Secretary-General's interview with Abderrahim Foukara of Al Jazeera (unofficial transcript)[use of any or all of the following text must be attributed to Al Jazeera]

Q: Mr. Secretary-General, thank you very much for appearing on Al Jazeera.

My first question is, the war is well and truly under way now. Is there anything that you could possibly conceive of that could still stop this war from going further?

SG: That's a good question. In fact, I just had a lunch with all the 15 members of the Security Council and this issue came up amongst members as to what the Council can do, and what are the prospects for a ceasefire, or a cessation of hostilities. And of course it raises lots of difficult questions, and of course in the Council also, you have several members of the Council who are leading this war in Iraq. And it was an interesting discussion, and of course the Council members are going to continue discussion amongst themselves.

If you are asking me if I see an immediate prospect for a ceasefire, I don't see it. I wish I could say there is an immediate prospect for a ceasefire, and that an appeal from the Security Council will lead to a ceasefire. I don't think that is the case. We all would want this war to end. And when I spoke in the Council I said “we want this war to end, and we want it to end as soon as possible”, because we see the consequences of war. I have always said war is a human catastrophe, and in fact in war, all are losers.

Q: Obviously, Mr. Secretary-General, we will talk about the consequences a little bit later, but in your estimation how much longer could war go on before it finally grinds to a halt?

SG: It's difficult for me to answer that question because this is not a UN operation and I don't have the details of the military operation. I don't know what is happening behind the scenes. I don't have a full report of what is going on on the ground. If it had been a UN peacekeeping operation, I would have much more information about it. I don't have it, and it would be presumptuous of me to try to answer that question.

Q: So, why do you think the UN failed? At least in the estimation of some members of the Security Council, why do you think the UN failed to avert the war in the first place?

SG: I think what you have to look at is the strenuous efforts that the UN and its Member States made to try to resolve this issue peacefully through inspections. I cannot recall any issue, since I have been at the UN, that the UN had dealt with that had led to three or four Security Council meetings at the ministerial level, with lots of capitals so actively engaged -- an issue that did not only engage governments and capitals, but also mobilized the public. I have never seen a situation where, before a shot is fired, you have millions taking to the streets.

So, we have had a very active Security Council, with the support of the people in whose name the Charter was written, trying to do this thing peacefully. Obviously, the members could not come to a common position, they could not agree, and the US [United States] and UK [United Kingdom] led their allies into war. But the Council did try, and I think in fact if you look at what happened here -- the focus on the UN and the expectations from the peoples of the world –there was a belief in the vision, in the original vision of the UN as our founding fathers had hoped it would be, that we should save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. And that whole effort and the popular movement, was to try and avert and do it peacefully. I am as pained as anybody in this building that we failed and now we see what is happening on the ground.

Q: I know that on many different occasions in the past you were asked, not to apportion the blame, but basically just address the issue of whether you think the Americans were responsible for this war, the French were responsible for this war, the Iraqis were responsible for this war, and I am hoping to get a more categorical answer from you this time.

SG: I don't know if it is even worthwhile to apportion blame at this stage. What is important is that everyone was agreed that Iraq should be disarmed. And everyone expected the Iraqi leadership to cooperate fully with the inspectors to disarm. The inspectors were in, doing their work, and most members of the Council felt the inspections had not run their course, and that a little more time was needed for the inspectors to get the work done. There was a difference in the Council, and in the end the Council couldn't come to a common position, and the US and the UK declared that the time for diplomacy was over, and [began] the war. So, at this stage I don't think this is really very helpful for me to begin giving percentages of blame to this or that, but what I wish we had been able to do was, as an international community, to have been able to find a way of resolving this issue peacefully, as the Council had intended in [resolution] 1441.

Q: Okay, now you wouldn't apportion the blame…

SG: That is correct.

Q: Would you say that this war is a legitimate one? Does it have the cover of legitimacy from your Organization?

SG: Obviously, it is not a UN-sanctioned war. The Council did not endorse this war, and I think that was clear.

Q: Therefore, because you are saying that the Council did not endorse this war, would you condemn it?

SG: And that is why the legitimacy of this action has been questioned, and widely questioned, and I myself have raised questions about it. I have raised questions about the legitimacy and whether it was in conformity with the Charter.

Q: But does that mean that you do condemn it or not?

SG: I think, in my statement in the Council I made it quite clear that we would have preferred that it should be done peacefully and that we wouldn't have had to through what we are going through.

I have never justified nor supported this war.

Q: I want to talk a little bit about your decision to pull UN personnel out of Iraq. The Iraqis and others are saying that you were too quick, that you jumped the gun basically. What do you say to that?

SG: That is wrong. Let's look at the facts. The UN staff and the inspectors were withdrawn on Tuesday. The issue was discussed with the Council on Monday, when I informed them that the inspectors, UNMOVIC [UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission] and also Dr. [Mohamed] El Baradei of the [International] Atomic [Energy] Agency, had received warnings from the US operators that war was about to begin. And I had also been called over the weekend. But we didn't act until we met with the Council on Monday and I informed the Council. And the staff moved out on Tuesday, and war was declared on Wednesday.

How much longer should I have kept them there? Could I have pulled them out after the war had begun? And as the Secretary-General of the UN, I have responsibility for the safety of these staff. Of course it is always a difficult decision when you pull out your staff. There were other occasions when there had been bombing in Iraq but I did not pull out the staff. But this is a different kind of action. And I pulled the staff out on the understanding that they would go back as soon as the situation permits.

There is also some fallacious thinking that if the staff had stayed in, the war would not have started and that because they were withdrawn, we caused a war. They left because of the war. The Oil-for-Food Programme was suspended because of the war. We couldn't run the operation without our people. The inspectors were withdrawn because of the war. The inspections stopped because there were no inspectors to carry out inspections. And it is as simple as that.

Q: Now, are you saying that if you had decided to keep UN personnel in Iraq after war broke out, are you saying that both the coalition forces and the Iraqis would have fired on that personnel?

SG: Not necessarily fired on that personnel but that personnel would be at risk, because I am not sure that personnel's presence would have stopped a war. There are journalists and others in Iraq, other outsiders, other foreigners. Has that stopped the war?

Q: Now the fact that you draw a parallel between the United Nations and the individual countries you say pulled their personnel, their staff, out of Baghdad, you seem to be equating the symbolism of the United Nations, which is a conglomerate of the world's countries, with individual countries.

SG: No. Individual countries pulled their staff out because of their concern about the safety of their personnel. The UN pulled the staff out for the same reason, for the security of the personnel. But we were the last to leave, and I was telling you this. And besides, even if they had stayed in these circumstances –you are watching the war on television as I am watching it –you think they could have worked? The inspectors could have continued inspections? The humanitarian aid workers who are at the port cities working and in Baghdad and the oil experts at the oil rigs and oil pumping stations could have done any work? I can understand the anger, the feeling and the emotions, but let's look at these issues calmly and analyse the facts. We took them out simply because of the risk and in accordance with our procedures which we apply to all war zones around the world where we have personnel –we do withdraw them.

Q: OK, now that you've explained to us from your point of view the situation regarding pulling out personnel, let me put it to you that some of your critics say that that particular situation does not necessarily apply to your suspension of the Oil-for-Food programme. Just yesterday, UN officials, in a press conference, they said that the United Nations does not have any qualms with working with the Iraqi Government, with the network distribution that the Iraqi Government had set up. Do you think, in the light of that, you could have let the Oil-for-Food agreement run a little longer?

SG: I don't know who these UN staff are, but let's also not forget that the actions which have been taken –the suspension of the Oil-for-Food and the recent Security Council resolution regarding this was approved by the Council members who themselves initiated the Oil-for-Food, and I daresay the Council is the best interpreter of its own resolutions. They didn't have any problems with this issue.

And secondly, I don't know who the UN staff or the UN experts are, but let me say that when we go back –as I said the staff will go back –obviously we will be working with the Iraqis. The Iraqi Government has established a very good network of distribution. There are 44,000 distribution centres. Where they are intact and they exist, we hope to be able to tap into that. Where they have been disrupted, we hope we will be able to work with them to re-establish them, so that they will handle the distribution. If we go in, we will work with the Iraqis to distribute the food and so the argument that the UN has no problem working with the Iraqis is irrelevant. We are prepared to work with them and we have worked with them. We left because we couldn't work. The conditions did not allow us to work and the programme became inoperable. As soon as the situation changes and we go in, there is no way the UN is going to go there and distribute food to 26 million Iraqis. We have to work with the Iraqi authorities and the Iraqi people who are in charge of the territory.

Q: So basically you're saying that before you suspended the Oil-for-Food programme, you had explored every possibility available and you couldn't find one to let that programme run on a little longer.

SG: The programme could not run on. The programme was dependent on three categories of staff –at the harbour, at the oil pumping stations and the ones who work and receive and monitor distributions. They all left. Of course, we had brought in quite a lot of food and the population have been given six weeks' supplies in anticipation of what may happen. But if your programme depends on personnel and you don't have the personnel to run it and the goods are not able to come in, how do you operate? I mean it's as simple as that.

Q: Incidentally, you have spoken in the past about, you know, the civilian population in Iraq facing a humanitarian catastrophe. What are you going to do about it?

SG: I think I've made it very clear in my contacts with the United Kingdom and the U[nited] S[tates] and also publicly in the Council, and my statements in the press, that in times of war, the belligerents have a responsibility for the welfare of the population. And in any territory that is occupied, the occupying power does have responsibility for the welfare of the people in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague regulation, they are responsible. The UN and the international community will assist through the Oil-for-Food [Programme] and the appeal we have made for additional resources, to be able to bring in other requirements which are over and above what the Oil-for-Food may be able to provide. But the fact that the UN and other NGOs and humanitarian organizations are trying to assist, does not relieve the belligerents or the occupying power of its responsibility. So the first responsibility goes to them, and we are going to try and assist. And as soon as the situation permits, we will be back doing our work.

Q: Secretary-General, you have mentioned now the occupying power and that takes us back to the proposals that you initially sent to the Security Council. Let me put it again to you what your critics are saying. They are saying that from the moment you decided to suspend the Oil-for-Food programme, you started talking about occupying power. The resolution that was adopted by the Security Council on Oil-for-Food talks about the necessary authorities.

SG: My letter to the Council used that term.

Q: But after your meeting a few days ago with the Arab Group here at the United Nations, you came out and you called on all the belligerents, and then you stopped, and you said the belligerents, the coalition and the Iraqi Government. Does that signal a change in your attitude?

SG: No, there is no change in my attitude, in the sense that you do have an Iraqi Government still in power, which is engaged in this war with the US and its allies. We don't know how this war is going to end. However this war ends - at the end of the day - if we go in to operate, we may find several situations. You may have one party in total control of their territory or you may have several groups controlling parts and pockets of the territory, and we have seen this in other war situations. For humanitarian purposes, we will have to be guided by need, the people in need, and access. And therefore whoever is controlling any territory after the conflict or during the conflict - even now - if we are able to get in, they will have to assure security and access for the humanitarian operators. And should not use food as a weapon –should not block us from getting through to the other side - to the enemy. So, in effect, you will have to deal with several groups.

Q: Secretary-General, we have less than minute, and we know that it's not fair to ask you to outline the future role of the UN in Iraq, but could you do that for us?

SG: I'm not sure if I'm in a position to outline the future role [in] Iraq. For the moment, the Council has asked us to co-ordinate humanitarian assistance, which we are going to do actively with other partners in the NGO world and all the UN agencies. I have no doubt that, regardless of how this war ends, the UN will have an important role to play. But the nature and the extent of that role will have to be discussed by the Council and the Member States, to decide what the UN should do, what resources they are going to bring to it and then we will move on. But at this stage, as I said, we don't know what is going to happen, we don't know how this is all going to end and what the post-conflict environment will be, what the security environment will be. So Council members will discuss it of course, with my input, and the Council will make a judgement on what the UN will do.

Q: Mr. Secretary-General, thank you very much.