Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan (A/81/111-E/2026/77)

Note: Footnotes have been omitted from this post for readability; please refer to the original report for the complete footnotes and source references.

18 June 2026

Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan

Note by the Secretary-General

Summary

In its resolution 2025/33 entitled “Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan”, the Economic and Social Council requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its eighty-first session, through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The General Assembly, in its resolution 80/158, entitled “Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources”, requested the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly at its eighty-first session. The present report, prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), has been submitted in response to those resolutions.

The report covers persistent Israeli practices and policies, including those that may amount to violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, that affect the social and economic conditions of the people living under the Israeli occupation. It also covers the gendered impact of the occupation.

The present report was prepared by ESCWA, drawing on contributions from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; the United Nations Trade and Development; the United Nations Development Programme; the United Nations Industrial Development Organization; the United Nations Population Fund; the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process; the World Health Organization; the World Bank; the United Nations Environment Programme; the World Food Programme; the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; the United Nations Human Settlements Programme; the Mine Action Service of the United Nations; and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

I. Introduction

1. The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 2025/33, expressed concern about the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan. In its resolution 2025/34, the Council highlighted the gender-specific repercussions in that regard. The General Assembly, in its resolution 80/158, demanded that Israel, the occupying Power, cease the exploitation, damage, cause of loss or depletion and endangerment of the natural resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan. The present report, submitted in response to those resolutions, provides information on relevant developments from 1 April 2025 to 31 March 2026.

II. Occupied Palestinian Territory

Israeli practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

2. The Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict has reduced the level of hostilities affecting the civilian population in the Gaza Strip. The ceasefire that entered into effect on 10 October 2025 has remained in place, albeit fragile. Israeli military operations, including air strikes, have continued, resulting in more casualties and further destruction of civilian infrastructure, particularly in areas under Israeli military control. All hostages held in Gaza have been released since October 2025.
3. On 22 October 2025, the International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The Court affirmed, inter alia, that Israel, as the occupying Power, must agree to and facilitate by all means at its disposal relief schemes for the population of the Occupied Palestinian Territory so long as that population is inadequately supplied, including relief provided by the United Nations and its entities, in particular the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), other international organizations and third States, and must not impede such relief. The Court also affirmed that Israel, as a Member State, has an obligation to cooperate in good faith with the United Nations, including UNRWA, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and that it must ensure respect for the privileges and immunities of the Organization.
4. Throughout the reporting period, air strikes, shelling and gunfire continued across various parts of the Gaza Strip and near withdrawal lines, resulting in casualties, including after 10 October 2025. The Israeli military remained deployed across more than 50 per cent of Gaza beyond the so-called “yellow line”, where access to humanitarian facilities, public infrastructure and agricultural land remains severely restricted or prohibited. Palestinians remained barred from accessing the sea. The demolition of residential buildings and land-levelling operations continue, including in the vicinity of the “yellow line”.
5. In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, violence continued at an alarming rate. Israeli authorities imposed widespread movement restrictions and conducted extensive military operations, including air strikes, incursions, arrests and detentions, particularly in the northern West Bank refugee camps.

Violence and the use of force

6. According to the Ministry of Health in Gaza, as at 31 March 2026, 72,285 Palestinians, mostly women and children, had been killed and 172,028 injured as a result of hostilities since 7 October 2023. Since the ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025, additional casualties have continued to be reported: by 31 March 2026, at least 709 Palestinians were reported killed and 1,928 injured in the Gaza Strip following the ceasefire.
7. In the West Bank, large‑scale Israeli security forces operations continued to be characterized by a militarized approach, including operation “Iron Wall” which started on 21 January 2025 and continued throughout the reporting period. These operations have involved the use of air strikes, shoulder-fired missiles and shelling and have resulted in the displacement of over 33,000 Palestinians, the demolition of residential structures and widespread damage to civilian infrastructure.
8. Settler attacks have become more frequent and more violent and many take place in the presence or with the support of Israeli security forces. Palestinian farmers have faced physical assaults, harassment and obstruction from accessing their lands, with olive trees uprooted or burned and entire harvests destroyed. Such attacks not only deprive Palestinian families of a vital source of livelihood but also contribute to an environment that may lead to forcible displacement.
9. Furthermore, in the West Bank, during the reporting period, 171 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces or settlers, including 45 children, with most of these fatalities from live ammunition used by Israeli security forces.

Detention and ill-treatment

10. Israeli authorities continued the routine use of administrative detention – on security grounds without criminal charge or trial – exposing Palestinian detainees to prolonged arbitrary deprivation of liberty with reports of conditions amounting to torture and ill-treatment and enforced disappearance.
11. As of March 2026, more than 9,500 Palestinians were reportedly held in Israeli prisons, including 73 women and an estimated 350 children. Of those, 3,442, were Palestinians from the West Bank held under administrative detention – without charge or trial – while 1,249 Palestinians from the Gaza Strip were held without charge or trial under Israel’s “unlawful combatants” law. The latter figure does not include detainees from Gaza reportedly held in military camps affiliated with the Israeli army.
12. The widespread and routine use of torture and other ill-treatment in detention against Palestinians continued to be reported, including the use of sexual and gender-based violence, repeated beatings, waterboarding, stress positions, starvation and medical negligence. Between 7 October 2023 and 31 October 2025, the United Nations verified 79 deaths of Palestinians, including a child, in Israeli detention.
13. On 30 March 2026, the Israeli Knesset adopted the “Death Penalty for Terrorists Law”, which reinstated the death penalty by hanging for persons convicted in the West Bank of lethal attacks. The law mandates that death sentences be carried out within 90 days, does not provide for the possibility of pardon and forecloses any meaningful right of appeal. The law raises serious concerns about due process violations, is discriminatory as it applies almost exclusively to Palestinians, and may violate international humanitarian law and international human rights law; its application to residents of the Occupied Palestinian Territory may amount to a war crime.

Destruction and confiscation of property and infrastructure

14. According to the April 2026 Gaza rapid damage and needs assessment, released by the United Nations, the European Union and the World Bank, the Gaza Strip has experienced unprecedented destruction of homes and civilian infrastructure since October 2023. The assessment documented widespread damage and destruction resulting from air strikes, shelling and ground operations, including in residential areas and locations sheltering civilians, the creation of military corridors, the destruction of humanitarian infrastructure and conditions that have impeded the return of displaced persons and hindered early recovery and reconstruction.
15. The assessment estimates that more than 371,000 housing units in the Gaza Strip were destroyed or damaged between October 2023 and October 2025, leaving over 60 per cent of the population without homes. It found that housing was by far the hardest‑hit sector, accounting for more than half of total physical damage.
16. The scale and pattern of destruction in the Gaza Strip, including widespread damage to residential buildings, civilian infrastructure and fundamental social structures, raise grave concerns regarding compliance with international humanitarian law, including the principles of distinction, proportionality and military necessity.
17. Since October 2023, 312 UNRWA installations have been impacted in Gaza, including designated emergency shelters, warehouses and medical facilities. During the reporting period, 92 UNRWA installations, such as schools and health centres, including facilities serving as collective emergency shelters for civilians and medical facilities, have been destroyed or damaged by Israeli forces.
18. UNRWA installations in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, were also subject to unauthorized entry, forced closure and demolition by Israeli authorities during the reporting period. On 8 December 2025, Israeli police forces raided the Agency’s headquarters compound in the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood of East Jerusalem, cut off communications, confiscated furniture and information technology equipment and lowered the United Nations flag. Subsequently, on 20 January 2026, Israeli authorities, accompanied by demolition equipment, forcibly entered UNRWA headquarters and demolished structures within the compound. On 12 January 2026, Israeli forces entered the UNRWA Jerusalem Health Centre in East Jerusalem and ordered its closure.
19. Israeli security forces have carried out mass demolitions in the northern West Bank camps of Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams in the context of operation “Iron Wall”, reconfiguring the layout and character of the three camps. Approximately 1,460 structures in the three camps were destroyed or severely or moderately damaged, including UNRWA installations.

Coercive environment and population displacement

20. Approximately 1.9 million people in the Gaza Strip – some 90 per cent of the population – have been repeatedly forcibly displaced, with many displaced more than 10 times. Nearly 1.7 million people, including 800,000 children, remain displaced and now live in tents or makeshift shelters, relying almost entirely on humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs.
21. Although conditions improved following the October 2025 ceasefire, the majority of UNRWA installations have remained in use as collective emergency shelters due to the widespread lack of safe and dignified shelter in Gaza. As at 31 March 2026, approximately 67,000 displaced persons were still residing in 83 UNRWA-managed collective emergency shelters, most of which were UNRWA schools and health centres.
22. In the West Bank, operation “Iron Wall” has triggered the largest population displacement in the West Bank since 1967; as at 18 March 2026, the United Nations had recorded 33,949 Palestine refugees forcibly displaced from the Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams camps, including more than 12,000 children. All three camps remain emptied of residents, who continue to be denied the right of return to their homes.
23. Displacement in the West Bank has continued to surge in 2026. In the first quarter of 2026, more than 2,200 Palestinians were displaced as a result of demolitions, settler attacks and military operations across the West Bank. Settler-driven displacement has been particularly acute. In the first three months of 2026, 1,697 Palestinians, including more than 750 children, were displaced in the West Bank in the context of settler violence and access restrictions, surpassing the total recorded for all of 2025.
24. Demolitions of Palestinian-owned structures by Israeli authorities have driven additional displacement. In 2025, 1,746 Palestinians, including 897 children, were displaced due to the demolition of homes and other structures in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem – the highest annual figure since the United Nations began documenting demolitions in 2009. In the first quarter of 2026, more than 500 Palestinians were further displaced through administrative, punitive and other demolitions. In East Jerusalem, forced evictions have intensified, particularly in the Silwan neighbourhood. In March 2026, Israeli forces forcibly evicted 15 Palestinian households comprising 70 people, including 29 children, in the Batn al-Hawa area of Silwan to enable the takeover of properties by an Israeli settler organization. Demolitions in the Al-Bustan area of Silwan continued, displacing additional Palestinian families and placing more than 1,500 Palestinians at imminent risk of further displacement.[20]

Israeli settlement activity and settler violence

Israeli settlements

25. The expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, threatens the viability of a two-State solution, in violation of international law and relevant United Nations resolutions. The principal organs of the United Nations have reaffirmed that the establishment by Israel of settlements in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. In its advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, the International Court of Justice concluded that Israel must immediately cease all new settlement activities and evacuate all settlers from the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
26. Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, has continued at a high rate during the reporting period, alongside measures expanding Israeli civil authority and administrative control over the occupied territory. The reporting period was marked by accelerated settlement planning and approvals, the establishment of new settlements and the retroactive legalization of outposts, increased demolitions and seizures of Palestinian-owned structures and a sharp rise in settler‑related violence. During the reporting period, some 10,000 housing units were advanced or approved in East Jerusalem, while over 26,640 units were advanced or approved in Area C.
27. Simultaneously, demolitions and seizures of Palestinian-owned structures, on the basis that they lacked building permits (which are difficult for Palestinians to obtain) reached record levels. In 2025, the Israeli Civil Administration demolished approximately 1,320 Palestinian-owned structures in Area C – a 25 per cent increase over 2024, which had itself been a record year – 146 of which were donor-funded. Demolitions in East Jerusalem similarly intensified, with 81 structures demolished and 161 Palestinians displaced in the first quarter of 2026 alone, in addition to forced self-demolitions undertaken by Palestinian owners to avoid Israeli fines.
28. In May 2025, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved a proposal to recognize 22 new settlements, described by Israeli officials as the largest expansion in decades. In August 2025, the Israeli Civil Administration’s Higher Planning Council approved plans for the construction of 3,401 settlement housing units in the E1 area, located within the municipal boundary of the Ma’ale Adumim settlement in Area C, and tenders for construction were published in December 2025. The construction of settlements in the El area will have severe consequences for the territorial contiguity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and dramatically restrict Palestinians’ ability to move within the West Bank and their access to health, education and employment. Palestinian herding and farming communities, who have been living in that area for decades, are at imminent risk of being displaced.
29. Israeli public and governmental initiatives have aimed at extending Israeli law, jurisdiction and administrative authority over large parts of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. On 4 December 2025, the Government of Israel adopted a decision to invest 2.75 billion new Israeli shekels (approximately $850 million) in settlement development, including for new settlements, the legalization of outposts and the expansion of existing settlements.[24] On 8 February 2026, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved measures expanding Israeli civil authority in the West Bank, including in parts of Areas A and B. These measures include the transfer of municipal authorities in Hebron, such as construction permits in the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs, from the municipality of Hebron to Israeli authorities, the removal of regulatory barriers on land acquisition and construction by Israelis and the shifting of certain functions from the Palestinian Authority to the Israeli Civil Administration.

Settler violence

30. Settler-related violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, escalated during the reporting period, reaching its highest levels recorded since the United Nations began documenting such incidents in 2006. During the reporting period, 2,018 settler violence incidents that resulted in casualties or property damage were documented, an average of more than five incidents per day. These incidents included 26 Palestinians killed in the context of settler attacks, including 16 directly by Israeli settlers. Reports indicated that Israeli settlers and other civilians were frequently accompanied or supported by Israeli security forces, who used force against Palestinians, including tear gas and live ammunition.
31. Settler violence and access restrictions during the 2025 olive harvest had a direct and severe impact on Palestinian agricultural livelihoods. In October and November 2025, 178 settler attacks linked to the olive harvest across the West Bank were documented. These incidents included attacks on farmers inside or on their way to olive groves, the theft of crops and harvesting equipment and the vandalism of olive and other trees and saplings. The geographic scope of attacks has expanded, with 88 Palestinian towns and villages affected, the highest number recorded since 2020. Damage to olive trees and saplings has similarly reached its highest level in six years, with over 6,000 trees and saplings vandalized in 2025, nearly double the trees and saplings vandalized in 2024.

Movement and access restrictions

32. Although October 2025 ceasefire enabled some improvement in humanitarian access, the overall humanitarian situation in Gaza remains catastrophic. In areas remaining under full Israeli military control, detonations of residential buildings continue to be reported, and access to humanitarian assets, public infrastructure and agricultural land remains restricted.

Gaza closures

33. Throughout the reporting period, the Israeli authorities issued evacuation orders at multiple points in Gaza. Between the collapse of the previous ceasefire on 18 March 2025 and the entry into force of the current ceasefire on 10 October 2025, at least 60 evacuation orders were issued, covering an estimated 300 km².
34. The Israeli army withdrew from parts of the Gaza strip following the October 2025 ceasefire, yet it remained deployed in areas outside the “yellow line” that cover more than 50 per cent of the Gaza Strip. Coordination with Israeli authorities continued to be required of aid convoys in or near those areas where Israeli forces remained deployed.

West Bank movement restrictions

35. Movement and access restrictions in the West Bank remained heightened, including the deployment of mobile checkpoints, the closure of road gates and the erection of concrete blocks and other obstacles. These frequently impacted humanitarian operations, as well as Palestinian access to services and livelihoods. As of December 2025, there were 925 movement obstacles in place across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem – the highest number recorded in the past 20 years. Combined with the long-standing impact of the “barrier” and its associated regime, these restrictions continue to fragment the West Bank, severe communities from farmland, schools and hospitals and undermine Palestinians’ access to essential services.[29]

Destruction and deprivation of access to natural resources

36. The conflict has inflicted severe and potentially irreversible damage to the natural resource base upon which the Palestinian population depends. The rapid damage and needs assessment estimates recovery and reconstruction needs in Gaza for the agriculture and food systems sector alone at $10.5 billion, the second highest of any sector, with $7.5 billion required in the first 18 months, the single largest short-term financing requirement across all sectors assessed. In the West Bank, restrictions on access to agricultural land, water and grazing areas continue to undermine rural livelihoods. The cumulative impact on food production capacity, water systems, soil health and ecosystems raises serious concerns about the long-term habitability of the Gaza Strip and the economic viability of agriculture across the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

Agricultural land and livelihoods

37. In the West Bank, restrictions on land and water access continued to constrain agricultural production throughout the reporting period. According to FAO, one third of surveyed crop producers cited restricted access to their land, and approximately two thirds of livestock holders within Area C reported challenges in accessing grazing lands.
38. In Area C, agricultural and herding livelihoods face compounding pressures from settlement expansion, military zone designations, demolition orders, access restrictions and settler violence. Agriculture remains a critical livelihood and food security pillar in the West Bank, with an estimated 115,000 families dependent on agriculture. FAO found that more than 72,000 farming and herding families, about two thirds of all agricultural families, required urgent emergency agricultural assistance amid widespread income loss, reduced crop and livestock production, water scarcity, movement restrictions and rising input, fuel and transport costs.
39. In the Gaza Strip, the scale of agricultural destruction is without precedent. As of mid-August 2025, 91.7 per cent of total cropland had been damaged. Following the October 2025 ceasefire, an FAO-United Nations Satellite Centre assessment found that only 36.8 per cent of cropland was accessible, while only 4 per cent of total cropland remained both accessible and undamaged. Similarly, only 17.3 per cent of greenhouse area was both accessible and undamaged, while just 7.2 per cent of agricultural infrastructure, primarily irrigation and canal systems, remained accessible and undamaged. A further 95.1 per cent of shrubs and natural forest and 89.0 per cent of grassland and fallow land have sustained extensive damage, with cascading consequences for biodiversity and ecosystem services.
40. Despite the ceasefire, agricultural livelihoods remain severely disrupted. Livestock has been largely abandoned, slaughtered or sold owing to the lack of fodder and water. Fishing activities have effectively ceased: all but 3 per cent of the fishing fleet had been destroyed by August 2025, and access to fishing areas remains restricted.

Water sources

41. In the West Bank, attacks on Palestinian water infrastructure by Israeli settlers have escalated during the reporting period, compounding structural access constraints. In January 2026, settlers attacked the Ayn Samiyah water pumping station north-east of Ramallah, a vital hub for water supply serving Palestinians across more than 20 communities, damaging critical infrastructure, blocking repairs and cutting the main water supply intermittently for over 100,000 Palestinians. In June 2025, bulldozing by settlers blocked a spring in the village of Farkha in Salfit, denying clean water to approximately 1,900 residents. In July 2025, pipeline sabotage in Majdal Bani Fadil disrupted water supply to seven villages serving 22,000 people for six days, with repairs impeded by access restrictions.
42. In the Gaza Strip, damage to desalination infrastructure, combined with severe constraints on electricity supply, fuel, connectivity and access, sharply reduced Gaza’s freshwater production. Actual seawater desalination production had fallen to around 4,500 m³/day, compared with pre-October 2023 capacity of 30,000 m³/day, while desalinated groundwater supply stood at about 15,500 m³/day, compared with 49,000 m³/day before October 2023. Additionally, all sewage treatment plants were rendered non-functional during the war. Combined with widespread damage to sewage networks, this has resulted in the discharge of large volumes of untreated wastewater into the terrestrial and marine environment, further degrading the already critically stressed coastal aquifer and increasing environmental contamination and public health risks. A surge in infectious diseases has been reported, including a 36-fold increase in cases of acute watery diarrhoea and a 384-fold increase in acute jaundice syndrome, indicative of hepatitis A.

Environmental contamination and debris

43. The war in Gaza has generated an estimated 68 million tons of debris across the Gaza Strip. The debris contains hazardous materials, including asbestos and heavy metals, and explosive ordnance. The removal and management of this debris alone is estimated to cost over $1.7 billion. Some destroyed industrial facilities have leaked petroleum and other hazardous materials, adding to severe levels of air, water and land pollution.
44. The destruction of vegetation cover, including 95.1 per cent of non-agricultural open areas, has left the land vulnerable to desertification and accelerated soil erosion. Israel’s military activity has compacted and reprofiled soil, degrading its productive capacity, increasing rainfall run-off and flood risk and reducing recharge of the underlying aquifer. The use of explosives during military operations has introduced toxic contaminants, including trinitrotoluene and heavy metals, into the soil and groundwater, posing serious risks to human health and ecosystems that will persist long after the cessation of hostilities.
45. The collapse of waste collection services during the conflict, combined with the inaccessibility of Gaza’s two sanitary landfill sites, led to the emergence of some 200 informal dump sites. Although many were capped during 2025, 56 remain, lacking sealing or sanitary control and continuing to pose risks to soil and groundwater quality.

Explosive ordnance and contamination

46. The full extent of explosive ordnance contamination in the Gaza Strip is not yet fully analysed, but early assessments suggest that it may be very high, including within the debris, constituting a serious barrier to reconstruction and safe return. Given Gaza’s population density of approximately 6,100 people per km², the presence of unexploded ordnance poses a significantly heightened risk of civilian exposure and causalities. Between April 2025 and January 2026, the Mine Action Service recorded 68 explosive ordnance-related accidents, resulting in 153 civilian causalities, including 29 fatalities.

Social and economic conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Economic conditions

47. The constraints on the Palestinian economy are not merely a consequence of recent events but are rooted in nearly six decades of occupation and, in the case of Gaza, also 19 years of blockade. The Occupied Palestinian Territory continued to face acute and compounding socioeconomic shocks, characterized by hostilities, persistent restrictions on movement and access, disruption of productive activity and markets, damage to infrastructure and impediments to trade and investment. The economic trajectories of the West Bank and Gaza have diverged sharply, but both face their most severe crisis on record. UNCTAD reported that two years of military operations and restrictions had triggered an unprecedented collapse, among the 10 worst economic crises globally since 1960, wiping out decades of development gains and reversing socioeconomic progress across the territory (see TD/B/72/3).
48. Although the Palestinian economy recorded a nominal increase of 4 per cent in 2025 compared to 2024, gross domestic product (GDP) remained 24 per cent below pre-October 2023 levels. The Palestinian economy is projected to grow by between 4.1 and 4.5 per cent in 2026, a pace that would extend the gradual recovery path but fall well short of restoring productive capacity, particularly when assuming the continuation of restrictions on movement, trade and clearance revenue transfers. In the Gaza Strip, GDP contracted by 84 per cent in 2025 compared to 2023. The World Bank described Gaza’s collapse as the most severe economic contraction ever recorded; Gaza’s GDP per capita has fallen to approximately $161 per year, less than 50 cents per day, among the lowest in the world, and equivalent to just 4.6 per cent of West Bank GDP per capita, down from near parity in 1994 (ibid.). The West Bank recorded a modest increase of 4.4 per cent in 2025 compared to 2024, yet remained 13 per cent below pre-October 2023 levels.
49. The rapid damage and needs assessment estimates recovery and reconstruction needs in Gaza at $71.4 billion over the next decade, including $26.3 billion in the first 18 months. Physical infrastructure damage is estimated at $35.2 billion, with economic and social losses amounting to $22.7 billion. The assessment finds that the conflict has set back human development in the Gaza Strip by 77 years.
50. The Palestinian Authority is confronting one of its most severe fiscal crises to date, threatening the continuity of essential public services. The crisis has been driven primarily by Israel’s deductions from, and subsequent suspension of, clearance revenue transfers. These revenues constitute approximately two thirds of total Palestinian fiscal revenue. Since May 2025, Israel has fully suspended the transfer of clearance revenues. Between January 2019 and April 2025, cumulative deductions and withheld amounts had already surpassed $1.76 billion, equivalent to 12.8 per cent of 2024 GDP and 44 per cent of total Palestinian net revenues. By early 2026, Palestinian officials reported that Israel was withholding approximately $4.4 billion in clearance funds (ibid.).
51. The fiscal contraction has had a direct and severe impact on the Palestinian Authority’s ability to function. Civil servants have not received full salaries since November 2021, with payments falling to between 50 and 70 per cent of earned pay. In September 2025, the Ministry of Education postponed the start of the academic year owing to the inability to pay teachers. By November 2025, salary arrears had reached $2.5 billion, while total public debt stood at $14.6 billion by the end of the year, equivalent to 106 per cent of 2024 GDP, including domestic bank debt, salary and private-sector arrears and external obligations.
52. The labour market across the Occupied Palestinian Territory has deteriorated severely. Nearly half of the workforce has been disrupted, with unemployment reaching 46 per cent in 2025, comprising 28 per cent in the West Bank and 78 per cent in the Gaza Strip. Nearly three quarters of Gaza’s pre-October 2023 employed population have lost their jobs, resulting in an employment-to-population ratio of just 9.3 per cent.
53. Inflationary pressures have compounded the crisis. In 2025, overall prices in the Occupied Palestinian Territory increased by approximately 11 per cent compared to 2024, driven primarily by a sharp increase in the Gaza Strip, where prices rose by around 22 per cent and the food consumer price index increased by 71 per cent. By contrast, the West Bank consumer price index registered a slight decline of 0.1 per cent. By February 2026, prices in Gaza remained 154.7 per cent above pre-October 2023 levels, with food prices 64.2 per cent higher.
54. In the West Bank, household livelihoods and purchasing power continued to deteriorate in 2025, as salary reductions, job losses and movement restrictions curtailed access to work. By the fourth quarter of 2025, unemployment stood at 27.5 per cent, with approximately 280,000 people unemployed, compared with 129,000 in the third quarter of 2023. Employment in Israel and Israeli settlements fell from approximately 172,000 workers before October 2023 to 51,000 by the fourth quarter of 2025. Informal employment remained widespread, affecting approximately 60 per cent of workers.

Food security

55. Food insecurity across the Occupied Palestinian Territory has deepened significantly during the reporting period, driven by hostilities in Gaza, restrictions on humanitarian and commercial supplies, the collapse of agricultural production, the West Bank fiscal and economic crisis and the deterioration of essential services. The consequences extend far beyond hunger, with cascading effects on health, child development, education, livelihoods and economic productivity. In 2025, famine was confirmed in parts of Gaza and, under the 2026 flash appeal, 3 million people were identified across the Occupied Palestinian Territory as being in need of food assistance.

Gaza

56. In August 2025, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analysis for July–September 2025 confirmed famine (phase 5) in Gaza Governorate, with projections that famine would extend to Dayr al-Balah and Khan Yunis Governorates between mid-August and the end of September 2025. By that period, nearly the entire population of Gaza was classified as being in crisis or worse (phase 3 or above), with 1.07 million people (54 per cent of the analysed population) in a situation of emergency (phase 4) and an estimated 514,000 people (22 per cent) in a situation of catastrophe (phase 5).
57. Acute malnutrition worsened in parallel. Up to June 2026, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification projections estimated that at least 132,000 children under 5 years would suffer from acute malnutrition, double the May 2025 estimate, including over 41,000 severe cases at heightened risk of death. Approximately 55,500 pregnant and breastfeeding women would require urgent nutrition support.
58. Following the October 2025 ceasefire and improvements in humanitarian and commercial access, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analysis in December 2025 confirmed that no areas of the Gaza Strip were any longer classified as being in famine. Gaza Governorate was downgraded from famine (phase 5) to emergency (phase 4) and the four governorates analysed – North Gaza, Gaza, Dayr al-Balah and Khan Yunis – were classified as being in a situation of emergency (phase 4) up to April 2026. Between 16 October and 30 November 2025, around 1.6 million people (77 per cent of the analysed population) faced high levels of acute food insecurity (phase 3 or above), including more than half a million in a situation of emergency and over 100,000 in a situation of catastrophe (phase 5). During the projection period (1 December 2025 to 15 April 2026), some 1.6 million people were expected to remain in crisis (phase 3) or worse, including 571,000 in a situation of emergency (phase 4) and approximately 1,900 in a situation of catastrophe (phase 5).
59. The availability of food in Gaza does not guarantee consumption. Households have largely exhausted savings and sold assets, leaving minimal coping capacity. Even where markets are stocked, most families cannot afford nutritious diets; more nutrient-dense foods remain scarce and prohibitively expensive. Food consumption surveys indicate an average of 1.7 meals per day per household, with 28 per cent of surveyed households consuming only one meal a day. Two thirds of women face obstacles in registering for humanitarian assistance, and older women report significant weight loss linked to difficulties in preparing food, disability and deteriorating mental health.
60. The nutritional situation remains deeply concerning. In March 2026, more than 2,800 children aged 6–59 months were admitted for malnutrition treatment, including over 400 with severe acute malnutrition. More than 46 per cent of children aged 6–23 months experienced severe food poverty, consuming fewer than two food groups out of the recommended eight food groups per day, while less than 10 per cent achieved minimum dietary diversity. An estimated 37,000 pregnant and breastfeeding women are projected to require treatment for acute malnutrition during 2026.

West Bank

61. In the West Bank, the food security situation has deteriorated sharply. According to the latest estimates, the number of food-insecure people increased from 352,000 (10.6 per cent of the West Bank population) at the beginning of 2023 to approximately 900,000 people (26 per cent) by late 2025. The deterioration of household income and livelihoods has been a key driver of West Bank food insecurity. Some 70 per cent of households reported that their income had worsened, primarily owing to salary reductions, job losses and insecurity preventing access to workplaces, leaving 55 per cent unable to cover their basic monthly expenses (see TD/B/72/3).

Health

62. The health systems across the Occupied Palestinian Territory have been severely affected. In the Gaza Strip, over two years of hostilities have devastated the health system, leaving the population of approximately 2.1 million with severely constrained access to essential services. In the West Bank, the escalation of military operations, settler violence and movement restrictions have disrupted health service delivery and access. The rapid damage and needs assessment estimates health sector recovery and reconstruction needs in Gaza at $10 billion – the third highest of any sector – comprising approximately $1.3 billion in physical infrastructure damage and $6.8 billion in cumulative sector losses.
63. The health system in the Gaza Strip has been devastated by sustained attacks, widespread displacement and destruction of infrastructure. As of January 2026, only 18 of 36 hospitals, 12 of 17 field hospitals and 96 of 197 primary healthcare centres remained partially functional. Nearly all health facilities sustained damage during the war, and the loss of an estimated 14 per cent of the health workforce owing to death, injury and displacement has further weakened service delivery.
64. Since October 2023, 868 attacks on healthcare have been verified in the Gaza Strip, resulting in 1,651 injuries and 991 deaths and affecting 175 health facilities and 211 ambulances. In the West Bank, 917 attacks on healthcare have been verified, resulting in 178 injuries and 37 deaths affecting 68 health facilities and 626 ambulances.
65. Following the October 2025 ceasefire, the partial recovery of healthcare services has been recorded and a significant volume of medical supplies has been delivered, although essential medical equipment continues to face administrative barriers to entry. Hospitals continue to receive several hundred trauma cases per month, and rehabilitation needs remain high, with at least 25 per cent of injured patients requiring long-term care. UNRWA conducts some 14,000 medical consultations daily, accounting for approximately 40 per cent of total consultations.
66. Pre-existing mental health conditions, compounded by the trauma of prolonged hostilities, have caused widespread psychosocial distress. Mental health and psychosocial support services have been integrated into emergency preparedness, yet the scale of need remains overwhelming. Humanitarian workers providing life-saving assistance also face immense psychosocial challenges, including post-traumatic stress disorder and secondary trauma, requiring specialized support.
67. Maternal and reproductive health services have been particularly affected. As of October 2025, only 15 health facilities in Gaza were able to provide obstetric and newborn care, and at least 15 women deliver babies outside a health facility every week.
68. The collapse of sanitation infrastructure, the accumulation of uncollected waste and overcrowded displacement conditions have triggered a major public health emergency. More than 70,000 cases of ectoparasite infections and rodent-borne illnesses were recorded in Gaza in the first months of 2026, with over 80 per cent of displacement camps reporting recurring rodent and pest infestations, alongside outbreaks of scabies and lice.[64]
69. Access to treatment for chronic and non-communicable diseases has been severely curtailed. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, more than 12,500 cancer patients in Gaza are in need of treatment, of whom 52 per cent are women. Preventive and early detection services have all but ceased to function, increasing the risk that treatable conditions will progress to advanced stages. The collapse of routine health services has also disrupted care for people living with diabetes, cardiovascular disease, hypertension, kidney disease and other chronic conditions.

Education

70. After more than two years of hostilities, about 700,000 school-aged children in Gaza remain out of formal schooling. As of January 2026, 18,863 students and 792 educational staff have been killed, and over 27,000 students and more than 3,200 teachers injured. Nearly 98 per cent of school buildings are damaged, with around 81 per cent directly hit. The rapid damage and needs assessment estimates education sector losses at $2.4 billion.
71. The prolonged interruption of education threatens long-term development, stability and social cohesion, and risks producing a generation deprived of foundational literacy, numeracy and digital skills. Expected years of schooling in Gaza are projected to decline by four and a half years, and average years of schooling by two years, compared to 2022 levels. More than 335,000 children under 5 years of age are now at risk of severe developmental delays as a result of the collapse of early childhood services. Following the October 2025 ceasefire, partial efforts to resume learning have been undertaken. By 31 March 2026, 584 temporary learning spaces were operational across the Gaza Strip, with an enrolment capacity of approximately 357,476 preschool and school-aged children.
72. The psychological toll on children is significant. All children in the Gaza Strip are assessed as needing psychosocial support, with many presenting signs of suffering from developmental regressions post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and other mental health conditions, all of which severely affect learning outcomes.
73. In the West Bank, education has been severely disrupted by the security situation. In May 2025, Israeli authorities forcibly closed six UNRWA schools in East Jerusalem, affecting approximately 800 students. In the West Bank, 10 UNRWA schools in the Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams refugee camps remain closed because of the Israeli forces’ operations. Across the West Bank, students lost up to 45 per cent of school days during the 2024/25 academic year in Jenin and Tulkarm, and 25 per cent of school days during the first semester of the 2025/26 academic year in conflict-affected schools. The Palestinian Ministry of Education has reported that more than 80 Palestinian schools serving approximately 13,000 students face full or partial demolition orders by Israeli authorities, primarily in East Jerusalem and Area C.

Cultural heritage

74. The conflict has caused severe damage to Palestinian cultural heritage, with profound consequences for living heritage, identity and historical memory. The destruction of cultural spaces, the displacement of practitioners and the loss of community cohesion have placed the practice and transmission of intangible cultural heritage at serious risk. As of March 2026, the United Nations had verified damage to 164 sites in Gaza since October 2023, comprising 14 religious sites, 128 buildings of historical and/or artistic interest, three depositories of movable cultural property, nine monuments, two museums and eight archaeological sites. Damaged sites include: the Great Omari Mosque, the oldest mosque in Gaza dating back nearly 1,400 years; the Church of Saint Porphyrius, one of the oldest churches in Christianity; the ancient port of Anthedon; and historic markets, palaces and bathhouses in the old city of Gaza.

Impact of the occupation on women and girls

75. Israeli policies and practices have had a profound and devastating impact on Palestinian women and girls across the Occupied Palestinian Territory, compounding pre-existing gender inequalities and exposing women and girls to intersecting humanitarian, economic, health and protection risks. Between October 2023 and December 2025, more than 38,000 women and girls, including over 22,000 women and 16,000 girls, were killed in Gaza, representing an average of at least 47 women and girls killed per day. Nearly 11,000 women and girls sustained injuries resulting in lifelong disabilities.
76. The conflict has fundamentally reshaped household structures. More than 58,600 households (1 in 7) in Gaza are now headed by women who, having lost their husbands, are sustaining their families without income, support or access to essential services. The loss of breadwinners, homes and livelihoods has significantly increased unpaid care work, economic dependency and exposure to poverty and exploitation. Women’s labour force participation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was already among the lowest in the world prior to October 2023; the current crisis has further entrenched gendered economic exclusion, with women’s participation at 17 per cent in Gaza and 19 per cent in the West Bank. Older women and women and girls with disabilities face compounded barriers, including mobility constraints, unsafe shelter conditions, limited hygiene options and obstacles in accessing humanitarian assistance.
77. The collapse of the health system has had particularly severe consequences for women’s health and reproductive rights. Approximately 540,000 women lack access to reproductive healthcare, and 700,000 face challenges managing menstruation owing to shortages of sanitary supplies.
78. Food insecurity and malnutrition among pregnant and breastfeeding women have had cascading health consequences. Over 40 per cent of pregnant and breastfeeding women in Gaza are severely malnourished, and two thirds suffer from anaemia, contributing to low-birth-weight infants and long-term health consequences linked to maternal malnutrition, psychological stress and limited prenatal care. An estimated 37,000 pregnant and breastfeeding women are projected to require treatment for acute malnutrition during 2026, alongside approximately 101,000 children aged 6 to 59 months, including 50,000 girls.
79. The protection environment for women and girls remains extremely challenging. Repeated displacement, overcrowded and unsafe shelters and the collapse of family and community protective networks have heightened the risk of gender-based violence. In March 2026, the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls, established by the Human Rights Council, warned that Israel’s restrictions on humanitarian operations were inflicting severe and escalating gender-specific harm and that obstructing gender-sensitive humanitarian assistance constituted indirect discrimination, further entrenching structural gender inequality. Access to prevention and response services remains critically limited.
80. In the West Bank, women and girls continue to face settler violence, harassment at checkpoints and restrictions on freedom of movement that limit access to employment, education and health services. The escalation of violence and movement restrictions since October 2023 has deepened gender-specific vulnerabilities, particularly in communities in Area C and the H2 area of Hebron.
81. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel documented that Palestinian women and girls were also detained by Israeli security forces during the reporting period, and that female detainees were subjected to sexual assault, harassment, forced nudity and threats of rape. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict has expressed serious concerns regarding reported instances of rape and other forms of sexual violence against Palestinian detainees, including women and girls.

III. The Occupied Syrian Golan

82. The Secretary-General recalls Security Council resolution 497 (1981), in which the Council decided that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights was null and void and without legal effect under international law. During the reporting period, the General Assembly adopted resolution 80/73 in December 2025, demanding that Israel withdraw from all of the occupied Syrian Golan to the line of 4 June 1967. The Assembly also adopted resolution 80/81, reaffirming that Israeli settlements in the occupied Syrian Golan are illegal and calling upon Israel to desist from changing the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure and legal status of the territory.
83. Settlement activity in the occupied Syrian Golan continues, including the expansion of existing settlements, the construction of new settlement units and the systematic confiscation of Syrian land, in violation of international law. Since 1967, an estimated 140,000 Syrians have been displaced and 341 villages destroyed. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic maintains that currently about 1,500 km² remains under Israeli occupation. There are approximately 31,000 Israeli settlers across some 35 settlements in the territory, living alongside an Indigenous population of Syrian Druze and Alawites of comparable size. The remaining Syrian Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan, predominantly Druze residents in five villages, continues to live under occupation-related constraints. The population is subject to Israeli law and administration imposed under the 1981 Golan Heights Law, which most residents reject: the vast majority of Syrian Druze in the occupied Golan have declined Israeli citizenship, retaining instead a resident status that limits their civic and political rights. Access to land and water resources remains restricted, and the expansion of settlements continues to encroach on agricultural land used by Syrian communities (see A/80/399).
84. During the reporting period, Israeli authorities continued to advance plans to expand settlement development in the occupied Syrian Golan. Settlement economic activity also continued to exploit the natural resources of the occupied Syrian Golan. Agricultural settlements utilize seized Syrian land for crop production, livestock grazing and the wine industry. The development of wind farms spanning over 6,000 dunams of occupied land constitutes further exploitation of occupied territory and its resources for the benefit of the occupying Power (ibid.).
85. The situation also deteriorated in and around the area of separation established under the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces. In December 2024, Israeli forces entered the area of separation and have remained present in several locations, in violation of the Agreement. Israeli authorities also reportedly established military outposts in the area of separation and indicated that Israeli forces would remain there indefinitely. Human rights organizations reported that civilians in affected areas faced curfews, restrictions on freedom of movement and access to land, damage to infrastructure, destruction of property and displacement. Additionally, human rights organizations documented the demolition of homes, restrictions on access to agricultural land and grazing areas and the construction of fixed military installations near villages, further constraining access to livelihoods and prospects for return.

IV. Conclusion

86. The past two and a half years have inflicted unprecedented suffering on the Palestinian people. More than 73,000 Palestinians have been killed, the vast majority women and children. Nearly 700,000 children have been denied education. The health system has been reduced to a fraction of its capacity. The economy in Gaza has contracted by 84 per cent. The final rapid damage and needs assessment estimates recovery and reconstruction needs at $71.4 billion and finds that the conflict has set back human development in the Gaza Strip by 77 years.
87. The current trajectory in the Occupied Palestinian Territory not only threatens the viability of a two-State solution but also undermines the broader realization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In Gaza, the near-total destruction of the economic base, social fabric and critical infrastructure has inflicted lasting intergenerational harm. In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, illegal settlement expansion, demolitions, movement restrictions, settler violence and large-scale military operations are further undermining livelihoods of the Palestinian population and territorial continuity of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The cumulative impact has reversed decades of human development gains.
88. I welcome the ceasefire in Gaza on the basis of the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, which was subsequently endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 2803 (2025), and the tireless mediation efforts of Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye and the United States of America. The ceasefire offers a critical opportunity to alleviate the profound human suffering endured by Israelis and Palestinians and people in the region and improve the humanitarian situation. I urge all parties to fully implement the terms of the ceasefire, exercise maximum restraint and adhere to their obligations under international law, including relevant United Nations resolutions. The ceasefire must be consolidated and pave the way for the recovery and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, as well as advance a durable political settlement that will end the occupation and establish the two-State solution in line with international law, relevant United Nations resolutions and previous agreements. The United Nations stands ready to support efforts that consolidate the ceasefire, including through scaled-up delivery of humanitarian assistance, and lay the groundwork for recovery and reconstruction.
89. I call for urgent and sustained action to address the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza. Humanitarian aid must flow safely, rapidly and unimpeded, at scale, and reach all those in need. Humanitarian aid is not negotiable. Essential services and civilian infrastructure must be restored. Humanitarian personnel must be given the protection that they are accorded under international law. I mourn the United Nations staff killed in Gaza, the highest toll in the history of the Organization, and strongly condemn the killing of all humanitarian personnel. The advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice on 22 October 2025 reaffirmed several fundamental obligations of Israel under international law, such as the obligation to cooperate with the United Nations, including UNRWA, in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and the obligation to agree to and facilitate appropriate impartial relief schemes in Gaza, including those provided by the United Nations. I strongly urge Israel to comply with its obligations in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations and other humanitarian actors in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in accordance with the advisory opinion.
90. The protracted military occupation of Palestinian territory and the Syrian Golan continues to have a devastating effect on the living conditions of the Palestinian and Syrian populations, as well as on social and economic development in the occupied territories. A number of Israeli practices and measures in the Occupied Palestinian Territory are contrary to the relevant Security Council resolutions, international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Some of these practices may be discriminatory, while others may amount to the forcible transfer or collective punishment of protected persons, which are grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention. I recall the advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, in which the International Court of Justice concluded that Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was unlawful and that Israel was under an obligation to bring its unlawful presence to an end as rapidly as possible. Adherence to international law is imperative to ensure that no actor enjoys impunity and to secure justice and peace for the populations of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the occupied Syrian Golan. Humanitarian and development efforts are key to alleviating the suffering of the Palestinians and Syrians under occupation.
91. Palestinian women and girls face a systematic erosion of their rights to safety, healthcare, education and participation. More than 38,000 women and girls have been killed since October 2023. The collapse of health services, the destruction of food systems and the breakdown of protective networks have placed women and girls at heightened risk of gender-based violence, exploitation and abuse. Older persons and persons with disabilities confront severe and often insurmountable barriers to mobility, assistance and access to essential services. Recovery and reconstruction must be gender-responsive, inclusive and accountable.
92. UNRWA remains vital to the humanitarian and development response across the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the region. I condemn in the strongest terms the Israeli authorities’ actions to demolish the UNRWA Sheikh Jarrah compound. The compound remains United Nations premises, and is inviolable and immune from any form of interference. The unacceptable continued escalatory actions against UNRWA are inconsistent with Israel’s clear obligations under international law, including under the Charter of the United Nations and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. I welcome the renewal of the UNRWA mandate and appeal to all Member States to guarantee the continuity of the Agency’s life-saving work through adequate and predictable funding and political support.
93. Syrians in the occupied Golan continue to face systemic barriers to employment, land ownership, mobility and access to public services, affecting women and youth in particular, while settlement economic activity exploits the territory’s natural resources and undermines local livelihoods and environmental sustainability. I call for respect for the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and reiterate my call for Israel to withdraw from all of the occupied Syrian Golan to the line of 4 June 1967, in line with relevant United Nations resolutions.
94. The occupation must end as rapidly as possible. A lasting and comprehensive peace can be achieved only through a negotiated two-State solution. I welcome the measures many Member States are taking to galvanize support for the two-State solution, as well as the General Assembly’s endorsement of the New York Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution. The United Nations remains committed to supporting Palestinians and Israelis in ending the occupation and resolving the conflict in line with international law, United Nations resolutions and other relevant agreements in pursuit of the vision of two States – Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous, viable and sovereign Palestinian State, of which Gaza is an integral part – living side by side in peace and security, within secure and recognized borders, on the basis of the pre-1967 lines, with Jerusalem as the capital of both States. The two-State solution is rapidly slipping away. This is a moment of reckoning that demands urgent, specific and irreversible steps towards a viable two-State solution.