Report of the Secretary-General: Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan (A/80/399)

 

25 September 2025

Eightieth Session

Agenda item 50

Israeli practices and settlement activities affecting the rights of the Palestinian people and other Arabs of the occupied territories

 

Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan

Report of the Secretary-General*

 

Summary

The present report, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 79/91, provides an update on Israeli settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan. It covers the period from 1 June 2024 to 31 May 2025.

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 79/91 and contains an update on the implementation of the resolution from 1 June 2024 to 31 May 2025. It is based on direct monitoring and information-gathering conducted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and on information provided by government sources, United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).[1]
2. The report includes an update on the unlawful Israeli settlement advancement in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which has risen sharply since October 2023, and which continued de facto to change the territory’s character, status and demographic composition and violate the human rights of the Palestinian people. The report contains an update on the unlawful Israeli settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan.

 

II. Legal background

3. International human rights law and international humanitarian law apply concurrently in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, namely, Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan.[2]
4. In its advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, the International Court of Justice found that the policies and practices of Israel, including the maintenance and expansion of settlements, amounted to the annexation of large parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory[3] and violated the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.[4] The Court found that the “régime of comprehensive restrictions imposed by Israel on Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory constitutes systemic discrimination based on, inter alia, race, religion or ethnic origin”.[5] The Court determined that the continued presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was unlawful and stated that Israel was “under an obligation to bring to an end its unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as rapidly as possible”.[6]

 

III. Update on settlement activities

A. Legal and policy initiatives of the Government of Israel

5. During the reporting period, the impact of structural changes of governance on the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, has been vast, accelerating the expansion of settlements and attempting to integrate them into the State of Israel. The Government of Israel is unlawfully exercising sovereignty over the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, by transferring administrative and legal powers to the civilian Government of Israel.[7] These developments, in line with coalition agreements promoting a policy of “application of sovereignty” over the occupied West Bank,[8] amount to the annexation of large parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as stated by the International Court of Justice,[9] and violate the obligation of Israel to respect the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that “such developments further institutionalize long-standing patterns of systematic discrimination, segregation, oppression, domination, violence and other inhumane acts against the Palestinian people”.[10]
6. As an example of the structural changes of governance helping to accelerate the expansion of settlements, the appointment of the former engineer of the Shomron Settlement Regional Council as head of the Civil Administration’s Planning Bureau in October 2024 reportedly led to a sharp increase in settlement plan approvals, often within days.[11] Since November 2024, the High Planning Council has reportedly convened weekly meetings, compared with once every three to six months previously, approving hundreds of housing units at a time.[12]
7. In December 2024, the Commander of the Central Command of Israel signed a military order that applied Israeli urban renewal laws to West Bank settlements,[13] enabling high-density construction to be funded through government budgets and tax incentives. The 2025 Economic Plan of Israel includes infrastructure projects to supply electricity to Israel.[14]
8. Concurrently, the Knesset advanced bills, inter alia, to enable Israeli citizens to purchase land in the occupied West Bank[15] and extend Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration to 14 settlements around Jerusalem to create a “Jerusalem metropolis”.[16] This would further fragment the territorial continuity of the West Bank and isolate East Jerusalem from it, undermining the viability of East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian State,[17] and would contribute to the ongoing denial by Israel of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination.
9. In line with Israeli policies and practices amounting to annexation,[18] on 11 May 2025 the Security Cabinet decided to resume the settlement of land title process in Area C of the occupied West Bank[19] – previously suspended since 1968. The Israeli Defense Minister described the decision as “a revolutionary decision that does justice to the Jewish settlement enterprise in Judea and Samaria and will lead to its strengthening, consolidation and expansion”,[20] replicating what has occurred in East Jerusalem, where settlement of land title is currently being used as the primary tool to seize unlawfully Palestinian land for the development of Israeli settlements.[21]
10. Other notable developments included the 18 July 2024 Security Cabinet decision granting the Settlement Administration powers to enforce, in the “agreed-upon reserve” in Area B, the discriminatory planning regime of Israel against Palestinian construction.[22] In April 2025, a new unit was reportedly established within the Israel Land Authority to identify what it deems as illegal Palestinian construction in the occupied West Bank.[23] These measures appear to consolidate annexation of the West Bank and intensify a discriminatory building permit and law enforcement regime that together induce the forced displacement of Palestinians, amounting to their forcible transfer under article 49 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (the Fourth Geneva Convention),[24] and may amount to the grave breach of unlawful transfer, as well as other war crimes and, under specific circumstances, a crime against humanity.[25]

 

B. Settlement consolidation and expansion

11. All Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and occupied Syrian Golan are illegal under international law, including in relation to the unlawful transfer by Israel of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.[26] As found by the International Court of Justice, the maintenance and expansion of Israeli settlements advance the integration of Palestinian territory into Israel, forming part of the policies and practices that amount to annexation of large parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in violation of the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force.[27] Settlements, outposts and the infrastructure serving them are built on unlawfully confiscated Palestinian land,[28] including land appropriated through declarations of so-called “State land”.[29] Israeli settlements also fragment the remaining areas of the occupied West Bank and disconnect the West Bank from East Jerusalem, further inhibiting the fulfilment of Palestinians’ right to self-determination within a contiguous State. Israel is under an obligation to cease immediately all new settlement activities and to evacuate all settlers from the Occupied Palestinian Territory.[30]
12. However, during the reporting period, there was an expansion and consolidation of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The NGO Peace Now documented 503,732 Israeli settlers in the West Bank[31] and 233,600 in East Jerusalem,[32] bringing the total to 737,332. There are 141 Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, 25 in East Jerusalem[33] (totalling 166 settlements) and 271 outposts.
13. On 28 May 2025, the Israeli Ministry of Defense announced that the Security Cabinet had approved a proposal to recognize 22 new settlements. This represents the biggest expansion in new settlements in decades, with the Defense Minister stating that this “prevents the establishment of a Palestinian state”.[34] On 23 March 2025, the Security Cabinet reportedly approved a proposal to split 13 neighbourhoods from existing settlements and to work towards recognizing them as independent settlements, enabling budget allocation and development.[35]
14. Approximately 21,950 housing units were advanced or approved in Area C of the occupied West Bank, representing a significant increase from the previous reporting period’s 13,410.[36] In East Jerusalem, 30,597 housing units were advanced or approved at the municipal and district levels, including 16,275 as part of six new settlements; and 5,258 as part of six existing settlements being expanded.[37] The Jerusalem District Planning Committee alone advanced or approved 13,180 housing units,[38] compared with 11,690 in the previous reporting period.
15. Road construction continued to be used to appropriate land and facilitate settlement expansion.[39] On 6 May 2025, the Israeli Finance Minister stated that the Government had invested seven billion shekels (approximately $2.1 billion) in roads since January 2025.[40] “This is how you bring in a million residents”, he stated, referring to Israeli settlers. By contrast, for Palestinians, access and movement in the occupied West Bank have been hampered by the 849 discriminatory movement obstacles of Israel.[41]
16. On 29 March, the Israeli Security Cabinet decided to allocate 335 million shekels to construct a bypass road between the Palestinian towns of Ayzariyah and Za’ayyim, east of the Ma‘ale Adummim settlement in Jerusalem governorate.[42] This road, previously referred to by the former Defense Minister as “Sovereignty Road”,[43] would effectively create a separate road system for Palestinians who are not from Jerusalem or do not have a permit to enter Jerusalem. This area has been designated by Israeli authorities for the E1 settlement plan and the expansion of the Ma‘ale Adummim settlement. The move appears to be designed to reduce Palestinian presence in the area by diverting traffic to this bypass road, while facilitating access to settlements. On 6 May, the Finance Minister stated that the Government would move forward in the coming months with construction plans in E1, effectively dividing the occupied territory’s northern and southern regions. He remarked, “This is how you kill the Palestinian state de facto. God willing, there’ll be [Israeli] sovereignty [in the West Bank] during this term”.[44]
17. With regard to the Gaza Strip[45] numerous events were held in which participants called for the Israeli resettlement of Gaza, repeatedly involving government ministers.[46]

 

C. Settlement outposts

18. According to Peace Now, during the reporting period, an unprecedented 55 outposts were established.[47] During the preceding decade, the yearly average had been eight. For the first time, outposts were established in Area B, with seven erected, including four in the “agreed-upon reserve”,[48] marking an alarming development in settlement expansion. By the end of May 2025, the total number of outposts in the occupied West Bank stood at 271. In addition, the Government retroactively legalized under Israeli law three outposts, facilitating their construction and expansion.[49]
19. According to Peace Now and Kerem Navot, the long-established practice of establishing shepherding outposts for grazing to appropriate large swathes of occupied land[50] accelerated.[51] In their report, it was stated that Israeli settlers had used shepherding outposts to seize at least 786,000 dunams of land – 14 per cent of the occupied West Bank’s total area.[52]
20. Outposts are established close to Palestinian communities as part of a coercive environment that is forcing Palestinians to leave their homes and lands in what could amount to forcible transfer and consolidates annexation.[53] Ra’s al-Ayn Awja, one of the largest remaining Bedouin communities in the central Jordan Valley, is home to approximately 1,100 people spread mostly within Area C. The community is surrounded by two Israeli settlements and five outposts. It is located near the Awja water springs, canals and falls – ideal for raising animals and herding. Following the January 2024 establishment of the Avisha’i outpost, settlers took control of the water spring and prevented Palestinian from gaining access through threats and violence. Residents are now forced to buy water from Awja village, making it impossible for the community to sustain itself. On 7 March 2025, 50 settlers from surrounding outposts attacked one of the families, in the presence of Israeli police, stealing 1,500 sheep and beating a 50-year-old man trying to defend his sheep. The victims tried to file a complaint with the Israeli police, but the case was closed on the grounds that the perpetrator was “unknown”.[54]

 

D. Other communities at heightened risk of forced displacement and forcible transfer in Area C

21. Masafer Yatta, in the South Hebron Hills, exemplified the intensified coercive environment of mass demolitions, settler violence and harassment that is forcing Palestinians to leave their lands in what could amount to forcible transfer. On 17 April 2025, a settler identified as an outpost security guard shot a 60-year-old Palestinian man in the leg in Rakiz, resulting in its amputation.[55] The man and his son had been protesting against settler encroachment on their land. Both were arrested and later released on bail, while no action was taken against the settlers. On 28 and 29 March 2025, in the hamlet of Khirbat Janbah, masked settlers, with the participation of Israeli Defense Forces, attacked Palestinian herders, injuring several, including children.[56] Soldiers detained more than 22 Palestinians – including 7 children – using blindfolds and handcuffs. The following day, soldiers returned and vandalized homes and public facilities. In February and May 2025, in Khallat al-Daba’, demolitions were carried out by Israeli security forces and the Civil Administration, the last of which destroyed 85 per cent of the community’s structures and displaced 49 people. On 14 May, settlers attacked the remaining residents, seriously injuring one. In 2022, the Israeli High Court upheld eviction orders affecting 12 herding communities in Masafer Yatta on the grounds the Israeli military had declared the area as a military firing zone, placing approximately 1,200 Palestinians at risk of forcible transfer.[57]
22. In the herding community of Khirbat Zanutah, South Hebron Hills, approximately 250 Palestinians, who had been displaced by settler violence in the aftermath of the 7 October 2023 attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups, remained unable to return, despite a 29 July 2024 Israeli High Court ruling obligating Israeli authorities to ensure their safe return.[58] On 21 August 2024, the men from the 33 families attempted to return but were forced to leave again, as the Israeli Civil Administration would not allow them to rebuild their homes; daily settler harassment resumed.[59] On 4 February 2025, following a petition by displaced villagers, the High Court issued a new ruling. It ordered the authorities to coordinate the residents’ return and allow them to rebuild structures destroyed by settlers.[60] However, further settler violence, including an attack on a newly rebuilt school on 26 April 2025, again forced the families to leave.
23. Between October 2023 and May 2025, 69 families were displaced in the Jordan Valley due to demolitions for lacking permits.[61] In Tubas, 90 settler incidents resulted in casualties or property damage, with 111 displaced by settler violence.[62] In the northern Jordan Valley, Israeli security forces erected checkpoints and closed access roads, effectively isolating these communities from the rest of the Governorate. Access to water was increasingly denied, as Israeli authorities and settlers seized local springs and denied connection to nearby pipelines, forcing reliance on costly water tanks.[63] Settler violence also escalated, and discriminatory restrictions on grazing land further undermined livelihoods.
24. The reporting period saw the mass forced displacement of Palestinians by Israel security forces during heavily militarized operations in northern West Bank. Through the extensive use of force during operation “Iron Wall”,[64] which began on 21 January 2025, preceded in December by operations by the Palestinian Authority, approximately 40,000 Palestinians were forcibly displaced from refugee camps in Tulkarm, Jenin and Nur Shams. After the camps were almost completely emptied, Israeli security forces proceeded to demolish roads and residential buildings, thereby preventing return.[65] On 10 February, the Israeli Finance Minister, Bezalel Smotrich, stated that “Tulkarm and Jenin will look like Jabaliya and Shuja‘iyah. Nablus and Ramallah will resemble Rafah and Khan Yunis. They will also be turned into uninhabitable ruins, and their residents will be forced to migrate and seek a new life in other countries.”[66]

 

E. Appropriation of land and resources

25. The illegal appropriation of land and resources – including through declarations of so-called “State land” – is a key tool used to dispossess and forcibly transfer Palestinians from their land, while enabling the transfer of the Israeli civilian population to it.[67] Collaboration between Israeli security forces and settlers in appropriating land and resources, including water sources,[68] was apparent in several communities.
26. The appropriation of occupied land through declarations of so-called “State land” enabled the advancement of Israeli settlement expansion.[69] In February 2025, the Civil Administration published, for the first time, six notices on the intention to allocate lands for shepherding, totalling 16,121 dunams across the occupied West Bank.[70] In one case in Umm Safa – a Palestinian village north-west of Ramallah – Israeli settlers began bulldozing 500 dunams of land on 10 September 2024 to establish a vineyard, claiming the land had been classified as “State land” by the Civil Administration. Since early December 2024, settlers brought a large water tank, sheep and cows to the bulldozed land and connected it to electricity lines. In parallel, daily harassment by settlers, supported by threats of shooting from soldiers, intensified.
27. Israel increasingly appropriated land by establishing so-called “military buffer zones” around settlements and settler roads, alleging security concerns. The International Court of Justice has assessed that the protection of settlers and settlements, the presence of which is contrary to international law, cannot be invoked as grounds to justify measures that treat Palestinians differently, nor can security concerns override the principle of the prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force.[71]

 

F. Forced evictions and demolitions

28. The forced displacement of the Palestinian population in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, was also fostered through a regime of demolitions, which the High Commissioner described as forming part of “an overarching institutional and legal regime of discrimination and oppression that leaves Palestinians no choice but to leave”.[72]
29. During the reporting period, Israel demolished, seized or sealed 1,875 structures, including 670 inhabited residential structures, in the occupied West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) and 217 in East Jerusalem, including 125 inhabited residential structures. This forcibly displaced 3,747 Palestinians (1,118 men, 1,086 women, 1,543 children – 794 boys and 749 girls) in the occupied West Bank and 645 Palestinians (173 men, 169 women, 303 children) in occupied East Jerusalem. The monthly average of Palestinians forcibly displaced from demolitions was 366, compared with 224 during the previous reporting period.[73]
30. Birin village in Hebron exemplifies the intensification of a coercive environment that induces forced displacement and forcible transfer through a combination of State-led demolitions and settler violence. The village is home to 46 Palestinian families (277 individuals), with 56 residential and non-residential structures. The community relies on animal breeding and livestock products as its main livelihood. In 1982, approximately 80 per cent of Birin’s land was declared so‑called “State land”, making it virtually impossible for Palestinians to obtain building permits. The village is near the Pene Hever settlement and, since the establishment of a nearby outpost in 2023, settler trespassing to graze cattle has increased significantly. Settler violence has escalated, often involving settlers in military uniform or accompanied by Israeli security forces. On 4 July 2024, the Civil Administration, backed by Israeli security forces, demolished six homes and an animal shelter, displacing eight families, comprising 44 people, including 20 children.[74] That night, three masked armed settlers attacked the tents sheltering the displaced families and assaulted two women. These demolitions have been followed by new settler infrastructure, including roads connecting the outpost to the Pene Hever settlement.[75]

 

G. Occupied East Jerusalem

31. Advancement of the “settlement of land title” – the process of land ownership registration – remained the primary tool with which to seize unlawfully land in occupied East Jerusalem for the development of Israeli settlements.[76] This could lead to the eviction and forced displacement and forcible transfer of thousands of Palestinians.[77] The process forms part of a regime of discriminatory laws and measures implemented by Israel that, taken together, constitute a breach of article 3 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.[78]
32. During the reporting period, the settlement of land title was initiated in 26 blocks of land, moved to an advanced stage in 113 blocks (including 86 in Bayt Hanina) and finalized in 8 blocks, including 3 for settlements in the Palestinian neighbourhoods of Bayt Safafa, Jabal al-Mukabbir and Shaykh Jarrah.[79]
33. In East Jerusalem, 217 structures were demolished, seized or sealed, of which 125 were inhabited residential structures.[80] Seven Palestinian properties were evicted: six households from Batan al-Hawa following cases filed in Israeli courts by a settler group, and the Musrara Café located across from the historic Damascus Gate, in a case filed by the General Custodian.[81]
34. A further 138 structures were demolished by their owners in East Jerusalem to avoid paying fines and charges imposed by Israeli authorities for lacking building permits, which are virtually impossible for Palestinians to obtain, exemplifying the coercive environment in which Palestinians live under the unlawful occupation.
35. From 1 to 29 March, Israel carried out 14 demolitions – 8 residential and 6 non‑residential[82] – marking a significant departure from the long-standing practice of suspending demolitions during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.
36. In Silwan, 224 Palestinians were displaced by demolitions and evictions.[83] In the Al-Bustan neighbourhood in Silwan, 22 Palestinian structures were demolished, including 17 inhabited structures,[84] resulting in the displacement of 25 households, comprising 115 people.[85] Over 100 homes in the neighbourhood are under imminent threat of demolition, placing the approximately 1,550 Palestinians of the Al-Bustan community at risk of forced displacement and forcible transfer, owing to discriminatory planning and zoning laws and Israeli plans to create a park called the “King’s Garden”, which would connect to nearby Israeli settlements and settler-operated tourist attractions in Silwan.[86] In the Batan al-Hawa neighbourhood in Silwan, 28 Palestinians were displaced by evictions and 3 by the demolition of their own property during the reporting period.[87] Over 87 Palestinian families in Batan al‑Hawa, totalling 600 to 680 persons, faced legal proceedings initiated by settlers under discriminatory Israeli laws to evict them from their homes.[88]
37. House raids, violence, intimidation and arbitrary arrest are elements of the coercive environment Palestinians face in East Jerusalem. In one case, Israeli security forces arrested and ill-treated Zuhair al-Rajabi on 9 August 2024 in Batan al-Hawa – a neighbourhood marked by a heavy presence of Israeli soldiers and police due to settler presence. Mr. al-Rajabi, a prominent 53-year-old community representative and advocate against settlement expansion and land confiscation, was subjected to a raid on his home. Israeli security forces threatened and pushed his family, physically assaulted Mr. al-Rajabi, and caused an estimated $20,000 in damage. Mr. al-Rajabi was detained by police overnight and released only after video evidence was presented of the Israeli security forces’ violence.

 

H. Settler and State violence

38. Settler attacks remained central to the coercive environment of violence, discrimination and oppression that induces forced displacement and forcible transfer, enables annexation and denies Palestinians’ right to self-determination.[89] During the reporting period, the United Nations recorded the forcible displacement of at least 841 Palestinians from 36 communities due to settler violence, including 699 Palestinian herders from 25 Bedouin and herding communities.[90]
39. Settler violence, which worsened dramatically after 7 October 2023,[91] continued to escalate across the occupied West Bank. During the reporting period, there were 1,516 incidents of settler violence recorded by the United Nations that resulted in casualties or property damage,[92] compared with 1,350 incidents during the previous reporting period.[93] Settlers killed three Palestinian men with live ammunition, and Israeli security forces killed three Palestinians (one girl, one boy and one man) in relation to settler violence.[94] In total, 686 Palestinians were injured during Israeli settler attacks (76 boys, 5 girls, 543 men and 62 women).
40. During the reporting period, Israeli security forces killed 434 Palestinians, including during heavy militarized operations, with 437 Palestinians killed in total in the occupied West Bank (including those killed by settlers) (67 boys, 5 girls, 351 men and 14 women). Over the same period, 21 Israelis were killed (2 boys, 15 men, 4 women) in Palestinian attacks or exchanges of fire in the occupied West Bank, including 13 members of the Israeli security forces and eight settlers.
41. The forcible displacement of five Palestinian families from Rantis, north-west of Ramallah, highlighted the increasingly blurred line between settler and State violence.[95] The families had faced constant harassment and violence from settlers from the nearby Ramat Avichai outpost. On 21 February 2025, Israeli security forces entered their homes without a warrant, vandalized property, assaulted them and ordered them to leave.[96] Soldiers returned daily until the families left, on 28 February. Community members identified one soldier as a settler who had previously participated in attacks against them. The army reportedly declined to investigate, despite acknowledging a breach of protocol.[97] Since October 2023, settlers have been enlisted and deployed in their areas of residence and across the occupied West Bank in large numbers for reserve duty and so-called “regional defence battalions”.[98]
42. In Duma village, Nablus, OHCHR monitored escalating violence – including gender-based violence – against a Bedouin family of 15, including 8 children and 2 women, causing their forced displacement. Following 7 October, settlers began harassing the family, pressuring them to leave by blocking access to the Duma spring, their primary source of water. Settler attacks intensified further after 12 April 2024, when a 14-year-old Israeli boy went missing and was later found dead. Settlers launched daily raids on the community, entering and searching homes – including when the family were in various states of undress – and using drones to photograph them. On 14 November 2024, three settlers entered the family’s home with dogs, which barked aggressively at the women and children while the settlers cursed at the family with sexual insults. The following day, approximately 15 settlers – some armed – vandalized the home and stole livestock. When Israeli security forces arrived, they said they could not protect the family, prompting them to leave their land, in what may amount to forcible transfer. As a result, the family lost access to their primary source of income and, at the time of drafting the present report, was living in makeshift shelters.
43. Organized attacks by settler mobs continued. On 4 December 2024 in Huwwarah, Nablus, approximately 50 settlers – masked and armed – attacked a Palestinian home housing a family of six, including a 70-year-old man. They threw incendiary devices into the house, setting it on fire. As the family attempted to extinguish the fire, the settlers violently assaulted them, severely beating the 70-year-old father. The family was forced to relocate.[99]
44. The acquiescence and support or participation of Israeli security forces with settlers in creating a coercive environment that induces forced displacement and forcible transfer occurred on multiple levels. In Bariyet Hizma, Jerusalem Governorate, OHCHR documented the forcible displacement of two families. Following 7 October 2023, Israeli security forces had restricted the families’ movement and had denied access to 80 per cent of their land and six water wells, citing “security” reasons. On 10 May 2024, settlers erected a new outpost 400 metres from the families’ homes and initiated daily harassment and threats against the families. The families relocated the women and children to the town of Hizma, while the men stayed behind – facing daily attacks – to care for their livestock, the families’ primary livelihood. On 16 June 2024, settlers attacked them with sticks and pepper spray and set one of their vehicles on fire. Despite filing complaints with the Israeli police, no action was taken. On 23 August, 20 settlers raided them again, physically assaulting the men and this time forcing them to leave. When they returned, they found their property destroyed or stolen.[100] When the men attempted to resettle approximately one kilometre away, Israeli security forces presented stop work orders and confiscated equipment. By the end of the reporting period, the men were living in their vehicles, unable to farm or herd and increasingly destitute.

 

I. Olive harvest

45. The olive harvest season, vital to the realization of Palestinians’ economic, social and cultural rights, has become a front line of settler and Israeli security forces’ attacks on Palestinians, resulting in forced displacement.[101] Between September and December 2024, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs documented 224 harvest-related incidents, during which 3,937 trees and saplings were vandalized. Access to olive groves was denied through Israel declaring land “closed military areas”.[102]
46. On 5 October 2024, mobs of settlers gathered at a herding outpost in Lubban al‑Gharbi, Ramallah, and – in groups of 10 to 20 – simultaneously attacked 15 to 20 Palestinian families harvesting olives. At least 25 Palestinians were injured in the attacks, including 2 women, 1 child, 1 person with a disability and several older men. Settlers also vandalized five vehicles, stole tools and sabotaged harvested olives.[103]

 

J. Accountability

47. Despite the continued rise of settler violence during the reporting period, there were no indictments for any killings and no convictions of any perpetrators.[104] According to the NGO Yesh Din, of the 185 incidents monitored, investigations had been opened in only 48 (26 per cent) after Palestinians filed complaints. Of those, 22 cases had been closed without filing an indictment, and 26 remained under investigation, with none having led to an indictment by the end of the reporting period.[105]
48. Of the 135 incidents in which Palestinian victims decided not to file complaints, 85 cited their lack of faith in the Israeli authorities to apprehend the perpetrators.[106] A further 28 cited a fear of retaliation from Israeli authorities or settlers, including further violence or loss of work permits.
49. According to Yesh Din, of the 1,701 police investigations into ideological, religious or politically motivated hate crimes against Palestinians that it has monitored since 2005, 93.8 per cent had been closed without indictment.[107] Only 3 per cent had led to full or partial convictions, fuelling the climate of impunity.
50. On 23 November, the Israeli Defense Minister announced the end of administrative detention orders against West Bank settlers, stating that the decision was meant “to convey a clear message of strengthening and encouraging the settlements”.[108] The Israeli security establishment reportedly linked this to an increase in settler violence.

 

K. Consolidation of Israeli annexation and dispossession of Palestinians in Bethlehem Governorate

51. Bethlehem Governorate illustrated the convergence of the policies of the Government of Israel and settler violence, forcibly transferring Palestinians into increasingly fragmented enclaves. This intensified during the reporting period and served to consolidate the permanent control of Israel over large parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which the International Court of Justice has held amounts to annexation in violation of international law.[109]
52. Following the 1967 occupation of East Jerusalem, Israel incorporated approximately 10 square kilometres of Bethlehem Governorate into an expanded Jerusalem municipality.[110] Under the 1993 Oslo Accords, Israel controlled most of the Governorate, with 85 per cent classified as Area C, and with a nature reserve covering 19 per cent of Areas A and B on which construction was prohibited. Since then, Israel has expanded settlements in Area C, and settlers have established outposts in Area C and increasingly in Area B. Furthermore, Israel has built a network of movement obstacles that fragment Palestinian land into ever smaller enclaves and sever Palestinian communities in Bethlehem from East Jerusalem.[111]
53. According to Peace Now, since 1967, Israel has established 18 settlements in Area C of Bethlehem Governorate, with an estimated settler population of 113,000, effectively encircling Bethlehem City.[112] On 14 August 2024, the Civil Administration allocated 602 dunams, to be seized from the Palestinian towns of Bayt Jala and Battir, for the new settlement of Nahal Heletz, on a World Heritage site of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Mr. Smotrich stated that the settlement aims to connect Gush Etzion to Jerusalem;[113] it would also sever Bethlehem from five Palestinian villages.[114] On 22 January 2025, 57 dunams were confiscated by military order to create a security buffer for the Efrat settlement, followed by a 16 February tender for 974 housing units for a new neighbourhood in the settlement, which will also block Bethlehem’s southern development.[115]
54. According to Peace Now, as at 31 May 2025, 10 outposts existed in Bethlehem Governorate, including 4 established between June 2024 and May 2025.[116] Notably, five are in Area B, within the “agreed-upon reserve” east and south of Bethlehem and near the settlements of Tekoa, Noqedim, Ma‘ale ‘Amos and Asfar. This is the same area where Israeli authorities have initiated demolitions of Palestinian properties in Area B on the grounds that they were within a natural reserve area. Settlers also built unauthorized roads linking outposts and settlements, further restricting Palestinian access to their land, and Israeli authorities installed four new iron gates on key access roads,[117] compounding restrictions on Palestinian movement.
55. Settlement expansion in Bethlehem Governorate coincided with the demolition of 135 Palestinian-owned structures for lacking Israeli-issued building permits, compared with 44 in the previous reporting period.[118] On 12 December 2024, Israeli security forces demolished eight residential buildings under construction in Malhah (Area B) – the first such demolition in Area B following the Israeli Civil Administration’s assumption of demolitions from the Palestinian Authority in the area. This raises further concerns about the consolidation by Israel of its unlawful annexation and extension of civilian authority over ever-increasing portions of the occupied West Bank.
56. In Bethlehem Governorate, OHCHR documented how outposts and the settler attacks that emanate from them appear to have been used, particularly after 7 October 2023, to forcibly transfer Palestinians and make way for Israeli settlements, as illustrated below.

 

Tuqu’

57. The Tekoa settlement, initially approved by Israel for 1,870 dunams, had expanded to 6,100 dunams by the end of the reporting period. New agricultural outposts had enabled settlers to seize an additional 550 acres from the neighbouring Palestinian town of Tuqu’, marking the largest land expansion from a single settlement to date.[119] According to Palestinian residents in the Tuqu’ wilderness, settlers from the nearby outposts and settlements (also including Ma‘ale ‘Amos and Ibei HaNahal) coordinated surveillance, harassment and attacks to force Palestinians from the area.[120]
58. This settlement expansion and displacement of Palestinian herders was accompanied by the construction of military outposts, settler patrolled roads and a metal gate to restrict Palestinian access, indicating a degree of coordination between settlers and the State.[121] Infrastructure projects included electricity lines and internal roads connecting Tekoa settlement to the surrounding outposts. Earth mounds were erected to block key routes, isolating Palestinian communities and restricting movement.
59. OHCHR documented settler attacks that forcibly displaced families from the wilderness around Tuqu’.[122] One family – three brothers, their wives and eight children – was displaced five times between October 2023 and late 2024. After continuous attacks by groups of settlers, they were forced to separate and relocate, with the women and children forcibly displaced to Tuqu’ town and the men to Marah Allib, Umm al-Hamam, Maniyah, Wadi al-Abyad and finally to Dayr Alla – a 40‑minute drive from Tuqu’ town over unpaved roads.
60. At their current location, settlers warned the men not to move beyond the immediate area around their tents and blocked access to grazing land. These forced displacements, which may amount to forcible transfer, have resulted in the family’s separation, insecurity and restricted access to basic services and livelihoods, with their livestock dwindling from 350 to 200 animals and the family now in significant debt.

 

Maniyah

61. OHCHR monitored the case of Palestinian herders, previously forcibly displaced from Al-Ganoub to the wilderness area of Maniyah village, south-east of Bethlehem Governorate. Most had been displaced following waves of settler violence between 2018 and 2022[123] and at the end of October 2023,[124] in what may amount to forcible transfer.
62. The herding families relocated to Wadi al-Abyad in Maniyah, two kilometres from a toxic landfill, living off of herding and agriculture. In August 2024, settlers established an outpost 700 metres away, preventing the families from harvesting crops or grazing sheep, confining them to 200 square metres around their homes and declaring: “This is the land of our forefathers and we have reclaimed it.”
63. Several months of daily settler intimidation and attacks culminated, on 14 February 2025, in over 40 masked armed settlers attacking the community, injuring 16 Palestinians from the community and vandalizing property.[125] One pregnant woman reported that settlers forced her family into a room and fired tear gas inside, nearly suffocating her one-year-old daughter and endangering her unborn child. The next day, families totalling 39 people decided to leave. By the end of the reporting period, the men had moved further south with their sheep while the women and children had relocated in Area C, fragmenting families and the community and undermining access to livelihoods.

 

IV. Settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan

64. The settlement activities of Israel in the occupied Syrian Golan remain in violation of international law and United Nations resolutions, including General Assembly resolution 79/90, in which the Assembly determined that all legislative and administrative measures and actions purporting to alter the character and legal status of the occupied Syrian Golan, taken or to be taken by Israel, were null and void.
65. The ongoing settlement activities in the occupied territory include the continuous expansion of existing settlements, the construction of new settlement units and the systematic confiscation of Syrian land – all in violation of international law, particularly the law of occupation. Among the ongoing projects is the development of wind farms spanning over 6,000 dunams of occupied territory. Such activities constitute the exploitation of occupied land and resources for the benefit of the occupying power.
66. In mid-December 2024 – just one week after the fall of the former Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on 8 December and, on the same day, the entry of Israel Defense Forces troops into the area of separation and the launch of Israeli airstrikes across the Syrian Arab Republic – the Israeli Cabinet approved the allocation of over 40 million shekels (approximately $11 million) to support the expansion of settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan.[126] The new investment furthered the Israeli Government’s resolution No. 864 of 2021, by which it aimed at doubling the Israeli settler population in the occupied Syrian territory within five years.[127] A few months before, the settlements’ local councils had complained about the implementation of the resolution and having to deal “more with keeping the existing population from leaving, rather than bringing in new residents”.[128] At the time of writing, 35 Israeli settlements accounted for a population of over 31,000 settlers in the Syrian territory occupied since 1967.[129]
67. Since 8 December, the Israel Defense Forces have maintained a continued presence within the area of separation, with the Israeli Prime Minister vowing that the “Golan Heights will be an inseparable part of the State of Israel forever.”[130] In January and February 2025, respectively, the Prime Minister and Defense Minister stated that the Israel Defense Forces would “remain at the summit of the Hermon and the security zone indefinitely to ensure the security of the communities of the Golan Heights and the north, and all the residents of Israel”, and “on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon and the buffer zone in the Golan Heights for an unlimited period of time”. By 8 May, the Israel Defense Forces had maintained and reinforced 10 military positions in the area of separation and two in the adjacent area. Israeli forces have restricted Syrian farmers’ access to their lands, fired warning shots at shepherds near the ceasefire line and caused damage to infrastructure, agriculture and livelihoods of Syrian communities, with complaints of detention of civilians and seizure and shooting of livestock.[131]

 

V. Conclusion and recommendations

68. The Secretary-General’s conclusions and recommendations made in the previous report remain valid.[132]
69. The Secretary-General reiterates his strong condemnation of the horrific attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups in Israel on 7 October 2023 and the continued holding of hostages in Gaza. The scope of death and destruction in Gaza has been unprecedented and horrifying. He unequivocally condemns the widespread killing and maiming of civilians in Gaza, including women and children, as well as journalists. He reiterates his call for an immediate ceasefire, unfettered humanitarian access and the immediate and unconditional release of all the hostages.
70. The Secretary-General recalls resolutions by the Security Council and the General Assembly, in which the Council and the Assembly, respectively, decided that the decision by Israel to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan was null and void and without international legal effect,[133] and reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan were illegal.[134] The establishment and expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan amount to Israel transferring its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, which is prohibited under international humanitarian law and may also amount to a war crime.[135]
71. The policies and practices of the Israeli administration further consolidated and extended the annexation of large parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, while emptying large parts of this territory of Palestinian communities. The character, status and demographic composition of the occupied territory continued to be altered through the actions of the Government of Israel, which included the ongoing forcible transfer of Palestinians and the transfer of part of its own civilian population into the Occupied Palestinian Territory, together with structural changes of governance. These population transfers may amount to war crimes and, under specific circumstances, also to a crime against humanity.[136]
72. The denial of Palestinians’ right to self-determination continues to be perpetrated through an increasingly institutionalized and entrenched regime of systemic discrimination,[137] violence and oppression by Israel. This violates a wide range of human rights, including those set out in article 3 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which Israel is a State Party.[138]
73. The Secretary-General calls upon Israel to bring to an end its unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as rapidly as possible, including by evacuating all Israeli settlers from the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and uphold the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, including by ceasing and making reparations for internationally wrongful acts as specified by the International Court of Justice.[139] In the meantime, he calls upon Israel to prevent and ensure accountability for attacks by settlers and its security forces against Palestinians and their property.
74. The Secretary-General recalls that, as held by the International Court of Justice, States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, nor to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such presence.[140]

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        [1]  Unless otherwise stated, information in the present report is drawn from OHCHR monitoring conducted in accordance with OHCHR methodological standards.

        [2]  See A/HRC/34/38 and A/HRC/58/73.

        [3]  Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2024, para. 173.

        [4]  Ibid., paras. 238–243.

        [5]  Ibid., para. 223. See also, A/HRC/58/73, paras. 6 and 7.

        [6]  Ibid., paras. 285 (3) and 285 (4). See also General Assembly resolution ES-10/24, para. 2.

        [7]  See A/HRC/58/73, para. 9; and A/79/347, para. 8.

        [8]  See https://main.knesset.gov.il/mk/government/Documents/CA37-RZ.pdf, para. 118.

        [9]  Legal Consequences, paras. 170–173. See also, paras. 158 and 159.

      [10]  See A/HRC/58/73, para. 10.

      [11]  See https://tinyurl.com/uavxzsw2; and https://peacenow.org.il/en/surge-in-settlement-plan-approvals-since-trump.

      [12]  https://peacenow.org.il/en/surge-in-settlement-plan-approvals-since-trump.

      [13]  See תקנון-המועצות-המקומיות-תיקון-מס-279-יהודה-ושומרון-התשפה-2024-2.pdf; and https://peacenow.org.il/en/urban-renewal-laws.

      [14]  See www.gov.il/he/pages/dec2282-2024, sects. 4 and 6; https://peacenow.org.il/en/the-annexation-moves-hidden-in-the-arrangements-law; and https://peacenow.org.il/en/power-plants-in-settlements.

      [15]  See ‎https://main.knesset.gov.il/en/news/pressreleases/pages/press30125q.aspx.

      [16]  See https://fs.knesset.gov.il/25/law/25_lst_1892340.docx; and www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-02-28/ty-article/.premium/step-to-full-sovereignty-law-to-annex-west-bank-settlements-near-jerusalem-set-to-pass/00000195-4c3f-d79a-abfd-fdff5ab10000.

      [17]  See General Assembly resolution 67/19.

      [18]  See Legal Consequences, paras. 165, 173 and 179; and A/79/347, para. 9.

      [19]  See https://peacenow.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Cabinet-Decision-Land-Registration-110525.pdf; www.timesofisrael.com/cabinet-approves-west-bank-land-registration-process-to-strengthen-jewish-settlement/; and A/76/336, para. 13.

      [20]  See https://peacenow.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/MOD-press-release-on-cabinet-decision-110525.pdf.

      [21]  See A/HRC/58/73, para. 25.

      [22]  See www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2024/06/1874.pdf; and https://peacenow.org.il/en/israeli-government-assumes-authorities-of-the-palestinian-authority-in-area-b.

      [23]  See https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/sy6agvft1e.

      [24]  Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 49; and Legal Consequences, paras. 142–147.

      [25]  Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 147; and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 7 (1) (d), 8 (2) (a) (vii) and 8 (2) (b) (viii).

      [26]  Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 49; Legal Consequences, paras. 115–119; and A/HRC/58/73, para. 13.

      [27]  Legal Consequences, paras. 173, 175 and 254.

      [28]  Ibid., para. 122.

      [29]  See A/79/347, para. 23.

      [30]  Ibid., para. 285 (5).

      [31]  See https://peacenow.org.il/en/settlements-watch/settlements-data/population (as of end of 2024).

      [32]  Latest figures as at 2022 from Peace Now, on file with the Secretariat.

      [33]  Ibid., as of end of May 2025. The NGO Ir Amim categorize these as 11 large government-initiated settlements (with another – Givat Hamatos – currently under construction), and 14 settler compounds/enclaves inside Palestinian neighbourhoods.

      [34]  Office of the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, on file with the Secretariat; and www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1j5954edlno; https://peacenow.org.il/en/cabinet-decision-22-settlements. This is not included in the total number of settlements referred to above.

      [35]  See www.timesofisrael.com/security-cabinet-approves-13-west-bank-neighborhoods-to-become-independent-settlements/.

      [36]  Office of the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, on file with the Secretariat.

      [37]  Ir Amim, on file with the Secretariat.

      [38]  Office of the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, on file with the Secretariat.

      [39]  See https://peacenow.org.il/en/all-paths-lead-to-annexation.

      [40]  See www.youtube.com/watch?v=v0aPUzVi4r8; and www.shomrim.news/eng/paving-the-way-to-annexation.

      [41]  According to OHCHR monitoring, movement restrictions and obstacles are discriminatory in effect. See for example, A/HRC/58/73, paras. 34 and 61; and www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/Factsheet%20Booklet_Movement_and_Access.pdf.

      [42]  See https://aurdip.org/en/the-cabinet-decided-to-build-the-road-that-will-close-the-heart-of-the-west-bank-to-palestinians/.

      [43]  See www.timesofisrael.com/bennett-orders-paving-of-sovereignty-road-allowing-uninhibited-e1-construction/.

      [44]  See www.youtube.com/watch?v=v0aPUzVi4r8.

      [45]  Legal Consequences, para. 78.

      [46]  See A/HRC/58/73, para. 17. See also, www.alhaq.org/advocacy/26404.html.

      [47]  Peace Now, on file with the Secretariat.

      [48]  Ibid.

      [49]  Ibid.

      [50]  See A/77/493, paras. 48–67; and www.keremnavot.org/thewildwest.

      [51]  See https://peacenow.org.il/en/the-involvement-of-amana-in-settlers-farms.

      [52]  See www.keremnavot.org/the-bad-samaritan-en.

      [53]  See A/HRC/58/73, para. 18; and Legal Consequences, paras. 116, 145 and 147.

      [54]  OHCHR monitoring.

      [55]  Ibid.

      [56]  Ibid.

      [57]  See A/77/493, para. 19.

      [58]  See https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts/23/420/ 082/a42&fileName=23082420.A42&type=2.

      [59]  OHCHR monitoring.

      [60]  See supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=NetVerdicts/2025/2/3/2023-0-8117-45-1&fileName=81ccea631aa6411dbf6fb2e4792254d6&type=2.

      [61]  United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on file with the Secretariat.

      [62]  Ibid.

      [63]  OHCHR monitoring.

      [64]  See www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2025/01/concern-use-unlawful-lethal-force-jenin-occupied-west-bank.

      [65]  See https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/un-human-rights-office-opt-mass-displacement-palestinians-northern-west-bank-source-growing-concern-enar; and https://x.com/OHCHR_Palestine/status/1904557200644677872.

      [66]  See www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250210-israels-smotrich-vows-escalation-against-palestinians-in-west-bank-threatens-gaza-like-fate/.

      [67]  Legal Consequences, paras. 120, 122, 143, 147, 166, 169 and 214.

      [68]  During the reporting period, 49 water sources in the Jordan Valley were sealed, confiscated or destroyed by the Israeli authorities (United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on file with the Secretariat).

      [69]  See A/HRC/58/73, paras. 20 and 21.

      [70]  See https://www.gov.il/he/pages/mireheb.

      [71]  See Legal Consequences, paras. 205 and 254.

      [72]  See A/HRC/58/73, para. 54.

      [73]  United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on file with the Secretariat.

      [74]  OHCHR monitoring.

      [75]  United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on file with the Secretariat.

      [76]  See A/HRC/58/73, para. 25; A/79/347, para. 46; and https://experience.arcgis.com/ experience/05a7bec8c51f4ddbb9d923554ffabef3/page/English-Map-/?locale=he.

      [77]  See A/HRC/58/73, para. 25.

      [78]  See also, Legal Consequences, paras. 165 and 223–229; and A/HRC/58/73, para. 25.

      [79]  Ir Amim, on file with the Secretariat.

      [80]  United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on file with the Secretariat.

      [81]  Ir Amim, on file with the Secretariat. See also, www.jerusalemstory.com/en/blog/police-forcibly-close-and-seize-musrara-cafe-near-damascus-gate; and www.jerusalemstory.com/ en/blog/musrara-cafe-across-jerusalems-damascus-gate-faces-closure.

      [82]  Ir Amim, on file with the Secretariat.

      [83]  United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on file with the Secretariat.

      [84]  Ir Amim, on file with the Secretariat.

      [85]  United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on file with the Secretariat.

      [86]  See A/HRC/58/73, para. 32.

      [87]  United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on file with the Secretariat.

      [88]  See A/HRC/58/73, para. 31.

      [89]  Legal Consequences, paras. 145, 154, 169 and 239.

      [90]  United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on file with the Secretariat.

      [91]  See A/79/347, paras. 50–54; and A/HRC/58/73, paras. 46–50.

      [92]  United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on file with the Secretariat.

      [93]  Ibid.

      [94]  OHCHR monitoring.

      [95]  See A/HRC/58/73, paras. 41–44 and 51.

      [96]  OHCHR monitoring.

      [97]  See www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-03-04/ty-article/.premium/idf-wont-investigate-illegal-expulsion-of-palestinian-families-by-soldiers-in-w-bank/00000195-6056-dcab-a9b7-e67fd2880000.

      [98]  See A/79/347, para. 53; and A/HRC/58/73, paras. 43 and 44.

      [99]  OHCHR monitoring.

     [100]  See also A/HRC/58/73, para. 50.

     [101]  See A/HRC/58/73, paras. 33–39; and www.alhaq.org/monitoring-documentation/26020.html.

     [102]  See A/HRC/58/73, para. 37.

     [103]  See also, A/HRC/58/73, para. 39.

     [104]  OHCHR monitoring.

     [105]  Yesh Din, on file with the Secretariat.

     [106]  Ibid.

     [107]  See www.yesh-din.org/en/data-sheet-law-enforcement-on-israeli-civilians-in-the-west-bank-settler-violence-2005-2024/.

     [108]  See www.timesofisrael.com/katz-says-settlers-in-administrative-detention-to-go-free-ties-it-to-palestinian-release/.

     [109]  Legal Consequences, paras. 172 and 173.

     [110]  See www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-203128/.

     [111]  OHCHR monitoring.

     [112]  Peace Now, on file with the Secretariat.

     [113]  See www.timesofisrael.com/land-allocation-approved-for-first-new-west-bank-settlement-to-be-built-since-2017/.

     [114]  Walajeh, Batir, Hussan, Wadi Fukin, and Nahalin.

     [115]  Military order No. 7-3-2025, on file with OHCHR; and https://peacenow.org.il/en/tender-for-1000-units-in-efrat.

     [116]  Peace Now, on file with the Secretariat. Three outposts were also “legalized” by Israel in the Bethlehem Governorate during the reporting period – Ibei Hanahal, Gvaot and Heletz.

     [117]  United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on file with the Secretariat.

     [118]  Ibid.

     [119]  See www.nytimes.com/2024/06/01/world/middleeast/west-bank-settlers-land-tuqu-takoa.html.

     [120]  OHCHR monitoring.

     [121]  Ibid.

     [122]  See also, A/79/347, paras. 64–67.

     [123]  See A/77/493, para. 50.

     [124]  See A/HRC/55/72, para. 26.

     [125]  OHCHR monitoring.

     [126]  See www.gov.il/he/pages/spoke-golan151224; and https://x.com/IsraeliPM_heb/status/ 1868288147756573077.

     [127]  See www.gov.il/en/pages/cabinet-approves-special-plan-to-develop-golan-heights-26-dec-2021; www.timesofisrael.com/cabinet-approves-11-million-plan-to-double-population-of-golan-heights/; and www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-12-17/ty-article/.premium/netanyahus-plan-to-promote-golan-heights-growth-is-amendment-to-decision-by-bennett-govt/00000193-d112-d4b3-adb3-f9f72cf20000.

     [128]  See https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/News/PressReleases/Pages/press24924e.aspx.

     [129]  See https://data.gov.il/dataset/residents_in_israel_by_communities_and_age_groups/ resource/64edd0ee-3d5d-43ce-8562-c336c24dbc1f.

     [130]  See https://x.com/IsraeliPM/status/1866248329186738341.

     [131]  See S/2025/154; and S/2025/350.

     [132]  See A/79/347, paras. 74–84.

     [133]  Security Council resolution 497 (1981).

     [134]  General Assembly resolutions 78/78; and 79/91.

     [135]  Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 49 (6); and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8 (2) (b) (viii).

     [136]  Ibid., art. 147; and, arts. 7 (1) (d) and 8 (2) (b) (viii).

     [137]  See also, Legal Consequences, para. 223.

     [138]  Ibid., para. 229. See also, A/HRC/58/73, para. 7.

     [139]  Legal Consequences, paras. 269 and 285 (6).

     [140]  Ibid., para. 285 (7). See also General Assembly resolution ES-10/24, para. 4 (b) and 4 (c); and Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 41 (2).