lebanon, a country which had stood for moderation. Israel should instead have brought promptly to the United Nations the act of terror committed against its aircraft at Athens on 26 December. He expressed the hope that the parties would come to realize that the best promise for peace in the area lay through co-operation with Ambassador Jarring.

292. The representative of Canada said that the Israel attack was unprecedented and out of proportion to any provocation offered. It seriously risked bringing about a rise in tension and further violent incidents in the Middle East. That kind of reprisal must be regarded with deep concern by all countries upholding the rights of persons to use civil air carriers to move safely from one place to another. He appealed to the parties concerned to make a renewed and determined effort to break out of the vicious cycle of violence and work for a settlement on the basis of the provisions and principles of resolution 242 (1967).

293. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government strongly condemned the attack on the Beirut Airport, just as it deplored all violations of existing cease-fire arrangements. It regarded the attack in Beirut as particularly reprehensible. The Security Council could not accept or condone acquisition of territory by conquest. Any suggestion that Israel must be subject to continuous violence and intimidation was equally unacceptable. The Council had thus declared the twin principles of withdrawal and security. It had also declared other purposes, among which was included a just settlement of the refugee problem and the freedom of passage through international waterways to all shipping without exception. Those principles and purposes had been repeatedly endorsed, particularly by the four permanent members of the Security Council. Unfortunately, because of mistrust and bitterness between the two sides, those approved principles and purposes had not yet been implemented. It was therefore necessary that, instead of violence, which created further mistrust and fear, the two sides should declare, without any reservation, their readiness to implement the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, permit the new refugees to return to their homes without delay and begin negotiations through the Secretary-General's Special Representative.

294. The representative of China said that the Council had been told that the military action taken by Israel was in the nature of a retaliation provoked by an attack on an Israel aircraft in Athens on 26 December and the previous hijacking of another Israel airliner. It seemed to his delegation that the massive, destructive foray into a centre of international transportation could not be justified under the circumstances. To deal an

unwarranted blow to a country which had hitherto shown itself to be moderate and restrained in its attitude towards Israel must cause universal concern. No Government, even under extreme provocation, should take the law into its own hands. His delegation was prepared to support prompt, effective and just action by the Council for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the Middle East.

295. The representative of Pakistan said that in the current situation, resulting from Israel's latest act of aggression at the Civilian International Airport of Beirut, there seemed to exist no doubt among the members of the Council that the Council's authority should be reasserted and that it should act promptly and speedily. It had been established during the debate, first, that the Israel attack called for condemnation by the Security Council in the most unmistakable terms; secondly, that the occurrence of a certain act at the Athens airport on 26 December not only was irrelevant to the current debate but was outside the purview of the Security Council; thirdly, that the Security Council was confronted with the worsening of the crisis in the Middle East as a result of the repetition of the acts of belligerency and the inclusion in the area of conflict of the defenceless State of Lebanon. Considering these factors, the Council, if it were to reassert its authority, must put responsibility on Israel to make reparation for the damages which it had caused to Lebanon. Every act and every declaration of policy by Israel aggravated the indignation felt by the Arab Governments and peoples at the continued occupation of their territories. The chances of a peaceful settlement could not be promoted unless that indignation was assuaged. For the Council to arrest the trend towards another war, it was essential that a balance be introduced into the situation by the imposition of some element of restraint on Israel's reckless course. The Pakistan delegation was also convinced that there was a need for the permanent members of the Security Council to concert their efforts for peace in the Middle East. It was their concerted action alone which could bring about the conditions necessary for the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). What was further required was a re-examination of the policies pursued so far in order to show an awareness of the sense of outrage suffered by the Arab peoples over the historic injustice inflicted upon them.

296. The representative of Paraguay said that his delegation had never hesitated to condemn premeditated military activities carried out in the territory of another sovereign State. Although attempts had been made to justify them by using the term "reprisals", the unprecedented attack carried out by the elements of the Israel Air Force against the Civilian International Airport of Beirut was most reprehensible. The situation in the Middle East being very grave and tense, it was necessary that individual and collective efforts be carried out in an effort to establish in the entire area a just and lasting peace. His delegation could support efforts towards a unanimous resolution reflecting the universal concern and anxiety in order to avoid a repetition of incidents similar to that before the Council.

297. The representative of Israel stated that the attackers of the El-Al aircraft in Athens had testified that they were Lebanese and had lived in the city of Tripoli. Both were members of the Palestine Liberation Front, which was the first to announce the execution of the Athens attack. The encouragement and the complicity of the Lebanese Government was no doubt accountable for the rapid expansion of that Front's activities. The attention of the Lebanese Government had been drawn on numerous occasions to the activities of the terror organizations within its borders. That Government, however, had not only continued to condone those activities but had publicly identified itself with them. Israel was determined to defend itself against attack, whether by regular or irregular forces; peace could not be attained if warfare continued while the Arab States disclaimed responsibility for it.

298. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the latest Israel armed provocations against the United Arab Republic, Jordan and now Lebanon, represented a new stage in Israel's aggressive policy directed against the neighbouring Arab States. The fact that the Government of Israel had officially declared that it had conducted a raid against the Beirut Airport simply proved that Israel's practice of reprisal and military provocation had now been raised to the level of the official policy of the Government of Israel. Modern international law ruled out the policy of military reprisals by States. Even before the Charter of the United Nations was adopted, international law recognized that it was absolutely inadmissible to carry out reprisals as a response to actions taken by individuals. The question of putting a stop to Israel's aggression depended very much on the position of the United States. It might contribute greatly to achieving a political settlement in the Middle East if the United States, eschewing lip-service and verbal condemnation, would use the possibilities that it had at its disposal, jointly with the Security Council and with other States, to bring the necessary pressure to bear on Israel. The United Kingdom could also take measures that would have a definite impact on the Government of Israel. For its part, the Soviet Union considered that the Council was now required to condemn Israel and, as indicated in resolution 248 (1968), to adopt in regard to Israel "the further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter".

299.  The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that the Charter was quite explicit about measures to be taken against aggression. Chapter VII of the Charter spoke of sanctions. One would like to know if the United States would be willing to apply sanctions if Israel would not offer reparations and an apology to Lebanon. He then recalled that he had already warned the Council that the question of Palestine was no longer one between the Arab States and Israel but, indeed, between the Palestinian people and those who had robbed them of their homeland.

300. The representative of Israel, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, charged that it was the Soviet Union which by its unreserved support of Arab intransigence and belligerency and its encouragement to Arab terror warfare against Israel had made the attainment of peace in the Middle East more difficult.

301.  At the 1462nd meeting of the Council on 31 December, the President stated that after intensive consultations, the members of the Council had been able to reach agreement on the text of the following draft resolution:

"The Security Council,

Decision: At the 1462nd meeting on 31 December 1968 the draft resolution was adopted unanimously as resolution 262 (1968).

302. The representative of Canada said that in supporting the resolution his delegation wished to emphasize that the Israel attack had taken place against a background of growing violence throughout the area. Neither that incident nor other incidents could be taken out of context, because otherwise they would be inexplicable. The incidents at the Athens and Beirut airports must be understood as expressions of extreme feelings of frustration and anger provoked by a state of mutual hostility. There would be no peace unless both sides felt free to develop their national life free from violence.

303. The representative of Brazil said that his delegation was gratified that the Council had adopted a clear indication of a firm purpose to deal with threats to peace in the Middle East. Brazil did not condone such violent acts as that at Athens airport, but no responsibility, direct or indirect, of the Lebanese Government had been established in that connexion. To bring permanent peace to the area, the Council should strive towards a definite political settlement on the basis of its resolution 242 (1967) and should do its utmost to check the arms escalation which was daily building up there.

304. The representative of Denmark stated that his Government, which deplored any and all violent incidents, would have preferred the Council to deal more directly with the act of terror committed against the Israel civil aircraft in Athens on 26 December. However, the last preambular paragraph of the resolution adopted by the Council should leave no doubt that the Council insisted that all undue interference with international civil air traffic be henceforth discontinued.

305. The representative of France said that the Israel attack against the Beirut International Airport was an obvious violation of the Council's resolutions, which was all the more serious as it had not been provoked by Lebanese action. While the events at the Athens airport were regrettable, the direct responsibility of the Lebanese Government had not been established. Israel's premeditated aggression struck a blow against a country which had always shown respect for the principles of the Charter and extended de facto warfare to a region that had up to then been spared. The resolution just adopted was the logical result of debates in which his delegation had been happy to note the emergence of certain common views on the necessity of concerted action by permanent members of the Security Council towards the achievement of a settlement of the Middle East conflict.

306. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Council must deplore all acts of violence and all violations of the cease-fire wherever they occurred, and, in particular, must be concerned at the new trend of threats to the safety of international civil air traffic. The pattern of violence emerged from the fundamental, unsolved problems of the Middle East. The Charter laid on all Members the duty to bring about by peaceful means the settlement of dangerous situations.

307. The representative of Hungary stated that the resolution adopted by the Council did not fully meet the requirements of the dangerous situation. Some members of the Council, while condemning Israel, were not prepared to take the logical step of applying sanctions as envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter. It was hoped that those members who considered the current resolution as adequate would use their influence with Israel to secure its compliance.

308. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation had already pointed out that Israel's attempt to describe its attack at Beirut as a "response" was futile. From the point of view of modern international law, reprisals as a means of self-defence against illegal action taken by another State would be admissible only if conducted within a very limited scope and without the use of armed force. Moreover, no evidence had been given of Lebanon's responsibility for the attack against the Israel airplane at the Athens airport. That attack had been carried out by citizens of a third State on the territory of yet another State, and under international law a State could be held responsible only for acts of its own citizens or armed forces. In violation of international law, the United Nations Charter and the Armistice Agreement, Israel had invaded Lebanese air space. After stating that the new act of aggression by Israel had aroused indignation everywhere, he read out a communication from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic on that subject. In the circumstances a much more clear-cut decision by the Council was needed, making provisions for measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. The resolution adopted by the Council might produce some useful results only if all members of the Council, particularly its permanent members, took all necessary measures to prevent a repetition of Israel's aggressive acts. Unfortunately, certain members of the Security Council, including certain permanent members, while condemning Israel's aggression in statements, had failed to demonstrate their will to proceed from words to deeds.

309. The representative of Algeria said that in a message to the Secretary-General, the Foreign Minister of his country, after condemning Israel's aggression, had stated that it gave additional proof of Israel's despair at the increasing success of the Palestinian patriots in their legitimate struggle to regain their homeland. No State could be held responsible for their acts. He added that Israel, in violation of all international tenets, had attacked Lebanon, and the Council would have been well within its competence to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter. The resolution adopted by the Council, although falling short of that requirement, had been supported by his delegation because it condemned Israel unequivocally, stressed the rights of Lebanon to compensation and issued a warning to Israel.

310. The representative of the United States said that his delegation wished to disassociate itself from the sweeping denunciations of Israel's alleged policies and acts, having nothing to do with the episodes properly before the Council. The Council was not being asked to pronounce its judgement on all issues of the Arab-Israel conflict. The resolution did not entirely suit his delegation. Despite differences over language or substance, however, it supported the resolution and endorsed its condemnation of the action against the Beirut Airport in accordance with his Government's initial response to the operation. His Government believed that the United Nations should be in the forefront of an effort to perfect new rules of international law that would give to the civilian airports of the world a special status, providing for appropriate examination of every situation in which that status was disregarded. He stated that it had been alleged that his Government, in supporting the resolution, had exhibited inconsistency. It should be noted that the policies of his Government were governed by principles on which friends sometimes disagreed. The United States Government was ready at any time to discuss measures to limit the flow of arms into the Middle East.

311. The representative of Senegal stated that his delegation's support was based upon its firm conviction that force should not be used to resolve international disputes. It also believed that Israel's attack against the Beirut Airport would only extend the zone of conflict.

312. The representative of Paraguay said that his delegation had voted in favour of the resolution, hoping that it would impress upon the parties the need of scrupulous respect for the cease-fire, thus facilitating the creation of an atmosphere for the success of the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jarring. Moreover, the last preambular paragraph of the resolution reflected the deep concern of the Council regarding the need to ensure free and uninterrupted international civil air traffic.

313. The representative of Israel said that by ignoring the fundamental principles of the United Nations, equality of all Member States, the resolution adopted by the Council was contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter and was, therefore, not applicable. The resolution reflected the moral, political and juridical bankruptcy of the Security Council in respect of the Middle East situation. It was not the Security Council resolution but the attitude and actions of the Governments in the area that would determine the destiny of that area. Israel's action in Beirut, taken in defence of its rights, should make the Arab Governments understand the depth of Israel's determination to ensure its right to peace and security. When the Arab States realized that determination, there would be peace in the Middle East.

314. The representative of Saudi Arabia congratulated the Council on reaching in such a short time unanimous agreement on a resolution condemning the Israel attack on Beirut Airport. However, Israel had been condemned in the Council many times without any effect. The right of the Palestinian people to survive and to return to their homeland should not be forgotten; it was they who would resolve the question, and they would be supported by every Arab.

315. The representative of Lebanon stated that the Council had hesitated to order the application of Chapter VII of the Charter, which was a logical step to take in the light of its discussions. Israel, which had deliberately attacked the Beirut Airport, aware that it was violating international law, the Armistice Agreements and the cease-fire decision, was not likely to heed the Council's warning. Lebanon, however, hoped that the Council, in the future, would respond to Israel's acts of aggression by sanctions; otherwise paragraph 3 of the resolution would be futile.

316. The President, at the conclusion of the debate, stated that by virtue of their great power and the responsibility given to them under the Charter, the permanent members of the Council had a special role to play in the maintenance of international peace and security and, therefore, periodic meetings of the four permanent members, as suggested at the beginning of the twenty-third session of the General Assembly by the Secretary-General, and as recently called for by France, would enhance the effectiveness of the Organization in that respect. The Middle East, he added, could perhaps be the first of the problems on which such consultations could be conducted profitably, since in that particular case all four permanent members had supported the Council's resolution 242 (1967).

(c) Communications to the Council from 1 January to 15 July 1969

317. In supplemental information issued on 4 January 1969 (S/7930/Add.110), the Acting Chief of Staff transmitted a report of an inquiry into a Lebanese complaint that during the night of 2-3 January, mortar and artillery shells had been fired on two occasions from Israel territory against four Arab villages in Lebanon. United Nations military observers had interviewed three witnesses and had seen physical evidence of mortar impacts and two broken telephone wires but had found no evidence of artillery shelling or casualties.

318. In a letter dated 22 February (S/9023), Lebanon complained that on the previous day Israel military planes had violated Lebanese air space on twelve occasions, sometimes in groups of two or four. Lebanese anti-aircraft artillery and Air Force units had taken action against the intruders. The Lebanese representative stated that the action should be viewed in the light of Israel's repeated threats against Lebanon, its efforts to implicate Lebanon in the incidents at the Zurich and Athens airports and other unjustified and unprovoked acts which revealed Israel's aggressive designs against Lebanon. In supplemental information issued on 24 February (S/7930/Add.121), the Chief of Staff reported complaints from the Lebanese authorities of overflights by two Mirage-type jet aircraft on 21 February. Aircraft had been seen by a United Nations military observer.

4.  COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND SYRIA

Communications to the Council and reports of the Secretary-General on the observance of the cease-fire from 16 July 1968 to 15 July 1969

319. In supplemental information issued on 3 and 4 September 1968 (S/7930/Add.75 and Add.77), the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported on two firings incidents which took place on 30 August and 2 September in which fire had been initiated by Israel. A Syrian complaint regarding the incident of 2 September, which stated that two Syrian soldiers had been killed and one wounded, had at first requested an inquiry, but later that request was cancelled. In a letter dated 5 September (S/8804), Israel, referring to these incidents, stated that the Syrians had approached the Israel cease-fire line across the no man's land and had been fired on, and that other recent incursions in the area for mine-laying and sabotage purposes had shown the need for vigilance on the part of the Israel forces. The refusal of the Syrian authorities to allow United Nations military observers access to the place of the incident showed Syrian responsibility for violation of the cease-fire.

320. Further firing incidents were reported on 13 and 14 September (S/7930/Add.84-85 and Add.87), in which fire was initiated from the Israel side and returned by Syria.

321. In supplemental information issued on 9 October (S/7930/Add.93), the Chief of Staff reported on two further firing incidents on 5 October. The first report concerned a Syrian complaint that Israel military positions had opened fire across the Israel cease- fire position, killing one woman. In the inquiry by United Nations military observers into the incident, observers reported hearing one shot, and Syrian witnesses stated that the woman had been picking grapes in an area considered by the local villagers to be east of the Syrian cease-fire position. In the second incident, Syria had complained that two Syrian soldiers forming part of a routine patrol had been shot when they lost their way and ran into an Israel ambush. Israel had complained that three Syrian soldiers had penetrated into Israel-held territory in the Golan Heights and opened fire at an Israel patrol; as a result of the exchange of fire two Syrian soldiers had been killed. United Nations military observers reported having heard several explosions and heavy machine-gun fire and seen flares illuminating the area. The bodies of the two soldiers were returned to Syria through arrangements made by Red Cross representatives.

322. A further exchange of fire was reported on 30 October (S/7930/Add.97).

323. In supplemental information issued on 25 November (S/7930/Add.102), the Chief of Staff reported on an inquiry into a Syrian complaint that one Syrian civilian had been killed and two had disappeared while looking for livestock on 19 November. Syrian witnesses stated that they had seen and heard firing from Israel forces and had seen Israel soldiers in the area between the forward defended localities and that fifteen Israel soldiers had been observed running after a civilian. The body shown the inquiry team had been identified as that of one of the three men who had been searching for livestock between the forward defended localities. Machine-gun and rifle cartridges with Hebrew markings had been found at the alleged scene of the incident in the area between the forward defended localities.

324. In supplemental information issued on 8 February (S/7930/Add.113), the Chief of Staff reported that on 7 February an Israel light aircraft had been seen crossing the Israel forwarded defended localities and ack-ack rounds and heavy machine-gun fire had been heard. On the same day the Israel authorities had stated that an Israel vehicle had struck a land mine south of the village of Rafid and that one Israel soldier had been killed and another wounded. Observers had seen an Israel half-track and other vehicles proceeding south, and an hour later had heard a loud explosion and seen the Israel half-track seriously damaged.

325. In supplemental information issued on 14 February (S/7930/Add.118), the Chief of Staff reported that United Nations military observers had observed unidentified aircraft crossing the Syrian and Israel forward defended localities and heard firing from both Israel and Syrian positions. Both Israel and Syria had charged that jet aircraft belonging to the other side had violated its air space and that following an air engagement Israel had claimed and Syria had admitted the loss of one of its aircraft. In an inquiry a damaged MIG 21 aircraft had been observed east of the Syrian forward defended locality.

326. In supplemental information issued on 24 February (S/7930/Add.122), the Chief of Staff reported several over-flights, many of the planes having been identified as Israel Mirage aircraft. Syrian anti-aircraft guns had opened fire on some of those planes. Explosions and machine-gun fire had been observed west of the Israel forwarded defended locality on the previous evening. Syria had complained that jet fighters and bombers had attacked civilian installations in the Hamah and Maisaloun areas and civilian cars on the main Damascus-Beirut road and that twenty civilians had been wounded as a result of that aggression. The Chief of Staff indicated that the bombing of Hamah and Maisaloun had been confirmed. In further supplemental information issued on 27 February (S/7930/Add.126), the Chief of Staff reported that in an inquiry conducted on 25 February at the request of Syria into the Israel air attack, observers had seen destroyed and damaged houses, factories and other buildings, as well as thirty-one persons who had allegedly been injured in the air attack on Hamah, all having the type of injuries that could be sustained by aerial bombing.

327. In relation to the same incident, Syria, in a letter dated 25 February (S/9028), charged that on the previous day a number of Israel bombers escorted by fighters had launched air attacks on civilian targets in the suburb and district of Damascus. Fifteen people had been killed, forty wounded and a number of houses, factories, a summer youth camp, a customs police station and other civilian installations had been destroyed. Private vehicles, including the car of the Ambassador of the People's Republic of Hungary in Syria, had been attacked on the road, and two Syrian and three Israel aircraft had been shot down in the engagement. That act of aggression had been preceded by statements of Israel leaders proclaiming a policy aimed at the annexation of Arab lands, in particular the Golan Heights. Israel, in a reply dated 28 February (S/9033), stated that it had taken air action on 24 February in self-defence to disable two El Fatah bases at Hamah and Maisaloun on the road between Damascus and Beirut, which were the central bases of that terrorist organization. The Government of Syria had for years, it charged, openly sponsored, organized and encouraged terror warfare against Israel.

328. In a letter dated 4 March (S/9041), Syria denied that the targets of Israel attack of 24 February were El Fatah bases and cited the report of the Chief of Staff (S/7930/Add.126) to show that the targets of that planned attack had been civilian installations. In a reply dated 12 March (S/9075), Israel reiterated its charge that the air action of 24 February had been directed against El Fatah bases, citing in support of its contention reports in the Arab Press attributed to El Fatah spokesmen to the effect that Hamah and Maisaloun served as bases for that organization. In a further letter dated 25 March (S/9110), Syria listed the names of civilian victims killed and seriously injured in that attack, including women and children.

329. Hungary and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics also sent communications with regard to the incident of 24 February. In a letter dated 11 March (S/9070), the representative of Hungary transmitted the text of a note verbale sent to the Government of Israel, protesting the air attack in which the life of the Ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic had been endangered and his car demolished as a grave violation of international law and reserving Hungary's right to claim full compensation. In a letter of the same date (S/9073), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted a TASS statement dated 28 February protesting that and other acts of provocation committed by Israel against the Arab countries which Israel sought to justify as reprisals. The struggle of peoples against invaders and occupiers was justified from the point of view of international law. Israel's acts of aggression showed that Israel was pursuing an aggressive policy with the aim of aggravating the situation in the Middle East and creating conditions which would preclude the possibility of establishing a lasting peace in the region in conformity with the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.

330. On 18 March Israel replied (S/9091) that, with regard to the TASS statement, its most sinister aspect was the blanket approval it expressed for the Arab terror warfare waged against Israel. The attempts to make that warfare legitimate was open encouragement to the Arab States to continue to violate the cease-fire and further undermine the prospects for peace.

331. In another letter dated 18 March (S/9094), Israel drew attention to the reported entry and stationing of Iraqi armed forces in Syria, stating that their presence would further aggravate the situation in the area, as there was no assurance that they would observe the cease-fire. Israel requested the Secretary-General to obtain from Iraq an assurance that the Iraqi forces would respect the cease-fire.

332. In a letter dated 25 March (S/9111), Syria stated that in view of Israel's policy of aggression, in particular after June 1967, it was only natural that the Arab countries should co-ordinate their defence and it was for that reason that they had formed an Arab common defence pact.

333. In a letter dated 1 April (S/9125), Iraq, commenting on Israel's letter of 18 March (S/9094), stated that the entry of Iraqi armed forces into Syria had taken place at the specific request of the Syrian Government and under the Joint Defence Agreement between Iraq and Syria. Iraqi troops, it was stated, had been stationed at a considerable distance from the cease-fire line in Syrian territory, and their presence in Syria was in accordance with the right of self-defence recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and by international law.

334. In two communications dated 10 April (S/9145 and S/9146), Israel noted that the Government of Iraq had refused to accept the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council in June 1967 and continued to proclaim a policy of waging war against Israel. Accordingly, Israel considered that Governments which permitted the maintenance of the Iraqi expeditionary forces on their territory should bear full responsibility for the consequent aggravation of the situation. Israel further stressed the urgency of efforts by the Secretary-General to obtain assurances that Iraq accepted the cease-fire resolutions and that its forces would respect the cease-fire. The positions of Iraq and Israel in this matter were reiterated in letters from the representative of Iraq on 24 April and 5 May (S/9175 and Corr.1, S/9192) and from the representative of Israel on 29 April and 12 May (S/9181, S/9201).

325. In a letter dated 4 April (S/9131), Syria charged Israel occupation forces with the destruction of Syrian villages and the demolition of houses (see section B, below) and said that on 28 March Israel soldiers had taken up positions at Briqa village in the buffer zone and on 30 March had fired on shepherds in the buffer zone, wounding and capturing one. In a letter of 8 April (S/9139), Syria charged that Israel had erected a new advanced observation point in the buffer zone, and in a further letter of the same date (S/9141), charged that on 5 April six Syrian shepherds had been captured and murdered by Israel soldiers in the area of Briqa village. In a letter dated 15 April (S/9158), Israel rejected the Syrian charges contained in the three above-mentioned letters and stated that Syria had no right or grounds for complaint over defence measures taken by Israel on its side of the cease-fire line, particularly when they were essential in face of repeated Syrian attempts to violate the cease-fire by its regular forces and by marauders and saboteurs (see also section B, below).

336. During the period from early April until 15 July, the Secretary-General continued to circulate supplemental information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO containing data reported by United Nations military observers on breaches of the cease-fire in the Israel-Syria sector. Supplemental information reporting on firing incidents or exchanges, in which machine-gun, mortar, heavy weapon, tank and ack-ack fire, as well as mine explosions, were heard, were issued on 9 and 28 April, 14, 27 and 28 May, 7 and 24 June and 9 July (S/7930/Add.152, Add.178, Add.196, Add.210, Add. 212, Add.225, Add.243 and Add.259). On 6 June (S/7930/Add.222), the Secretary-General circulated a revised list, submitted by the Chief of Staff, of the locations of the observation posts situated along the limits of both the Syrian and Israel forward defended localities. Also reported during this period were two incidents of aerial engagements in which the military observers had observed the firing of air-to-air missiles and the probable downing of aircraft. The first incident was reported in supplemental information issued on 29 May (S/7930/Add.214), and the second on 9 July (S/7930/Add.258). The observers reported in the latter incident having seen four Israel Mirage aircraft flying west to east over the area between the limits of the forward defended localities, two Mirage aircraft engaging three MIG 21 aircraft, and two unidentified aircraft falling in the area. Shortly thereafter, observers had again seen four Mirage aircraft crossing the area, two aircraft engaged in high air battle, five air-to-air missiles fired and an object falling which could have been an aircraft. In a letter dated 10 July (S/9320 and Corr.1), Syria complained that three Syrian planes had been downed and a Syrian pilot killed, while intercepting attacking Israel planes, four of which had been downed. The letter charged that the latest attack had been premeditated and executed as part of a new aggressive military strategy adopted by the Israel General Staff.

B.  Question concerning the treatment of civilian populations in

    Israel-occupied territories and related matters

337. During the period covered by this report, the Security Council received a number of communications concerning the treatment of civilian populations in territories under Israel occupation. Communications from the Arab States complained about Israel's policies in these territories, alleging the arrest, detention, torture, dispossession and expulsion of Arab civilians from their homes, the destruction of Arab villages and houses and the establishment of Israel settlements in the occupied areas. Israel rejected the charges of the Arab States and made counter-charges regarding the treatment of Jews in certain Arab States (see section D, below). The Secretary-General submitted a report on his efforts to send a representative to the Middle East to enable him to meet his reporting obligations under Security Council resolution  237  (1967)  concerning humanitarian questions. His report was discussed by the Council at two meetings in September 1968.

(a) Communications to the Council from 16 July to 18 September 1968

338. By a letter of 18 July (S/8685), Jordan drew attention to a map circulated at the twenty-seventh World Zionist Congress held in Jerusalem in June depicting the location of some thirty-five new Jewish settlements. The majority of those para-military fortified settlements, it was stated, were to be established in occupied Arab territory. In reply, Israel, in a letter of 28 July (S/8696), stated that of the "thirty-five new Jewish settlements" referred to only fourteen were in areas that had come under Israel control since the cease-fire of June 1967, and nearly all of them had been in existence for some time. In previous communications Israel had explained that the activities of the "Nahal outposts" were designed to assist in ensuring the security of the area and in maintaining the cease-fire. In a letter of 2 August (S/8717), Jordan rejected the Israel explanation and stated that land had been illegally expropriated, villages had been razed to the ground and thousands of Arabs had been expelled to accommodate new Israel settlers.

339. In a letter dated 24 July (S/8690), Jordan drew attention to the deteriorating conditions of more than 400,000 refugees and displaced persons forced to flee from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the East Bank of Jordan. Jordan charged that owing to Israel intransigence in implementing Security Council and General Assembly resolutions only a small proportion of the displaced persons had been allowed to return. In a further letter dated 25 July (S/8691), Jordan charged that Israel intended to deport another 50,000 Palestinian refugees from the Gaza Strip to the East Bank and charged Israel with systematically persecuting the Arabs in the occupied territories in order to further its policy of colonization. In a letter dated 26 July (S/8693), Sudan also protested the planned mass expulsion. Jordan, in a letter dated 29 July (S/8698), protested the carrying out by Israel of this act of mass expulsion in defiance of the Security Councils resolutions; Israel's expulsion of the refugees with the support of its armed forces had resulted in a firing incident at the King Hussein Bridge (see section A, above). In a letter dated 30 July (S/8700), Israel rejected the charges that any pressure had been exerted on Palestinian refugees to leave the Gaza Strip; nor it was added, were they being prevented from leaving. In a further letter dated 1 August (S/8711), Israel stated, in reply to the Jordanian letter of 24 July, that it was Jordan that had failed to effect the return 3,000 refugees a day to the West Bank, following humanitarian agreement signed by the two countries on 6 August 1967. In reply, Jordan stated in a letter 2 August (S/8717) that Israel's distortions could justify the obstacles that it had placed in the way

the return of the refugees. In a letter of 5 August (S/8722), Jordan transmitted a copy of a protest against deportation sent by the Mukhtars of Jabalia Camp to the Director of UNRWA in the Gaza Strip show Israel's premeditated plan for the expulsion a deportation of the refugees.

340. In a letter dated 25 July (S/8689), Syria charged that the Israel invading forces were systematically continuing their ruthless colonization of Arab-occupied territories, as evidenced by Israel statements and press reports, and their inhuman treatment of the Arab civilian population. These allegations were rejected by Israel in a letter of 1 August (S/8708) which also charged continued oppression of Syrian Jews and continued rejection by Syria of all United Nations efforts towards peace in the Middle East a letter of 9 August (S/8742), Syria stated that Israel had ignored the issues raised in Syria's previous letter and maintained its charges. In a letter of 16 August (S/8749), Syria quoted further reports and statements in support of its charges that Israel was integrating occupied Syrian territory in the Golan Heights into Israel.

341. By a letter dated 29 August (S/8789), Jordan transmitted a copy of a letter of 25 July from the inhabitants of Emmaus, Yalo and Beit Nuba, charging that following their forced evacuation from their homes and property in the six-day war, their villages had destroyed, and they had been rendered destitute.

342. By a letter dated 18 September (S/8820) Jordan transmitted protests sent by Arab leaders inhabitants of the occupied territories to Israel officials and international bodies against the measures taken by the Israel authorities in the occupied territories, in addition to protests relating to Jerusalem, there were included protests concerning the mistreatment of innocent Arab ladies in Israel prisons, a letter from ___ lawyers and a declaration by trade union leaders concerning the expulsion of refugees in Jabalia Camp, the Gaza Strip and a request for the end of Israeli occupation by the mayors and dignitaries of the West Bank.

(b)  Report of the Secretary-General of 31 July and requests for a meeting

343. On 31 July 1968, the Secretary-General.  Pursuant to Security Council resolution 237 (1967), General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V), submitted a report (S/8699) setting forth the communications between the Secretary-General and the parties from May to July 1968 relating to his proposal to send a representative to the Middle East, in particular for the purpose of meeting his reporting obligations under Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) concerning humanitarian questions. In letters of 2 and 20 May, the Permanent Representative of Syria had emphasized his Government's understanding that the humanitarian resolutions under which the proposed special representative would be appointed referred exclusively to the civilian population in the Arab areas occupied by Israel and to the Arab refugees from those areas and did not apply to Jewish communities in Arab countries, and that the mission of the representative would be confined to reporting under those resolutions. In conversations on 23 May and in written communications of 12 and 26 June and 8 July 1968, the Permanent Representative of Israel had stated his Government's view that the mission of the representative should include the situation of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries, including those in Iraq and Lebanon. Israel maintained that the relevant resolutions related to the conditions of the civilian population throughout the Middle East area of conflict and not only in Israel-held territories. It was clear that Iraq was one of the States directly concerned because of its participation in the war; although Lebanon did not fully participate in the fighting, anxiety was felt about the Jewish community there, and there was no logical reason why Lebanon should be excluded from the scope of the mission.

344. The Secretary-General, orally on 23 May and in written communications of 18 and 27 June and 15 July, stated that the proposed extension of the terms of reference to cover the treatment of the Jewish communities in Iraq and Lebanon was unacceptable and regretted that the question had been raised, particularly at such a late stage. The second humanitarian mission would have the same terms of reference and general scope as the first (Gussing) mission, and the suggested extension had not been raised at that time. The Secretary-General expressed his deep concern for the situation of the Jewish communities in the Arab States and said that he had been dealing directly with the question of the treatment of the Jewish community in Iraq through that country's Permanent Representative and would continue to do so. He added that there was no indication that a problem existed concerning the treatment of the Jewish community in Lebanon. The Secretary-General then pointed out that it was only by a broad humanitarian interpretation that it had been possible in the case of the Gussing mission to stretch the terms of the resolutions to include "humanitarian inquiries" concerning Jewish persons in Syria and in the United Arab Republic as ancillary to the investigation of the condition and treatment of inhabitants in occupied territories. The Security Council resolution could not, by legal interpretation, be regarded as applying to the Jewish communities in Iraq and Lebanon. Attached to the Secretary-General's letter of 15 July was a brief legal analysis concerning the application and scope of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. The Secretary-General stated that he regretfully had to conclude that the points raised by Israel were to be taken as conditions which had to be met, if the proposed mission was to be able to proceed and have the necessary access to the areas with it was concerned.

345. The Secretary-General communicated the position of Israel to Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic. The replies from the representatives of Syria and Jordan on 23 July and the United Arab Republic on 25 July confirmed that their Governments would welcome the Secretary-General's Special Representative, whose terms of reference, they stated, had been clearly indicated in Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V). The obstacles and arbitrary demands of Israel to the

proposed second mission were aimed, it was stated, at perpetuating the tragedy of the Arab inhabitants expelled by the Israel occupation authorities and at continuing the inhuman treatment of the civilian population under Israel rule in occupied Arab territories. The representatives of the Arab States hoped that the Secretary-General would see that the two resolutions were effectively and fully implemented.

346. On 29 July a reply was transmitted from the Foreign Minister of Israel, in which he stated, inter alia, that Israel was not imposing "conditions" but was asking only that the mission should have an equal opportunity to investigate the situation of Jewish communities in Arab countries since the recent conflict. Israel believed that that was clearly within the scope of the relevant resolutions, which had made plain that United Nations humanitarian concern extended to civilians in the whole Middle East area. It was the unwillingness of the Arab Governments to co-operate in that respect which was delaying the mission. The Foreign Minister requested that the Secretary-General communicate the substance of his Government's position also to Iraq and Lebanon, since those countries were also directly involved in the conflict and inquiry needed to be made into the situation of their Jewish

communities.

347. The Secretary-General concluded his report by stating that there was currently no basis on which the mission could proceed, since it required the co-operation of the parties concerned and the necessary assured access. The difficulties arose from an attempt to broaden the scope and terms of reference of the new mission beyond those applying to the Gussing mission, which went as far as the relevant resolutions would permit. There was no question of discrimination; approaches had been made to the Governments concerned, including the Government of Iraq, regarding the treatment of Jewish communities, and there appeared to be no problem regarding the Jewish community in Lebanon. The Secretary-General held that on the legal level, the resolution could not be stretched to cover those two countries and stated that he had not approached them regarding the question of the acceptance of the mission. He pointed out that resolution 237 (1967) had referred to "the area of conflict" not the territory of States parties to the conflict and that the records of the discussions preceding the adoption of the resolution also showed that it had been motivated by concern for the inhabitants of the occupied areas where military operations had taken place. The proposed mission would be concerned exclusively with humanitarian matters. The Secretary-General considered it unfortunate that considerations involving the well-being of a great many people should not be regarded as being of sufficient urgency to override the obstacles that the projected mission was facing.

348. By a letter dated 17 September (S/8819), the representatives of Pakistan and Senegal requested the President of the Security Council to call an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the Secretary-General's report (S/8699).

(c) Consideration by the Council at its 1453rd and 1454th meetings

    (20 and 27 September 1968)

349. At the 1453rd meeting on 20 September 1968, the Security Council placed the letter from Pakistan and Senegal on its agenda. The representatives of Jordan, Israel and the United Arab Republic and, subsequently, of Syria were invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

350. At the same meeting, the representative of Senegal introduced a draft resolution (S/8825, and Rev.1) co-sponsored by Pakistan and Senegal, which, in its operative part, would have had the Security Council: (1) deplore the refusal of Israel to receive a Special Representative of the Secretary-General; (2) request the Secretary-General urgently to dispatch a Special Representative to the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel, following the hostilities of 5 June 1967, and to report on the implementation of resolution 237 (1967); and (3) request the Government of Israel to receive the Special Representative, to co-operate with him and to facilitate his work. The representative of Senegal stated that the Israel Government, by introducing into the question elements which were entirely alien, in fact as well as in law, to the humanitarian procedure which the Secretary-General wished to follow, had hindered the implementation of resolution 237 (1967) which related solely to the civilian populations in the area where hostilities had taken place and were subsequently occupied by Israel and which had nothing whatsoever to do with the status of minorities in foreign countries. He hoped that the Government of Israel would co-operate with the Secretary-General's Representative and that the draft resolution would be adopted unanimously.

351. The representative of Pakistan said that the Secretary-General's report showed clearly that Israel had raised certain issues entirely irrelevant to resolution 237 (1967) in order to becloud the fact that the Council had addressed a clear call to Israel to ensure the welfare and fundamental rights of inhabitants under its military occupation since June 1967. His delegation entirely agreed with the interpretation that the projected mission was limited only to "areas where military operations have taken place". It was the clear duty of the Council to ensure that, pending final settlement of the political issues, the people who had been left under Israel military occupation were not denied their fundamental rights. The attempt to bury that humanitarian question by raising irrelevant issues must be resisted by the Council.

352. The representative of Jordan said that the issue before the Security Council was whether or not Israel should be permitted to defy the Council's injunction calling for the security, welfare and safety of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories. Israel was resisting an impartial investigation because that would uncover its criminal acts and lawless behaviour. He charged that the Israelis had (1) denied the right of the inhabitants of the occupied areas to protection, safety, welfare and security; (2) unlawfully interfered in the religious rights of the inhabitants; (3) forced prisoners of war to take part in services of military production, which would be used in war operations against their country; (4) arbitrarily arrested many innocent individuals without trial and tortured many others; (5) expelled thousands of Palestinians and many of their leaders from Sinai and the Gaza Strip and from the West Bank of Jordan to the East Bank; (6) ignored the laws of the occupied territories, changed the status of officials and judges, and promulgated Israel laws in direct violation of international law and practice; (7) des- troyed Arab houses and confiscated Arab property; (8) settled Jewish groups on Arab land in occupied territories; (9) imposed harsh and discriminatory economic measures on the inhabitants of the occupied territories; and (10) committed acts leading to systematic destruction of the essential foundations of the life of the Palestine people. Should Israel deny these charges, he said, that would reinforce the fact that the only way to find out the truth was by on-the-spot investigation. In support of his charges, the representative of Jordan referred, inter alia, to previous communications he had addressed to the Council concerning the destruction and looting of Arab property, desecration of the Holy Places, attacks on Arab inhabitants, intimidation and torture of arrested persons, expulsions of Arab leaders and groups of inhabitants, destruction of Arab villages after the cease-fire resolutions and the demolition of Arab houses and establishment of Israel settlements (S/8750, S/8820, S/8290, S/8311, S/8445, S/8373, S/8691, S/8698, S/8722, S/8634, S/8666, S/8667, S/8609, S/8685).

353. The representative of Israel stated that the complaint before the Security Council was but a reflection of continued Arab hostility and intransigence and an expression of Arab refusal to advance towards a just and lasting peace. Far from contributing to the promotion of understanding, it heightened tension and did not assist the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It was regrettable that the Arab Governments were delaying the process by which the current situation of cease-fire lines and military administration could be replaced through agreement and peace by recognized boundaries and normal government. Israel had conveyed its willingness to the Secretary-General to co-operate with a second representative on a fact-finding mission within the context of Security Council resolution 237 (1967) and General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V). If the mission was unable to undertake its work it was only because the Arab countries had insisted that the mission be based on anti-Jewish discrimination.

354. The representative of Israel then said that he was authorized to state that any person present at the Security Council table who wished to come to Israel would be welcome and his visit to the territories under Israel control would be facilitated so that he could form his own impressions. What Israel could not accept was deliberate disregard for the fate of Jews who were in distress. The meeting for the first time since 1948 between Arabs and Israelis showed that peaceful co-existence between the two peoples was possible, since both wanted peace; the normalcy of the situation had been commented upon by neutral observers. The real humanitarian problem in the Middle East concerned the people of Jewish faith in Arab countries. The representative of Israel charged that in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, Jews had been subjected to discrimination, oppression and inhuman treatment.

355. The representative of Algeria, on a point of order, stated that by raising the question of the situation of people of Jewish faith in various Arab countries, the representative of Israel was departing from the agenda and interfering directly in the domestic affairs of sovereign States.

356. The President explained that the item in the agenda was the situation in the Middle East, under which the Council was considering the letter from the representatives of Pakistan and Senegal (S/8819). That, in turn, referred to the report of the Secretary-General (S/8699), which contained the views of Governments, including Israel. Those views had ranged over the issues which had been referred to by speakers in the debate.

357. The representative of Senegal, supported by the representatives of Algeria and Pakistan, called attention to the terms of the letter from Senegal and Pakistan.

358. Following informal consultations, a revised version of the draft resolution of Pakistan and Senegal (S/8825/Rev.2) was before the Council at its 1454th meeting on 27 September 1968.  It read as follows:

"The Security Council,

359. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed concern that humanitarian action, in accordance with the clear purposes of the Council unanimously expressed after the June hostilities, had been so long delayed. At the same time, the Council must not lay itself open to charges of discrimination. The General Assembly and the Council, in adopting the humanitarian resolutions, had been concerned about civilians in the area of conflict. The Secretary-General had explained that by a broad humanitarian interpretation it was possible to stretch the terms of the resolution to include humanitarian inquiries concerning Jewish persons in Syria and the United Arab Republic as ancillary to the investigation of the condition of the inhabitants of the occupied territories; he had also explained why it was not possible to extend the inquiries to Lebanon and Iraq. While it might be possible to contend that the Secretary-General had gone beyond the strict interpretation of the resolutions, he had done so for humanitarian reasons which should be respected; no charge of discrimination could be made against him. What was needed was effective action without delay through a unanimous decision to assist those who had been suffering too long. He appealed on humanitarian grounds that every support should be given to the Secretary-General and his representative in the discharge of that humanitarian mission.

360. The representative of France stated that his delegation supported the Secretary-General's idea of sending a new representative to the area to enable him to report in accordance with the resolutions of the Council and the Assembly and regretted that certain obstacles had made it impossible to send such a representative. The Secretary-General had stated that the second mission would have the same scope as the first mission and that had caused no particular difficulties. France, for obvious humanitarian motives in line with its traditions, had been gratified at the broad interpretation placed by the Secretary-General on the resolutions concerning the area of activity of the Gussing mission. However, the areas at which the resolutions were aimed were the territories occupied by Israel. France had always urged a speedy end to that occupation, but as long as it continued the Security Council must be informed with regard to the conditions prevailing there.

361. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that the continued illegal occupation of the Arab lands and the mistreatment of their inhabitants was a constant violation of the international principles, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949, regarding behaviour of States in time of war and protection of civilians. Among the most flagrant crimes were the inhumane practice of indiscriminately demolishing houses as a means of suppressing the legitimate aspirations of the civilian inhabitants; the appropriation of lands owned individually or collectively by Arabs, especially in Jerusalem; intimidation, coercion and massive deportation aimed at changing the ethnic and demographic structure of the occupied Arab territories. That established policy of repression explained why Israel was adamant in its refusal to co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and had put obstacles in the way of the implementation of resolution 237 (1967). Israel's violation of human rights had been recognized by the Teheran Conference on Human Rights. The resolution of that Conference had made it imperative for the Secretary-General not to delay the dispatch of his Special Representative.

362. The representative of Syria stated that resolutions 237 (1967) and 2252 (ES-V) had been completely disregarded by Israel, which had committed and was still committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in the occupied Arab territories, as could be seen from various United Nations documents and in writings of Israel, American and other Western writers. While the humanitarian aspect of the problem was the one which should guide the Council's deliberations, it should not override legal considerations, as the Secretary-General had made clear. The members of the Jewish community in Syria were Syrian citizens with full, equal rights and duties; those who were concerned about ethnic or religious minorities in Arab countries could seek assurances from the International Red Cross Committee, whose representative had paid tribute to Syrian efforts to protect its Jewish citizens. Swelling the number of refugees, which were increasing daily, the occupied areas of Syria had been almost completely emptied of their inhabitants, and over forty villages there had been levelled by Israel bulldozers; as the Commissioner-General of UNRWA had pointed out, the standard of living which UNRWA had been able to provide to the refugees was inadequate.

363. Referring to his delegation's previous communications to the Council, the representative of Syria charged that the Israel occupying authorities had committed violations of human rights and of the Geneva Conventions, including intimidation and expulsion of indigenous inhabitants, burning of crops, seizure of innocent individuals, looting and bulldozing of villages. There were now thirty-eight new Israel settlements in the occupied Arab territories, nine of which were on Syrian soil. Jewish sources had stated that the Golan Heights would be converted into a summer resort area, and plans had been made for grazing massive herds of cattle there. The resolutions adopted by the Economic and Social Council, the Commission on Human Rights and the Teheran Conference relating to the treatment of the Arab civilian population in the Israel-occupied territories should remind the Council of the gravity and dimensions of the human problem involved.

364. The representative of Israel said that the Arab delegations and their supporters had tried by devious arguments to dismiss the problem of oppression of Jews in the Arab States in the wake of the June 1967 hostilities; it was not the first time that they had proposed in the Council that justice and law be one-sided. He cited reports relating to the situation of Jews in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The situation had been considered grave enough for the Secretary-General's first Representative on humanitarian matters to concern himself with it, and the situation of Jews in Iraq woeful enough for the Secretary-General to take it up repeatedly with the Government of Iraq. Yet the Arab delegations and the sponsors of the draft resolution before the Council would have it ignored. The Arab Governments by continuing to wage war against Israel were responsible for the situation and Israel was therefore compelled to put its security in the forefront of its considerations. Israel had no objection to a second United Nations humanitarian mission examining the situation in areas under Israel control, provided the Arab Governments took the same position regarding the situation of Jews in their territories since June 1967. Resolution 237 (1967) was addressed to the Governments concerned, not to one Government, and its preamble and paragraph 2 made it plain that international concern extended over the Middle East region as a whole, not only the territories under Israel occupation.

365. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Council was dealing with one more manifestation of Israel's aggressive policy in violation of the Charter and the Council's decisions. The question of the situation of the Arab population in territories occupied by Israel and of the dispatch to the Middle East of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for humanitarian purposes was an inalienable part of the problem of the speedy liquidation of the consequences of Israel aggression against the Arab States. Israel had not heeded the warning contained in resolution 237 (1967) but had continued to commit acts of lawlessness in the occupied Arab territories and had established there a régime of arbitrary oppression, expropriating Arab lands, expelling the Arab inhabitants, and destroying Arab villages Because it feared exposure, it was therefore hindering the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. What was happening in the occupied Arab territories emphasized the need for the speediest possible liquidation of the consequences of Israel aggression, the earliest possible withdrawal of Israel troops from Arab territories and a political settlement it the Middle East through the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 For refusing to comply with the Security Council's resolution of 14 June 1967, and for refusing to allow the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to enter the territories concerned in spite of all the Secretary- General's efforts, Israel should be decisively condemned by the Security Council which should also reaffirm resolution 237 and demand its immediate implementation.

366. The representative of Algeria said that Israel had set conditions which it knew in advance were unacceptable for the fulfilment of the humanitarian mission in order to avoid having to account for the conditions of life of the displaced populations following its expansionist policies. There was only a slight chance that Israel would eliminate the obstacles it had imposed because its unavowed aim in posing as the champion of minorities all over the world was to provoke dissension within States and create an atmosphere of suspicion towards their minorities. It was seeking to provoke or increase a current of emigrants who would be forced out of fear and hatred and thus allow Israel to increase its population and colonize the newly conquered territories. Instead of admitting its responsibilities for the non-implementation of resolution 237 (1967), Israel had preferred to cast blame on the Arab countries. The humanitarian mission must be maintained as precisely interpreted by the Council and the Secretary-General.

367. The representative of Ethiopia said that in sponsoring resolution 237 (1967) his delegation's primary purpose had been to ensure the safety and welfare of peoples who had been directly affected by the military conflict of June 1967 and, more particularly those inhabiting the territories which had come under Israel military control during and subsequent to the conflict. In requesting the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the resolution it had taken special care not to specify any rigid course of action which would make it difficult for him to carry out his mandate; it commended his efforts and hoped that they would continue. His delegation could not accept the Israel interpretation of resolution 237 (1967) on  the conditions that emanated from it. That did not mean that Ethiopia was unconcerned about the necessity of universal respect for religious freedom; it condemned all religious persecution and discrimination on grounds of race, religion, colour or creed. The course of action proposed in the draft resolution was fair and just, and his delegation would support it.

368. The representative of India said that the language of paragraph 1 of resolution 237 (1967) making it quite clear that the scope of the inquiry was limited to the occupied areas. The task of the Special Representative was simple and unambiguous: to gather full information on the basis of which the Secretary-General could report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution. In the light of the Secretary-General's report, it must be concluded that the purposes and principles of the resolution had not yet been fulfilled. India was deeply concerned about the plight of the Arab civilians under foreign occupation and urged Israel to co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

369. The representative of Hungary said that the discussion had shown that the representative of Israel was attempting to widen the scope of the debate to include issues outside the framework of the subject-matter. The Security Council should not tolerate those attempts. The representatives of Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Syria and Algeria had produced a large number of facts in favour of the urgency of a visit of the Special Representative to occupied Arab territories. The term "areas where military operations have taken place" in resolution 237 (1967) clearly referred to the areas of the Arab States illegally occupied by Israel. By frequent reference to the Jewish people, the representative of Israel was trying to confuse the issue. Israel was responsible for implementing resolution 237 (1967) and the resolution which the Council might adopt regarding the humanitarian conditions of those Arab citizens, no matter what their religious beliefs. The draft resolution was very modest in form and careful in wording and should be adopted unanimously.

370. Statements in exercise of the right of reply were made by the representatives of Syria, Israel and the USSR referring to conditions of Jews, Christians and Kurds in Syria and Jews in the USSR and of Arabs in the occupied areas in Syria and the Gaza strip.

371. Following a brief procedural discussion in which the representative of the United Kingdom, on a point of order, suggested that the vote on the draft resolution be postponed and the representatives of Pakistan and the USSR opposed such postponement, the President put the draft resolution to the vote.

Decision: At the 1454th meeting on 27 September 1968, the revised draft resolution of Pakistan and Senegal (S/8825/Rev.2) was adopted by 12 votes in favour, none against and 3 abstentions (Canada, Denmark, United States of America) as resolution 259 (1968).

372. Following the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General stated that the Special Representative could be on his way with minimum delay, once there was assurance that he would have the access and co-operation indispensable to the fulfilment of his mission.

373. The representative of Brazil said that in voting for the draft resolution, his delegation had had the same humanitarian concern without political motivation which had inspired it to co-sponsor resolution 237 (1967). The new resolution should not be construed as being directed against any State or any of the parties involved in the Middle East dispute; it was a measure to help the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring about the implementation of resolution 237 (1967).

374. The representative of China said that in voting for the draft resolution, his delegation understood that it was a follow-up of resolution 237 (1967) for the purpose of enabling the Secretary-General again to dispatch a Special Representative on a humanitarian mission and would in no way detract from the earlier resolution or prejudice the discretion of the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring about its implementation.

375. The representative of Denmark stated that his delegation had abstained in the voting on the draft resolution, as it was not convinced about the adequacy of the approach in that resolution to the problems involved. It had felt strongly that the United Nations, in pursuance of resolutions 237 (1967) and 2252 (ES-V), should take an active interest in the safety, welfare and security of the civil populations affected by the hostilities of 1967. It was clear that the Secretary-General had done everything in his power to follow the implementation of the two resolutions, and it was highly regrettable that obstacles should have been raised to the sending out of a second humanitarian mission. It was the duty of those concerned to co-operate with the Secretary-General, especially in a case like the present one where, in a truly humanitarian spirit, he had shown considerable flexibility and given to the resolutions in question what the Secretary-General himself had called a broad humanitarian interpretation. There could be no doubt that those concerned, and not least the Government of Israel, should have been more forthcoming. His delegation believed that the Council should have expressed its full support of the Secretary-General's efforts, including the dispatch of another Special Representative with the scope and terms of reference set forth in the Secretary-General's report, and should have called on those concerned to co-operate fully and unconditionally with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative.

376. The representative of Paraguay said that his delegation had voted for the resolution for humanitarian reasons and because it adhered to the fundamental principle that all resolutions of the Security Council must be scrupulously observed. It regretted the omission in the resolution of the provision of the first and second preambular paragraphs and operative paragraph 2 of resolution 237 (1967). It felt that the Governments concerned must scrupulously observe the provisions of that resolution.

377. The representative of the United States stated that his Government continued to support an approach to the issue on the basis of resolution 237 (1967). It would have been pleased to vote for a draft resolution which clearly provided for the dispatch of a United Nations representative on the same basis as before. It regretted that the sponsors had not found acceptable an informal proposal presented during the consultations by which the Secretary-General would have been asked urgently to pursue his efforts, including the dispatch of a Special Representative, with a view to implementing resolution 237 (1967), and would have requested that the Secretary-General be given all necessary assistance and be permitted to carry out his task without conditions being imposed. His delegation could have supported such a text. Moreover, it appeared that the sponsors wished to disassociate the Security Council from the fate of Jewish minorities in the area of conflict; this was unacceptable to his delegation. A text which appeared to narrow the terms of reference of the Special Representative or was ambiguous on that point was not designed to achieve practical results; the United States could not therefore support it. The United States was deeply concerned about the plight of those who were suffering as a result of the hostilities and considered that the United Nations should pursue its humanitarian role. It considered that it was on the basis of resolution 237 (1967), as interpreted by the Secretary-General, which had produced practical results the previous year, that further progress was most likely to be made, and it hoped that despite the divisive elements introduced by the adoption of the resolution a common ground might yet be found that would permit the United Nations to manifest its legitimate and real concern for the people of the Middle East.

378. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation had felt that the resolution was in a form unlikely to facilitate the implementation of resolution 237 (1967) and therefore had put forward alternative proposals, which it regretted had been rejected. On the other hand, it strongly supported the purpose of resolution 237 (1967), the dispatch of the Secretary-General's Representative to the Middle East and the implementation of the humanitarian resolution without conditions. Therefore, although it did not accept certain sections of the resolution, it supported, in particular, the last operative paragraph and had voted in favour of the resolution.

379. The President, speaking as the representative of Canada, said that Canada shared the deep and general concern about the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants in the area of conflict in the Middle East and supported the efforts of the Secretary-General to send another Special Representative on humanitarian questions to the Middle East. It would have accepted the suggestion in the Secretary-General's report that the second mission should have the same scope and terms of reference as the first and that the broadest possible humanitarian interpretation should be given to the terms of reference. Unfortunately, the resolution took a restrictive view of the mission and was therefore unlikely to achieve its primary purpose, the dispatch of another Special Representative. Since it was concerned that Security Council resolutions should be so drafted as to be carried out, Canada had been obliged to abstain.

380. The representative of Senegal said that the sponsors of the resolution had taken into account the Secretary-General's report in trying to find a way out of the deadlock in the Council. It hoped that after the adoption of the current resolution, resolution 237 (1967) would be applied effectively and rapidly. The sponsors asked only that a representative of the Secretary-General should go and find out what was happening to the inhabitants of the Arab territories occupied by Israel. Clearly, the Representative could find in the resolution just adopted by the Council no legal basis permitting him to go to sovereign States which no longer administered zones currently occupied by Israel. If Israel did not wish to admit a representative, it had only to withdraw from the occupied territories. The sponsors hoped that no further obstacles would be placed in the way of an important inquiry concerning the safety, welfare and security of inhabitants of the Arab territories militarily occupied by Israel.

381. The representative of Pakistan stated that Pakistan's position that the Council had adopted resolution 237 (1967) out of concern for the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of Arab territories under the temporary military occupation of Israel remained unchanged; that was the basis for the current resolution which it had co- sponsored. The amendments accepted to the original draft did not, in his delegation's opinion, change the basic concept of that resolution.

382. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that the Council had indicated clearly to Israel that the responsibility for co-operating with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General lay with the Israel authorities and that no conditions would be accepted with regard to the fulfilment of the Representative's mission. The Representative should be sent to the occupied areas immediately, and all facilities necessary for his mission should be accorded to him. He regretted that the delegations of the United States, Denmark and Canada had abstained from voting for a merely humane resolution.

383. The representative of Syria associated his delegation with the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic.

(d) Report of the Secretary-General of 14 October 1968

384. On 14 October, the Secretary-General, in pursuance of paragraph 1 of resolution 259 (1968), submitted a report (S/8851) containing the texts of letters exchanged by him with the representatives of Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic. On 28 September, the Secretary-General had addressed a letter to the representative of Israel, seeking assurance that the Israel Government would receive, co-operate with and facilitate the work of the Special Representative to be designated by him. On the same day, he had also written to the representatives of the three Arab States to obtain the co-operation of their Governments for the Special Representative.

385. In their replies, the representatives of Jordan and the United Arab Republic had given assurances of their Governments' fullest co-operation with the Special Representative. The representative of Syria, after stating his Government's understanding that under resolutions 237 (1967) and 259 (1968) the Special Representative had no mandate over Syrian citizens of Jewish faith, had also assured him that the Special Representative would be afforded all co-operation in his efforts. The representative of Israel reiterated his Government's stand that the task of the Special Representative should, in accordance with its interpretation of resolution 237 (1967), include the question of treatment of both Arab and Jewish persons in the States which were directly concerned because of their participation in the war. He added that as soon as the Secretary-General had received assurances from the Arab Governments that had participated in the June war that the Special Representative would have the access and co-operation indispensable to the fulfilment of his mission concerning the Jewish minorities in those countries, Israel would be ready to discuss the arrangements for the mission.

386. In his reply to the representative of Israel, the Secretary-General pointed out that his request for co-operation was made under resolution 259 (1968) which in its paragraph 1 referred exclusively to "Arab territories under military occupation by Israel", and in its paragraph 2 made a request of Israel which envisaged implementation without conditions. The Secretary-General concluded that since Israel's reply did not afford him a basis on which to dispatch the Special Representative, he had no alternative but to report to the Security Council accordingly.

387. In conclusion, the Secretary-General stated that as would be seen from the correspondence, he had not been able to give effect to the decision of the Security Council.

(e) Further communications received between 27 September 1968 and 15 July 1969

388. In this period many communications were received relating to the conditions of the inhabitants of the territories occupied by Israel following the hostilities of June 1967.

389. In a number of letters Syria made specific charges of the demolition of Syrian villages in occupied territory or of houses in Syrian villages. Israel in reply stated either that it was a question of demolition of damaged and abandoned houses or that the Israel actions were necessary for security reasons.

390. In a letter dated 15 October (S/8857), Syria charged that on 18 September Israel had started demolishing the occupied Syrian village of Souraman and on 10 October the village of Ahmediye. In a letter dated 21 October (S/8863), Israel replied that Syria had magnified out of proportion the demolition of some abandoned and damaged houses which constituted a risk as they were in danger of collapse. Syria confirmed its charges in a letter of 7 November (S/8893) and, in a letter dated 21 November (S/8904), stated that the demolition of Souraman was continuing.

391. In a letter of 4 March (S/9042), Syria charged that on 26 February the Israel occupation forces had set fire to the village of Khisfine. On 4 April it charged (S/9131) further demolition of houses on 26 March and at Aboukhbit on 31 March; on 8 April it charged (S/9139) the demolition of houses at Kuneitra on 31 March; on 11 April it charged (S/9150) the demolition of houses on 6, 7 and 8 April at the villages of Zbizetun, Tel Esseqi, Errazaniye and Khan El-Joukhadar. In reply to those charges, Israel asserted in a letter dated 15 April (S/9158) that Syria had no grounds for complaint over defence measures taken by Israel on its side of the cease-fire line in the face of Syrian violations by its regular forces and by marauders and saboteurs. In a letter dated 17 April (S/9164), Syria, in turn, protested that so-called defence measures could not justify the razing of villages, demolition of houses and mass execution of shepherds, and called attention to Israel's refusal to accept the dispatch of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in accordance with the Council's resolution 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968. In a further letter dated 25 April (S/9177), Israel declared that since Syria's policy had remained one of war with Israel, Syria had no basis for advising Israel on how to defend itself. In a letter dated 9 May (S/9199), Syria charged further demolition of houses by Israel authorities on 27 and 28 April at the village of Aache.

392. In letters of 12 December 1968 (S/8928) and 16 January 1969 (S/8971), Syria drew attention to reports by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency concerning Israel plans for establishing Israel settlements on the Golan  Heights.

393. Charges of the violation of human rights and the Geneva Conventions in occupied Arab territories were also made in communications from various Syrian organizations transmitted by letters dated 28 October and 5 November (S/8873 and S/8887). In a letter of 30 October (S/8876), Israel rejected Syrian charges and accused Syria of oppressing Jews and other minorities. Syria, in rejecting the Israel charges in a letter of 6 November (S/8892), quoted a letter from Israel intellectuals regarding violation of human rights in the occupied territories.

394. In a number of communications throughout the period, Jordan, in addition to protests relating to Jerusalem and the treatment of its population (see section C, below), complained of oppressive measures against Jordanian citizens in the occupied areas, in particular, of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, ill-treatment in prisons, unjustified expulsion and demolition of houses. A number of these charges were rejected by Israel as false or distorted.

395. In a letter dated 9 December (S/8923), Jordan charged Israel with taking oppressive measures against Jordanian citizens in the occupied areas, in particular, with arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, and, in letters of 12 December (S/8929, S/8930), transmitted resolutions adopted by the Arab Regional Conference on Human Rights held in Beirut on 4 December 1968, condemning the Israel attack on the civilian population of Irbid on 3 December and the arbitrary imprisonment of Jordan citizens under Israel occupation.

396. By a letter dated 13 December (S/8932), Jordan transmitted a memorandum signed by mayors, members of the professions and members of women's organizations on the West Bank, protesting the treatment of the inhabitants by the occupation authorities, including house demolition, property confiscation and unjustified arrests and expulsions.

397. By a letter dated 7 January 1969 (S/8961), Jordan transmitted a statement by a Jordanian citizen, the President of the Union of Palestine Arab Students in Lebanon, alleging his ill-treatment and that of other Arabs in Israel prisons. His charges were rejected as false by Israel in a letter dated 13 January (S/8965).

398. In a letter dated 30 January (S/8988), Jordan drew attention to the condition of the refugees in eastern Jordan, following floods and snowstorms, and urged that steps be taken for their speedy return to their homes.

399. On 10 February, Jordan transmitted (S/9001) a list of protests submitted to the Israel occupying forces by religious leaders and institutions against Israel measures in the occupied areas, in particular in Jerusalem.

400. In a letter dated 21 March (S/9102), Jordan charged Israel with arbitrary measures against the Arab population in the occupied areas, especially Jerusalem, including arbitrary detention, attacks on schools and students and demolition of houses. In a letter of reply dated 31 March (S/9122), Israel stated that Jordan had distorted necessary security measures taken by Israel against those who had committed acts of murder and terror or had abetted them.

401. In a letter of 17 April (S/9162), Jordan charged Israel with the arbitrary arrest and expulsion of Arab personalities from the West Bank as a means of pressure on the population. In a letter dated 22 April (S/9174), Israel replied that in the two cases cited, the individuals had been arrested on the basis of information that they were engaged in terrorist activities and that they had been well treated and had left the country at their own request.

402. In a letter dated 8 May (S/9197), Jordan charged further violations of human rights in the West Bank and in Gaza, particularly with regard to women suspected of resistance to foreign occupation, and transmitted protests from relatives of those detained and from the Red Cross Societies of Jordan and Lebanon. Israel, in a letter of 14 May (S/9208), rejected those charges as false and distorted and said that they were designed to divert attention from Jordan's responsibility for the continuation of acts of terror and aggression carried out by and from Jordan. Jordan reaffirmed its charges in a letter dated 26 May (S/9225) and quoted reports from Israel papers of arbitrary detentions and the demolition of houses. Israel rejected the Jordanian contentions and reaffirmed its position in a letter of 2 June (Corr.1).

403. In a cable dated 3 February (S/8991), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic charged the Israel authorities with inhuman treatment of the civilian population in the Gaza Strip. Israel rejected these charges in a letter dated 5 February (S/8994), stating that the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza limited their actions to the minimum required to prevent outbreaks of violence, which, it stated, the Egyptian Government was fostering.

404. In a communication transmitted on 21 February (S/9029), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Southern Yemen protested against the armed attack by Israel on the civilian inhabitants of Khan Younis on 13 February 1969.

405. In a letter transmitted on 13 February (S/9011), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq charged Israel with atrocities against the inhabitants of the occupied Arab territories.

C.  Communications concerning the situation in and around Jerusalem

and its Holy Places

(a) Communications and reports received between 15 July 1968 and 2 July 1969

    and requests for a meeting

406. During the period covered in the current report, a number of communications were addressed to the Security Council concerning Jerusalem and its Holy Places, which had been discussed by the Council in April and May 1968 prior to the adoption on 21 May of resolution 252 (1968).

407. In a letter dated 19 August 1969 (S/8750), Jordan complained of incidents of lawlessness against Arab inhabitants in occupied Jerusalem, charging that on the preceding day hundreds of Israel youths had attacked Arab residents in Arab Jerusalem, injuring scores of innocent civilians, looting Arab stores and destroying property, during which time the Israel police apparently had not intervened. The letter linked the incidents with other charges of mistreatment of Arab inhabitants in the occupied territories (see section B, above). In a reply dated 21 August (S/8756), Israel charged that the incidents in question had arisen with three premeditated and planned terror attacks carried out by terror organizations operating from Jordan, which, the letter stated, were supported and even participated in by the Government of Jordan (see section A, above). Moreover, the Jerusalem authorities had condemned the outburst and had arrested a number of the young men implicated.

408. By a letter dated 11 October (S/8847), Syria transmitted to the Secretary-General a message from some of the religious leaders in Syria condemning the desecration of the Holy Places by the Israel occupying forces. By a letter dated 22 October (S/8864), Kuwait forwarded a group of forty photographs, together with accompanying explanatory notes, which related to alleged desecration by Israel authorities of Moslem and Christian Holy Places in and around Jerusalem and the destruction of Arab homes in the city. In a letter dated 6 November (S/8890), Jordan also brought to the attention of the Secretary-General charges of continuous Israel acts of demolition and change of character of historical and religious buildings in Jerusalem and transmitted a letter from the Mayor of Jerusalem containing an account of Israel's measures in that respect.

409. By a letter dated 5 February 1969 (S/8995), Jordan transmitted a cable which it stated had been addressed to the President of the Security Council on 1 February by Mr. Rouhi El-Khatib, the Mayor of Jerusalem, urging action to end the liquidation of the 70,000 Arabs of Jerusalem and the repressive measures being promulgated by Israel to change the character of the Holy City. In a further communication dated 10 February (S/9001), Jordan transmitted a list of protests submitted to the Israel authorities by religious leaders and institutions against the measures taken by the Israel Government and concerning the conduct of some Israel citizens in Jerusalem.

410. In a letter dated 8 February (S/8998), Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council "to consider the continued Israeli defiance of Security Council resolution 252 (1968)", which, among other things, called upon Israel "to desist from taking any action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem". Jordan stated that despite that clear warning, Israel had enacted, against Arab opposition, legislation designed to destroy the character of the city and incorporate the Arab life and institutions into Israel life. The legislation was to take effect on 25 February and would create a situation which threatened not only the economic life of the Christians and Moslems of Jerusalem but international peace and security, warranting, therefore, consideration of that situation by the Security Council.

411. By another letter dated 8 February (S/8999), Jordan transmitted the text of a memorandum addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel by a group of Arab lawyers in Israel-occupied territory, in which they had protested against Israel legislation aimed at completing the process of Israel's annexation of Jerusalem and its environs.

412. In a note dated 10 February (S/9000), the President of the Security Council stated that since the Government of Israel had decided to postpone until 23 May 1969 the putting into effect of the legislative provisions which formed the subject-matter of Jordan's complaint, the meeting of the Security Council, which had been fixed for 11 February, had been postponed.

413. In a letter dated 13 February (S/9010) to the Secretary-General, Jordan stated that the postponement allowed for an extension of the time-limit during which efforts could be made for the repeal of the legislation and thus avoid confronting the world with a fait accompli. Jordan also requested the Secretary-General to furnish the Security Council with a progress report on the implementation of resolution 252 (1968).

414. In a report dated 11 April (S/9149), submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, the Secretary-General stated that since the termination of the mission of his Personal Representative in Jerusalem in September 1967, he had had no means of obtaining first-hand information upon which he could base a report. On 13 February 1969, the Secretary-General had sent a note to Israel in which he recalled that under resolution 252 (1968) the Security Council had considered that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tended to change the legal status of Jerusalem were invalid and could not change that status; had urgently called upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tended to change the status of Jerusalem; and had requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution. The Secretary-General had stated that he must, in the main, look to the Government of Israel for the information necessary in the discharge of his responsibilities and had therefore requested the Government of Israel to provide him with such information. In reply on 25 March, the representative of Israel had informed the Secretary-General that the position of his Government continued to be the same as set forth in the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel of 10 July 1967 (S/8052) and in the statements which had been made on that subject by the representatives of Israel in the General Assembly and the Security Council.

415. The Secretary-General then stated that the only other source of information of an official nature pertinent to the implementation of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) was the Israel Official Gazette, published originally in Hebrew. According to that source, the Israel Parliament had adopted on 14 August 1968 the "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law", which was relevant to the situation in Jerusalem. Regarding the implementation of that law, the Secretary-General recalled that the President of the Security Council had indicated, in his note of 10 February 1969, that Israel had decided to postpone until 23 May 1969 the putting into effect of that law. The report of the Secretary-General contained as annex I an unofficial translation of the "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law, 5728, 1968", and as annex II an unofficial translation of the "Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law, 5728, 1968" and explanatory notes.

416. In a letter dated 23 June (S/9277), Israel complained of an incident which it stated was carried out from Jordan on 20 June against the civilian population of Jerusalem, when three bombs were exploded in a narrow street which serves as a passage for worshippers on their way to the Western (Wailing) Wall, injuring three Arab and one Israel inhabitants.

417. By a letter dated 26 June 1969 (S/9284), Jordan complained of Israel's further violations of its resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 concerning Jerusalem. Jordan stated that instead of complying with the Security Council's directives, the Israel Government, in utter disregard of the will of the inhabitants of Jerusalem, had enacted Administrative Regulation Law 1968 and had, on 27 April 1969, enacted further provisions and new regulations. Although an urgent meeting of the Council on this matter, called in February 1969, had been deferred, Israel had continued to take measures contrary to the Council's resolution 252 (1968) and the United Nations Charter and was further implementing its plans for the establishment of Israel settlements in the city. Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider Israel's continued defiance of resolution 252 (1968) on Jerusalem.

418. By letters dated 30 June and 2 July (S/9289 and S/9303), Jordan transmitted photographs which, it stated, showed Israel bulldozing of Arab houses and Muslim shrines in Jerusalem adjacent to the Western Wall of the Aqsa Mosque and the construction of Israel settlements on confiscated Arab land in eastern Jerusalem.

(b) Consideration by the Council at the 1482nd to 1485th meetings (30 June to 3 July 1969)

419. At the 1482nd meeting on 30 June, the Security Council included in its agenda Jordan's letter of 26 June 1969 (S/9284), and the President invited the representatives of Jordan, Israel and the United Arab Republic, pursuant to their requests, to participate in the debate without the right to vote. Subsequently, the representatives of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Morocco, Iraq, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Yemen, Tunisia and Kuwait also requested, and were similarly invited, to participate in the discussion.

420. The representative of Jordan stated that the urgent meeting had been called to consider a situation threatening not only the political and economic life of Jordanian citizens in Jerusalem but international peace and security. By failing to respond to the request of the Security Council, Israel had continued to violate the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly calling on it not to take any action tending to alter the status of Jerusalem. Israel laws were designed to create a greater Jerusalem to be part of a greater Israel and tended to subordinate all previous Arab life to those laws and gradually liquidate the whole Arab character of the city. With eviction on  political grounds a daily occurrence in occupied Jordan, the Israelis were able to confiscate Jordanian property under the law, although Jewish ownership in the whole city of Jerusalem was not more than 26 per cent, the rest being legally Arab. Indicating that the new law contained provisions making it impossible for Arab business to maintain its independence and identity, he stated that there were more than 180 Arab companies and firms in Jerusalem, employing more than 4,000 people, which, under the law, could either be totally absorbed in the Israel economy or be automatically liquidated. Such laws violated the Council's resolutions, international law and the Geneva Convention and were therefore null and void and had no legal basis. If the Israel actions, intended to create a fait accompli, remained unchecked, it would be impossible to create the necessary preconditions for peace. If no action was taken immediately, the Security Council would face more conflict in the area, and if something was not done soon, the city of peace might very well become a city of real conflict. The representative of Jordan asked the Security Council to deplore the failure of Israel to show any regard for Security Council resolution 252 (1968); to call once more upon Israel to rescind all measures which had resulted or might result in changing the status of the city of Jerusalem, and, in future, refrain from all actions likely to have such an effect; to warn Israel that unless the illegal acts of legislation were rescinded the Council would reconvene to take action, including the application of Article 41 of the Charter; to appeal to Member States to refrain from sending arms and military equipment to Israel until it complied with the Council's requests; to reaffirm Security Council resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967 on Jerusalem and declare the new Israel legislation dated 23 August 1968 and the subsequent decrees and legislation null and void; and to call upon the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council on the implementation of its resolution.

421. The representative of Israel stated that Jordan had come before the Security Council to plead the cause of its 1948 invasion and that Jordan and other Arab States were openly pursuing warfare against Israel. The Jordanian regular army and the Iraqi forces stationed in Jordan were actively involved in terrorist operations. To seize the Security Council in these circumstances with technicalities of registration and commercial enterprises was the height of frivolity, and the intensification of Jordanian and Egyptian armed attacks had been widely condemned as prejudicing the search for peace in the Middle East. The Jordanian complaint was a manoeuvre to divert attention from the fact that the Arab Governments had hardened even further their refusal to conclude peace with Israel. Regarding the regulations which were the subject of the complaint, he said that what mattered to Jordan was less what Israel did than the fact that Israel did it. In reply to Jordanian complaints concerning Israel measures in the area of the Wailing Wall, he stated that Jordan had, in 1948, razed thirty-four of the thirty-five houses of worship, as well as schools and homes, in the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem. Moreover, captured saboteurs had admitted that they had been dispatched to attack worshippers at the Wailing Wall in 20 June. The people of Israel and the world at large would follow with interest the views expressed by the members of the Security Council on such outrageous assaults on peaceful worshippers at a Holy Place in the city of Jerusalem.

422. Describing the life in Jerusalem under a united rule, the representative of Israel stated that the thousands of foreign visitors visiting Jerusalem would attest to the fact that the city was basically content. An incident did sometimes occur, and some of Jerusalem's inhabitants might not be happy, but a large number of Christian and some Moslem leaders had expressed satisfaction at the situation regarding their Holy Places. He then charged that Jordan was not motivated by Jerusalem's welfare but by continued belligerence against Israel. Jordan's attitude disregarded the basic precepts of international law and morality and was in violation of the rights of the city's population, which consisted of more than 200,000 Jews, 60,000 Arabs and 5,000 others. It was evident that the great majority of the city's population categorically rejected any Jordanian claims to intervene in its life.

423. The representative of Jordan, exercising the right of reply, stated that the figures established by the Anglo-American Commission on Palestine showed that Jerusalem had had a majority of Arabs, not Israelis, as the representative of Israel had stated. Regarding the unity of the city, he stated that the Council had objected to annexation by force, which amounted to aggression, not unity. He concluded by stating that the issue was Israel's defiance of the Council's own resolution. Violations had continued and more acts of aggression had been committed; and Jordan had come to the Council for an effective remedy.

424. The representative of Saudi Arabia asked if the Council was paralysed on the question and whether it was going to pass more resolutions which would not be implemented. After referring to the history of Jerusalem, he stated that Jerusalem was sacred to three great religious faiths and the Zionists should not make it their capital. He warned that the situation was serious and that the lethal weapons of today might tomorrow wipe out Jews and Gentiles alike.

425. At the 1483rd meeting, on 1 July, the representative of the United Arab Republic stated that the Israel measures of annexation were meant to achieve the consolidation of Israel's occupation and that the will of the international community in that respect had been demonstrated in the General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions, which had all invalidated the Israel measures, reaffirmed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and called upon Israel to rescind those measures and desist forthwith from changing the status of the Holy City. Israel was under obligation to carry out those decisions, but Israel's reaction to these resolutions had been negative and Israel had persisted in its destruction of Arab homes and properties. The time had come for the Council to move from the stage of passing resolutions of condemnation and injunctions to the stage of measures and actions to enforce its decisions. His delegation would fully support the measures suggested by the representative of Jordan.

426. The representative of the United Kingdom reaffirmed the position of his Government, as stated in the General Assembly by his Foreign Secretary on 21 June 1967, that under Article 2 of the Charter, war should not lead to territorial aggrandizement. Regarding Jerusalem, he reiterated his support of the position that no unilateral action should or could change the status of that city. It was essential for the Council to require that nothing should be done by unilateral action to prejudice the future of Jerusalem, which must be kept open and decided upon as part of a final settlement ensuring a permanent peace. Although no one disputed the vital concern in the matter of the countries of the Middle East, the Council and the whole world had a legitimate interest in peace in the area, and the Council was not to be told that its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security was diminished or deferred. He said in conclusion that Jerusalem was the heart of the whole problem and that a just and complete settlement should not be ruled out in advance or rendered impossible by any act designed to prejudice the future status of the city.

427. The representative of France stated that Jerusalem had already been the subject of many debates and resolutions by the Security Council and the General Assembly, including resolution 252 (1968), and that since 1967 a number of measures adopted in the occupied territories, and particularly in Jerusalem, had given rise to Jordan's protests to the Council and the General Assembly. The new complaint of Jordan appeared to be the continuation of previous ones and stemmed from Israel's non-compliance with the provisions of resolution 252 (1968). Recalling that France had voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, he pointed out that since that time France had opposed anything that might further increase the hostilities among the parties concerned in the Middle East. There could be no doubt that all legislative or other measures adopted by Israel that might facilitate the process of integration of part of Jerusalem were in contradiction to those resolutions and that some of them were contrary to the rules of international law regarding armed occupation and to the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Israel authorities had often given assurances that they would take steps to assure free access by all to places of worship. However, the problem was not only administrative and social but political, religious and legal in nature. It was his delegation's hope that Israel would consent to put an end, without delay, to the contested measures and safeguard the character of a city, the future status of which could in no way be prejudiced.

428. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that the Council was forced again to consider the question in view of the illegal attempts by Israel to annex the Arab part of Jerusalem. The General Assembly had firmly opposed the annexationist designs of Israel and termed Israel's action illegal. In its resolution 252 (1968), the Security Council had confirmed the resolutions of the General Assembly, but the actions of Israel in Jerusalem testified to the fact that the Government of Israel was ignoring those resolutions. Israel occupation forces were carrying out in Jerusalem a programme of measures aimed at changing the Arab nature of the Old City, expelling Arab inhabitants, destroying Arab houses and imposing Israel settlements in the Arab section. The overwhelming majority of the Member States of the United Nations and world public opinion had condemned and rejected Israel's annexationist plans in Jerusalem. Israel therefore should ponder the dangerous consequences for the State of Israel itself in pursuing such a policy. The Security Council, in discharging its duties under the Charter, must take the necessary measures to see that its decisions were carried out. The Council must demand of Israel that it cease immediately all attempts at "Israelizing" Arab Jerusalem, which it was occupying, and implement resolution 242 calling for a political settlement in the Middle East and the withdrawal of Israel forces from all occupied Arab territories.

429. The representative of Algeria stated that by promptly and almost unanimously adopting the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council regarding Jerusalem, the international community had shown the occupiers the importance it attached to the fate of the Holy City. But Israel, defying the hundreds of millions of human beings for whom Jerusalem was the symbol of faith, had begun on 8 June 1967 to take preliminary measures to absorb the Old City, in flagrant violation of all the resolutions of the United Nations and despite the opposition of the population of Jerusalem. In three successive aggressions Israel's objective had been more land and fewer Palestinians. The Security Council must examine Israel's refusal to implement its previous decisions on this question. It was his delegation's opinion that the Council should take up its responsibilities in accordance with the Charter and tackle the causes of the crisis that has shaken the Middle East for twenty-one years.

430. The representative of the United States stated that the discussion thus far had made amply clear that the status of Jerusalem was not an isolated problem but an integral part of the whole complex of issues in the current conflict. The Council had recognized that fact in resolution 242 (1967), which treated the entire Middle East situation as a package. That resolution remained the basis for the approach to a just and lasting peace in the area. Because Jerusalem was one of the holiest cities in the world, the United States had always considered that the city enjoyed a unique international standing. In the opinion of his delegation, none of the deep concerns over Jerusalem which moved all parties to the Arab-Israel dispute were served by what was now taking place there, whether it was actions by those now in authority or by individuals considering themselves aggrieved. The United States considered that the part of Jerusalem that came under Israel control in the June war was occupied territory, subject to the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying power. Under the Geneva Convention and international law the occupier must maintain the occupied area as intact and unaltered as possible, any changes being necessitated by immediate needs of the occupation. The actions of Israel in occupied Jerusalem gave rise to understandable concerns that the eventual disposition of East Jerusalem might be prejudiced and that the private rights and activities of the population were already being affected and altered. His Government did not accept those measures as affecting the ultimate status of Jerusalem. After recalling his government's efforts to bring peace to the Middle East, he suggested that the Council should request the parties concerned to desist from any action in Jerusalem or elsewhere that might prejudice a final comprehensive settlement and a just and lasting peace. Any proposal should be subjected to the test of whether it would help or hinder the peaceful settlement process.

431. Exercising his right of reply, the representative of Israel, referring to the talks between the four Powers, stated that Israel's Prime Minister had said that Israel did not accept in principle that those Powers should arrogate to themselves the right to decide the destiny of other States without the participation of those concerned. From the political and practical standpoint, she had said, Israel could only react negatively to the Big Four talks, being fully aware that one of the Powers was hostile and the outspoken representative of the Arabs. He stated that the United Arab Republic and Algeria had refused to accept United Nations resolutions, including the call in the 22 November 1967 resolution for a peaceful settlement, and he asked whether anyone could seriously consider that Israel should listen to advice from those sources. Quoting figures from various periods, he reiterated that Jerusalem had had a Jewish majority for many years. Any Arabs re-located in Jerusalem had been fully compensated. Violence, harassment and pressure would not weaken Israel's determination to work for its goal of real peace and security for Jerusalem, for Israel as a whole and for its neighbours.

432. The representative of Syria referred to a statement by the representative of the Catholic Women's Guild concerning the difficulties encountered by Arab workers in Jerusalem in finding work. He also stated that in 1947 the British Mandatory Powers had submitted to the United Nations a document showing that Jewish ownership in the Jerusalem sub-district was 2 per cent and that of the Arabs 80 per cent.

433. The representative of Saudi Arabia stated that Jerusalem, in the seventh century, had been inhabited by a conglomeration of peoples, neither Arabs nor Jews, who later had embraced Islam and Arabism. Regarding the attitude of Israel about living standards in Jerusalem, he said that it reminded him of the "white man's burden" used as an argument in the colonization of Africa and Asia. A just peace had to meet the aspirations of the Palestinian people. The Arabs did not want compensation; they wanted their homes which their people had occupied for centuries. It was the indigenous people who held title to Jerusalem and to all of Palestine.

434. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the representative of Israel had distorted the facts and that there was no indication that Israel intended to comply with the resolutions of the Council, but that it meant to continue its policy of expansion and annexation.

435. At the 1484th meeting, on 2 July, the representative of the United Arab Republic stated that Israel's defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions regarding Jerusalem had gone so far that it had informed the Secretary-General that its annexation of Jerusalem was irreversible and not negotiable. Regarding Israel's policies, he stated that in Israel's view, peace would amount to the surrender of the Arab peoples to its will and their acquiescence in its territorial ambitions.

436. The representative of Morocco stated that the decisions and resolutions by the United Nations on the question of Jerusalem had been violated, and although it was a question of Arab territory, interest in the city and its Holy Places was world-wide. In spite of United Nations resolutions, Israel had transferred the main part of its governmental machinery to Jerusalem and held military parades there, Jordan had submitted its complaint in order to denounce that series of violations that were contrary to clear-cut decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Noting that the representative of Israel had read a statement by the Israel Prime Minister contending that the Great Powers had nothing to say about the matter, he stated that that had not always been Israel's policy. Israel had been glad to have their support at various times, but now it feared that they would interfere with its designs. But the great Powers had special responsibilities under the Charter, and he hoped that their talks would be successful.

437. The representative of Zambia deplored the fact that Israel was, according to The New York Times, moving its national police headquarters from Tel Aviv to East Jerusalem, which had been part of Jordan until 1967. His delegation had been grieved to find that Israel continued to defy with impunity the decisions of the Council. Regarding the laws promulgated by Israel, he said that they were intended to confuse even more an already confused situation. Restating his Government's stand on the whole Middle East question, he said that political reality must persuade everyone to accept the independence and sovereignty of the State of Israel, but it was also clear that territorial aggrandizement could not be recognized. It was time that both sides listened and paid attention to world appeals for peace, and the Council had a duty to call on Israel not to proceed with its measures.

438. The representative of Nepal stated that his delegation considered all actions taken by Israel which tended to change the status of the city of Jerusalem as invalid. The occupying authorities, he added, had taken further measures in a clear bid to change the status of Jerusalem in defiance of the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. His delegation expected all parties, particularly those directly interested in the question, to show restraint, moderation and respect for the decisions of the United Nations. That appeal was not an equation between those who pursued a policy of annexation and those who suffered from it.

439. The representative of Hungary stated that the problems regarding Jerusalem constituted an integral part of the Middle East issue facing the Council. Israel had created an additional and more difficult problem by fundamentally and juridically changing the status of a part of the occupied territory. The measures complained of, which the representative of Israel had qualified as mere technicalities, were violations of the Charter and United Nations resolutions. The location of the national police headquarters in the occupied city constituted an act of grave provocation and not a mere technicality. It was difficult to understand how a Government which based its claim to Jerusalem on religious grounds could fail to take into account the sentiments of others motivated by the same consideration. The Middle East situation, he concluded, remained explosive, and the Security Council should not tolerate any further violation of its decisions.

440. The representative of Finland said that the General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem were based on legal and political considerations and proceeded from the basis that the Government of Israel could claim no sovereignty over Jerusalem and that measures by Israel could not be accepted as altering the status of the city. The Finnish Government had concurred in that view in voting in favour of the afore-mentioned General Assembly resolutions. He referred to the fact that the situation in Jerusalem was intensifying tensions in the Middle East at a time when the overall situation in the area was deteriorating. The Secretary-General had some time ago called to the urgent attention of the members of the Security Council the critical situation in the Suez Canal sector and the danger of a break-down in the cease-fire arrangements there. The tension and violence continued unabated along the cease-fire lines and beyond them in other areas as well. All acts in defiance of the pertinent cease-fire resolutions made the task of promoting a peaceful settlement on the basis of the resolution adopted on 22 November 1967 more difficult. The Four Power talks still offered the best hope that would ensure progress toward a peaceful and accepted settlement. The Council should, therefore, do everything possible to promote the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

441. The representative of China stated that there was a consensus that the Holy City should be kept out of international rivalry and strife. The question of Jerusalem could not be viewed in isolation from the Middle East problem as a whole. The Council's resolution on Jerusalem remained binding on the Council as well as on the parties concerned. No matter what Israel had done in Jerusalem since 1967, it had not been acceptable to the Arab population and was inconsistent with the terms of Security Council resolution 252 (1968). The Council should reaffirm the principles laid down in resolution 252 (1968) and urgently call upon Israel to comply with the requirements of that resolution.

442. The representative of Malaysia stated that perhaps it was not too late to remind Israel that the status of the Holy City was not purely a matter between Israel and Jordan and that any changes in its status would have profound repercussions also on Christians and Muslims all over the world. Recalling the resolution regarding Jerusalem adopted by the International Islamic Conference in April 1969, which condemned Israel for having usurped the Arab territories and, in particular, the Holy City, he stated that if Israel continued to defy the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly regarding Jerusalem, it would have to contend not only with its Arab neighbours and the Muslim world but with the political and moral force of the United Nations.

443. The representative of Lebanon said that both the General Assembly and the Security Council in 1967 and 1968 had adopted several resolutions on the question of Jerusalem, for which Israel had shown only disrespect. His delegation was gratified that the representatives of the Four Powers had all reaffirmed the positions of their Governments with regard to Israel's illegal and invalid decision to annex the old Arab city of Jerusalem, as that decision prejudiced the final settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict under Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. If Israel wished peace, it must desist from acts that undermined peaceful development, and its presence in the Old City was not conducive to peace. In these circumstances the Security Council had a special responsibility to prevent the development of such a perpetual conflict by taking measures under the Charter to bolster its resolution 252 (1968).

444. The representative of Iraq said that the complaint before the Council constituted an appeal by all humanity, not one by Jordan or the Arab States. By taking more coercive measures in the occupied territory, and in Jerusalem in particular, Israel was showing contempt for world public opinion. In his view the Council should act immediately and put an end to Israel's defiance.

445. The representative of Indonesia stated that Jerusalem was a Holy Place to 100 million Indonesian Muslims. The tension in the Middle East was threatening the precarious balance of power in that area. The actions of Israel were a clear violation of its obligations under international law as an occupying Power. His delegation believed that only by a firm stand could any further aggravation of the situation be averted.

446. The representative of Spain stated that the military occupation of Jerusalem by Israel was not justified in any way and was contrary to a number of United Nations resolutions, despite which Israel continued to take measures designed to change the legal status of the city and to consolidate an illegal de facto situation. The Security Council must urgently demand respect for the United Nations resolutions, condemn the policy of faits accomplis and reiterate that the use of force could not justify any territorial annexation. Patience must have a limit in the light of non-compliance with resolutions and the flouting of the rights of many Member States.

447. The representative of Colombia stated that his delegation's position on the problems of the Middle East had not changed since first set forth in June 1967. On the specific question of Jerusalem which was before the Council, he entirely endorsed resolution 252 (1968) and considered that any action or step which violated that resolution was illegal and arbitrary. Therefore, his delegation could not endorse or countenance any alteration of the legal status of Jerusalem by unilateral initiative, regardless of its origin.

448. The representative of Paraguay stated that since the position of his delegation was based entirely on questions of principle, it was unchangeable and immutable. He recalled the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its second, third and fourth sessions regarding the establishment of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum and stated that in his delegation's view, despite the de facto situation, those provisions were still fully and legally valid unless they were modified by the General Assembly. He also recalled the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V), and of Security Council resolution 252 (1968), and stated that in the light of those decisions, the new legislative and administrative measures and other actions taken by Israel which tended to change the legal status of Jerusalem had no legal validity and were not binding. Moreover, those actions taken by Israel in Jerusalem affected other aspects of the general problem of the area and had a negative effect on the efforts being made both by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative and by four Permanent Members of the Security Council.

449. The representative of Syria stated that Israel's violation of the Council resolution on Jerusalem was only part of Israel's pattern of behaviour. Israel had disregarded all resolutions relating to Jerusalem, had taken the law into its own hands and was depriving the Arabs in Jerusalem and the other occupied territories of basic human rights.

450. The representative of Israel stated that Arab intransigence and hostility toward Israel had been made clear in the statements of the United Arab Republic, Algeria and Syria. Replying to Arab assertions, he stated that Jerusalem had been united and integral for centuries and had been divided for only nineteen years after an invasion. He went on to say that for the first time all universal religions were accorded recognition and respect, and Israel would make certain that all inhabitants of Jerusalem, Jew and Arab, would have their rights respected.

451. At the 1485th meeting of the Council on 3 July, the representative of Afghanistan said that he held the same views as expressed by previous speakers that the status of Jerusalem should not be changed, that Israel should withdraw its forces from all the occupied territories and that Israel's actions in East Jerusalem were detrimental to the common interests. The United Nations had an obligation to take action in the matter, which was of interest to the small countries which made up the majority of the United Nations member

ship. In an insecure world no small country could allow the concept of acquisition of territory by military force to be accepted. He appealed to the members of the Council to intensify their efforts to bring about peace in the Middle East.

452. The representative of Saudi Arabia reiterated his previous position and stated that the United Nations should implement its decisions rather than pass resolutions which seemed to be a futile exercise. The big Powers, he added, should act before it was too late.

453. The representative of Tunisia said that by its action in Jerusalem, Israel was violating international law and the resolutions of the United Nations. He hoped that the Council would show the proper determination to see that its resolutions were implemented. Israel had said it would not give up Jerusalem. The Council should face that challenge.

454. The representative of Sudan said that he was appealing to the Council members to see that their decision on Jerusalem was not made void by the daily acts of Israel to perpetuate its domination. The Palestinians would never forget the injustice done to them. They were scattered in refugee camps, but they were fighting back; and the leaders of Israel must fear the relentless force of the Palestinians' desire to return to their homeland. There was no doubt that Israel's actions in Jerusalem were in violation of the Security Council resolution on the issue. Referring to statements by Israel leaders about annexing Jerusalem, half of the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, and stating that Israel had refused all peace overtures, he said that the Council must find a way to ensure implementation of its resolutions. The peace effort would otherwise fail.

455. The representative of Jordan observed that the Council was now in possession of photographs showing the construction of Israel settlements (S/9289 and S/9303) and the bulldozing of Arab shrines. The Israelis presented the conflict as one between Israel and the Arab States, ignoring the Palestinian people. Stressing the colonial character of Israel policies, he recalled that according to one historian, the Zionist Jews from East Europe had inflicted in Palestine the same moral wrong as had been committed in South Africa and Rhodesia. He said that nobody liked any form of foreign domination. People liked freedom, even with poverty.

456. The representative of Yemen said that his country had hoped the Council would take the required measures to protect Jerusalem's special character. Israel had deprived the Palestine people of their homeland. It had persisted with its measures in Jerusalem, despite the United Nations resolutions on the subject. The Council should make sure that the Zionist State did not defy the whole world.

457. The representative of Pakistan pointed out that this was the third time in two years that the United Nations had been concerned with the question of Jerusalem. Israel had shown total defiance of the Council's resolutions and had refused to rescind measures changing the legal status of the city. Recalling the statements of the representatives of the big Powers and statements by representatives of a wide range of countries condemning Israel's actions as offensive to the universal religious interest and as transgressing the rules which govern military occupation under international law, he stated that any Council decision should be based on the principle of the non-admissibility of territorial gains by conquest. He added that no one would be deluded by Israel's talk of "reunification" of Jerusalem. Referring to Article 24 (1) of the Charter, which conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, he said the four permanent members of the Council had to safeguard the interest of all Members of the United Nations in the City of Jerusalem. The representative of Pakistan then introduced a draft resolution (S/9311) sponsored by Pakistan, Senegal and

Zambia. The text of the draft resolution read as follows:

"The Security Council,

458. The President, speaking as the representative of Senegal, stated that the problem of Jerusalem was a religious, juridical and political one and could not be solved by administrative measures. Although requested by the Council not to take any measures to change the status of Jerusalem, Israel had acted in dilatory fashion and did not seem to be willing to comply therewith. All Members should abide by the United Nations decisions.

459. In putting the draft resolution to the vote, the President stated that a separate vote had been requested on operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution.

Decision: At the 1485th meeting on 3 July 1969, paragraph 5 of the three-Power draft resolution was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (United States).

The draft resolution as a whole was adopted unanimously, as resolution 267 (1969).

460. After the vote, the representative of the USSR stated that he had voted for the draft resolution because, basically, it reflected world indignation at Israel's actions and its refusal to abide by the Council's resolutions. There was a special significance to the new resolution because it had been adopted unanimously. If Israel disregarded it, the Council must meet again to consider further action.

461. The representative of the United States said that he had voted for the resolution because it was consistent with his Government's position on Jerusalem. His delegation abstained on paragraph 5 because the language in it was inconsistent with the language of the previous paragraph, which stated that the measures referred to could not change the status of Jerusalem. Moreover, the United States did not consider the provision practical. In voting for the resolution, his delegation was not committing itself to any specific course of action in any future consideration of the matter by the Council. The United States continued to believe that Jerusalem could not be dealt with on a piecemeal basis. It rededicated itself to a determined effort for agreement on a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in the context of which Jerusalem should not again become a bone of contention among religions and nations.

462. The representative of Israel stated that his delegation had already called the attention of the Council to the Arab States' repudiation of the United Nations Charter in relation to Israel, among other things their rejection of the Security Council's peace and cease-fire resolutions. He questioned the value of a resolution adopted at the instigation of those States. Resolutions of the kind just adopted by the Council could not affect Jerusalem's life.

463. The representative of Jordan stated that Israel was engaged in disqualifying various States after having disqualified the Council in connexion with its decision on the Beirut raid. But the Council should ponder what to do about Israel's defiance. There was no alternative to the Council thinking seriously of invoking Article 41 of the Charter providing for sanctions. States should also stop shipping weapons to Israel. After thanking all the delegations which stood for justice, he noted that the Council had voted unanimously and said that now, more than ever, Israel stood alone.

(c)  Communications and reports received between 30 June and 15 July 1969

464. On 30 June the Secretary-General issued an addendum (S/9149/Add.1 and Corr.1) to his report of 11 April on the implementation of resolution 252 (1968), in which he brought to the attention of the Security Council further information concerning legislation adopted by Israel. The legislation consisted of certain emergency regulations entitled "Regulation of Legal and Administrative Matters–Further Provisions", which took the form of additional provisions of the "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law" contained in his initial report (S/9149). The addendum contained as annex A an unofficial translation of a Law and Administration Ordinance, and as annexes B and C two sets of regulations which postponed for six months certain of the provisions of the "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law".

465. By a letter dated 3 July (S/9312), the representative of Turkey transmitted the text of a statement made by his Minister of Foreign Affairs in connexion with the Security Council's discussion. The statement recalled the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly in connexion with the status of Jerusalem and noted that Israel had continued to take measures inconsistent with them. Turkey hoped and believed that the Security Council would re-examine the current situation in detail and take all the measures it might deem necessary for its amelioration.

D. Other matters brought to the attention of the Security Council

in connexion with the situation in the Middle East

(a) Communications concerning an attack on an Israel civil aircraft

at Zurich airport

466. On 18 February 1969, a spokesman of the Secretary-General stated that the Secretary-General had heard with dismay and deep concern of the attack on an El Al airliner at Zurich airport on that day. The Secretary-General believed that that attack, as well as the one at the Beirut airport two months previously, was a matter of urgent concern to all Governments and peoples. The Secretary-General also hoped that that act would not be followed by an attack of retaliation but by constructive international action to prevent acts of violence against international civil aviation in the future.

467. In communications dated 19, 20 and 25 February (S/9016, S/9017, S/9018, S/9020, S/9025), the United States, United Kingdom, Finland, France and Italy condemned the attack and expressed concern at the threat which such attacks posed for the safety of international civil aviation. They appealed to the parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exercise the utmost restraint so as to avoid the chain of action and reprisal and not jeopardize the efforts in search for peace in the area.

468. In a letter dated 20 February (S/9021), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel protested to the Secretary-General against an armed assault on the crew and passengers of the EL Al aircraft at Zurich on 18 February, two months after a similar attack on another Israel aircraft at Athens airport. He believed that those actions were the work of organized groups of saboteurs operating with the support and co-operation of Arab Governments which were Member States of the United Nations and of the International Civil Aviation Agency. After noting that the Security Council resolution of 31 December 1968 had not said a word against the attack on an El Al aircraft at the Athens airport, the Foreign Minister expressed the view that the latest attack had taken place "in the atmosphere of international indulgence thus created". After referring to the above statement of the spokesman of the Secretary-General, he expressed interest in what constructive international action the Secretary-General had in mind to prevent those actions against international civil aviation.

469. In a reply dated 26 February (S/9030), to the Foreign Minister of Israel the Secretary-General stated that he had been in touch with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association regarding the Zurich incident. He had also consulted certain Members of the United Nations with a view of finding means to prevent those acts. He believed that improved methods of international police co-operation and regulation of a national as well as international character might contribute towards the prevention of those acts of terrorism and violence. However, he considered that the only sure way of bringing an end to terrorist acts would be some substantial movement towards a peaceful settlement of the major issues underlying the Middle East conflict on the basis of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. An essential first step towards that end would be a declared readiness by the parties to implement that resolution.

470. In a reply dated 5 March (S/9048), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel stated his country was vitally interested in the promotion of improved methods for international police co-operation and regulation of a national and international character and would actively associate itself with the meeting of the Council of the ICAO. However, it would be wrong to ignore the responsibility of Member States, since the attacks at the Zurich and Athens airports and the hijacking of an Israel airliner to Algiers had not been acts of individuals, but of terrorist organizations supported and encouraged by Arab States in violation of their international responsibilities. He suggested that constructive international action to safeguard civil aviation might include an undertaking by all States to prevent and condemn actions on their soil designed to endanger civil aviation, and he regretted that the Secretary-General had not conveyed his Government's request to certain Arab Governments to condemn those attacks and dissociate themselves from them and take required steps against the organizations which had carried out those attacks. His Government would continue to co-operate with Special Representative of the Secretary-General to promote an agreement for the implementation of the resolution of 22 November 1967.

471. In a letter dated 10 March (S/9064), the Secretary-General quoted the exchange of communications between himself and the Permanent Representative of Israel on 19 and 20 February in which the Secretary-General had indicated that it would not be helpful if his good offices were used to transmit questions or messages of a political nature from one Government to another unless the parties concerned had previously agreed to that procedure. He had, therefore, been unable to carry out Israel's request to transmit two questions to certain Arab Governments, but he had suggested that the Government of Israel might bring those questions to the attention of those concerned through a communication to the Security Council. The Secretary-General added that he continued to believe that a declaration by the

parties of their readiness to implement the 22 November resolution would constitute a helpful first step towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

(b) Communications concerning archaeological excavations in occupied territory

472. In a letter dated 23 May 1969 (S/9220), Syria charged that Israel was continuing its excavations in the occupied territory of Syria and was misappropriating Syrian cultural property. These excavations were being undertaken in the areas of Banias and Fiq, where Roman temples had been found, and in the area of Jibbin, where an archaelogical hill had been destroyed as a result of the opening of a road. After declaring that very important archaeological pieces had been removed from their places of origin, Syria stated that those illegal acts constituted a violation of articles 4 and 5 of the 1954 Hague Convention as well as of article VI, paragraph 32, of the recommendations adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in 1956. Syria referred to its previous complaint on 7 July 1967 (S/8040), which Israel had, on 14 July 1967 (S/8058), declared unfounded, stating that a representative of UNESCO, who was then expected in Israel, would be invited to visit the site referred to by Syria. Syria requested a report on the question of excavations and theft of its cultural property.

473. In a letter dated 29 May (S/9229 and Rev.1), Israel, in reply, stated that no Israel scientist had carried out any excavations in any of the sites mentioned by Syria or in any other parts of the Golan Heights. The historical altar from the town of Banias had been removed temporarily and restored to its original site after arrangements for its safety had been completed. In a letter dated 6 February 1968 to the Director-General of UNESCO, the Commissioner-General, appointed under The Hague Convention of May 1954, had already dismissed such Syrian charges. The report of the Director-General to the seventy- eighth session of the Executive Board of UNESCO had stated that the Commissioner-General in Jerusalem had informed him that "investigations had been carried out where the information supplied had been sufficient to make inquiries possible, and that the complaints in question had proved groundless".

474. In a letter dated 10 June (S/9246), Syria, pointing out that Israel had admitted having remove the historical altar for its safety and that it had been restored later, stated that those justifications had also been used by the Nazi occupiers in Europe. The report of the Director-General of UNESCO quoted by Israel related only to complaints made in 1967 and 1968. Moreover, the High Commissioner had stated that his investigations were based upon cases "where the information supplied had been sufficient to make inquiries possible". In the same report, the High Commissioner had informed the Director-General of UNESCO that "atmospheric conditions" had made the Golan Heights inaccessible and that he had been unable to visit the site of excavations. Israel, in citing the report of the Director-General of UNESCO, had only meant to mislead the international community. Syria's six complaints, contained in its letter of 23 May 1969, remained unanswered, and only when a report of the Director-General of UNESCO on the matter was submitted in 1969, with specific reference to Syria's 1967 complaints, could it be cited in answer to Syria's letter. In a further letter dated 1 July (S/9299), Syria stated that its accusations stood and that it was awaiting the report on them by the Director-General of UNESCO.

(c) Communications concerning the treatment of Jewish communities in Arab States

475. In a letter dated 30 September 1968 (S/8837) Iraq protested against the interference in its internal affairs represented by the discussion by Israel in the Security Council regarding the treatment of Jews in Iraq and denied the Israel allegations (see section B above). In a letter of 9 October (S/8844), Israel reaffirmed its position that the situation of the Iraqi Jews should be the subject of a fact-finding mission by representative of the Secretary-General, as provided in resolution 237 (1967); and in a further letter of 11 October (S/8848), Israel drew attention to a cable from the association of Jews from Egypt, Iraq and Syria, expressing concern at the conditions of Jews in those countries.

476. In a letter dated 27 January 1969 (S/8982) the Foreign Minister of Israel protested the execution by Iraq on that day of nine Iraqi Jews, who, it was stated, had been wrongfully accused of spying for Israel. In a letter of 29 January (S/8987), the representative of the United States drew attention to the statement of the United States Secretary of State expressing concern on humanitarian grounds at the public execution of fourteen persons convicted of espionage in Iraq. In its statement transmitted on 31 January (S/8989), Iraq stated that those executed had been tried in accordance with the law and found guilty of espionage; those not found guilty, including Jews, had been acquitted. It accused Israel of distorting the facts to create a propaganda smokescreen. By a letter of 6 February (S/8997), Israel transmitted twenty-seven statements from various countries relating to the executions in Iraq.

477. In a further letter dated 26 February (S/9031), Israel protested against the executions of 20 February in Iraq of eight persons for espionage for Israel and charged continued inhuman measures against the Jewish community in Iraq. These charges were rejected by Iraq in a letter dated 11 March (S/9068). In a letter of 19 March (S/9095), Israel, and in a letter of 27 March (S/9118 and Corr.1) Iraq, reaffirmed their charges.

E. Reports of the Secretary-General on the progress of the efforts

of his Special Representative to the Middle East

478. On 29 July 1968, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a fourth report (S/8309/Add.3) on the progress of the efforts of his Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, covering his activities after 29 March 1968. It stated that during that period Ambassador Jarring had held discussions with the Governments of Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Israel and Lebanon. In addition to reporting to the Secretary-General regularly on those meetings, Ambassador Jarring also had met him at Teheran on 22 April 1968, and it was then agreed that he would return to New York for further consultations. He stayed in New York between 15 May and 21 June, during which period he held consultations with the Secretary-General and the permanent representatives  of  the  parties concerned.

479. During the period between 21 June, when he left for Europe, and 22 July, when he returned to New York, Ambassador Jarring had met with officials of some of the parties in various cities of Europe. In the light of his discussions, he had arrived at the conclusion, which was endorsed by the Secretary-General, that it would be advisable for him to extend further his contacts with the parties, and for that purpose he would return to the Middle East.

480. On 3 December 1968, the Secretary-General submitted the fifth report (S/8309/ Add.4) on the mission of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, covering his activities after 29 July.

481. In accordance with his intention as recorded in the previous report, Ambassador Jarring arrived in Nicosia on 15 August for a further round of discussions with Governments concerned. On 23 September, he arrived at United Nations Headquarters, where the Foreign Ministers of the parties had gathered for the twenty-third session of the General Assembly. Ambassador Jarring first met with them informally, and later formally, and concluded his discussions with them by receiving written communications from the Foreign Ministers of Israel and the United Arab Republic.

482. On 26 November, Ambassador Jarring wrote to the Secretary-General, stating that, as agreed with him, he was leaving New York on 27 November for a further round of talks with the parties and that he intended to invite them to a new round of discussions in the middle of January 1969. In his reply dated 27 November, the Secretary-General, after concurring with Ambassador Jarring's programme, expressed to him his gratification on Ambassador Jarring's willingness to continue his efforts with the parties towards a peaceful settlement. The Secretary-General once again put on record his appreciation of the wisdom, tact and patience shown by Ambassador Jarring in the task entrusted to him.

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