Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territories
Report of the Secretary-General
1. The General Assembly, at its thirty-eighth session, considered the Secretary-General's report on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories (A/38/278-E/1983/77), which had been submitted pursuant to its resolution 37/222 of 20 December 1982. On 19 December 1983 it adopted resolution 38/166, in paragraph 8 of which it requested the Secretary-General
"to prepare and submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, through the Economic and Social Council, a comprehensive report: on the current and future impact of the Israeli settlements on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories, including a comparison between the living conditions of the latter and those of the residents of the Israeli settlements".
2. So as to enable the Secretary-General to prepare and submit the required report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, and in an effort to ensure a balanced and objective expert view, the Secretary-General used the services of three consultants: Dudley Madawela, formerly Co-ordinator of Units, Social Development Branch, Center for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat; Edward Balassanian, architect, urban designer and city planner; and Mirtha Halim, economist. The consultants were requested to prepare the report on the basis of material available from the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies and from the specialized agencies, and other published and unpublished literature pertaining to the subject. They were also to gather information through visits to Egypt, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic and the occupied territories, and through discussions with government officials and others, as well as with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
3. Since permission to visit the occupied territories was not granted by the Government of Israel, the consultants, in preparing their report, had to rely on secondary sources of information. From 22 January to 28 February 1984, the consultants visited and had discussions with the relevant government officials of Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic. Further discussions were held with the United Nations officials stationed in those countries. Discussions were also held with the relevant officials of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Damascus and Amman. Meetings were held with the former Minister of Awgaf and Holy Places, the former Mayors of Jerusalem, Halhul and Hebron, former professors from the West Bank, and with Palestinians who had recently visited the occupied territories or who had knowledge of recent developments in those territories.
4. The consultants also visited the headquarters of, and gathered relevant information and data from the following bodies: Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHS), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), International Labor Organization (ILO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health organization (WHO). Various United Nations reports dealing with conditions in the occupied Palestinian territories were also reviewed, particularly those of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, the Security Council Commission established under resolution 446 (1979) of 22 March 1979 on the situation in the occupied Arab territories, and the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian people. A substantial amount of relevant material and information was gathered from those sources, which supplemented other information and data available in published documents of various other organizations of the United Nations system that were made available to the experts and material published in books, periodicals and the popular press, as indicated in the various footnotes contained in the report prepared by the consultants.
5. The report prepared by the three consultants is reproduced in the annex below.
ANNEX
Report of the team of consultants on the living conditions of the
Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories
CONTENTS
|
Paragrphs |
Pages |
||
|
I |
INTRODUCTION |
1-7 |
5 |
|
II. |
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS |
8-24 |
6 |
|
III. |
SETTLEMENT TRENDS |
25-43 |
9 |
|
A. Overview |
25-32 |
9 |
|
|
b. Plan formulation |
33-37 |
12 |
|
|
C. Investment in the settlement programme |
38-43 |
13 |
|
|
IV. |
IMPACT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON LAND AND WATER RESOURCES, HOUSING, PUBLIC AMENITIES, AND INFRESTRUCTURE SERVICES |
44-66 |
14 |
|
A. Impact on growth and expansion of Palestinian towns and villages |
44-50 |
14 |
|
|
B. Impact on production and trade |
51-54 |
20 |
|
|
C. Impact on housing |
55-66 |
19 |
|
|
V. |
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS |
67-106 |
23 |
|
A. Impact on production and trade |
67-78 |
23 |
|
|
B. Impact on labour and employment |
79-88 |
41 |
|
|
C. Impact on money and finance |
89-98 |
37 |
|
|
D. Aggregate impact |
99-106 |
38 |
|
|
VI. |
IMPACT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE SOCIAL LIFE AND RELLIGIOUS PRACTICES OF THE PALESTINIANS |
107-120 |
43 |
|
VII. |
IMPACT OF ISRAELI SETTLELMENTS ON THE JUDICIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES |
121-126 |
47 |
|
APPENDICES |
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|
I. |
Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, with projections to the year 2010 |
57 |
|
|
A. Settlements established from 1967 to 1983 |
57 |
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B. Settlements planned for establishment from 1983 to 1986 |
60 |
||
|
II. |
Land confiscated during the period February 1983 to February 1984 |
63 |
|
|
III. |
Housing demolished in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by the occupying authorities as a punitive measure, 1967-1982 |
65 |
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The present report has been prepared in response to General Assembly resolution 38/166 of 19 December 1983, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare and submit to it at its thirty-ninth session, through the Economic and Social Council, a comprehensive report on the current and future impact of the Israeli settlements on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories, including a comparison between the living conditions of the latter and those of the residents of the Israeli settlements.
2. While the previous reports on this question submitted to the General Assembly (A/34/536 and Corr.1; A/35/533 and Corr.1; A/37/238; A/38/278-E/1983/77) dealt with the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories under the general conditions of occupation, this report, in compliance with the Assembly's request, focuses and examines the direct impact of the Israeli settlements on the living conditions of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. In this context some of the overall policies and practices of the occupying Power have had to be examined in order to determine this impact.
3. As in previous reports, the occupied Palestinian territories are defined as the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza. In view of the fact that data on East Jerusalem are not published separately by the Israeli authorities, as is done for the West Bank and Gaza, the consultants have had to rely on information conveyed to them by persons knowledgeable of the conditions there, including the former Minister of Awgaf and Holy Places and the former Mayor of Jerusalem.
4. A matter of particular difficulty in preparing this report was the gathering of information on the living conditions in the Israeli settlements for purposes of comparing them with those in Palestinian communities. Since it was not possible to gather first-hand information, the consultants have had to rely on secondary sources of information obtained through interviews and from published material and have had to arrive at some general conclusions. These have been included in the respective chapters and sections dealing with the current and future impact of the Israeli settlements on the living conditions of the Palestinians in the occupied territories.
5. Section II of the report contains a summary of findings which are documented and substantiated in the body of the report. Section III gives an overview of Israeli settlement trends and plans. Most of the information was gathered from the reports of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, news items appearing in the popular press and information supplied by the Palestine Liberation Organization. Although the press reports are generally quoted from the Israeli newspapers, the same information did appear in the Arab newspapers in the occupied territories, particularly Al Fajr, Asha’b and Al Quds. Virtually all of the press reports were extracted from the reports of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.
6. Section IV examines the situation as it affects the growth and expansion of Palestinian towns and villages, water resources and housing. Section V describes the impact of the Israeli settlements on the economy of the occupied territories, section VI, the impact on the social life and religious practices of the Palestinians, and section VII, the impact on the judicial and local government systems in the territories. In each of these aspects of living, the future impact has been assessed on the basis of a continuation of current policies and practices. An empirical comparison of the living conditions of the Palestinians in the occupied territories with those of the Israeli residents irk the settlements has also been included under each of the aspects.
7. In the preparation of this report, the consultants relied as much as possible on published sources which were supplemented by interviews with people knowledgeable of the conditions in the occupied territories. The consultants wish to place on record their appreciation of the co-operation offered them by ministers and officials of the Governments of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, officials of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, representatives and officials of the Palestine Liberation Organization, individuals in Amman who are closely in touch with current developments in the occupied territories, and officials of the specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system.
II. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
8. According to Jordanian sources, at the end of 1983 the State of Israel had expropriated 2,607,901 dunums (260,790 hectares) or 47.4 per cent of the West Bank territory, while according to some Israeli sources, Israel controls at present between 50 and 60 per cent of the land in the occupied territories. Of the expropriated land, 26 per cent has been allocated to Israeli settlements. Estimates based on Israeli and Palestinian data indicate that by now almost all of the Jordan Valley's potentially cultivable land has been expropriated for the Israeli settlements.
9. Israel continues to establish settlements in a manner that limits and/or impairs the expansion and growth of Palestinian towns and villages. As a new development, as has been done in East Jerusalem, Israel has initiated the establishment of an urban settlement in the center of Hebron. The Government of Israel has also announced a plan known as the "Ben Porat Plan", a major feature of which is to relocate residents of Palestinian refugee camps to new residential quarters in various locations.
10. The impact of Israeli settlements on water resources is a function of the amount of expropriated cultivable land rather than the number of settlers. As a general rule 100,000 people consume 6 million cubic meters of water per year for domestic purposes, whereas an agricultural settlement containing about 300 families (1,200 people) farming 2,500 dunums (250 hectares) of cultivable land uses 2.4 million cubic meters of water per year for irrigation purposes.
11. Water resources of the Gaza are in a critical situation. But in the West Bank annual precipitation supplies eight times more than the present water requirements of the area. However, Israeli authorities, by combining the need of Israel proper with that of the West Bank, have declared water resources in the West Bank at a critical stage as well. As a consequence they are imposing a series of restrictive measures on the indigenous population of the area, such as maintaining the usage of water at 1967 levels. On the other hand, preferential treatment has been reported to be practiced by the occupying authorities in supplying water to Israeli settlers.
12. There is an overall annual decline in residential construction in towns and villages of the occupied territories in spite of a 24 per cent increase in towns in Gaza. New construction of housing barely covers the need resulting from the natural increase of the population. Consequently, since 1967 the housing industry has contributed virtually nothing towards amelioration of dilapidated and substandard housing.
13. There has been no publicly subsidized and/or initiated low income housing for many years. Punitive demolition of houses continues at an accelerated rate. In addition, a new punitive measure of sealing houses or rooms with concrete is being applied by the occupying authorities.
14. Absence of construction to replace dilapidated and substandard housing, along with the restrictive policies of the occupying authorities as regards building permits and transfer of funds from abroad, is expected to worsen the already serious housing conditions. The virtually stand-still state of public housing, and the non-existence of financial measures to assist low income families to acquire proper housing are added dimensions to the above-mentioned problem.
15. Indications at the present time are that the Israeli Government will continue to follow the policy of establishing settlements in the occupied territories and settling more Israelis in them, to a projected minimum of 100,000 by 1987 and 190,000 by 2010. These numbers exclude Israelis in East Jerusalem and other
Palestinian localities incorporated into the City immediately after the 1967 war.
16. The policies designed to promote, protect and develop the settlements have a direct economic effect in that they diminish the amount of land and, water resources available to the Palestinians. The increasing control exercised by the occupation authorities over what agricultural products can be produced and where, the restrictions on industrial production, the control of marketing that limits and directs exchange over the "open bridges" to Jordan and "open border" with Israel, and the negative effect on investment caused by the absence of a financial system, the restrictions on building, the continuous devaluation of the Israeli shekel, and the general feeling of insecurity, are factors that contribute to important structural changes in the economy of the occupied territories. These changes can be summarized as: diminished importance of the agricultural sector without a corresponding development of an industrial base; relative lack of opportunities for employment in the occupied territories, with consequent daily commuting to Israel by the Palestinian labor force; increased concentration of Palestinian labor in the building trades; reorientation of production towards goods that can be sold to and through Israel, while Palestinian consumption is met by increased imports from Israel; development of a chronic trade deficit for the territories that is not balanced by the earnings of workers or the surplus trade with Jordan, and is partly offset only by remittances from Palestinians abroad.
17. The economic policies of the occupying Power have, therefore, created a situation of total dependence of the economy of the West Bank and Gaza by controlling production and reducing the capacity to create jobs in such a manner as to diminish the potential for economic development. The growth of income that is reported statistically hides the two facts of lack of indigenous development and economic dependency. The persistence of a dual currency system in the West Bank provides an outlet for Palestinian savings, which are not invested in the territories, to a safe haven in Jordan. Dinars are also hoarded as protection against the inflation characteristic of the Israeli economy. This dual system also provides Israel with a useful means to acquire hard currency.
18. Under a system that appears to be designed to attract Israelis to settlements and to compel Palestinians to leave the territories, there is a wide difference in the access to earning opportunities that each group enjoys. While the settlers are often on the government payroll or in private or public enterprises, the Palestinians are hindered from working their land, and it highly, educated, have no access to employment, unless they emigrate or join the ranks of commuting manual laborers. In production, the settlers are subsidized, and enjoy assured markets at guaranteed prices, while Palestinians are impeded by restrictions, regulations, and direct controls, and have no access to credit, let alone subsidies.
19. The settlers enjoy all the benefits of full citizenship, including those of the National Insurance Scheme, while the Palestinians working in Israel are denied such benefits on the grounds of non-residence in Israel, although they are full contributors to that system. The settlers enjoy a standard of living superior to that of the Palestinians by the design of the settlements and the amenities they offer, while Palestinians are forbidden to improve their houses and gardens and discouraged from investing in industry. The two groups live under widely disparate conditions. The first are able to look forward to growth and development, the second are fearful of total dispossession, which they believe to be the aim of the occupying Power.
20. The increasing number of Israelis who are moving into the settlements that are being established is affecting adversely the social life of the Palestinians in the occupied territories and disrupting their daily activities. The current policy of establishing Israeli settlements in close proximity to Palestinian populated towns and villages has given rise to more frequent interaction between the settlers and the Palestinians. However, the interaction has been predominantly one of conflict and confrontation often leading to violence. The settlers form a privileged class in the occupied territories, have the support of the administering authorities and the Government, are permitted to carry firearms and often get involved in maintaining law and order.
21 The intervention of the settlers in the day-to-day life of the Palestinians in the occupied territories has included interference with farming activities; obtaining, with the support of the administration, land from the villages for territorial expansion of their settlements and for provision of infrastructure to them; disruption of classes and school activities because of alleged stone-throwing incidents by students; confrontation in places of religious worship and, more recently, violent acts intended to damage or destroy such places. The latter has been attributed to terrorist groups. The Palestinian residents of some of the refugee camps have been subjected to frequent harassment, partly because of the resistance of the camp dwellers to a plan by the Israeli Government to relocate them elsewhere.
22. The occupied territories are subject to two different judicial and local government systems. A separate system of local government operates for the Israeli settlements which, among other privileges, have powers for planning and development of all the areas which are beyond the existing territorial boundaries of the Palestinian towns and villages. Israeli law is extended to the settlers, while the Palestinians are subject to military law; and justice is dispensed to the Israeli settlers through Israeli courts, while the Palestinians are subject to the jurisdiction of military courts, the judgement of which cannot be appealed.
23. The facilities available to the Israeli settlers to meet their educational and health needs, appear to be superior to those available to the Palestinians in the territories. The systems available to the settlers are of the same high standard and quality as those in Israel. In contrast, the facilities and services available to the Palestinians are below average and not commensurate with the increase in population and advances in the educational and medical sciences.
24. While the Israeli settlers are quite free to pursue their social and cultural interests and activities within the territories without any hindrances, the Palestinians are subjected to frequent curfews which restrict their activities. Security checks carried out by military personnel, the police, and the settlers at any time of the day or night are routine happenings.
III. SETTLEMENT TRENDS
A. Overview
25 The trends in the establishment of Israeli settlements in the Arab territories occupied after June 1967 can roughly be divided into three phases, namely:
(a) 1967 to 1970;
(b) 1971 to 1977 when the Labor Government was in power;
(c) 1977 to the present during the tenure of the Likud Government.
These periods do not form distinct phases but rather a continuous process, considering that the Labor Government was in power during the first two phases and the influence of the National Religious Party has been continuous in both Governments. The differences lie more in emphasis than in radical changes in policy.
26. In the first phase, 1967 to 1970, although there does not seem to have been an initial declaration of policy, the Defense Ministry undertook the establishment of military outposts, commonly known as "nahals", in strategic areas, as security measures and for the purpose of maintaining law and order in the territories.Nahals were established in the Jordan Valley – three in 1968 (Mehola, Kalia and Aragaman); one in 1969 (Patazael); and four in 1970 (Gilgal, Massua, Yitav and Maele Bfravim). A nahal outpost was also established in the Gaza (Kfar Darom – 1970). 1/ Meanwhile, the Ministry of Housing and Construction undertook the construction of urban residential units within the Arab area incorporated in the City of Jerusalem, namely the Arab sector of Jerusalem and the surrounding Arab villages of Sour Baher, Biet Safafa, Eltour, Elamm, El Assaweh and Anata as well as the area around the airport. Units were being constructed, particularly in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, Ramat Eshkol and French Hill. 2/ Private groups of Israelis were also active in establishing a presence in the occupied territories. Thus, a former Jewish settlement at Kfar Etzion, which had been abandoned after the 1948 war, was re-established by the children of the original settlers, and a religious group illegally established a settlement at Kiryat Arbala, a suburb of Hebron. One civilian settlement was established in 1969 in the Etzion Block north of Hebron (Rosh Tzurim) and one in 1970 (Alon Shvot). A religious co-operative, (moshav), Mevo Horon, was also established in the Latrun Salient in January 1970.
27. On the whole, the establishment of Israeli settlements during this period appears to have followed the Allon Plan, presented by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Yigal Allon, to the Government on 13 July 1967, which included fixing the Jordan River as Israel's "secure border" with Jordan; holding a strip of 15 to 20 kilometers wide in the Jordan Valley which would include the first ridge of mountains west of the Valley; holding the eastern slopes of Mt. Hebron and the Judaean Desert to the Dead Sea; and making minor border adjustments in places like Latrun and the Etzion Block. 3/
28. By the beginning of the second phase in 1971, there was growing evidence of an emerging policy on settlement. The press made reference to the existence of a Ministerial Committee for the settlement of the occupied territories, and announcements to that effect were made by Israeli Government ministers and leaders. 4/ While settlements during this period were established in the priority areas outlined in the Allon Plan, other considerations appear to have influenced the shaping of policy, as was indicated in a statement in the Knesset Made on 19 July 1972 by Mr. Israel Galili, Minister without Portfolio and Chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Settlement. He was quoted as saying that the Israeli Government had put no area out of bounds for Jewish settlements and that the only limitations to Israeli settlement in the occupied territories were moral ones; and that settlement policy was not dictated by security alone but historical right as well, if not more so. 5/
29. Further indications given by Israeli ministers as to the trends in settlement policy included a statement made by Mr. Moshe Dayan that the West Bank was part of the fatherland and Israelis had the right to settle there on a permanent basis in accordance with Government policy decisions. 6/ During the period 1971-1976, settlements were established as follows: in the Jordan Valley, 7; Bethelem, 1; Nablus, 1; Ramallah, 1; Gaza, 2; and East Jerusalem, 10 (see appendix I-A). The settlements in the East Jerusalem area were established according to a master plan drawn up in 1971 for the construction of approximately 21,000 residential units.7/
30. With the election of the Likud Government in early 1977, settlement trends in the occupied territories were influenced by certain decisions taken by the Government, particularly to "thicken" and strengthen already established settlements and to accelerate the pace of establishing new ones. 8/ While continuing to establish settlements in the priority areas determined by the Labor Government, the Likud Government opened new areas for settlement, which included the northern West Bank, the western slopes of the Jerusalem hills and the vicinities of Palestinian' towns, such as Ramallah, Nablus and Jenin. Not only was the Government to establish settlements in these areas, but also private groups, notably the Gush Emunim. 9/ Some of the considerations which led to this expansion were articulated from time to time by Government ministers and other leaders; for example, Mr. Ariel Sharon, Minister of Agriculture and chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Settlement, on 3 July 1978 stated that settlements had been located on the northern West Bank U partly to outflank the 300,000 Palestinians who straddle the former Armistice Line" (A/33/356, para. 82). On 18 January 1979, he stated that "Jewish settlement is necessary east of Nablus in order to protect a proposed approach road to the Jordan Valley from the coastal plains" (A/34/631, para. 57). He was also reported to have stated during a Cabinet discussion on the matter that "Jews had every right to rebuild their homes in the center of Hebron, especially at sites like the Hadassa hospital where Jewish title is indisputable". 10/ Mr. Drobles, Co-Chairman of the Jewish Agency's Settlement Department, stated on 18 May 1979 at a press conference that the State of Israel must for political and other reasons develop the entire region of "Judea and Samaria" (West Bank) (A/34/631, para. 49); and referring to nahal outposts-established in the fiscal year 1982/83, he said that they were designed to curb "illegal spread of Arabs in vital areas" (A/37/485, para. 209).
31. During the period 1977 to 1983, settlements were established as follows: Jordan Valley, 17; East Jerusalem, 11; Gaza, 11; Hebron, 15; Bethlehem, 8; Ramallah, 17; Nablus, 21; and Jenin, 5 (see appendix I-A).
32. In a survey of the activities of his Ministry, the Minister of Science and Development, Mr. Yuval Ne’eman, who is also the Acting Chairman of the Joint Committee on Settlement of the Government of Israel and the World Zionist Organization, stated on 13 March 1984 that
"there isn't enough settlement … There isn't enough – not so much in terms of the number – but the problem is rate, since we are establishing settlements, but unfortunately they look like settlements set up by the pre-state Jewish community, when there was no state yet. I would hope that at the time when this is being done by the state, there would not be 15 housing units at the beginning, but 100 and 200 … If you look at my survey and see where the 48 settlements have been established in the last years, you will find that settlements not in accordance with the 'Allon Plan' can be counted on one hand … Only six or seven of the settlements we established were outside the (parameters of the) plan. Of course, if you put the Allon Plan in a narrower corridor, then many more settlements are outside the plan". 11/
B. Plan formulation
33. According to the information gathered by the consultants from secondary sources, formulation of settlement plans is done by various bodies, notably the Ministries directly concerned with settlement, for example, the Ministries of Agriculture, Housing and Defense. The Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization is also actively engaged in settlement planning, and in one instance, the Gush Emunim also had produced a master plan. However, final approval lies with the Ministerial Committee for Settlement and the Israeli Government Cabinet. The Ministerial Committee is composed of seven ministers of Government and an equal number of members of the World Zionist Organization. 12/ The Ministerial Committee as well as the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization announce from time to time various plans which have been formulated by each body, sometimes short-term and at other times, long-term.
34. In its planning, the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization, which is said to be identical with the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency which has responsibility for settlement within Israel proper (A/33/356), can draw on the experience in establishing settlements within Israel during the period from 1948 to 1967. The planning is on a regional basis and comprises rural settlements, rural service centers and regional towns, as for example in the Lakhish region within Israel. 13/ Evidence of this approach is contained in a report in the Ma’ariv of 3 March 1974 that plans had been drawn up for the establishment in the Gaza Strip of 6 moshavim and 3 kibbutzim along with a municipal center. The regional center of Alon Shvut for the Etzion Block of settlements 14/ and Ma'aleh Ephraim as a service center for settlers in the Jordan Valley 15/ are further examples of the regional planning approach.
35. Since 1977, coinciding with the election of the Likud Government, the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization appears to have become more active in formulating its own plans, which were subject to Government approval. Thus the Jerusalem Post of 19 January 1977 and the Ha'aretz of 13 January 1977 reported a four-year plan by the Settlement Department to establish 56 rural settlements, including 27 in the occupied territories. A five-year project for establishing 59 settlements in the West Bank was put forward in 1980 by the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization. Thirty of them had already been established since 1978 and 20 were to be ready by 1,983. 16/ Another plan was put forward by the Settlement Department to establish 710 settlements (12 to 15 each year) between 1980 and 1985. They were to be located in proximity to other established settlements around Hebron, Ma'aleh Adumin, Jerusalem, and Jenin area and the Jordan Valley. 17/ In a new development, a committee of experts drawn from various ministries of Government (Defense, Housing and Construction, Labor and Social Services) and representatives of the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization have drawn up a master plan to establish Gush Emunim settlements in the West Bank (15 according to Al Ittihad). 18/
36. In the survey of the activities of his Ministry of Science and Development referred to earlier, the Minister, Mr. Yuval Ne’eman mentioned that since 1982, the Joint Committee on Settlement had decided on the establishment of 48 settlements of which 8 were to be in the "Samaria" mountains; 7 in western "Samaria"; 7 in the Jordan Valley; 5 in the Jerusalem-Etzion Block area; 2 on the Hebron Plateau; 9 in the Yattir region; 3 in Gaza; and 3 in the Arava, the other 4 being in Galilee. Of these, 43 were either populated or started to be built. In 1984 anti 1985 some 12 new settlements were to be established by the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization. Some of these would be army outposts converted into civilian settlements, "exploiting infrastructure constructed as part of defense activities"; some would be settlements in entirely new areas. 19/
37. According to information provided by the Department of Occupied Homeland Affairs of the Palestine Liberation Organization (appendix II-B), plans have been formulated to establish another 72 settlements during the period 1983-1987, distributed as follows: Jordan Valley, 4; Bethlehem, 9; Nablus, 33; Hebron, 10; Ramallah, 7; unspecified, 9.
C. Investment in the settlement program
38. It is difficult to determine precisely the magnitude of resources expended in the establishment of the Israeli settlements, particularly because the resources are made available from various sources, as the analysis below indicates. It would appear that funds for the initial establishment, as well as operations and maintenance are included in the budgets of various ministries of Government, notably those concerned with agriculture, housing and defense, the last for the establishment of military outposts (nahals), many of which have been converted subsequently to civilian settlements. The World Zionist Organization, through its Settlement Department, channels substantial resources not only towards the establishment of the settlements, but also for procuring settlers and maintenance of outposts. 20/ The Jewish National Fund expends resources on buying and reclaiming land, and the Israeli Land Authority also purchases land for settlement purposes. 21/ According to the information gathered by the consultants, the parent bodies of various movements, such as Moshav and Kibbutz, and religious groups often bear part of the costs of operations and maintenance during the initial stages of developing the settlements affiliated with them. The resources invested were in settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories as well as the Golan Heights and, up to 1979, in the Sinai.
39. There is no record readily available of the resources expended during the initial years of the settlement movement, apart from a report appearing in the Ha’aretz of 10 February 1975 which mentioned Israeli pounds 800 million as the amount spent on the settlements since 1967. Another report in the Ha'aretz of 1 February 1977 mentioned a decision of the Ministerial Committee on Settlement to allocate 225 million for establishing 25 settlements, 17 of which were to be built in the occupied territories.
40. More precise information began to be released to the public with the advent of the Likud Government in 1977. Speaking as the Chairman of the Ministerial Committee on Settlement, Mr. Sharon had said that the Committee "intends to spend le 108 million, one third of the development budget on new sites", as reported in the Jerusalem Post of 6 March 1978. A report appearing in the Ha’aretz of 6 June 1978 mentioned that the Minister of Housing and Construction had budgeted 80 million for constructions in new settlements in the northern region of the West Bank, out of a global provision of 170 million earmarked for settlements. The Israeli Government budget for 1978/79 had the following breakdown for settlements (A/33/356, para. 50):
2.5 billion for new settlements and extension of existing ones
830 million for the Housing Ministry
600 million for the Agricultural Ministry.
41. The decision of the Government of Israel on 16 September 1979 to authorize the purchase of land in the West Bank and Gaza by Israeli citizens and corporations opened the door for private investment to flow into the settlement movement; and so did the program of "Build Your Own Home", sponsored by the Jewish Agency, which provided attractive incentives to prospective settlers.
42. By 1980, the expenditure on settlements was increasing rapidly both because of the accelerated program of establishing them and also the fall in value of the Israeli pound. It was reported that the Government was to invest at least 7.5 billion during the fiscal year 1980 in the occupied territories. A budget of 3 billion had been allocated by the World Zionist organization Settlement Department to the development of 103 settlements in the occupied territories (A/35/425, paras. 93 and 94).
43. Concerning the fiscal year 1984/85, the Jerusalem Post of 27 October 1983 reported that the Finance Minister, Mr. Yigal Cohen-Orgad, had stated at the Knesset Finance Committee meeting on 26 October that the expenditure on settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories and the Golan Heights for the fiscal year 1984/85 would be Israeli shekels (IS) 35 billion (pounds changed into shekels in 1981).
IV. IMPACT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON LAND AND WATER RESOURCES, HOUSING, PUBLIC AMENITIES, AND INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES
A. Impact on growth and expansion of Palestinian towns and villages
44. Palestinian communities inhabiting the West Bank and Gaza are basically agricultural. To them the basic elements of land and water are of vital importance. The Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs of the Government of Jordan reports that up to January 1984, the State of Israel had taken possession of 2,607,901 dunums (260,790 hectares) of West Bank territory, which constitutes 47.4 per cent of the total area. According to the same source, 26 per cent of this land has been allocated to the 165 Israeli settlements created by the end of July 1983. 22/ According to the Washington Post, some Israeli sources have estimated Israeli controlled land in the West Bank at over 50 to 60 per cent of its total area. 23/ The example of the Jordan Valley can serve as an illustration of the magnitude of Israeli expropriation of Palestinian lands. Elisha Efrat, an Israeli geographer, states that "the Jordan Valley is estimated to contain 16,500 acres (66,775 dunums or 6,677 hectares) of cultivable land unevenly distributed along the length of the valley. 24/ By his calculation, on the basis of 7.s acres (30 dunums) of land per agricultural unit, and approximately 80 agricultural units per settlement, the Jordan Valley could support between 18 and 25 Israeli settlements. 25/ The most recent account of the Department of Occupied Homeland Affairs of the Palestine Liberation Organization shows that by the end of 1983 Israel had established 31 settlements of various types in the Jordan Valley (see appendix I-A).
45. According to Elisha Efrat, the criteria for locating Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are to use the least suitable agricultural land, to avoid densely populated Palestinian localities and to refrain from impairing the growth of Palestinian villages. 26/ However, according to Meron Benvenisti (ex-Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem) the main criteria for planning and locating Israeli settlements are as follows:
(a) Abolishing the independent planning powers of Palestinian village councils and district planning commissions, and vesting all planning powers in the Higher Planning Council, a body composed of Israeli officials only; 27/
(b) Circumventing Palestinian villages; 28/
(c) Locating settlements so that they restrict expansion of adjacent Palestinian villages and farms; 29/
(d) Segregating public services between Palestinian and Israeli settlements; 30/
(e) Locating Israeli settlements on higher ground for a militarily more secure and superior position; 31/
(f) Restricting future spatial expansion of Palestinian towns and villages by limiting their maximum built-up area by restrictive land use regulations, and designating the remaining spaces either "special areas" (i.e. allocated or planned to be allocated for Israeli settlements) or agricultural land, natural reserves or areas for future planning; 32/
(g) Creating extremely wide building lines on either sides of main roads (100 and 150 meters) in order to obstruct traditional expansion of Palestinian housing along main arteries. 33/
46. A very recent development in Israeli settlements' policy is locating Israeli settlements inside densely populated Palestinian urban centers. The Ministry of the Occupied Territories Affairs of Jordan reports that the Government of Israel, in spite of the strong opposition of the local population, has initiated a plan of establishing an urban settlement in the middle of the city of Hebron in the West Bank at the location of the central vegetable market which was burnt down during Israeli-imposed curfew hours. 34/
47. According to recent press reports, "the Israeli authorities are considering a plan drawn up by a committee chaired by Minister Mordechai Porat for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees living in camps in the West Bank". 35/ A is to demolish major objective of this plan which is known as the "Ben Porat Plan", some of the camps and construct proper housing in specified locations, in order to relocate the refugees to new and adequate living quarters. Some Israeli newspapers have announced that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) will be involved in this project. 36/ In a statement to the press, on 14 December 1983, the Commissioner-General of UNIRWA made clarifications to the effect that:
(a) UNRWA has not been associated with the plan and does not envisage being involved in its execution;
(b) The agency will not oppose voluntary acceptance of the move to new quarters by the refugees, but will strongly object to any coercive attempt to make refugees comply with any particular attempt;
(c) The agency will expect to continue providing its services to relocated refugees, since their status and eligibility as refugees will not be affected by the move. But relocating installations, such as schools and clinics, will require additional funding. 37/ Palestinian sources consider the "Ben Porat Plan" another attempt by the Government of Israel in the direction of dispersing Palestinians within the occupied territories with the objective of creating a more homogeneous mosaic of Jewish settlements and Palestinian communities in the region, and dismantling the camps which have become strongholds of Palestinian resistance against assimilation and erosion of Palestinian national identity. 38/
48. The future impact of the Israeli settlements on the growth and expansion of Palestinian towns and villages in the occupied territories will be determined by the number of settlements that will be established in the coming years and the increase in the Israeli population living in them. According to the data compiled by the Department of Occupied Homeland Affairs of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Israeli sources, some 78 new settlements will be established during the period 1983-1987 (see appendix I-B). At present, approximately 35,000 Israelis are said to be living in the settlements, and according to government plans 100,000 are expected to live in them by 1987 with a projected figure of 190,000 by the year 2010. 39/
49. Considering that investment resources are being provided on an increasing scale for the settlement movement (see paras. 38-43 above), and Israeli families are inclined to move into the settlements because of the improved quality of life in them and cheaper prices of houses, 40/ the target for 1987 appears to be a possibility, and that for 2010 a more nebulous one. According to one estimate, 41/ during the period 1985-1994, the natural increase of the Palestinian population in the territories is expected to be approximately 685,000. Over the next decade the above-mentioned increase in the number of Israeli settlers, plus the natural growth of the Palestinian population, even without considering the conceivable return of a portion of Palestinian refugees, is expected to double the existing population of the territories. This means that, even at the present unacceptable standards, there will be a doubling of the need for water, cultivable land, housing, public amenities and services, infrastructural facilities etc.
50. Previous policies and practices of the Government of Israel in expropriating land for the settlements in the occupied territories indicate that to accommodate- an additional 65,000 to 155,000 Israeli settlers within the next 26 years will require further expropriation of large quantities of land not only for providing the settlements with the necessary infrastructure but also for their expansion. This would mean that Palestinian towns and villages will not have enough land for their future growth and expansion to accommodate the increase in the Palestinian population projected above.
B. Impact on water resources
51. According to Meron Benvenisti,
"The impact of Israeli settlements on West Bank water is a function of the amount of land irrigated by the settlers and not of the actual number of settlers. Indeed, Israeli settlers today are 2-3 per cent of the West Bank population and use 20 per cent of the total water consumption of the area. Yet 96 per cent of this amount is for irrigation". 42/
The supply of water in the West Bank and Gaza is estimated to be approximately 800 million cubic meters (m3) and 50 million m3 per year respectively. The annual consumption of water for agricultural and domestic uses in each of these regions is estimated at 100 million m3 per year. This means that while the annual supply of water in the West Bank is eight times more than its consumption, Gaza consumes about double the amount of water available from annual precipitation. 43/ The following table presents water resources and their allocation to domestic and agricultural uses.
52. While the situation in Gaza is very serious and requires immediate remedy to prevent rapid drop of underground water level below the red line, increase of salinity, and intrusion of sea water into the land, the supply of water in the West Bank is more than adequate for the present and the future needs of a much larger population and extended agricultural activities. 44/ However, Israeli sources, by defining the region to be served by the available water resources of the West Bank as the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, which includes the State of Israel, arrive at the following opposite picture and conclusions:
"The scarcity of water in the region between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River has resulted in a situation where all the major groundwater aquifers are already fully exploited. In the Gaza Strip and in the western and northeastern basins of Judea and Samaria, the groundwater aquifers are already overexploited. Exploitation of water resources must end in Judea and Samaria and decrease in the Gaza Strip. According to present forecasts of demographic and economic development, there will be a water deficit by the end of the century of 200-400 million m3 per year in these two areas." 45/
Table 1: Water resources and their allocation to domestic andirrigation uses: 1982
|
Polpuation (thousands) |
Land under irrigation (thousand dunums) |
Available water (million m3) |
Allocation of water (million m3) |
Annual deficit or surplus (million m3) |
|||
|
Irrigation a/ |
Domestic b/ |
Total |
|||||
|
West Bank |
748 |
87.5 |
800 |
87.5 |
15 |
102.5 |
+697.5 |
|
Gaza Strip |
476 |
102 |
50 |
102 |
9.5 |
111.5 |
-61.5 |
Sources:
For population figures, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983;
For land under irrigation, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Palestine: options for development" (TD/B/960), report prepared by P. G. Sadler and B. Abu Kishk, 11 May 1983, p. 18; for available water, p. 19;
For calculating allocated water for irrigation, Elisha Efrat, "Spatial patterns of Jewish and Arab settlements in Judea and Samaria", in Daniel J. Elazar, ea., Judea, Samaria and Gaza: Views on the Present and Future (Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1982), p. 22;
For calculating allocated water for domestic use, Meron Benvenisti, The West Bank and Gaza, Data Base Project (Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1982), p. 23.
a/ At 1,000 m3/yr/dunum.
b/ At 20 m3/yr/person.
53. Reasons for the above-mentioned conclusion of Israeli sources, which are drawn in spite of the figures presented in the preceding table, is beyond the scope of this report. This conclusion, however, has resulted in restrictive measures imposed by the occupying authorities in terms of limiting the usage of water by the Palestinian population to the maximum level used in 1967, 46/ which has had a direct and detrimental impact upon the living conditions of the Palestinian people. At the same time, Israeli settlements are being created in increasing numbers every year. Each Israeli agricultural settlement consumes an average of 2.4 million m3 of water per year. 47/ "Drilling of irrigation wells has been severely restricted in the West Bank since 1967, while the Israeli Water Company was given permission to drill 30 new wells there. Since 1967, only two new wells for agricultural use have been permitted to the (Palestinian) people of the West Bank". 48/
54. As we stated before, Israel considers the West Bank aquifers as serving Israel and the West Bank, and according to the previous quotation, in paragraph 52, the major aquifers in this area are already fully exploited and even in some areas overexploited. For all practical purposes, therefore, the fact seems to be that the aquifers of the West Bank, instead of serving a population of 748,000 Palestinians and 35,000 Israeli settlers, also serve a significant portion of over 3 million Israelis within Israel proper. If this practice continues, the need created by the future increase of Israeli settlers and the natural growth of population in the West Bank alone, will surpass the capacity of the West Bank water resources.
C. Impact on housing
55. According to figures presented in the Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983, the amount of residential building completed during 1981 in the West Bank towns and villages declined by 15.4 and 4.1 per cent respectively compared with 1980. In Gaza, residential construction in the towns had increased by 23.9 per cent, while decreasing by 5.8 per cent in the villages. The combined figures of West Bank and Gaza show a decline of 1.2 per cent in towns and 4.3 per cent in villages. This is illustrated in the table below.
Table 2: Area of residential and non-residential buildings completed in 1980 and 1981
(thousands of m2)
|
West Bank |
Gaza Strip |
Total |
|||||||
|
1980 |
1981 |
Change (Percen- tage) |
1980 |
1981 |
Change (percen- tage) |
1980 |
1981 |
Change (Percen- tage) |
|
|
Total |
589.0 |
534.3 |
-9.3 |
204.5 |
238.4 |
+16.6 |
793.5 |
772.7 |
-2.6 |
|
Towns |
271.7 |
229.8 |
-15.4 |
154.1 |
190.9 |
+23.9 |
425.8 |
420.7 |
-1.2 |
|
Villages |
317.4 |
304.5 |
-4.1 |
50.4 |
47.5 |
-5.8 |
367.8 |
352 |
-4.3 |
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983, table XXVII/36, p. 798.
56. The above-mentioned decline became more significant in the light of the fact that by one estimate there are 200,000 residential units in the West Bank of which 70 per cent (140,OO0 units) need to be replaced because of either dilapidation or unacceptable standards. 49/ in terms of square meters of construction on the basis of 120 m2 per dwelling unit, this means 16,800,000 m2 of needed residential construction.
57. As was stated in the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session (A/38/278-E/1983/77, annex, para. 24), there has been a significant discrepancy in the amount of residential construction in relation to total housing need, which is comprised of need created by population growth plus replacement of dilapidated and substandard housing. The following table updates the figures presented in the above-mentioned report on the supply of housing in relation to housing need in the occupied territories. It can be readily observed that the housing industry over the 15 years since the 1967 occupation, after satisfying the housing need of 38,589 units resulting from population growth, has only contributed a total of 6,721 units (an average of 450 units per year) towards replacing the estimated 140,000 dilapidated and substandard units.
Tablel 3: Comparison of supply of housing with housing need in the Palestinian territories, 1967-1982
|
West Bank |
Gaza Sstrip |
Total |
|
|
Population increase, 1967-1982 a/ Average Family size, 1982 b/ Number of families, increase, 1967-1982 Number of families living in substandard and dilapidated housing, 1982 c/ total housing need, 1982 Total residential construciton completed 1967-1982 d/ (m3) Average size of dwellingl unlits completed, 1979-1981 e/ (m3) Total number of dwellillng units, increase, 1967-1982 |
161,600 6.7 24,119 3,888,800 116.6 33,069 |
95,500 6.6 14,470 1,615,800 132 12,241 |
38.589 140,000 178,589 45,310 |
Sources: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983: a/ table XXVII/I; b/ table XXVII/14; d/ table XXVII/33; e/ table XXVII/34;
c/ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "Palestine: options for development" (TD/B/960), report prepared by P. G. Sadler and B. Abu Kishk, 11 May 1983, p. 41.
58. The long-term impact of the occupying authorities' lack of attention to residential construction in particular and construction activities in general, could be expected to further aggravate the shortages in housing units and public buildings in the future. The same could be said of the restrictive practices ofthe occupying authorities in terms of administrative obstacles to issuing building permits 50/ and transfers of funds from abroad. 51/
59. There has been no activity in residential construction by the public sector since 1968 in the West Bank and since 1978 in Gaza. 52/ This means that the occupying authorities have not taken any measures towards helping lower income groups of the local population to acquire adequate housing since those dates. At the same time, virtually all of the Israeli settlers enjoy some kind of direct or indirect subsidy in the form of long-term low interest government loans, and government provision of public amenities, and infrastructural facilities, which further decreases cost of the housing etc. 53/
60. The contrast in housing and community facilities is most apparent in occupied Arab Jerusalem. While new apartment complexes have been built in and around it with all modern amenities, paved roads and open spaces, little or no improvement has been made to the housing and infrastructure in the Arab sector of the city. This neglect is said to extend to municipal services also, such as garbage collection, street cleaning and public lighting. Where other urban settlements have been established, such as Ariel, Ma'aaleh Adumim, Ma'aaleh Efraim and Kiryat Arba'a, the same high standards as in Jerusalem would have been applied, as is evident in the demolished settlement of Yamit in northern Sinai.
61. So far as the standard of housing is concerned, there are many indications, and it is reasonable to assume, that the houses in the Israeli settlements are constructed and equipped at a much higher standard than those occupied by the Palestinians. Assuming that all new house construction in the settlements includes such facilities as kitchen, bathroom, toilet, running water and electricity, an assessment of the lack of these facilities in Palestinian homes in the occupied territories can be made from the table below, extracted from the Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983.
Table 4. Household facilities in the West Bank and Gaza, 1981(percentages)
|
West Bank |
Gaza |
|||||
|
Total |
Villages |
Towns |
Total |
Refugee camps |
Towns |
|
|
Kitchen exclusively for household No batheroom No toilet Running water in dewelling Electricity round the clock |
73.2 49.3 14.7 44.9 50.6 |
65.8 59.6 21.5 29.3 26.9 |
86.4 26.2 2.4 79.0 95.8 |
80.1 38.8 2.2 51.4 88.5 |
85.5 48.9 1.0 39.7 83.9 |
77.8 30.3 1.7 63.1 89.2 |
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983, table XXVII/36.
62. Israeli rural settlements go through various stages of development, such as temporary accommodation in the nahals to prefabricated buildings; and ultimately to permanent structures of houses with public buildings, electricity, water supply, approach roads and other amenities. Commenting on the facilities available in the settlements, Mr. Nafez Nazzal, in his article on "Land tenure, the settlements and peace" in the book, A Palestinian Agenda for the West Bank and Gaza, 54/ writes that the houses are air-conditioned, and those situated in the Jordan Valley are equipped with a powerful apparatus capable of dealing with the heat of the valley. Each house, or in some cases every pair of houses, has access to a huge air-conditioned shelter, dug in the ground and overtopped by boulders, which is connected by a paved way to the front of each house. Rows of electric lamps criss-cross each settlement and surround the fence. The settlements are flood-lit in the night. Inside the settlement there is a central area covered by grass which requires considerable amounts of water to keep it green. Community services, such as kitchen, clubs and dining rooms are air-conditioned.
63. The Israeli regional planning concept of rural settlements, rural service centers and regional towns has been applied with advantage to provide the basic necessities and services to the Israeli settlers. However, no such planning approach has been applied to improve the living conditions of the Palestinian residents. Palestinian communities have been limited by various regulations from undertaking new constructions whether private or public, and municipalities have been restricted from improving services or providing new facilities. Many restrictions have been placed on improving water service and electricity supply, while the neighboring settlements have been provided generously with these amenities.
64. The impact of the above-mentioned discrepancy and differing standards in housing conditions of Israeli settlers and Arab population is expected to have far-reaching effects of deprivation, frustration and antagonism of the local inhabitants of the area against the Israeli-Jewish population in the neighboring settlements. Some of the violent, incidents between Israelis and Palestinians, recorded in the reports of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, 55/ can be reasonably assumed to have been partly due to the frustration resulting from preferential treatment of Israeli settlers.
65. The occupying authorities are continuing their practices of demolishing houses and therefore punishing the families of those suspected or convicted of committing violent acts or engaging in demonstrations, stone throwing etc. against Israeli settlers and authorities. Appendix III presents the number of houses demolished by Israeli authorities from 1967 to 1982. It can be observed from this table, that since 1977, when such demolition was reduced to one, there has been a marked increase of up to 55 units in 1982. The total number of houses demolished for punitive reasons over the 16-year period of occupation has been 1,346 units, 28 of which were demolished in Gaza.
66. According to information supplied to the consultants by Palestinian sources and confirmed by news reports in Israeli papers, 56/ in addition to demolishing houses, Israeli authorities have devised a new method of punishment, by which the house, or the main room of the house of the family whose member is accused of stone throwing, is sealed off with concrete instead of being demolished.
V. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS
A. Impact on production and trade
57. The most immediate and direct consequences of the acceleration of Israeli settlement in the occupied territories are on ownership and use of land. These, in turn, impose radical changes in the economy of the territories, the central characteristic of which has been the predominance of agriculture. Expropriation and confiscation, by their nature, limit the land area accessible to Palestinian farmers, 57/ and the associated control of water resources by Israel 58/ directly affects the utilization and productivity of this land.
58. Other measures adopted by the occupying Power in response to the requirements of its own economy, and to its political and security considerations, further restrict the freedom of Palestinian farmers in the use of their land and impede the independent development of the agricultural sector. Examples of such measures are:
(a) Opening of roads to connect settlements among themselves and with Israel through agricultural land, 59/ and the maintenance of "safety" zones along them, where Palestinians are not allowed to plant or build; 60/
(b) Restrictions on the use of grazing land; 61/
(c) Limitations on the areas cultivated with specific products or in specific geographical areas, e.g. restriction on planting of citrus fruit trees in the West Bank, 62/ and its prohibition in Gaza, 63/ restrictions on planting of tomatoes and
eggplant in the Jiftlik region (Jordan Valley), 64/ and on all crops in the Ghor Valley (West Bank) where the pattern of production is to be determined by the authorities; 65/
(d) Prohibition of overnight stays in the Ghor Valley by Palestinian agricultural workers residing elsewhere, so as to discourage their work in this area; 66/
(e) Prevention of the establishment of agricultural co-operatives by Palestinian farmers, and of their access to agricultural credit from East Bank Institutions. 67/
59. Related to the policy of "open borders" between Israel and the territories, which has been maintained since 1969, 68/ the agricultural sector has been re-oriented in response to the need of the Palestinian farmer to emphasize those crops that can be sold in Israel, and de-emphasize those which, even if for local consumption, are produced more cheaply in Israel. In their endeavors to use market opportunities in Israel, Palestinian farmers have benefited from access to Israeli technology, but a great part of technical progress, particularly in the second half of the nineteen seventies, has been due also to technical and financial aid from Jordan and charitable organizations; or it has been imitative of developments in Jordan. The obstacle to faster growth of agriculture, it has been observed, lies in Israeli land and water policies. 69/ which are associated with the settlement thrust. Use of irrigation by Palestinian farmers is limited. Thus, fields vary according to rainfall, particularly in the West Bank.
70. The contribution of agriculture to the GNP of the territories tends to fluctuate year to year in unison with the fluctuations in the value of agricultural output, which respond, in turn, to the volume of rain. However, a diminution of this contribution between the periods 1968 to 1974 and 1975 to IL980 can be observed in the West Bank, and a downward trend is evident in Gaza, as shown in table 5. Thus the relative importance of the agricultural sector has clearly declined.
71. Employment in agriculture has decreased in both territories, as evidenced in table 6. Given the increase in value of agricultural product, it would seem that labor productivity has increased. This is corroborated by the growth in value added per worker of 6.9 per cent in Gaza and 8 per cent in the West Bank between 1975 and 1981. 70/
72. The labor freed by increased productivity in agriculture has not been absorbed in the industrial sector of the territories but, as will be discussed later, has had to find employment in Israel.
73. Investment in industry has been severely limited by a number of factors: 71/
(a) Lack of an indigenous financial system which would provide producers with credit, specialized knowledge, and advice;
(b) Uncertainty, both political and financial, the latter being the consequence of the high rates of inflation in Israel, and the continued devaluation of the Israeli shekel;
(c) Lack of participation by Palestinians in major economic policy decisions that affect them, which results in lack of protection for their industries, particularly against competition from Israel's far more developed industries;
(d) Import licensing of industrial machinery, under the authority of the military government;
(e) Building licenses, the fees for which are high for the level of capitalization of Palestinian industries, and the process lengthy;
(f) Restrictions on the use of water and prohibition on the sinking of new wells. Where new industry is prohibited in or near towns or cities, and well sinking is restricted elsewhere, lack of water becomes an impediment to new industry;
(g) Taxes and Customs duties. The Jordanian income tax of 25 per cent and social service tax of 12.5 per cent have been retained. In addition, a value added tax of 8 per cent was introduced in 1976, raised to 12 per cent in 1977 and to 15 per cent in 1981. Customs duties are hidden in the prices charged by the Israeli importers through whom imports are to be made, and an additional value added tax on the transaction with the importer must be borne by the final buyer.
Table 5. Contribution of the agricultural sector to gross national product in the West Bank and Gaza, 1968-1980
(Millions of Israeli pounds in current prices)
|
West Bank |
Gaza |
|||||
|
GNP |
Value of agricultural product |
Contribution of agrucltural (percentage) |
GNP |
Value of agricultural product |
Contribution of agriculture (percentage) |
|
|
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1985 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 |
330.0 420.0 481.0 722.0 1,118.0 1,305.0 2,257.0 3,133.0 4,705.0 6,280.5 11,560.0 20,080.1 51,920.9 |
115.0 153.0 141.0 203.0 307.0 340.0 796.0 713,0 1,243.0 1,380.1 3,090.4 4,430.2 15,180.7 |
34.8 36.4 29.3 28.1 27.4 26.0 35.2 22.7 26.4 21.9 26.7 22.0 29.2 |
128.0 154.0 206.0 288.0 450.0 671.0 961.0 1.429.0 2,178.0 3,133.0 5,068.0 10,045.0 21,457.0 |
36.0 41.0 54.0 73.0 106.0 134.0 176.0 297.0 485.0 685.0 997.0 1,487.0 2,642.0 |
28.1 26.6 26.2 25.5 23.5 19.9 18.3 20.7 22.2 21.8 19.6 14.8 12.3 |
Source: David Kahan, Agriculture and Water in the West Bank and Gaza (Jerusalem, West Bank Data Base Project, !983), table 5, p. 16
Table 6. Employment in agriculture, 1968-1981
(Thousands)
|
West Bank |
Gaza |
|||||
|
Total employment |
Employment in agriculture |
Percentage in agriculture |
Total employment |
Employment in agriculture |
Percentage in agriculture |
|
|
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1976 1978 1979 1980 1981 |
84 100 101 91 90 88 95 91 92 93 95 93 93 93 |
32.7 46.9 42.4 36.6 34.3 30.0 36.0 31.8 31.4 30.7 32.3 29.2 31.0 28.5 |
39 47 42 40 38 34 38 35 34 33 34 31 33 30 |
46 52 53 52 46 45 46 47 47 49 49 45 46 46 |
12.0 17.2 16.8 16.0 11.4 11.7 11.6 12.3 12.8 12.4 10.3 9.5 8.7 8.4 |
26 33 32 31 25 26 25 26 27 25 21 21 19 18.2 |
Source: David Kahan, Agriculture and Water in the West Bank and Gaza, (Jerusalem, West Bank Data Base Project, 1983), table 7, p. 18.
74. Under the conditions described above, the industrial sector of the territories remains one of small enterprises (98 per cent of them employ 10 or fewer workers) concentrated in the following occupations: repair trades, 13 per cent; quarrying and cement block and tile manufacturing, 11 per cent; carpentry and crafts, 15 per cent; and sewing and garment manufacturing, 20.5 per cent. Most firms are operating at around 50 per cent capacity. 72/ The combined industrial value added in the West Bank and Gaza equals about one per cent of the value added in Israeli industry. 73/ Most firms are owner-financed and cannot offer employment and wage conditions competitive with those in Israel. Those in sewing and garment manufacturing perform finishing work under subcontract for Israeli firms utilizing very low-paid female labor; thus, they contribute very little to industrial value added in the territories.
75. The agricultural and industrial activities of the settlers, in contrast, are promoted and subsidized by the Government of Israel. The extensive use of irrigation by the settlers has been described in section IV, section B. The high degree of protection of Israeli goods is well documented, as is the use of price guarantees for agricultural products. 74/ In addition, the recent settlement drive is complemented by an industrialization plan for the West Bank which is designed to attract industry and Israeli labor to this "hinterland", according to which there will be by the year 2015, over 85,000 Jewish workers in Israeli West Bank industry and only about 23,000 Palestinian workers. The plan proposes the largest Israeli industrial concentrations to be located within the most densely populated regions of the West Bank and near the major Israeli population areas. 75/
76. Israel exercises total control of trade between the occupied territories and the rest of the world, including Israel. The territories have become an important market for Israeli products, while exports of their products are restricted. In the case of agricultural products, restrictions to their exportation to Israel protect Israeli products from competition. 76/ At the same time, Israeli restrictive policies do not permit the development of alternative industrial exports. 77/ Thus the "open borders" policy has operated in one direction. On the other hand, a policy of "open bridges" (those connecting the West Bank with Jordan, across the Jordan River) has also been applied, with limitations. On the export side, the Arab boycott of Israeli products has restricted industrial exports to Jordan, mostly originating in the West Bank, as local industries have had to buy their inputs from or through Israel. 78/ On the import side, restrictions, licenses and duties, and the administrative and security controls imposed have discouraged growth. Trade with the rest of the world has not developed, as it has to be channeled through Israeli agents, and is thus subject to Israeli control and direction. Tables 7 and 8 illustrate the pattern of trade that has evolved under these conditions for the West Bank and Gaza, respectively.
77. It is apparent from tables 7 and 8 that, in all years since 1971, the territories have had a negative trade balance. Most importantly, the balance vis-a-vis Israel – a country with which trade was practically nil before the occupation – has been not only negative, but consistently larger than the total trade deficit. Thus the surplus achieved in the trade with Jordan only partly offsets the persistent deficit with the rest of the world and with Israel. Net transfers by Palestinians living abroad paid 21 to 28 per cent of the West Bank trade deficit and 39 to 44 per cent of that of Gaza between 1980 and 1982. 79/
78. Israel became very quickly (by 1971, where the figures in table 9 start) the major trading partner of the territories. 80/ According to table 9, roughly 50 per cent of West Bank and 80 per cent of Gaza exports for 1971-1980 went to Israel, while 79.8 to 87.8 per cent of West Bank imports and 84.9 per cent to 91 per cent of those of Gaza originated in Israel. Industrial products constituted, in all years, over 80 per cent of total imports of both territories from Israel. The territories have become the most important market for Israeli products after that of the United States.
Table 7. West Bank: export, imports and trade balance, by type of product and destination, 1971-1982
(In millions of Israeli shekels)
|
1971 |
1974 |
1975 |
1976 |
1977 |
1978 |
1979 |
1980 |
1981 |
1982 |
|
|
Exports To Israel Agriculturalproducts Industrial products To Jordan Agriculturalproducts Industrial products To other countries Agriculturalproducts Industrial products |
14.8 7.8 1.2 6.6 6.8 1.7 5.1 0.2 – 0.2 |
41.4 29.1 5.5 23.6 12.0 3.5 8.5 0.3 – 0.3 |
69.5 44.6 6.6 38.0 22.1 7.1 15.0 2.8 1.9 0.9 |
78.3 41.7 10.7 30.9 46.3 22.4 23.9 1.1 – 1.1 |
125.2 77.8 16.7 61.1 46.3 22.4 23.9 1.1 – 1.1 |
243.6 132.7 29.3 103.5 108.6 44.3 64.3 2.3 – 2.3 |
372.6 229.1 46.3 182.3 141.0 52.4 88.6 2.5 – 2.5 |
981.4 567.4 138.6 428.8 405.7 107.9 297.8 8.3 – 8.3 |
2394.5 1496.8 257.5 1239.3 880.6 281.2 599.4 17.1 – 17.1 |
5066.7 2726.0 425.7 2300.3 2319.5 776.2 1543.3 21.2 – 21.2 |
|
Imports From Israel Agriculturalproducts Industrial products From Jordan Agriculturalproducts Industrial products From other countries Agriculturalproducts Industrial products |
28.6 22.8 4.0 18.8 1.4 0.5 0.9 4.4 0.8 3.6 |
88.1 79.0 12.6 66.4 2.0 0.2 1.8 7.1 1.4 5.7 |
146.5 129.7 20.5 109.2 3.2 0.1 3.1 13.6 5.0 8.6 |
197.1 176.7 29.1 147.6 3.1 0.2 2.9 17.3 7.1 10.2 |
280.4 252.0 43.1. 208.9 4.9 0.3 4.6 23.5 7.1 16.4 |
440.6 381.3 63.8 317.5 8.8 0.6 8.2 50.5 2.4 48.1 |
897.4 777.1 117.9 659.2 12.7 1.0 11.7 107.6 9.0 98.6 |
2095.5 1819.5 298.5 1520.9 27.9 2.6 25.3 248.2 16.5 231.7 |
4980.5 4409.5 655.8 3753.7 85.2 2.1 83.1 485.8 31.1 454.7 |
10545.0 9254.6 1112.3 8142.3 223.5 10.6 212.9 1066.9 134.3 932.6 |
|
Trade balance With Israel With Jordan With other countries |
-13.8 -15.0 5.4 -4.2 |
-46.7 -49.9 10.0 -6.8 |
-77.0 -85.1 18.9 -10.8 |
-118.8 -135.0 31.2 -15.0 |
-155.2 -174.2 41.4 -22.4 |
197.0 -248.6 99.8 -48.2 |
-524.8 -548.0 128.3 -105.1 |
-1114.1 -1252.0 377.8 -239.9 |
-2586.0 -2912.7 795.4 -468.7 |
-5478.3 -6528.6 2096.0 -1045.7 |
Source: For 1971-1979, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Palestinian: options for development” (TD/B/960), report by P.G. Sadler and B. Abu Kishk, 11 May 1983, tables V/2 and V/4, pp.38 and 40. For 1980-1982, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983.
Table 8. Gaza: exports, imports and trade balance, by type of product and destination, 1971-1982
(In millions of Israeli shekels)
|
1971 |
1974 |
1975 |
1976 |
1977 |
1978 |
1979 |
1980 |
1981 |
1982 |
|
|
Exports To Israel Agriculturalproducts Industrial products To Jordan Agriculturalproducts Industrial products To other countries Agriculturalproducts Industrial products |
10.5 3.9 .9 2.9 1.2 1.2 – 5.5 5.5 – |
27.4 16.7 2.7 14.0 5.1 5.1 – 5.6 5.6 – |
52.0 33.6 4.8 28.8 10.5 10.5 – 8.5 8.5 – |
65.0 52.9 7.7 42.3 2.0 2.0 – 10.1 10.1 – |
138.9 83.6 18.2 65.4 42.3 42.2 .1 13.0 13.0 – |
212.6 140.0 36.1 103.9 57.6 57.6 0.1 15.0 15.0 – |
307.7 207.6 46.5 161.1 77.5 77.5 – 22.6 22.6 – |
782.0 595.5 120.2 475.3 138.2 138.2 .1 48.3 48.3 – |
2162.6 1790.3 259.4 1430.9 292.7 291.4 1.3 79.6 79.6 – |
4430.1 3609.0 402.0 3207.0 694.1 693.7 .4 127.0 127.0 – |
|
Imports From Israel Agriculturalproducts Industrial products From Jordan Agriculturalproducts Industrial products From other countries Agriculturalproducts Industrial products |
18.4 15.6 2.5 13.1 – – – 2.8 .1 2.7 |
61.3 54.6 7.4 47.8 .1 – .1 6.6. .7 5.9 |
111.8 105.6 14.8 90.8 .1 – .1 6.1 .9 4.2 |
148.4 135.6 18.3 117.3 – – – 12.8 5.2 7.6 |
247.44 230.1 34.3 195.8 – – – 17.7 8.5 9.2 |
346.4 314.6 68.2 269.5 – – – 32.1 3.6 28.5 |
535.3 487.6 68.2 419.4 – – – 47.7 7.2 40.5 |
1378.9 1226.7 162.8 1063.9 – – – 152.2 13.8 138.4 |
3586.2 3259.1 385.9 2813.2 – – – 317.1 26.3 290.8 |
7580.8 6891.1 765.9 6125.2 – – – 689.7 133.8 555.9 |
|
Trade balance With Israel With Jordan With other countries |
-7.9 -11.8 1.2 2.7 |
-33.9 -37.9 5.0 -1.0 |
-59.2 -72.0 10.4 2.4 |
-83.4 -82.7 2.0 -2.7 |
-108.9 -146.5 42.3 -4.7 |
133.8 -174.3 57.6 -17.1 |
-227.6 280.0 77.5 -25.1 |
-596.9 -631.2 138.2 -103.9 |
-1413.6 -1468.8 292.7 237.5 |
-3150.7 -3282.1 694.1 -562.7 |
Source: For 1971-1979, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Palestine: options for development" (TD/B/960), report by P.G. Sadler and B. Abu Kishk, 11 May 1983, tables V/2 and V/4, pp.38 and 40
For 1980-1982, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983.
Table 9 Israel: Share of exports and imports of West Bank and Gaza, 1971-1982
|
1971 |
1974 |
1975 |
1976 |
1977 |
1978 |
1979 |
1980 |
1981 |
1982 |
|
|
West Bank Exports to Israel as share of total exports Imports from Israel as share of total imports Share of industrial products in total imported from all Israel Share of industrial products in total imported from all sources Gaza Exports to Israel as share of total exports Imports from Israel as share of total imports Share of industrial products in total imported from Israel Share of industrial products in total imported from all sources |
53.3 79.8 82.5 81.7 35.1 84.9 83.9 85.2 |
70.5 89.6 84.2 83.8 60.8 89.2 86.4 86.8 |
64.0 88.6 84.2 82.6 63.8 94.5 86.0 85.1 |
62.5 89.7 83.5 81.6 64.2 91.2 86.5 84.2 |
62.2 89.9 82.9 81.9 50.2 91.9 85.1 82.7 |
54.5 86.5 83.2 84.6 65.8 91.4 85.9 85.8 |
61.5 86.6 84.8 85.7 67.7 91.0 86.0 85.0 |
57.8 86.8 83.6 84.8 76.2 89.0 86.7 87.2 |
62.5 88.5 85.1 86.2 82.8 91.1 88.2 88.5 |
53.8 87.8 88.0 88.1 81.5 91.0 88.9 88.1 |
Source: For 1971-1979, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Palestine; options for development" (TD/B/960), report by P. G. Sadler and B. Abu Kishk, 11 May 1983, tables V/2 and V/4, pp. 38 and 40.
For 1980-1982, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983, table XXVII/11.
B. Impact on labor and employment
79. Israel has utilized increasing numbers of workers from the occupied territories. While in 1970 only 11.9 per cent of Palestinian workers were employed in Israel, the percentage had increased to 32.4 by 1975 and 35.5 by 1982, and employment in the territories declined from 88.1 per cent in 1970 to 64.5 per cent in 1982 (see table 10). The dominant feature in the distribution of Palestinian labor in Israel has been the overwhelming importance of the construction sector, where, according to ILO, 81/ there is "a disproportionate concentration of workers from rural areas". It would seem that the marked reduction in agricultural employment in the occupied territories provides a pool for employment in Israel, mostly in construction, but increasingly also in the industrial sector, where by the end of the nineteen seventies, it accounted for about 5 per cent of the total manpower. 82/
80. It is also to be noted that employment of Palestinians in Israel rose fastest up to 1973, when the country enjoyed a booming economy, and declined from 1975 to 1977, following the general recession in Israel, suggesting the contribution made by Palestinian labor to the expansion of the Israeli economy, and its role as "buffer" in time of recession. It may be noted in this regard that during the recession years of 1973 to 1976, Israeli unemployment increased insignificantly – from 2.6 per cent in 1973 to 3.6 in 1976 – compared with unemployment during the 1965-1967 recession, 83/ which was 3.6 per cent in 1965 and 10.4 per cent in 1967.
81. Thus, the land and water policies associated with the settlement policy, by reducing agricultural employment in the territories, have modified not only the structure of employment therein, but, it has been claimed, the class structure of Palestinian society, as a large portion of those engaged in agriculture have been transformed into wage-labor, that is, into an industrial proletariat 84/ which, however, is not utilized for industrialization; this is impeded by occupation policies on land and water, agricultural production, industrial production and trade, as discussed above. The figures in table 11 seem to confirm this claim. The increased employment in Israel has not gone into agriculture and, in the territories, the declining total of employed workers concentrates more and more in construction, industry and services, a shift that could be attributable to settlement construction, and subcontracting for Israeli industry.
82. It has also been observed that this is "proletarianization without urbanization”, 85/ as workers have to return to their homes in Gaza and the West Bank every day. According to table 12, more than 80 per cent do so.
83. As table 12 shows, the majority of Palestinian workers are young. Only 15 per cent of them have received no schooling; the majority, 54.4 per cent, have attended between one and eight years of school, and a sizeable group, 30.5 per cent of the total, have more than 9 years of education.
Table 10. Employment of workers from the occupied territories, by place of work, 1970-1982
|
Year |
Total employed (thousand) |
Employed in the occupied territories (thousand) (percentage) |
Employed in Israel (thousands) (Percentage) |
||
|
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 |
173.7 176.5 188.7 194.7 210.4 204.9 205.8 204.4 210.9 212.1 215.7 215.9 222.7 |
152.7 142.7 136.3 133.4 141.7 138.6 140.9 141.4 142.7 138.0 140.6 140.1 143.6 |
88.1 80.6 72.2 68.5 67.3 67.6 68.5 69.2 67.3 65.1 65.2 64.9 64.5 |
20.6 33.8 52.4 61.3 68.7 66.3 64.9 63.0 68.2 74.1 75.1 75.8 79.1 |
11.9 19.4 27.8 31.5 32.7 32.4 31.5 30.7 32.7 34.9 34.8 35.1 35.5 |
Source: For all years, except 1971 and 1973, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983.
For years 1971 and 1978, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "Palestine: options for development" (TD/3/96O), report by P. G. Sadler and B. Abu Kishk, 11 May 1983, table 1.7, p. 9.
Table 11. Employment of workers from the occupied territories selected economic branch and place of work, 1970-1982
(Percentage)
|
Empolyed in the occupied territories |
Total |
|||||
|
Year |
Agriculture |
Industry |
Construction |
Other |
(percentage) |
(thousands) |
|
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 |
38.7 36.8 33.5 31.3 33.8 31.8 31.4 30.5 29.5 38.0 28.4 26.3 27.6 |
13.8 13.6 13.9 15.1 14.0 14.5 14.4 14.2 15.2 16.8 16.3 16.0 15.5 |
8.4 5.6 6.2 6.4 6.2 7.3 8.2 9.1 9.5 10.1 9.6 10.7 9.9 |
39.1 43.8 46.4 47.2 46.0 46.4 46.0 46.2 45.5 45.1 45.7 47.0 47.0 |
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 |
152.7 142.7 136.3 133.4 141.7 138.6 140.9 141.4 142.7 138.0 140.6 140.1 143.6 |
|
Employed in Israel |
||||||
|
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 |
24.4 22.3 23.1 19.3 19.1 14.3 15.4 16.2 16.8 14.8 13.7 12.7 12.8 |
11.6 14.8 17.1 18.5 17.5 18.4 19.7 21.3 22.2 22.8 20.9 18.2 17.7 |
54.3 52.3 49.5 51.7 52.5 54.4 50.3 45.3 44.8 46.2 47.4 51.0 52.8 |
9.7 10.6 10.3 10.9 10.9 12.9 14.6 17.2 16.2 16.2 18.0 18.1 16.7 |
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 |
20.6 33.8 52.4 61.3 68.7 66.3 64.9 63.0 68.2 74.1 75.1 75.8 79.1 |
Sources: For all years except 1971 and 1978, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983.
For years 1971 and 1978, United Nations conference on Trade and Development, "Palestine: options for development", (TD/B/960), by P. G. Sadler and B. Abu Kishk, 11 May 1983, table 1.8, p. 10.
Table 12. Persons from the occupied territories employed in Israel, by age, years of schooling, and frequency of returning home, April-June 1981
|
Number (thousands) |
Percentage |
|
|
Age 14-24 25-34 55 up Years of schoolling 0 1-6 7-8 9 up Frequency of returning home Every day Once a week Other |
29.1 18.9 18.1 4.0 Total 70.1 10.5 27.0 11.2 21.4 Total 70.1 56.4 9.5 4.2 Total 70.1 |
41.5 27.0 25.8 5.7 100.0 15.0 38.5 16.0 30.5 100.0 80.5 13.5 6.0 100.0 |
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983.
84. The participation of Palestinian labor in the economy of Israel has been aided by Israeli training in the West Bank and Gaza, aimed at skill development primarily in industrial and transport trades, 86/ and by the establishment of "a dense network of employment offices in the occupied territories to which Israeli employers are required to apply for hiring workers, compulsory registering of workers and issuing of a work permit for a given job, and payment of wages and social benefits through the payment division of the employment service". 87/
85. It has been pointed out by ILO that there are deficiencies in vocational training at intermediate level, and a "lack of planned action based on the needs of the local economy".88/ The consultants were informed by officials of the Ministry of Education of Jordan, as well as by Egyptian authorities and representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization that the occupying authorities not only have not initiated action in this direction, but have so far denied several requests by Palestinians to be allowed to introduce applied sciences and technological training programs in Palestinian universities, in the curricula of which the humanities and social sciences are dominant. 89/ In 1980, only 119 university graduates were employed in West Bank industry, according to Meron Benvenisti. Thus the high emigration rate of the highly educated. 90/
86. ILO has also reported that "the residency requirement for entitlement to certain benefits under the National Insurance Law (old age and survivors' benefits, invalidity benefits, child allowances, unemployment benefits), excludes non-resident workers from coverage even though they are required to contribute to the scheme". 91/ that "the special system under which wages and social benefits are paid not directly by the employer but through the employment service means that payments tend to be held up"; 92/ and that concentration of workers from the occupied territories in the construction sector means that they suffer most from the disadvantages of self-employment and subcontracting and "from the high accident rate which is prevalent in the sector. 93/
87. The phenomenon of "illegal" workers – those hired outside the system set up by Israel – is described as "intractable" by ILO. 94/ This organization refers to a 1983 Jerusalem Post survey of workers from Gaza, the findings of which were that 14,000 of the 22,000 "illegal" workers are paid through the payments division of the employment service; that there was a "hard core" of 8,000 "illegal" workers who were contracted by the day or the hour and who spent the night at their place of work, also "illegally"; and that hiring children was also a practice. 95/ ILO reports the estimate of "illegal" workers of the Government of Israel to be 25 per cent of the Palestinian labor force employed in Israel, while Histadrut (the General Federation of Labor in Israel) estimates the number to be 25,000 to 30,000 workers, or about 33 per cent; and, similarly, the Government of Jordan estimates it to be 27,000 workers. If this last figure is accepted and added to those in table 5 (which does not include "illegal" workers), for 1981 and 1982, the percentage of the Palestinian labor force employed in Israel rises to 43 per cent. 96/
88. With respect to wages, most sources agree that the average wage for workers from the territories has remained at about 50 per cent of that for Israeli workers in the same occupations, 97/ but the gap between wages in Israel and in the territories has almost disappeared. According to ILO, 98/ increased demand for this labor in Israel has resulted in a rate of growth of daily remuneration, in real terms, of 5 per cent between 1970 and 1981.
C. Impact on money and finance
89. One aspect where the economy of the occupied territories has not been rendered totally dependent on that of Israel is the monetary system. After 1967, Israel closed all commercial banks, which were integrated with Egyptian banks in Gaza and with Jordan banks in the West Bank, and replaced them by Israeli banks. But, at the same time, Israel allowed the continued circulation of the Jordanian dinar in order to facilitate recovery And trade with Jordan. Consequently, Israeli banks have not been able to establish themselves strongly, and a dual monetary system persists, where the Israeli shekel is the primary means of exchange, but the stronger and more stable dinar is the reserve of value. Possibly because of the strong preference of Palestinians to hold dinars, a number of measures have been introduced to control the amounts taken into the West tank, such as Military Order 973, which limits the flow of funds and transfers to the occupied territories. 99/ A new measure to discourage withdrawals from Palestinian bank accounts is a 3 per cent tax on such withdrawals. 100/
90. There also seems to be a tendency for savings to be held outside the West Bank, in Jordanian banks, and to be invested in Jordanian real estate. An informal money market also exists, consisting of exchange agencies that act as intermediaries with the banks in Amman, accepting checks against accounts in those banks. 101/
91. The system of taxation in existence before the occupation was kept by Israel in the territories. However, the increased consumption of Israeli goods means that the consumer pays the taxes that affect those goods as well as Israeli import duties. Thus the increased demand by Palestinians of Israeli goods not only enlarges the market for those goods and thus contributes to the growth of the Israeli economy; it also contributes to the Israeli fiscus. Of greater importance, workers are subject to payroll deductions, which are sizeable, although they do not receive the corresponding benefits. As of January 1983 for Gaza and February for the West Bank, the Jordanian income tax was replaced by an Israeli one. For purposes of estimating the tax base, residents had to declare all their property, movable and immovable, including furniture and jewelry, and their sons' properties inside and outside the territories. 102/
92. In contrast, residents of most settlements are granted a reduction of 7 per cent in income tax up to a certain income. Purchase taxes, the Land Registry Tax and capital gains taxes on sale of property do not apply to them in the West Bank. They are, however, entitled to all the benefits of the National Insurance system by an extra-legal arrangement. 103/
93. According to Meron Benvenisti, public investment comes front two budgets: the military government's civilian budget, which depends on that of Israel's Ministry of Defense and serves the Arab population, and the budgets of the civilian Israeli ministries, which serve the Jewish population, that is, the settlements. 104/ The investment share of the military budget was 11 per cent in l980. 105/
94. In addition, there is a civil administration, 106/ and two levels of local government: the local councils in charge of settlements' affairs, and municipal councils in charge of local Palestinian affairs. Both have jurisdiction over questions relating to roads, water, electricity, gas, sewage, crafts and industries, health, cleanliness, public places, parks etc., 107/ but no information was available on the levels or proportion of their expenditures in any of these aspects.
95. The civilian administration receives funds from three sources: (a) from the Government of Israel, 28 per cent; (b) from income tax paid by Palestinians working in the territories, value added tax, indirect taxes and fees, 47 per cent; and (c) from the "Deduction Fund", 25 per cent. 108/ The Palestinian municipalities depend on income from government sources, which has declined from 36.8 to 17.1 per cent of the total resources between 1969/70 and 1979/80, on taxes (mainly sales and property), and on transfers from the Arab world which by 1980 constituted close to 50 per cent of their resources. 109/
96. The Deduction Fund is constituted by the deductions taken by the employment service from the wages of Palestinians working in Israel, estimated at about 30 per cent of the wage bill. Since Palestinians are not eligible for benefits from the national insurance system, the Fund is supposed to be utilized for development – i.e. investment – in the occupied territories. However, the Fund is not directly transferred to the civilian administration, as provided by Israeli law, but to the Chief Accountant (Israel's Treasury), who has, on the average, transferred between 55 and 80 per cent of the total to the civilian administration and kept the rest for use in Israel. 110/
97. The property tax payable to the Palestinian municipalities is not collected by them, but by the Ministry of Finance, and all funds thus collected are kept in trust for the municipalities. A percentage is distributed to them according to decisions of the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Ministry of the Interior, and some of these funds may be allocated to other purposes. 11l/
98. With respect to administration of finances, Israeli local councils have total discretion without interference, including appointment of their own accountants. Palestinian municipal councils are subject to regulations published by the Ministry of the Interior, with the agreement of the Council of Ministers, and the accountants who inspect-their finances are selected by the Council of Ministers. 112/
D. Aggregate impact
99. The growth of gross domestic product and gross national product is portrayed in tables 13 and 14. Even after deflation, the constant price figures show an upward trend, more pronounced in the West Bank than in Gaza. Real GNP per capita also grew at relatively high rates, at least, up to 1980 when the rate of growth started to fall. It cannot be ascertained, however, whether these figures reported by Israeli statistics include the product generated in the Israeli settlements, or refer only to the Palestinian economy.
Table 13. Occupied territories: GDP, GNP and GNP per capita in current and
1968 prices, 1968-1982
(Millions of Israeli shekels)
|
1968 |
1976 |
1977 |
1978 |
1979 |
1980 |
1981 |
1982 |
|
|
At current prices |
||||||||
|
West Bank Gross domestice product Gross national product |
33.9 34.4 |
372.5 481.8 |
494.9 684.5 |
901.1 1155.5 |
1476.4 2977.1
|
3996.5 5101.4 |
7731.6 10354.0 |
17682.8 24246.0 |
|
Gaza Gross domestic product Gross nationa product |
13.1 13.1 |
157.8 220.3 |
231.2 315.8 |
347.1 501.7 |
641.7 980.9 |
1459.1 2239.8 |
2213.6 5346.9 |
7024.7 11803.1 |
|
At 1968 prices |
||||||||
|
West Bank Gross domestic product Gross nationa product Gross national product per capita (in shekels) Gaza Gross domestic product Gross nationa product Gross national product per capita (in shekels) |
33.3 34.4 59.5 13.1 13.1 36.4 |
77.1 101.2 150.2 25.6 38.2 89.7 |
74.7 99.8 146.3 26.7 39.7 90.9 |
87.8 115.0 166.1 26.5 41.3 92.1 |
81.4 110.9 157.9 29.5 45.6 103.8 |
102.1 131.0 185.3 28.0 44.5 101.5 |
91.2 119.7 167.9 28.3 46.1 102.5 |
98.8 130.2 180.4 27.8 45.9 100.0 |
Sources: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983.
Table 14. Occupied territories: growth of GNP at market prices and of GNP per capita
(Two year moving average, 1968 prices)
|
West Bank |
Gaza |
Total occupied territories |
||||
|
Years |
GNP at market prices |
GNP per capita |
GNP at market prices |
GNP per capita |
GNP at market prices |
GNP per capita |
|
1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 |
6.6 5.4 6.7 3.9 -0.3 |
5.1 3.9 5.6 3.1 -2.3 |
4.0 7.2 3.8 0.5 1.5 |
1.3 6.8 5.0 0.3 -0.8 |
5.9 5.9 5.9 2.9 0.2 |
3.8 5.1 5.4 1.7 -1.1 |
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983.
100. The contribution to GNP made by labor earnings abroad (i.e. Israel) stood about 24 per cent throughout the 1976-1982 period for the West Bank, and between 33 and 39 per cent for Gaza. 113/ This underscores the importance of these earnings in the growth of GNP and in the increased capacity to spend of the people in the territories. In addition, if the increased spending were on locally produced outputs, it could be said that these earnings would contribute to economic growth; but, since they finance imports from Israel, the effect is lost in the territories. Thus the growth in GNP and the resulting increases in private consumption are externally generated and not the result of or cause for economic development within the territories.
101. The consultants were not able to obtain data on distribution of income either between Israeli and Palestinian residents of the occupied territories, or among Palestinians at different income levels. Israeli data on disposable private income and private consumption expenditures in the territories are not disaggregated by group (Israeli/Palestinian, or income group).
102. In sum, it has been the policy of Israel to encourage economic linkages between its economy and that of the West Bank and Gaza in a selective manner. The sale of Israeli products in the territories has been unhampered, while entrance of goods from the West Bank and Gaza into Israel is subject to strict limitations. The bridges connecting the East and West Banks of the Jordan River have been kept open, under selective controls. The employment of workers from the territories in Israel has been encouraged. The subcontracting of work by Israeli firms to individuals and firms in the West Bank and Gaza has been permitted, while development of infrastructure and industry has been impeded. This policy, combined with those of expropriation and confiscation of land, control of water resources, and restriction on agricultural activity, has determined the nature of the economy of the territories as complementary to and dependent on the economy of Israel.
103. Consequently, a significant number of Palestinians emigrate, as illustrated in table 15. Positive migration occurred only in 1969 and 1973 in the West Bank and 1973 in Gaza. All other years register emigration at rates ranging from 2.2 to 2.4 per thousand in the West Bank and from 4.7 to 11.5 in Gaza. Emigration has increased since 198U in both territories. A view expressed by many of the officials contacted by the consultants was that the occupation policies in the territories are designed, as a whole, to promote the emigration of Palestinians and thus make the colonization of the land by Israel easier. The lower rates of emigration from Gaza reflect not only the distance from Jordan, but also the legal difficulties for Gazans to travel due to the fact that they are not entitled to passports recognized by the countries of destination.
104. Emigration has been particularly high among males aged 14 to 25, as this group tends to seek employment in the Arab countries. This selective pattern of emigration affects the demographic structure of the population. By increasing the percentage of women in childbearing age relative to the total population, it may sustain relatively high rates of natural increase, even in the face of declining fertility. It also contributes to increasing the number of dependants per wage earner: dependency ratios, consequently also to a slower rise in the standard of living. Finally, it has led to lower labor force participation rates, particularly in the West Bank.
Table 15. Migration, West Bank and Gaza, 1967-1981
West Bank Gaza
Number Rate per 1000 Number Rate per 1000
1967 -13 000 21.8 -12 300 32.0
1968 -15 800 27.0 -32 300 87.5
1969 + 1 300 2.2 – 2 900 8.1
1970 – 5 000 8.3 – 3 300 9.0
1971 – 2 500 4.1 – 2 400 6.5
1972 – 7 200 11.5 – 4 000 10.4
1973 + 300 .5 + 1 700 4.3
1974 – 2 800 4.2 – 1 900 4.7
1975 -15 100 22.5 – 3 500 8.3
1976 -14 400 21.2 – 4 200 9.7
1977 -10 400 14.7 – 2 900 6.5
1978 – 9 400 13.4 – 4 700 10.3
1979 -12 600 17.7 – 4 800 10.3
1980 -17 300 24.0 – 5 100 11.3
1981 -15 700 21.6 – 5 300 11.5
Source: Eitan Sabatello, The Populations of the Administered Territories: Some Demographic Trends and Implications, (Jerusalem, West Bank Data Base Project, 1983), table 10, p. 29 A.
105. With respect to future impact, it seems apparent that the central questions are not economic. Yet the new interrelationships developed between the territories and the economy of Israel in the context of expanded settlements are important.
106. Freeing of sizeable numbers of workers from agricultural and industrial occupation in the West Bank and Gaza and their consequent employment in Israel is the most important aspect of the new relationship, which has been characterized as one of dependence. If present trends of expropriation of land and water resources, prohibition or restriction of specific cultures, limitations to industrial development, and incentives for Palestinians to seek wage-employment in Israel continue, it may be expected that the commuting labor force would continue to increase, at the expense of a further shrinking agricultural work force. If present policies on production and exports of agricultural produce also continue, the exposure to the more advanced Israeli technology and to the Israeli market would create pressure to increase and diversify agricultural output. However, if suppressing agricultural development is, as is claimed by many authors, an Israeli goal, then it would imply additional restrictions and controls to achieve this goal. The possibility of increased numbers of Palestinians yielding to frustration and leaving the territories may be contemplated. On the other hand, the potential for development through the mobilization of the growing wage-labor class and the more technically aware peasantry must also be considered. In this eventuality, the issue of the presence of the Israeli settlements would still remain.
VI. IMPACT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE SOCIAL LIFE AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICES OF THE PALESTINIANS
107. The movement of an increasing number of Israelis into the settlements that have been and are being set up in the occupied territories is affecting adversely the social life and disrupting the daily activities of the Palestinians in the territories. What is occurring is the emergence of two societies, each distinct from the other in matters of culture, religion, language, customs, outlook, attitudes and behavior. The situation is further aggravated by certain other factors that make peaceful coexistence more difficult. The Israeli settlements contain only Jews, since non-Jewish Israelis, for instance Arab Israelis, are not admitted to them. 114/ This tends to segregate even more the Israelis in the settlements from the neighboring Palestinian communities and hinders any meaningful relationships arising between them. That the settlements are usually located, particularly in non-urban areas, on high ground overlooking the countryside, are fenced in and have their entrances guarded, often from a watchtower, make the presence of the settlements even more forbidding to the residents of the nearby Palestinian villages.
108. The Palestinians view the Israeli settlers as intruders in a land in which they have lived and farmed for generations and centuries, who have usurped their space and are exploiting their resources to satisfy a life style quite different from their own. The Israeli settlers, on the other hand, perceive the Palestinians as an alien group of people in a land which, according to the pronouncements of their leaders, is considered part of the Israeli fatherland. 115/
109. The current policy of establishing settlements in clusters in proximity to Palestinian communities has tended to increase the tension between the Palestinians and the Israeli settlers. The tension has been highest and the incidents of confrontation most numerous in those areas where the Israeli settlements comprise members of radical religious groups, such as in Hebron and Nablus.
110. The permission granted to the Israeli settlers to carry arms and to be involved in maintaining law and order has had a direct impact on the normal day-to-day activities of the Palestinians. According to residents of the West Bank visiting Amman, who were interviewed by the consultants, the streets in Palestinian villages and towns are deserted after nightfall. People confine themselves to their homes, fearing to go out lest they be accosted by either the armed settlers, the police or army personnel on patrol, asked to show their identity papers and questioned at length. The presence of a group of armed settlers in a market place or on patrol is sufficient cause for Palestinians to become apprehensive of any encounter, however peaceful it might be. While the Israeli settlers are free to move as they please and are able to pursue their social and cultural interests without any hindrances, the Palestinians are subjected to frequent curfews. The need to obtain permission from the occupying authorities to hold meetings, which is often denied, and the close supervision exercised over the activities of Palestinian institutions and organizations in the occupied territories has further curtailed the social and cultural activities of the Palestinian residents.
111. The Israeli settlers, in the exercise of their role as maintainers of law and order and having the support of the military authorities administering the territories, have been known to exceed their powers and harass Palestinians individually as well as collectively. For instance, the Ha’aretz of 15 May 1981 reported that Rabbi Kahane had admitted that members of his group from Kiryat Arba’a have armed patrols in the streets of Hebron, check identity papers and enter houses which had once belonged to Jews in order to get the Palestinian occupants to leave. Numerous incidents have also been reported in the press of settlers harassing farmers and interfering in their farming activities on the grounds that the land they were working on belonged to the settlement. Such incidents have been most common in the Etzion Block area between Hebron and Jerusalem. 116/
112. Incidents of stone throwing as an expression of resistance to the occupation, usually by Palestinian youths, have brought about severe reprisals by Israeli settlers in their role of guardians of law and order. These reprisals have been usually directed against educational institutions and have often led to interference in their functioning and disruption of classes. A particularly serious incident presumably in retaliation for a stone throwing incident, reported during the past year, was the attack by masked gunmen, believed to be settlers, on Hebron's Islamic University in the last week of July 1983, when three students were killed and 33 injured. 117/. On another occasion, following an incident in which a minibus carrying children from the settlement at Yattir to school in Kiryat Arba'a was stoned near a Palestinian school in Hebron, settlers travelling on the bus as guards broke into the school firing shots into the air. After failing to catch the youths they suspected of the attack, they detained the headmaster and took him first to Kiryat Arba’a and then to the local military authorities. Subsequently, the army ordered the school closed for a month. 118/
113. With the increase in the number of settlements, Palestinian schools, including those managed by UNRWA for refugee children, situated close to the roads frequented by traffic to and from the settlements, have been subjected to many harassment’s by settlers in their efforts to curb stone throwing by students. There have been numerous instances when settlers, usually armed, have entered these schools, disrupting classes in order to question students, taking some students away for further questioning and closing the school for a few days until inquiries were completed. As far as the UNRWA schools are concerned, suggestions have been made by the military authorities that concrete walls, two meters high, should be built along the length of the school facing the road, or that the school should be relocated away from the road. 119/
114. Interference in religious places and with religious performances has increased and enlarged in scope in recent years. The numerous incidents involving the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem have been Widely publicized, the latest being on 27 January 1984, when a cache of hand-grenades and explosives were discovered in the Islamic cemetery abutting the Mosque and the guards at the Mosque had also discovered ladders and ropes dangling over the wall. 120/ Another holy place that has been the scene of frequent confrontation between Palestinian Muslims and Israeli Jews is the Patriarch’s Cave at Hebron. Jews have been allowed access to the Cave to hold prayer meetings at which times the Arab Muslims must keep away. In fact, access by Muslims to the Cave has been progressively curtailed. According to the Ha’aretz of 11 September and Al Fajr of 18 September 1983, the Civil Administration in the West Bank had imposed restrictions on Muslim prayers during the Jewish holidays (the Jewish New Year's Day, the Day of Atonement, the Feast of the Tabernacles, and the Rejoicing of the Law) all occurring over a period of three weeks in September.
115. A number of violent attacks against Muslim as well as Christian religious places have been widely reported during the past year. These have included the stabbing of two nuns in the convent of the Russian Orthodox Church in Jerusalem; the planting of explosive devices in mosques at Hebron and Nablus, in a Christian church at Bethany and a Russian Orthodox church at Ain Haren near Jerusalem; and the burning of the library of the Anglican Church in Jerusalem. 121/ These incidents have been attributed to Israeli groups, such as the so-called "Terror Against Terror" group, which have emerged in Jerusalem and the occupied territories and whose intent, according to Jordanian and Palestinian sources, is to harass, intimidate and terrorize Palestinians, compelling them to leave the territories. In this connection, the Israeli Chief of Staff, Moshe Levy, reportedly told a Knesset Committee that he did not know if a Jewish underground existed in the territories, but he could not rule out the possibility that "some dangerous movement is underway". 122/
116. The refugee camps have been the targets of frequent interference by settlers and military personnel, who believe that the camp residents are closely involved in incidents of unrest, demonstrations and stone throwing. 123/ The interference’s have been most grave in those camps which have been earmarked in connection with the plans being prepared by the Government of Israel to relocate the refugees, such as Dheisheh and Jalazun.
117. The excesses committed by the Israeli settlers in the West Bank in their dealings with Palestinian residents and the laxity of the law enforcement authorities in pursuing these cases led to the appointment by the Government of Israel, in 1981, of what has come to be known as the Karp Commission. The Commission's report was released recently, more than 20 months after its presentation to the Minister of Justice. In its report, the Commission mentions that the civilian police are hindered in their investigations into criminal offences because of the pressure brought to bear by the Military Government for the release of persons detained for questioning. The report also describes the settlers as refusing to co-operate with the police and the district attorney and concludes that the current situation contained "the beginnings of a dangerous process whose end is difficult to foresee". 124/
118. The progressive increase in the number of Israelis living in the occupied territories is bound to aggravate the current conflicts between them and the Palestinian residents in the pursuit of their daily activities. The Palestinians feel that the establishment of Israeli settlements in close proximity to their towns and villages and often surrounding them is intended to prevent them from maintaining close ties with their neighboring communities. Moreover, the frequent security checks which are carried out both by the security forces and the settlers, and the curfews frequently imposed, are seriously affecting their sense of solidarity and social cohesion. This will be further affected by the intentions of the Government of Israel to disperse the refugees in the present camps, which are located close to Palestinian populated areas.
119. A comparison of the standards of social services available to the Israeli settlers with those available to the Palestinians becomes difficult in the absence of factual data regarding the former. However, based on empirical observation and information from secondary sources, it can be stated that the clustering of Israeli settlements has made it easier to provide the settlers with facilities at a level adequate to meet their needs in education and health and their social and cultural interests. The larger settlements have their own medical clinics, kindergartens and facilities for social and cultural activities. The smaller or under-populated settlements are provided with the means and facilities to make use of these services available at the rural centers and regional towns. The road networks that are being established to interconnect the settlements and provide access to metropolitan centers in Israel, enable the settlers to use educational and health services and to pursue their social and cultural activities without any impediments. In regard to education, welfare and religious services, the standards applied to the settlements in the West Bank are said to be more generous than in Israel proper. 125/ These, as well as health services, are provided exclusively for the benefit of the settlers, emphasizing the segregation of the Israelis and Palestinians living in the territories.
120. Where the Palestinians are concerned, it is known that their educational institutions are often overcrowded, and there are shortages of equipment and teaching personnel. Their activities are frequently interrupted by curfews imposed on the locality, closure because of suspected stone throwing by the students, and classes are often disrupted by security forces and armed settlers entering in search of alleged stone throwers. As far as medical services are concerned, the system available to the Palestinians is considered inadequate and is often affected by shortage of medical personnel and equipment and lack of medical supplies. According to the reports of the Special Committee of Experts appointed by the World Health organization, which visits the occupied territories annually to study the health conditions of the inhabitants, the improvements made to the health services are far from adequate to meet the needs of a growing population and to reflect the advancements made in medical science. Efforts by local Palestinian groups to provide more facilities and improve services have often been thwarted by the administering authorities, an example being the refusal by the Government of Israel to approve the construction of a new hospital in Hebron which had been initiated through voluntary effort. 126/
VII. IMPACT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON THE JUDICIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
121. An anomalous situation has emerged in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza where people occupying a common territorial space are governed by two different judicial and local government systems. 127/ This has come about with the steady increase in Israeli settlements established in the territories and the progressive application of Israeli law to the residents of these settlements, while the Palestinians continue to be subjected to Jordanian law and the Defense Regulations of 1945 enacted by the British mandatory authorities, both in force at the time of Israeli occupation in 1967, which have been amended since by military orders issued from time to time by the Military Command administering the territories.
122. According to a report prepared by the Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs of Jordan 128/ an attempt is now being made to formalize and facilitate the application of Israeli law to the occupied territories through a Knesset resolution of 2 January 1984 approving two laws. One of the laws is applied to the Jewish settlers, while the emergency law used by the British Mandate in 1945 continues to be applied to the Arab citizens. The new laws permit the Israeli authorities the right to apply the articles of the civil law and the penal law in the-occupied territories, if the Legal Committee of the Knesset approves it, without recourse to a Knesset vote.
123. Since the occupation, the Military Command has issued more than a thousand Orders, most of them amending Jordanian law. Violations of these are tried in military courts, although they are deemed to be amendments to Jordanian laws. The judgement of the military courts cannot be appealed. The Military Command also issues from time to time Orders which are applicable to the settlers or the settlements. Violations of these as well as of Israeli laws applicable to the settlers are tried in the Israeli courts.
124. Beginning in 1979, the settlements have been incorporated into local and regional councils by the extension of the Israeli municipal law to them. This was done through the issue of Military Orders No. 783 of 20 March 1979 and No. 982 of 1 March 1981. New settlements are eligible for incorporation as local councils if they are urban settlements or as members of a regional council if they are non-urban. Their method of incorporation and their functions are similar to those of municipal and regional councils in Israel. The Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza have, therefore, elected self-governing bodies empowered to issue by-laws and having jurisdiction over those matters which come within the purview of the municipal law, including planning for the territorial space assigned to them. This includes not only the land allotted to them directly but also land seized for military use and land declared as "state domain". 129/
125. There have arisen, therefore, in the West Bank and Gaza two systems of local government and administration, one comprising the Israeli settlements operating under Israeli municipal law and the other comprising the Palestinian towns and villages operating under former Jordanian law as amended by military orders. While the settlement councils are subject to the due process of law for any omissions or commissions, the Palestinian councils are subject to unilateral action by the administering authority in the territories either by military order or summary action, as in the case of the dismissal of mayors and dissolution of the elected councils by the Civil Administration a few years back. While the powers and functions of the Palestinian towns and villages are being restricted or curtailed, for example, in matters such as the issue of building permits and the collection of taxes, those of the Israeli settlements and their residents are being expanded through legislation that is enacted in the Knesset or through military orders extending Israeli law to them. 130/
126. Implications for the future of the present policy of having a dual system of local government and administration in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza are twofold. The steady increase in the number of settlements and the tendency of the occupying authorities to confiscate more and more land, which will be allotted to them, will progressively reduce the territorial space that will remain under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian town and villages. The fact that the Israeli settlements, through their councils, are involved in high level decisions pertaining to infrastructural, legal, economic, security, land and water matters in the territories and that they, through the "Council of Jewish settlements in Judaea and Samaria", form a powerful lobby at central Government level, will further erode the powers and functions of the Palestinian towns and villages in these matters.
Notes
1/ See appendix I-A for settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.
2/ Reply received by the Special Committee to Investiage Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population in the Occupied Territories from the Government of Jordan (A/8089), annex V, pp. 4 and 7. See also appendix I-A of the present document.
3/ Yigal Allon, "Israel: the case for defensible borders", Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 55, No. 1 (October 1976), pp. 38-53. See also the statement of Mr. Raymond Tanter, Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, in his testimony before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st session, 12 and 21 September and 19 October 1977 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 55.
4/ Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, (A/8389), pp. 27-32.
5/ Jerusalem Post, 20 July 1972.
6/ Ha’aretz, 24 July 1974.
7/ Jerusalem Post, 5 March 1971.
8/ See statements by Mr. Ariel Sharon, reported in the Jerusalem Post, 11 November 1977, and by Mr. Weissman in Ha’aretz, 13 March 1978.
9/ The Government’s decision to allow the Gush Emunim to set up settlements in army camps was reported in the Jerusalem Post, 2 December 1977, and Al Quds, 2 December 1977.
10/ Jerusalem Post, 7 May 1979.
11/ Government of Israel, "From the Knesset", press release (Jerusalem, Government Press Office, 14 March 1984).
12/ Ma’ariv, 6 July 1977.
13/ Government of Israel, "Facts about Israel", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Division (1966), p. 101.
14/ Ma'ariv, 14 August 1974.
15/ Ma'ariv, 14 August 1975.
16/ Times (London), 16 May 1980; Asha’b and Al Quds, 19 May 1980.
17/ Asha'b and Al Ittihad, 19 and 23 September 1980.
18/ Jerusalem Post, 14 February 1979; Al Ittihad, 20 February 1980.
19/ Government of Israel "From the Knesset", press release (Jerusalem Government Press Office, 14 March 1984).
20/ Ha’aretz, 12 March 1980; Ha’aretz, 6 June 1978.
21/ Ha’aretz, 31 January 1977.
22/ Office of the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Israeli colonization of Arab lands" (Amman, August 1983), annex table 1.
23/ Washington Post, 12 September 1982 as referred to in Office of the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Israeli colonization . . . " p. 8.
24/ Efrat, "Pattern of Jewish and Arab settlements in Judea and Samaria", Daniel Elazar, ed., in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza: Views on the Present and Future (Washington, D.C., 1982), American Institute for Public Policy Research, p. 21.
25/ Ibid., p. 22.
26/ Ibid., pp. 18, 21 and 23.
27/ Meron Benvenisti, "The West Bank and Gaza Data Base Project: pilot study report", presented to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. (1982), pp. 35-36.
28/ Ibid., p. 55.
29/ Ibid., p. 55.
30/ Ibid., P. 67.
31/ Ibid., p. 55.
32/ Ibid., pp. 37 and 38.
33/ Ibid.
34/ Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Report-presented to the UNCHS delegation, for period February 1983 to February 1984", Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs (Amman), pp. 9-10. Unofficial translation.
35/ United Nations press release (PAL/1534), 14 December 1983.
36/ Al-Hammishmar (newspaper in Hebrew), 27 November 1983, as referred to in Office of the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "UNRWA in Jordan: current situation* (Amman, January 1984), p. 5.
37/ United Nations press release (PAL/1534), 14 December 1983.
38/ Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs, "Report presented to UNCHS … " pp. 2-5.
39/ Ibid., p. 10.
40/ See Ha'aretz, 4 August 1983, reporting the results of a survey conducted in July 1983.
41/ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "Palestine: options for development" (TD/B/960), report by P. G. Sadler and B. Abu Kishk, 11 May 1983, p. 5, para. 12.
42/ Benvenisti, op. cit., p. 25.
43/ UNCTAD, op, cit., p. 19, para. 50.
44/ Ibid., p. 19, paras. 49 and 53.
45/ J. Schwart, “Water resources in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip", in Elazar, ed.,
op. cit., p. 100.
46/ UNCTAD, "Palestine: options p. 33.
47/ Efrat, op. cit., p. 22.
48/ Office of the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Israeli colonization . . .” p. 15.
49/ UNCTAD, “Palestine: options … “, p. 41, para. 90.
50/ Verbal evidence presented to the consultants by the officials of the Office of the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 23 February 1984.
5l/ Office of the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Israeli colonization . . .” pp. 16 and 17.
52/ Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983, table XXVII/33, P. 749.
53/ See for example: Efrat, op. cit., p. 23, on educational and health services and supply of utilities to settlements; Office of the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Israeli colonization … “, pp. 9 and 10, on the magnitude of the Government of Israel's subsidy to the settlements; Benvenisti, op. cit., pp. 53-62, on the planning and design of Israeli settlements; and on subsidized housing; the testimony of Dr. Israel Shahak, Professor, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate Committee of Judiciary, 95th Cong., first session on the question of West Bank settlements and the treatment of Arabs in the Israeli-occupied territories, October 17-18 1977, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 7.
54/ Edited by Emile A. Nakhleh and published by American Enterprises Institute for Public Policy Research (Washington, D.C. 1980), p, 116.
55/ See in particular, Special Committee reports of the past five years (A/33/356, 13 November 1978; A/34/63, 13 November 1979; A/35/425, 6 October 1980; A/36/579, 26 October 1981; and A/37/485, 20 October 1982).
56/ Reported in Ha’aretz and Ma’ariv, 13 and 14 December 1983, as reported by the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories in document A/AC.N5/R.276, 29 December 1983, para. 20. See also Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs, "Report presented to UNCHS … “ pp. 1 and 17.
57/ For the impact of settlements on land, see chap. IV, sect. A of the present report.
58/ Chap. IV, sect. B, of the present report details the methods and impact of Israeli control of water resources.
59/ Office of the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Israeli colonization … “.
60/ In Raja Shahadeh, "Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank: how the land was acquired for their use and how they are structured", paper presented at the eighth United Nations seminar on the Question of Palestine, 9-13 May 1983, Jakarta, Indonesia, organized by the Division of Palestinian Rights on the theme , 'The Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People".
61/ Office of the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Israeli colonization . . .” p. 14.
62/ Ibid.
63/ Antoine Mansour, Palestine: une e'conomie de risistance en Cisjordanie et a Gaza, (Paris, Editions I'Harmattan, 1983), p. 141.
64/ United Nations, Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, "Summary of reports" (A/AC.145/R.273), 14 November 1983.
65/ Office of the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Israeli colonization … “, p. 4.
66/ Ibid.
67/ Ibid.
68/ A review of the "open border" policy is found in Brian Van Arkadie, Benefits and Burdens: A Report on the West Bank and Gaza Strip Economies Since 1967 (New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977), chap. 1.
69/ For example, by Benvenisti, op. cit.
70/ David Kahan, Agriculture and Water in the West Bank and Gaza, (Jerusalem, West-Eank Data Base Project, 1983), table 43, p* 79o
71/ Information obtained from "Survey of the manufacturing industry in the West Bank and Gaza Strip", report prepared by P. G. Sadler, V. Kazi and E..Jabr for the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, July 1983.
72/ "Survey of the manufacturing industry … “, pp. 3 and 4 and 19-21.
73/ Kahan, op. cit., p. 1.
74/ See, for example, Brian Van Arkadie, op. cit., pp. 88-95.
75/ Hillel Frisch, Stagnation and Frontier Arab and Jewish Industry in the West Bank, (Jerusalem, West Bank Data Base Project, 1983), pp. 76-87.
76/ Office of the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Israeli colonization … “, p. 11.
77/ UNCTAD, "Palestine: options … “, p. 35.
78/ For further explanation of this point, see Brian Van Arkadie, op. cit., pp. 33, 34, 80 and 81.
79/ Figures calculated from Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1983, tables XXVII/10 and XXVII/11.
80/ The growth of imports and exports is not as relevant to the argument as the relative importance of the different markets, which is illustrated by table 9.
81/ International Labor Conference, Sixty-ninth session, 1983, Report of the Director General, appendix III, p. 26.
82/ Ibid., p. 27.
83/ Mansour, op. cit., p. 59.
84/ See for example, Najwa Makhoul, "Change in the employment structure of Arabs in Israel", in Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XI, No. 3 (Spring 1982), pp. 77-102.
85/ Makhoul, loc. cit.
86/ International Labor Conference, Sixty-ninth session, 1983, Report of the Director-General, appendix III, p. 40.
87/ Ibid., p. 27.
88/ Ibid., p. 41.
89/ Office of the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Israeli colonization . . .” p. 18, items 2 and S.
90/ Fisch, op. cit., p. 74.
91/ ILO, op. cit., pp. 27 and 28.
92/ Ibid.
93/ Ibid.
94/ Ibid., p. 29.
95/ On this subject, "illegal" recruitment-of children as workers, there have been numerous reports in Arab periodical literature, and research papers have been prepared by a number of organizations, e.g. International Labor Organization (not available to the consultants), and Committee for the Defense of Palestinian Human Rights under Israeli Occupation, Slave Markets: The Exploitation of Palestinian Children by Israel (Beirut, May 1979).
96/ Some authors put the proportion as high as 75 per cent, e.g. M. W. Khouja and P. G. Sadler, in their report, prepared for UNCTAD, "Review of the economic conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories", (TD/B/870), 26 August 1981.
97/ See, for example, ILO, op. cit., p. 27, and Benvenisti, op. cit., pp. 7 and 8.
98/ ILO, op. cit. pp. 36 and 37.
99/ Office of the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Israeli colonization … 0, p. 15.
100/ Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Labor, Effects of Israeli Policies and Practices on Arab Labor Conditions in the Arab Occupied Territories during 1983 (January 1984). Unofficial translation.
101/ Mansour, op. cit., chap. IV.
102/ Office of the Crown Prince of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Israeli colonization..” pp. 16 and 17.
103/ Meron Benvenisti, Israeli Role in the West Bank, Legal and Administrative Aspects, (Jerusalem, West Bank Data Base Project, 1983), pp. 17 and 18.
104/ Benvenisti, op. cit., p. 16.
105/ Ibid.
106/ The civilian administration was created by Military Order 947 of 8 November 1981, to take over the powers of the military administration in civilian matters. In actuality it is subordinate to the Military Commander of the Defense Forces, who appoints its head. See Meron Benvenisti, "Israeli Role. . .” pp. 19-32.
107/ Shahadeh, op. cit., p. 100.
108/ David (deddi) Zuckor, Avner Halperin, Zeev Haspar, Hagar Kahana, Rivka Levin, Research on Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 1979-1983, (Tel Aviv, International Center for Peace in the Middle East, 1983), p. 75.
109/ Ibid, p. 73.
110/ Ibid., pp. 76 and 77.
111/ Ibid., p. 101.
112/ Ibid., p. 102.
113/ These are, in percentage terms, the differences between GNP and GDP in the West Bank and Gaza, respectively. They are accounted for by net factor payments from abroad (in this case primarily wage income of Palestinians working abroad).
114/ See testimony of Dr. Israel Shahak, Professor, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, ninety-fifth Congress, first session on the question of West Bank Settlements and the Treatment of Arabs in the -Occupied Territories, October 17 and 18, 1977, (United States Government Israeli Printing Office, 1978), pp. 2 and 3.
115/ Mr. Dayan as reported in Ha’aretz, 24 July 1974 and Mr. Begin as reported in L’Express, 23-29 May 1977.
116/ For details of these incidents, see "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories" (A/36/579), paras. 149 to 184. Also see State of Israel, the Report of the Karp Commission, press bulletin (Jerusalem, 9 February 1984).
117/ Jerusalem Post, 2 and 3 August 1983.
118/ Jerusalem Post, 10 November 1983.
119/ Information gathered from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near Last.
120/ Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs, "Report presented to the consultants".
121/ These incidents have been documented in the report presented to the consultants by the Jordanian Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs.
122/ Jerusalem Post, and Ha’aretz, 14 December 1983.
123/ These and other details regarding the rehabilitation of the refugee camps in the West Bank appeared in Ha’aretz, 13, 14 and 21 November, the Jerusalem Post, 21 November, and Ma’ariv, 22 November 1983. For incidents see Ha’aretz, 11 November, Jerusalem Post and Ha’aretz, 27 November and Al Fajr of 25 November 1983.
124/ State of Israel, press bulletin (concluding section of the Karp report) (Jerusalem, 7 February 1984).
125/ Benvenisti, op. cit., p. 47.
126/ World Health organization, documents A/35/16 and A/36/14.
127/ For further details of these issues, see A/38/282, paras. 5-33.
128/ Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs, report presented to the consultants, p. 1.
129/ Benvenisti, op. cit., p. 45.
130/ Ibid., p. 42.
APPENDIX I
Settlement in the West Bank and Gaza with projections to the year 2010
Compiled by the Palestine Liberation Organization
Department of Occupied Homeland Affairs, Amman, Jordan
A. Settlements established from 1967 to 1983
|
Settlements (Total number) |
Area (dunums) |
Residential units |
Families |
|||||||
|
Location |
J |
W |
G |
Present |
2010 |
Present |
2010 |
Present |
2010 |
|
|
1967 (2) Jewish quarter Kfar Ezyon |
E. Jerusalem Bethlehem |
x |
x |
– 870 |
– – |
220 80 |
– 120 |
– 65 |
– 120 |
|
|
1968 (5) Argaman Kaliya Kiriat Arab Mehola Ramat Ashkol 1969 (4) Fatazael Rosh Zorim French Hill Haddassa 1970 (7) Gilgal Alon Shvut Massuu Mevo Horon Yitav Atarot Muale Efrayim |
Jordan Valley Jordan Valley Hebron Jordan Valley E. Jerusalem Jordan Valley Bethlehem E. Jerusalem E. Jerusalem Jordan Valley Bethlehem Jordan Valley Ramallah Jordan Valley E. Jerusalem Jordan Valley |
x x x x |
x x x x x x x x x x x x |
– 1900 900 – 600 2000 400 15000 2300 470 – 1050 2300 10000 – |
– – 1700 – – – – – – – – – – – 4000 |
40 26 1100 70 1700 92 55 2400 90 212 50 48 50 61 e/ 240 |
160 160 4000 160 – 160 120 – 120 600 160 160 120 – 2500 |
28 18 750 39 – 50 20 – 50 195 30 46 30 – 264 |
160 – 15000 70a/ – 80a/ 100b/ – 100a/ 250 80a/ 80 90a/ – 3000 |
|
|
1971 (2) Hamra Mizpe Shalem 1972 (1) Bekdut 1973 (11) New Yaaqov Ramot Gillo Talbiot San Hadria Givat Shaul Ranat Rahel Givat Hamiftai Gittit Mekhora Nezr Hazami |
Jordan Valley Jordan Valley Jordan Valley E. Jerusalem E. Jerusalem E. Jerusalem E. Jerusalem E. Jerusalem E. Jerusalem E. Jerusalem E. Jerusalem Jordan Valley Jordan Valley Gaza |
x x x x x x x x |
x x x x x |
x |
– 2300 – 1000 – 4000 – – – – 3500 3700 – – |
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – |
62 32 31 – 1500 4500 3500 300 – – 300 64 55 – |
160 – 80 – 8000 10000 5000 – – – 900 1205 160 – |
40 32 55 2500 – – – – – – 22 30 39 |
120a/ 160 160 – – – – – – – 120a/ 75a/ – |
|
1974 (1) Kafar Barom d/ 1975 (6) El Azar Qedumin Ofra Mishor Adomim Pezael Mihlag Dafna 1976 (1) Netiv Hagevue 1977 (18) Almog (A) e/ Beit El (A) Beit El (B) El Qana Halamish Kafar Ruth Kokhav Hashahar Migdal Oz Niran (Naaran) Rehen Rimonim Roi Salit Shave Shomeron Teqoa Mahan Givon Shelomzi Yyon Beit Horon |
Gaza Bethlehem Nablus Ramallah E. Jerusalem Jordan Valley E. Jerusalem Jordan Valley Jordan Valley Ramallah Ramallah Nablus Ramallah Ramallah Bethlehem Jordan Valley Nablus Nablus Bethlehem E. Jersualem Jordan Valley Ramallah Bethlehem E. Jerusalem Jordan Valley Ramallah |
x x x |
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x |
– 850 1000 250 – – 270 2600 1900 254 75 2000 1000 – 850 650 2300 – 310 – – 200 1067 – – 100 |
– – 2000 350 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 320 – – 350 – – – – |
– 50 265 120 – – 300 68 42 139 111 280 115 – 60 50 70 48 50 50 40 91 78 – – 80 |
– 120 3000 250 – – 1400 160 200 400 152f/ 450f/ 250 – 300 160 120 120 320 160 160 250 250 – – 250 |
– 30 170 100 – – – 33 23 90 75 130 73 – 27 26 30 13 25 25 38 60 54 – – 40 |
– 100b/ 2000 – – – – 80a/ 200 – – 7000 – – – 75b/ 65a/ 120 320 75a/ 120 250 120b/ – – – |
|
|
1978 (10) Ariel Har Girlo Karne Shomron Kataf Mevo Dotan Mizpe Yeriho Shavmot Mehola Kfar Tapuah Tomer Zohar 1979 (5) Atzmomah Ganeital Shillo Zori Kafr Adumum |
Nablus Bethlehem Nablus Gaza Jenin E. Jerusalem Jordan Valley Nablus Jordan Valley Hebron Gaza Gaza Ramallah Jordan Valley El Jerusalem |
x X |
x x x x x x x x x x |
x |
– 284 – – – 100 – – 2700 – – – 740 – 10000 |
20000 – – – – 471 – – – – – – – – – |
1010 80 220 36 40 57 40 36 74 – 20 – 124 – 92 |
2500 300 2500 112 200 471 160 250 160 – 25 – 252 – 250 |
1300 50 500 20 24 37 30 18 41 – 20 – 65 – 50 |
2410 200a/ 3000 26 250 – 75a/ 250 80a/ – 25 – – – – |
|
1980 (11) Beit Haarava Efrata Elon Monreh Givon Hadasha Hemdat d/ Homesh Qiryatim Maale Shomron Vered Yeriho Yafit Nezairn 1981 (16) Almog (B) e/ Ateret Beit Abba (Barkn) Beit Arieh Givon Hinanit Maale Adumim Maale Amos Maon Mattityahu Maale Mikhmas Nilli Pesagot Telem Yaqir Shaqid 1982 (37) El David Adura Brakna (A) Alfe Menashe Einav Elei Sinai Aeel Eshklot Gadiv Ganor Ginat d/ Javat Zeev Iritt d/ Kafira Maskiot Morag Mulnevo Naama Newe Dequlin Negohot Neot Adomin Netafim Newe Daniel Ramat QidronSamur Shaaretiqwe Sheqef Bedoloh Eisha Yaqin Yatir Yoezer Noat Qedumin Nisamit Otmiel Rotem Anassa Almon (A) Almon (B) Karmel Emmanuel Sussia Zavta Naaleh Ofarim (A) |
Jordan Valley Bethlehem Nablus E.Jerusalem Jordan Valley Nablus Hebron Nablus E.Jerusalem Jordan Vally Gaza Jordan Valley Ramallah Nablus Rahallah E. Jerusalem Jenin E. Jerusalem Bethlehem Hebron Ramallah Ramallah Ramallah Ramallah Hebron Nablus Jenin Bethlehem Hebron Nablus Nablus Nablus Gaza Ramallah Hebron Gaza Gaza Jenin E. Jerusalem Nablus E. Jerusalem Jordan Valley Gaza Jordan Valley Jordan Valley Gaza Hebron Hebron Nablus Bethlehem Bethlehem Nablus Nablus Hebron Gaza Jordan Valley Hebron Hebron Nablus Jordan Valley Gaza Nablus Jordan Valley Hebron E. Jerusalem E. Jerusalem Hebron Nablus Hebron Nablus Ramallah Ramallah |
x x x x x x x x |
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x |
x x x x x x x |
1600 2350 700 25 – – 2400 – 2400 3500 – 1900 400 200 950 60 – – 2350 2400 500 1610 2100 – 4 – – 350 – 250 – – – – 300 – – – 500 170 – – – 5800 3300 – – – 170 – – 400 – – – – – – – – – – – – 200 200 2400 – – – – – |
– – 1500 – – – – – – – – 800 – 60 – – – – 680 – – 200 – – – 350 – 350 – – – 300 – – – 1500 250 – – – – – – – – 350 – 1000 400 – – – – – – 1000 – – – – – 500 500 – – – – – – |
21 330 124 50 – 50 30 47 50 44 – 42 45 50 61 60 40 2800 60 17 40 40 68 50 – 50 40 32 – 15 – 40 – – 20 36 40 – 124 20 – – – – – 70 – – – 2 – 40 70 – – – – – – – – – – – 105 5 30 880 – 300 – – |
– 4000 1500 120 200 250 200 250 140 160 – 200 200 250 400 300 210 5000 2000 200 160 104 250 150 200 250 400 200 250 200 2500 200 – – 100 120 164 250 2000 250 350 200 – 120 – 160 250 150 – 200 2000 250 700 – – – 200 – 600 – – – – – 250 250 200 10000 200 2500 1100 2500 |
15 180 80 22 – 20 25 46 36 19 – 23 18 50 61 24 15 1200 28 7 16 35 40 45 40 40 30 20 – 15 – 19 20 – – 23 16 – 110 – – – – – 14 70 – – – 60 – 12 – – – – – 500 – – – – – – 11 11 20 – – – – – |
160 5000 1500 200 200 200 200 250 – 65a/ – 120 200 350 – – 250 – 250b/ 100 80 200 – – – 250 250 – – – 2500 80 – – 100 30 26 250 – 250 350 200 – 120 60 120 250 120 250 – 2000 200 – – – – 200 – 600 – – – – – 250 250 200 4000 250 – 1100 2500 |
|
B. Settlemlents planned for establishment from 1983 to 1986 |
||||||||||
|
1983-84 (30) Ankhi Atara Atniel Dolev Elqana (c) Ganei Modin Ganim Garesh Kabirit Katzik Khalilim Navley Yarak Kokhav Einaron Lev Hashomron Mazleh Levona (A) Mazleh Levona (B) Matar Matti Yahu (B) Migdalim Mikhmetat Mizpe Yehuda Narciss Nava Neta Omarim Oranit Pragot Tel Halim Zalaf Brosh 1984-85 (18) Adoraim Akrabit Aviel West Avneikhefez Beitar Brukheil Eshtamoa Keshet Yehonaton Hur Hermesh North Naggid Rama Tas Carker Telem (B) Terzah Zuritadulum Zik Jewish quarter |
Bethlehem Nablus Hebron Ramallah Nablus Ramallah Nablus Nablus Nablus Ramallah Hebron Nablus Bethlehem Nablus Nablus Nablus Nablus Ramallah Nablus Nablus Bethlehm Nablus Nablus Hebron Habron Nablus Bethlehm Nablus – Jordan Valley Hebron Nablus Nablus Nablus Bethlehem Nablus Hebron Nablus Nablus Nablus Bethlehem Bethlehem Ramallah Bethlehm Nablus Bethlehm Hebron Hebron |
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x |
– – 200 – – – – 200 – – – – 500 – – 100 400 – – 100 – – 170 – – – – 350 – – – – 250 – – 150 – – 300 50 – 200 – – – – – – |
– – 250 – – – – 350 – – – – 500 – – 250f/ 400 – 250 250 – 200g/ 250g/ – – – – 350 250 – – – – 750f/ 400 – 250 – – 300 200f/ 500 350g/ – – – – – |
– – 250 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – — – – – – – – |
120 200 – 300 700 700 200 250 250 200 250 400 250 450 200 250 250 800 200 200 2000 200 250 200 250 500 250 250 200 200 200 250 150f/ 1000 500 500 200 150 1000 250 250 700 400 200 150 250 200 – |
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – |
120 200 200 300 700 700 200 250 250 200 250 400 250 450 200 250 250 800 200 200 – 200 250 200 250 500 250 250 200 200 200 250 150f/ 1000 500 500 200 150 1000 250 250 700 4400 200 150 250 200 – |
||
|
1985-86 (4) Barakha (B) Naaran (B) Ofarim (B) Rihan (B) 1986 (10) Elqana (D) Givat Ehud Har Mandakh Hermesh Naaba (B) Nahal Zori Nahal Zohar Rihanit h/ Shomoronit h/ Terez h/ 1986-87 (2) Deir kalaa Salit (B) |
Nablus Jordan Valley Ramallah Nablus Nablus Ramallah Hebron Nablus Jordan Valley Jordan Valley Hebron – Nablus Nablus Nablus |
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x |
– – – – – – 300 – – – – – – – – – |
– – – – – – 300 – – – – – -2200 – – – |
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – |
200 200 1500 250 1200 700 200 250 200 120 250 – 5000 2000 – – |
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – |
200 200 1500 250 1200 700 200 250 200 120 250 – 5000 2000 – – |
||
|
Military, or no information available d/ Mazleh Yonatan Mizpeh Adulam Nahalim Hiria Nabluz Yarrit Paati Hebron Zur Natan |
||||||||||
|
No date available Elqana (B) |
Nablus |
– |
x |
– |
– |
– |
1500 |
– |
1500 |
|
J: East Jerusalem; W: West Bank; G: Gaza Strip; a dash (-) indicates that the information is not available.
Sources: "Israeli settlements in Gaza and the West Bank (including Jerusalem)s their nature and aims (United Nations, 1982)) Index of Settlements, West Bank and Gaza, vols. 1 and 2; existing, July 1983; planned, April 1983 (Jerusalem, West Bank Data Base Project); Survey of Israel "Map of settlements in Eretz Israel". Settlement Department of the Jewish Agencyl Settlement Division of the Zionist Organization (Jerusalem, 1982)1 Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Jerusalem", report prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Committee of the Occupied Territories (Amman, 1980).
a/ Expected 1991.
b/ Expected 1995.
c/ Total number of factories established: 61.
d/ Military information, otherwise none available.
e/ Known also by the name "Anatot".
f/ Expected 1986.
g/ will be built after 1984.
h/ Will be built after 1986.
APPENDIX II
Land confiscated during the period February 1983 to February 1984
|
Location/Villages
|
Area confiscated (dunums) |
Subtotal |
|
Ramallah
Jibia, Umsafa and Nabi Saleh
Belt Illo
Beitounia
Deir Dibwan
Ramallah Cit
Bethlehem-Hebron
Yatta
Between Hebron and the Dead Sea
Ain Fares, Abul Zuluf
Ras Qanat Saleh
Slir
Tarqoum. A
Tafouh
Shamjah Family
Sourif
Belt Omer
Al Burj
Beir Razel
Beit Oula
Belt Sahour
Beit Sahour
Ush Al-Uhrab-Beit Sahour Area
Al-Khader
Nablus-Tulkarm-Jenin
Salem Village land
Deir Hatabhazmour
Akaaba
Jabal Al Raz
Kafr Sour
Shouta, Kouri, Beit Heed, Safareen
Akaaba
Al Mazrala, Al Qibtineh
Ualql.Lya
Raba, Al Zababoeh
Al-Zababdeh
Jerusalem
Rafat
Jssawiyeh
Shuifat
Beit Hanina
|
2,000 400 600 200 7 23,000 170,000 20,000 800 5,000 500 200 10,000 430 2,000 4,000 6,000 2,000 6 250 1,000 3,207 2,800 4,000 2,000 1,250 1,300 10,000 1,600 3,000 4,000 5,600 400 2,500 7,000 6 5,000 |
3,207 3,207 35,350 14,256 298,009 |
Location/Villages Area confiscated
Ramallah
Jibia, Umsafa and Nabi Saleh 2,000
Belt Illo 400
Beitounia 600
Deir Dibwan 200
Ramallah City 7 3,207
Bethlehem-Hebron
Yatta 23,000
Between Hebron and the Dead Sea 170,000
Ain Fares, Abul Zuluf 20,000
Ras Qanat Saleh
Slir 800
Tarqoum. A 5,000
Tafouh 500
Shamjah Family 200
Sourif 10,000
Belt Omer 430
Al Burj 2,000
Beir Razel 4,000
Beit Oula 6,000
Belt Sahour 2,000
Beit Sahour 6
Ush Al-Uhrab-Beit Sahour Area 250
Al-Khader 1,000 245,196
Nablus-Tulkarm-Jenin
Salem Village land 2,800
Deir Hatabhazmour 4,000
Akaaba 2,000
Jabal Al Raz 1,250
Kafr Sour 1,300
Shouta, Kouri, Beit Heed, Safareen 10,000
Akaaba 1,600
Al Mazrala, Al Qibtineh 3,000
Ualql.Lya 4,000
Raba, Al Zababoeh 5,600
Al-Zababdeh 400 35,350
Jerusalem
Rafat 2,500
Issawiyeh 7,000
Shuifat 6
Beit Hanina 5,000 14,256
TOTAL: 298,009
Source: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, “Report of the Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs” (Amman, February 1984), annex IV.
APPENDIX III
Houses demolished in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip_by the occupying authorities as a punitive measure, 1967-1982
1967 130
1968 140
1969 301
1970 191
1971 231
1972 35
1973 34
1974 61
1975 77
1976 24
1977 1
1978 2
1979 8
1980 24
1981 32
1982 55
Total 1,346 of which 1,318 on the West Bank 28 on the Gaza Strip
Source: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Occupied Territories Affairs (Amman).
Document symbol: A/39/233|E/1984/79
Document Type: Report
Document Sources: General Assembly
Subject: Land, Settlements, Social issues
Publication Date: 25/05/1984
Document Type: Report
Document Sources: General Assembly
Subject: Land, Settlements, Social issues
Publication Date: 25/05/1984