SG: I just came out of my last lunch with the Security Council. I can assure you the atmosphere was nothing like the last supper. [laughter] There was lots of laughter, and some very serious discussions. I shared with them my concern about problem areas that are going to dominate their agenda, and encouraged them to keep an eye on them. I spoke to them about the broader Middle East. I spoke to them about Darfur, and our efforts to resolve Kosovo, which will come to a head early next year.
I was also pleased to be able to thank them for all the cooperation, the friendship and the camaraderie that we have had, and to particularly thank Ellen Loj, the Danish Ambassador, who was the only woman in the group, who held her own, and brought a dimension to the discussions which would have been missing if she wasn't there.
Q: Could you give us your reaction to the Iraq Study Group's report and its call for a new approach to handling Iraq?
SG: I haven't read the full report, but let me say that I never believe there is only one way of solving a problem. And I think the idea that the President [George W. Bush] has asked for the report to look at other options, and has indicated he is going to study it, is very positive. It is a very complex issue. There are no easy answers. The Group that looked at the Iraq issue are very experienced men and women and I am sure that their advice will be taken seriously. I know many of them, and I appreciate their wisdom and their experience.
Q: You yourself have been a very strong advocate of talking to, particularly the Iranians and the Syrians, and that was a key recommendation. Would you urge the President to accept that particular recommendation?
SG: I think the President will have to study the report and decide how to proceed, what to expect, and how to implement it. But it is a well known fact that in my contacts with the administration in the past, I had urged them to talk to both Iran and Syria.
Q: Mr. Secretary-General, what did [Sudanese] President [Omar al-]Bashir tell you in his letter? What have you told him in response? And what are the possibilities of a so-called hybrid force ever getting into Darfur?
SG: President Bashir's letter was a bit ambiguous. But of course he was at the Summit in Abuja, where the Summit endorsed the hybrid approach. Obviously, the proof of the pudding is going to be in the eating, and we are going to come up with concrete steps which we will press the Sudanese on. Right now we have a team in Addis looking at the implementation and what is required for the second phase, and the third phase is also extremely important. And, of course, the Security Council will agree to pick up the cost if it is confident that we will be able to put on the ground a workable, effective force, that will bring some measure of security, that will allow aid to get to the IDPs, and will allow us to work with the parties on the implementation of the peace process. We are in touch with the Sudanese and the African leaders, particularly President [Thabo] Mbeki [of South Africa] who chaired the meeting in Abuja. But we are going to press the Government. Of course, the international community has been willing to go into Darfur. The Sudanese authorities are the ones who have blocked us, and we are continuing pressing them and we have asked others with influence to work with them, both from the global arena, and also leaders in the region.
Q: Just could you give a sense of the conditions in your residence, the need to refurbish it? Why is the money now coming, that you are leaving?
And on another issue, on Somalia, do you think that that Resolution [1725] is a bit dangerous that went through yesterday?
SG: On the question of the residence, I think we need to pose that question to the General Services department, who made the study, and came up –in fact –from what they have told me the building was put up in 1921 and the only main refurbishment was in [1950]. So there is lots of work to be done. I was told, in fact, that they had originally thought of doing it before we moved in, but I am happy that they did not do that to me and I didn't have to spend a year or so in a hotel. But I think it does need refurbishing.
On the question of Somalia, we have a complex situation on the ground. We should encourage the Somalis to come together to discuss their differences and find a way forward. They had met several times in Khartoum but they haven't come to an agreement. But I think there are lots of military groups on the ground. There is also a risk that neighbouring countries will get involved, and of course if this force is going in, how quickly will it go in? It is also important that we get the Somalis to understand that the force is coming in to help, and not have a confrontation with the peacekeeping force that is coming in to help, and so it has to be handled very carefully.
Q: Mr. Secretary-General, my question - you partly answered it –concerning Somalia. Since we didn't get the prior approval [from] the Islamic Court, how worried are you that they may be seen as an invading force, and possibly increase the danger of spreading the conflict? And secondly, how worried are you about the image of the United Nations failing again to protect civilians in Sudan, millions displaced and the Security Council is helpless to act really?
SG: Let me say that, on your first issue, I would hope that those who are going to be sending in troops will find a way of engaging the Somali parties, to let them know that they are coming there to help them to stabilize the situation, to help their people, and they are not coming in as an invasion force of any kind. In these operations you need to deal with the people on the ground, who are holding the ground, to be able to come to some understanding and then move in and do your work.
On your second question, I think the question here is, 'Who has failed?' I think the responsibility to protect the citizens is the responsibility of the government in Khartoum. The government patently has not been able to do that, given all the difficulties we see in Darfur –the killings, the rape, the destruction –and the international community has offered to go in to help them, but the government has refused to accept that help. The failure of the government to accept that help is also, as I have said, placing the government in a very difficult situation. In time they may have to answer collectively and individually for what is happening in Darfur. I think, in this situation, the international community has been prepared to go in; the difficulty has been with the government, and I think we should be clear where the failure lies, where the difficulties lie. And when we say the UN has failed –you often talk of the UN as the Secretariat –but there are many UNs.
Thank you very much.