{"id":198975,"date":"1969-12-31T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2019-03-12T17:42:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/?p=198975"},"modified":"2019-03-12T17:42:09","modified_gmt":"2019-03-12T17:42:09","slug":"auto-insert-198975","status":"publish","type":"document","link":"https:\/\/www.un.org\/unispal\/document\/auto-insert-198975\/","title":{"rendered":"Yearbook of the United Nations 1969 (excerpts)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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YEARBOOK<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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OF THE<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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UNITED<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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 NATIONS<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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1969<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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Volume 23<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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Office of Public Information<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

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United Nations, New York<\/strong><\/i><\/p><\/div>\n


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THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

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During 1969, the situation in the Middle East continued to concern the United Nations. The various  aspects of the question are dealt with below under the following subject headings: (a<\/i>) the status of the cease-fire between Israel on the one hand and Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq on the other; (b<\/i>) questions concerning the treatment of civilian populations in Israel-occupied territories; (c<\/i>) the situation in and around Jerusalem and its Holy Places; (d<\/i>) general statements and other matters related to the situation; and (e<\/i>) reports of the Secretary-General relating to the search for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem. (For information on other issues related to the situation in the Middle East that came before the United Nations during 1969, see pp. 230-42, 243-46 and 509-12.)<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>An item entitled "The situation in the Middle East" was included in the agenda of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly (which opened on 16 September 1969) but was not discussed.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>However, at the closing meeting of the session on 17 December 1969, the President announced that her consultations with various delegations had led her to believe it was the general feeling that the item should be deferred until the next session.  Accordingly, the Assembly decided to include the item in the provisional agenda of its twenty-fifth session (due to open on 15 September 1970).<\/p><\/div>\n

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THE STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

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COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL AND JORDAN<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

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COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL<\/p><\/div>\n

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(12 FEBRUARY-17 MARCH 1969)<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>From mid-February to mid-March 1969, the Security Council and the Secretary-General received a number of communications from Jordan and Israel, each complaining of the other's violations of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council in 1967.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Jordan, which also charged Israel with violating the Armistice Agreement, complained of shelling and bombing of its villages by Israeli ground and air forces and the use of napalm bombs and missiles.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Israel rejected the Jordanian charges and itself charged that numerous attacks had been launched from Jordan by regular and irregular forces against its territory and people.  Israel further charged that Arab terrorists had been pursuing terror warfare with the sanction and collaboration of the Jordanian authorities and armed forces and that Israel had been forced to take appropriate action in self-defence.<\/p><\/div>\n

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COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION<\/p><\/div>\n

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BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL<\/p><\/div>\n

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DURING PERIOD 26 MARCH-1 APRIL 1969<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 26 March 1969, Jordan charged that Israeli jet aircraft had that day attacked Jordanian villages in the area of Es-Salt, causing the deaths of 17 civilians and the wounding of 25. It requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider such continuous and grave Israeli violations of the cease-fire and to take more effective measures to check Israel's acts of aggression.  On the following day, Israel also requested an urgent meeting to consider grave and continued violations of the cease-fire by terrorist groups operating from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 27 March, the Security Council included the two complaints in its agenda as separate items and invited the representatives of Jordan, Israel and, subsequently, the representative of Saudi Arabia to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of Jordan stated that Israeli shellings of Jordanian villages in the north had become a daily practice that was often escalated by Israeli jet fighters carrying out raids deep into Jordanian territory. Many of those attacks, which had been reported by Jordan to the Council since December 1968, were against civilian targets and had resulted in loss of life and severe damage to property.  In the previous six weeks, Israel had intensified its daily raids.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Referring to the raid of 26 March, the subject of Jordan's complaint to the Council, the representative of Jordan stated that the sites of Ein Hazzar that were involved in the raid were winter resorts frequented by civilians and travellers who stopped there before crossing the Jordan River.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The Israeli raid, Jordan's representative further stated, had killed taxi drivers and many of their passengers and had destroyed six houses in the area and several civilian vehicles.  As had been reported in The New York Times, <\/i>there were no military installations in the immediate area and no anti-aircraft fire had been directed against Israeli planes. Further, the severe international condemnation of the Israeli raid on the airport at Beirut, Lebanon, in the Council's resolution of 31 December 1968 (262 (1968)), 1<\/u>\/ had apparently prompted its leaders to think of a new policy under which it could continue its aggression without drawing world public attention to those acts.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Israel, the Jordanian representative continued, had found such a new policy in the so-called active self-defence, under which Israel would send a few of its jet fighter-bombers deep into Jordanian territory to hit civilian targets in the shortest possible time, ending their indiscriminate bombing by dropping time bombs that exploded when civilians gathered to carry away their dead. The new Israeli attacks had covered almost all of the populated areas on the East Bank of the Jordan River in the north and in the south.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>In spite of that policy of aggression, Jordan's representative added, his Government had wished to refrain from coming to the Council in order to avoid prejudicing the peace efforts of four of the permanent members of the Council (see page 228).  It had all along supported all efforts towards finding a peaceful solution to the situation in the Middle East and in that respect had co-operated with all representatives of the Secretary-General. Israel, however, had done everything to frustrate those efforts. Thus, it was the duty of the Security Council to take measures so that Israel's acts of aggression were discontinued and all its attempts towards frustrating a peaceful solution were checked. Unless adequate measures u ere taken under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 2<\/u>\/ the representative of Jordan declared, more and more acts of aggression from Israel would follow.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of Israel stated that, in spite of the Security Council cease-fire resolution, Arab military aggression had continued unabated; Israel had no choice but to defend itself as it had done on 26 March 1969, when it took action to disable terrorist bases in Jordanian territory. Since 20 January 1969, 200 sabotage raids and firing attacks across the cease-fire line had been reported. During February 1969, those attacks had resulted in eight Israelis being killed and 61 being wounded. One United Nations observer had been injured in the explosion in a supermarket in Jerusalem.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of Israel then said that the main terrorist organizations had their headquarters in Jordan, and an agreement had been reached in regulating relations between them and Jordan, which implicated the latter in the activities of the commandos to such an extent that its responsibility for violations of the cease-fire could not be denied. Israel's action of 26 March 1969, he claimed, had been directed against an El-Fatah base at Ein Hazzar, an isolated site to which the El-Fatah command had transferred itself after the Israeli action against the terrorist bases at Es-Salt in August 1968. The Ein Hazzar base was an operational centre with, among other features, a roadblock manned by terrorist squads – one of those set up following the agreement between the Jordanian Government and the terrorist organizations in November 1968. In such bases, there were also canteens and recreational facilities beside which terrorist vehicles w ere always parked. It was against those centres for attack, those bases for operations of terror that Israel's action had been taken.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Israel's representative stressed that his country had shown the utmost restraint in the face of uninterrupted attack; it could not, however, forgo completely its right to defend itself. When an end was put to terror warfare and the Arab States scrupulously maintained the cease-fire to which they had pledged themselves, added Israel's representative, there would no longer be a need for Israel's defence actions. Until then, Israel's right to self-defence remained inalienable and could not be questioned or curtailed by labelling its counter-actions as reprisals, a concept that had no application to the present situation in the Middle East.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of the USSR said that Israel's latest act of aggression against Jordanian villages had been committed in clear violation of the cease-fire and the relevant Security Council resolutions.  It was clear that Israel's air attack and the position it took in the Security Council were intended to disrupt the efforts that were being made to find a peaceful solution to the situation in the Middle East. The attack of 26 March 1969 was the latest in the chain of Israeli attempts to seize Arab territories by force. Such attempts were met naturally by a resistance and liberation movement.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>As this movement grew, the USSR representative added, Israel had begun launching new military actions that could not be distinguished from naked aggression and could in no way be described as actions in self-defence. Israel must realize, however, that acts of aggression could not go unpunished and that the struggle of peoples against the aggressors was not only legitimate on the basis of international law but also invincible. By its actions, Israel was undermining international efforts to restore peace in the middle East on the basis of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 (242 (1967)). 3<\/u>\/  In the face of such a challenge, the Security Council must condemn Israel's new act of aggression and demand that it observe the Council's previous resolutions concerning the cease-fire and cease any activities designed to subvert efforts towards finding a peaceful settlement.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representatives of Nepal, Senegal and Zambia deplored Israel's military action against civilian centres in Jordanian territory at a time when efforts were being made to find a peaceful solution to the problem of the Middle East. That solution, it was stated, did not lie in finding a new formula but in implementing the one contained in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which had been unanimously adopted.  Furthermore, the cease-fire should be strictly observed so that efforts towards a settlement might meet with success.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of Nepal added that a lasting peace in the Middle East was possible only through a settlement that was negotiated either bilaterally or within the framework of the United Nations and that should include the withdrawal of troops from occupied territories, termination of all claims of belligerency, respect for the sovereignty and integrity of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of the United States said his Government deplored the loss of civilian lives in the reported Israeli attack and wished to make clear once again its firm opposition to attacks of that kind, which were in flagrant violation of the cease-fire. The United States urged Israel to avoid such indiscriminate actions involving violations of the Security Council resolutions concerning the cease-fire.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>However, the United States Government was well aware that the attack must be seen in the total context of the continuing absence of peace in the Middle East, he added. There had been other equally serious incidents.  Thus, while condemning the Israeli air attack, the Security Council could not refrain from condemning the grave violations from the other side.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>There were, he also noted, various incidents for which the Arab fedayeen <\/i>had proclaimed their responsibility. The United States equally deplored those actions and the Arab Governments could not completely escape responsibility for them. All Governments concerned should scrupulously observe the cease-fire.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The Council should condemn the immediate act of violence submitted to it, as well as all other acts that had violated the cease-fire, the United States representative declared. Only with such a decision could the Security Council preserve a spirit of impartiality that would be most conducive to the success of its efforts to comply with the cease-fire arrangements and to make every effort to see that all violations of the cease-fire were prevented.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>In considering the current situation, he went on to say, the Security Council should not lose sight of some of the hopeful developments.  The Secretary-General's Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring, was in the area and was holding consultations with the Governments concerned. Also, some of the permanent members of the Council were having talks on ways and means whereby Ambassador Jarring's efforts could best be assisted.  The United States representative concluded that, in those circumstances, what was required in addition to co-operation with Ambassador Jarring was for the parties concerned to comply with the cease-fire arrangements and to make every effort to see that all violations of the cease-fire were prevented.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>In the view of Saudi Arabia's representative, one of the main reasons for incidents involving violations of the cease-fire and for unrest in the Middle East was that an act of injustice had been done to the people of Palestine when, contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, they were denied the right of self-determination. That, he said, was the crux of the problem in the Middle East. A people living in their own homeland had been driven away and denied the right of self-determination by another group of people coming from outside.  The Palestine question, therefore, was not a dispute between the Arab Governments and Israel. It was a struggle of the Palestinian people to regain their lost homeland.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of Algeria asserted that Israel's attack on Ein Hazzar was part of a carefully prepared strategy intended to destroy the economic resources of the Arab countries and to compel them to accept an imposed solution.  For 20 years, Israel had unjustly deprived a people of their right to self-determination and national existence.  Currently that people was resolutely claiming recognition and resisting oppression and occupation. In order to undermine that struggle, Israel was carrying out repeated attacks against neighbouring Arab countries of Palestine under its so-called policy of active defence.  Faced with such an undisguised act of aggression, the Security Council must condemn Israel and must envisage the necessary measures to be taken in accordance with the Charter.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of Finland said that the Council could not accept any arguments put forward to justify unilateral military action that constituted a breach of the cease-fire, nor could it consider in isolation this or the many other incidents it had previously dealt with; they must be seen as part of the unbroken cycle of violence that was undermining the cease-fire arrangements. The Council must insist, therefore, on strict observance of the cease-fire by the parties, which should refrain from any action likely to increase tension in the area. The cease-fire was, however, a temporary arrangement established as a first step towards peace. The Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967(242 (1967)) 4<\/u>\/ had set out the principles on which a just and lasting peace could be established. The Secretary-General's Special Representative was continuing his efforts to promote agreement on the basis of that resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>At the same time, Finland's representative added, four permanent members of the Security Council were also moving towards joint talks, which should be welcomed by the international community. In its current discussion, the Council should not proceed in such a manner as to make the forthcoming negotiations more difficult.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of the United Kingdom stated that for almost two years the notice of the Council had been drawn to an appalling list of violent acts committed in the Middle East, resulting in the killing of innocent persons and the widespread destruction of property; his delegation condemned all acts of violence and breaches of the cease-fire.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>It was right and proper, he added, that the parties come to the Council, but the latter would only be tinkering with the problem if it were to concentrate on individual incidents, for the time had come when action to settle the problem could no longer be delayed.  It was proper that there should be new initiatives for peace, involving, in particular, four of the permanent members of the Council.  The four-power talks were expected to begin before long, and the Council must condemn any action that damaged the prospects for success of these peace initiatives.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Therefore, while appreciating the concern and feeling of Jordan with regard to the victims of the recent attacks on its territory, the United Kingdom would urge Jordan to reflect on the need to avoid a serious split in the Council which, at the present stage of the joint search for peace, would be a set-back to the interests of the Jordanian people, and of all the peoples of the Middle East.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of France said the recent Israeli attack on Ein Hazzar had brought destruction to a country that already had suffered cruelly. Israel's declaration that its repeated attacks were aimed at commando bases could not justify operations that constituted a new step in the escalation of military action, about which the Security Council had every reason to be concerned.  The French Government, which condemned all violations of the cease-fire, believed that the aerial bombings tended to increase the animosity among the population directly affected by those attacks and to strengthen the reaction of which the fedayeen <\/i>were a manifestation. Those attacks delayed, if not dispelled, the possibility of a settlement.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>In May and June 1967, he went on to say, the French Government had done everything within its power to have the States concerned avoid the outbreak of an armed conflict, but to its regret those efforts had not been successful. In the months that followed, France again had tried to limit the consequences of the conflict and have conditions for pacification prevail. That was why France had at all times called for the rapid implementation of Council resolution 242 (1967). Realizing that in the present circumstances bilateral talks were not feasible, and that the situation was deteriorating rapidly, the French Government had suggested that the four members of the Council involved should unite their efforts to seek ways and means for the implementation of that resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of Pakistan said that Israel's attack on rest homes and winter resorts in Ein Hazzar was part of a systematic pattern of inflicting heavy destruction on the neighbouring States. In previous meetings, the Council had rejected Israel's plea for action under the right of reprisal because it considered that the acceptance of that theory would destroy the rule of law embodied in the United Nations Charter. In its resolutions 248 (1968), 256 (1968) and 262 (1968), 5<\/u>\/ the Council had condemned Israel's military attacks, and in its resolution 248 (1968) it had explicitly stated that it would have to consider further and more effective steps if actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire continued. In Pakistan's view, a much more forceful stand by the Security Council was called for in a case where even the pretext of so-called retaliation could not be advanced. Israel was applying its recently proclaimed doctrine of "active defence," which was the assertion of an unlimited right to attack Arab territories for having given refuge to the uprooted people of Palestine.  However, Israel's military action was not likely to prevent the increase in strength and activities of the resistance movement, which was the inevitable response to occupation, but would instead hamper efforts towards a peaceful settlement.  The most recent attack had come precisely at the time when some hope had been aroused by the efforts of four Council members to promote a just solution.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Pakistan believed that the Security Council should condemn the attack as a flagrant violation of the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions, and should issue a final warning to Israel that any repetition of such attacks would result in the adoption by the Council of necessary measures under the Charter.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of Spain observed that Israel's attack against civilian centres in Jordan threatened peace and security not only in the Middle East but throughout the world. That situation had resulted directly from the aggression of 5 June 1967, the subsequent occupation of the territory and the non-compliance with Council resolution 242 (1967). 6<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Without prejudice to the fact that that resolution must be completely implemented, he went on, it was obvious that the Charter did not allow for the occupation of territory by force.  Spain believed that the violent acts about which Israel had complained could be avoided if it were to withdraw immediately from the territory occupied by it. After Israel's withdrawal, the cause for resistance would disappear. If there were as many fedayeen <\/i>camps and bases as the representative of Israel had described, one would have to conclude that it was not a question of terrorists but of an entire people who had been expelled from their territory and who had revolted against the injustice done to them.  However, the most recent Israeli military action had been taken at a time when no act of violence had been committed from the other side, and also when four members of the Council were endeavouring to find a solution.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The Spanish representative emphasized that the Council must take the most appropriate decisions to prevent a Member of the United Nations from continuing to violate the Organization's resolutions and committing aggression against neighbouring States.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The spokesman for Colombia held the view that the recent attack by Israel formed part of a tactic of reprisals that was contrary to the principles of the Charter and an act with which no State could associate itself. At the same time, his country condemned all violations of the cease-fire and terrorist acts, irrespective of their source. The principles embodied in Council resolution 242 (1967) were still valid, and their full implementation was the only sure guarantee of restoration of peace in the area.  France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, with their influence in the region, might be able to obtain the active co-operation of Israel and the Arab States necessary for the implementation of that resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Colombia still considered as valid the formula for peace in the Middle East that the Latin American group of States had first submitted at the emergency session of the General Assembly in June 1967 and that later had formed the basis of Council resolution 242  (1967).  The formula provided for an over-all solution, taking into account the tragic plight of the Palestinian refugees, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories, the recognition of Israel and the ending of the state of belligerency.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The President of the Security Council, speaking as the representative of Hungary, said that Israel, by its attack on Jordan on 26 March, had once again violated the sovereignty of that country and the Council's cease-fire resolutions. Israel had maintained that its military action had been defensive in character and was aimed at the maintenance of Israel's security. However, those assertions were not corroborated by Israel's actions. Israel, having occupied militarily large sections of Arab territories, could not demand submission by the people of those territories.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Hungary maintained, he continued, that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council could not be used to consolidate Israel's occupation.  Its main purpose was to stop further territorial incursions by Israel.  It was not the security of Israel but that of its Arab neighbours that was threatened by Israel's occupation of their territory.  The deteriorating situation in the Middle East was a matter of great concern to the United Nations, particularly to four permanent members of the Security Council who, because of that concern, had agreed to hold talks with a view to contributing to the implementation of Council resolution 242 (1967).  Hungary would support every initiative that might lead to a political settlement by a full implementation of that resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Paraguay's representative regretted the loss of life resulting from violations of the cease-fire and also the material damage, particularly since that damage had been inflicted on a developing country like Jordan; he added that his country could not condone the violent incidents involving serious violations of the cease-fire, nor could it accept the theory of the exercise of reprisals whereby a State could arrogate to itself the right to carry out military operations of the kind which had caused the Council to meet.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Paraguay further regretted that those incidents had taken place at a time when four permanent members of the Security Council were establishing contacts to intensify the efforts for a just and stable peace on the basis of Council resolution 242 (1967).  It was for that reason that Paraguay urged the parties to comply strictly with the cease-fire resolutions and to help in creating an atmosphere for the success of the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and those of four permanent Council members.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>China's representative, noting that Israel had claimed that the targets of its attacks were not civilian centres but centres of armed elements hostile to it, said that whatever might be the case, he considered the air raid to be a clear violation of the cease-fire and one to be condemned by the Council. The attack could not be characterized as a measure of self-defence; it was, rather, a punitive action showing that Israel believed in the effectiveness of armed action as a means of redress and had not attached sufficient importance to the urgency and desirability of pursuing conciliatory policies. The basis or a just and lasting settlement had already been provided in Council resolution 242 (1967), and the parties concerned should give every assistance to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 1 April 1969, the representative of Pakistan submitted a draft resolution sponsored also by Senegal and Zambia, by which the Council would, among other things: (1) deplore the loss of civilian life and damage to property; and (2) condemn the recent premeditated air attacks launched by Israel on Jordanian villages and populated areas in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions, and warn once again that if such attacks were to be repeated the Council would have to meet to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such attacks.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>In submitting the three-power draft resolution, the representative of Pakistan said the sponsors had sought to prevent a division among the permanent members of the Council on the eve of the projected four-power talks and had not insisted on their original text. However, in the name of what was termed to be a balance, they could not give equal emphasis to premeditated attacks launched by a Government and sporadic violent acts by a resistance movement directed against foreign military occupation.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The United States representative said that the three-power joint draft resolution was not balanced, having concentrated on one kind of violence and having ignored the other kind of violence which had provoked it.  Had the sponsors been willing to add another operative paragraph condemning or deploring all violations of the cease-fire, the United States would have been able to support it.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of the USSR observed that some members of the Council had expressed misgivings with regard to the adoption of the Asian-African draft resolution because it might create a division in the Council.  He did not share those misgivings and felt that the draft resolution should serve as a further warning to those who were attempting to undermine the efforts for a peaceful solution and the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). 7<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of Paraguay said he would abstain in the vote on the three-power draft resolution because it had omitted references to certain parts of Security Council resolutions 248  (1968) and 256 (1968), 8<\/u>\/ which, inter alia, <\/i>made the point that all acts of violation of the cease-fire should be prevented.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The draft resolution was subsequently revised to include a preambular paragraph by which the Council would recall its resolution of 12 June 1967 (236 (1967)), 9<\/u>\/ calling for respect for the cease-fire, and a new first operative paragraph by which the Council would reaffirm its resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968) by which, among other things, the Council condemned Israel's air attacks on Jordanian territory in flagrant violation of the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 1 April 1969, the Security Council adopted the revised three-power text by 11 votes to 0, with 4 abstentions, as resolution 265 (1969).<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>By the preambular part of this text, the Security Council recalled its resolution 236 (1967) of 12 June 1967; observed that numerous premeditated violations of the cease-fire had occurred; viewed with deep concern that the recent air attacks on Jordanian villages and other populated areas were of a pre-planned nature, in violation of resolutions 248 (1968) of 24 March 1968 and 256 (1968) of 16 August 1968; and expressed its grave concern about the deteriorating situation which endangered peace and security in the area.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>By the operative part of the resolution, the Council: (1) reaffirmed its resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968); (2) deplored the loss of civilian life and damage to property; and (3) condemned the recent premeditated air attacks launched by Israel on Jordanian villages and populated areas in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions, and warned once again that if such attacks were to be repeated the Council would have to meet to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such attacks.<\/p><\/div>\n

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COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL<\/p><\/div>\n

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(APRIL-DECEMBER 1969)<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 8 April 1969, both Israel and Jordan complained of attacks on the cities of Elat and Aqaba. Israel asserted that following a rocket attack on Elat from the area of Aqaba, it had taken air action in self-defence. Jordan charged that Israeli aircraft had raided Aqaba with rockets and bombs. Both sides reported casualties.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>In letters dated 20 and 28 April, Israel complained of attacks on Israeli posts in the Golan Heights, exchanges of fire across the Jordan River, engagements with saboteur units infiltrating from Jordan and the intensification of artillery attacks with the participation of Iraqi artillery and United Arab Republic military bases in Jordan. Israel stated that fire had to be returned in self-defence.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In letters to the Security Council, Jordan complained of Israeli shelling on 19, 20, 21 and 22 April of civilian targets inside its territory, including bombing of villages in the northern part of the Jordan Valley and the suburbs of Irbid, causing civilian casualties and heavy damage to property. Jordan also complained on 1 May of further shelling by Israel of the area of Shuna Shamaliya, in addition to aerial bombing of the areas of Tel Shubeil and Wadi Yabis, causing more civilian deaths.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter of 16 May, Jordan submitted further charges against Israel, claiming that on 14 May the Israel air force had bombed the Irbid district, causing the deaths of six civilians; it also stated that on 9 May an Israeli military unit had crossed the Jordan River, had dynamited five houses, and had mined the area of Wadi Yabis, causing more civilian casualties. Jordan further charged that Israeli forces had used the farm of an Arab orphanage in the Jericho area as a point from which to shell Jordanian positions.  Jordan's letter also listed 86 cease-fire violations by Israel in the period from 17 February to 9 May.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 21 May, Israel, after rejecting these Jordanian charges, stated that they were only a pretext for Jordanian shelling of targets in the Jericho area.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In letters dated 22 and 23 May, Jordan stated that on 21 May Israeli forces had attacked the villages of Safi and Feifa and that its jets had shelled and strafed the area of Deir Alla in the north, causing civilian casualties and destroying houses and schools.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Israel charged on 24 May that fire had been opened from Jordanian territory on the Ethiopian monastery south of the Allenby Bridge, and referred to 57 attacks between 11 and 17 May. On 28 May, Israel further charged that the orphanage of the Arab Development Society had been shelled again from Jordan, and that such shelling was part of a series of preplanned assaults from Jordan on civilian centres, including localities inhabited by Arabs.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In the latter part of June, Jordan submitted charges that its territory had been subjected to bombing and strafing by Israeli jets, as well as to tank and artillery fire, causing casualties and destruction.  Jordan stated that those attacks were deliberate and unprovoked, and that the continued use of napalm created a situation of such gravity as to require urgent action by the Council.  Jordan added that by those attacks, Israel had wanted to undermine the peace efforts of four of the permanent members of the Security Council.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In two letters dated 23 June, Israel charged Jordan with responsibility for a bombing incident in Jerusalem and stated that the campaign of aggression waged against it by regular and irregular Jordanian forces and Iraqi troops in Jordan had been intensified. Israel also referred to 600 acts of aggression that, it said, had been committed from Jordanian territory so far that year.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 12 August, Jordan stated that its territory had been subjected to further shelling and air raids, and that on 10 August Israel's jet aircraft had attacked the East Ghor Canal – a vital irrigation project in Jordan – which had been attacked twice by Israel within two months, indicating Israel's intention of destroying Jordan's agricultural economy. Jordan listed in its letter 93 cease-fire violations by Israel during the period from 5 May to 26 July 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In reply to Jordan's charges, Israel stated on 20 August that Jordan had been encouraging aggressive activities against it, and that Jordanian regular and irregular forces, reinforced by military units from Iraq, had participated in those armed attacks.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 8 December, Jordan charged that shots had been fired by two Israeli torpedo boats at the Japanese ship Shinkai-Maru <\/i>in the Gulf of Aqaba while that ship was en route to the Jordanian port of Aqaba.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In letters dated 26 November, 9 and 22 December, Jordan further charged that its territory had been subjected to aerial attacks and artillery shelling causing injuries to civilians and damage to property.  In the 22 December letter, Jordan charged that, in carrying out those attacks, Israel seemed to follow a premeditated official policy; therefore, more effective international action was required.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 16 December, Israel stated that its aircraft had taken action against a terrorist base on the East Bank of the Jordan River, and that on 8 December the town of Beit Shean had been shelled from Jordan with Katyusha rockets.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING COMPLAINTS<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

BY ISRAEL AND UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter dated 25 January 1969, Israel transmitted to the Security Council a statement in which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, after quoting from a reported statement by the President of the United Arab Republic to that State's National Assembly on 20 January 1969 in support of the "Palestinian resistance forces," said that the statement of the President of the United Arab Republic must be regarded as official United Arab Republic policy.  It therefore had disturbing implications for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East as called for in resolution 242 (1967). 10<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 2 and 26 January, the Secretary-General circulated two reports containing supplemental information from the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO), Lieutenant-General Odd Bull, relating to firing on an Israeli patrol and the presence of and firing on Israeli motor gunboats in the Suez Canal.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>During the month of February, Israel charged the United Arab Republic with waging terror warfare against Israel and with continued attacks on Israeli forces on the east side of the Canal. The United Arab Republic on 13 February charged that Israel had continued to refuse to comply with the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Also during the month of February, the Secretary-General submitted several reports to the Security Council on the Suez Canal sector and these reports, which were based on information received from General Bull showed that there was an increasing number of small-arms firings across the Canal, mostly from the west side.  In his report of 11 February, the Secretary-General indicated that in reporting recent firing incidents in the Suez Canal sector, the UNTSO Chief of Staff had expressed his concern at this development and believed the situation to be serious.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter dated 13 March, Israel rejected the charges contained in the United Arab Republic letter of 13 February and said it was the United Arab Republic that had a negative position on Security Council resolution 242 (1967).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In letters dated 8, 9, 11, 13, 18 and 24 March, Israel charged that the United Arab Republic had undertaken large-scale attacks on those dates along a wide front, sometimes extending throughout the whole Canal sector, and alleged that on 8 and 9 March Algerian forces had participated in the attacks.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The United Arab Republic, in letters dated 9, 11, 13, 18 and 24 March, charged Israel with large-scale attacks and the shelling of cities and civilian installations on the west side of the Canal.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The supplemental information reports submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council in March pointed to a marked increase in firing incidents during that month. In particular, there were major exchanges of fire across the Canal involving heavy weapons, on 8, 9, 11, 13, 18 and 24 March.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 1 April, Israel charged that the speeches by the President of the United Arab Republic on 27 and 30 March reiterated with emphasis the policy of aggression being pursued by the United Arab Republic in disregard of the Charter and Security Council resolutions. On 3 April, the United Arab Republic rejected those charges and insisted that the cause of the deteriorating situation in the area was attributable to Israel's refusal to implement United Nations resolutions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Also in April, both Israel and the United Arab Republic submitted to the Council charges of cease-fire violations. In letters dated 4, 8, 9, 10, 14 and 21 April, Israel charged the United Arab Republic with large-scale artillery attacks, sniping, overflights, and commando attacks across the Suez Canal, and in letters dated 4, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 21 and 25 April, the United Arab Republic charged Israel with shelling cities and civilian installations on the west side of the Canal.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 30 April the United Arab Republic charged that an Israeli air attack had been carried out on 29 April on civilian installations in the Naga Hammadi and Idfou areas, hundreds of miles away from the military front.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>From April onwards, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Council, on an almost daily basis, reports from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO relating to incidents in the Suez Canal sector. These reports showed that heavy exchanges of fire took place almost daily from 8 April, and that from mid-September the situation further deteriorated with the introduction and intensification of air bombing.  The report also showed that on numerous occasions firing was directed at United Nations observation posts. During that period, several United Nations observation posts had to be temporarily closed.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 21 April, the Secretary-General, in a special report to the Security Council, called attention to the prevailing situation in the Suez Canal sector, which he viewed as grave. After referring to the information submitted by General Bull, the Secretary-General stated that it was clear that observance of the Security Council cease-fire resolutions had been degenerating steadily particularly since 8 April, and that there had been daily major breaches of the cease-fire for 12 successive days. The United Nations military observers, w ho were operating under conditions of great danger and difficulty, had exerted every effort to bring a quick end to each instance of firing, but firing soon erupted again. In the circumstances, it was only possible to conclude that the cease-fire had become almost totally ineffective, and that a stage of virtual active war existed in the Suez Canal sector.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Referring to the Secretary-General's report, the USSR, in a letter dated 8 May, stated that the deterioration of the situation, which had aroused grave concern, was caused by Israel's policy of frustrating the efforts towards a peaceful settlement as provided in the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 (242 (1967)).  That same policy was evident in Israel's attitude towards the four-power consultations, which could be an effective means of reaching a settlement on the basis of the Council's resolution. If the situation in the area were to be returned to normal, it was necessary that the Security Council resolution on the cease-fire be strictly observed.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter of 15 May, Israel stated that the USSR's letter had again vilified his Government's position. The responsibility of the United Arab Republic for the aggravation of the situation in the sector had been clearly shown in the reports of the UNTSO Chief of Staff.  It added that it would continue to observe scrupulously the cease-fire on the basis of reciprocity, and hoped that the United Arab Republic would do the same.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 2 May, the Secretary-General, in another report on the status of the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector, said he was increasingly concerned about certain developments there that threatened the effectiveness of the observation of the cease-fire. Those developments exposed United Nations military observers and other United Nations personnel to grave danger and caused heavy damage to United Nations installations, vehicles and equipment.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In the 2 May report, the Secretary-General included texts of his letters of 21 April to the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic and their replies. In these letters, the Secretary-General – after drawing attention to supplemental information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO containing accounts of heavy exchanges of fire occurring almost daily in the Suez Canal sector – stated that besides constituting serious violations of the cease-fire, those violations also impaired the United Nations observation operation. In that respect, he noted the complaint of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO that United Nations installations and facilities, although clearly and unmistakably marked, had been repeatedly fired upon by both sides.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>After giving a summary of some of the damage caused between  8 March and 20 April to United Nations installations and vehicles and the risk involved for United Nations personnel, the Secretary-General requested the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic urgently to instruct the military forces concerned to avoid as much as possible actions that restricted the observation operation or endangered the safety of United Nations personnel in the Suez Canal sector.  He also requested that the construction of new shelters for United Nations personnel be completed as a matter of urgency.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In replying on 23 April, the representative of Israel stated that his country's forces were under strict orders to do all within their power to prevent danger to United Nations personnel and installations.  He added that it was clear that the United Arab Republic forces had recently been opening fire intentionally on United Nations military observers, and on United Nations installations and transport, in order to inflict injury, damage and destruction on them.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a second letter on the same day, the representative of Israel added that it was beyond dispute that the Israeli armed forces were punctilious in respecting the status and duties of the United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector, that this was borne out in the latest series of reports from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, and that they were co-operating fully with General Bull and were doing their utmost to reduce to the absolute minimum any risks to the observers and their equipment, and to United Nations installations.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of Israel added that his Government therefore regretted that the Secretary-General in his letter had referred indifferently to "parties" in general terms, a wording that was liable to convey a misleading impression, as if the two parties were equally responsible for the situation in the Suez Canal sector.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>After referring to General Bull's report relating to the incidents in the Suez Canal sector, the representative of Israel went on to say that almost all damage to United Nations installations had been on the Israeli side, owing to attacks by Egyptian armed forces.  The reply added that the Israeli authorities had endeavoured to the utmost to expedite the construction of shelters and would continue to do so to the extent that Egyptian acts of aggression did not impede such efforts. Israel believed that the simple answer to the difficulties to which the Secretary-General had referred was the faithful and scrupulous observance of the cease-fire.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter of 29 April, the representative of the United Arab Republic stated that his Government had responded affirmatively to the proposals submitted by General Bull and had already taken the necessary steps towards strengthening the shelters assigned to the observers all along the west side of the Suez Canal with a view to making them safer and more secure against Israeli fire from across the Canal.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of the United Arab Republic further stated that the responsibility for the deteriorating situation and aggravation of conditions in the Suez Canal sector lay clearly with Israel which, after having committed its aggression of 5 June 1967, persisted in pursuing a policy aimed at annexing the Arab territory it had occupied and consistently refused to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council, in particular resolution 242 (1967). 11<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a further letter, dated 1 May 1969, to the representative of Israel, the Secretary-General stated that Israel's claim that during the period from 12 March to 20 April no damage whatsoever had been caused to the United Nations observation post on the Egyptian side was not correct: on 8, 9 and 11 March, United Nations installations on the west side of the Suez Canal had in fact sustained a great deal of damage, as reported by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO.  There was also damage to United Nations installations on the west side of the Canal during exchanges of fire on 8 and 25 April.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Secretary-General added that the purpose of his letter was not to start a discussion on the responsibility for the events in the Suez Canal sector but to secure as far as possible increased co-operation in facilitating the task of observation and the provision of all possible assistance and protection to United Nations personnel in carrying out their duties.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter of the same date to the representative of the United Arab Republic, the Secretary-General, after noting the offer of continued co-operation in the building of shelters, observed that the representative of the United Arab Republic had not made any specific reference to the question of encroachment on United Nations observation posts and incidents of firing near United Nations personnel, installations and vehicles. Since 21 April, exchanges of fire had continued to take place daily in the Suez Canal sector and encroachment of and firing near or on United Nations observation posts had continued.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>After giving details of some of the recent incidents as reported to him by General Bull the Secretary-General said his concern for the safety of United Nations military observers had been borne out by an incident on 22 April in which a United Nations military observer had been seriously injured when his vehicle had struck an anti-tank mine. The observer was wounded when he and another observer were proceeding to assist two others whose vehicles had struck a mine while they were en route to a United Nations observation post; the relief of that team of observers had to be postponed for almost a week because of continued firing in the area.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In conclusion, the Secretary-General said that, taking all these factors into consideration General Bull had proposed the establishment of safe perimeters around United Nations installations.  The UNTSO Chief of Staff had considered, and the Secretary-General had agreed, that each of the United Nations control centres and observation posts should be surrounded by a free area of agreed dimensions, clearly marked and free of any manned or unmanned firing positions and of any military personnel and equipment.  The Secretary-General also agreed with General null that, with the agreement of the two parties, UNTSO should be provided with a United Nations craft to be used for the relief and evacuation of United Nations personnel at observation posts when relief by road was not possible.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 17 May, Finland expressed its appreciation for the Secretary-General's efforts to protect the observers. As one of the Governments that had made military personnel available to serve as United Nations observers in the Suez Canal sector, Finland hoped that the arrangements initiated would ensure, with the co-operation of the Governments concerned, the continued effectiveness of UNTSO, which was an indispensable means of maintaining the cease-fire.  <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 13 May, the United Arab Republic informed the Secretary-General that the fortification of the observers' shelters along the west side of the Suez Canal was under way, and stated further that other steps had been taken to eliminate the exposure of the United Nations military observers to Israeli fire.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>During the latter part of April and in May, letters received by the Security Council from both Israel and the United Arab Republic related to charges of cease-fire violations. Israel rejected the charges contained in the United Arab Republic communications of 25 and 30 April, and declared that the United Arab Republic was responsible for maintaining tension in the area and initiating breaches of the cease-fire, while Israel had acted only in self-defence. In letters of 1, 12 and 15 May, the United Arab Republic charged Israel with firing across the Suez Canal, with attempts to cross the Canal, and with systematic destruction of civil and economic installations in the area.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In letters of 13 and 24 June, Israel charged that units of the armed forces of Kuwait stationed in the United Arab Republic were participating in armed attacks against Israel and that the Kuwaiti Government was aiding and abetting Arab terror warfare against Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 16 June, Kuwait replied that its co-operation with the United Arab Republic was in full accord with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 12<\/u>\/ and that its support for the Palestinian resistance movement stemmed from support of the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter of 25 June, Israel charged that United Arab Republic forces had crossed the Canal and attacked an Israeli position on 22 and 23 June, leaving behind the bodies of five Egyptian soldiers. Despite arrangements for the return of the bodies by United Nations and Red Cross representatives, their removal, the letter added, was prevented by Egyptian mortar fire.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On the same subject, the United Arab Republic transmitted to the Secretary-General on 11 July a communication from a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross concerning difficulties encountered in retrieving the bodies of the United Arab Republic soldiers killed on 23 June, and charged that Israeli authorities had left the bodies to deteriorate, in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a further communication, on 17 July, the United Arab Republic charged that in handling the removal of the bodies, Israeli authorities had procrastinated in order to reinforce their positions.  Israel replied to that charge on 18 July, asserting that it was the United Arab Republic that had frustrated the attempt to remove the bodies of the dead soldiers on 17 July by firing on the recovery location, thus compelling the party in charge to withdraw.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Reporting on the matter on 18 July, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO stated that arrangements had been made in agreement with the two parties to recover and deliver the bodies on 24 June. However, the recovery attempt had not been completed because United Arab Republic mortar rounds had landed at the recovery location, compelling the party in charge to withdraw. The United Arab Republic authorities had later insisted on the immediate return of the bodies, charging that Israeli forces were using the cease-fire for purposes other than the recovery of the bodies. Another proposal to hand over the bodies on 25 June had been rejected by the United Arab Republic authorities. It was agreed to make a new attempt on 14 July. As preparations were being made to start the recovery work, machine-gun fire had been heard from the west side, and bullets had passed within 20 to 30 metres of the recovery site. A proposal for a cease-fire had been accepted by Israel, but no reply had been received from the United Arab Republic authorities.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In the latter part of July, the United Arab Republic and Israel submitted further complaints of cease-fire violations. The United Arab Republic charged that Israeli forces had on 20 July attempted to take over "Green Island" located in the southern part of the Suez Canal; on the same day, Israeli jets had attacked civilian centres and economic installations in several cities of the Canal zone. Israel stated on 22 July that it had to take measures of self-defence in the face of the continuous attacks by the United Arab Republic, and that those measures were directed solely against military positions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 5 July, the Secretary-General, in a special report to the Security Council, drew attention to the serious situation prevailing in the Suez Canal sector. After recalling his report of 21 April 1969, he said that the observance of the cease-fire had deteriorated during the second week in June, with exchanges of heavy-weapons fire initiated almost daily, especially from the west side of the Canal, as reported to the Security Council in the supplemental information reports. The fact that many of those activities had been announced by the parties themselves implied a tacit recognition by them that the cease-fire, to all practical intents and purposes, had ceased to be respected in the Suez Canal sector.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Referring also to his report of 2 May 1969, in which he had expressed his concern about the danger to which United Nations military observers and installations had been exposed, the Secretary-General said that that risk had, if anything, increased in the previous two weeks. Messages had been sent out by UNTSO to the parties concerned about incidents of firing on United Nations personnel and installations, but without noticeable effect.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>He then pointed out that the observers were unarmed men doing their best, under extraordinary stress and strain, to fulfil the task assigned to them by the Security Council. They could not be expected to serve as virtual targets in a shooting gallery. If they continued to be fired upon, the Secretary-General added, he would have to advise the Security Council on the future course of action, including even the possibility of withdrawing the observers.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>After pointing out the difficulties of ensuring effective observation of a cease-fire under those circumstances, the Secretary-General appealed to all parties in the Middle East to end immediately all offensive military actions and to return to observance of the Security Council cease-fire. He also appealed to all Members of the United Nations to do their utmost to help make the cease-fire effective and to support the peace efforts.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Referring to the Secretary-General's special report of 5 July, the United Arab Republic stated in a letter of 10 July that the responsibility for the deterioration of the situation in the area lay solely with Israel, which had refused to accept and implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 for withdrawal of its troops from occupied territories, and was obstructing efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The United Arab Republic had made all efforts for the success of Ambassador Jarring's mission, had accepted Security Council resolution 242 (1967), and had co-operated with the United Nations to ensure the safety of the observers in the Suez Canal sector.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Israel, in a reply referring to the same report, placed the responsibility for the situation on the United Arab Republic, which it charged had proclaimed a policy of initiating fire and of raiding across the Suez Canal. For its part, Israel had always been prepared to adhere to Security Council resolutions on a reciprocal basis, and had co-operated with the United Nations cease-fire machinery for the protection of United Nations personnel. Israeli forces, the reply added, were under orders to avoid causing any harm to United Nations observers or installations.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 27 July, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that Major B. R. Plane of the Swedish Army, a United Nations observer, had been killed by artillery fire while on duty on the west side of the Suez Canal.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 30 July, the Secretary-General, in a report on this incident, informed the Security Council that a board of investigation from UNTSO headquarters had come to the conclusion that Major Plane had died in the course of duty from a fragment of an artillery shell that had exploded outside his observation post. It also concluded that the artillery shell in question had come from an area occupied by Israeli forces.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In his observations on the incident, the Secretary-General stated that the tragic death of Major Plane had given a grim reality to the fears felt about the situation in the Suez Canal sector; he recalled that he had already drawn attention to the steadily deteriorating conditions in which the observers had been carrying out their duties, as indicated in the daily supplemental information reports to the Security Council that had mentioned firing on the observers, their posts, vehicles and equipment.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Secretary-General then appealed to the parties to abide by the cease-fire and respect the observers who supervised it, and to co-operate with efforts made within the United Nations for a peaceful settlement. He again urged the members of the Security Council to influence events in a new constructive direction and to consider measures to improve the working conditions of the observers in the Suez Canal sector.  It was increasingly evident, he added, that the absence of any early prospect of implementing Security Council resolution 242 (1967) 13<\/u>\/ was one of the factors that tended to increase the incidence of cease-fire violations in all sectors of the Middle East.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Secretary-General then paid personal tribute to the observers and to the memory of Major Plane, and expressed appreciation to the Governments that had provided those observers. He concluded by stating that after consultation with those Governments he would make further recommendations to the Security Council.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 19 August, the Secretary-General reported that, because of United Arab Republic artillery fire at an unoccupied post on the east side of the Canal, a working party at that post had had to withdraw. In a letter dated 23 August, Israel informed the Secretary-General that on the night of 20-21 August, the work on the construction of Observation Post Orange (located on the east side of the Canal in the Bitter Lakes area) had been stopped at the request of the observers, who had been advised that the United Arab Republic authorities were opposed to the continuation of work on the shelter. However, the Secretary-General, in a letter dated 27 August, informed Israel that according to the reports received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lieutenant-General Odd Bull, work had continued at Observation Post Orange and the shelter had been completed on 25 August.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 22 September, General Bull, reporting on the temporary closing of Observation Post Mike (the southernmost part on the west side of the Canal), stated that in his meeting with authorities of the United Arab Republic and of Israel, he had discussed the question of problems that the observers had to face in the Suez Canal sector.  He pointed out that Observation Post Mike had received special attention in view of its closeness to United Arab Republic positions, and its relocation was envisaged. That post had been fired at from the east side eight times, and artillery fire close to that post had resulted in the death of Major Plane. As a result of frequent firing, the post had sustained serious damage and the UNTSO Chief of Staff had no alternative but to close it temporarily with effect from 24 September.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 9 November, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported naval and aerial activity north of the Kantara Control Centre at Rahba, near the Mediterranean coast. The Israeli authorities had later complained to the UNTSO Operations Officer that on the evening, of 8 November two destroyers and three torpedo boats of the United Arab Republic had shelled the Romani area for about 45 minutes, and stated that Israeli aircraft had been employed against those vessels.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter of 4 December, the representative of the United Arab Republic recalled his conversation with the Secretary-General on 2 December in which he had expressed the grave concern of the Arab delegations to the United Nations concerning the use of United States-built Phantom jet aircraft by Israeli forces against towns and villages in the United Arab Republic, a situation that had been the subject of a report by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. He added that the use of Phantom jets by Israel bore out the warnings repeatedly expressed by the Arab countries regarding the serious repercussions of providing such offensive weapons to Israel. Such military aid assumed a disturbing character when it came from a permanent member of the Security Council.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

COMPLAINTS BY<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

ISRAEL AND LEBANON<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(4 JANUARY-17 JULY 1969)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>On 4 January 1969, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council a report from the Acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO concerning a complaint submitted by Lebanon to the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission.  The Lebanese delegation to the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission complained that during the night of 2-3 January mortar and artillery shells had been fired on two occasions from Israeli territory against four villages in Lebanon. At the request of the Lebanese delegation, United Nations military observers conducted an inquiry on this complaint.  They interviewed three witnesses and saw physical evidence of mortar impacts and two broken telephone wires but found no evidence of artillery shelling or casualties.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 22 February, Lebanon complained that on the previous day Israeli military aircraft had violated its air space on 12 occasions, and that its anti-aircraft artillery and air force units had to take action against the intruders. That action should be viewed in the light of Israel's repeated threats against Lebanon, its efforts to implicate Lebanon in the incidents at the airports at Zurich, Switzerland, and Athens, Greece, and other unjustified and unprovoked acts that revealed Israel's aggressive designs against Lebanon.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that the Lebanese delegation had submitted complaints to the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission concerning those incidents and added that twice on 21 February a United Nations military observer in the area had observed two Mirage-type aircraft flying south from one of the Lebanese villages concerned.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 17 July, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that the Chairman of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission had received a complaint from Lebanon that on the previous day an Israeli patrol had penetrated into Lebanese territory in the area of El-Megidieh destroying three houses and taking two Lebanese nationals by force into Israeli territory. The United Nations military observers who conducted an investigation on the complaint heard two witnesses who had confirmed the abduction; the observers saw physical evidence of three destroyed houses, 14 dead sheep and one unexploded hand-grenade with Hebrew markings.<\/p><\/div>\n

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COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION<\/p><\/div>\n

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BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL<\/p><\/div>\n

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DURING PERIOD 11-26 AUGUST 1969<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 12 August 1969, Lebanon requested the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider its complaint concerning an Israeli attack on some Lebanese villages near the border in southern Lebanon. On the previous day, Lebanon had charged that Israel's jets had attacked six villages near its southern border with napalm bombs, rockets and machine-guns, resulting in the deaths of four civilians and the wounding of three.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Also on 12 August, Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider its complaint concerning several armed attacks against its territory from Lebanon, charging that in the previous few months 21 attacks by shelling, firing and mining had been carried out against Israeli localities, resulting in military and civilian casualties.  In the face of those attacks, Israel had been compelled in self-defence to take action on 11 August against irregular terrorist encampments in Lebanese territory.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>On 13 August, the Council included in its agenda the complaints by Lebanon and Israel and invited the representatives of both States to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of Lebanon charged that an unprovoked and massive act of aerial aggression had been committed against his country.  Since Israel had claimed that its attacks on villages in southern Lebanon had been undertaken in retaliation for attacks carried out against Israel from Lebanese territory, it should have resorted to the United Nations machinery established under the Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement, which continued to be valid and in force.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>He went on to say that Lebanon had respected its obligations under that Agreement, but Israel had constantly refused to resort to the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission or to let any investigations take place. In addition, Israel had refused to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions. Instead, it had taken action unilaterally in defiance of international law.  Lebanon could not be held accountable for the actions of the Palestine commandos who were struggling to establish their legitimate rights. As a small and defenceless country, Lebanon relied on the rule of law and on the Security Council.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>After recalling that in the Security Council's resolution of 31 December 1968 (262 (1968)) 14<\/u>\/ the Council had issued a solemn warning to Israel that in case of recurrence of acts of violence it would have to consider further steps, the representative of Lebanon urged the Council to take steps as provided in the Charter, including sanctions, and to hold Israel responsible for the damages inflicted against civilian life and property.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of Israel stated that, despite the 1967 cease-fire, terror operations against his country had continued unabated, and that the regular armies of the Arab States had intensified their attacks against Israel. Along with the other Arab countries, Lebanon had allowed its territory to become a base of terror operations against Israel, and the Lebanese Government seemed unable or unwilling to curtail those operations. Israel, which had been subjected to Arab aggression for more than two decades, had to take action in self-defence, carefully directing its action at the areas of concentration of the saboteurs.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>In Israel's opinion, Lebanon could not be absolved of responsibility for the use of its territory by terror organizations.  It was well known to Lebanon that Israel's aim was to maintain the cease-fire, but Lebanon's failure to put an end to the utilization of its territory for attacks against Israel had compelled Israel to take action in self-defence.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>In a letter dated 15 August, Israel asserted that, even as the Security Council continued its deliberations, new attacks were being carried out against Israel. It was charged that a village had been hit by bazooka fire from Lebanese territory, and that saboteurs had crossed from Lebanon to Israel and blown up water conduits and an electric pole near the Lebanese frontier.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>In a note of 18 August, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that on 16 August he had addressed identical letters to both parties concerning the situation in the Israel-Lebanon sector, which was then under discussion in the Council and involved serious breaches of the cease-fire.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>Because there had been no effective United Nations observation operation in that sector since June 1967, the Secretary-General stated it had not been possible for him to provide the Council with accounts of incidents, including the recent ones under discussion in the Council. Moreover, the lack of verified information could not but affect adversely the consideration of the question in the Council.  He had therefore proposed to both Governments that an adequate number of United Nations observers be stationed on both sides to observe and maintain the Security Council's cease-fire, for he believed that that would provide an important means of deterring incidents.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>The Secretary-General added that if replies from both Governments were favourable, he would request the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to consult immediately with the two Governments and to recommend to him both the number of additional observers that might be required and other necessary arrangements for their stationing on both sides in the Israel-Lebanon sector.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 18 August, the representative of Lebanon replied that since the Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949, United Nations observers of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission had been stationed on Lebanese territory, enjoying full freedom of operation, and their status had not been altered by the June 1967 war. Furthermore, the Armistice Agreement, which in Lebanon's opinion remained valid and applicable, contained no provision for unilateral termination of its application and therefore could not be revoked unilaterally.  He added that while Israel for more than two years had not allowed the United Nations observers to operate on the Israeli side of the Armistice line, the Government of Lebanon continued to adhere to the Armistice Agreement and would agree to strengthening its machinery.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>On 25 August, the representative of Israel replied that his Government's policy rested on reciprocal respect for the cease-fire.  The cease-fire in the Israel-Lebanon sector had been disturbed because terrorist groups operating from bases in Lebanese territory had carried out acts of armed violence in defiance of the cease-fire.  Having accepted the cease-fire, Lebanon was responsible for preventing violations from its territory and for restoring the relative quiet previously existing in that sector.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>As for the Secretary-General's proposal for stationing United Nations observers, Israel said that since Lebanon had asked that the observers be stationed only within the framework of the 1949 Armistice Agreement, while international policy since June 1967 had been to move beyond the cease-fire to a permanent peace, Israel found no point in studying the proposal in greater detail. However, should Lebanon be willing to accept the proposal as defined in the Secretary-General's letter, the Government of Israel would then submit its views and would be willing to work for the effective reinforcement of the cease-fire in the Israel-Lebanon sector.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>At the meeting of the Security Council on 14 August, the representative of Algeria said the violation of Lebanon's sovereignty by Israeli aircraft was part of Israel's plans to expand and occupy more Arab territories under the pretext of security needs. Israel's aggression and its occupation of Arab territories should not hide the deeper reason for the conflict, which lay in the loss of their homeland by the Palestinian people. For years, the Security Council had adopted resolutions condemning Israel and warning that in case of further acts of aggression it would take further steps to give effect to its decision. In view of the current Israeli attacks against Lebanon, the time had come to consider those further measures, and should the Council be unable to meet its responsibilities in that respect it would be up to the Palestinians and the other Arab peoples to liberate their own territories.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>The USSR representative said that by its latest act of aggression against Lebanon, Israel was again showing its stubborn refusal to accept a political settlement of the Middle East conflict on the basis of resolution 242 (1967). 15<\/u>\/   It was Israel and not Lebanon that had violated the Armistice Agreement and had thwarted the work of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>With regard to the activities of the Palestinians, he affirmed that it was not a question of subversion, as Israel had described the acts of Arab partisans, but the legitimate struggle of the Arab people against Israel's aggression and occupation of their lands. If Israel really wanted peace it should comply with resolution 242  (1967) in all its parts. He said, in conclusion, that the Council must strongly condemn Israel, and that the USSR was prepared to support any effective measures the Council might decide upon to meet the situation resulting from that aggression.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>The representative of France said the new incident illustrated the dangers inherent in the absence of a political solution to the Middle East conflict.  Furthermore, reprisal acts had always been condemned by the United Nations and were contrary to all United Nations resolutions.  Such reprisal acts by Israel, he added, would only aggravate the situation.  France, which was making every effort for a lasting peace in the area, was ready to support any measures that might help in the search for peace in the Middle East region.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The United States representative said his Government was concerned that the accumulation of incidents in the Middle East could gradually undermine the hope for a lasting peace in the area. The United States, in the four-power talks and elsewhere, had been making strenuous efforts to support the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to reach a peaceful settlement in accordance with Council resolution 242 (1967).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>After referring to the absence of United Nations observers on the Israel-Lebanon border, the representative of the United States went on to suggest that Israel and Lebanon consider the possibility of stationing UNTSO observers along their border with the hope that such measures might help to prevent some of the incidents that had led to the present situation. The United States, he added, could not condone Israel's attack on Lebanon, nor could it completely exonerate Lebanon from its responsibility for attacks carried out from its territory.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>At the meeting of the Security Council on 15 August, the representative of Finland stated that the breaches of the cease-fire could not be treated in isolation from the realities of the situation in the Middle East. The Secretary-General, he pointed out, had repeatedly drawn attention to the dangers of the situation resulting from daily fighting and to the unjustified risks to which the unarmed observers of UNTSO were being subjected. If that situation continued, it could break the entire structure of the internationally supervised cease-fire in the Middle East and endanger efforts to establish peace through the United Nations. The maintenance of the cease-fire was essential for the success of the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative to assist the parties to reach agreement in accordance with resolution 242  (1967).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>The representatives of Pakistan, Senegal, Zambia and China deplored Israel's attack on civilian villages in Lebanon, a country that, they said, was devoted to peace and had shown moderation in the Middle East conflict. They pointed out that while Lebanon had reiterated its adherence to the Armistice Agreement, Israel had resorted to force and had taken action unilaterally in violation of the United Nations Charter.  They urged the Council to take measures to prevent further deterioration of the situation.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>A number of representatives said they welcomed the proposal of the Secretary-General that United Nations observers be stationed on both sides of the border and urged both Israel and Lebanon to give that proposal their serious consideration.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>The representatives of Nepal and Colombia thought that the border incidents had diminished the possibilities of conciliation. Although they considered that Israel's policy of reprisals was contrary to international norms and ethics, they felt that Lebanon could not be absolved of its responsibility for attacks carried out from its territory.  Violations of the cease-fire should be censored regardless of their origin or reasons.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>On 26 August, the President of the Security Council stated that after intensive consultation among Council members, agreement had been reached on the text of a draft resolution by which the Council would, among other things: (1) condemn the premeditated air attack by Israel on villages in southern Lebanon in violation of its obligations under the Charter and Security Council resolutions; (2) deplore all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire; (3) deplore the extension of the area of fighting; and (4) declare that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire could not be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts. On 26 August, the Council unanimously adopted the text as resolution 270 (1969).  (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)<\/p><\/div>\n

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COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL<\/p><\/div>\n

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(SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1969)<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>In letters dated 3 and 5 September, 6 October and 4 December, Lebanon stated that its southern villages had been bombed and shelled by Israeli jet aircraft, resulting in casualties and damage. On 3 October, an Israeli helicopter-borne force had landed in a village inside Lebanese territory and had kidnapped three civilians and wounded four others.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>In letters dated 4 September, 10 October and 15 December, Israel charged that villages on its border near Lebanon had been subjected to increasingly frequent attacks from Lebanese territory that resulted in casualties and property damage.  Furthermore, Israel said infiltrators had planted mines and abducted Israeli citizens.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

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CONCERNING ISRAEL AND SYRIA<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>During the period under review, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council reports on incidents in the Israel-Syria cease-fire sector, based on information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Lieutenant-General Odd Bull.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>On 7 February, General Bull reported that an Israeli light aircraft had been observed by United Nations military observers crossing the Israeli forward-defended localities. Anti-aircraft and machine-gun fire had also been heard.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>On 8 February, he further reported that the Israeli authorities had informed him that a land mine had exploded under an Israeli vehicle south of the village of Rafid in the Israel-Syria sector, and that one Israeli soldier had been killed and another wounded.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>In further supplemental information dated 14 February, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that the United Nations observers had witnessed aerial activity and anti-aircraft and machine-gun fire from both sides in the sector.  He also reported that each party had charged that jet aircraft belonging to the other side had<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

violated its air space, and that following an air engagement Israel had claimed the downing of a Syrian jet and Syria had admitted the loss.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>On 24 February, General Bull reported several overflights from west to east on that day, several of the planes having been identified as Israeli Mirage aircraft. He added that Syrian anti-aircraft guns had opened fire on some of those planes. Syria had complained to the UNTSO Chief of Staff that Israeli jet fighters and bombers had attacked civilian installations in the Hamah and Maisaloun areas and civilian cars on the main Damascus-Beirut road; 20  civilians had been wounded as a result of that raid.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 27 February, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported that in an inquiry conducted at the request of Syria into the Israeli air attack on Hamah of 24 February, United Nations military observers had seen destroyed and damaged houses, factories and other buildings, and 31 hospitalized persons who were reported to have<\/p><\/div>\n

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been injured. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>On 25 February, Syria complained to the Security Council about the incident, charging that a number of Israeli bombers escorted by fighters had launched air attacks on civilian targets in the suburb and district of Damascus, killing 15 people and wounding 40 others. A number of houses and factories, a summer youth camp and a customs house had been destroyed.  Private vehicles, including the car of the Ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic to Syria, had been attacked on the road, and two Syrian and three Israeli aircraft had been shot down in the engagement.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>Israel, in a reply dated 28 February, stated that on the morning of 24 February it had taken air action in self-defence to disable two central El-Fatah bases in Syrian territory which were located in the two towns on the road between Damascus and Beirut. The Government of Syria, it charged, had for years openly sponsored and encouraged terror warfare against Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Syria denied on 4 March that the targets of the Israeli attack were El-Fatah bases, and cited the report of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to show that the targets of that planned attack had been civilian installations.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 12 March, Israel reiterated its charge that the air action of 24 February had been directed against El-Fatah bases.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 25 March, Syria submitted the list of civilian victims reportedly killed or seriously injured in that attack.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>Communications about the attack of 24 February were also received from Hungary and the USSR. In a letter dated 11 March, the representative of Hungary transmitted the text of a note verbale sent to the Government of Israel protesting the air attack, in which the life of the Ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic had been endangered and his car demolished, as a grave violation of international law and reserving Hungary's right to claim full compensation.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>In a letter of the same date, the USSR transmitted a statement by the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS), dated 28 February, protesting the acts of provocation committed by Israel against the Arab countries, and stating that those acts showed that Israel was pursuing an aggressive policy with the aim of aggravating the situation in the Middle East and creating conditions that would preclude the possibility of establishing a lasting peace in the area in conformity with Council resolution 242 (1967). 16<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 18 March, Israel asserted that the TASS statement constituted blanket support of the Arab terror warfare waged against Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>In letters dated 4 and 8 April, Syria charged that Israeli forces in the occupied Syrian territories were deliberately destroying homes and villages in violation of article 53 of the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilians and properties in occupied territories, and that on 5 April Israeli soldiers had kidnapped and murdered six Syrian shepherds in the area of Briqa village.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>On 15 April, Israel denied Syria's charges and stated that Syria had no grounds for complaint over defence measures taken by Israel on its side of the cease-fire line.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>During the period from April to the end of July, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO reported on numerous incidents in the Israel-Syria sector.  These included firings and exchanges of fire and, in some instances, air activity.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 10 July, Syria complained that three of its aircraft had been downed and a Syrian pilot had been killed while intercepting attacking Israeli planes, four of which had been downed. It charged that the latest attack had been premeditated and executed as part of a new aggressive military strategy adopted by Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 1 August, Syria charged that on 30 July six Israeli aircraft had bombed Syrian positions, and stated that a complaint about the attack had been lodged with the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Israel replied on 6 August that Syria had recently increased its acts of aggression along the cease-fire line and also had pledged itself to wage a war of attrition. In the face of this situation, Israel was compelled to take measures in self-defence.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 8 August, the representative of Syria stated that the official statement of Israel, as quoted by the news media, including a report by The New York Times <\/i>on 4 August 1969, indicated that Israel had made a firm decision to retain most of the area occupied by it in 1967, including the Golan Heights.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>In a letter dated 19 August, Israel charged that saboteurs had crossed the cease-fire line from Syrian territory and had fired bazooka shells in the direction of a United Nations observation post; it added that during that attack one United Nations military observer had been injured by glass splinters.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>On 30 September, Syria charged that Israel was deliberately pursuing the demolition of Syrian villages and the colonization of Arab lands with intensive settlements. Between 18 September 1968 and 13 July 1969, the letter added, the Israeli authorities had demolished no less than 17 new Syrian villages in the occupied Golan Heights.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>From the middle of August to the end of December 1969, the reports of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO indicated that incidents involving firing and sometimes air activity continued to take place at frequent intervals in the Israel-Syria sector, and on several occasions there were firings on or near United Nations observation posts.<\/p><\/div>\n

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COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

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IRAQ AND ISRAEL<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span><\/i>On 18 March 1969, Israel drew attention to the reported entry and stationing of Iraqi armed forces in Syria and requested the Secretary-General to obtain from Iraq an assurance that the Iraqi forces would respect the cease-fire.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Iraq replied on 1 April that the entry of Iraqi armed forces into Syria had taken place at the specific request of the Syrian Government and under the Joint Defence Agreement between Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, Iraqi troops had been stationed at a considerable distance from the cease-fire line in Syrian territory, and their presence in Syria was in accordance with the right of self-defence recognized by the Charter and by international law.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>Syria, in a letter of 25 March, had stated that in view of Israel's policy of aggression and its oppression of Arab residents in occupied territories it was but natural that the Arab countries should co-ordinate their efforts; for that reason they had formed an Arab common defence pact.<\/p><\/div>\n

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\t<\/span>In two letters of 10 April, Israel noted that the Government of Iraq had refused to accept the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council in June 1967 and had continued to proclaim a policy of waging war against Israel.  Accordingly, Israel considered that Iraq, as well as those Governments which permitted the maintenance of the Iraqi expeditionary forces on their territory, should bear full responsibility for any consequent aggravation of the situation. Israel further emphasized the urgency of the Secretary-General's efforts to obtain assurances from Iraq to accept the cease-fire resolutions and to have its forces respect the cease-fire.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>Iraq and Israel further reiterated their respective positions in letters dated 24 April and 5 May, and 29 April and 12 May, respectively.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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COMPLAINTS BY<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

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ISRAEL AND JORDAN<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL<\/p><\/div>\n

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(12 FEBRUARY-17 MARCH 1969)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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S\/9006 (A\/7510), S\/9039 (A\/7520). Letters of 12 February and 4 March 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

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S\/9065 (A\/7527). Letter of 10 March 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

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S\/9083 and Corr.1, S\/9085. Letters of 16 and 17 March 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

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S\/9089. Letter of 17 March 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION<\/p><\/div>\n

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BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL<\/p><\/div>\n

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DURING PERIOD 26 MARCH-1 APRIL 1969<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1466-1573.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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S\/9113. Letter of 26 March 1969 from Jordan (request to convene Council).<\/p><\/div>\n

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S\/9114. Letter of 27 March 1969 from Israel (request to convene Council).<\/p><\/div>\n

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S\/9115, S\/9116. Letters of 27 March 1969 from Israel and Saudi Arabia (requests to participate in Council's discussions ).<\/p><\/div>\n

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S\/9120 and Rev.1. Pakistan, Senegal, Zambia: draft resolution and revision.<\/p><\/div>\n

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S\/9121. Letter of 31 March 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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RESOLUTION 265 (1969), as proposed by 3 powers, S\/9120\/Rev.1, adopted by Council on 1 April 1969, meeting 1473, by 11 votes to 0, with 4 abstentions (Colombia, Paraguay, United Kingdom, United States).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>The Security Council,<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>Having considered <\/i>the agenda contained in document S\/Agenda\/1466\/Rev.1,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>Having heard <\/i>the statements made before the Council,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>Recalling <\/i>its resolution 236 (1967) of 12 June 1967,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>Observing <\/i>that numerous premeditated violations of the cease-fire have occurred,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>Viewing with deep concern <\/i>that the recent air attacks on Jordanian villages and other populated areas were of a pre-planned nature, in violation of resolutions 248 (1968) of 24 March 1968 and 256 (1968) of 16 August 1968,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>Gravely concerned <\/i>about the deteriorating situation which endangers peace and security in the area,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Reaffirms <\/i>resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968);<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Deplores <\/i>the loss of civilian life and damage to property;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Condemns <\/i>the recent premeditated air attacks launched by Israel on Jordanian villages and populated areas in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions, and warns once again that if such attacks were to be repeated the Security Council would have to meet to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such attacks.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

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COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(APRIL-DECEMBER 1969)<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9137. Letter of 8 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9138. Letter of 8 April 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9166 and Corr.1. Letter of 20 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9167, S\/9170, S\/9173. Letters of 21 and 22 April 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9180. Letter of 28 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9187. Letter of 1 May 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9211 (A\/7555), S\/9212 (A\/7556). Letters of 16 May 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9217 (A\/7557). Letter of 21 May 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9218, S\/9219. Letters of 22 and 23 May 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9221, S\/9228 (A\/7560). Letters of 24 and 28 May 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9271, S\/9275. Letters of 19 and 23 June 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/\/9274, S\/9277. Letters of 23 June 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9285, S\/9386 (A\/7578), S\/9388. Letters of 26 June and 12 August 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9399 (A\/7584). Letter of 20 August 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9512, S\/9543, S\/9546. Letters of 26 November and 8 and 9 December 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9560. Letter of 16 December 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9578. Letter of 22 December 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

COMPLAINTS BY ISRAEL<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

AND UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.109, 111. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 2 and 26 January 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.112, 114-117, 119, 120, 122-127. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 5, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17 and 24-28 February 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.128, 130-145. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 3, 5-14, 18 24 and 26 March 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.147 and Corr.1, 148-151, 153-164, 165 and Corr.1, 166-177, 179, 180. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 4 8-11, 13-26 and 28-30 April 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.181-194, 195 and Corr.1, 197-209, 211, 213, 215, 216. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 1-10, 12-24 and 26-31 May 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.217-224, 226-242, 244-249. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General dated 2-7, 9-14, 16-28 and 30 June 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.250-257, 259-264, 265 and Corr.1, 266-268, 270, 271 and Corr.1, 272-282, 283 and Corr.1, 284-290.  Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 1-5, 7-12 and 14-31 July 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.292, 294-311, 313, 314, 316, 317, 319, 321-326. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 1, 2, 4-9, 11-16, 18-23 and 25-30 August 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.327, 328, 330-344, 346-349, 350 and Corr.1, 351-367. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 1-6, 8-13, 15-20, 22-27, 29 and 30 September 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.368-402, 404, 405. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 1-4, 6-11, 13-18, 20-25 and 27-31 October 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.406-411, 413-423, 425-431, 433-439. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 1, 3-15, 17-22 and 24-29 November 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.440-448. 450, 452, 454, 457-463, 465, 466, 468, 470, 472-180. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General dated 1-6, 8-13, 15-20, 22-24, 26, 27 and 29-31 December 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8978. Letter of 25 January 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8991 (A\/7505). Telegram of 3 February 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8994 (A\/7506), S\/90011. S\/9009. Letters of 5, 12 and 13 February 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9008. Letter of 13 February 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9057, S\/9059. Letters of 8 and 9 March 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9060, S\/9061. Letters of 9 March 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9062, S\/9071. Letters of 9 and 11 March 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9072. Letter of 11 March 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9076-S\/9078. Letters of 13 March 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9080, S\/9092. Letters of 13 and 18 March 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9093, S\/9106, S\/9109. Letters of 18 and 24 March 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9108. Letter of 24 March 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9124. Letter of 1 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9130, S\/9132. Letters of 3 and 4 April 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9134, S\/9140. Letters of 4 and 8 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9143. Letter of 8 April 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9144, S\/9147. Letters of 9 and 10 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9148, S\/9152, S\/9155. Letters of 10, 11 and 13 April 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9156. Letter of 14 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9157, S\/9159, S\/9165. S\/9168. Letters of 14, 15, 18 and 21 April 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9171. Special report of Secretary-General, dated 21 April 1969, on critical situation in Suez Canal sector.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9172. Letter of 21 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9178. Letter of 25 April 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9186. Telegram of 30 April 1969 from United Arab Republic.\t<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9188. Report of Secretary-General, dated 2 May 1969, on developments threatening effectiveness of United Nations observation operation in Suez Canal sector (containing texts of letters exchanged between Secretary-General and Permanent Representatives of Israel and United Arab Republic, from 21 April to 1 May 1969).<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9189. Letter of 1 May 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9194 and Corr.1. Letter of 7 May 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9196. Letter of 8 May 1969 from USSR.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9206, S\/9207. Letters of 12 and 13 May 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9209. Letter of 15 May 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9210. Letter of 15 May 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9213. Letter of 17 May 1969 from Finland.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9214, S\/9254. Letters of 19 May and 13 June 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9256. Letter of 16 June 1969 from Kuwait.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9278, S\/9283, S\/9286. Letters of 24, 25 and 27 June 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9316. Special report of Secretary-General, dated 5 July 1969, on increasing ineffectiveness of cease-fire in Suez Canal sector (containing texts of letters exchanged between Secretary-General and Permanent Representative of Israel and United Arab Republic, from 21 April to 1 May 1969).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9321 Letter of 10 July 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9322. Letter of 11 July 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9325, S\/9337. Letters of 11 and 17 July 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9339 Letter of 18 July 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9343, S\/9344. Letters of 20 July 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9349. Letter of 22 July 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9368. Special report of Secretary-General, dated 30 July 1969, on death of United Nations military observer on 27 July 1969 in Suez Canal sector.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9398 (A\/7582). Letter of 19 August 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9405 (A\/7588). Letter of 23 August 1969 from Permanent Representative of Israel to Secretary-General.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9417 (A\/7598). Letter of 27 August 1969 from Secretary-General to Permanent Representative of Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9468. Letter of 8 October 1969 from Organization of African Unity (transmitting, inter alia, <\/i>texts of resolutions adopted by Sixth Assembly of African Heads of State and Government on situation in Middle East).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9540 (A\/7828). Letter of 4 December 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMPLAINTS BY<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

ISRAEL AND LEBANON<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(3 JANUARY-17 JULY 1969)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>S\/7930\/Add.110, 121, 269. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 4 January, 24 February and 17 July 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9023. Letter of 22 February 1969 from Lebanon.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS TO AND CONSIDERATION<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>DURING PERIOD 11-26 AUGUST 1969<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1498-1502, 1504.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S\/9383. Letter of 11 August 1969 from Lebanon.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9385. Letter of 12 August 1969 from Lebanon (request to convene Council).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9387 Letter of 12 August 1969 from Israel (request to convene Council).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9389, S\/9390. Letters of 13 August 1969 from Israel and Lebanon (requests to participate in Council's discussions).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9392. Letter of 15 August 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9393 and Add.1,2. Note by Secretary-General dated 18 August 1969 (containing text of letter of 16 August 1969 from Secretary-General to Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel, and their replies dated 18 and 25 August 1969).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9410. Draft resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

RESOLUTION 270 (1969), as proposed by Council members, S\/9410, adopted unanimously by Council on 26 August 1969, meeting 1504<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>The Security <\/i>Council,<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>Having considered <\/i>the agenda contained in document S\/Agenda\/1498\/Rev.1,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>Having noted <\/i>the contents of the letter of the Charge' d'affaires ad interim <\/i>of Lebanon (S\/9383),<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>Having heard the <\/i>statements of the representatives of Lebanon and Israel,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>Grieved <\/i>at the tragic loss of civilian life and property,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>Gravely concerned <\/i>about the deteriorating situation resulting from the violation of Security Council resolutions,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>Recalling <\/i>the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon of 23 March 1919, and the cease-fire established pursuant to resolutions 233 (1967) and 234 (1967) of 6 and 7 June 1967, respectively,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>Recalling <\/i>its resolution 262 (1968) of 31 December 1968,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>Mindful <\/i>of its responsibility under the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>1.  Condemns <\/i>the premeditated air attack by Israel on villages in southern Lebanon in violation of its obligations under the Charter and Security Council resolutions;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>2.  Deplores <\/i>all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>3.  Deplores <\/i>the extension of the area of fighting;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>4.  Declares <\/i>that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1969)<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9429. Letter of 3 September 1969 from Lebanon.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9431. Letter of 4 September 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9433, S\/9465. Letters of 5 September and 6 October 1969 from Lebanon.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9470. Letter of 10 October 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9496. Letter of 3 November 1969 from USSR.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9497. Letter of 4 November 1969 from United States.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9530. Letter of 4 December 1969 from Lebanon.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9556. Letter of 15 December 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

CONCERNING ISRAEL AND SYRIA<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.113, 118, 122, 125, 126, 129, 131, 146. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 8, 14 24, 26 and 27 February and 3, 6 and 29 March 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.152, 178, 186, 196, 210, 212, 214, 222, 225, 243. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 9 and 28 April, 6, 14 and 27-29 May and 6, 7 and 24 June 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.258, 291, 293, 298, 312, 315, 318, 320, 329, 345. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 9 and 31 July, 1, 6, 19, 21, 23 and 25 August and 2 and 15 September 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/7930\/Add.403, 412, 424, 432, 447, 449, 451, 453 455, 456, 464, 467, 469, 471. Supplemental information received by Secretary-General, dated 30 October, 7, 15 and 22 November and 8-11, 18, 21 and 22 December 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9028 (A\/7518). Letter of 25 February 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9033. Letter of 28 February from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9041. Letter of 4 March 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9070. Letter of 11 March 1969 from Hungary.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9073. Letter of 11 March 1969 from USSR.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9075, S\/9091. Letters of 12 and 18 March 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9110 (A\/7532), S\/9131, S\/9139, S\/9141, S\/9150. Letters of 25 March and 4, 8 and 11 April 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9158. Letter of 15 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9164. Letter of 17 April 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9177. Letter of 25 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9199, S\/9320 and Corr.1, S\/9371. Letters of 9 May, 10 July and 1 August 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9379. Letter of 6 August 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9381. Letter of 8 August 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9398 (A\/7582). Letter of 19 August 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9459 (A\/7689), S\/9489 (A\/7730). Letters of 30 September and 28 October 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

IRAQ AND ISRAEL<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9094 (A\/7528). Letter of 18 March 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9111 (A\/7533). Letter of 25 March 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9125 (A\/7535). Letter of 1 April 1969 from Iraq.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9145, S\/9146 (A\/7539). Letters of 10 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9175 and Corr.1 (A\/7545 and Corr.1). Letter of 24 April 1969 from Iraq.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9181. Letter of 29 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9192. Letter of 5 May 1969 from Iraq.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9201 (A\/7552). Letter of 12 May 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

QUESTIONS RELATING TO TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

POPULATIONS IN ISRAEL-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

In the course of 1969, the Security Council received a number of communications from Arab States complaining about Israel's policies in the territories under Israeli occupation and alleging that Israel had arrested, detained and tortured Arab civilians, and had razed villages and demolished houses. Israel rejected those charges and submitted counter-charges alleging that Arab authorities had engaged in aggressive and terrorist activities against Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(See also pp. 509-12.)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter dated 16 January 1969, Syria drew attention to reports by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency concerning Israel's plans for establishing 32 Israeli settlements in the Syrian territory of the Golan Heights. The letter charged that this policy of colonizing the occupied territories confirmed Israel's expansionist designs.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In letters dated 4 March and 4, 8 and 11 April, Syria further charged that the Israeli occupation forces had been destroying and setting fire to several villages in the Syrian territory occupied by Israel, in violation of tile Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and scores of United Nations resolutions, and that complaints about those violations had been lodged with the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In its letter of 4 April, Syria added that the acts of razing villages and the destruction of houses in Syrian territory occupied by Israel had taken place on the very day that the Security Council was looking into Jordan's complaint about attacks on civilians.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Israel replied to Syria's charges on 15 April, stating that Syria had no grounds for complaint over defence measures taken by Israel on its side of the cease-fire line in the face of Syrian violations by its regular forces and by marauders and saboteurs.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span><\/strong>Syria protested on 17 April that so-called defence measures could not justify the razing of villages, demolition of houses and mass execution of shepherds, and called attention to Israel's refusal to accept the dispatch of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in accordance with the Council's resolution of 27 September 1968 (259 (1968)). 17<\/u>\/ <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Israel asserted in a letter dated 25 April that, since Syria's policy had remained one of war with Israel, Syria had no basis for advising Israel on how to defend itself.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 28 October, Syria drew attention to Israel's decision to extend Israel's legal jurisdiction to the Syrian territory of the Golan Heights in defiance of all United Nations resolutions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 7 January, Jordan transmitted the text of a statement by the President of the Union of Palestine Arab students in Lebanon, a Jordanian citizen, alleging that he and other Arabs had been ill-treated in Israeli prisons. Those charges were denied by Israel in a letter of 13 January.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 30 January, Jordan drew attention to the deteriorating conditions of the refugees in eastern Jordan following floods and snowstorms, and urged that steps be taken for their speedy return to their homes.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 3 February, the United Arab Republic charged, and on 5 February Israel denied, that the Israeli authorities had been inflicting inhuman treatment on the civilian population in the Gaza sector.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 10 February, Jordan transmitted a list of protests submitted to the occupying forces of Israel by religious leaders and institutions concerning Israeli measures in the occupied area.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In letters dated 13 and 21 February, Iraq and Southern Yemen charged Israel with armed attack and with atrocities against the civilian population in the Israel-occupied areas.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 21 March, Jordan charged that the Arab population in the occupied areas, especially Jerusalem, were the subject of arbitrary detention by the Israeli authorities. Furthermore, Jordan charged, Israel had attacked schools and students and had demolished houses.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Replying on 31 March, Israel stated that Jordan had distorted what were necessary security measures taken by Israel against those who had committed acts of murder and terror or had abetted them.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Further charges of arbitrary arrest and expulsion of Arab personalities from the West Bank were made on 17 April by Jordan, which stated that Israel was using these measures as a means of pressure against the population. Israel replied on 22 April that some Arabs had been arrested on the basis of information that they were engaged in terrorist activities, and that they had been well treated and had left at their own request.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 8 and 26 May, Jordan submitted further charges of violations of human rights committed by Israel in the West Bank and in Gaza, particularly with regard to women suspected of resistance to foreign occupation; Jordan also transmitted protests from relatives of detainees and from the Red Cross Societies of Jordan and Lebanon. Israel denied those charges on 14 May and 2 June, stating they were designed to divert attention from Jordan's responsibility for the \t<\/span>continuation of acts of terror and aggression carried out by and from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 26 September, Jordan complained that the people of Al-Khalil (Hebron) and Beit Sahur had been subjected to intimidation, economic strangulation, arbitrary arrests, and torture, and charged that the Israeli army had spoiled goods in stores, deported people to the East Bank, blown up houses and imposed a curfew for 22 hours a day.  On 7 October, Israel replied that after a series of sabotage acts in those towns, causing the deaths of several civilians, Israeli authorities had to take preventive and police measures to ensure the safety of the population.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter dated 14 October, the United Arab Republic charged that one of its citizens, who was a member of the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees gees in the Near East (UNRWA), had been subjected to illegal arrest and arbitrary trial in  disregard of the immunities enjoyed by officials of the United Nations. On 17 October, Israel replied that the person in question had been duly tried and convicted for several security offences falling outside her official duties, and that the court had dismissed as inapplicable the contention that she was immune from prosecution under the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In three letters dated 10, 21 and 25 November, Jordan transmitted the texts of articles published in two London newspapers, The Times <\/i>and The Sunday Times, <\/i>on the treatment of civilian populations in Israel-held territories.  These articles, he said, showed the intensification of measures of collective punishment inflicted by Israel on innocent civilians.  He also transmitted the texts of some letters to the editor published by The Times <\/i>on the same subject.  On 18 November, Israel replied by transmitting the texts of other letters to the editor, also published in The Times, <\/i>on the treatment of civilian populations, and on 19 December the text of a letter addressed to The Sunday Times <\/i>from the Embassy of Israel in London.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S\/8961 (A\/7500). Letter of 7 January 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8965 (A\/7501). Letter of 13 January 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8971 (A\/7502). Letter of 16 January 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8978. Letter of 25 January 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8988 (A\/7504). Letter of 30 January 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8991 (A\/7505). Telegram of 3 February 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8994 (A\/7506). Letter of 5 February 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9001 (A\/7509). Letter of 10 February 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9011 (A\/7513). Letter of 13 February 1969 from Iraq.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9029 (A\/7517). Letter of 21 February 1969 from Southern Yemen.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9042 (A\/7522). Letter of 4 March 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9102 (A\/7531). Letter of 21 March 1969 Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9122 (A\/7534). Letter of 31 March 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9131, S\/9139, S\/9150. Letters of 4, 8 and 11 April 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9158. Letter of 15 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9162 (A\/7542). Letter of 17 April 1969 from Jordan<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9164. Letter of 17 April 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9174 (A\/7544), S\/9177. Letter of 22 and 25 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9197 (A\/7551). Letter of 8 May 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9199. Letter of 9 May 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9208 (A\/7554), S\/9217 (A\/7557). Letters of 14 and 21 May 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9225 (A\/7559). Letter of 26 May 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9230 and Corr.1 (A\/7563 and Corr.1). Letter of 2 June 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9456. Letter of 26 September 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9459 (A\/7689). Letter of 30 September 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9466. Letter of 7 October 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9474 (A\/7711). Letter of 14 October 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9478 (A\/7716). Letter of 17 October 1969 from\t<\/span>Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9489 (A\/7730). Letter of 28 October 1969 from\t<\/span>Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9501 (A\/7758). Letter of 10 November 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9506 (A\/7766). Letter of 18 November 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9507 (A\/7783), S\/9511 (A\/7792). Letters of 21 and 25 November 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9575 (A\/7918). Letter of 19 December 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

THE SITUATION IN AND AROUND JERUSALEM AND ITS HOLY PLACES<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

During 1969, the Security Council received a number of communications about the situation in Jerusalem and its Holy Places, a subject that was considered at Security Council meetings held in late June and early July, and also at Further meetings held in September in connexion with an incident at the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. The Secretary-General also submitted reports on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 252 (1968), 267 (1969) and 271 (1969) 18<\/u>\/ related to Jerusalem.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY COUNCIL<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

AND REPORT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(FEBRUARY-JUNE 1969)<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter dated 5 February 1969, Jordan transmitted the text of a cable that had been addressed to the President of the Security Council on 1 February by Rouhi El-Khatib, the Jordanian Mayor of Jerusalem, urging action to end the liquidation of the 70,000 Arabs of Jerusalem and the repressive measures being promulgated by Israel to change the character of the Holy City.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 10 February, Jordan also transmitted a list of protests submitted to the Israeli authorities by religious leaders and institutions against the measures taken by Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 8 February, Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the continued Israeli defiance of the Security Council's resolution of 21 May 1968 (252 (1968)), which, among other things, called upon Israel "to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem."  Despite that clear warning, Jordan stated, Israel had enacted legislation designed to destroy the character of the city and to incorporate Arab life and institutions into Israeli life. The legislation was to take effect on 25 February and would create a situation that threatened not only the economic life of the Christians and Moslems of Jerusalem but also international peace and security, therefore warranting consideration of that situation by the Council.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In another letter of 8 February, Jordan transmitted the text of a memorandum addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel by a group of Arab lawyers in Israel-occupied territory, in which they had protested against Israeli legislation aimed at completing the process of Israel's annexation of Jerusalem and its environs.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a note dated 10 February, the President of the Security Council stated that the meeting of the Council scheduled for 11 February had been postponed, Israel having decided to postpone until 23 May 1969 the implementation of the legislative provisions that were the subject of Jordan's complaint.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Referring to the postponement of the Security Council's meeting, Jordan contended on 13 February that the postponement would allow for efforts to be made to repeal the legislation and thus avoid confronting the world with a fait accompli. <\/i>Jordan also requested the Secretary-General to furnish the Council with a progress report on the implementation of resolution 252 (1968).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 11 April, the Secretary-General, in pursuance of Security Council resolution 252 (1968), submitted a report in which he stated that since the termination of the mission of his Personal Representative in Jerusalem in September 1967, he had had no means of obtaining first-hand information upon which he could <\/strong>base a report.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span><\/strong>He went on to say that on 13 February 1969, he had sent a note to Israel in which he recalled that under resolution 252 (1968) the Council: had considered that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tended to change the legal status of Jerusalem were invalid and could not change that status; had urgently called upon Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action that tended to change the status of Jerusalem; and had requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution. The Secretary-General had stated that in the main he had to look to the Government of Israel for the information necessary in the discharge of his responsibilities and had therefore requested the Government of Israel to provide him with such <\/strong>information. The representative of Israel had informed him on 25 March that the position of the Government of Israel continued to be the same as set forth by Israel's Foreign Minister on 10 July 196710 and in statements made on the subject by Israel in the General Assembly and the Security Council.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Secretary-General then stated that the only other source of information of an official nature pertinent to the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 21 May 1968 (252 (1968)) was the Israel Official Gazette, <\/i>published originally in Hebrew. According to that source, the Israeli Parliament had adopted on 14 August 1968 the "Legal and Administrative Matters (Regulation) Law, 1968," which was relevant to the situation in Jerusalem.  With regard to the implementation of that law, the Secretary-General recalled that the President of the Security Council had indicated in his note of 10 February 1969 that Israel had decided to postpone until 23 May 1969 the implementation of that law. The report of the Secretary-General contained as an annex an unofficial translation of that law, and relevant explanatory notes.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 30 June, the Secretary-General issued an addendum to his report of 11 April on the implementation of Security Council resolution 252 (1968), in which he brought to the attention of the Council further information concerning legislation adopted by Israel, legislation that consisted of certain emergency regulations entitled "Regulation of Legal and Administrative Matters – Further Provisions." These were additional provisions of the Regulation Law contained in his initial report. The addendum contained three annexes – an unofficial translation of a "law and administration ordinance" and two sets of regulations that postponed for six months certain provisions of the Regulation Law.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

COMPLAINT BY JORDAN AND<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

CONSIDERATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(30 JUNE-3 JULY 1969)<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 26 June 1969, Jordan complained of further violations by Israel of the Security Council's resolution of 21 May 1968 (252 (1968)), and stated that the Government of Israel, instead of complying with that resolution, had enacted Regulation Law 1968, and had on 27 April 1969 enacted further provisions and regulations. Jordan recalled that the urgent meeting of the Council which it had requested had been deferred.  Israel, however, continued to violate <\/strong>basic human rights in the Holy City and to take measures contrary to the provisions of resolution 252 (1968) and the United Nations Charter. Jordan therefore requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the continued Israeli defiance of resolution 252 (1968).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>With letters dated 30 June and 2 July, Jordan also transmitted photographs that, it stated, showed Israeli bulldozing of Arab houses and Moslem shrines in Jerusalem and the construction of Israeli settlements on confiscated Arab lands in eastern Jerusalem.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 30 June, the Council included Jordan's complaint in its agenda, and invited the representatives of Jordan, Israel and the United Arab Republic and, subsequently, the representatives of Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of Jordan stated that Israel's action in defiance of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions had threatened not only the political and economic life of Jordanian citizens in Jerusalem but also international peace and security. Although the Council and the Assembly had called upon Israel not to take any action tending to alter the status of Jerusalem, Israel's laws were designed to merge Jerusalem in Israel and to subordinate all Arab life to Israeli laws and thus liquidate the whole Arab character of the city.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Jordan requested the Security Council: to declare Israel's failure to implement resolution 252(1968); to call upon it to rescind all measures that had resulted or might result in changing the status of Jerusalem; to warn Israel that, unless the illegal acts of legislation were rescinded, the Council would reconvene to take action including the application of Article 41 of the Charter; 20<\/u>\/ to appeal to Member States to refrain from sending arms and military equipment to Israel and to reaffirm its previous decisions, as well as General Assembly resolutions on the question of Jerusalem; and to call upon the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council on the implementation of its resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of Israel stated that Jordan's request for consideration by the Council of the administrative measures taken by his country was only a manoeuvre to divert attention from the fact that the Arab Governments had hardened even further their refusal to conclude peace with Israel. Jordan appeared to be complaining about certain measures and regulations merely because Israel had undertaken them.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>As for Jordan's complaint concerning Israel's measures in the vicinity of the Western (Wailing) Wall, the representative of Israel said that relocation of tenants in that area had been necessitated because their homes had been the sites of explosive charges detonated on 20 June by saboteurs from Jordan, a matter about which he had complained to the Council and the responsibility for which had been admitted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.  Referring again to the sites of the Western (Wailing) Wall, he said that in 1948 Jordan had razed 34 of the 35 houses of worship in the area of the Western Wall, as well as schools and homes of the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem. The large number of foreign tourists who were visiting Jerusalem would attest to the fact that the city was basically content. Furthermore, a large number of Christian leaders and some Moslem leaders had expressed satisfaction at the situation with regard to their Holy Places in Jerusalem.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In the course of the debate, several members of the Security Council and representatives invited to participate in the discussion maintained that the essential issue before the Council was that Israel had defied both the Council's request not to take any measures that tended to change the status of Jerusalem and the Council's decision that any measures taken in violation of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions were invalid.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Some members also maintained that Israel's action had transgressed the rules that governed military occupation under international law and were offensive to numerous religious interests.  Others, referring to the Security Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, felt it imperative that the Council ensure that its decisions were respected.  Many expressed the hope that the efforts of the permanent members of the Council would lead the way to an over-all settlement and would help to safeguard the interests of all Members of the United Nations in the City of Jerusalem.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a statement transmitted to the Security Council on 3 July, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey noted that Israel had continued to take measures inconsistent with United Nations resolutions and expressed the hope that the Council would re-examine the current situation in detail and take measures that might be necessary for its amelioration.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 3 July, the representative of Pakistan introduced a draft resolution, sponsored also by Senegal and Zambia, by which, among other things,  the  Security  Council  would: (1) reaffirm its resolution of 21 May 1968 (252 (1968)); (2) deplore the failure of Israel to show any regard for  the  relevant  General Assembly and Security Council resolutions; (3) censure in the strongest terms all measures taken to change the status of the City of Jerusalem; (4) confirm that all legislative and administrative measures and actions by Israel which purported to alter the status of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, were invalid and could not change that status; (5) urgently call once more upon Israel to rescind forthwith all measures taken by it which might tend to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, and in future to refrain from all actions likely to have such an effect; (6) request Israel to inform the Security Council without any further delay of its intentions with regard to the implementation of the provisions of this resolution; (7) determine that, in the event of a negative response or no response from Israel, the Security Council should reconvene without delay to consider what further action should be taken in this matter; and (8) request the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 3 July, the Security Council voted on the three-power draft resolution. The paragraph calling upon Israel to rescind all measures taken by it which might tend to change the status of Jerusalem and to refrain from all such action in future was adopted by 14 votes to 0, with 1 abstention. The draft resolution as a whole was adopted unanimously as resolution 267 (1969).  (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

REPORT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(5 DECEMBER 1969)<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 5 December 1969, the Secretary-General, as requested, submitted a report on the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 3 July 1969 (267 (1969)).  To obtain the necessary information for his report to the Council, he had addressed a note to the Permanent Representative of Israel on 27 August, in which he referred to resolution 267 (1969) requesting Israel to inform the Security Council, without any further delay, of its intentions with regard to the implementation of the provisions of that resolution, and asked for an early reply. That request had been reiterated in further notes dated 15 October and 21 November.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a reply dated 27 November, the Foreign Minister of Israel had stated that the division of Jerusalem had arisen out of illicit armed action by Jordanian forces in 1948 in defiance of the Security Council's appeals for a cease-fire. That division had been terminated following hostilities initiated by Jordan in 1967.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>With respect to international concern for the Holy Places, he stated that Israel had ensured that the Holy Places would be administered under the responsibility of the religions concerned.  In contrast to the action taken during the Jordanian occupation, when the Jewish Quarter of the walled Old City had been practically destroyed and the ancient Jewish cemetery and houses of prayer desecrated, Israel had restored and reconstructed the Holy Places belonging to all religions. The progress of the City of Jerusalem during the past two years stood in sharp contrast to the situation that had prevailed previously.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Government of Israel, he said, did not claim exclusive jurisdiction in the Holy Places of Christianity and Islam in Jerusalem and was willing to discuss that principle with those traditionally concerned. In the meantime, his Government's policy was that the Moslem and Christian Holy Places should always be under the responsibility of those who held them sacred, and that principle had been in practical effect since 1967.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMPLAINT CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

FIRE IN AL AQSA MOSQUE<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a telegram dated 21 August 1969, addressed to the President of the Security Council, Jordan stated that at 7:20 that morning fire had broken out in the Al Aqsa Mosque, in Jerusalem, lasting for more than three hours and causing complete destruction of the southern part of the ceiling and the twelfth-century pulpit, as well as severe damage to the walls. The telegram added that Jordan held the Israeli authorities responsible because the act had taken place when the Holy City and all the West Bank were under Israeli military occupation. Jordan asked the Security Council to take effective measures against the Israeli authorities who had failed to show any regard for United Nations resolutions concerning Jerusalem.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter of 22 August, Israel drew attention to two statements issued the previous day in which the Israeli Prime Minister and Cabinet had expressed shock and regret at the fire, had noted that fire brigades had been called immediately, and had stated that a commission of inquiry would investigate and publish findings about the cause of the fire.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In another letter of 25 August, Israel reported that due to the prompt efforts of Arab and Jewish fire brigades, the fire had been extinguished in time to preserve the main structure and the dome of the Mosque.  Again the Government expressed its profound sorrow at the event.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In separate letters dated from 21 August to 2 September, the representatives of India, Libya, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria and the USSR expressed the shock and grief felt by the people and Governments of their respective countries at the fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 22 August, Afghanistan, Algeria, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Republic and Yemen drew attention to the grave event of 21 August 1969 in Jerusalem, when the Al Aqsa Mosque, one of the holiest shrines of Islam, had been extensively damaged by arson.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>They added that the occurrence of that outrage while Jerusalem was under the military occupation of Israeli authorities had filled the populations of their countries with profound horror and grief. After stating that the occurrence of such events aggravated further the threat to peace, they emphasized the urgency of suitable action by the United Nations towards: (a<\/i>) instituting an impartial investigation into the grave events resulting in the fire; (b<\/i>) preventing the recurrence of any act of vandalism of the Holy Places in Jerusalem; and (c<\/i>) enabling the representatives of Governments of Islamic countries to assess the damage to the Al Aqsa Mosque and to prepare and execute plans for its repair.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 28 August, the representatives of 25 Member States requested the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation resulting from the extensive damage caused by arson to the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 9 September 1969, the Security Council included the above request in its agenda. The Council President, with the consent of the Council, invited the representatives of Indonesia, Israel and the United Arab Republic, at their requests, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. At subsequent meetings, similar invitations to participate without vote were extended to the representatives of Ceylon, India, Jordan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Somalia.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of Pakistan stated that in considering the item the Council had to view it in the perspective of civilization as a whole. That vandalism against the monuments of the human spirit had become unthinkable was a confidence shattered on 21 August when, under Israel's military occupation, the holy Al Aqsa Mosque had been damaged by arson. It could not be denied that the environment produced by Israeli's occupation of the Holy City had provided an element of encouragement to those responsible for the crime. The withdrawal of Israeli control from the Old City of Jerusalem, he added, was imperative if the conflict in the Middle East was to become controllable. That conflict was already grave, and the addition to it of a conflict involving the sensibilities of vast populations from all parts of the world would make it limitless in its repercussions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of Pakistan then said that the action suggested by the signatories of the letter to the Security Council was in accordance with Council resolutions 252 (1968) and 267  (1969), 21<\/u>\/ which had confirmed that all legislative and administrative measures taken by Israel to alter the status of Jerusalem were invalid.  In view of these resolutions and the repercussions felt throughout the world, particularly in the Islamic communities, he said, the Council's response to the outrage of 21 August must be to take urgent measures to prevent any recurrence of that event.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of the United Arab Republic said that, since Israel had continued its defiance of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the question of the status of Jerusalem, the burning of Al Aqsa could not be treated in isolation. For that reason, it was imperative that all Member States should bring the aggressor back into the realm of international authority. Effective measures, including the application of sanctions, should be taken by the Security Council to bring about full implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions, the restoration of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, and the prompt and complete termination of Israeli aggression.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The spokesman for Indonesia said that in a communication to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, he had requested an impartial investigation to enable the representatives of the Governments of Islamic countries to assess the damage and to make plans for the repair of the Mosque. In defiance of resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969), Israel had carried out certain measures in Jerusalem, and the Council had heard charges of acts of demolition and desecration.  The extent of those charges could not be determined because Israel had refused to allow the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to make an impartial survey of the situation.  In the circumstances, the Security Council must take effective measures to have its resolutions concerning Jerusalem fully implemented.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Israel's representative said his Government shared the sense of shock at the damage caused to the Al Aqsa Mosque and had already promised that its swift repair would be carried out as soon as possible. However, all decent public opinion had been revolted at the false accounts of that tragic occurrence and its deliberate exploitation for political purposes.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Israel, he said, believed that a number of the Moslem States requesting Security Council consideration of the matter had done so only out of genuine concern for a Moslem Holy Place, without any desire to increase tension.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>He went on to say that, as in cases of natural calamity, when the inherent understanding of human beings for each other's distress came to the fore, there were elements of precisely the same understanding in the case of the fire on 21 August 1969 in the Al Aqsa Mosque. Both Arabs and Jews had striven side by side to overcome the fire.  Arab-Jewish co-operation continued in efforts to apprehend the person responsible for the fire, and the official inquiry into the circumstances of the fire was being conducted by a commission composed of Arab and Jewish personalities, before which Arab and Jewish witnesses were appearing in an endeavour to ascertain the facts.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of Israel then gave an account of the events of 21 August, when the fire at Al Aqsa took place. He said that the Prime Minster of Israel and the Israeli Cabinet, which had met urgently in a special session, had issued statements expressing deep regret at the outbreak of fire in the Mosque and the readiness of the Government of Israel to give all aid and co-operation necessary for the repair and restoration of those parts of the building that had been damaged. On 22 August, an Australian visitor, Michael Rohan, had been arrested by the Israeli police on the basis of evidence submitted by the Moslem guards at the Al Aqsa Mosque, and formal charges had been filed against him.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Israel's representative went on to say that official Israeli communications on the Al Aqsa fire expressed revulsion at the efforts to attribute culpability to Israel for causing the fire. The Foreign Minister of Israel had stated on 24 August that Al Aqsa was a part of universal culture, that as a result of damage to it a part of the human legacy had been injured, and that everything must be done to restore it as far as possible to its full splendor. It was in that spirit that the Security Council must consider the incident, and its action must not cause further division and hostility.  The Arab population in Jerusalem, which was shocked by the fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque, had remained calm despite attempts by some groups, prompted by foreign broadcasts, to exploit the situation. Their leaders had expressed their satisfaction at the measures taken by the Israeli authorities and the progress made with regard to investigation of the fire. Israel was prepared also to make available all necessary assistance, including the admission of experts from abroad.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of India said his country, with its firm belief in secularism, had felt grieved at the desecration of a place of worship.  Furthermore, numerous civic and religious leaders of many faiths had expressed their profound shock.  Nevertheless, it must not be believed that the question before the Council was a religious issue. It had wider implications and concerned the juridical status of Jerusalem. India considered that the incident was a direct consequence of the illegal occupation by Israel of Jerusalem and other Arab areas.  United Nations resolutions reaffirmed the principle that territory could not be acquired by military conquest. Therefore, the Council should make Israel carry out the various United Nations resolutions fully and faithfully.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Jordanian representative said that in previous discussions in the Council Jordan had drawn attention to the steps taken by Israel to bring about the complete annexation of Jerusalem. Israel had tried to absolve itself of the crime of the Al Aqsa fire, but, according to press reports emanating from Israel itself, the person suspected of arson had been brought from Australia by a Jewish agency to work for Israel in a kibbutz and had entertained dreams of rebuilding Solomon's temple. The burning of Al Aqsa was not only a premeditated act of burning a sacred monument but open defiance of the feelings of the people who cherished the cultural heritage Al Aqsa represented.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>It was not a secret, he added, that Israel and various Zionist organizations had been working to change the character and status of Jerusalem against the wishes of its people and in defiance of United Nations resolutions.  Therefore, the incident could not be viewed as an isolated event. The fears of the Moslem people and other peace-loving peoples had been aroused not by the event of the fire alone but by the other changes that Israel had made in the status of Jerusalem.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Hungary's representative said that although his country was a secular State it understood fully the feelings of shock; of those States that had requested the Council's consideration of the attempt to destroy the Al Aqsa Mosque by arson. The basic consideration was that it was the Israeli occupation that had nurtured a favourable climate in which an act of arson could take place. To prevent such acts, it was necessary for Israel to withdraw its forces from the Arab territories including Jerusalem, complying fully with the Security Council resolution of 3 July 1969 (267 (1969)), and to declare its agreement with the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of the United Kingdom believed that there were three propositions on which the Council could readily agree. First, the Council must reaffirm its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969) concerning the status of Jerusalem. Second, the Council should deplore the attempt to burn the Mosque. That crime was condemned by everyone in all countries, but it would be unjustified to reach any conclusion about the complicity of any State in the absence of adequate evidence.  The third proposition on which there was general agreement was that, despite obstacles to the implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 (242 (1967)), 22<\/u>\/ the Holy Places must be fully preserved and protected. With a decision based on these three propositions, the Council then could press further its search for a lasting peace in the Middle East.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 12 September, the representative of Pakistan introduced a draft resolution by which the Security Council, among other things, would: (1) reaffirm its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969); (2) recognize that any act of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Jerusalem or any encouragement of, or connivance at, any such act might seriously endanger international peace and security; (3) determine that the execrable act of desecration and profanation of the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque emphasized the immediate necessity of Israel's desisting from acting in violation of the aforesaid resolutions and rescinding forthwith all measures and actions taken by it designed to alter the status of Jerusalem; (4) call upon Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the Geneva Conventions governing military occupation and to refrain from causing any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Supreme Moslem Council of Jerusalem, including any co-operation it might desire from countries with predominantly Moslem population and from Moslem communities in relation to its plans for the maintenance and repair of the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem; (5) condemn the failure of Israel to comply with the aforementioned resolutions and call upon it to implement forthwith the provisions of these resolutions; (6) reiterate the determination expressed in resolution 267 (1969) that in the event of a negative response or no response, the Security Council should convene without  delay  to  consider  what  further  action  should  be taken in this matter; and (7) request the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council at the earliest possible date.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of Pakistan said that it reflected the consensus of the 25 Member States that requested the Council to meet to consider the event of 21 August 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 15 September, the representative of France said his country fully shared the deep emotion that had been aroused at the news that one of the most highly revered places of worship and one of the most celebrated works of art had been damaged by fire. The repercussions of the fire had been all the more pronounced since it had taken place in the section of Jerusalem that had been under Israeli occupation since June 1967.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Jerusalem, he went on to say, constituted a crucial point in any solution of the Middle East situation, and the Security Council, in order to prevent an increase in tension, had asked on 3 July 1969 that there should be no change in the status of Jerusalem and had censured all measures to change that status. France shared the wish for a full and impartial investigation that would establish responsibility for the incident and contribute to restoring calm in the area.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Tunisia's representative observed that the request of the 25 Member States had amply stressed that the situation resulting from the fire at Al Aqsa was a threat to international peace and security.  The basic fact was that military occupation by Israel had created an atmosphere conducive to the commission of the act of burning the Al Aqsa Mosque. In the circumstances, the responsibility of the Security Council and four of its permanent members was to see that military occupation of Arab territories was brought to an end.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The United States representative said his country was profoundly shocked and dismayed by the fire at the Al Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem and agreed that the facts surrounding the tragedy must be investigated thoroughly and impartially. After a careful examination of the facts that were so far available, his Government had seen no evidence to support the allegation that the act of suspected arson had been other than the act of an individual.  It had also noted that Israel had taken immediate steps to institute a commission of inquiry composed of representatives of three religious and that it would continue its co-operation with the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in applying the 1954 Convention and Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of Finland said the damage suffered by one of the most important religious shrines of the world was a loss to civilization as a whole. The incident raised the issue of the safety and protection of the Holy Places in Jerusalem, which was a matter of universal concern. It was for that reason that in August 1967 Ambassador Ernesto A. Thalmann of Switzerland, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, was specifically requested to investigate the situation concerning all the Holy Places in Jerusalem.  The unanimous adoption of resolution 267 (1969) on 3 July 1969 had made it clear that the international community could not accept as valid any measures that might tend to change the status of Jerusalem. The Security Council should deal with the question in a manner that would prevent further deterioration of the situation. On the basis of that criterion, Finland would determine its position on the draft resolution before the Council.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Spanish representative held the view that the military occupation of the Holy City by Israel was the factor underlying the case under discussion. It was appropriate, therefore, that the draft resolution submitted by Pakistan should have reiterated the principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force. By its resolutions, the Security Council had sought to find a solution to the Middle East situation on the basis of justice and respect for the interests of the parties concerned. However, in view of Israel's continued defiance of those resolutions, Spain would vote in favour of Pakistan's draft resolution which condemned the rebellious attitude of Israel with regard to United Nations resolutions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The President of the Security Council, speaking as the representative of the USSR, stated that the General Assembly and the Security Council had devoted considerable time to the question of Jerusalem. Their resolutions on that question were based on a basic principle that reflected the legal consciousness of Member States – namely, that Israel's military occupation of Jerusalem was an unlawful act and that Israel had no right to change that city's status.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>He went on to say that, by its resolution of 22 November 1967 (242 (1967)), the Security Council had called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories, without making any exception of Jerusalem or any other Arab territory. All decisions of the Security Council were binding upon Member States. It was an obligation, without exception and without conditions, assumed by each Member State under Article 25 of the Charter. 23<\/u>\/  Israel's attempts to change the status of Jerusalem included forcible expulsion of Arab inhabitants, destruction of Arab quarters, and subjection of the economic life of the Arab part of Jerusalem to the requirements of the Israeli military economy.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Continuing, the USSR representative said it was the atmosphere of repression that had led to the act of vandalism resulting in the damage to the Al Aqsa Mosque. The fact that the Al Aqsa Mosque had been set on fire under a continuing military occupation was not an accident but a direct result of Israel's aggression, for which the Israeli authorities would never be able to divest themselves of responsibility.  Israel's continued occupation of Arab lands had prolonged a dangerous situation and created a direct danger of war.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>It was imperative, therefore, the USSR representative declared, for the Security Council to take effective action to compel Israel to implement its resolution of 22 November 1967 (242 (1967)) and other decisions. For that reason, the USSR would support the draft resolution submitted by Pakistan.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Before the vote on the draft resolution, the representative of Pakistan noted that the current debate had brought out certain points that must be kept in mind in order to enable the Security Council to discharge its responsibility in the situation placed before it by the 25 Member States.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Council, he said, must realize that the event of 21 August had caused such anguish that, if the Council failed to take meaningful action, a sense of the gravest injustice was bound to grow, creating a situation that could not but be a danger to international peace and security.  Since the Council was not a court of justice, its concern was not to determine the issue of criminal responsibility for the act of arson but to deal with the political circumstances surrounding that act. Those were inextricably associated with Israel's military occupation of the Old City. The Council, therefore, was dealing with a political matter, not a religious conflict. Those who supported the draft resolution did not seek a condemnation of the evil act of 21 August, which stood self-condemned; nor did they seek to have the Council pronounce itself in such a manner as to imply complicity on the part of the Israeli authorities.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Before concluding his statement, the representative of Pakistan amended the fourth operative paragraph of the draft resolution (see above) by adding the phrase "and international law" after the words "Geneva Conventions."<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Before the Pakistan draft resolution, as amended, was put to the vote, the French representative requested a separate vote on the fourth operative paragraph. He would have preferred that paragraph to include a reference to the 1954 Convention and Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 15 September 1969, the Security Council voted on the draft resolution and adopted the fourth operative paragraph by 10 votes to 0, with 5 abstentions. It then adopted the draft resolution as a whole by 11 votes to 0, with 4 abstentions, as resolution 271 (1969).  (For text of resolution, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

REPORT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(16 DECEMBER 1969)<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 16 December, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the Security Council in accordance with its resolution 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969. He said he had communicated that resolution to the Government of Israel the day it had been adopted but, having received no information, he had addressed a note to the Permanent Representative of Israel on 24 November, requesting the necessary information about the implementation of the resolution, inasmuch as it was his intention to submit a report to the Security Council not later than mid-December 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Secretary-General said he had received a reply from the Permanent Representative of Israel on 16 December stating that the genesis of resolution 271 (1969) was an attempt by the Arab States to exploit the fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque for political and propaganda purposes, and that the tension and antagonism thus deliberately created had damaged further the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. The representative of Israel added that the report of the commission of inquiry that had been appointed by the President of the Supreme Court of Israel had been published, and that the trial of the person accused of arson in connexion with the fire was then in progress. In the meantime, temporary repairs to the Mosque had been carried out and prayers were being conducted as usual.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS TO SECURITY<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

COUNCIL AND REPORT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(FEBRUARY-JUNE 1969)<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8995. Letter of 5 February 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8998. Letter of 8 February 1969 from Jordan (request to convene Council).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8999 (A\/7508). Letter of 8 February 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9000. Note, dated 10 February 1969, by President of Security Council.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9001 (A\/7509), S\/9010 (A\/7512). Letters of 10 and 13 February 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9149 and Add.1 and Add.1\/Corr.1. Report of Secretary-General, dated 11 April 1969, submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968, and addendum dated 30 June 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMPLAINT BY JORDAN AND<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

CONSIDERATION BY SECURITY COUNCIL<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(30 JUNE-3 JULY 1969)<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1482-1485.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S\/9284. Letter of 26 June 1969 from Jordan (request to convene Council).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9288. Letter of 30 June 1969 from Israel (request to participate in Council's discussions).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9289. Letter of 30 June 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9290, S\/9294-S\/9298, S\/9300, S\/9302. Letters of 30 June-2 July 1969 from United Arab Republic Saudi Arabia, Syria, Morocco, Iraq, Indonesia, Lebanon and Malaysia (requests to participate in Council's discussions).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9303. Letter of 2 July 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9304-S\/9307, S\/9310. Letters of 2 and 3 July 1969 from Sudan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Tunisia and Kuwait (requests to participate in Council's discussions).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9311. Pakistan, Senegal, Zambia: draft resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9312. Letter of 3 July 1969 from Turkey.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

RESOLUTION 267 (1969), as proposed by 3 powers, S\/9311, unanimously adopted by Council on 3 July 1969, meeting 1485 (following adoption of operative paragraph 5 by separate vote of 14 to 0, with 1 abstention (United States)).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Security Council,<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Recalling <\/i>its resolution 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, respectively, concerning measures and actions by Israel affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Having heard <\/i>the statements of the parties concerned on the question, <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Noting <\/i>that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions Israel has taken further measures tending to change the status of the City of Jerusalem,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Reaffirming <\/i>the established principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Reaffirms <\/i>its resolution 252 (1968);<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Deplores <\/i>the failure of Israel to show any regard for the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council mentioned above;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Censures <\/i>in the strongest terms all measures taken to change the status of the City of Jerusalem;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>4.\t<\/span>Confirms <\/i>that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel which purport to alter the status of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, are invalid and cannot change that status;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>5.\t<\/span>Urgently calls <\/i>once more upon Israel to rescind forthwith all measures taken by it which may tend to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, and in future to refrain from all actions likely to have such an effect;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>6.\t<\/span>Requests <\/i>Israel to inform the Security Council without any further delay of its intentions with regard to the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>7.\t<\/span>Determines <\/i>that, in the event of a negative response or no response from Israel, the Security Council shall reconvene without delay to consider what further action should be taken in this matter;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>8.\t<\/span>Requests <\/i>the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

REPORT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(5 DECEMBER 1969)<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9537. Report of Secretary-General, dated 5 December 1969, submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMPLAINT CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

FIRE IN AL AQSA MOSQUE<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

SECURITY COUNCIL, meetings 1507-1512.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S\/9401. Telegram of 21 August 1969 from Jordan (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9402 (A\/7585). Letter of 22 August 1969 from Libya (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9403 (A\/7586). Letter of 22 August 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9404. Letter of 21 August 1969 from Morocco (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9407 (A\/7587 and Add.1). Telegraphic communication of 22 August 1969 from Afghanistan, Algeria, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic and Yemen (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9408 and Corr.1 (A\/7589 and Corr.1). Letter of 25 August 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9409 (A\/7590). Letter of 25 August 1969 from Pakistan (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9412. Cable of 23 August 1969 from Mauritania (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9413 (A\/7597). Letter of 26 August 1969 from India (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9415 (A\/7599). Letter of 27 August 1969 from Syria (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9418. Letter of 28 August 1969 from Somalia (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9421 and Add.1,2. Letter of 28 August 1969 from Afghanistan, Algeria, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic and Yemen (request to convene Council).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9422 (A\/7640). Letter of 28 August 1969 from Saudi Arabia (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9424 (A\/7645). Letter of 29 August 1969 from Jordan (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9426. Letter of 2 September 1969 from USSR (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9430 (A\/7647). Letter of 29 August 1969 from Maldives (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9435-S\/9437, S\/9439-S\/9444. Letters of 9-12 September 1969 from Israel, United Arab Republic Indonesia, India, Somalia, Jordan, Ceylon, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia (requests to participate in Council's discussions).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9445. Pakistan: draft resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9446. Letter of 12 September 1969 from Lebanon (request to participate in Council's discussions).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9447. Letter of 12 September 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9448. Letter of 15 September 1969 from Tunisia (request to participate in Council's discussions).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

RESOLUTION 271 (1969), as proposed by Pakistan, S\/9445, and as orally revised by sponsor, adopted by Council on 15 September 1969, meeting 1512, by 11 votes to 0, with 4 abstentions (Colombia, Finland, Paraguay, United States) (after adoption of operative paragraph 4 by separate vote of 10 to 0, with 5 abstentions (Colombia, Finland, France, Paraguay, United States)).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Security <\/i>Council<\/i>,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Grieved <\/i>at the extensive damage caused by arson to the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on 21 August 1969 under the military occupation of Israel,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Mindful <\/i>of the consequent loss to human culture, <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Having heard <\/i>the statements made before the Council reflecting the universal outrage caused by the act of sacrilege in one of the most venerated shrines of mankind,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Recalling <\/i>its resolutions 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969 and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, respectively, concerning measures and actions by Israel affecting the status of the City of Jerusalem,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Reaffirming <\/i>the established principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Reaffirms <\/i>its resolutions 252 (1968) and 267 (1969);<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Recognizes <\/i>that any act of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Jerusalem or any encouragement of, or connivance at, any such act may seriously endanger international peace and security;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Determines <\/i>that the execrable act of desecration and profanation of the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque emphasizes the immediate necessity of Israel's desisting from acting in violation of the aforesaid resolutions and rescinding forthwith all measures and actions taken by it designed to alter the status of Jerusalem;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>4.\t<\/span>Calls upon <\/i>Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and international law governing military occupation and to refrain from causing any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Supreme Moslem Council of Jerusalem, including any co-operation that Council may desire from countries with predominantly Moslem population and from Moslem communities in relation to its plans for the maintenance and repair of the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>5.\t<\/span>Condemns <\/i>the failure of Israel to comply with the aforementioned resolutions and calls upon it to implement forthwith the provisions of these resolutions;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>6.\t<\/span>Reiterates <\/i>the determination in paragraph 7 of resolution 267 (1969) that, in the event of a negative response or no response, the Security Council shall convene without delay to consider what further action should be taken in this matter;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>7.\t<\/span>Requests <\/i>the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the Security Council at the earliest possible date.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

REPORT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

(16 DECEMBER 1969)<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

S\/9559. Report of Secretary-General, dated 16 December 1969, in pursuance of Security Council resolution 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

GENERAL STATEMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

RELATING TO THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

GENERAL STATEMENTS<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span><\/i>During 1969, general statements and other communications concerning the situation in the Middle East were brought to the attention of the Security Council.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter dated 1 October 1969, the representative of Morocco transmitted the text of the Final Declaration of the Islamic Summit Conference held at Rabat, Morocco, from 22 to 25 September 1969, in which statements were made, inter alia, <\/i>concerning the fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque, the Islamic shrines in Jerusalem, and the continued Israeli occupation of Arab territories.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 7 November, India sent a letter concerning the representation of India at the Islamic Conference at Rabat; an official delegation from India had gone to the Conference, but no other delegation from India had been present representing "The Muslim Community of India," as mentioned in the first paragraph of the Final Declaration of the Conference.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 8 October, the observer of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at the United Nations transmitted the text of the resolutions adopted by the Sixth Assembly of African Heads of State and Government – held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 6 to 9 September 1969 – on aggression against the United Arab Republic and the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 (242 (1967)). 24<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter dated 3 November, the USSR transmitted a statement of 25 October by the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) concerning the events in Lebanon. According to the statement, the United States Embassy in Lebanon, on the pretext of expressing concern for the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon, had circulated a statement that had, in fact, put forward the claims of the United States to interfere in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The TASS statement added that, if the United States were genuinely interested in preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the Arab States, it would direct all its efforts towards a speedy implementation of the decisions of the United Nations concerning the situation in the Middle East.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter of 4 November, the United States regretted that the TASS statement and other recent statements concerning the Middle East emanating from Moscow, USSR, had contained unfounded allegations against the United States that had appeared at a time when the United States and the USSR were actively engaged in confidential discussions about a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute.  The United States had recently reiterated that it was for peace in the area and did not condone or support any policy of expansionism.  It would continue to support Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its provisions and to pursue discussions with other States to facilitate a settlement.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter dated 2 December, the representative of Bulgaria transmitted the text of a statement on the situation in the Middle East, in which a group of States – Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the USSR – had expressed concern about the increase in tension in the Middle East as a result of Israel's policies.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Replying on 8 December, Israel transmitted a communication from its Foreign Ministry declaring that the statement published in the name of the USSR and five other socialist States was a further contribution to the perpetuation of the dispute in the Middle East, and showed that the USSR was not qualified to join in unprejudiced consultations on the establishment of peace.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 30 December, the representative of the United States transmitted the text of a statement made by his Government's Secretary of State on 9 December 1969 on the policy of the United States concerning the situation in the Middle East. Outlining that policy with regard to the various elements of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, the Secretary of State said that a state of peace between the parties must be established, based on clear and stated intentions to bring about basic changes in the attitudes and conditions characteristic of the Middle East situation.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>He went on to say that peace must be sustained by creating a sense of security on both sides through the establishment of demilitarized zones and reliable security arrangements. The Security Council resolution had endorsed the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by war and had called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied during the 1967 war. The United States, he said, supported that part of the resolution, including withdrawal, just as it had supported the other elements of the resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>As to the problem of <\/i>the Palestinian refugees, the Secretary of State maintained that there could be no lasting peace without a just settlement of that problem. As to the status of Jerusalem, the United States could not accept unilateral action by any party to decide the final status of the city. The future of the city could be determined only through an agreement between the Governments of Israel and Jordan, taking into account the interests of other countries in the area and of the international community.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

INTERFERENCE WITH<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 18 February 1969, a spokesman for the Secretary-General said that the Secretary-General had heard with dismay and deep concern of the attack that day on an Israeli El-Al airliner at the airport at Zurich, Switzerland. The Secretary-General believed that that attack, as well as the one at Beirut, Lebanon, two months previously, 25<\/u>\/ was a matter of urgent concern to all Governments and peoples.  The Secretary-General also hoped that it would be followed not by an act of retaliation but by constructive international action to prevent future acts of violence against international civil aviation.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In communications to the President of the Security Council during the latter part of February, the United States, the United Kingdom, Finland, France and Italy condemned the attack and expressed concern at the threat that such attacks posed for the safety of international civil aviation.  They appealed to the parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exercise the utmost restraint so as to avoid a chain of action and reprisal and not jeopardize efforts towards peace in the area.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 20 February, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel protested to the Secretary-General about the armed assault on the crew and passengers of the El-Al aircraft at Zurich on 18 February; he recalled that a similar attack had taken place two months before on another Israeli aircraft at the airport at Athens, Greece. He believed that those actions were the work of organized groups of saboteurs operating with the support and co-operation of Arab Governments that were Member States of the United Nations and of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>After  noting  that  the Security Council's resolution of 31 December 1968 (262 (1968)) 26<\/u>\/ had not said a word against the attack on an El-Al aircraft at the Athens airport, the Foreign Minister expressed the view that the latest attack had taken place in the atmosphere of international indulgence thus created. He referred to the 18 February 1969 statement of the spokesman for the Secretary-General, and inquired as to what constructive international action the Secretary-General had in mind to prevent such actions against international civil aviation in the future.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 26 February, the Secretary-General replied that he had been in touch with ICAO and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) with regard to the Zurich incident. He had also consulted certain Members of the United Nations with a view to finding means to prevent such acts.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Secretary-General believed that improved methods of international police co-operation and national as well as international regulations might contribute towards the prevention of such acts of terrorism and violence.  However, he considered that the only sure way of bringing an end to terrorist acts would be some substantial movement towards a peaceful settlement of the major issues underlying the Middle East conflict, on the basis of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 (242 (1967)). 27<\/u>\/  An essential first step towards that end would be a declared readiness by the parties to implement that resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Foreign Minister of Israel replied on 5 March that his country was vitally interested in the promotion of improved methods for international police co-operation and national and international regulation, and would actively associate itself with the discussion of the subject, proposed to the Council of ICAO. However, he added, it would be wrong to ignore the responsibility of Member States, since the attacks at the Zurich and Athens airports and the hijacking of an Israel airliner to Algiers, Algeria, had been acts not of individuals but of terrorist organizations supported and encouraged by Arab States in violation of their international responsibilities.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Foreign Minister of Israel suggested that constructive international action to safeguard civil aviation might include an undertaking by all States to prevent and condemn actions on their soil designed to endanger civil aviation. He regretted that the Secretary-General had not conveyed Israel's request to certain Arab Governments to dissociate themselves from those attacks and take the required steps against the organizers and perpetrators of them. His Government, he added, would continue to co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to promote an agreement for the implementation of the Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 10 March, the Secretary-General referred to the observation of the Foreign Minister of Israel that the two questions of his Government had not been transmitted to certain Arab Governments; he recalled that, in his aide memoire of 20 February to the Permanent Representative of Israel, he had indicated that it would not be helpful if his good offices were used to transmit questions or messages of a political nature from one Government to another, unless the parties concerned had previously agreed to that procedure. He had been unable, therefore, to carry out Israel's request, but he had suggested that the Government of Israel might bring the questions to the attention of the States concerned through a communication to the Security Council.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Secretary-General added that he continued to believe that a declaration by the parties of their readiness to implement the Council resolution of 22 November 1967 was an essential first step towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a note dated 3 September 1969, the Secretary-General circulated the texts of a cable he had received from the President of the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA) and his answer to that cable.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a cable dated 1 September, the President of IFALPA requested a meeting with the Secretary-General in connexion with the problem of hijacking. On 29 August, he had conveyed to the Foreign Minister of Syria his organization's anxiety over the hijacking of a Trans World Airlines (TWA) aircraft to Syria on 28 August, the reported detention of two passengers by the Syrian authorities, and their failure to punish the hijackers. He stated that that case was part of the alarming growth of the hijacking problem, and it illustrated that the problem had gone beyond the point of air safety into the political field, involving actions that could be a threat to world peace.  Accordingly, the Security Council should take the necessary measures to secure the release of the two passengers detained in Syria and to punish the hijackers.  In his reply dated 3 September, the Secretary-General agreed to meet with the representatives of IFALPA. He also stated, in connexion with the incident of the TWA aircraft, that he was greatly concerned with the necessity for the prompt release of all of the aircraft passengers and crew and of the aircraft itself.  His position on the matter of hijacking had always been that no advantage should be taken by anyone of the criminal act of hijacking, for that would only further encourage such reprehensible acts.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 25 September, the representative of Canada transmitted to the Security Council copies of an exchange of telegrams between the President of the Canadian Air Line Pilots Association and the Prime Minister of Canada concerning possible action by the United Nations to find a solution to the problem of unlawful interference with international civil aviation.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(See also pp. 792-95.)<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

ARCHAEOLOGICAL EXCAVATIONS<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 23 May 1969, Syria charged that Israel was continuing its excavations in the occupied territory of Syria and was misappropriating Syrian cultural property. These excavations were being undertaken in the areas of Banias and Fiq, where Roman temples had been found, and in the area of Jibbin, where a hill of archaeological significance had been destroyed as a result of the opening of a road.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>After declaring that important archaeological pieces had been removed from their places of origin, Syria said those illegal acts constituted a violation of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, as well as of the recommendations adopted at New Delhi, India, in December 1956 by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Syria referred to its previous complaint of 7 July 1967 that Israel had, on 14 July 1967, declared unfounded; at that time, Israel had said that a representative of UNESCO, who was then expected in Israel, would be invited to visit the site referred to by Syria. Syria requested a report on the question of excavations and theft of its cultural property.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter dated 29 May, Israel replied that no Israeli scientist had carried out any excavations in any of the sites mentioned by Syria or in any other part of the Golan Heights area.  The historical altar from the town of Banias had been removed temporarily and restored to its original site after arrangements for its safety had been completed. In a letter dated 6 February 1968 to the Director-General of UNESCO, the Commissioner-General appointed under the Hague Convention of May 1954 had already dismissed such Syrian charges. The report of the UNESCO Director-General to the seventy-eighth session of the Executive Board of UNESCO, in 1968, had stated that the Commissioner-General in Jerusalem had informed him that "investigations had been carried out where the information supplied had been sufficient to make inquiries possible, and that the complaints in question had proved groundless."<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 10 June, Syria, after pointing out that Israel had admitted having removed the historical altar for its safety and having restored it later, stated that those justifications had also been used by nazi occupying authorities in Europe whenever they committed theft and vandalism of cultural treasures. The report of the Director-General of UNESCO quoted by Israel related only to complaints made in 1967 and 1968.  Moreover, the High Commissioner had stated that his investigations were based on cases "where the information supplied had been sufficient to make inquiries possible."  In the same report, the High Commissioner had informed the Director-General of UNESCO that atmospheric conditions" had made the Golan Heights inaccessible and that he had been unable to visit the site of excavations. Israel, in citing the report of the Director-General of UNESCO, had only meant to mislead the international community.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Syria added that the six complaints contained in its letter of 23 May 1969 had remained unanswered, and only when a report of the Director-General of UNESCO on the matter was submitted in 1969, with specific reference to Syria's 1969 complaints, could Syria's letter be answered in terms of that report.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a further letter dated 1 July, Syria said that its accusations stood and that it was awaiting a report on them by the Director-General of UNESCO.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

TREATMENT OF JEWISH<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

COMMUNITIES IN ARAB STATES<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span><\/i>In a letter of 27 January 1969, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel protested the execution by Iraq on that day of nine Iraqi Jews who, it was stated, had been wrongly accused of spying for Israel. In a letter of 29 January, the representative of the United States drew attention to the statement of the Secretary of State of the United States expressing concern on humanitarian grounds about the public execution of 14 persons convicted of espionage in Iraq. In a statement transmitted on 31 January, Iraq stated that those executed had been tried in accordance with the law and found guilty of espionage; those not found guilty, including Jews, had been acquitted. It accused Israel of distorting the facts to create a propaganda smoke screen. On 6 February, Israel transmitted 27 statements from individuals and groups throughout the world relating to the executions in Iraq.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a further letter, dated 26 February, Israel protested against the executions on 20 February in Iraq of eight persons accused of engaging in espionage for Israel, charging continued inhuman measures against the Jewish community in Iraq.  These charges were rejected by Iraq in a letter dated 11 March.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter of 25 August, the representative of Israel transmitted a statement issued by his Government, to the effect that it had heard of the execution of 15 men, of whom two at least were Jews, and it appealed to heads of States, spiritual leaders and heads of international organizations to do everything in their power to help the Jews of Iraq, Syria and Egypt leave those countries.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

SERVICE IN ISRAEL'S ARMED FORCES<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

BY UNITED STATES CITIZENS<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In a letter dated 17 October, the United Arab Republic drew attention to a statement made in Tel Aviv, Israel, by the United States Embassy, which it interpreted as meaning that United States citizens could retain their American nationality even if they became citizens of Israel and enlisted in its armed forces. By this, it charged, the United States was undermining the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 (242 (1967)),28<\/u>\/ which it had pledged to support, and was encouraging its citizens to take arms under the Israeli flag against the Arab peoples.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Rejecting the charges of the United Arab Republic, the representative of the United States on 20 October transmitted a statement by his Government denying insinuations that it was in any way encouraging Americans to serve in any foreign armed forces. Americans residing abroad were subject to induction for military service if the law of their country of residence so required; such service did not automatically entail loss of United States citizenship.  With regard to other allegations, no members of the United States armed forces were operating American aircraft purchased by Israel or serving in the Israeli armed forces.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In letters dated 18, 20 and 24 October, respectively, Libya, the United Arab Republic and Iraq expressed the view that the position taken by the United States in permitting its citizens to fight under Israel's flag could only lead to further escalation of the conflict in the area and might lead the Arab Governments to seek support from other nations outside the region.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 20 October, the United States representative reiterated his Government's stand. State Department officials, he said, had made clear to the ambassadors of Arab countries that the United States sought to discourage service in the armed forces of foreign countries by its citizens, that no United States military personnel were serving in Israel's armed forces, that some persons with dual nationality might be serving in foreign forces, and that consular officials assisted persons with dual citizenship who sought to avoid induction into the armed forces of another State. Those policies were applied on a world-wide basis, and no special status was accorded to any country in the Middle East or elsewhere.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

PROTECTION OF PERMANENT<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

MISSIONS OF ARAB COUNTRIES<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span><\/i>On 4 December, the representatives of Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and Yemen informed the Secretary-General that about 40 members of the Ad Hoc <\/i>Committee for the Jewish Defence had entered the premises of the Permanent Mission of Syria the previous afternoon and had staged a "sit-in" for one and a half hours.  That was the second time since October 1966 that the Syrian Mission had been subjected to such acts by American Zionists. Furthermore, in the past, several Arab missions to the United Nations and other Arab offices had been subjected to violent acts, including threats to the lives of the Arab ambassadors.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>After stating that those demonstrations and threats had made their work difficult, these representatives asked that their protest be conveyed in the strongest terms to the host country of the United Nations, with a demand that all necessary steps be taken to protect their missions.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

GENERAL STATEMENTS<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9073. Letter of 11 March 1969 from USSR.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9091. Letter of 18 March 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9460 (A\/7692). Letter of 1 October 1969 from Morocco (transmitting text of Final Declaration of Islamic Summit Conference, Rabat, Morocco, 22-25 September 1969).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9468. Letter of 8 October 1969 from OAU (transmitting, inter alia, <\/i>text of resolutions adopted by Sixth Assembly of African Heads of State and Government on situation in Middle East).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9496. Letter of 3 November 1969 from USSR.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9497. Letter of 4 November 1969 from United States.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9500 (A\/7756). Letter of 7 November 1969 from India.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9520 (A\/7811). Letter of 2 December 1969 from Bulgaria (transmitting text of statement on situation in Middle East of 27 November 1969 by "the group of socialist States").<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9545 (A\/7842). Letter of 8 December 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9588. Letter of 30 December 1969 from United States.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

INTERFERENCE WITH<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9016. Letter of 19 February 1969 from United States.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9017. Letter of 20 February 1969 from United Kingdom.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9018. Letter of 20 February 1969 from Finland.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9020. Letter of 20 February 1969 from France.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9021 (A\/7515). Letter of 21 February 1969 from Israel (transmitting letter of 20 February 1969 from Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel to Secretary-General).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9025. Letter of 25 February 1969 from Italy.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9030 (A\/7519). Letter of 26 February 1969 from Secretary-General to Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9048 (A\/7523). Letter of 5 March 1969 from Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel to Secretary-General.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9064 (A\/7526). Letter of 10 March 1969 from Secretary-General to Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9428. Note by Secretary-General dated 3 September 1969 (containing texts of cables, dated 1 and 3 September 1969, exchanged between President of International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations and Secretary-General).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9428\/Add.1. Note by Secretary-General (containing his statement issued on 6 September 1969).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9457. Letter of 25 September 1969 from Canada (containing texts of telegrams, dated 10 and 22 September 1969, exchanged between President of Canadian Air Line Pilots Association and Prime Minister of Canada).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

ARCHAEOLOGICAL EXCAVATIONS<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9220 (A\/7558). Letter of 23 May 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9229 and Rev.1 (A\/7562 and Rev.1). Letter of 29 May 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9246 (A\/7565), S\/9299 (A\/7567). Letters of 10 June and 1 July 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

TREATMENT OF JEWISH<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

COMMUNITIES IN ARAB STATES<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8982 (A\/7503). Letter of 27 January 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8987. Letter of 29 January 1969 from United States.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8989. Letter of 31 January 1969 from Iraq.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/8997, S\/9031. Letters of 6 and 26 February 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9068. Letter of 11 March 1969 from Iraq.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9095. Letter of 19 March 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9118 and Corr.1. Letter of 27 March 1969 from Iraq.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9411 (A\/7596). Letter of 25 August 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

SERVICE IN ISRAEL'S ARMED FORCES<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

BY UNITED STATES CITIZENS<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9417 (A\/7714). Letter of 17 October 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9479 (A\/7717). Letter of 20 October 1969 from United States.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9480 (A\/7718). Letter of 20 October 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9481. Letter of 18 October 1969 from Libya.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9484 (A\/7721). Letter of 20 October 1969 from United States.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9487 (A\/7727). Letter of 24 October 1969 from Iraq.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

PROTECTION OF PERMANENT<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

MISSIONS OF ARAB COUNTRIES<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9532 (A\/7827). Letter of 4 December 1969 from Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

REPORT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL RELATING TO SEARCH<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

In the introduction to his annual report to the General Assembly, dated 15 September 1969, the Secretary-General noted the marked deterioration of the situation in the Middle East during the previous six months, particularly in the Suez Canal sector, where the cease-fire had almost completely broken down.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Secretary-General had no doubt that this development was to a considerable extent connected with the impasse in the search for a peaceful settlement and the absence of an early prospect for the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 (242 (1967)). 29<\/u>\/  The hopes for such a settlement had been widely prevalent after the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of this resolution, but so far they had been unfulfilled, in spite of nearly two years of effort by the United Nations and other parties.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Secretary-General went on to say that his Special Representative to the Middle East, Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring, had made and continued to make persistent efforts to achieve at least a first step towards a settlement. However, experience had painfully demonstrated that in these efforts Ambassador Jarring had found himself acting largely on his own, with little or no effective support from other sources in the form of helpful guidance and backing on the resolution of specific issues.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In this connexion, the Secretary-General indicated that he did not accept the narrow interpretation of the role of Ambassador Jarring as being exclusively or even primarily to bring the parties together around a common negotiating table. There could be no question that this would be highly desirable, but if this could not be done immediately it was not to be concluded that there was nothing else for Ambassador Jarring to do. There was more than one procedural route to peace.  Ambassador Jarring also had the function of seeking to bring the positions of the parties together by such means and efforts as he might find possible.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In the Secretary-General's view, the parties had the duty to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring in this respect and to provide him with all information concerning their positions and demands necessary for the conduct of fruitful discussions, exchanges and negotiations.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Secretary-General noted that in recent months, in addition to the efforts of the Security Council and of Ambassador Jarring, four permanent members of the Security Council (France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States) had, on the initiative of their Governments, engaged in consultation in an attempt to strengthen Ambassador Jarring's hand in his quest for a solution to the problem.  This was a development that should have been greeted universally as an encouraging and auspicious step.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In conclusion, the Secretary-General stated that the continuation of the struggle in the Middle East was a prospect that all Members of the United Nations should contemplate with the utmost concern and for which the United Nations itself inescapably bore a heavy responsibility. The Secretary-General considered it imperative that some way be found to reverse the present trend toward catastrophe.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 21 October, the Secretary-General, at the request of the Permanent Representatives of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, issued a note setting forth the text of a statement released on 20 September by the Foreign Ministers of those four countries. The note indicated that the four Foreign Ministers had met with the Secretary-General for a discussion of the situation in the Middle Last, which they regarded as increasingly serious and urgent. They reaffirmed that the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 (242 (1967)) should be supported and carried out, agreed that a durable peace should be established in the Middle East, reaffirmed that all States in the Middle East had an inalienable right to exist as independent and sovereign States and, with the above objectives in mind, indicated that the conversations and contacts already established by the four powers would be continued.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

A\/7601\/Add.1. Introduction to annual report of Secretary-General on work of the Organization, September 1969, Chapter IV, paras. 62-75.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9485. Note by Secretary-General dated 21 October 1969 (transmitting text of statement released on 20 September 1969 by Foreign Ministers of France, USSR, United Kingdom and United States).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

DOCUMENTS OF THE<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

GENERAL ASSEMBLY<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

GENERAL ASSEMBLY – 24th SESSION<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Plenary Meeting 1838.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

A\/7500 (S\/8961). Letter of 7 January 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7501 (S\/8965). Letter of 13 January 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7502 (S\/8971). Letter of 16 January 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7503 (S\/8982). Letter of 27 January 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7504 (S\/8988). Letter of 30 January 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7505 (S\/8991). Telegram of 3 February 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7506 (S\/8994). Letter of 5 February 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7508 (S\/8999), A\/7509 (S\/9001), A\/7510 (S\/9006), A\/7512 (S\/9010). Letters of 8, 10, 12 and 13 February 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7513 (S\/9011). Letter of 13 February 1969 from Iraq.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7515 (S\/9021). Letter of 21 February 1969 from Israel (transmitting letter of 20 February 1969 from Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel to Secretary-General).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7517 (S\/9029). Letter of 21 February 1969 from Southern Yemen.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7518 (S\/9028). Letter of 25 February 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7519 (S\/9030). Letter of 26 February 1969 from Secretary-General to Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7520 (S\/9039). Letter of 4 March 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7522 (S\/9042). Letter of 4 March 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7523 (S\/9048). Letter of 5 March 1969 from Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel to Secretary-General.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7526 (S\/9064). Letter of 10 March 1969 from Secretary-General to Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7527 (S\/9065), A\/7528 (S\/9094). Letters of 10 and 18 March 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7531 (S\/9102). Letter of 21 March 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7532 (S\/9110), A\/7533 (S\/9111). Letters of 25 March 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7534 (S\/9122). Letter of 31 March 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7535 (S\/9125). Letter of 1 April 1969 from Iraq.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7539 (S\/9146). Letter of 10 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7542 (S\/9162). Letter of 17 April 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7544 (S\/9174). Letter of 22 April 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7545 and Corr.1 (S\/9175 and Corr.1). Letter of 24 April 1969 from Iraq.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7551 (S\/9197). Letter of 8 May 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7552 (S\/9201), A\/7554 (S\/9208). Letters of 12 and 14 May 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7555 (S\/9211), A\/7556 (S\/9212). Letters of 16 May 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7557 (S\/9217). Letter of 21 May 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7558 (S\/9220). Letter of 23 May 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7559 (S\/9225). Letter of 26 May 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7560 (S\/9228), A\/7562 and Rev.1 (S\/9229 and Rev.1), A\/7563 and Corr.1 (S\/9230 and Corr.1). Letter of 28 May, letter and revision of 29 May, and letter of 2 June 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7565 (S\/9246), A\/7567 (S\/9299). Letters of 10 June and 1 July 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7578 (S\/9386). Letter of 12 August 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7582 (S\/9398), A\/7584 (S\/9399). Letters of 19 and 20 August 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7585 (S\/9402). Letter of 22 August 1969 from Libya (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7586 (S\/9403). Letter of 22 August 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7587 and Add.1 (S\/9407). Telegraphic communication of 22 August 1969 from Afghanistan, Algeria, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic and Yemen (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7588 (S\/9405). Letter of 23 August 1969 from Permanent Representative of Israel to Secretary-General.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7589 and Corr.1 (S\/9408 and Corr.1). Letter of 25 August 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7590 (S\/9409). Letter of 25 August 1969 from Pakistan (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7596 (S\/9411). Letter of 25 August 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7597 (S\/9413). Letter of 26 August 1969 from India (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7598 (S\/9417). Letter of 27 August 1969 from Secretary-General to Permanent Representative of Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7599 (S\/9415). Letter of 27 August 1969 from Syria (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7601 and Corr.1. Annual report of Secretary-General on work of the Organization, 16 June 1968-15 June 1969, Chapter I.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7601\/Add.1. Introduction to annual report of Secretary-General, September 1969, Chapter IV, paras. 62-75.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7602. Report of Security Council to General Assembly, 16 July 1968-15 July 1969, Chapter I.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7640 (S\/9422). Letter of 28 August 1969 from Saudi Arabia (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7645 (S\/9424). Letter of 29 August 1969 from Jordan (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7647 (S\/9430). Letter of 29 August 1969 from Maldives (reproduced in S\/9447).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7689 (S\/9459). Letter of 30 September 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7692 (S\/9460). Letter of 1 October 1969 from Morocco.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7711 (S\/9474), A\/7714 (S\/9477). Letters of 14 and 17 October 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7716 (S\/9478). Letter of 17 October 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7717 (S\/9479). Letter of 20 October 1969 from United States.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7718 (S\/9480). Letter of 20 October 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7721 (S\/9484). Letter of 20 October 1969 from United States.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7727 (S\/9487). Letter of 24 October 1969 from Iraq.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7730 (S\/9489). Letter of 28 October 1969 from Syria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7756 (S\/9500). Letter of 7 November 1969 from India.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7758 (S\/9501). Letter of 10 November 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7766 (S\/9506). Letter of 18 November 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7783 (S\/9507), A\/7792 (S\/9511). Letters of 21 and 25 November 1969 from Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7811 (S\/9520). Letter of 2 December 1969 from Bulgaria.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7827 (S\/9532). Letter of 4 December 1969 from Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7828 (S\/9540). Letter of 4 December 1969 from United Arab Republic.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7842 (S\/9545), A\/7918 (S\/9575). Letters of 8 and 19 December 1969 from Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7630. Resolutions  adopted  by  General  Assembly  during its 24th session, 16 September- 17 December 1969. Other decisions, p. 8.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) continued during 1969 to assist Arab refugees in Jordan, the West Bank of the Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Gaza Strip, providing them with relief and health services, shelter and educational training.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The large-scale movement of refugees from the West Bank and Gaza to east Jordan, which had taken place during 1968, did not continue in 1969. Thus, the east Jordan refugee population remained comparatively stable.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Overshadowing all administrative and operational considerations of the work of the Agency in 1969 was its deteriorating financial position.  The refugee population had continued to increase, and UNRWA'S purchases of goods and services on the world market could not escape the impact of rising prices.  In most cases, contributions to the Agency had not increased correspondingly.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 10 December 1969, the General Assembly, inter alia, <\/i>directed UNRWA to continue its efforts, drew attention to the critical financial position of UNRWA and called upon Governments to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of UNRWA.  At the same time, the Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine and drew attention to the critical financial position of UNRWA and called upon Governments to make the post generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of UNRWA.  At the same time, the Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine and drew attention to the situation resulting from Israeli policies in the occupied territories.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

ACTIVITIES IN 1969<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Continued assistance was provided by UNRWA to refugees in the form of food, shelter, health services and education, on the basis of eligibility and need. The question of eligibility and restoring order in registration records occupied the Agency as a main effort during 1969, since many records were thrown into confusion following the mass movements of population after the 1967 hostilities.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In addition to providing basic food rations to eligible persons, the Agency, as a continuing temporary measure, issued rations to children of displaced refugees residing in emergency camps in east Jordan. Furthermore, since the basic ration content was dietetically inadequate, a supplementary feeding programme was established to protect and promote the health of such groups among the refugee population as infants, pre-school-age children, pregnant women, nursing mothers and tuberculosis patients.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The emergency feeding programme introduced after the 1967 hostilities was maintained throughout 1969; those benefiting from this programme were mainly newly displaced refugees, but assistance was also provided to some others on the West Bank and in Gaza.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The registered population of the 53 established UNRWA camps increased slightly in 1969, from 433,031 in June 1968 to 434,952 in June 1969.  The number of persons actually residing in these camps in 1969 was estimated at 490,000. In addition to some camp improvements, such as road work and the erection of shelters, the Agency built a number of schoolrooms, training centres and buildings for health facilities.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>About 1,300 tons of used clothing were received by UNRWA in 1969 and distributed to needy registered refugees. The Agency spent over $30,000 on inland transportation costs and on ocean freight for some of the clothing received from abroad. Special issues of clothing, blankets and kerosene were provided for members of the community who required special assistance.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The emergency health measures provided after the 1967 hostilities were improved through the establishment of a number of centres for the treatment of children, the provision of more extensive water distribution systems and other steps.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Under UNRWA's normal health programme, curative and preventive medical services continued to be provided directly by the Agency at 89 places and at a further 21 places operated by Governments or voluntary societies and subsidized by UNRWA. The Agency's health programme included the operation of clinics, hospitals and laboratories, as well as programmes for the control of communicable diseases, maternal and child care, health education, nursing services, nutrition, environmental sanitation and medical education and training.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Compared with a total school enrolment of 125,933 in 1968, 143,891 children were enrolled in 1969 in schools operated jointly by UNRWA and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Early in 1969, demonstrations, strikes by students and teachers and the closing of certain schools caused widespread disturbances to the school programmes. In the occupied territories, the protests were mainly directed against the occupation authorities, whereas in Lebanon they were the result of differences the Agency and its teaching staff.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Under a programme established to train volunteer leaders in youth activities, UNRWA in 1969 operated 34 youth activities centres, including six in the temporary camps in east Jordan. It also maintained 27 pre-school play centres, five teacher training centres, and seven vocational and technical training centres. The Agency's programmes in adult education, training for the handicapped and scholarships for university study continued to operate during 1969. Many of the UNRWA relief programmes were carried out in co-operation with specialized agencies and other United Nations and non-United Nations bodies.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

CONSIDERATION BY<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

GENERAL ASSEMBLY<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

REPORT OF COMMISSIONER-GENERAL<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span><\/i>In his annual report to the General Assembly covering the period from 1 July 1968 to 30 June 1969, the Commissioner-General of UNRWA pointed out that the Agency's programmes of relief, education and health had continued on the same lines as in the past. The main problems during the period were related to the continuing consequences of the 1967 hostilities, including: military occupation and the continuing deferment of hope of return to their homes for all but a small fraction of those who had to move in 1967; the persistence of sporadic hostilities and a general heightening of tension in the area; and a deteriorating financial position that cast doubt on the Agency's future operations.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The report contained an appeal to set the finances of UNRWA on a firmer foundation and to assure it of funds adequate for its task.  Unless more income were forthcoming or expenditures could be reduced, the Agency was faced with the threat that its cash reserve would soon be exhausted, the Commissioner-General warned. He expected the 1969 fiscal year to end with a deficit of between $3.3 million and $3.8 million.  The Commissioner-General believed that the Agency's budgetary position could not be stabilized without a major decision by the General Assembly on the method of future financing and\/or on the scope of the services the Agency was to provide for the refugees.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Commissioner-General indicated that UNRWA was not responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the refugee camps.  In Lebanon, Syria and east Jordan, the Arab host Governments had undertaken security functions with regard to the refugees as part of their normal responsibilities towards the population within their borders. As for the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza, the Government of Israel had been called upon by the Security Council to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place; 30<\/u>\/ those inhabitants included the refugees who had remained in Gaza and the West Bank.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>According to the report, the repercussions of military and political events, the general tension in the Middle East and air raids and other hostilities had added to the strains of exile and emergency conditions among the refugees. In the Gaza Strip, for example, strikes and incidents had become almost daily occurrences during the first months of 1969. The Agency could not escape some of the consequences, such as the arrest, detention and imprisonment of its staff for alleged illegal activities outside of their official duties.  In the period covered by the report, 54 staff members had been arrested, of whom 40 had been detained for varying periods without trial and then released, eight had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, and six were still under detention as at 30 June 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Uncertainty about the future had hung over the heads of the refugees for 21 years, the Commissioner-General's report continued. The refugees continued to be disappointed over the delay in the realization of their hopes to return to their places of residence before June 1967, their hopes to be repatriated to their original homes or to be compensated for those choosing not to return, and their hopes for "a just settlement of the refugee problem" as part of the just and lasting peace envisaged by the Security Council in its resolution of 22 November 1967.  31<\/u>\/  In the meantime, the refugees were confronted with the physical dangers resulting from hostilities across the cease-fire lines, and the frustrations and fears of security measures, such as curfews, interrogations and detentions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The very limited return of refugees or other displaced persons to their former places of residence had required the Agency to continue to provide services for more than 200,000 persons in Syria and east Jordan. The Commissioner-General regretted that on the West Bank there were still well-equipped camps that were only partly occupied and in some cases, particularly at Jericho, were almost empty, while their former inhabitants lived under barely tolerable conditions in the emergency camps or whatever other accommodation they had been able to find in east Jordan.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>It was obvious, the Commissioner-General concluded, that as long as the problem of the refugees remained unsettled, the need for the services provided by UNRWA must continue. These services could not be substantially reduced without bringing further hardship to many hundreds of thousands of persons, causing widespread repercussions that would exacerbate the dangerous situation in the Middle East.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 9 September 1969, the Secretary-General submitted a report in pursuance of the General Assembly's resolution of 19 December 1968 32<\/u>\/ requesting him to report to the Assembly on the situation of displaced persons who had fled the Israel-occupied areas as a result of the hostilities of June 1967 and on implementation by Israel of the Assembly's call upon it to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who had fled.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In his report, the Secretary-General stated that on 23 July 1969 he had addressed a letter to the Permanent Representative of Israel asking for information on the steps Israel had taken to carry out policies and practices that had ag-_____ achieved. On 14 August, Israel had replied that since the adoption of the resolution the Arab Governments in general, and the Jordanian Government in particular, had continued to carry out policies and practices that had aggravated the security and political conditions in the area and made the return of displaced persons more difficult.  In spite of difficulties created by the infiltration of terrorists and also the continuing persecution of Jewish minorities in the Arab countries, Israel had continued to the best of its ability to facilitate the return of persons who had fled during the 1967 hostilities.  It had also issued a great number of permits for temporary visits in either direction, for business, family and other reasons.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISCUSSIONS<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Both the annual report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and the report of the Secretary-General were considered by the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly at the Assembly's twenty-fourth session, which opened on 16 September 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>When the Commissioner-General presented his annual report, he said there were over 1.4 million names on the list of persons who had asked for UNRWA'S assistance. That number did not include persons displaced for the first time in 1967, who were being cared for almost entirely by the Governments concerned. Excluding from that figure some 150,000 persons who, because of their income, had no right to the usual services, there were still about 1.25 million persons eligible for some form of UNRWA assistance.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>He noted that over 840,000 persons were receiving the monthly food ration at a cost of about 4 cents per day. Many years ago, a ceiling had been put on the number of rations to be issued and that ceiling was still being observed.  Were it not for the ceiling, some 300,000 registered refugee children could ask for rations.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>One of the services which had been expanded after the hostilities of 1967 was the provision of ration supplements or hot meals for children and other vulnerable groups, the Commissioner-General said. Those increased food services had been cut back where possible, but they were still above the pre-1967 level.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The increase in demand had also been marked in the area of education and training. In some UNRWA teacher training and vocational training centres, the number of applications for admission was four to five times greater than the number of places available.  The estimated cost of maintaining the present programme of activities would clearly have to be increased. The Commissioner-General noted that, since UNRWA could no longer draw on its reserves, from 1970 onwards it would have to secure new income amounting to some $5 million above the 1969 level so as to be able to meet its 1970 expenditure, which was now estimated at approximately $44.59 million.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Throughout its life, the Commissioner-General explained, the Agency had faced difficulties caused by the fact that it was an international agency with particularly sensitive functions to perform within the areas of sovereign States. Since June 1967, two-fifths of the refugees had been living in areas under military occupation. Security considerations had, therefore, been given greater emphasis by all governmental authorities with which UNRWA had to deal, and the activities of UNRWA personnel and the transport of supplies had been subjected to increased restrictions. The Commissioner-General proposed to seek the advice of the Secretary-General on the steps to be taken if the requirements of Governments and the performance of UNRWA's functions could not be reconciled.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In the course of the Special Political Committee's discussion, the Commissioner-General replied to questions by representatives concerning developments in UNRWA camps on the West Bank and in Gaza, with particular reference to arrests, detention and deportation of UNRWA staff members, casualties suffered among them, and losses and damage to the Agency's property since June 1967. The Commissioner-General informed the Committee that since June 1967 a total of 128 staff members in the Gaza Strip and 47 in the West Bank had been arrested or detained.  Since 30 June 1969, three staff members had been deported from the West Bank, and five had been arrested and detained; a total of 12 were now under detention. In Gaza, one member had been deported; and 25 had been arrested and detained, 17 of whom had been subsequently released.  All cases of arrest and deportation had been taken up with the Israeli authorities. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 10 November, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia asked that "the Palestine Arab delegation" be heard by the Committee.  On 14 November, 14 Members – Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and Yemen – requested that the Special Political Committee hear "the delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization."  The Committee decided, with regard to each request for participation, to authorize the persons constituting the said delegations to speak in the Committee without such authorization implying recognition of the organization or the delegation in question.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>During the Committee's debate, general praise of the Commissioner-General and the staff of UNRWA was expressed for their devotion to the Agency's increasingly difficult tasks. Members also recognized the continuing need for the Agency's services and commented on the humanitarian aspects of the refugee problem.  Many speakers dealt with the severe financial difficulties of the Agency and appealed for increased and broader support. Others were concerned mainly with the basic issues of the Arab-Israel dispute. There was general concern, expressed with varying emphasis, about Israel's non-compliance with the Security Council's resolution of 14 June 1967 (237 (1967)) 33<\/u>\/ and the General Assembly's resolution of 19 December 1968 34<\/u>\/ which called upon Israel to facilitate without delay the return to their homes and camps of the persons who had fled the Israeli-occupied areas since the outbreak of the June 1967 hostilities.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Several Members considered that the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 (242 (1967)) 35<\/u>\/ provided the basis for a peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East, but Albania, Algeria, Ghana, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Yemen, among others, disagreed.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representatives of Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic and Yemen were among those stressing that no solution of the refugee problem should be imposed on the Palestinian Arabs that did not take into account the right of self-determination they were determined to exercise, as required by justice, international law and the United Nations Charter.  Any solution to the problem that did not take this into consideration was doomed to failure. These representatives added that the refugee problem could be settled only by allowing the Arab inhabitants of Palestine to return to their country, from which they had been forcibly expelled as a result of a combined aggression of imperialist and Zionist forces.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The refugee problem, said Lebanon, had been created by the campaign of murder and terrorism waged in 1948 by Zionist organizations against the indigenous inhabitants who had fled in panic.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Syria said the right of the refugees to return to their homes had been recognized by everyone except the Zionist authorities.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>These speakers, and representatives of other Arab States, said they welcomed the assumption by the Palestinians of responsibility for their own fate and that the Palestinians were waging a legitimate struggle for their right to exist, to return to their homes and to exercise their right of self-determination.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of Lebanon held that the Palestinian fighters were striving to reconstitute Palestine as a secular and democratic State, free from racial and religious discrimination and provided with secure borders.  Algeria believed that only the struggle of the Palestinian people could produce conditions for a lasting solution and for a peace based on justice.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Algeria and Kuwait were among those that held that the Palestine refugee problem was different from any other refugee problem because the people of Palestine had been deprived of their natural rights, while being assured by the international community that those rights were being safeguarded. The safeguards that had been incorporated in the United Nations resolutions had not been fulfilled, giving the refugees no alternative but to take up arms.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of Syria said Israel had been admitted to the United Nations on the explicit condition that it would carry out the resolutions of the General Assembly, especially resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 on partition and resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 36<\/u>\/ on repatriation and compensation of the refugees; but since 1947 Israel had not complied with any resolution by any international organization and had not only flouted but publicly denounced all United Nations resolutions calling for peaceful settlement.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Jordan stated that the major powers had a special responsibility under the Charter and were expected to exert all possible pressure and to take all Charter measures to ensure compliance with resolutions they had supported. It was unfortunate, he added, that the United States was providing Israel with the most modern weapons; such assistance had only increased Israel's arrogance.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Other speakers shared the view that the persons displaced after the hostilities of June 1967 should be allowed to return to their homes.  Ceylon, for example, said Israel had continued to defy not only the resolutions of the General Assembly, but also the Security Council's resolution of 14 June 1967 (237 (1967)) calling on it to facilitate the return of the so-called new refugees.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen charged that the Israelis were using methods of repression in the occupied territories that they had learned from their nazi oppressors.  Such punishment, said Kuwait, was imposed on Arabs whose only crime had been to refuse to inform the occupying authorities against their co-religionists. The representative of Jordan said the Palestinian people were reacting as any people would react to an aggressor.  Resistance was the natural corollary to occupation.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>A member of "the Palestine Arab delegation" stated that the Palestine Arab refugees had totally rejected the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 37<\/u>\/ and were determined to resist any settlement that deprived them of their right to self-determination and of their right to return to their ancestral homeland. They were also determined, he said, to resist any Arab State or any Arab leader who might be forced to submit to the pressure of the great powers and might be tempted to recognize any right of sovereignty for the Jew-Khazar invaders over one square metre of Palestine soil.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>A spokesman for "the delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization" stated that the Palestinian people would rectify the mistakes of the United Nations, which had recommended the partition of Palestine on 29 November 1947. Their armed revolutionary struggle was part of the world-wide liberation movement against colonialism.  The humanitarian objectives of that struggle, which sought to establish a pluralistic State, he said, were in sharp contrast with the expansionist policy of the Israel Zionist movement, which endeavoured to create a purely Jewish State. The Palestinians had rejected the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, which some people regarded as a suitable basis for a solution of the problem. He added that the Palestinians had no guardian or protector, and no State or group of powers could conclude an agreement on their behalf. Finally, he said there could be no just or lasting peace until a Palestinian State was established and all the rights of the Palestinian people had been restored.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of Israel said the war against Israel in 1948 had given rise to two waves of refugees – Arab refugees leaving Israel and Jewish refugees entering Israel from the Arab States.  The Jewish refugees had found refuge in Israel. Most of the Arab refugees had been urged by their own leaders to leave Israel, and the great majority, without leaving Palestine, had simply moved across to the Arab side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines and become wards of the United Nations.  He expressed the view that the Arab Governments were preventing the refugees' rehabilitation in the host countries and denying them permission to resettle abroad.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Had the Arab States accepted the United Nations resolution affirming the Jewish people's right to independence and not invaded Israel, there would have been no Arab refugee problem, the representative of Israel said.  He added that the Arab States had overlooked the fundamental principle of the much quoted General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948 (194 (III)), 38<\/u>\/ which called for a negotiated peace between Israel and the Arab States. They also disregarded the fact that paragraph 11 of that resolution, providing for return or resettlement, made it clear that only those ready to live at peace with Israel would be allowed to return. 39<\/u>\/<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The refugee problem created by the displacements of 1948 and 1967 resulting from Arab aggression could be fully resolved, he said, only in the context of a comprehensive peace package, as recognized in the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. 40<\/u>\/  Pending a peace settlement, Israel was doing its best to reconcile the return of displaced persons with its responsibilities for the safety, welfare and security of the State of Israel. The fact that the majority of persons leaving the occupied area had left of their own free will explained why so many had not availed themselves of permission to return.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Israel, its representative continued, had reiterated the proposal made to the General Assembly for the past two years that a conference of Middle Eastern States should be convened in order to draw up a five-year plan for the solution of the refugee problem in the framework of a lasting peace and integration of refugees into productive life. The Arab States had unfortunately made it impossible to discuss the refugee problem from the technical and humanitarian viewpoints alone because of their persistent denial of Israel's right to freedom and sovereignty. He added that the sooner the Arab States agreed to talk with Israel, the sooner the refugee problem would be solved.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Referring to Arab allegations about conditions in Israel-held areas, the representative of Israel said that examination of the allegations was meaningless without recalling that the Israelis were there because in 1947 the Arab States had decided to launch a final onslaught on Israel's existence. Israel was being compelled to take security measures to protect the local population against increased terrorist operations encouraged by Arab Governments, such as murdering civilians, destroying houses and exploding dynamite charges in crowded public places. Neighbourhood punishment, he said, was not collective punishment but was directed only against those who assisted saboteurs. Considered against that background, the general conditions in Israel-held areas were not unsatisfactory.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Israeli spokesman rejected comparisons between nazi methods and Israel's measures to combat terrorism, adding that the use of the epithet "nazi" to describe the Jewish people was an insult to the memory of the six million Jews murdered by the Hitler régime.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The central problem confronting the United Nations in the Middle East, the Israeli representative declared, was the design of certain Member States which aimed at the destruction of Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of the United States stressed that the refugee problem was linked with the other issues dividing Israel and the Arab States, a fact clearly reflected in the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. A just solution of the refugee problem must be developed and implemented within the framework of that resolution, he said.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Attaching particular importance to the return of the 350,000 persons displaced by the 1967 war, the United States again urged Israel to facilitate their return in accordance with Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. The United States believed that the security problems for the occupying authorities could be minimized by a well planned programme.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In connexion with paragraph 11 of the General Assembly's resolution of 11 December 1948, the representative of the United States pointed out the twofold responsibility of the United Nations entailed in the words "refugees wishing to return home and live at peace with their neighbours."  The requirement that the wishes of the refugees be respected did not give an unconditional right of free choice.  There was a second limiting requirement: that the legitimate interests of States should be safeguarded. The United Nations was therefore responsible for not countenancing proposals threatening the existence of Israel.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of the United Kingdom said the Palestine refugees were the victims of an intolerable and inadmissible injustice and his Government had not forgotten the principles stated in the General Assembly's resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.  Everyone had hoped that the refugees and displaced persons would be allowed to return to their homes in accordance with United Nations resolutions. Such a step could have transformed the whole situation.  However, since the adoption of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) on 22 November 1967, it had been accepted that the settlement must be a comprehensive one. He added that the resolution was indivisible; withdrawal could not come without peace being assured, and peace could not be won without withdrawal.  Similarly, there could be no peace without settlement of the refugee problem and no settlement of that problem without peace.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of France said the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 could bring about a just and lasting peace in the area and an equitable and definitive solution to the problem of the refugees.  Their suffering could be ended only as a result of a political settlement.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of the USSR stressed that UNRWA'S humanitarian help to the refugees could not attack the real problem, which was political. Forced into exile by Israel's policy of aggression in 1948 and 1967, the Palestinian Arabs were waging a struggle against imperialism and for national liberation. They had a right to live in their own land and to exercise self-determination. A political and legal basis for settling the refugee problem was provided by the Security Council's resolution of 14 June 1967 41<\/u>\/ and by paragraph 11 of the Assembly's resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, which gave complete freedom of choice to the refugees to return or to receive compensation and did not authorize Israel to decide which Arab refugees to allow to return home.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of the USSR said his Government continued to recognize Israel's right to exist but had never supported the ideology and policies of Zionism. Israel's policy in the occupied territories of forced exile, arrests, destruction of homes and collective punishment was contrary to the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1949 Geneva Convention relating to the protection of civilians in time of war and was analogous to nazi policy. The USSR firmly supported the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs and believed it essential for the United Nations to take energetic steps to ensure Israel's immediate and full compliance with United Nations resolutions on the Palestinian Arab refugees. Peace could not be restored, he said, unless Israel withdrew from the occupied territories and unequivocally stated its intention to abide by the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

GENERAL ASSEMBLY DECISIONS<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Three draft resolutions were submitted to and approved by the Special Political Committee and subsequently adopted by the Assembly.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>By the first of these, sponsored by the United States,  the General Assembly would: (1) note with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 42<\/u>\/ had not been effected, that no substantial progress had been made in the programme endorsed by the Assembly on 26 January 1952 43<\/u>\/ for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continued to be a matter of serious concern; (2) express its thanks to the Commissioner-General and the staff of UNRWA for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees; (3) direct the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to continue his efforts in taking such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need; (4) note with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), and request the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof; (5) direct attention to the continuing critical financial position of UNRWA, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report; (6) note with concern that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to UNRWA continued to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements; (7) call upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of UNRWA particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and therefore urge non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The Special Political Committee approved this draft resolution on 5 December 1969, by a vote of 101 to 0, with 4 abstentions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Afghanistan, Burundi, the Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia and Yugoslavia sponsored a second draft resolution.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>By  the  preambular  paragraphs  of  this  draft  resolution,  the  Assembly   would: (a<\/i>) recognize that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees had arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights; (b<\/i>) express concern that the denial of their rights had been aggravated by reported aggressive acts against the refugees; (c<\/i>) recall the Security Council's resolution of 14 June 1967; and (d<\/i>) recall its own previous resolutions on the subject.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly would: (1) reaffirm the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine; (2) draw the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation resulting from Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories and Israel's refusal to implement the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions; and (3) request the Security Council to take effective measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter to ensure the implementation of those resolutions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 5 December 1969, the Special Political Committee approved this text by a roll-call vote of 50 to 22, with 38 abstentions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Some 20 representatives explained their negative votes or abstentions on this 12-power draft text. Among the points advanced were the following: that the terms of the draft resolution cast doubt on Israel's right to existence; that they were detrimental to efforts to obtain implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967; and that they would have a harmful effect on the refugees and displaced persons. In addition it was stated that the reference to the reaffirmation of the rights of the people of Palestine was ambiguous and that the proposal that the General Assembly would request the Security Council to take measures exceeded the Assembly's powers.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The representative of Israel termed the text one-sided, bellicose and malevolent in purpose and said that most of its sponsors did not recognize Israel's right to exist and were committed to destroying Israel. The other draft resolutions, he maintained, approached the situation constructively.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>A third draft resolution was sponsored by Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and Yugoslavia. By this 18-power draft resolution, the General Assembly would: (1) reaffirm previous resolutions; (2) endorse, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who were still displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities; and (3) strongly appeal to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to UNRWA and to the other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>On 5 December 1969, the Committee approved this 18-power draft resolution by 102 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>At a plenary meeting on 10 December 1969, the General Assembly voted on the draft resolutions recommended by the Special Political Committee.  The text sponsored by the United States was adopted by ll0 votes to 0, with 1 abstention, as resolution 2535 A (XXIV).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The General Assembly then voted on a motion by Somalia that the 12-power draft resolution came within the category of "other questions," referred to in Article 18(3) of the Charter 44<\/u>\/ and therefore should be decided by a simple majority vote. The motion was adopted by a roll-call vote of 50 to 46, with 21 abstentions. The 12-power draft resolution was then adopted by a roll-call vote of 48 to 22, with 47 abstentions, as resolution 2535 B (XXIV).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The 18-power draft resolution was adopted by the Assembly by a roll-call vote of 108 to 0, with 3 abstentions, as resolution 2535 C (XXIV).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>(For texts of these resolutions, see DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES below.)<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

PLEDGES AND PAYMENTS FOR 1969<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>For the calendar year 1969, 55 countries and territories pledged the equivalent of $39,792,749 towards UNRWA'S budget. As at 31 December 1969, the equivalent of $30,337,524 had been received in payment of these pledges.  In addition, non-governmental organizations, private individuals and business corporations contributed a total of $1,786,421 to UNRWA during the year.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

GOVERNMENT PLEDGES AND<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA FOR YEAR ENDING<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

31 DECEMBER 1969<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

(Showing equivalent in US dollars of pledges<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

and contributions in cash, kind and services)<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Pledging Government\t<\/span>    Pledge\t<\/span>Contribution  <\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t\t\t<\/span>  Received<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Abu Dhabi\t<\/span>    10,000\t<\/span>         –<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Australia\t<\/span>   364,934\t<\/span>   304,274<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Austria\t<\/span>    15,000\t<\/span>    15,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Belgium\t<\/span>    74,771\t<\/span>    74,771<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Canada\t<\/span> 1,574,074\t<\/span> 1,111,111<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Central African Republic\t<\/span>     1,800\t<\/span>         –<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Ceylon\t<\/span>       800\t<\/span>       800<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Chile\t<\/span>     1,000\t<\/span>         –<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>China\t<\/span>    30,000\t<\/span>    30,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Cyprus\t<\/span>       480\t<\/span>       480<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Denmark\t<\/span>   572,882\t<\/span>   519,549<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Federal Republic of Germany\t<\/span> 3,073,055\t<\/span> 3,073,055<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Finland\t<\/span>    60,000\t<\/span>    60,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>France\t<\/span>   683,959\t<\/span>   682,765<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Gaza Authorities\t<\/span>    93,414\t<\/span>    93,414<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Ghana\t<\/span>     3,000\t<\/span>         –<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Greece\t<\/span>    15,000\t<\/span>    15,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Holy See\t<\/span>    12,500\t<\/span>    12,500<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>India\t<\/span>    13,333\t<\/span>         –<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Iran\t<\/span>     6,000\t<\/span>     6,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Iraq\t<\/span>   100,000\t<\/span>   100,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Ireland\t<\/span>    50,000\t<\/span>    50,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Israel\t<\/span>   943,103\t<\/span>   943,103<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Italy\t<\/span>   238,619\t<\/span>   238,619<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Jamaica\t<\/span>     3,250\t<\/span>     3,250<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Japan\t<\/span>    50,000\t<\/span>    50,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Jordan\t<\/span>   151,854\t<\/span>   151,854<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Kuwait\t<\/span>   220,000\t<\/span>   220,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Lebanon\t<\/span>    51,222\t<\/span>    51,222<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Liberia\t<\/span>     9,000\t<\/span>     3,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Libya\t<\/span>   100,000\t<\/span>   100,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Luxembourg\t<\/span>     3,000\t<\/span>     3,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Malaysia\t<\/span>     1,500\t<\/span>     1,500<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Monaco\t<\/span>       204\t<\/span>       204<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Morocco\t<\/span>    40,000\t<\/span>    40,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Netherlands\t<\/span>   111,189\t<\/span>   111,189<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>New Zealand\t<\/span>    67,200\t<\/span>    67,200<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Niger\t<\/span>       450\t<\/span>       450<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Nigeria\t<\/span>     5,000\t<\/span>     5,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Norway\t<\/span>   111,810\t<\/span>   111,810<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Pakistan\t<\/span>    20,968\t<\/span>    20,968<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Philippines\t<\/span>     3,750\t<\/span>     3,750<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Qatar\t<\/span>    12,000\t<\/span>    12,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Republic of Viet-Nam\t<\/span>     3,000\t<\/span>     3,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Saudi Arabia\t<\/span>   297,778\t<\/span>   297,778\t<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Spain\t<\/span>   704,734\t<\/span>   704,734<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Sweden\t<\/span> 2,194,018\t<\/span> 2,194,018<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Switzerland\t<\/span>   869,056\t<\/span>   776,463<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Syria\t<\/span>    88,642\t<\/span>    59,258<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Tunisia\t<\/span>     4,000\t<\/span>     4,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Turkey\t<\/span>    10,000\t<\/span>    10,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>United Arab Republic\t<\/span>       400\t<\/span>       400<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>United Kingdom\t<\/span> 4,500,000\t<\/span> 4,500,000<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>United States\t<\/span>22,220,000*\t<\/span>13,481,035**<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Yugoslavia\t<\/span>    20,000<\/u>\t<\/span>    20,000<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t\t<\/span>39,792,749\t<\/span>30,337,524<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>* Pledge payable in accordance with a condition that the amount contributed by the United States should not at any time constitute more than 70 per cent of the total of all governmental contributions received.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>** Since the United States fiscal year ends in June (rather than December, as for UNRWA), the contribution represents payments received for half the donor's contribution period for 1969.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

GENERAL ASSEMBLY – 24th SESSION<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Special Political Committee, meetings 665-686.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Ad Hoc Committee of General Assembly for Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to UNRWA, meeting 1.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Plenary Meeting 1827.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

A\/7577. Letter of 24 July 1969 from Secretary-General (transmitting statement of Commissioner-General of UNRWA on Agency's financial position).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7601. Annual report of Secretary-General on work of the Organization, 16 June 1968-15 June 1969, Chapter III M.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7614. Report of Commissioner-General of UNRWA (for period 1 July 1968-30 June 1969).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7665. Report of Secretary-General.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/SPC\/131. Letter of 10 November 1969 from Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia (requesting hearing for "Palestine Arab delegation").<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/SPC\/132. Letter of 14 November 1969 from Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen (requesting hearing for "delegation of Palestine Liberation Organization").<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/SPC\/133. Revised budget estimates for 1969 and 1970. Note by Commissioner-General of UNRWA.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/SPC\/134. Financing UNRWA operations. Note by Commissioner-General of UNRWA.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/SPC\/135. Transcription of statements by Commissioner-General of UNRWA and Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs in Special Political Committee on 2 December 1969, meeting 680.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/SPC\/136. Letter of 10 December 1969 from Commissioner-General of UNRWA.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/SPC\/L.175. United States: draft resolution, approved by Special Political Committee on 5 December 1969, meeting 686, by 101 votes to 1, with 4 abstentions.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

A\/7839. Report of Special Political Committee, draft resolution A.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

RESOLUTION 2535 A (XXIV), as recommended by Special Political Committee, A\/7839, adopted by Assembly on 10 December 1969, meeting 1827, by 110 votes to 0, with 1 abstention.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The General Assembly,<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Recalling <\/i>its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963, 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965, 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965, 2154 (XXI) of 17 November 1966, 2341 (XXII) of 19 December 1967 and 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Noting <\/i>the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1968 to 30 June 1969,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Notes with deep regret <\/i>that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of Assembly resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Expresses its thanks <\/i>to the Commissioner-General and the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Directs <\/i>the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue his efforts in taking such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>4.\t<\/span>Notes with regret <\/i>that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine was unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation thereof;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>5.\t<\/span>Directs attention <\/i>to the continuing critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>6.\t<\/span>Notes with concern <\/i>that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions to help relieve the serious budget deficit of the past year, contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East continue to fall short of the funds needed to cover essential budget requirements;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>7.\t<\/span>Calls upon <\/i>all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and therefore urges non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

A\/SPC\/176 and Add. 1,2. Afghanistan, Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Yugoslavia: draft resolution, approved by Special Political Committee on 5 December 1969, meeting 686, by roll-call vote of 50 to 22, with 38 abstentions, as follows:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In favour: <\/i>Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Against: <\/i>Bolivia, Botswana, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Gabon, Gambia, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malawi, Nicaragua, Panama, United States, Uruguay.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Abstaining: <\/i>Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, United Kingdom, Venezuela.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

A\/L.584. Somalia: motion (that decision on draft resolution B recommended by Special Political Committee, A\/7839, should be made by simple majority vote), adopted by Assembly on 10 December 1969, meeting 1827, by roll-call vote of 50 to 46, with 21 abstentions, as follows:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In favour: <\/i>Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Against: <\/i>Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Abstaining: <\/i>Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Ethiopia, France, Guyana, Honduras, Italy, Kenya Laos, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Thailand, Venezuela.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

A\/7839. Report of Special Political Committee, draft resolution B.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

RESOLUTION 2535 B (XXIV), as recommended by Special Political Committee, A\/7839, Adopted by Assembly on 10 December 1969, meeting  1827, by roll-call vote of 48 to 22, with 47 abstentions, as follows:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In favour: <\/i>Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Ceylon, China, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Against: <\/i>Bolivia, Botswana, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Guatemala, Israel, Liberia, Malawi, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Rwanda, Swaziland, United States, Uruguay. <\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Abstaining: <\/i>Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, United Kingdom, Upper Volta, Venezuela.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The General Assembly,<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Recognizing <\/i>that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Gravely concerned <\/i>that the denial of their rights has been aggravated by the reported acts of collective punishment, arbitrary detention, curfews, destruction of homes and property, deportation and other repressive acts against the refugees and other inhabitants of the occupied territories,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Recalling <\/i>Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Recalling also <\/i>its resolution 2252 (RES-V) of 4 July 1967 and its resolution 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 calling upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Desirous <\/i>of giving effect to its resolutions for relieving the plight of the displaced persons and the refugees,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Reaffirms <\/i>the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Draws the attention <\/i>of the Security Council to the grave situation resulting from Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories and Israel's refusal to implement the above resolutions;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Requests <\/i>the Security Council to take effective measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to ensure the implementation of these resolutions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

A\/SPC\/L.177. Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, Yugoslavia: draft resolution, adopted by Special Political Committee on 5 December 1969, meeting 686, by 102 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

A\/7839. Report of Special Political Committee, draft resolution C.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

RESOLUTION 2535 c (XXIV), as recommended by Special Political Committee, A\/7839, adopted by Assembly on 10 December 1969, meeting 1827, by roll-call vote of 108 to 0, with 3 abstentions, as follows:<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>In favour: <\/i>Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Southern Yemen, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Against: <\/i>None.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Abstaining: <\/i>Laos, Malawi, Portugal.<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>The General Assembly,<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Recalling <\/i>its resolutions 2252 (RES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967 and 2452 C (XXIII) of 19 December 1968,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Taking note <\/i>of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from I July 1968 to 30 June 1969,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Bearing in mind also <\/i>the letter dated 24 July 1969 from the Secretary-General addressed to all States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>Concerned <\/i>about the continued human suffering resulting from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>1.\t<\/span>Reaffirms <\/i>its resolutions 2252 (RES-V), 2341 B (XXII) and 2452 C (XXIII);<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>2.\t<\/span>Endorses, <\/i>bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>3.\t<\/span>Strongly appeals to <\/i>all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

OTHER DOCUMENTS<\/i><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

S\/9584. Letter of 24 December 1969 from Secretary-General (transmitting text of resolution 2535 (XXIV) adopted by Assembly on 10 December 1969).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

Palestine Refugees Today. UNRWA Newsletter: <\/i>No. 58 (Dec. 1968, Jan., Feb. 1969); No. 59 (Feb., Mar., Apr. 1969); No. 60 (May, June, July 1969); No. 61 (Sept., Oct., Nov. 1969); No. 62 (Dec. 1969, Jan. 1970).<\/p><\/div>\n

\n

Notes<\/u><\/p><\/div>\n

\n

\t<\/span>1<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1968, pp. 236-37, text of resolution 262 (1968).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>2<\/u>\/\t<\/span>For text of Chapter VII of the Charter, see APPENDIX II.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>3<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 257-58, text of resolution 242 (1967).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>4<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 3.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>5<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1968, p. 234, text of resolution 248 (1968); p. 235, text of resolution 256 (1968); and pp. 236-37, text of resolution 262 (1968).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>6<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 3.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>7<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 3.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>8<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 5.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>9<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1967, p. 190, text of resolution 236 (1967).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>10<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 3.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>11<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 3.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>12<\/u>\/\t<\/span>For text of Article 51 of the Charter, see APPENDIX II.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>13<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 3.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>14<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 1.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>15<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 3.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>16<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 3.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>17<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1968, p. 250, text of resolution 259 (1968).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>18<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1968, pp. 264-65, text of resolution 252 (1968).  See DOCUMENTARY REFERENCES for texts of resolution 267 (1969) and 271 (1969).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>19<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1967, p. 216.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>20<\/u>\/\t<\/span>For text of Article 41 of the Charter, see APPENDIX II.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>21<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 18.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>22<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 257-58, text of resolution 242 (1967).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>23<\/u>\/\t<\/span>For text of Article 25 of the Charter, see APPENDIX II.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>24<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 257-58, text of resolution 242 (1967).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>25<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1968, p. 229.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>26<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1968, pp. 236-37, text of resoslution 262 (1968).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>27<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 24.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>28<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 24.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>29<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 257-58, text of resolution 242 (1967).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>30<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 190-91, text of resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>31<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1967, pp. 257-58, text of resolution 242 (1967).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>32<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1968, p. 294, text of resolution 2452 A (XXIII).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>33<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 30.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>34<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 32.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>35<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 31.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>36<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1947-48, pp. 247-57, text of resolution 181 (II); and Y.U.N., 1948-49, pp. 174-76, text of resolution 194 (III).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>37<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 31.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>38<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 36.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>39<\/u>\/\t<\/span>Paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) states, inter alia<\/i>, "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property."  For full text of resolution 194 (III), see Y.U.N., 1948-49, pp. 174-76.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>40<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 31.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>41<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 30.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>42<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See footnote 39.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>43<\/u>\/\t<\/span>See Y.U.N., 1951, pp. 315-16, text of resolution 513 (VI).<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span>44<\/u>\/\t<\/span>For text of Article 18 of the Charter, see APPENDIX II.<\/p><\/div>\n

<\/p>\n

\n

\t<\/span><\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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