International Atomic Energy Agency
Board of Governors
General Conference
(Unofficial electronic version)
Sub-item 5(b) of the Board's provisional agenda
(GOV/1999/47)
Item 23 of the Conference's provisional agenda
(GC(43)/1)
APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
GC(43)/17/Add.1; GC(43)/17/Add.1/Corr.1 and GC(43)/17/Add.2
Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors
and to the General Conference
1. In resolution GC(42)/RES/21 (1998), the General Conference, inter alia, called upon all parties directly concerned:
2. The resolution also took note:
3. The resolution further called upon all States in the region:
4. In his Report to the forty-second regular session of the General Conference (GOV/1998/45-GC(42)/15), the Director General identified the steps he had taken to continue consultations with States of the Middle East region as relevant to the mandate which the General Conference had conferred upon him. In this regard, the Director General said that during his visit to Israel from 28 June – 2 July 1998, his discussions with the then Prime Minister and other senior officials had focused on his mandate in particular and, more generally, on ways to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East. With regard to the Director General's mandate, to facilitate the early application of full-scope (comprehensive) Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region as relevant to the preparation of model agreements, as a necessary step towards the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East 1/, Israel had reiterated its view that priority should be given to the establishment of comprehensive peace and security in the region. This could later be followed by arms control and the establishment of the Middle East as a NWFZ, of which mutual verifications and safeguards would be an integral part. On the other hand, the view expressed by all other States of the region, during the Director General's consultations with them, continued to be that the application of safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region should not depend upon the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ and/or on the conclusion of a comprehensive peace settlement. According to this view, the application of full-scope safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the region would itself be a key confidence building measure which could contribute towards those objectives.
5. The Director General's Report also gave details about a Technical Workshop on "Safeguards, Verification Technologies and Other Related Experience", including experience in various regional contexts, which, had taken place at Agency Headquarters from 11 – 13 May 1998 for experts from the Middle East and other areas. As the General Conference may recall, the Workshop originated from a request in a Presidential Statement at the forty- first regular session of the Conference on 3 October 1997 (GC(41)/DEC/14). The programme for the workshop, prepared in consultation and co-ordination with the parties concerned, aimed further to increase understanding about the features and application of IAEA safeguards; of other verification concepts, technologies and tools; and about experience gained in specific regional contexts, notably in IAEA verification of compliance with NWFZ agreements. The overall objective of the Workshop, as well as of those which had preceded it in 1993 and 1997, was to help to facilitate choices and options with regard to some of the issues on which consensus will be needed for the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ, in particular, appropriate verification arrangements. The report of the Director General to the thirty sixth regular session of the General Conference (GC(XXXVI)/1019 of 16 September 1992) and other, later reports have shown that verification modalities in a future Middle East NWFZ will hinge substantially on the types of obligation to be verified. Examples of broad categories of obligations which might form part of a NWFZ agreement, have been given in reports of the Director General, for example, (i) those which preclude research and development on and the possession, acquisition, manufacture or stationing of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices; (ii) those which preclude research and development on and the production, importing or stockpiling of weapons-usable materials and require the disclosure of all nuclear activities, including research and development, imports, exports and production; and (iii) those which require the application of safeguards to all nuclear material, installations and relevant equipment and non-nuclear material. As reports of the Director General have emphasised, greater clarity about the views of Middle East States on issues such as these is indispensable to the preparation of the model verification agreements foreseen in General Conference resolutions, most recently in resolution GC(42)RES/21 of 25 September 1998.
6. The Director General has continued his consultations with representatives of Middle East States since last year's regular session of the General Conference. As part of those consultations, the Director General visited Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon from 28 February – 11 March 1999 and Morocco from 12 – 15 May 1999. In his meetings with Heads of State, Heads of Government and other senior officials, the Director General reiterated his willingness to provide any assistance within his mandate and authority in connection with measures, including confidence building and verification measures, aimed at establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East. The Director General also continued to stress the importance he attaches to obtaining additional and more detailed information from States of the Middle East on all issues relevant to his mandate and sought to elicit current views.
7. As a further way of seeking more detail about the views of States of the Middle East region on key issues, the Director General wrote, in May 1999, to Foreign Ministers of States of the Middle East. In his letters, a copy of which is reproduced in Annex 1, the Director General again focused attention on the two aspects of his mandate from the General Conference.
8. With regard to the first aspect, the Director General asked recipients of his letter for their current thinking about the application of safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the Middle East and for their views on any practical steps which might be taken now to foster a climate of confidence which might lead to such application.
9. To date, the Director General has received 3 responses to his letter. These responses from Iraq, Israel and Jordan are attached at Annex 2.
10. The Director General will continue his consultations with States of the Middle East with a view to achieving progress towards fulfilling the two aspects of his mandate. Furthermore, in the renewed hope that States of the region can agree, as called upon by the General Conference, "to take measures, including confidence building and verification measures, aimed at establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East", the Director General will continue to be ready to provide any assistance within his authority that the States of the region deem appropriate.
GOV/1999/51-GC(43)/17
Annex I
TEXT OF LETTER OF 10 MAY 1999 FROM THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN MINISTERS OF STATES OF THE MIDDLE EAST
i. those which preclude research and development on and the possession, acquisition, manufacture or stationing of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;
ii. those which preclude research and development on and the production, importing or stockpiling of weapons-useable materials (i.e. uranium enriched to 20% or more in uranium -235 and separated plutonium) and require the disclosure of all nuclear activities, including research and development, imports, exports and production; and
iii. those requiring the application of safeguards to all nuclear material, installations and relevant equipment and non-nuclear material.
Translated from Arabic
Annex II
TEXT OF LETTER OF 9 JUNE 1999 FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF IRAQ ADDRESSED TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
1. No safeguards system can be implemented effectively and efficiently unless it is a comprehensive system covering a whole region or area, and any nuclear differentiation in the Middle East would not be helpful in creating the proper environment for the application of a safeguards system;
2. It is imperative that balanced efforts and commitments by all parties be intensified in order to broaden the basis for the implementation of the Agency's comprehensive safeguards system to cover all parties, in particular "Israel", which has so far signed neither the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. I therefore question the reason behind this appeal to the Arab States – which have already accepted comprehensive Agency safeguards – to apply further stringent, rigorous measures under the Model Additional Protocol, while Israel maintains its nuclear arms arsenal and its nuclear capabilities with a view to continuing to manufacture additional nuclear weapons outside the scope of the international measures being adopted by the Agency;
3. Any partial and coercive international approach to the issue of armament in the Middle East will not achieve the objectives foreseen by the international community because a serious situation currently prevails in the Middle East, which was described by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference as a "region of tension", and there is a colossal power imbalance, in which Israel possesses a massive arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, in addition to long-range missiles, in defiance of the United Nations General Assembly's efforts since 1974 to establish the Middle East as a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolution 487(1981), which called on Israel to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards and paragraph 14 of resolution 687(1991), which called for the actions taken against Iraq to represent steps towards the goal of establishing a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
4. Iraq underwent a bitter and cruel experience and was subjected, for a long time, to a system of control that was unique in its rigorousness and its arbitrariness and that used unprecedented methods and criteria, based on unjust resolutions that gave the United Nations licence to carry out its mandate fully and comprehensively for several years with respect to all weapons of mass destruction, including those in the nuclear area for which the Agency has responsibility. This mandate went beyond all the control measures and safeguards systems that have been or that are currently being applied anywhere in the world. However, we now note that the same States which – for dubious, political motives – had voiced their alleged fears and anxieties about the situation in the Middle East arising from Iraq's possession of so-called weapons of mass destruction are backing, contributing to and supporting, either directly or in various indirect ways, the programmes and activities implemented by Israel that are directly related to maintaining the development of Israel's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities and its long-range missiles;
5. Despite Iraq's bitter experience in the field of disarmament over the past nine years, Iraq has not noticed any serious, committed steps by the relevant international bodies to universalize the steps applied to Iraq by applying them to States and parties in the Middle East that possess arsenals of nuclear weapons and publicly vaunt the fact;
6. As for the intrusive, comprehensive verification arrangements proposed in the letter as part of the safeguards system, Iraq considers that they should be immediately applied in practice to all States in the Middle East without exception, and above all to "Israel", whose huge arsenal of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction constitutes a danger to the peace and security of the States and populations of the region, otherwise it will be impossible to ensure the credibility of any safeguards system;
7. The application of comprehensive IAEA safeguards in the Middle East cannot be linked with a peace settlement, because Israel's development of nuclear weapons and its failure to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards pose a constant threat to the Arab States and to the region of the Middle East. It is therefore imperative that Israel accede to the NPT and that it immediately and unconditionally place its facilities under Agency safeguards and eliminate its nuclear arsenal;
8. As to the geographical limitations of the Middle East region, on which you sought to have our views, these limitations are obvious and were confirmed in the remarks submitted by Iraq to the technical committee entrusted with the consideration of a draft treaty to establish a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which holds its meetings on nuclear issues at the headquarters of the League of Arab States in Cairo;
9. Actions taken by the United States during the preparatory meetings for the 2000 NPT Review Conference and at other specialized meetings to thwart efforts to exert pressure on Israel to accede to the NPT, to place its facilities under the Agency's safeguards system and to eliminate its nuclear weapons played a major role in fostering Israel's tendency to run counter to the will of the international community. Moreover, the role undertaken by the relevant international organizations has been of limited effect in changing this attitude and getting Israel to comply with the will of the international community. The steps taken by the Agency's Director General have brought about no practical or tangible results in this direction over the years, because the application of comprehensive safeguards and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East were linked to a peace settlement in the region – a linkage which Israel constantly strives for. Serious efforts must therefore be exerted to achieve results that serve the region's security and stability, in other words, that rid it completely of nuclear weapons by applying paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687(1991), which was adopted in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and was fully implemented by Iraq, as well as Security Council resolution 487(1981).
TEXT OF LETTER OF 6 AUGUST 1999 FROM THE ISRAELI ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION ADDRESSED
TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
TEXT OF LETTER OF 10 AUGUST 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN ADDRESSED TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
1. Jordan strongly supports the idea of establishing a Middle East region free of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological).
2. Jordan has always called for the application of the IAEA full-scope safeguards on all nuclear plants in the Middle East without any exception.
3. Jordan has always called for the realisation of the universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which calls for the adherence of all States to the Treaty. Needless to say that all States in the Middle East are parties to the NPT with the exception of the State of Israel.
4. Jordan believes that practical steps for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ) should be taken as soon as possible so as to give impetus to the Middle East Peace Process. Such a mechanism, once achieved, will enhance the International regime for nuclear non-proliferation which can then be used as a tool for nuclear disarmament.
1/ With respect to the States of the region that have nuclear activities of safeguards relevance, the Agency applies comprehensive safeguards (INFCIRC/153) to nuclear facilities in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Libya and Syria and item-specific safeguards (INFCIRC/66) to one facility in Israel.
Document Type: Report
Document Sources: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Subject: Arms control and regional security issues
Publication Date: 17/08/1999