OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir on the question of land,
Tel Aviv, 4 June 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Statement on the peace process by Mr. Bassam Abu-Sharif,
the Palestine Liberation Organization spokesman,
Rome, June 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Statement by Mr. David Levi, Foreign Minister of Israel,
after meeting Mr. James Baker, United States Secretary of State,
in Washington on 13 June 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Excerpt from the partial text of letter by President George Bush
to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, date not given: end of May/
beginning of June 1991, as published by the Israeli newspaper
Ma'ariv on 10 June 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Partial text of letter by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir
to President George Bush, date not given, as published by
the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv on 19 June 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Press Release, Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic
in Washington, D.C., 14 July 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Political declaration, London Economic Summit 1991,
16 July 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Extracts from replies by President Hafez al-Assad to questions
from journalists following the visit of Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak to Damascus on 17 July 1991, released in Arabic
by the Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic,
Washington, D.C., date not given. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Extracts from replies by Secretary of State James A. Baker and
Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara' to questions from journalists
following the meeting with President Hafez al-Assad on 18 July 1991,
as circulated by the Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic,
Washington, D.C., on 19 July 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Statement by President Bush and President Gorbachev
on the Middle East, Moscow, 31 July 1991. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
In April 1991, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People requested that the Division for Palestinian Rights of the United Nations Secretariat prepare urgently and update regularly, for the use of the Committee members and observers, a compilation of relevant recent statements, declarations and proposals regarding the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the question of Palestine and the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East. The first issue of the compilation, prepared in response to the decision of the Committee, appeared the same month.
Note should be made that reproduced herein are only those parts of the statements, declarations, proposals and initiatives, quoted or summarized, which relate to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the question of Palestine.
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir on the question of land,
On 4 June 1991, in his address before religious teachers at Tel Aviv, Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, the Prime Minister of Israel, said the following regarding the territories occupied by Israel:
"I must say that as long as the Arab States look for ways to bypass direct negotiations, whether by involving the United Nations or through an international conference, it will be a sign that they have not yet decided to end the conflict, to recognize Israel, to get used to the idea of its existence, or to reach a peace settlement with the State of Israel. Up to this moment, the expected turning point has not come, and our neighbours still insist on a continuing status for the international body and for it to be institutionalized.
"The extent of concessions we made when we agreed that the sovereignty of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip will be an issue for negotiations, despite our deep belief that those areas are an organic part of Eretz Yisrael, the State of the Jewish people, must be appreciated.
"We agreed that those issues would be discussed in negotiations, since we are committed to that in the Camp David accords, and Israel always stands by its commitments. Those who call on us to compromise on that issue would never consider for even one moment handing over their vital interests, including a single inch of their land, to any international forum. That is a demand made only of Israel."1/
Statement on the peace process by Mr. Bassam Abu-Sharif,
the Palestine Liberation Organization spokesman,
According to Al-Dustur, dated 11 June 1991, Mr. Bassam Abu-Sharif, the Palestine Liberation Organization spokesman, during a seminar held at Rome in early June, summarized the position of the PLO as regards the peace process in the Middle East in the following :
"…
"1. The PLO is ready to find a just solution and to work toward establishing a comprehensive peace through direct negotiations with the Israeli Government under international supervision or under the supervision of a commission from the USSR, the United States, and Europe.
"2. The basis of this solution is international legitimacy, that is, Security Council and United Nations resolutions on the Israeli- Palestinian-Arab conflict and UN resolutions related to the Palestinian people's rights.
"3. The PLO accepts the principle of UN resolution 181, which stipulates the establishment of two States in Palestine, one Palestinian and the other for the Jews.
"4. The PLO accepts resolution 242, and the Palestinian State, provided for by resolution 181, will be established on the Palestinian territories which were occupied in 1967.
"5. The PLO condemns terrorism, whether it is by individuals, groups, or state terrorism.
"7. The PLO accepts a short transitional stage during which the occupied territories would be placed under the supervision of the United Nations. During that period, arrangements shall be made to establish the State, and all details, including the creation of a passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the water, labour, and other issues, will be discussed at the negotiations.
"8. During this period, a timetable for the Israeli forces' withdrawal will be implemented. At the end of this period, a referendum shall be held on the form of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.
"9. Security guarantees shall be given to Israel by the UN Security Council five permanent member States as long as these guarantees do not conflict with Palestinian sovereignty.
"10. The PLO accepts that a UN peace-keeping force be deployed on the border area on the Palestinian side to ensure the commitment to the guarantees given to Israel and to guarantee the security of the Palestinian State."2/
Statement by Mr. David Levi, Foreign Minister of Israel,
after meeting Mr. James Baker, United States Secretary of State,
in Washington on 13 June 1991
After his meeting with Mr. James Baker, United States Secretary of State, on 13 June 1991 in Washington, Mr. David Levi, Foreign Minister of Israel, said the following, as communicated by Jerusalem Israel Television Network on 14 June 1991:
"I cannot, of course, go into all the details [of the Baker meeting], except for one: no Palestinian State. The process is not aimed at bringing about a Palestinian State. Two, no PLO, in any form. Three, nothing will be agreed on behind Israel's back, and Israel will not be surprised. There were also other things; direct negotiations are the target of the process. No element will intervene over the issues to be brought up or on the bilateral discussion between Israel and the Arab States. Those are very important issues which had to be gone over once again."3/
Excerpt from the partial text of letter by
President George Bush to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir,
date not given:4/ as published by the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv on 10 June 1991
"Although I know that making peace will involve risks for Israel, we built a process that provides answers to your concerns and needs. It is a process that includes the Arab States and the Palestinians, the Palestinians from the territories, and not the PLO.
"The process tries to bypass the issues which caused you problems in the past year; a process which squares with Camp David, which will continue in stages to assure that you will not have to cope with the issues of the final status (of the territories) at the beginning of the process; a process which will start with a conference that will not torpedo or compete with direct talks.
"I told you on the phone that I am determined to bring the Arabs to the negotiating table with you and to start talking. The United States will not be a partner to a conference that puts up obstacles or contradicts or replaces direct negotiations between the sides. Only direct negotiations can settle the differences between you.
"We have already taken the trouble to make that very clear to the Arabs and the Palestinians. Jim Baker told them that they must enter give-and-take negotiations with you; that they should not depend on a conference or hold onto anything else that might extricate them from that need or the need to compromise and reach difficult decisions for the sake of peace.
"We will say that plainly: The conference to which we are referring is not a forum for negotiations or decision-making; it is a forum to break the 'taboo' of a face-to-face meeting and for the sake of advancing a direct dialogue.
"I also understand your concerns about a UN presence at a conference and about additional convocations of the conference, but I do not see how a simple observer can be a problem for you, especially if he will be present only at a conference which cannot dictate its preferences.
"Furthermore, the lack of a decision-making role, our determination to assure that all the sides understand that a conference cannot serve as a forum for appeals, and your ability to prevent any meeting which you do not want, all these ensure that there will be no way to get out of negotiations. When all these are joined together, they meet your concern that the conference should not reconvene at some future time.
"On the issue of the United Nations and the reconvening (of the conference), we studied various alternative proposals–the 'alternatives' that Jim promised to try, but without success. In this process, already based mainly on your conditions, we cannot sell anything less to your neighbours.
"King Hussayn is being asked mainly to deal with the PLO, the fundamentalists, and perhaps Syria, and he needs several tokens to which he can point. Honestly, he will not need those tokens and there will be no doubt about his ability to include Palestinians in a joint delegation if he can say that there will be a freeze in settlement activity the moment negotiations start.
"I call on you to consider that. If it is impossible, then we will require something like the compromise proposal that we worked out on the United Nations issue and the right of the conference to convene more than once. In any case, your interests will be looked after, and whatever the circumstances, these limited tokens will not influence the contents of the negotiations.
"You should also know that when we get closer to reaching an opportunity to issue invitations to a conference, we expect the Soviets to agree to the approach explained here.
"It is important that we focus on the significance of this effort: direct negotiations. I believe that we are able to get these negotiations going. It would be very difficult to understand somebody who chooses not to enter into direct bilateral or multilateral negotiations because of the two problems of modalities–which are still on the table. Modalities which, as I have said, cannot influence the negotiations themselves.
"I depend on you personally, Mr. Prime Minister, to help us bridge the gaps and get the negotiations started. With a joint effort, we have a chance to start direct negotiations and to establish real hope for a more tranquil future for the region. I cannot think of a better legacy for both of us to pass on to those who come after us."5/
Partial text of letter by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir
to President George Bush, date not given,6/
as published by the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv on 10 June 1991
"I will deal with the points you raised in your letter, which deal with the peace process with the candor and frankness called for in our special relationship.
"Our position, which is based on long experience, is that direct negotiations with each of the Arab States separately is not just a matter of technical procedure. It involves testing the intentions of the Arabs, who have still not changed, about their acceptance of Israel and reconciliation with it.
"With the particular logic of this part of the world, our neighbours are still looking for a process that will enable them in the end to claim that they did not recognize Israel's right to exist as a legitimate entity in the region. They therefore demand as wide-ranging an international character to the discussions as possible, as well as UN participation. That is the reason for their demand to define the aim of the peace process in terms such as an overall settlement, and not as peace agreements with Israel.
"Those are the reasons for our positions over the years, which each Arab Government interested in joining the peace process must undertake to discuss directly with Israel.
"An international conference will sabotage direct discussions and will prevent them form having any chance of succeeding. Any kind of call or reconvening of the conference will create the same negative results and will push the focus away from direct bilateral discussions. We know for a fact that that is the aim behind the Arab demand for continuation and UN participation.
"Within the framework of our peace initiative and in the exchange of views with Secretary Baker, we tried to take into account Arab sensitivities. We agreed to joint auspices to start direct discussions only in order to satisfy the Arab demand for what they call 'international legitimacy'; we agreed to joint auspices and a UN contribution because we feared that our agreement on those points would open the way to what would become an international conference with UN participation.
"We are keen to conduct peace talks with our Arab neighbours, though they continue to arm themselves unceasingly and do not hide the fact that those arms are meant to be used against us.
"We agree with you completely about the need to help King Hussayn and to encourage him to join the peace process. I continue to be convinced that Jordan is the most logical and reasonable partner for peace talks with us. Any assistance that can help in that direction will be welcomed.
"An understanding was reached that the Arab-Palestinian representatives would come from the region, that they would accept the two-track negotiations and the rapprochement in stages, and that they would be committed to live in peace with Israel. Those demands alone, however, do not guarantee the appointment of representatives who are trustworthy and are not in any way subservient to the PLO.
"That is vital because there can be no peace process with Israel if the PLO is involved. We believe that a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation is the best way to deal with the issue of the Arab Palestinian representation and to discuss with us a solution of the Arab Palestinian problem. In addition, the composition of the Palestinian part of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation must be agreed to by us…"7/
Press Release, Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic
in Washington, D.C., 14 July 1991
The text of the press release reads as follows:
"Syrian Foreign Minister Mr. Farouk Al-Sharaa today handed American Ambassador Mr. Edward Djerjejian a letter from President Hafez Assad to President George Bush. The letter contains Syria's response to Mr. Bush's letter concerning the convening of a peace conference to find a just and comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of United Nations resolutions.
"In his letter, President Hafez Assad commended the efforts made by President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker to overcome the difficulties impeding the convening of a peace conference.
"President Assad characterized as positive and balanced Mr. Bush's proposals and subsequent American clarifications, considering them an acceptable basis for reaching a comprehensive solution and achieving peace in the region, because these proposals are based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 which are applicable to all fronts, and securing the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people.
"President Assad expressed his satisfaction that President Bush proceeded in his proposals from the principles of international legitimacy and paid particular attention to the role of the United Nations at the peace conference, and stressed upon European participation.
"President Assad expressed special appreciation for President Bush's pledge that the United States and the Soviet Union will be a moving force behind the peace process and will take upon themselves the special responsibility of bringing the peace conference to a successful conclusion in terms of achieving its goals as defined by pertinent United Nations resolutions."
Political declaration, London Economic Summit 1991,
The political declaration of the London Economic Summit entitled "Strengthening the international order" contains the following passage, para. 8:
"…
"8. We attach overriding importance to the launching of a process designed to bring comprehensive, just and lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbours, including the Palestinians. Such a peace should be based on United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. We support the concept of a peace conference starting parallel and direct negotiations between Israel and representative Palestinians on the one hand, and Israel and the Arab States on the other. We confirm our continuing support for the current American initiative to advance the peace process, which we believe offers the best hope of progress towards a settlement. We urge all the parties to the dispute to adopt reciprocal and balanced confidence-building measures and to show the flexibility necessary to allow a peace conference to be convened on the basis set out in this initiative. In that connection we believe that the Arab boycott should be suspended as should the Israeli policy of building settlements in the occupied territories."
Extracts from replies by President Hafez al-Assad to questions from journalists
following the visit of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to Damascus on
17 July 1991, released in Arabic by the Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic,
Washington, D.C., date not given
The following text of the extracts was translated at the United Nations:
"President Hafez al-Assad said: 'We have discussions with the Americans concerning their ideas, as submitted to us, for achieving peace in the region.' He went on to say: 'What has emerged is what we might call a set of proposals sent out by President Bush in a letter addressed to Syria. We have studied them carefully, we consider that they contain points of balance, and we have decided to give our agreement, because the points were to some extent appropriate and the premises derived from the pertinent United Nations resolutions.'
"Replying to a question about the role which could be played by the United Nations, President al-Assad said that he was satisfied with that role and added: 'The United Nations is present in its resolutions, it is present in the observers to which the American plan refers and it is present in the agreements which must also be submitted to the United Nations for approval. We can say that there is a set of elements which ensure a useful and continuing role.'
"The President also mentioned Security Council resolution 338 (1973) and the Geneva Conference: 'The Conference was convened under a Security Council resolution; the Conference held its first session and, from the legal standpoint, it remains in existence.'
"According to President al-Assad, experience showed that Israel was stubborn and would endeavour to prevent the achievement of real peace in the region. 'As you know,' he said, 'they – or at least some of them – are now talking of a golden age. We want this to be a golden age for the whole world and for our Arab nation too.'
"Of the next step after acceptance of the American plan, the President said: 'We of course have our view of the next step and I spoke about this with President Mubarak, but this is our view, that of the Arab side, and we shall see what is suggested by the United States as the principal intermediary.'
"In reply to a question as to whether the American plan addressed Israel's occupation of the Golan as an essential element, President al-Assad said: 'Of course it is an essential element, as is every inch of Arab land.' He said that Syria and Egypt were committed to the Palestinian cause and that this was self-evident. 'The solution must be comprehensive, meaning that there can be no separate solution of a Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese or Egyptian question. We are searching for a comprehensive solution.'"
Extracts from replies by Secretary of State James A. Baker and
Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara' to questions from journalists
following the meeting with President Hafez al-Assad on 18 July 1991,
as circulated by the Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic,
Washington, D.C., on 19 July 1991
Circular No. 93, issued in Arabic by the Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic in Washington, D.C. on 19 July 1991, contains in part the following text, as translated at the United Nations:
"…
"The points contained in President Bush's letter and in President al-Assad's letter of reply were reviewed. There was agreement that the sum of the points contained in President Bush's letter constituted an appropriate basis for the convening of the peace conference and the achievement of a just and comprehensive peace on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). It was agreed that contacts between the two sides should be pursued.
"Last night, Mr. Farouk al-Shara', Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. James Baker, United States Secretary of State, held a press conference attended by correspondents of Arab and foreign news agencies and world television networks, the reporters accompanying Mr. Baker and members of the press and the media in Syria.
"At the beginning of the press conference Mr. Baker said: 'I should like to begin by saying that tonight I had a very good meeting with President Hafez al-Assad, with Mr. Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Vice-President of the Republic, and with my colleague Mr. Farouk al-Shara', Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is apparent to me that Syria has made a very important decision and, as a result of that meeting, I am pleased to report that Syria has agreed to the proposals we have made, including coming to a peace conference whose terms of reference would be a comprehensive settlement based on resolutions 242 and 338. I think that this is an extraordinarily important and positive step, it gives us something to work with, and we are going to try and build on it throughout this trip in an effort to promote the cause of peace.'
"Mr. Farouk al-Shara', Minister for Foreign Affairs, then spoke, saying: 'I agree with Mr. Baker. The meeting with President Hafez al-Assad was good, and there was no difficulty reaching agreement on the contents of President Bush's letter and the positive response of President al-Assad to the American proposals, proposals which are based on resolutions 242 and 338 and on the principles of international legitimacy.'
"In reply to a question on the role of the United Nations, as reported in the Syrian press quoting President Hafez al-Assad, Mr. Baker said: 'We are in agreement with what was reported. There are a number of factors relating to the United Nations, and perhaps the most important of these is the one that I mentioned just now, namely the terms of reference on the conference and the negotiations that will follow. This will be reflected in any invitation issued to attend the conference with the aim of seeking a comprehensive settlement based on United Nations resolutions 242 and 338. Then, as you know, a United Nations observer will be present, or perhaps a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will attend.'
"Question: 'Will the United Nations role be that of a participant?'
"Mr. Baker answered: 'The representative will have the capacity of an observer.' Mr. Baker added that, within the framework, the observer, as a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, would be able to register comments and make contact with the participants and those sponsoring the conference. 'These are the proposals that we made, and these are the proposals that President Hafez al-Assad agreed to.'
"In reply to a question, Mr. Baker said: 'All the parties have agreed that the terms of reference would be resolutions 242 and 338. The parties will have different interpretations of what the resolutions mean and of what they require. The progress of the negotiations will provide us with the answer to what it is that these resolutions require in particular.'
In reply to another question, on whether the United States had given any private assurances to Syria, Mr. Baker answered: 'Since the beginning of my efforts for peace in the Middle East I have made it clear that no assurances would be given to any one party that would not be made known to the others. The method that we have established in our efforts is the same method that we are pursuing now, and no private assurances will be provided that are not made known to the other parties. With regard to the Golan Heights, you are aware of the political position of the United States concerning the Golan. We have not recognized Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights.'
"To a question addressed to Mr. al-Shara' concerning Syria's understanding of the role of the United Nations in the peace conference, he answered: 'I should like to refer to the statement made by President Hafez al-Assad the day before yesterday in his press conference with President Hosni Mubarak. The elements that constitute a role for the United Nations will produce the important role that we seek from the United Nations. In other words, we can say that there is a set of elements that accords a useful role to the United Nations and a basis for international legitimacy. We are therefore satisfied with the contents of President Bush's letter to President Hafez al-Assad.'
"To a question addressed to Mr. al-Shara' on whether the United Nations observer role would authorize it to participate in the negotiations, he answered: 'As I told you, the presence of the United Nations at the peace conference will not be reflected only in the attendance of a United Nations observer but will also reflect a set of elements at the head of which is the fact that United Nations resolutions 242 and 338 will serve as terms of of reference. Furthermore, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be kept fully informed, by the United States and the Soviet Union, of the progress made in the peace process throughout that process from beginning to end. There is an understanding of the contents of President Bush's letter to the effect that the agreements that will be reached will be deposited with the United Nations and then approved by the Security Council.'
"Mr. Baker was asked whether Israel would be interested in the talks he had held with the Syrians or if it ought to be interested. Baker said: 'I very much hope so, because I believe that the proposals that we have put forward are good and reasonable proposals. As you all know, Israel has had a number of nagging problems. So I cannot prejudge what its reactions will be like. Of course, between now and my meeting with the Israeli leaders, I shall be holding a number of meetings in other Arab capitals, and I am looking forward to finding out what reactions are in those capitals.'
"Mr. Baker was asked whether the Moscow Summit would issue invitations to attend the conference. He said: 'I believe, and I am sure, that President Bush and President Gorbachev will talk about the United States and Soviet efforts and those of many other countries to create a peace process in the Middle East, which is what the region sorely needs. As to whether it will issue invitations or not, I think much depends on what the results will be like in the other capitals we are going to visit.'
"Mr. al-Shara' was asked whether the conference would be reconvened. He said: 'Our interpretation is that the conference will not conclude its sessions in practical terms until it achieves its objectives, namely peace. The conference may suspend its plenary sessions, but it will not complete its work until it manages to achieve its goal or the purpose for which it was convened'."
Statement by President Bush and President Gorbachev
on the Middle East, Moscow, 31 July 1991
Following is the text of the statement as published in The New York Times:
"President Bush and President Gorbachev reaffirmed their strong mutual commitment to promote peace and genuine reconciliation among the Arab States, Israel and the Palestinians. They believe there is an historic opportunity now to launch a process that can lead to a just and enduring peace and to a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. They share the strong conviction that this historic opportunity must not be lost.
"While recognizing that peace cannot be imposed and that it can only result from direct negotiations between the parties, the United States and the Soviet Union pledge to do their utmost to promote and sustain the peacemaking process.
"To that end, the United States and the Soviet Union, acting as co-sponsors, will work to convene in October a peace conference designed to launch bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Invitations to the conference will be issued at least 10 days prior to the date the conference is to convene. In the interim, Secretary Baker and Minister Bessmertnykh will continue to work with the parties to prepare for the conference."8/
1. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia, No. FBIS-NES-91-108, 5 June 1991, p. 17.
2. Ibid., No. FBIS-NES-91-112, 11 June 1991, pp. 7-8.
3. Ibid., No. FBIS-NES-91-116, 17 June 1991, p. 19.
4. End of May/beginning of June 1991; The New York Times of 19 July 1991 indicates 1 June 1991 as the date of the letter.
5. Ibid., No. FBIS-NES-91-122, 25 June 1991, p. 18-19.
6. Beginning of June 1991.
7. Ibid., No. FBIS-NES-91-112, 11 June 1991, pp. 27-28.
8. The New York Times of 1 August 1991, p. A11.
