MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON IRAQ/KUWAIT
Explanation
of Vote by Sir Jeremy Greenstock KCMG,
United Kingdom Permanent Representative
8 November 2002
I said at the Council's open debate on Iraq on 17
October that no shadow of a doubt remained that
Iraq has defied the United Nations - not any particular
Member State, but the United Nations over the last
eleven years. I itemised on that occasion the ways
in which Iraq has sought to frustrate and hinder
inspections since 1991.
With the adoption of this Resolution, the Security Council has clearly stated that the United Nations will no longer tolerate this defiance. As OP2 makes crystal clear, Iraq is being given a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations; a final opportunity to remedy its material breach of SCR 687 set out in OP1. The regime in Baghdad now faces an unequivocal choice: between complete disarmament and the serious consequences indicated in Op 13.
The
fact that this Resolution has the overwhelming support
of Council members sends the most powerful signal
to Iraq that this is the only choice, that it can
no longer evade its obligations. under UN resolutions.
Because of the strength of this signal, there is at
least a chance that Iraq will finally comply with
its obligations and that military action can be averted.
A
key part of the Resolution we have adopted today is
the provisions giving inspectors the penetrating strength
needed to ensure the successful disarmament of Iraq.
I am glad that the Council has recognised that we
could not afford a return to the ambiguous modalities
and MOUs of the past; that we could not afford exceptions
to unconditional, unrestricted, and immediate access;
that we could not afford to have inspectors again
standing by helplessly while crucial documents are
burned or while convoys leave from the back doors
as inspectors arrive in the front; and that we could
not afford interviews compromised by intimidating
minders. The provisions we have agreed, including
making legally binding the practical arrangements
set out by the inspectors themselves, will significantly
strengthen the hand of UNMOVIC and IAEA. This will
reinforce international confidence in the inspectors.
It will also, I hope, lead Iraq away from a fatal
decision to conceal its WMD. If Iraq is genuinely
committed to full WMD disarmament, it can ensure inspections
get off to a flying start by providing the complete
and accurate declaration required under OP3. The UK
has full confidence in Dr Blix and Dr EI-Baradei and
their teams, and full respect for their integrity
and independence, as they embark on a crucial and
difficult task.
We heard loud and clear during the negotiations the concerns about "automaticity" and "hidden triggers" - the concern that on a decision so crucial we should not rush into military action; that on a decision so crucial any Iraqi violations should be discussed by the Council. Let me be equally clear in response, as one of. the co-sponsors of the text we have adopted. There is no "automaticity" in this Resolution. If there is a further Iraqi breach of its disarmament obligations, the matter will return to the Council for discussion as required in OP12. We would expect the Security Council then to meet its responsibilities#,,
Ultimately, the choice lies with Iraq as to whether
to take the peaceful route to disarmament. The UK
hopes that Iraq will fully co-operate with the United
Nations, meet its obligations, and take the path back
to the lifting of sanctions laid out in SCRs 1284
and 687. The disarmament of Iraq in the area of WMD
by peaceful means remains the UK's firm preference.
But if Iraq chooses defiance and concealment, rejecting
the final opportunity it has been given by the Council
in OP2, the UK - together, we trust, with other Members
of the Security Council - will ensure that the task
of disarmament required by the Resolutions is completed.