Press encounter following the monthly lunch with the Security Council (unofficial transcript)

Obviously, as I mentioned to you this morning, this is the first time we have had this sort of invitation from the Iraqis, and we will need to get them to understand the requirements of the Council. We are prepared to deal with them on that basis.

Q: Are you planning to send a letter to the Iraqis setting out your positions on this?

SG: We will respond to their letter, yes.

Q: Is the position that they can have technical talks on practical arrangements, as they tried to do in Vienna, or they can have no technical talks unless Iraq agrees to the inspectors [can go] back?

SG: I think the issue is broader than that, and a bit more complex, in the sense that we would want to discuss with them the return of the inspectors. All members of the Council agree that we should do everything to get the inspectors back and if Iraq is open to that sort of idea there are practical bases for moving forward, and this is something we are going to explore in the next letter.

Q: How are you going to explore it, by sending a letter, or by talking to...?

SG: I think initially by a letter, but depending on the answer, there could be discussions at the technical level.

Q: We understand you had another note from Iraq this morning. Does that help clarify anything at all?

SG: I think that document really expanded on the earlier letter. It was a Note Verbale expanding on the letter that they had sent last week.

Q: Did it change anything though, that you had thought you understood the first time, or did it?

SG: I think I understood it the first time, without the amplification.

Q: Were there some differences among Council members, or did you have the unanimous support of the Council for going ahead in this manner?

SG: I think, generally, Council members would want to see the inspectors return to Iraq. There were shades of emphasis - some indicating that the Council itself has been very keen to get the inspectors in, and we should go the last mile to get the others in, and there are those who believe that this is gamesmanship and that nothing may come out of it, and one should be aware of that.

Q: Mr. Secretary-General, what would you say to member states that might use this kind of rejection, really, of the Iraqi invitation as sort of a chip in their corner, if you will, to build the evidence for a strike against Iraq.

SG: I wouldn't say that it is a rejection of the Iraqi invitation. First of all, in my own initial reaction, I welcomed the letter and indicated that this is the first time they have ever written inviting UN inspectors to come in, but as I have indicated to you earlier, there are clarifications which we have to give to the Iraqis and get them to understand that the Council has given certain instructions to Mr. Blix as to how to proceed, and if they accept to work with him on that basis then of course the invitation will be looked at in a different light.

Q: But doesn't it support the cause for a strike against Iraq; doesn't it show that Iraq is not dealing in good faith?

SG: But it hasn't been rejected. We have to see how Iraq reacts to the next letter.