Nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East – First Cttee debate – Verbatim record (excerpts)

Official Records

General Assembly

Fifty-fifth session

First Committee

25th meeting

Monday, 30 October 2000, 3 p.m.

New York

President:  Mr. U Mya Than…………………….(Myanmar)

The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

Agenda items 65 to 81 (continued)

Action on all draft resolutions submitted under all items

/…

The Chairman: The Committee will now take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.37.

A recorded vote has been requested.

I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

Mr. Lin Kuo-chung (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.37, entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”, was introduced by the representative of Australia at the Committee’s 21st meeting, on 23 October 2000. The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.37 are listed in the draft resolution itself and in document A/C.1/55/INF.2.

A recorded vote was taken.

/…

Draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.37 was adopted by 149 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.

The Chairman: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes or positions on the draft resolution just adopted.

Mr. Mekdad (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): My delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.37, entitled “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty” (CTBT), because Syria has consistently stressed that a treaty as significant and sensitive as the CTBT, with its future obligations on all member States, should not under any circumstances disregard the legitimate concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States, which constitute the overwhelming majority of countries in the world. Those States have received no guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, nor are they allowed to acquire the advanced technology, in all its forms, so essential to accelerate the pace of national development.

The thrust of the many substantive and fair remarks made regarding the CTBT has been that the Treaty contains no provisions that show a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to phase out their nuclear arsenals within a reasonable period of time. Nor do the provisions explicitly state that it is illegal to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. It does not stress the need to achieve the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in order to put an end to all aspects of such proliferation. The thrust of those remarks has also been that the provision is exclusive to the maintenance of a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests and not nuclear laboratory tests or the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and the production of new types of such weapons. Those remarks have also stressed that the on-site verification and inspection system might open the door for abuse of the national data provided by the national surveillance systems and that this data would be arbitrarily used for purposes of political expediency. The most bizarre provision in the Treaty is that States that have already signed the Treaty might take measures against countries that have not yet signed, which could include measures taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. That indeed is a violation of the sovereign right of States to accede or not to accede to any treaty.

The Syrian Arab Republic views those substantive loopholes with very grave concern indeed. Syria completely rejects the inclusion of Israel in the countries of the Middle East and South Asia. The current situation in the Middle East is volatile, and Israel is the only country possessing nuclear weapons and all other forms of weapons of mass destruction, and it is also working to develop such weapons quantitatively and qualitatively. Furthermore, Israel refuses to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency verification and control system. All that impedes — indeed, jeopardizes — ongoing efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and makes our region and the entire world vulnerable to the Israeli nuclear threats without any tangible international reaction.

Mr. Bar (Israel): Israel signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996. That decision reflects its long-standing policy and willingness to be involved in the non-proliferation efforts of the international community in a responsible and serious manner, with due consideration to its security situation. Israel played an active role throughout the negotiations on the Treaty in Geneva and contributed politically and conceptually to the drafting of the Treaty. Since the establishment of the Preparatory Commission in November 1996, Israel has played a major part in the endeavour to develop the elements of the CTBT verification regime, including the practical procedure to be adopted in the operational manuals by which the Treaty will be implemented.

Israel decided to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.37 because of the importance it attaches to the CTBT, notwithstanding reservations regarding some of the wording in operative paragraph 1.

We would like to clarify Israel’s position as follows. The CTBT is governed exclusively by its policy-making organs, particularly the Preparatory Commission. The relevant Preparatory Commission resolution differs significantly from the draft resolution before us. Operative paragraph 1 of this draft resolution omits crucial conditions and prerequisites required for the ratification of the Treaty as determined by the CTBT text itself. For example, in article IV, paragraph 1, the Treaty states, inter alia, “At entry into force of this Treaty, the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of this Treaty.”

In view of Israel’s active role in this Treaty, we are looking forward to future consultations with all the relevant countries on the drafting of next year’s resolution. This, we hope, will lead to a text that Israel could not only support without reservations but could also co-sponsor.

/…

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.


Document symbol: A/C.1/55/PV.25
Document Type: Meeting record
Document Sources: General Assembly
Subject: Arms control and regional security issues
Publication Date: 30/10/2000
2021-10-20T18:14:08-04:00

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