OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE
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Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
The issue of Palestinian deportees and the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations . . 1
Remarks by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Tel Aviv, 8 January 1993 . . . . 1
Text of a statement by the Palestinian delegation to the
Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, Jerusalem, 13 January 1993 . . . . . . . . 2
Excerpts from an interview with the Head of
Information Department of the PLO, 14 January 1993. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Excerpts from an interview with Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin,
Jerusalem, 21 January 1993. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Excerpts from an interview with President of Egypt Hosni Mubarak,
Cairo, January 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Excerpts from a decision by the High Court of Justice of Israel
on the question of the Palestinian deportees, Jerusalem, 28 January 1993. . 7
Remarks by the Vice-President of the Syrian Arab Republic,
Damascus, January 1993. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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Since April 1991, at the request of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the Division for Palestinian Rights of the United Nations Secretariat has prepared on a monthly basis a compilation of relevant statements, declarations, documents or other material regarding the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the question of Palestine and the convening of an international peace conference on the Middle East for the use of the Committee members and observers. The present issue covers the month of January 1993.
Reproduced herein are only those parts of the statements, declarations, documents or other material, quoted or summarized, which relate to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the question of Palestine.
The issue of Palestinian deportees and the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations
Remarks by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Tel Aviv, 8 January 1993
On 8 January 1993, at Jerusalem, in an IDF* Radio interview, Foreign Minister of Israel Mr. Shimon Peres explained Israel's position on the question of the deportation of Palestinian civilians and on a possible action by the Security Council in that regard.
Asked about Security Council resolutions, Mr. Peres said:
"I am looking to the future. I think about what we must do in the future, not what we should say about the past. You can talk about the past if you either have a journalist's temperament or a historian's ambition. I have neither. I look to the future and ask what should be done from today to tomorrow. I was not here, as you know, when the Government decision was made, and I also do not want to be wise after the fact. In reference to the future, we must make sure first of all that the expulsions do not clash with the chance of renewing the peace talks. In my view, that is the supreme consideration."
Questioned whether there was such a fear, he said:
"There is such a danger. For instance, if the Security Council passes extremist resolutions, the Arabs will not allow themselves to be less extremist than the United Nations. If the European States take extremist positions, again, the Arabs will have to radicalize their positions. Therefore, we must look not only at the Arab side which comes to the peace negotiations, but also make sure that non-Arabs do not radicalize the Arab positions. I told the UN envoy today: Let us say that you remain firm in your positions and force us to yield, you will endanger the peace process. By wanting to resolve the deportee issue, you can bring the peace process to a halt. Pay attention to what is more important, to what is the really important issue.
To a question concerning a possible action by the Prime Minister or the Israeli Government, Mr. Peres replied:
"The Prime Minister's decision on the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] is very acceptable to me. In reference to the United Nations, I told the UN envoy that I do not suggest that they demand that Israel back down from its decisions because that would also cause a radicalization. At the same time, we do not want to reach an all-out clash with the United Nations. I believe there are several ideas that can unite those two contradictions into a single policy."1/
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*Israel Defence Forces
Text of a statement by the Palestinian delegation to the
Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, Jerusalem, 13 January 1993
On 13 January 1993, at Jerusalem, the following statement was released by the office of the official spokesperson of the Palestinian delegation to the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations:
"The official and firm stance of the Palestinian team to the peace talks on the deportation issue and its repercussions on the political process totally adheres to the PLO decision announced on 17 December 1992 and as clarified by the Palestinian leadership in all official internal, Arab, and international meetings.
"The deportation operation and collective banishment are among the most repugnant and harshest kinds of collective punishment and represent an escalation in Israel's practices against the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, in its violation of the Palestinian people's human and national rights, and in its persistent defiance of international legitimacy and law. Israel is using these defenceless people as hostages and victims without any accountability or deterrence.
"The recent campaign of deportation against more than 400 Palestinian residents from their homes, land, and homeland has dealt a mortal blow to the peace process and has brought it to a complete halt.
"Israel bears full responsibility for the situation which the talks have reached, bearing in mind that the peace process had faced deadlock as a result of Israeli intransigence, positions, and proposals that contravene the aims and terms of reference of the peace process, summed up in Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace.
"Resumption of the peace talks necessarily requires the return of the deportees in implementation of Security Council resolution 799 and the removal of all obstacles and causes for the failure of those talks.
"The Palestinian side, which is committed to the peace process and its aims, does not see any possibility of resuming the talks before the deportees return to their homeland. If there is a real intent to realize peace in the region through the resumption of the talks, for the breakdown of which Israel bears responsibility, the deportees should be returned and a review and assessment should be conducted of the causes and the fault that prevented any progress in the process and which consequently has led to its collapse.
"The unified stance and the decisive popular response to the deportation operation remains the greatest proof of the Palestinian people's resilience and resolve.
"Among the basic requirements for reviving a genuine peace process based on international legitimacy and actual commitment to peace, we outline the following:
– "Returning the deportees to their homeland in implementation of Security Council resolution 799 (1992). This means committing Israel to international legitimacy represented in the Security Council resolutions and in implementing the Fourth Geneva Convention in the occupied Palestinian lands. This requires curbing Israel and making it accountable and providing protection to the Palestinian people under occupation, thus ensuring a halt to all human rights violations beginning with the deportation operation and including the demolition of houses, torture of prisoners and detainees, seizure of land and resources, and all other sorts of collective punishment, including economic and political.
– "Modifying Palestinian participation in the peace process wherein it will become comprehensive, representative, and legitimate through direct and official PLO participation, without any conditions and restrictions on the participation of Jerusalem or diaspora Palestinians.
– "Reviewing the negotiating framework in light of the process' failure to achieve any progress as a result of Israeli intransigence and procrastination and the Israeli side's lack of commitment to the principles, terms of reference, and aims stipulated in and based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace. This means reinforcing the principle of withdrawal from the occupied territories and linking the transitional stage with the final stage in order to prevent any bias in implementing resolution 242 in the final stage.
– "Activating the role of the sponsoring countries and having them bear their full responsibility as a third neutral party. This would allow them to intervene directly to ensure commitment to the principles and terms of reference and end continuing Israeli attempts to infringe upon and violate those principles and terms. They should create the elements and mechanism for accountability, commitment, and arbitration.
"The Palestinian people, led by the PLO, their sole legitimate representative, is committed to a just peace that ensures their rights and is subject to international law and legitimacy. The Palestinian people have endured the hardship of deportation and the suffering of occupation with firmness and resolve. They are also confronting the challenge of peace with the confidence of a struggling people insisting on regaining rights and justice. Despite the qualitative imbalance of forces and despite the deportation that came as a steep escalation in the occupation's repressive policy and practices and in its attempts to undermine the chances of real peace, we shall not refrain from struggling for the sake of the inalienable rights of return, freedom, independence, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State on national Palestinian soil."3/
Excerpts from an interview with the Head of
Information Department of the PLO,
14 January 1993
In an interview, carried by Al-Fajr, on 14 January 1993, Mr. Yasser Abed Rabbo, Head of the Information Department of the PLO and member of its Executive Committee, stated the following regarding the position of the PLO on the deportation of Palestinian civilians and its effect on the peace process:
"…
"There are no differences in the Palestinian position. The PLO's decision was stated clearly since the first moment of deportation and before any other party. This decision stressed that there can be no participation in the peace process before the return of the deportees. This position was conveyed to all Arab and international parties. It was also discussed at the Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo. We explained that our policy is based on commitment to the peace process. It also holds Rabin's Government responsible for pushing this process toward collapse. As far as we are concerned, we cannot have negotiations on one hand, and an "iron-fist" policy and deportation on the other. This is the Palestinian stance. On the basis of this stance, the PLO was able to activate the international and Arab positions, issue [Security Council] resolution 799, and contact the European Community and ask it to intervene actively for the return of the deportees. This stance has produced good results. We adhere to an even-handed policy based on rejecting deportation and the "iron fist", stemming from the need to protect the peace process. This process cannot proceed effectively now and achieve its aims with the continuation of the current Israeli policy. In addition to this, we have stressed that repression and deportation have coincided with an inflexible Israeli stance in the negotiations. This stance became evident through the Israeli plan that calls for dividing Palestinian land and limiting Palestinian authority to administrative and municipal powers. Consequently, reopening the doors to the peace process requires abandoning the inflexible policy, both in the negotiations and in dealing with the Palestinian people in the occupied territories through an "iron-fist" policy.
"…
"We will not withdraw from the peace process. We believe that peace is in the interest of the Palestinian people. It is our main pursuit. Halting or suspending the talks, however is a protest act because of the other party's persistence to convert the talks into a futile political process. They want to pursue deportation and collective punishment despite our sitting at the negotiating table.
"We consider the peace process to be the Palestinian people's strategic option. Within the framework of this process, one should adopt positions that affirm the interests and rights of the Palestinian people and protect their security and lives. Therefore, when we refuse to continue the negotiations under the shadow of repression, we are not rejecting the peace process nor does it mean that we are withdrawing from it. This means holding Rabin's Government responsible for leading this process to a dead end."4/
Excerpts from an interview with Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin,
Jerusalem, 21 January 1993
In an interview with MBC Television correspondents, conducted at Jerusalem, and broadcast in London, on 21 January 1993, Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin explained Israel's position with regard to the situation in the region and the Middle East peace process.
Asked how he viewed Israel within the new framework of the Middle East peace process, Mr. Rabin replied:
"I believe in peace. I have seen too many wars and bloodshed on both sides. I believe that in the long term it will be possible to reach peace for the sake of the area and its peoples and countries. I believe the Middle East area contains vast sources of energy ample enough for all those who live in it. The peace process or the peace negotiations are now focusing on the invitation which was sponsored by the former Soviet Union, and Russia now, and the United States for peace negotiations in Madrid. Many people expected miracles. It is not so simple to get rid of the hatred, suspicion, animosity, war, and violence which constituted and still constitute part of the daily lives and relationships between the Arab countries and Israel.
"I think that what we have done – at least since I became prime minister – is to realize that peace cannot be achieved without compromises by both sides. On our part, for example, and through our negotiations with Syria, we did what no Government in Israel had done in the past. We openly and clearly said that we accept UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. We clearly said that this means withdrawing Israeli forces from the Golan Heights to secure the recognized boundaries. We told the Syrians that we will not negotiate the dimensions of the withdrawal before we know the nature of the peace Syria is offering us. Will it be along the lines of the peace we have with Egypt – that is, open boundaries for the movement of people and goods, diplomatic relations, including embassies, and a policy that encourages the normalization of relations between the peoples of the two countries? On the other hand, let the peace treaty once it is signed stand on its own feet and not be influenced by what could be accomplished or not accomplished in the peace negotiations with the other participating Arab countries. I think that until now, and for the past 25 years, no Israeli Government has made such an offer to Syria. I am not saying that it is simple and that a settlement will be reached tomorrow. I think that Syria is a partner and has a president who is able to make decisions.
"Regarding the Palestinians in the Israeli territories, unfortunately, the issue is more complicated. It was decided, with the consent of all the delegations participating in the Madrid peace conference, that the Palestinian and Israeli sides should reach a permanent solution through various stages. The first stage is ISGA, meaning arrangements for an interim self-government authority for a period of no longer than five years. At the beginning of the third year of this period, negotiations are held to find a permanent solution based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.
"The interim agreement should serve as a prelude that will change the situation in the region, create confidence, and give the Palestinians what Jordan failed to give them when the West Bank was under its control, and what Egypt failed to give when it controlled Gaza – namely, the Palestinians will run their own affairs. This is an interim agreement that does not deal with the main subjects that must be agreed upon to reach a permanent solution.
"The problem lies in the lack of a cohesive leadership for the Palestinians and the spread of domestic violence. Because of the hardliners, the moderates are reluctant to proceed with the peace process and realize that a compromise is the only way to reach a peace agreement. But I am not pessimistic. I believe there is a need for the Arab and Israeli negotiators to achieve peace. I also tend to believe that 1993 will witness decisive settlements, or at least one decisive settlement."
In response to a question on difference between his own public statements and those of the Israeli delegation at the negotiation table, Mr. Rabin said:
"I said time and again that I am ready to meet with the Palestinian negotiating delegation today or tomorrow, here in Jerusalem. There is no need to go to Washington to meet. I am ready to explain to them that there is no difference in essence. In short, we want to give the Palestinians the right to run almost all civil and government jobs. We want them, if they want, to enjoy democratic general elections to elect a Palestinian body to represent them and run the interim self-government affairs. We are ready to see them running courts and domestic, agricultural, commercial, health, cultural, and police affairs in the regions where Palestinians live. We do not mean regional divisions, but the management of the territories. For our part, we will run the affairs of the Israelis living in the region and take the responsibility for public security."
When questioned about his readiness to meet with a PLO representative, Mr. Rabin said:
"I am ready to meet with the official Palestinian delegation in its current form, which represents the Palestinians in the territories here in Jerusalem. We negotiated with this delegation, which agreed to participate in the Madrid conference on the basis of certain principles. If we violate these principles on which we agreed and on the basis of which the Madrid conference, as well as the peace negotiations that followed were held, it means that we would change the rules of the game in the peace process. This would mean that these principles are invalid. We have to cling to our responsibilities and to the formula on which the negotiations are based. We expect all the negotiating Arab delegations, including the Palestinian delegation, to fulfill their obligations. We have no objections regarding the Syrian, Jordanian, or Lebanese delegations. Nor do we have any objections to the Palestinian delegation as long as it adheres to the rules of the game on which it previously agreed. I am not talking of anything new."
To a question on progress made in Israel's negotiations with the Syrian Arab Republic, he answered:
"…
"I believe that the way we presented our position no doubt has led to this change. I hope the Syrians and the Palestinians also will understand our distinguished political stand which we demonstrated in the peace negotiations. For example, the former Israeli Government approved holding only municipal elections, but I agree to holding general political elections for the Palestinians. Second, the former Likud Government's philosophy and policy were based mainly on the assumption that all Israeli territories, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, should be part of Israel's sovereignty over all its territories. I maintain the opposite: I want Israel to be a Jewish State and not a State consisting of two nationalities. I do not want to annex 1.8 million Palestinians who live in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. I am not saying that I will return to the pre-Six-Day War borders. Therefore, I am ready to make territorial concessions. I do not have the intention to annex the areas in which the bulk of the Palestinians live. Third, I prevented the building of 7,000 housing units which were planned in Palestinian territories, because for special reasons, I do not want to dissipate our energy in building houses in an area which I do not consider to be priority for Israel. We were unable to stop what we had previously begun to build and had to finish, but we do not give priority to investment in Palestinian areas."5/
Excerpts from an interview with President of Egypt Hosni Mubarak,
Cairo, January 1993
In an interview with Der Spiegel, conducted at Cairo, and carried by the magazine in its issue of 25 January 1993, President of Egypt Hosni Mubarak said the following regarding a solution of the question of Palestine:
"The Palestinians must get their territory – the occupied territories. That is what they have in mind. It should begin with autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But you cannot tell the Palestinians that they will get this piece of land, and Israel will get that piece of land. That would not be a realistic approach. Once peace is restored, all neighbours will work together – Egyptians, Jordanians, Palestinians, and Israelis."
With regard to a question on who represents the Palestinian people, Mr. Mubarak said:
"We continue to consider the PLO the only representative of the Palestinian people. That was decided at an Arab summit conference, and we have to keep to it. The PLO is trying very flexibly to find a solution to the conflict. It has remained popular – despite Hamas."6/
Excerpts from a decision by the Israel: High Court of Justice of Israel
on the question of the Palestinian deportees,
Jerusalem, 28 January 1993
The following is the unofficial translation of excerpts of a decision of the High Court of Justice of Israel on the question of the Palestinian deportees, issued on 28 January 1993, at Jerusalem, by the Government Press Office, and communicated by the Foreign Ministry of Israel:
"1. This morning (Thursday), 28.1.92, the High Court of Justice decision regarding the petitions on the temporary removal of the Hamas activists was issued.
"2. The High Court of Justice decision is substantiated and detailed, and extends over 32 pages. The following is the summation clause:
"'17. In summation, we have unanimously reached the following conclusions:
"A. Concerning the individual expulsion orders, we determine that the failure to satisfy the right to a prior hearing does not affect their validity. We instruct that the right to a hearing now be given, as detailed above.
"B. The order regarding the temporary expulsion (emergency order) is invalid due to the reason brought forth in sections 12(d) and 13, above. This conclusion does not affect the validity of the individual expulsion orders.
"C. As stated, charges against the validity of the individual expulsion orders which were issued pursuant to regulation 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945, should be raised before the advisory commission.
"In accordance with the above, we dismiss the petitions and cancel the order nisi.'
"3. Also of note are sections 14 and 15 of the High Court of Justice ruling, which mention the procedures by which the appeals can be heard: '14. The petitioners charged that the individual expulsion orders are invalid owing to defects in the process, beyond the negation of the right to petition. The respondents disputed this.'
"We believe that, in the case before us, the place of the charges such as these is before the advisory commission to which the deportee is permitted to direct his appeal. As long as the advisory commission has not decided otherwise, each individual order remains valid.
"15. The respondents must now make practical arrangements for the realization of the right to appear before an advisory commission operating in accordance with regulation 122 (8) of the above regulations vis-à-vis all who wish to do so. Accordingly, if a written appeal is received from a deportee – via the International [Committee of the] Red Cross or any other means – by which the commission is requested to hear his appeal, it is proper that the petitioner be permitted to appear personally before the commission in order that the commission may take note of his verbal explanations, and that it may examine the matter and the justice of the expulsion order executed in his case. Prior to his appearance before the commission, he should also be allowed a personal meeting with an attorney who wishes to represent the deportee before the commission.
"The commission can conduct its hearings anywhere that the IDF can ensure that the hearings are held properly.
"To implement all the above, the respondents must make practical arrangements, the details of which should be decided upon by the authorities responsible for them. The beginning of the arrangements has been described in the State deposition submitted to us on 25.1.93, but these must be supplemented in accordance with the spirit of our words herein.
"Furthermore, we have taken note of the statement of the Legal Advisor to the Government on 25.1.93, according to which there will be held – within a reasonable amount of time and at the initiative of the respondents – a further analysis of the security information relating to the matter of each deportee who does not submit an appeal."7/
Remarks by the Vice-President of the Syrian Arab Republic,
Damascus, January 1993
In an interview with a weekly magazine Al-Wasat, at Damascus, in January 1993, Mr. Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Vice-President of the Syrian Arab Republic, among other things, addressed the issues of the Palestinian deportees and the status of the Israeli-Syrian negotiations.
On the issue of the Palestinian deportees:
"With regard to the Palestinian deportees issue, we are making major international efforts and extensive contacts to exert pressure on Israel to compel it to backtrack and return these combatants to their country and families. At any rate, it is difficult to talk about what can be done at a time that has not come yet. We do not want to link one matter to another. We believe that Security Council resolution 799 needs to be implemented, just as another Arab country is being forced to implement UN Security Council resolutions."
On the Israeli-Syrian negotiations:
"Our policy is clear. We want a comprehensive solution on all the fronts. This is why we did not accept Syrian-Israeli negotiations without the existence of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, and Jordanian-Israeli negotiations. We adhere to a comprehensive solution and to a solution on all the fronts. There is coordination among the negotiating Arab delegations. When we reach a stage which requires meetings the foreign ministers meet, discuss, and coordinate among themselves."
"…
"There are no Syrian-Israeli secret contacts or meetings outside the framework of the Washington bilateral negotiations. I can also say that no progress was made in the rounds of negotiations with the Israelis. We are still at square one, but that does not mean that the peace process has reached a dead end or has failed. We continue the talks. If we achieve satisfactory results that fulfill our national and pan-Arab objectives, then we would proceed on the same road. If not, then we would naturally stop."
Asked about the conditions of the Syrian Arab Republic for a peace agreement with Israel, Mr. Khaddam said:
"That the peace should be comprehensive and that Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 should be implemented in a way that would lead to Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and guarantee the Palestinian people's national rights."8/
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Notes
1. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Near East & South Asia, No. FBIS-NES-93-006, 11 January 1993, p. 41.
2. Ibid., FBIS-NES-93-008, 13 January 1993, p. 32.
3. Ibid., FBIS-NES-93-009, 14 January 1993, p. 3; also Al-Quds, 13 January 1993 (in Arabic).
4. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Near East & South Asia, No. FBIS-NES-93-010, 15 January 1993, p. 4; also Al-Fajr, 14 January 1993 (in Arabic).
5. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Near East & South Asia, No. FBIS-NES-93-013, 22 January 1993, pp. 27-28.
6. Ibid., FBIS-NES-93-017, 28 January 1993, p. 8; also Der Spiegel, 25 January 1993 (in German), pp. 128-131.
7. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Near East & South Asia, No. FBIS-NES-93-018, 29 January 1993, pp. 29.
8. Ibid., FBIS-NES-93-016, 27 January 1993, p. 45-46; also Al-Wasat, 25-31 January 1993 (in Arabic), pp. 17-21.