Needs Assessment and Plan for Action

Needs Assessment Report

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The views expressed in this document are those of the consultants and do not necessarily represent the views of the United Nations
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List of Acronyms

CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DPKO The Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECA Economic Commission for Africa
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
GBV Gender-Based Violence
IDP Internally Displaced Persons
NGOWG NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security
OSAGI Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women
REC Regional Economic Communities
RRR Repatriation, Resettlement and Rehabilitation
SC Security Council
SCR Security Council Resolution
SOAWR Solidarity for African Women’s Rights
SPLM Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement
SuWEP Sudan’s Women’s Empowerment Network
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UAF Urgent Action Fund
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
WILPF Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
WIPNET Women’s Peace Network
WIPSEN Women’s Peace and Security Network
I. Introduction

1. The last seven years there has been a systematic increase in commitments to fully implement United Nations Security Council Resolution (SCR)1325 (2000) on Women Peace and Security, unanimously adopted in October 2000. In Africa, these commitments are intensified by a number of interconnected factors, including the all too recent spate of violent conflicts. The concomitant demand for conflict resolution has resulted in a plethora of peace agreements as well as global, regional, sub-regional and local initiatives for peace, security, reconstruction and democritisation. Given that a good number of these initiatives, particularly those taken locally, have been launched by women’s groups, there is a tendency to assume one of the following about SCR 1325 (2000) and its implementation in Africa: a) that it has gained popularity locally; b) that it is moving from recommendations to full action; or c) that its principles have been realised for African women. It is important to note that significant progress has been made with regards to the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000), however, a lot more remains to be done if it is to maximally benefit African women.

2. The Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women (OSAGI) in New York, in partnership with the UN Economic Commission for Africa’s (ECA)’s Centre for Gender and Social Development in Addis Ababa, has embarked on an initiative to raise awareness about the importance of implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) in Africa, especially in countries emerging from conflict. The aim is to build national capacities, including of national mechanisms on gender equality and the advancement of women in order to accelerate implementation of SCR 1325 (2000). This needs assessment consists of three sections: Section I addresses findings from a literature review on the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) in Africa, especially in countries emerging from conflict. The aim is to build national capacities, including of national mechanisms on gender equality and the advancement of women in order to accelerate implementation of SCR 1325 (2000). This needs assessment consists of three sections: Section I addresses findings from a literature review on the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) in Africa, especially in countries emerging from conflict.

II. Findings from the Literature Review

3. This section relies primarily on documents produced by intergovernmental organisations, such as the United Nations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), particularly those concerned with either peace and security or women’s human rights. As this section is intended for practical use, it is structured to provide easy reference to the analysis, findings and recommendations under each major area of concern covered by SCR 1325 (2000). The section outlines SCR 1325 (2000)’s provisions, notes conceptual and methodological difficulties with any assessment of implementation of those provisions, addresses SCR 1325 (2000)’s impact to date, and then discusses general challenges facing the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000).

4. From there, it analyses challenges specific to each large area of concern covered by SCR 1325 (2000). In so doing, this section attempts to make use of the so-called ‘3 Ps’ framework for action,1 addressing prevention, protection and participation. However, as the attempt reveals, what

1 An explanation of the so-called ‘3Ps’ framework is found in the section addressing conceptual and methodological difficulties assessing implementation of Resolution 1325(2000) and its impact to date.
implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) is evident in the literature to date is not easily categorized in this manner.


5. Passed by the United Nations Security Council on October 31, 2000, Resolution 1325 (2000) has been hailed as a milestone with respect to its recognition of and commitment to address women’s experiences of armed conflict. Drawing from and referencing international human rights and humanitarian law relevant to peace and security as well as women’s human rights, SCR 1325 (2000) addresses the increasing targeting of girls and women during armed conflict; the impact of armed conflict on girls and women, including as internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees; the roles of women in the prevention, management, and resolution of armed conflict; and the effective participation of women in decision-making and all peace efforts.


7. SCR 1325 (2000) addresses protection by reiterating the obligation to multilateral intervention under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, which states that “the Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures.” Furthermore, SCR 1325 (2000) notes the need for data; institutional arrangements; and training focused on protection, women’s special needs and human rights. These are necessary to end gender-based violence (GBV) during and post-conflict. Additionally, SCR 1325 (2000) specifies that GBV should be prosecuted and thus excluded from consideration for amnesty during peace negotiations and post-conflict constitutional and legal reform negotiations.

8. Finally, with respect to participation, SCR 1325 (2000) stipulates that women should be involved, at decision-making levels, in all national, regional and multilateral institutions for the prevention, management and resolution of armed conflict. It directly expands this stipulation to cover women’s involvement in the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements. The bulk of its provisions, however, address the United Nations system, urging that:

- Security Council peacekeeping missions be prepared in consultation with local and other women’s organisations;
- Women be increasingly appointed as special representatives and envoys (with member states regularly submitting suitable candidates to a centralized roster for consideration);

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2 This includes both legally-binding, ‘hard’ law such as: the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols of 1977; the Refugee Convention of 1951 and its protocol of 1967; the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of 1979 and its optional protocol of 1999; the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and its protocols of 2000; and the Rome Statute on the ICC as well as morally-persuasive, ‘soft’ policy such as: the Beijing Platform for Action (PFA) and the Beijing+5 review process commitments.
• Women be increasingly engaged in field operations (as humanitarian and human rights staff, civilian police and military observers);
• A gender perspective be integrated into all peacekeeping missions;
• Guidelines and training materials be prepared on gender perspective (including HIV/AIDS) for circulation to and use by member states in their national training programmes for civilian and military police preparing to deploy;
• Member states provide “voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations fund for Women and United Nations Children’s Fund, and by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;”
• Special needs of women, including female ex-combatants, be addressed with respect to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), including mine clearance, as well as repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation (RRR) and post-conflict reconstruction; and
• Finally, women’s human rights should be addressed in post-conflict negotiations and reforms of the Constitution, the electoral system, the police force and the judiciary.

9. However, to address this lacuna, the “3Ps,” a conceptual framework, was developed by the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGOWG) in preparation for two Security Council roundtable discussions, addressing the integration of Council thematic resolutions into its the country-specific work, in January and July 2004. The roundtable discussions concerned five Council Resolutions: 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict; 1366 (2001) on the role of the Council in the prevention of armed conflict; 1325(2000); and 1460 (2003) on children in armed conflict. Viewing these Resolutions as cross cutting and interrelated, the NGOWG noted that all addressed the prevention of violent conflict, the protection of civilians and women’s participation in conflict prevention, management resolution and peace-building.

10. It further noted that all: are rooted in common pillars (international human rights and humanitarian law and policy); and identify roles, processes and means for implementation (by the United Nations, member states and civil society). Positing that gender inequality is a threat to peace and security, it reiterated SCR 1325 (2000)’s two core demands (for women’s representation in decision-making and women’s participation, together with gender mainstreaming, in all peace and security initiatives), it suggested that, by using the “3Ps,” principles of conflict prevention, participation of women in peace and security, and protection of civilians with consideration to the specific needs of women, men, girls and boys to reading SCR 1325 (2000), strategies could be developed to advance implementation.

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3 The NGOWG consists of: Amnesty International (AI); Femmes Africa Solidarite (FAS); the Hague Appeal for Peace; International Alert (IA); the International Women’s Tribune Centre (IWTC); Women’s Action for New Directions; the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children; the Women’s Division of the General Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church; Women’s Environment and Development organisation (WEDO); and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).
A. Prevention

11. The use of SCR 1325 (2000) in preventing armed conflict faces two key difficulties. First, certain contemporary realities that will increasingly contribute to armed conflict were not anticipated by SCR 1325 (2000). Climate change, for example, creates resource depletion, meaning that women, who still bear primary responsibility for reproductive labour in Africa, must walk further for water and wood. En route, they are vulnerable to exhaustion and various forms of violence including, gender-based and sexual violence. On return, they may still have insufficient fuel and water to support their families. Domestication of SCR 1325 (2000) must take these new realities into account.

12. Second, older realities were deliberately excluded from negotiations of SCR 1325 (2000). Even though, in today’s world, nuclear proliferation (or fears thereof) seems to provide new excuses for war, disarmament (including nuclear disarmament) does not feature in SCR 1325 (2000). This implies that efforts at prevention must again be moved centre stage. “I used to say, even in these hallowed halls, women, women everywhere and not enough in positions of power. But my views have evolved. It takes more than ovaries to qualify women for participation at any table where the fate of human kind is at stake—that is, at all decision-making tables. We need progressive women, women who are inclusive in their thinking and doing, who are gender equality sensitive; who embrace non-violence and dialogue. And who will abolish nuclear weapons and war.”

13. SCR 1325 (2000) is more concerned about the prevention of armed conflict’s reoccurrence. But, even in this respect, it does not explicitly acknowledge the opportunity provided by the fact that gender relations are usually in flux during and immediately after conflicts. Thus, this opportunity to address gender inequality has often been ignored. More attention needs to be paid to whether and how peacekeeping missions (and the UN agencies that support them) can more actively support national policies, programmes, projects and other initiatives for gender equality as a strategy for prevention.

14. Within Africa, the African Union’s Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality of 2004 promotes gender parity within member states. It also encourages women’s participation in peace and security decision-making through appointments of women as special envoys and representatives. This has been followed up by some of the regional economic communities (RECs) engaging with peace and security. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for example, is committed to increasing the number of women in senior positions in its Conflict Prevention Framework. ECOWAS also runs conflict prevention programmes through its Gender Division and Office for Political Affairs in coordination with the Women’s Peace Network (WIPNET). However, the engagement of countries’ Department of Defence and Security on these issues would be useful, as would debate by parliamentarians on women in peace and

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7 Weiss.
8 Barnes.
9 Barnes.
10 Ikpe.
security. At the national level, efforts at prevention through enhancing understanding of gender and security and women’s engagement in peace and security remain scanty.

B. Protection

15. Towards the end of 2007, the Security Council expressed concern that GBV, particularly rape, remains “pervasive, and in some situations have become systematic,” despite calls for the protection of women and girls.\(^\text{11}\) Noting that it has reached “hideous and pandemic proportions” in some societies attempting to recover from conflict, the Secretary-General urged the Council to establish a mechanism dedicated to monitoring violence against women and girls. The Secretary-General hoped that a new mechanism could support political leadership, peacekeeping missions, and other UN entities in providing preventive, physical protection. The Secretary-General launched a global campaign against GBV, including sexual violence at the end of 2007.

16. For although women play many roles within situations of armed conflict, serving, as was the case in Sierra Leone, as “cooks, porters, sex slaves, heads of households, combatants and income generators,” they continue to experience extreme forms of GBV, including sexual violence, during armed conflict.\(^\text{12}\) In addition, sexual violence is never experienced in armed conflict as a single event, but rather as a continuing violation. Women bodies are increasingly systematically targeted during armed conflict, resulting in both physical and psychological injuries as well as discrimination and stigmatisation following armed conflict. In Sierra Leone, survivors have either felt too ashamed to return to their own homes or have done so in silence, unable to express what they have gone through due to fear of rejection by family and community members and thus loss of economic security. Those identified as former ‘bush wives’ have been discriminated against, isolated and excluded from their families and communities. These women find it difficult to obtain food, shelter, and work, let alone medical attention. In effect, they are prevented from both reintegration and economic independence.\(^\text{13}\)

17. Comprehensively addressing the needs of survivors of GBV, including sexual violence, experienced during armed conflict is inadequate because information on these issues remains “scarce, scattered and selective.” This demonstrates the need for better documentation of GBV, including sexual violence, during and post-armed conflict.\(^\text{14}\)

18. Some troop-contributing member states have also established norms regarding sexual abuse and exploitation when committed by their personnel in peacekeeping missions. However, these norms have tended to be prohibitive rather than preventative and community based.\(^\text{15}\) For example, both Morocco and South Africa have mandated disciplinary action against their


\(^{13}\) AI as above.


\(^{15}\) Bastick et al.
peacekeepers if found guilty of sexual abuse or exploitation. However, ensuring that disciplinary action takes place is difficult given the frequent lack of evidence or witnesses. This problem is compounded if troop-contributing member states do not have national laws or policies on GBV. South Africa, however, has strong rape laws (recognizing that rape hinges on lack of consent), which do not further victimize survivors. The South African Department of Justice, as well as other government agencies, has issued National Policy Guidelines for Victims of Sexual Offences.16

19. Since all justice and security sector institutions—including peacekeepers, national police forces and the judiciary, transitional justice mechanisms—are crucial in preventing and responding to sexual violence during post-armed conflict, one key strategy has been to advocate for an increase of women within these institutions at all levels.

20. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), for example, has set a target of ten percent female representation for military and policy personnel on peacekeeping missions. As of May 2007, the percentage was only 1.92,17 due to the fact that meeting this target depends on contributions from member states and few member states have reached this target internally. However, in January 2007, the United Nations first all female peacekeeping contingent of civilian police was deployed from India to Liberia. Within Liberia itself, a three-month educational support programme for women between 18 and 35 interested in joining the police force is also underway, with the target of 20 percent representation.18

21. But this strategy is not enough. “More women in the police force must be accompanied by a strategy to improve policing as a service equally accessible to women. This in turn requires laws that incorporate women’s rights and a judicial system accessible to victims of sexual violence.” Therefore, a second key strategy has been to make the reporting of GBV easier for women and to improve investigations as to enable prosecution. In Sierra Leone, for example, family support units that provide legal aid to survivors, as well as women’s police stations, have been put in place. The model is now being replicated in Liberia through its women and children’s protection unit. Uganda also now has women’s police stations.19

22. In addition, norms now exist to ensure justice for survivors. One example is the General Assembly’s resolution 52/86 of 12 December 1997 that includes model Strategies and Practical Measures on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the Field of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Another example is General Assembly’s Resolution 60/147: Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. Civil societies, including women’s organisations, have also produced tools to help navigate the national and international criminal justice system with respect to GBV and sexual violence. The Urgent Action Fund (UAF)-Africa, for example, has produced a compendium of tools, The International

16 Bastick et al.
17 Bastick et al.
18 Bastick et al.
19 Bastick et al.
Criminal Court: basic documents, in both print and CD-Rom, the latter including a training manual.

23. Despite these advances, challenges to achieving justice for survivors still exist. The first is the challenge of defining justice. Particularly in post-conflict situations, when bringing parties of the armed conflict to the negotiation table means compromises that sometimes overlook women’s human rights violations. In Sudan, for instance, no provisions on accountability for war crimes, GBV, or sexual violence, were included in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. As a result, there are rarely sensitive discussions about whether justice should be retributive (that is, dependent on the criminal justice system) or restorative (that is, provided by a transitional justice mechanism which may incorporate customary or traditional justice systems) or both. Customary or traditional justice systems in Africa may provide greater access and cultural sensitivity for survivors.

24. However, the assumption is often that it is male family members of the survivors who are aggrieved rather than the survivors themselves. Sentences are thus often negligible, provided that the “honour” of the survivor’s male family members is satisfied by, for example, the perpetrator marrying the survivor or paying fines to their male family members.20

25. In Rwanda, a combination of retributive and restorative justice was used—the former through the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania and the national criminal justice system, and the latter through a re-modelling of a customary or traditional justice system through the so-called “Gacaca courts.” Sierra Leone’s transitional justice process used the same method, through the Special Court on Sierra Leone for retributive justice and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). However, this two-pronged process was recently critiqued for its failure to ensure justice for survivors. For, “six years after the end of the conflict in Sierra Leone, little has been done to ensure that the survivors of sexual violence receive justice, acknowledgement of their suffering or reparations. All parties to the eleven year-long war were responsible for abuses, including rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy and other crimes of sexual violence against an estimated quarter of a million women and girls. To date, however, the Government of Sierra Leone has not addressed the physical and psychological effects of the crimes committed against so many women and girls. Neither has it provided justice, recognition of the crimes, or effective rehabilitation programmes.” 21

C. Participation

26. Much has been written about how gender inequality can sustain armed conflict, and about gender roles within armed conflict (including, increasingly, women’s roles as actors). Yet, ensuring women’s equal participation at all levels in peace agreement negotiations, peacekeeping and post-armed conflict reconstruction continues to prove difficult. There still exists a “militarised and patriarchal” culture, and a “tyranny of the urgent” (that is, a focus on ending overt violence between primarily male actors and the influence of re-asserted unequal gender relations during the

20 Bastick et al.
21 AI.
same). Despite the appointment of Ambassador Ellen Margrethe Løj of Denmark as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Liberia and the deployment of the all-female police contingent from India to the peacekeeping mission in Liberia in 2007, the Secretary-General acknowledges that women remain underrepresented in the formal peace process, and calls for enhancing their role in matters related to the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.

**Peace Agreements and Electoral Processes**

27. Despite higher recognition of women’s roles within armed conflict, patriarchal social structures tend to re-assert themselves during peace agreement negotiations and post-armed conflict. This usually results in the loss of “privileges” gained by women during armed conflict, relegation of women back to the domestic sphere, and lower levels of women’s political involvement than anticipated. This trend is assisted by the fact that women's access to peace processes continues to be uneven.

28. In Sudan, for example, women’s organisations have worked not only on poverty, illiteracy and disease, but also on the impact of war on women. They have created safe markets in bordering conflict zones (lead by southern Sudanese women). These groups also created north-south dialogue under the Sudanese Women’s Empowerment Network (SuWEP), an umbrella for five women’s organisations. However, while some were present at the peace agreement negotiations, they were unable to make substantive input and influence the outcomes in favour of women’s human rights. The result was that Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was not endorsed by the Comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), the Women’s Agenda for Peace was not included in the CPA’s six protocols and the CPA contained no provisions on accountability for crimes against humanity, war crimes, GBV or sexual violence. Further, there were no provisions for women’s representation in the Joint National Transition Team (JNTT). While the CPA did guarantee a base percentage of women’s representation in decision-making, as enumerated in the interim Constitution, these percentages have not been met due to the argument that not enough qualified women exist. These gender equality failures have been attributed to the negotiating parties, member states, international observers, monitors and “partners,” none of whom made use of SCR 1325 (2000)’s provisions to assist the Sudanese women in advancing their agenda.

29. Based on that experience, women’s organisations were more prepared for the negotiations of the Darfur Peace Agreement, whose outcomes thus better ensured women’s rights. During these peace agreement negotiations, advocacy by the African Union (AU), international “partners” (particularly Canada and the Scandinavians) and The United Nations Fund for Women (UNIFEM) was critical. UNIFEM supported the convening of a Gender Expert Support Team (GEST). GEST, composed of several ethnicities, raised gender issues surrounding the subjects of security, power, and wealth sharing in an explicit manner. The result was that the Darfur Peace Agreement explicitly included women’s human rights, addressing issues of education, poverty,
protection and women’s equal representation through affirmative action, training and capacity building.24

30. It is important to note the clear challenges that impede this process of protecting women’s rights. The overall climate is not conducive to civil society, particularly given Sudan’s Organisation of Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act (2006), which restricts the actions of NGOs. In addition, funding for autonomous women’s organisations is hard to secure and there are clear divisions within the Government of Sudan on what gender and women’s human rights are and how they are best achieved.25

31. The provisions of peace agreements and the resulting Constitutional arrangements greatly impact the outcomes of post-armed conflict elections for women. In countries emerging from conflict, numbers of women participating in elections are high — a remarkable testament to women's eagerness to participate in post-conflict decision-making, in spite of the gender-based violence that so many women encounter in daring to run for office. Numbers of women winning these contests vary according to whether electoral systems embrace special temporary measures, as mandated by the CEDAW. The strongest examples of the positive impact of these measures come from Rwanda, where women won 49 percent of Assembly seats in the 2003 election and Burundi, where they won 30.5 percent in the 2005 elections. Where such measures have not been adopted or have been inconsistently applied, proportions of national assembly seats won by women have been disappointing: for instance, after the recent elections in Sierra Leone this share reached only 14.3 percent, a slight decrease from the previous election.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction

32. The utility of SCR 1325 (2000) in post-conflict reconstruction depends on several factors. The first factor concerns whether or not there is recognition and understanding of SCR 1325 (2000). As mentioned previously, SCR 1325 (2000) has generally not been considered for use in situations of low-intensity but persistent internal conflict. In Nigeria, for example, one of the largest troop-contributing member states in Africa, SCR 1325 (2000) is only beginning to be considered and only with respect to external engagements. With respect to protection, Nigeria did promise penalties for its 120 person police force that was withdrawn from United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) on allegations of arms trading, mineral exploitation, and sexual abuse and exploitation. Moreover, as concerns participation, it has started to encourage the recruitment of female police officers—a necessary step given that of the combined Nigerian and Pakistani 1,240 strong police force of UN peacekeepers, only 42 are women. One out of every ten Nigerian female police officers was commended this year.26

33. The second factor is the member state’s level of post-conflict reconstruction. Immediately post-conflict, Rwanda’s particular experience of armed conflict, its changed demographics post-conflict, the presence of united women’s organisations and the political

24 Eltahir.
25 Eltahir.
26 Ikpe.
commitment of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) all combined to ensure post-conflict reconstruction in line with SCR 1325 (2000). In some ways, “Rwanda is unique because of the magical coalescing of top-down and bottom-up support and involvement of women, the returnees, and the magnitude of the conflict and gender sensitive men in key political positions.”

34. Rwanda’s priorities with respect to protection were clear: providing care and assistance to survivors of GBV and sexual violence. Rwanda’s dedication to participation is evident in that Rwanda now has the highest number of female parliamentarians in the world. As concerns post-conflict reconstruction, Rwanda rebuilt homes on lands to which female heads of household now had titles, providing livelihoods for women and shelter for those orphaned by the genocide.

35. Where peacekeeping missions are in place, a third factor effects the utility of SCR 1325 (2000): the extent to which the peacekeeping missions themselves embrace SCR 1325 (2000), while actively seeking out and engaging with not only the host government, but also civil society and the women’s movement.

36. In Sierra Leone, for example, clear progress was observed when United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which was the largest UN peacekeeping mission at the time, evolved into the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL). Its post-conflict reconstruction priorities evolved from DDR to assisting the host government with developing its poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP), employment and economic growth, decentralization efforts and reform of the justice and sector. And, through its gender advisor and gender unit, it increasingly began to act on SCR 1325 (2000).

37. The gender advisor provided training on SCR 1325 (2000) for the peacekeeping mission, the government, civil society, and the women’s movement. The gender advisor was also critical for ensuring that gender and women’s human rights were taken on board in security and justice sector reforms. For example, the gender advisor supported the development of family units within the police, and other legal reforms.

38. Most importantly, however, the gender advisor played a liaison and advocacy role for women’s organisations within the peacekeeping mission—with whom collaboration was initially ad hoc due to their lack of access. As in Rwanda, Sierra Leone experienced an increase in female-headed households post conflict. “Women were affected by the conflict in both empowering and in disempowering ways.” They had acquired new skills both informally (simply by living through prolonged armed conflict), as well as formally (from training programmes, projects and initiatives within the refugee camps and in the Diaspora). And they had, through the armed conflict, also developed a unity and focus. In fact, during the armed conflict, the Sierra Leone Women’s Forum (SLWF) influenced parties to the armed conflict through non-confrontational and non-partisan strategies such as demonstrations, marches, and meetings with non-state actors to call for disarmament.

27 Powley quoted in Richardson.
28 Richardson.
29 Olanisakin.
39. During the peace agreement negotiations, SLWF influenced the creation of Article 28 of the Lome Peace Agreement. Article 28 calls for women’s needs to be addressed in post-conflict reconstruction. These needs include education, health, and income-generation. It also ensured DDR for female ex-combatants, and women’s participation in all negotiations and decision-making and legal reform. Finally, during the transitional period, SLWF began to engage politically by calling for and participating in electoral consultations, campaigning on women’s human rights issues and advocating for women’s political participation.

40. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) is the most recent peacekeeping mission in Africa and thus, is widely expected to have built on the experience of other missions with respect to implementation of SCR 1325 (2000). Gender and women’s human rights were included in the needs assessment done prior to the mission’s establishment. In addition, it has a Gender Affairs Unit and a gender policy that covers all aspects of the peacekeeping mission. The overall mandate of UNMIS is to monitor and support implementation of the CPA, provide support to African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), and ensure DDR and the voluntary return and reintegration of refugees (RRR). However, the mandate of the Gender Affairs Unit is to address GBV, ensure women’s participation and ensure compliance of UNMIS with relevant international standards. So far, it has translated SCR 1325 (2000) into local languages, supported the development of women’s peace clubs within the universities (beginning in Khartoum) and provided gender training in all sectors. The Gender Affairs Unit has also been innovative with respect to preventative, community-based security, through the involvement of the Hakamat (elderly, female praise singers).

41. As in Sierra Leone, conceptualising SCR 1325 (2000) through the legal reforms is dependent on influencing the host government, awareness and proactive cooperation, and engagement with civil society and the women’s movement. Implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) is at risk if the UN mission has a negative or deficient relationship with local and national organizations. Therefore, gender affairs units must be sure to interact and coordinate with civil society and the women’s movement.

42. An initial priority for post-conflict reconstruction is DDR. The UN has developed integrated DDR standards, applying both to female ex-combatants and females associated with armed groups. UNIFEM has also developed a checklist on gender-responsive DDR. Since 88 percent of girl soldiers were denied access to DDR in Sierra Leone, the consistent application of gender-responsive DDR is critical. An additional concern is the impact of GBV and sexual violence on women’s access to and experience of DDR: 73 per cent of women and 75 per cent of girls in Liberia’s DDR had experienced sexual violence. This impacts how DDR is designed and delivered. In Liberia, UN peacekeepers, in collaboration with the Ministry of Gender and

30 Olanisakin.
31 Eltahir.
32 Bastick et al and Eltahir.
33 Eltahir.
34 Other aspects of post-conflict reconstruction are covered in the sections of this literature review addressing prevention and protection.
35 Bastick et al.
36 Bastick et al.
Development and women’s organisations, organized a GBV awareness raising campaign. The outcome was that 24,000 girls and women participated in DDR, when only 2,000 had been initially anticipated.37


A. Conceptual and Methodological Challenges

43. In attempting to evaluate implementation of SCR 1325 (2000), the first conceptual and methodological challenge is the complex nature of international law and policy. International law and policy, although usually perceived of as being top-down, emanating from the multilateral institutions, is in fact, in some ways, bottom-up and derived from practice. As such, it is difficult to determine international policy’s precise impact on advancing practice, because at least some of the practices that it prescribes will inevitably exist prior to its entry into law. This implies that in seeking to gauge implementation of SCR 1325 (2000), attention needs to be paid more to the content of its provisions and where within national government agencies such provisions would logically be of concern, than to determinations of whether attempts to address such content are a direct consequence of the resolution itself.

44. The second challenge is that although SCR 1325 (2000) is less about gender and more about women, strategies to realize its provisions have tended to rely on gender mainstreaming as a strategy. This distinction has sometimes been problematic. As illustrated in Sierra Leone, “although the United Nations and government of Sierra Leone have supported gender issues in rhetoric, in practice, the result has been tokenistic and under-resourced initiatives that have not effectively capitalized on local initiatives. What is needed is more than an ‘add women and stir’ strategy.”38 What this implies is that, with respect to implementation of SCR 1325 (2000), strategies should focus on gender mainstreaming to advance women’s human rights.

45. The third and final conceptual and methodological challenge is how to measure the structural change that SCR 1325 (2000) is meant to achieve. SCR 1325 (2000)’s provisions use weak language, compared to other Security Council resolutions and it includes no clearly defined targets, benchmarks, indicators or timelines.39 This has made both monitoring the implementation and the evaluation of the impact very difficult both within UN system and at the national level.

B. Challenges of Data, Evidence and Statistics

46. There is a certain lack of academic literature specifically focussing on the results achieved in the context of the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000). In addition “since 2000, there have been scores of reports on what should happen to implement SCR 1325 (2000), but very little reported

37 Bastick et al and UN DPKO.
on what has been done.” 40 This means that little is known about what impact the implementation
of SCR 1325 (2000) has on the lives of women on the ground. Conclusively, “the lack of
empirical evidence of the impact of peacekeeping missions and SCR 1325 (2000) in advancing
gender equality at the various national, regional and international levels is a major shortcoming of
the literature on gender and peace building issues.” 41

47. In addition, quantitative measurement of SCR 1325 (2000)’s impact is difficult given the
lack of data and difficulties in obtaining it, particularly at the national level. In some countries, for
example, no data on women’s recruitment and representation could be obtained without written
authorization from the special representative as such data was deemed “confidential.”42 Qualitative
shifts are, however, possible to identify although largely anecdotal. What qualitative
evidence does exist has largely attributed the low levels of impact to flaws in implementation.

C. General Challenges with Respect to Implementation

48. Since SCR 1325 (2000) assigned the bulk of implementation responsibility to the UN
system, the first general challenge is the difficulty of transmitting SCR 1325 (2000) through that
system and downwards to the field. This applies particularly to peacekeeping missions but also to
UN humanitarian and relief agencies. While the UN system has, in fact, taken significant steps to
ensure this transmission occurs, 43 effective transmission depends on shared understandings of
gender and security across the UN system. As these do not, in fact, exist (although attempts are
being made to ensure they do), there continues to be disagreement about SCR 1325 (2000)’s
meaning.

49. A second general challenge is consistently low levels of awareness about SCR 1325 (2000)
at the national level (except within Security Council permanent member states and troop-
contributing member states, most of which have begun the process of developing national action
plans on implementation of SCR 1325 (2000)). 44 Even in those member states most affected by
armed conflict, awareness seems to be higher among non-state parties to the conflict. For example,
a current parliamentarian with the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the Sudan
noted that the SPLM used SCR 1325 (2000) to organise and mobilize southern Sudanese women,
to pressurize negotiating parties and attempt to input into the negotiation of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement. 45 Within relevant government agencies, departments and line Ministries of the
current Government of Sudan, however, awareness remains low. Awareness of SCR 1325 (2000)

40 Richardson.
CSDG, KCL (unpublished concept paper).
peacekeeping operations in conflict-affected regions: case study of Sudan.’ London: CSDG, KCL (unpublished
paper).
43 An outline and analysis of these steps follows in the section dealing with implementation of Resolution 1325(2000)
under the sub-section on peacekeeping under the section on participation.
44 Examples here include Canada, Norway and Sweden.
45 Eltahir.
rests primarily within that part of civil society (including the women’s movement) that has the capacity to engage regionally and internationally.\textsuperscript{46}

50. A related third general challenge is that SCR 1325 (2000) is sometimes viewed as inapplicable to low-intensity intra-state conflict. This point is highlighted by the case of Nigeria, a troop-contributing member state, which is concerned about SCR 1325 (2000)’s application more in respect to its external commitments and engagement than to its internal conflicts.\textsuperscript{47} SCR 1325 (2000) being viewed as applicable to inter- rather than intra-state conflict is a significant problem given that these conflicts continue to be defined in Africa in simplistic and mutually exclusive ways.

51. The persistence of these two last challenges, seven years after the adoption of SCR 1325 (2000), has been partly attributed to translation—in a literal sense. However, in 2003 Peace Women started the process of compiling existing translations of SCR 1325 (2000) and calling for new translations. Since 2003 the number of translations available has increased from 9 to 95. There are an additional seven translations pending, five of which are in languages spoken in Sudan.\textsuperscript{48} Some argue, however, that a literal translation is not enough. These people emphasize the complicated social issues encompassed by SCR 1325 (2000) that must be communicated across boarders.\textsuperscript{49}

52. Even where some awareness exists at the national level, a fourth general challenge exists in dealing with where responsibility for implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) is placed. In Nigeria, for example, SCR 1325 (2000)’s implementation falls under the line Minister responsible for gender.\textsuperscript{50} This is problematic in two ways: First, SCR 1325 (2000) logically implicates far more government agencies, departments and line Ministries than those directly addressing gender and women’s human rights; and, second, within Africa, national machineries for gender mainstreaming and women’s human rights typically lack resources and cross-cutting influence at the national level, particularly in post-conflict situations. This is especially so with respect to the electoral and justice systems, upon which implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) logically relies.\textsuperscript{51}

53. It has been suggested that domestication of SCR 1325 (2000) is one way to proceed with advancing implementation at the national level. As already noted, this has begun happening, at least to some extent, through the process of developing national action plans for its implementation. However, few countries, especially from the developed world, developed national action plan. A more immediate way to proceed would be to consciously link SCR 1325 (2000)’s provisions to relevant international human rights and humanitarian law already signed onto, ratified and domesticated.

\vspace{0.5cm}
\textsuperscript{46} Eltahir.
\textsuperscript{48} Muriithi.
\textsuperscript{49} Barnes.
\textsuperscript{50} Ikpe.
\textsuperscript{51} Ikpe.
54. An example of this is the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, which entered into force in 2005. Article 10 of the Protocol covers the right to peace (including the rights to peace, to participate in peace negotiations and, interestingly, the obligation to reduce military expenditure). Article 11 of the Protocol covers the protection of women in armed conflict (including prohibitions against the forced recruitment of girl soldiers and the consideration of GBV and sexual violence as crimes against humanity, genocide or war crimes, genocide and/or crimes against humanity to which international criminal justice should apply). Given the quick uptake of this Protocol in terms of its entry into force and ratification, its potential to significantly advance implementation of SCR 1325 (2000)’s provisions at the national level should be stressed.

55. It is also clear that conscious and consistent engagement of peacekeeping missions and various UN agencies present on the ground with civil society and the women’s movement as well as with relevant government agencies, departments and line Ministries is critical to implementation of SCR 1325 (2000).

56. The Solidarity for African Women’s Rights (SOAWR) coalition was instrumental to the Protocol’s adoption by the AU and now supports national level campaigns on its domestication (where relevant) and implementation. Data, evidence and statistics that exist at the national level in support of SCR 1325(2000)’s implementation have largely been provided by women’s organisations. An example is the documentation of armed conflict’s impact on women produced by Isis-Women’s International Cross Cultural Exchange (WICCE) in Uganda. It used documentation from northern Uganda to advocate for follow-up medical and psychological support for northern Ugandan women and to ultimately ensure that fistulae was included in Uganda’s national health policy. WICCE also trains women in armed conflict on documentation, using tools it has developed such as (2005) Documenting the Violations of Women’s Human Rights During Armed Conflict: a tool for advocacy and sustainable peace and Pillars for Peace: A handbook for women peace builders. Women’s organisations are also carrying out national level awareness-raising on SCR 1325 (2000). One example is the ‘Women Talk Peace’ radio programme series produced by the Liberia Women Action Committee and the International Women’s Tribune Centre (IWTC) in English as well as local languages. ‘Women Talk Peace’ is also on the air in Kenya, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Uganda.

57. However, financing and political support for such initiatives continue to be limited. Nonetheless, in the last four years, UAF-Africa has disbursed over 100 rapid response grants to women’s organisations engaged in peace and security in 25 African member states.

III. Findings from National Case Studies in Africa

58. This section includes findings from a comprehensive country assessment conducted to provide baseline information on the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) in countries at different phases of conflict across Africa.
1. **Methodology**

59. The assessment was carried out through field visits, completion of questionnaires and interviews. Responses were elicited from actors working in countries at different stages of conflict: countries experiencing open conflict; countries in post conflict reconstruction stages; and countries playing pivotal roles in peacemaking, peace building and peacekeeping across Africa.

60. The questionnaires were designed in different formats to capture contextual specificities. For example questionnaires were designed to suit the post conflict realities in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire. Questionnaires were also designed to suit key respondents’ needs and areas of operations. For example specific questionnaires were designed for key institutions working on peace and security on the continent such as Regional Economic Communities and United Nations agencies (see Annexes for samples of questionnaires).

61. Responses were received from the following countries: Liberia, DRC, Sierra Leone, Mali, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Cote d’Ivoire. Responses were also received from ECOWAS and IGAD. Additional research was conducted on key areas highlighted in the study to nuance points made by respondents.

The questionnaires were structured around key themes:

- **Awareness of the resolution**;
- **Usability and relevance**;
- **Implementation within intergovernmental institutions at the international and regional levels**.
- **Challenges encountered with the implementation of the resolution**;
- **Funding for SCR 1325 (2000) related activities**;
- **Recommendations for national action plans**.

By focusing on these themes, the country analysis examined if there had been substantial increase in women’s awareness on peace and security issues and women’s involvement in formal and informal processes. The assessment examined if women’s integration into decision-making structures across the continent could be credibly linked to the implementation of the SCR 1325 (2000).

62. Furthermore, interviews with government officials examined if the resolution is an avenue through which women become involved in peace and security policy making and implementation. The analysis also assessed the extent to which RECs, the custodians of regional peace and security, have mainstreamed gender into their structures and operations. This report is a synthesis of the responses received and will capture the results based on these themes.


63. Awareness of the resolution varied in each country depending on the level of conflict or peace the country was experiencing. For example responses from the questionnaires revealed that awareness of the resolution among civil society actors is higher in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as these countries are in post conflict stages and the
resolution has been instrumental in galvanising women’s participation in peace processes. In Liberia, awareness of the resolution emerged through civil society’s involvement in international activities. Groups like the Liberian Women’s Initiative and the Association of Liberian Female Lawyers (AFELL) participated in United Nations processes on the adoption of the resolution. Awareness among these urban-based organisations dates back to 1999. The situation is vastly different in Sierra Leone. Though organisations like the Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET) and Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) have also known about the resolution since 2000, most civil society organisations (CSOs) were not aware of the resolution and its relevance until the country’s Truth and Reconciliation hearing processes commenced and the resolution was used as a tool to advocate for women’s inclusion. In the DRC, awareness increased in 2002 during the Inter-Congolese dialogue process. In the Sudan, awareness of the resolution varies in different parts of the country. In the South, awareness was raised during the peace process by civil society organisations. In Darfur, awareness increased as the atrocities and violations against women intensified.

64. At the governmental level, in the countries that participated in the study, awareness of the resolution was highest for national gender agencies, like the Ministry of Gender and Women’s Affairs. However, even within these ministries, awareness was low. For example, in Sierra Leone the Ministry became aware of SCR 1325 (2000) in 2005, almost 5 years from its adoption.

65. Among the Regional Economic Communities, awareness is also highest in the gender units or structures. SADC’s gender unit has used the resolution to increase women’s participation in peace building across the region. SCR 1325 (2000) was also used as the basis for peace and conflict issues in the Unit’s strategic plan. However, awareness within gender units did not always transfer to the broader organization. Experiences from the ECOWAS conflict early mechanism (ECOWARN) show that neither SCR 1325 (2000) nor women’s issues were prioritised in the design or structure of the ECOWARN.

66. Due to the low awareness within governmental departments, the assessment showed that governments play limited roles in raising awareness of the resolution among the public. Furthermore, where government departments have been involved in awareness raising activities it was usually initiated by civil society. A respondent in the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs in Sierra Leone stated that civil society organisations lead the awareness raising process in the Ministry by organising training workshops on the resolution.

67. Even among civil society, the analysis revealed different levels of awareness of the resolution. The feedback from the questionnaire shows that SCR 1325 (2000) is not widely known. While international non-governmental organisations seem to be more aware of the existence of the resolution (most often through group email links, participation in international forums, etc), most of these INGOs are yet to fully mainstream SCR 1325 (2000) in their work; and in cases where they do mainstream gender, they do so not necessarily on the basis of their knowledge about SCR 1325 (2000). At the national and local levels, civil society’s usage of the resolution has been more widespread and profound in countries that have experienced violent conflicts (like Liberia or Sierra Leone), than in countries that have not. Nonetheless even at this level, the resolution is yet to be maximally recognized and applied. As most respondents noted, this is largely due to some CSO’s capacity challenges, namely the lack of know-how and expertise.
to mainstream, implement, monitor and assess impact --particularly in cases where their organisational mandate is not solely focused on peace and security.

68. Ruth Ceaser, an activist in Liberia, addressed the issue of awareness by stating that “knowledge of the resolution is not awareness. Women might know about the resolution but they are not aware of its importance or relevance to their situation/context.”

69. Translation of the resolution into local languages has been used to raise awareness in different countries. Translated versions of the resolution have been disseminated to community-based organisations in Senegal, Liberia, Nigeria, DRC and Sierra Leone. This has contributed to the goal of raising awareness of the resolution. Below are samples of the different levels of civil society actors’ awareness of the resolution:

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<th>National NGOs</th>
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<td>The Liberia Democratic Institute, LDI has been aware of the existence of the resolution since 2002. They noted the resolution is more popular in urban areas than in the rural areas. The increasing awareness of the resolution among CSOs in Urban Liberia is largely due to the experience and consciousness of the impact of violent conflicts on the lives and livelihoods of women and children. The result was a plethora of networks, coalitions, interactive dialogue forums (specifically for grassroots women) and workshops where women and gender issues such as gender based violence and SCR 1325 (2000) were (and still are) discussed and popularised as an advocacy tool for addressing the daily ills, realities and aftermath of the seven years war. Consequently, women’s participation in conflict resolution and peace building has increased; and SCR 1325 (2000) has now become a reference for a more strategic engagement at both national and local levels. This was demonstrated in the recent experience with the passage of the rape bill. Furthermore, a number of CSOs, multilateral organisations, government parastatals (particularly the Gender Ministry) and UN agencies in Liberia have forged partnerships to advance the implementation of the resolution. These collaborations are stronger between CSOs and multilateral organisations and UN agencies such as UNDP and UNIFEM, than between CSOs and governments or other CSOs. The stronger links between multilateral organisations and the UN bodies could be attributed to the funding relations that exist between these bodies and CSOs. LDI noted that the steps taken to support women’s indigenous peace building have been mostly on an organisational basis rather than in an integrative manner. Ultimately, the weakness with regards to the poor implementation of the resolution is largely based on inadequate political will and donor fatigue.</td>
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The Enhancing the Interaction and Interface between Civil Society and the State to improve Poor Peoples’ Lives (ENCISS) project, which is based in Sierra Leone is focused on national poverty reduction and security sector reform processes as part of its mandate to achieve human security. In its work, it advocates for the inclusion and increased participation of women in the decentralized security sector and in civilian security structures. SCR 1325 (2000) is used as an advocacy tool. However, beyond this, SCR 1325 (2000) has not been systematically applied or mainstreamed into the work of ENCISS.

The Association for Women’s Peace Initiative in Mali (Association des femmes pour les initiatives de paix AFIP), in its response indicated that there are over ten women’s organisations in Bamako working on the issue of peace and security. While the principles of SCR 1325 (2000) may be applied in their work, this has largely been accidental as no clear-cut measures have been taken to mainstream or apply the resolution. The resolution is more popular among NGOs in Bamako and veterans. Partnerships have mainly been with the Ministry of Interior and Defence, and with Veterans.

The Kebetkache Women Development and Resource Centre in Nigeria became aware of SCR 1325 (2000) in 2004 through an email from the Joan Kroc Institute, and became more informed about the resolution during the 49th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). The Centre only began to implement the resolution in 2007. Most of its activities on women, peace and security have been peace marches, radio discussions on violence in the Niger Delta and training. The level of awareness of the resolution is low as it remains unknown among a good number of organisations at the national and local levels. The impact of the resolution is assessed in terms of its usefulness in promoting women’s participation in conflict resolution and peace building despite cultural limitations. According to the respondent, the main advocates of SCR 1325 (2000) are civil society actors who have been focused on raising awareness about the instrument. Notwithstanding, women’s involvement in the Niger Delta is seen as vacillating between moderate and low. Funding and the poor documentation of existing initiatives are seen as the main challenges. In developing a national action plan, the respondent indicated that, the focus should be placed on indigenous women’s groups. |

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<th>Community Based Organisations</th>
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<td>The Lutheran Church in Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Programme had only just become aware of the existence of the resolution. They also stated that there was a low level awareness of the resolution among CSOs and that awareness was greater among CSOs in the urban areas. Print and electronic media, songs, dramas, billboards and t-shirts with inscriptions have all been used to raise awareness of the resolution at the local level. Groups like the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET/WANEPA)</td>
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have also translated the resolution into local languages and small pocket booklets to improve its accessibility and user-friendliness. They evaluated the level of awareness of the resolution as fairly good and noted that collaboration has been more intense between CSOs and multilateral organisations, with the former receiving financial and material support to conduct sensitisation campaigns on the resolution. With regards to the contributions of the resolution to capacity building in the area of peacemaking and peace building, the respondent noted that more women have become peace agents (animators), and their activism resulted in the cessation of violence and a growing respect for women peace builders. The lack of political will on the part of the government is also cited as a limitation to the full implementation of the provisions of the resolution, which on its part is also deficient in its lack of punitive measures for gender based violence such as rape.

The Rozaria Memorial Trust, based in Zimbabwe, stated that the level of awareness of SCR 1325 (2000) is low among grassroots rural populations and moderate in urban areas. Simplified flyers have been used by the Trust to raise awareness on the resolution. In addition, the respondent stated that there has been limited collaboration between CSOs; partial or non-existent collaboration between CSOs and government; and moderate collaboration between CSOs and Multi-lateral organisations.

Regional NGOs
The African Women’s Development and Communication Network (FEMNET) has a gender mainstreaming strategy, even though this does not specifically focus on women, peace and security issues. For FEMNET, the level of awareness of SCR 1325 (2000) is moderate.

International NGOs
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) became aware of SCR 1325 (2000) prior to its adoption. ACCORD became aware through its participated in a seminar on “Gender Implications for Peacekeeping and Reconstruction in Africa,” which was held in Mombasa, Kenya in March 2000 in anticipation of the adoption of the resolution. Notwithstanding its long-term familiarity with the resolution, ACCORD rates the general level of awareness of the SCR 1325 (2000) as moderate, since the relevance of the resolution and its applicability in prevailing political, social and economic contexts is yet to be firmly understood.

3. Usability and Relevance

70. SCR 1325 (2000) serves two main purposes; it functions as an advocacy tool for engendering peacemaking processes, and also as an instrument of international law that is binding on all UN Member States who “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council”. Evaluating the usability of the resolution among different actors was a central part of the country assessment process. The main point raised by most respondents on the usability of the resolution was the need to dilute some of the legal language. For example, some respondents expressed that they still did not understand certain aspects of the resolution. They expressed difficulty in understanding the first three paragraphs of the preamble, which alludes to previous resolutions “1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000”. Most people in African countries are not aware of the existence of these resolutions and their linkages to SCR 1325 (2000). Therefore, any discussion of SCR 1325 (2000) needs to be preceded by training and information on previous resolutions and their significance to SCR 1325 (2000).

71. A respondent in Liberia stated that the resolution assumes that concepts like peacemaking, peace building and peacekeeping are well known. Experience in trying to popularise the resolution in Liberia revealed that most people, and particularly women, were not familiar with the conceptual and practical differences of these terms. Therefore, attempts to use the resolution as an advocacy tool were preceded by training sessions aimed at raising understanding of concepts and their application.

72. Since the resolution was adopted in 2000, there have been a number of intense violent conflicts and civil wars in Africa. In all of these wars women have played critical roles in advocating for peace and calling for the involvement of women in peace processes. However, most of the actions taken by women were coordinated without using or referring to SCR 1325
(2000). For example, in Sierra Leone respondents highlighted that the country’s Truth and Reconciliation process, as well as the Demobilisation and Disarmament process, actively involved women and women’s groups. However, when the issue of women’s participation was elevated during these processes it was not specifically inspired by SCR 1325 (2000). A similar example was given in Liberia where women demonstrated en masse to mitigate the violence in the country, but not as a result of SCR 1325 (2000).

73. The Honourable Minister of Gender in Liberia, Varba Gaylor, in an interview during the assessment stated that “SCR 1325 (2000) was far from women’s minds when the war broke out in 2003. The driving force for women’s activism was the belief that something needed to be done”. This sentiment was supported by other women’s groups such as the Liberian Women’s Initiative (LWI) and Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia (AFELL) interviewed for the assessment. However, the resolution was useful after the peace talks, in examining avenues for women’s inclusion in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

74. Respondents in Liberia identified a linkage between the involvement of women in the peace process to the eventual emergence of women in key decision-making positions. AFELL states that this has boosted the confidence of women in the country and has created the space for women to challenge previous accepted societal practices that infringe on women’s rights. It was stressed that securing decision-making positions for women was not enough; continuous steps had to be taken to transform historical male structures. Therefore, SCR 1325 (2000) should not be viewed as an end in itself but as a means to an end.
75. In Sierra Leone, the implementation of the TRC process in 2000 coincided with adoption of SCR 1325 (2000). The resolution strengthened the argument that the TRC process should be engendered and that a gender perspective should be incorporated into the Commission’s investigation processes. The public hearings brought national attention to the plight of women during the war. The Commission also focussed on the marginalisation and discrimination of women in pre-war situations. The hearings provided an opportunity for women in Sierra Leone to show solidarity against sexual violence. Large numbers of women attended the hearings in Freetown; the country’s capital, and provided emotional support to victims who gave testimonies. It was noted that though the TRC brought attention to the impact of the conflict on women, it did not halt the occurrences of violence against women in Sierra Leone. Domestic violence remains very high and structures for redress for violations against women are lacking.

76. Furthermore, while there has been an increase in women’s ascension to decision-making and political positions, the numbers are still very low. The Sierra Leonean interviews also revealed that there was little coordination among government departments on issues of women and gender and this had stunted collaboration on the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000). In 2006, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children’s Affairs organised a training workshop on peace building in which SCR 1325 (2000) was addressed. The participants of this workshop included gender focal points in the line ministries. This was the first time the focal points worked together on SCR 1325 (2000) related issues.

77. In Uganda, the resolution was used as an advocacy tool for the involvement of women in the peace talks between the government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army. It was also

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**Senegal**
MALAO: “We have studied the resolution and worked on its articles which at the time seemed more relevant to us. In this instance, paragraphs 1 and 8 were most relevant as we wanted women to understand that their presence at the negotiations for peace was a right, not a favour.”

**Liberia**
Liberia Women’s Initiative: “Women’s involvement in peace building in the country preceded 1325(2000). The resolution is only strengthening our efforts. It has made it somewhat easier to discuss the issue of women’s peace and security among women and with policy makers. But there is still a lot of work to do.”

**Uganda**
NAWOU: Over the last 20 years, women of Northern and Eastern Uganda have suffered greatly as a result of the long drawn out conflict. Rape, defilement, displacement and dehumanisation are examples of what women have been exposed to. The resolution helped bring these atrocities to the attention of the Ugandan people.

**Sudan**
SIHA: The resolution has been central to SIHA’s development of training packages. It was used for training on advocacy for peace building.

**WIPSEN Africa**
Sierra Leone: In the 2005 Elections, the resolution played a central role in support for women’s participation in the elections process. The peace train was also used to call for violence free elections.

**DRC**
Synergy 1325(2000): “We have carried out researches to disseminate the resolution trying to adapt it to the specific context of each province of our country. To this end we began with the interpretation of the Resolution to the Congolese context before restricting it to the specific context of each province according to its local realities.”
used as a tool to train women on the importance of their involvement in peace processes. The Uganda Women’s Network (UWONET) states that the resolution was the key international instrument used to call for the involvement of women in the peace talks. ISIS-WICCE representing UWONET delivered a message to the Juba Peace Talks mediator, Dr Riek Machar calling for the inclusion of women in the talks. Through the efforts of ISIS and other women’s groups, one woman was included in the government’s team and two women joined the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) team. The Ugandan government also initiated a dialogue with civil society on the Juba Peace Talks and developed a national peace and recovery plan. A policy on gender and internal displacement is also being developed.

78. The resolution has also been useful in addressing the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) on the continent. In Senegal, the Movement against Small Arms in West Africa (MALAO) has been using the resolution to combat the spread of SALW in the Casamance region. Inclusive processes bringing together local actors and traditional women were constructive in the surrender and destruction of arms in Samine, in the region of Kolda. MALAO has also used the resolution to advocate for the inclusion of women in the peace process between the government of Senegal and the Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC) in 2005.

79. Training and capacity building for women on peace building and conflict resolution has increased on the continent since the adoption of SCR 1325 (2000). Many civil society organisations across the continent have designed training programmes for women on peace building using the SCR 1325 (2000) as a starting point. For example, the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the University of Cape Town in South Africa, used the resolution to train women’s groups in Southern and West Africa. Femme Africa Solidarite (FAS) has also used the resolution as an advocacy tool in various contexts such DRC and the Mano River Union countries.

80. The relevance of SCR 1325 (2000) in different conflict contexts was analysed in the assessment. Whereas countries in open or post conflict situations found it easy to apply the resolution to advocacy on women’s inclusion in decision making processes, countries where sporadic localised violent conflicts occur had difficulty in utilizing the resolution. For example, the resolution has not been used in intense conflict situations such as those in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the conflicts in the North of Ghana, and the Pastoralist conflicts in different IGAD countries. Cote d’Ivoire, for example, is developing an action plan on implementing SCR 1325 (2000), focussing on: gender mainstreaming, protection, integration and capacity building for participation.

81. However, some respondents believed that SCR 1325 (2000) is only relevant in conflicts where the United Nations is actively involved. Concern was expressed that the propensity to focus on larger conflicts was depriving women and girls in localised conflicts the protection available in the resolution. That said, however, application of SCR 1325 (2000)’s provisions with respect to peace processes seems to be increasing with time. For example, Cote d’Ivoire’s Linus-Marcoussis agreement was negotiated without significant contributions from women and paid little attention to gender and women’s human rights; however, there was some improvement with the Ouagadougou agreement. In the later Arusha Accord for Burundi, SCR 1325 (2000) was drawn upon both to insist on women’s participation and to ensure that gender and women’s human rights were addressed. This was also the case with the Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
82. In many countries not experiencing open conflict, SCR 1325 (2000) is not widely used. This is true of countries that contribute troops to peacekeeping missions such as Kenya, Ghana and Ethiopia. In both Kenya and Ghana, where progressive gender mainstreaming policies and initiatives exist, the focus on women’s peace and security is predominantly domestic addressing issues like domestic violence. More attention is given to ensuring the implementation of CEDAW. Respondents stated that they were uncertain of how to use the resolution in a non-conflict context. However, Ethiopia has an inter-ministerial committee on defence, justice and women’s affairs. Ethiopia also contributes female soldiers to peacekeeping missions, as do Namibia, Zambia and South Africa, which is the largest contributor of female soldiers to both UN and AU peacekeeping missions. Additionally, Ghana is in the process of developing an action plan on the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) and has conducted some training on it.

83. In Liberia, UN peacekeepers used the resolution to organise specific outreach programmes to encourage women to join the DDR process. Some women had been unaware of the programme, or assumed participation was open only to men. Ensuring the participation of girls proved to be particularly challenging. Girls were often reluctant to identify themselves as fighters, or as being associated with the fighting forces out of fear of stigmatisation. UN peacekeepers developed messages and organised awareness campaigns to encourage women and girls to participate in the DDR process, and to sensitise receiving communities. The Office of the Gender Advisor was also instrumental in engendering the reform of the security sector. For example, the organization “Women Associated with Fighting Forces”, (WAFFs) was recognised during the process. A gender policy was also developed for the Liberian National Police that led to an increase in the number of women recruited in the police. In Sierra Leone and Burundi, the resolution has become relevant to the post conflict reconstruction processes. The resolution has been central to calls that the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission’s (PBC) initiatives in both countries involve women at all stages. It also raised awareness of women’s specific socio-economic and psychosocial needs that should be addressed by the Commission. Many respondents argued that without SCR 1325 (2000), it would have been difficult to have national and international consensus on the involvement of women in the PBC’s work.

84. Respondents in Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone and DRC stated that a major clause in SCR 1325 (2000) is the call for the end of impunity, and the prosecution of perpetrators of sexual and other types of violence against women and girls. However, this has been difficult to implement in these countries. For example in Sierra Leone, very few women were willing to come forward to testify about wartime violations during the country’s TRC process. Most women wanted to forget the incidents and a significant number feared stigmatisation and reprisal attacks. Access to justice remains a challenge in all of these countries. Groups like Women in Law and Development in Africa (FIDA, WILDAF) and other local groups have tried to address the problem, but the situation persists.

85. Civil society has organised innovative initiatives specifically aimed at the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000). Women as Partners for Peace in Africa DRC chapter (WOPPA-DRC) and Femmes Africa Solidarite (FAS) organised the Nairobi Training Workshop. This workshop worked to build Congolese women’s capacity for and technique of negotiation in preparation for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun City, South Africa. It further intended to harmonize the views of women from all sides in order to engender the peace process.
86. Also in the DRC, “Synergy 1325” an organisation formed specifically for the implementation of the resolution, participated in the assessment. This organisation has been working to promote the usage and dissemination of the resolution since 2002. Embodying the SCR 1325 (2000), the organisation has participated in peace processes such as the Inter Congolese Dialogue and the International Conference of the Great Lakes.

87. In accordance with the findings of “Synergy 1325” in the DRC, many organisations use the resolution as a reference document but do not fully take advantage of its significance. “Synergy 1325” has attempted to improve the utilization of the resolution by translating it into four national languages. The translated versions were disseminated to key provinces of Kinshasa, Bas Congo, Equateur, Bandundu, Northern and Southern Kivu. Conferences, presentations and workshops were organised in collaboration with the media and used to ensure that information on the resolution, and its importance to post conflict peace building in the country, reached all sections of the population.

88. The applicability of the resolution to continental and regional instruments was also discussed and analysed during the country assessment. At the continental level, respondents believed that the resolution to a large extent provided an environment to discuss the role of women in conflict and peace as outlined in the Protocol to the African Charter on Human Rights on the Rights of Women. The protocol is considered as providing a pioneering legal framework of reference, enabling various stakeholders and populations to work towards the respect of women’s rights. It is a comprehensive legal framework for ending human rights violations against women and children during conflict. A critical component of the Protocol is its focus on the protection of women and girls in situations of armed conflicts and post conflict reconstruction processes. This important focus on women in conflict situations provides a critical nexus for implementing SCR 1325 (2000).

89. However, there is the recognition that SCR 1325 (2000) receives more support and attention than the Protocol due to the weight of the UN behind its implementation. Respondents expressed the need for all UN entities working on the continent to support the implementation of the Protocol on the Rights of Women as an indigenous African instrument that emphasises or legitimises the usage and implementation of SCR 1325 (2000).

90. One key area expounded on was the need for more documentation on progress in women’s involvement in decision-making. Respondents in the study acknowledged that while there has been an exponential increase in documenting women’s experiences in peace and conflict situations by organisations such as ISIS WICCE in Uganda, FAS and ACCORD, a lot still needs to be done. Florence Boloko of “Synergy 1325” in DRC, states that analysis is needed on the impact of women in decision-making positions. The experiences of women in influential decision making positions need to be documented.
4. **Implementation within Multilateral Institutions**

A. **Regional Economic Communities (RECs)**

91. The usage and implementation of 1325 (2000) varies across the RECs. This assessment examined the ongoing processes within RECs to develop functional peace and security architectures, and the extent to which 1325 (2000) has been utilised in this development. Each REC has developed a concept of mechanisms for addressing issues of peace and security but these mechanisms are still at the early stage of creation. Common to these mechanisms is a strong commitment to conflict prevention. This commitment at the level of the RECs is a reflection of the high priority given to conflict prevention in the agenda of African governments at the continental level. Specifically, steps are underway to operationalise a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) as one of the pillars of the Peace and Security Council. This continental system will build on the regional warnings systems operated by RECs. However, presently the RECs are at different stages of development, and this has affected the process of developing early warning systems.

92. Both the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the South African Development Community (SADC) are in the beginning stages of early warning systems. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) currently operate the most advanced warning systems on the continent.

**Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD):**

93. IGAD’s early warning system, Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism (CEWARN), established in 2003, is designed to serve the region as a mechanism that systematically anticipates and responds to violent conflicts in a timely and effective manner. Since its establishment, the CEWARN has used its network of Field Monitors, Country Coordinators, National Research Institutes and Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) at the national level, to monitor and report on pastoralist conflicts in two pilot areas: the Somali cluster (that incorporates parts of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia) and the Kamaroja cluster (that incorporates parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda). In Somalia, IGAD assisted with ensuring that SCR 1325 (2000) was applied to the Somali Peace Process. Although progress was achieved in the peace process, it was not followed through by the Transitional Federal Government.

94. The CEWARN research and training officer who participated in this assessment said that though there had been efforts to engender the peace and conflict indicators monitored within the system, the engendering of the entire mechanism had been slow. CEWARN’s first four years were dedicated to the installation of a functional computer-based early warning system, collecting and analysing information from the field, and standardizing reporting structures. The indicators used to analyse the field reports attempted to assess the level of vulnerability of Women and Children in pastoral conflicts. However, this was done in an ad-hoc manner. The recently developed five-year strategy plan (2007-2011), tries to address this gap by integrating gender into its core strategic objectives. Progressive steps are also being taken to mainstream gender analysis into the Early Warning and Early response framework. Specifically, a Gender and Early Warning Training Manual is being developed in collaboration with the Gender Affairs.
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS):

95. The ECOWAS early warning system, ECOWARN, was also established in 2003. Overall, there has been little integration of gender into ECOWARN. Even though ECOWAS has gender structures within its institutions—a Gender Unit at the ECOWAS secretariat and the Gender and Development Centre in Dakar—their formal involvement in peace and security issues has been minimal. The role of the ECOWAS Gender Development Centre (EGDC) is to establish, develop, facilitate, coordinate and follow-up the strategies and programmes aimed at ensuring that matters related to the disparities between men and women. Integration programmes in the community, and women’s promotion are both incorporated into the framework of the objectives of the ECOWAS Treaty. A Gender policy has been developed and a section of the policy is dedicated to “Gender based violence, conflict resolution and peace building.” Recently, the EGDC has been working to implement that mandate by organising several forums to examine how to enhance the involvement of women in the peace process. Partnering with civil society is integral to the Centre’s strategy as CSOs particularly women’s groups have more experience working on peace and security. ECOWAS has now finalised an action plan on the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000).

South African Development Community (SADC):

96. SADC does not have an advanced early warning system; however, there are attempts to engender conflict resolution and peace building initiatives in the region. The SADC Gender Unit has taken notable strides to ensure that women are infused into the security architecture of the institution. In 2005 the Unit commenced development of a SADC Gender Based Regional Integration Plan: Strategic Implementation Framework 2006 – 2010, which is a detailed framework developed in line with the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development (1997), the Addendum on the Elimination of Violence against Women and Children (1998), and the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). This implementation framework aims to enhance the involvement of women in peace and security initiatives carried out by the institution.


97. The main challenge expressed regarding the implementation of the resolution was that, after seven years, the level of awareness is still relatively low in Africa. While there has been marked progress among civil society, particularly amongst women, awareness of the resolution in communities in conflict is still low, as demonstrated by the Juba peace talks between the government of Uganda and the LRA. Women in communities where the LRA had pillaged and raped had no awareness of the resolution.

98. Many NGOs and in particular women’s groups have organised training workshops and seminars around the resolution. However, these workshops did not incorporate implementation plans that track the usage of the resolution after the workshops. Lack of funding was given as the reason for this limited follow up.

99. Similarly, beneficiaries of the training workshops found it difficult to use the resolution in the course of their work after the workshops. Some respondents in Liberia mentioned lack of
commitment to the resolution within their respective organisations, limited information on how to use the resolution as an advocacy tool and difficulty in identifying allies outside of women’s groups, as some of the reasons for this.

100. Respondents found that many women were hesitant to become involved in male dominated, high profile peace processes. This was described as a key challenge in using the resolution as a tool to gain women’s involvement. Most women found it easier to support “more prominent” women to participate in the talks (for example, female politicians and members of civil society) than to put themselves forward.

101. On a practical level, many women still are not involved in issues related to peace and security; either because the structures are skewed to exclude them or they exclude themselves. A respondent from ECOWAS stated that women are not applying for positions related to peace and security. Jobs like early warning analysts, and defence strategists do not attract women. Primarily because they do not have the skills for these jobs, as historically, they have been men’s jobs.

102. The protraction of violent conflicts and civil wars remains a threat to implementing the resolution. Though the resolution calls for all sides in armed conflicts to take special care to protect women and girls, they remain vulnerable targets in conflict situations. The chaos and anarchy of open conflict means that women and girls continue to be vulnerable to attacks, especially sexual based violence.

103. The situation is worse in countries where civil society is handicapped and interventions by external actors are minimal. For example in Somalia, once a taboo, rape became the routine weapon in the conflict, with a high percentage of women raped. International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) in depth discussions with Somali women revealed both the tremendous psychological impact and brutal power of this “weapon”, and the ongoing fear it has caused among women.

104. A similar situation exists in post conflict Burundi, where rape is the most reported form of sexual violence in the country. It is committed by both state and non-state actors, and is becoming more and more prevalent in the home and community. There were more than 2,000 cases of rape in North Kivu between January and September 2007. In the ongoing war in Sudan’s Darfur violations against women are also on the rise. These examples reveal that the resolution alone is not serving as a deterrent for sexual assaults on women during violent conflicts. Respondents in Sudan commented that national laws and practices had to support the tone and message of the resolution. For example the Government of Sudan established National Judicial Committees to investigate allegations of rape in Darfur and subsequently established State Committees on Combating Gender-Based Violence. SCR 1325 (2000) should be used to measure if these committees are making an impact.

105. Respondents in this study expressed the difficultly of addressing sexual and gender-based violence. The two main challenges of prosecuting sexual and gender- based violence as expressed by respondents in Liberia were: first, the current capacities of courts, and second, the ignorance of victims about the possible of prosecution. In addition, women were not only unaware about the stages and procedures of prosecuting offenders but also afraid of coming forward due to social and
cultural stigmatisation of victims. Furthermore, the practice of widespread “facilitated compromise between victims and perpetrators” hinders the prosecutorial process. This practice prevents cases from reaching the justice system since they are usually facilitated by traditional and community leaders. Institutional weaknesses were also identified as a hurdle to prosecution. Many courts have resource constraints, technical limitations and low awareness of GBV, all of which affect their ability to deal with cases as they come.

106. Implementing the resolution presents challenges for countries experiencing relative peace on the continent. Many do not view the resolution as relevant to their situation. For example, respondents from Ethiopia stated that the resolution is not being utilised in the country, because “Ethiopia does not see itself as falling under the field of the resolution’s implementation”. However, Ethiopia is an important actor in peace and security on the continent, and knowledge and usage of the resolution in troop contribution is important.

107. The assessment also revealed that while it is possible to find research and documentation on the impact of conflicts and wars on women, and the roles they play in building peace, more needs to be done to evaluate the impact of women in decision making on the daily lives of women.

108. Poor coordination among various actors working on women, peace and security issues is another challenge. For example in Liberia, the influx of funding into the post conflict environment brought with it a plethora of initiatives for women. Lack of cooperation between the donors and implementing organisation led to duplication of activities, ad hoc activities and unhealthy competition.

109. Finally, a common challenge facing the implementation of the resolution in all the countries assessed is the continued perception of the resolution as a tool for women only and not a tool that can be used by men. Honourable Edwin Snowe, the former Speaker of the Liberian parliament who was interviewed during the assessment, pointed out that during his term as speaker he was never involved in any advocacy to promote the resolution. He stated that this was a missed opportunity by women’s groups. He urged that the quest to raise awareness of the resolution and to galvanise support for its use should identify strategic men to serve as spokespersons and supporters of the process. This would draw in a male audience and broaden the debate.


110. SCR 1325 (2000) calls for “measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution”. The assessment asked respondents about the nature of support needed to enhance local women’s peace initiatives. Training, capacity building and funding were identified as the main types of support women’s peace initiatives require. Funding for women’s initiatives in general across Africa is poor.

111. Women’s activities are often under funded. Frequently, the funding is provided in such a manner that does not improve the institutional capacities of women’s groups that are struggling to sustain themselves. Women’s funding institutions such as the African Women’s Development Fund (AWDF) and the Urgent Action Fund have supported peace building initiatives across the
continent, particularly supporting women’s participation in peace processes. However these institutions provide limited funding.

112. Women’s groups on the continent are exploring new avenues for supporting women’s involvement in peace and security. ISIS WICCE, in collaboration with the Commonwealth Foundation and UNIFEM, pioneered an initiative titled “Where is the money”, which is intended to support the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) on the continent.

IV. Conclusion

113. In the seven years since its adoption, much has been done to try to implement SCR 1325 (2000). The UN system, in particular, has developed policies, standards, guidelines and mechanisms to assist with its implementation at the national level, including through the work of peacekeeping missions. But challenges remain; both at the international and national levels. Women’s representation in decision-making, whether at the UN, UN peacekeeping missions or the national level, remains rather low. Insufficient attention is paid to gender and women’s human rights issues within the broad context of work on peace and security.

114. It is evident that the bulk of work to implement SCR 1325 (2000) at the national level lies in four core areas: First, matching the formal peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction process carried out by the UN peacekeeping missions and the UN agencies with the initiatives by the host governments and civil society, including women’s movement; second, ensuring that host governments themselves begin to more actively implement SCR 1325 (2000)’s provisions across all relevant government agencies, departments and line ministries—engaging civil society and the women’s movement; third, building the necessary knowledge, skills and capacities to ensure the increase of women in decision making processes; and fourth, improving or establishing mechanisms that address violations committed against women and girls in all situations of conflict and impunity.

115. In so doing, it would perhaps be useful to reference not only the international but also the regional human rights standards that ground SCR 1325 (2000)’s provisions, such as the Protocol and the Solemn Declaration. Involving the AU’s Women, Gender and Development Directorate, as well as the gender machineries within the RECs (particularly those involved in peace and security) may contribute to effective implementation.

116. In addition, it might be useful to more consciously demonstrate the importance of SCR 1325 (2000) in situations of low-intensity but persistent internal conflict on the continent. At present time there is increased recognition of its application in Africa’s troop-contributing member states, but it is still largely understood to be only relevant to internationally and regionally acknowledged situations of armed conflict. It is hoped that this needs-assessment will assist the advancement of SCR 1325 (2000) in Africa.
1. **Development of National Action Plans**

117. Through the country assessment process, respondents provided suggestions for efficient implementation of the resolution at the national levels in Africa. Respondents specifically emphasized the importance of the development of national action plans as a tool for the implementation of the resolution.

118. Most respondents stressed that the process of developing national action plans for SCR 1325 (2000) has to be preceded by an institutional awareness of the resolution and understanding of its political importance. Such knowledge becomes the foundation for ensuring political will and commitment to implement the plan.

119. The task of fully implementing SCR 1325 (2000) is a large one. Considerable resources and high-level political attention are required for its implementation. Robust financial and human resources must be allocated to this process in order to demonstrate that international and national political will is real.

- The conceptualisation, implementation and evaluation of national action plans on SCR 1325 (2000) should be a joint effort between civil society and government;
- The responsibility of leading the implementation of action plans should not be left to Ministries of gender and women’s affairs. Responsibility for different aspects of the plan should be distributed to key government departments such as defence, foreign affairs and internal affairs;
- UN agencies working at national levels should be given roles to play in the implementation of the plans;
- Clear indicators should be designed to evaluate the impact;
- The three main arms of government; Judiciary, Legislative and the Executive should be involved in the implementation process;
- The national strategy should involve local government structures. There is a tendency to focus on central governments. Local authorities play a critical role at the rural and community levels and should be brought into the process;
- Training should be at the core of any national action plan on SCR 1325 (2000) in Africa. There is high illiteracy on the continent and the plan should serve the dual role of being educative as well as influencing policy and practice. Training should incorporate indigenous tools to avoid the perception that peace building and conflict resolution principles are externally driven;
- Community groups should be used to roll out implementation of the action plans;
- Action plans should be a monitoring tool used to maintain and sustain peace;
- There should be steps to ensure that the action plan incorporate regional peace building policies and practices, such as those implemented by the RECs and the African Union. It is important that action plans on SCR 1325 (2000) call for joint implementation of the African Women’s Protocol;
- The plan should have a periodic review schedule that will elicit feedback from all actors.

Below is a recommended framework for developing national action plans for the implementation of the resolution in Africa.
2. **Framework for National Action Plans**

   **A. Overview**

   120. The task of developing national action plans for the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) will vary depending on the country context. National action plans should be structured to capture the peace and conflict dynamics of the country, the roles and interactions between various institutions and stakeholders in the country, the skills and capacities needed to implement the plan and the resources required to support the plan.

   **B. Components of an Action Plan**

   - A description of the country situation regarding peace and security;
   - An outline of activities to be undertaken;
   - Key actors responsible for implementing each activity;
   - Timeframe for the implementation of activities;
   - The resources needed to undertake each activity;
   - How progress will be measured (indicators and milestones); and
   - How often and under what circumstances revision of the plan would take place.

   **C. Suggested Template for Action Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Institutions/stakeholders</th>
<th>Suggested initiatives</th>
<th>Monitoring and Evaluation schedule</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formation of joint task force on SCR 1325 (2000)</td>
<td>Provide platform for multisectoral collaboration on the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) at the national level</td>
<td>• National gender machinery&lt;br&gt;• Parliamentarians&lt;br&gt;• Local government officials&lt;br&gt;• Traditional rulers&lt;br&gt;• Civil society&lt;br&gt;• UN agencies&lt;br&gt;• Donors/funders</td>
<td>organise consultation with key stakeholders on the formation of joint task force&lt;br&gt;organise periodic meetings&lt;br&gt;A focal point in each government ministry should be appointed to monitor implementation&lt;br&gt;Regular update sessions to parliament on the implementation of the resolution. The joint task force can be formed using existing collaborative</td>
<td>Task force should set indicators to gauge national implementation&lt;br&gt;A supervision committee or department should be given the task of reporting to taskforce</td>
<td>Task force should develop budget for each activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(Ekiyor, Wanyeki 2008) This framework has been designed using the feedback from the country assessment process. It serves as a guide for the development of national action plans on Resolution 1325(2000).
structures to implement regional peace and security initiatives such as those instituted by Regional Economic Communities (RECs) should be involved in this task force. E.g. the ECOWAS zone bureaus, IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Units CEWERUs. Countries such as Ghana and Kenya have national peace policies and national architectures for peace. These should also be involved in the national task force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training and Capacity Building on SCR 1325 (2000)</th>
<th>Enhance skills and capacities on women, peace and security at community and national levels. Strengthening the capacity of women’s groups to play roles in conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding.</th>
<th>o Community based organisations, o National civil society actors o National joint task force on SCR 1325 (2000) o Experts on peace and security</th>
<th>Training on theories and concepts conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Training on gender analysis, gender mainstreaming etc. Training on technical skills in mediation, negotiation, lobbying and advocacy. *Infuse indigenous African training techniques in all training initiatives. *Build on existing mechanisms for capacity building in each context. Comprehensive monitoring framework to measure the impact of skills acquired in the short, medium and long term should be designed for each training and capacity building initiative.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Awareness raising on the resolution | Inform general and specific audiences on the existence of the resolution and its relevance to national peace and security. Raise awareness among key institutions on the importance of gender analysis and mainstreaming on peace and security. | All participating institutions and stakeholders | Organise targeted activities to raise awareness of protection, participation, peacekeeping, and post conflict reconstruction. Translate resolution into local languages. Interpret technical parts of the resolution. Utilise key dates and anniversaries to raise awareness on key components of the resolution, e.g. International Women’s day, Human Rights day, African Union day and other national.

Budgets for training and capacity building initiatives can be incorporated into financial planning of the various institutions and stakeholders. |
### Celebrations

Documentation of women’s role in peace and conflict situations

- Track the contributions of women to peacebuilding
- Document the impact of conflict on women
- Document the progress of women in decision making processes

Research institutions Practitioners

Commission periodic national studies on the impact of conflict on women
Collect statistics on the progress of women’s participation in decision making

Findings of research should be reviewed periodically by task force

### Setting targets:

**Suggested targets for monitoring the implementation of national plans should include:**

- Increased number of women in decision making
- Improved access to justice for women and girls
- Increased numbers of women with skills in conflict resolution, conflict prevention and peacebuilding
- Numbers of women involved in informal and formal peacebuilding


- Make use of the “3Ps” checklist, including the questions to consider while drafting country and thematic resolutions in the SC;
- Develop clearly defined targets, benchmarks, indicators and timelines for SCR 1325 (2000)’s provisions for both the UN system and member states;
- Focus the implementation of gender mainstreaming strategy to advance women’s human rights;
- Ensure the exchange of information, including the quantitative and qualitative data, within the UN system and members states for efficient monitoring the implementation of the SCR 1325 (2000);
- Support academic research and publications on implementation of SCR 1325 (2000);
- Reach a common understandings of gender and security among UN peacekeeping missions (and the UN agencies supporting their work) and national actors, particularly governments and civil society. Ensure that definitions of security reached are human, gendered and agreed upon with local populations, including women;
- Recognise that SCR 1325 (2000) can be utilized in countries with low-intensity internal conflict and promote its implementation in member states undergoing such conflict;
- Relate the content of SCR 1325 (2000) to on-going policies, programmes, projects and initiatives relevant to national government agencies, departments and line Ministries;
- Intensify awareness raising about SCR 1325 (2000) at the national levels, beyond Security Council Permanent Member states and troop-contributing member states through its further translation into national languages;
- Support the domestication of SCR 1325 (2000) through, for example, the process of developing national action plans for its implementation;

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\(^{53}\) The recommendations under this section are conceptual and thematic, as per the 3Ps framework.
• Link the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) at the national level with the implementation of already ratified or adopted relevant international and regional human rights and humanitarian law instruments. Pay particular attention to Articles 10 and 11 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa;
• Address where responsibility for implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) is placed at the national level. If within national gender machineries, ensure any national plans of action for its implementation implicate all relevant government agencies beyond those directly addressing gender and women’s human rights. Ensure that national gender machineries have the financial and human resources as well as cross-cutting influence across national governments to promote the implementation;
• Ensure that any structural or systemic weaknesses of national electoral and justice systems that may exist, particularly post-conflict, are addressed. Emphasize the development of strategies, processes and mechanisms for gender mainstreaming and the promotion and protection of women’s human rights;
• Pay particular attention to the paragraphs 8(b) and 15 of SCR 1325 (2000) on “measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements”.
• Ensure that Security Council peacekeeping missions “take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women’s groups”.
• Support more conscious, consistent and proactive engagement of peacekeeping missions and UN agencies with civil society, including the women’s organizations, in general and in such areas as: domestication of SCR 1325 (2000); documentation of the impact on armed conflict on women; the collection of data, evidence, statistics; and media outreach;
• Enhance and upscale financing and other support for grant makers specifically concerned with gender and women's human rights.

Conflict Prevention

• Recognise that the prevention of armed conflict will increasingly depend on efforts to address climate change as well as disarmament (including nuclear disarmament) and ensure that SCR 1325 (2000) is brought to bear on multilateral institutions as well as relevant national government agencies, departments and line Ministries;
• Recognise that conflict prevention depends on the achievement of substantive gender equality together with a commitment to non-violence. Ensure that participation strategies pursued take both of these aspects into account;
• Prevent armed conflict’s reoccurrence by consciously seizing the opportunity provided by the positive change in gender relations that often happens during and immediately post-conflict. Use this fluctuation to more actively support national policies, programmes, projects and other initiatives for gender equality.
• In such support, make use of the AU’s Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality with respect to gender parity and women’s participation in peace and security, as well as similar commitments within the RECs;
• Engage national level military training institutions.

Gender-Based Violence
• Pressure the Security Council to establish a mechanism dedicated to monitoring violence against women and girls in situations of armed conflict;
• Encourage the Special Representatives of the Secretary General to consistently demonstrate leadership in ensuring that the peacekeeping missions would provide protection to women.
• Ensure that all mandates for peacekeeping missions and of the UN agencies working on the ground explicitly address the issues of protection, including protection from gender-based and sexual violence;
• Recognise that sexual violence is never experienced in armed conflict as a single event, but rather as a continuing violation and thus, ensure interventions to address both physical and psychological injuries as well as the discrimination and stigmatisation which may persist as the result of such violence;
• Encourage better documentation of GBV, including sexual violence, during and post-armed conflict;
• Make more consistent use of existing international norms and strategies as well as UN documents, including the Secretary-General’s bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse.
• Ensure consistent use of the UN standard training modules on sexual exploitation and abuse within preparations for peacekeeping missions and predeployment (and training therein);
• Appoint gender officers/units and, where relevant, human trafficking officers/units, with mandates to address GBV and sexual violence.
• Support community-based prevention efforts by civil society, including women’s organisations;
• Collaborate with women’s organisations by providing medical, psychosocial and legal support for survivors of gender-based and sexual violence
• Request all peacekeeping missions to regularise firewood patrols for women among IDPs and refugees;
• Address GBV and HIV/AIDS by developing relevant national laws and policies, as well as through strengthening of national healthcare systems and education.
• Ensure that these national laws and policies also clearly and specifically relate to the conduct of civilian and military personnel deployed to peacekeeping missions. These laws should include codes of conduct defining GBV and sexual violence, stipulating the age of consent and making clear provisions and processes for disciplinary action around sexual abuse and exploitation. This could include on-site court martials rather than repatriation for criminal or military trials at home;
• Set targets and timelines for increasing the number of women within security sector institutions, including the police force, the military and the judiciary. These timelines should include transitional justice mechanisms (paying attention to recruitment, retention and advancement procedures and mechanisms and ensuring gender training is provided pre-service and in-service);
• Attempt to reach the UN DPKO’s target with respect to the deployment of civilian and military personnel to peacekeeping missions;
• Institute legal and practical reforms to improve survivors’ access to, and use of, security sector and judicial sector institutions. For example, make the reporting of GBV and sexual violence, accessible for women;
• Ensure national criminal justice systems have the capacity, expertise and infrastructure to respond to GBV and sexual violence, and to deliver justice to survivors;
• Domesticate norms to ensure justice for survivors, such as the (2005) Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.
• Ensure adaptation and use, at the national level, of the UN’s model strategies and practical measures addressed at the elimination of violence against women in the field.
• Ensure the meaning of justice to survivors is defined with the participation of survivors during the negotiation of peace agreements. Do not enable blanket amnesty provisions to be included in such agreements. Also customary or traditional restorative justice mechanisms should not be adopted if they do not involve women in their decision-making process and directly answer survivors’ own needs for justice;
• Facilitate the sharing of experiences between member states on protection and good practices on impunity;
• Strategise on how to hold all parties to the conflict accountable (particularly non-state actors or where member states are themselves implicated);
• Demonstrate accountability and put an end to impunity within the UN system itself through publicizing the findings of investigations into allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation and actions taken.

Political Participation

• Ensure that women's access to peace processes becomes more structured and systematic. Women should have not only increased representation, but clear content input in these processes;
• Ensure that supporting multilateral institutions (both regional and international), member states involved and non-state parties will intensify their efforts to enhance women’s access to and input into peace agreement negotiations;
• Urge the AU to develop to a clear plan on women’s representation, gender mainstreaming and the integration of women’s human rights issues into its structures and initiatives such as: the Panel of the Wise; the Continental Early Warning System (EWS); the African Standby Force (ASF); the military staff committee; and the Peace Fund, engaging its Women, Gender and Development Directorate and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM);54
• Advocate for the RECs to assume an increased role and responsibility for advancing women’s participation beyond their engagement with gender advisors/units;55
• Urge the IGAD to respect in practice its commitment to women’s involvement in peace processes contained in (2005) Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism (CEWARN);56

54 CCR et al.
55 The Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) all have gender advisors/units.
56 CCR et al.
• Urge member states to organize a Constitutional reform to address women’s citizenship, equality and participation, including dualism that may persist between customary and/or religious law and statutory law;\textsuperscript{57}
• Member states need to expand women’s political participation in Africa beyond the female Presidential example provided by Liberia and the women’s representation in parliaments in Mozambique, Rwanda and South Africa though efficient use of various strategies, in particular affirmative action and/or quotas;
• Engage national parliaments and women’s caucuses if they exist, to enhance women’s political participation;
• Build capacity and enhance advocacy for women’s inclusion in peace agreement negotiations;
• Financially support women’s organisations, networks and initiatives seeking to engage with peace agreement negotiations.

Peacekeeping

• Ensure that SCR 1325 (2000) is reflected in the mandates for peacekeeping missions with respect to both policy and operations;
• Include SCR 1325 (2000) in all briefings, training and other preparations for peacekeeping mission staff at all levels, including the military;
• Address gender mainstreaming and women’s human rights concerns in every aspect of peacekeeping, including DDR, rule of law, elections and capacity development of national institutions;
• Collect and analyze information about the differential impacts of conflicts on the lives of women, men, girls and boys and propose practical solutions to respond to their specific needs;
• Increase women’s representation within peacekeeping missions (as special representatives, heads, international civilian staff, national civilian staff, police staff and military staff);
• Ensure gender advisors/units in peacekeeping missions have authority, human, financial and technical resources to perform, the former preferably through placement in the Office of the special representative to the Secretary-General;
• Ensure that gender and women’s human rights are addressed consistently within peacekeeping missions.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction

• Recognise and make use of SCR 1325 (2000)’s relevance in member states at advanced stages of post-reconstruction (for instance, through facilitating sharing of experiences with member states at earlier stages);
• Ensure that peacekeeping missions proactively engage with and support post-conflict reconstruction efforts among civil society and the women’s movement in order to advance SCR 1325 (2000);
• Document and facilitate the sharing and use of lessons learnt from the experiences of Gender Advisors/Units within different peacekeeping missions with respect to advancing SCR 1325 (2000);

\textsuperscript{57} CCR et al.
• Ensure that priority-setting for post-conflict reconstruction supported by peacekeeping missions is not only externally determined but happens with the full participation of the host government as well as civil society and the women’s movement;

• Recognise that generating internal support for peacekeeping missions—with host governments, civil society including the women’s movement and the media—requires not only media and public relations but consistent recognition and engagement of internal post-conflict reconstruction processes;

• Intensify efforts to implement SCR 1325 (2000) at the national level by supporting relevant efforts outside of peacekeeping missions to enable the cultural/religious structural or systemic change that implementation requires. Involve cultural and religious leaders if relevant, but not to the detriment of gender or women’s human rights;

• Document alternative strategies to peace building and post-conflict reconstruction and take into consideration the existing local peace initiatives in that respect.

• Make more consistent use of the UN DDR standards, applying it equally to men and women, whether they were ex-combatants, supporters, or just associated with armed forces;

• Include women and children in the definition of the DDR’s beneficiaries and allow registration in DDR without having weapons and proof of recruitment or rank;

• Ensure separate structures for registration and accommodation of men and women in DDR;

• Include trauma counselling as part of DDR and provide counselling on options available for RRR (especially for “bush wives”).
V. References


VI Annexes

Annex I.

The questionnaires were distributed to the representatives of the civil society, national governments and UN agencies in Liberia, DRC, Sierra Leone, Mali, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Cote d'Ivoire. The majority of the responses were received from civil society. The questionnaires were also distributed to the African Union and Regional Economic Communities.

1. Sample of Questionnaire for Countries

Introduction

The project on the national implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325(2000) in Africa is being implemented by OSAGI in close collaboration with ECA.

The goal of project is to launch an awareness-raising campaign about the importance of the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) in various countries of Africa especially in countries emerging from conflict. The objective is to build-up national capacities, including of those of national mechanisms on gender equality and advancement of women, and accelerate the implementation of Security Council resolution.

The first phase of the project is an assessment of how the resolution is being used in key countries across the continent. This questionnaire forms part of that assessment.

Structure of the Questionnaire

<p>| Country: |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of conflict in country:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Section 1: General information |
| Name of Respondent: |
| Designation of Respondent: |
| Mandate of Institution: |

| Section 2: Awareness of Resolution |
| 2.1 Civil society (only to be completed by civil society organisations) |
| Do you know how many civil society organisations work in the field of peace and security in your country? |
| Do you think that civil society is aware about the resolution and familiar with it? |
| How did they learn about the resolution? |
| Have they been working on its implementation, and if so, for how long? What strategies have been used to make the resolution relevant to the local context? |
Describe the level of collaboration on implementing the resolution among:
- civil society organisations;
- CSOs and government;
- CSOs and multilateral organisations (for example, the AU, UN)

Has the resolution been a useful advocacy tool? If yes, how?

Describe what ways (if any) the resolution has contributed to building capacity in peace building, and peacemaking?

What steps, initiatives or programmes have been taken by civil society to support women’s indigenous peace building in the country?

What would you describe as the key strengths and weaknesses of the resolution?

### Section 2.2: Government agencies

Does the department have a policy on gender mainstreaming and if so, how is it being implemented?

When did the department become aware of 1325(2000)?

How has awareness of the resolution been used within the organisation?

Who were the main advocates for raising awareness about 1325 (2000)?

What would you describe as the main obstacles to raising awareness?

How has the Resolution been useful in developing policies and programmes on peace and security?

Provide examples of some of these policies and programmes.

Describe the level of cooperation among government departments on women, peace and security in the country?

What resources /funds have been invested into the implementation of 1325(2000)?

What contributions or challenges have 1325(2000) introduced to the country?

### Section 3: Implementation within UN agencies at country level

What is the level of awareness within the UN system?

In what ways is resolution being used by the UN in the country?

Has it been integrated into the CCA and UNDAF?

How has the resolution influenced post conflict reconstruction activities in the countries?

What partners have been key to implementing the resolution and how?

What have been the main obstacles to implementing the resolution?

Six years since the adoption of the resolution, how would you say the resolution has improved the UN’s work in the country?

How was Resolution 1325(2000) useful in DRR?

- How exactly were the special needs of women and girls taken into consideration during Demobilization, Disarmament, Repatriation, Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

What limitations were experienced in using the resolution in these processes?

How has the impact of 1325(2000) been measured?

How can implementation of the resolution be improved in the future?

### Section 4: Funding and 1325(2000)

How has 1325(2000) been used in raising funds for peace building initiatives?

What donors support 1325(2000) activities?
Additional comments:
Annex II

2. **Sample of Questionnaire for AU and RECs**

**Introduction**

The project on the national implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in Africa is being implemented by OSAGI in close collaboration with ECA. The goal of the project is to launch an awareness-raising campaign about the importance of the implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) in various countries of Africa especially in countries emerging from conflict. The objective is to build-up national capacities, including of those of national mechanisms on gender equality and advancement of women, and accelerate the implementation of Security Council resolution.

The first phase of the project is an assessment of how the resolution is being used in key countries across the continent. This questionnaire forms part of that assessment.

**Instructions**

This section of the questionnaires is specifically for AU and Regional Economic Communities.

Target Respondents:

- Gender Units/Desks;
- Departments responsible for peace and security.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Section 1: General information</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of Respondent</td>
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<td>Designation of Respondent</td>
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</table>

**Awareness**

What is the organizational structure within the Institution responsible for gender mainstreaming? *Please list all gender structures within the institution*

How is gender mainstreaming implemented within your institution and across the region?

Who are the key partners on gender mainstreaming in the institution and across the region?

What is the level of involvement of women in peace and security issues within the institution?

Specifically, how are women involved in conflict prevention initiatives?

To what extent is SCR 1325(2000) used within the institution?

How you rate the level of awareness of the resolution within the institution and across the region?

- High
- B) Moderate
- C) Low

Explain the reason for this response.

What specific activities have been organised on women, peace and security by the Institution in the region?
How does the institution approach or address issues of sexual violence against women in the region?
How would you rate the level of women’s involvement in peace processes in the region?
What specific challenges have been encountered in attempting to involve women in peace processes in the region?
Have any attempts been made to engender the regional peacekeeping forces? If yes, what specific activities have been carried out?
What can be done to improve women’s peace and security in the region?
If a national action were to be developed on implementing SCR 1325(2000), what should be the key components of such a plan?

Additional comments