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Chairman: Mr. Yordan TCHOBANOV (Bulgaria).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Sanz Briz (Spain), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 25

Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/4861; A/SPC/58 and Add.1) (continued)

1. Mr. PLIMPTON (United States of America) said that under the present agenda item there were three matters to be considered: the annual report of the Director of UNRWA (A/4861), the problems of UNRWA, and the past and future activities of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. He hoped that the debate in the Special Political Committee would provide an opportunity for progress towards the economic and social rehabilitation of the Palestine Arab refugees and that the interests of those refugees would come before all other considerations.

2. Within the limits imposed upon it, UNRWA had done excellent work. During the past year, it had continued to carry out a programme of vocational training which was designed to promote the re-adaptation of the refugees to a new life and which might usefully be expanded still further. It had also concerned itself with the development of co-operatives, programmes of youth activities and the training of the physically handicapped.

3. In part II of his report, the Director of UNRWA set forth the serious financial problems facing the Agency in the immediate future. If those problems were to be solved, Governments would have to contribute more to that humanitarian cause. His own Government had contributed over \$250 million to the United Nations programmes for Palestine refugees since 1948 and it had increased its contributions in the last few years. He paid a tribute to the host countries, which had provided services and gifts in money and in kind.

4. In accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions on properties left behind by the Palestine Arab refugees, the Conciliation Commission had completed its identification of the some 450,000 parcels of land to which those provisions applied; it was now estimating their value at the time when they had been abandoned and was preparing a list of claimants. He congratulated the Commission's technical staff, who were carrying out a complex task of the

greatest importance for the settlement of the refugee question. With the co-operation of the five Governments concerned, the Conciliation Commission was obtaining the release of the Arab refugees' bank accounts. Lastly, he drew attention to the "Historical Survey of the Efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to secure the implementation of operative paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III)" (A/AC.25/W.81/Rev.2 and A/AC.25/W.82/Rev.1), which realistically described the difficulties the Commission encountered in its endeavours to conciliate between conflicting interests. As in the past, the United States delegation firmly supported the provisions for repatriation, resettlement and compensation in operative paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) and hoped that they would be implemented before long.

5. The future offered still broader problems; patience, wisdom and determination would be needed if any real progress was to be made in the interests both of the refugees and of the whole area of the Near East. For the last few years that region had enjoyed relative calm, partly because of the qualities of its leaders and the efficient operation of the United Nations organs engaged in the maintenance of stability in that region. Yet, in spite of the present calm, there was still tension, which must be reduced; as long as the refugee question remained unsettled it would represent a grave threat to peace.

6. In keeping with its constant desire to contribute to an improvement in the situation, in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly, the United States Government had given unqualified support to the appointment of Mr. J. E. Johnson as Special Representative of the Conciliation Commission. Mr. Johnson was an eminent man with a long record of service in the furtherance of international peace and understanding. His mission, as it had been defined, was to explore with the Governments concerned "practical means of seeking progress on the Palestine Arab refugee problem, pursuant to resolution 1604 (XV) of the United Nations General Assembly".

7. Mr. Johnson had ably carried out the preliminary phase of his mission. He had recommended that, provided the qualified and cautious optimism expressed in his report continued to be justified, "careful consideration should be given to the appointment as Special Representative, to serve until the autumn of 1962, of an individual who should have the confidence not only of the Commission but of the States directly concerned" (A/4921/Add.1 and Corr. 1, para. 56). He had also emphasized that, regardless of the progress that might be made under the most optimistic assumptions, there would be Palestine Arab refugees for some time to come and they would continue to need generous and imaginative international assistance. The United States delegation was pleased that the Conciliation Commission had endorsed Mr. Johnson's conclusions. The Commission had undertaken a new approach, which had some chance of success. It was important not to com-

promise that chance by obstructing the Commission's efforts. In the interests of the refugees themselves, it was better to look to the future than to the past. To that end, the most useful thing the Committee could do was to encourage the Conciliation Commission to complete the technical aspects of its property identification and evaluation project. If the results of the present debate enabled the Conciliation Commission to continue its efforts, the United States Government would agree to support a limited extension of the mandate of UNRWA. He appealed to the members of the Committee to avoid fruitless controversy, to concentrate on the interests of the refugees and to try to settle the question in a constructive spirit.

8. The CHAIRMAN, in accordance with the decision taken on 4 December 1961, at the 306th meeting, invited Mr. Emile Ghory to make a statement.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Emile Ghory took a place at the Committee table.

9. Mr. GHORY said he wished first to point out that the Palestine Arabs, who were called refugees, were not a people without a country. They were a people of two million, who were entitled to live in freedom and independence, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

10. The so-called refugee problem was an inseparable part of the whole Palestine problem. The Director of UNRWA had made that clear in his report (A/4861), in which he said that any solution of the question of the refugees, if it was to be effective, must take adequately into account the deep feelings and aspirations of the peoples of the Middle East as a whole. Mr. Johnson, the Special Representative of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, had had to admit in his report that it was unlikely that progress could be made on the Palestine Arab refugee question apart from, or in advance of, an over-all settlement.

11. It was therefore essential that the United Nations should take up the Palestine problem forthwith. That was all the more urgent in that there was now a plot to liquidate the Palestine problem through a settlement of the refugees question by such measures as the rehabilitation and resettlement of the refugees outside Palestine and the astounding idea of compensation. Such a plan would lead to the complete fragmentation and destruction of the Palestinian people as a political and ethnic group and to its disappearance as a national entity. The Conciliation Commission, by its inertia and partiality, had become an instrument of that policy. That was clear from Mr. Johnson's report, which tried to confuse and obscure the facts of the problem. The method of step-by-step settlement proposed by Mr. Johnson was essentially designed to evade the question of the refugees' right to repatriation, although that right had been confirmed in operative paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III).

12. The Palestine problem had been before the United Nations since 1947. The United Nations had been unable to solve it because, under the influence of colonialism, international Zionism and the policy of the Western Powers, it had ignored the real problem, particularly its main legal aspects.

13. In order to understand the justice of the cause of the Palestine refugees, it was necessary to know the historical origin of the question. The account given by the Special Representative of the Conciliation Commission was inaccurate in both facts and interpretation.

14. Before the First World War the Palestine Arabs, as Ottoman subjects, had enjoyed the same civil, political and religious rights as the Turks. Swayed, however, by a spirit of nationalism, they had aspired to complete freedom and national independence. Trusting in the pledges which the United Kingdom had given them during the war, they had believed that the end of that conflict would bring freedom to their territory. They had, however, been treated as spoils of war by the Allies and instead of achieving independence they had been placed under British Mandate. They had been enraged to learn that the United Kingdom, without any right, had promised the world Zionist movement to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine.

15. In 1918 the population of the country had been estimated at 708,000 Arabs and 57,000 Jews. The Arabs had then owned 97.5 per cent of the total land area of the country and the Jews only 2.5 per cent. The situation was now completely reversed: over a million Arabs had been driven out of their country, their property had been confiscated by the Zionist usurpers and they were today reduced to living on international charity. That radical change had been effected in two stages.

16. Under the guise of the Mandate, the United Kingdom had ruled Palestine as a Crown Colony for thirty years. During that period, it had done all it could to help the Zionists to entrench themselves in Palestine. By 1947 the number of Jews in the country had risen to over 600,000 and the proportion of the total land area owned by them had risen to about 7.5 per cent. That policy, however, had not brought about the desired result and it had encountered the increasing opposition of the Arab population. To prepare the ground for the take-over of Palestine by the Jews and for the creation of a Zionist State, the United Kingdom Government, in its capacity as Mandatory Power, had in 1947 requested^{1/} the convocation of a special session of the General Assembly to make recommendations under Article 10 of the Charter concerning the future Government of Palestine. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) appointed by the General Assembly, had subsequently submitted two plans,^{2/} The majority had proposed the partition of Palestine into an Arab State, a Jewish State and an international city (Jerusalem), while the minority had proposed the establishment of an independent federal State of Palestine consisting of an Arab State and a Jewish State, with Jerusalem as its capital.

17. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question had adopted the partition plan by 25 votes to 13, with 17 abstentions,^{3/} or less than two-thirds of the members present and voting.

18. The General Assembly, however, had subsequently adopted that plan (resolution 181 (II)) by 33 votes to 13, with 10 abstentions,^{4/} as a result of the intimidation and pressure exerted on various Member States by certain great Powers, especially the United States, acting under Zionist influence. It had been that decision which had unleashed the forces of expulsion and dispossession that were later to create the refugee problem now before the Committee. The ultimate objective of Zionism had been, and still was, the transformation

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No. 11, vol. II, annex I.

^{2/} *Ibid.*, vol. I.

^{3/} *Ibid.*, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, 34th meeting.

^{4/} *Ibid.*, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, vol. II, 128th meeting.

of Palestine into a thoroughly Jewish country. To attain that objective, it had been necessary to uproot the Arab masses by resorting, under the protection of the United Kingdom forces, to atrocities against defenceless Arab towns and villages. In March 1948, however, the fierce Arab resistance had rendered the position of the Zionists very precarious. In the meantime, the United Kingdom authorities had handed over the administration of certain towns, including the port of Tel Aviv, to the Zionists. The latter, making use of those advantages, had unleashed murderous attacks, the culminating point of which had been the massacre at Deir Yassin on April 1948.

19. These events had led the Security Council to adopt a resolution^{5/} on 1 April 1948 calling upon the Arab and Jewish armed groups in Palestine to cease their acts of violence immediately, and upon the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee to make representatives available to the Security Council for the purpose of arranging a truce between the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine. The General Assembly had met a special session on 16 April, and on 17 April the Security Council had adopted a further resolution^{6/} reminding the Mandatory Power of its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order in Palestine and calling, in particular, upon the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency to cease all activities of a military or para-military nature, as well as acts of violence, terrorism or sabotage.

20. While the General Assembly had been considering a United States proposal^{7/} that Palestine should be placed under United Nations trusteeship, the Jewish leaders had decided to launch military attacks against Arab civilians in order to drive out the greatest possible number. Those attacks had been made with the connivance of the British, whose forces had prevented Arab reinforcements from reaching the beleaguered towns and villages, thus obliging the defenceless population to flee. Those atrocities had been committed at a time when the Mandatory Power had still been responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The United Kingdom Government was thus answerable before the United Nations and before the International Court of Justice for the losses to life and property that had been suffered by the Palestine Arabs, 400,000 of whom had been forced to flee the country by the time the Mandate had been terminated.

21. On 14 May 1948^{8/} the Zionists had taken yet another step in defiance of the Security Council and the General Assembly by proclaiming the Jewish State, in an attempt to decide the Palestine question unilaterally and to confront the United Nations with a "fait accompli". The United States, with indecent haste, had immediately recognized the new illegal State, and, thanks to the support of the Western Powers and the inertia of the United Nations, the Zionists had managed, in further attacks, to force another 500,000 Arabs to abandon their homes and their property. That was how the refugee problem had come into being.

22. Mr. Johnson was therefore incorrect in stating in his report that there was no agreement on the events and their causes, or on the interpretation, significance

^{5/} Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for April, 1948, documents S/714 I.

^{6/} *Ibid.*, document S/723.

^{7/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Special Session, Annex to Volumes I and II, document A/C.1/277.

^{8/} Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for May, 1948, document S/747.

or validity of the basic resolutions and other United Nations documents. The historical facts clearly showed that the present situation in Palestine had been illegal *ab initio* and that consequently all actions and results deriving therefrom lacked any legal or moral validity.

23. That situation was the outcome of the use of force by the Zionists against the territorial integrity and political independence of the country and against the independence of its Arab inhabitants, to whom sovereignty should have reverted on the termination of the Mandate. Such use of force was forbidden by the Charter of the United Nations.

24. One of the purposes of the United Nations was to bring about by peaceful means the adjustment or settlement of disputes. The question of the future government of Palestine had been the subject of a dispute which had been referred to the United Nations. Even while the United Nations had been searching for a solution of the problem, the Jewish minority in Palestine had used force in order to confront the world with a "fait accompli".

25. In 1948, the Jews of Palestinian nationality—as distinct from the Jewish aliens whose illegal immigration had been imposed by force on the indigenous population—had accounted for only 16 per cent of the total number of Palestinian citizens, while the Arabs had constituted 84 per cent. It had been that minority, however, that had expelled the great majority of the inhabitants.

26. The Zionist forces of aggression had been equipped, armed and financed by foreign Powers, and in particular by the Western Powers, who had sent the Zionists arms and money and had helped them to recruit volunteers, even in the camps for displaced persons. All the facts supported his contention that the occupation of Palestine by the Zionists was unlawful.

27. Turning to the question of the financing of UNRWA, he wished to emphasize that in contributing to that agency the great Powers were not giving alms to the Arab refugees but rather acquitting themselves of the responsibility which they had incurred by encouraging the Zionist aggression and helping to perpetuate the illegal situation which had resulted from it. They did not hesitate to use their contributions as a weapon with which to try to force the Arabs to bow to a "fait accompli". It was interesting to compare the sums contributed by the Western Powers to UNRWA with the fabulous amounts they had spent in the service of the Zionist cause during the same period.

28. There was no need whatever to resort to charity in order to finance the operations of UNRWA. A simple act of justice would suffice. The lands and properties confiscated from the Arab refugees by the usurpers yielded an annual revenue of about \$170 million, or approximately five times the amount requested for relief under the annual budget of UNRWA. All that was required, therefore, was to hand over the Arab lands and property situated in the occupied area to a custodian appointed by the United Nations, who would administer them and see that the revenue was paid to the legitimate owners of the property; that would enable the latter to live as human beings, and would also lighten the burdens of the United Nations. Any opposition to such a measure would constitute only an encouragement to looting and robbery.

29. The Arabs of Palestine, forced by the Zionist usurpers to abandon their country and their property, had a manifest and inalienable right to recover that

property. But the Zionists, apparently with the complicity of the Western Powers and of the Conciliation Commission, seemed determined to violate operative paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and to force the hand of the United Nations by persuading it that the repatriation of refugees was impossible. Those efforts were accompanied by a large-scale propaganda campaign directed against the Arabs and seeking to present Zionism as a socialist liberation movement. The Zionists were trying to create the impression that the Palestine conflict had existed only since 1948, whereas in fact the present dispute was but one aspect of the whole Palestine problem. They also claimed that the number of Arabs evicted from Palestine was counterbalanced by an equal number of Jewish so-called refugees forced to flee from the Arab countries; they thus endeavoured to present the problem in terms of racial and religious strife between Arabs and Jews provoked by alleged Arab "anti-Semitism". However, anti-Semitism, which was essentially a European phenomenon, was alien to the Arabs, who were themselves of Semitic stock, and was repugnant to their political and religious traditions.

30. Despite another of the Zionist claims, the Palestine problem was not a conflict between the Arabs and the Zionists, but rather between the alien Zionist invaders and the Arabs of Palestine, the legitimate owners of the country. To be sure, the Arab States were concerned about the Palestine problem and their assistance was welcome, but they, too, regarded the problem as essentially a matter for the Palestinian Arabs. The position taken by the Arab States was inspired by a genuine patriotism and, despite Zionist allegations, they had never exploited and would never exploit the refugee problem to further their political aims and their own ambitions.

31. No Zionist propaganda could disguise the fact that the Palestine situation was a case of colonialism in its ugliest form. The peoples of Asia and Africa who had suffered from the evils of imperialism had nevertheless been able to live on in their countries and to combat colonialism there. Many of them were now represented in the United Nations. Nowhere outside Palestine had imperialism displaced and expelled the indigenous populations from its homeland.

32. Zionism, far from being a socialistic and humane liberation movement, had been, from the outset, the instrument of the imperialist powers in their colonial designs on the Middle East and the Arab world. The ultimate aim of Zionism was to establish a great Jewish State extending from the Nile to the Euphrates. Even today, the Zionist State, which depended entirely on assistance from the Western countries, served as an intermediary for the latter in enabling their capital and influence to enter countries which believed that they were receiving aid directly from the Zionists.

33. The United Nations must not remain aloof from the Palestine problem and condone the illegal situation prevailing at the present time. Occupation by force did not confer new rights on the occupier. The Jewish minority, with the aid of alien Jewish immigrants, had invaded Palestine by means of aggression and insurrection. According to a principle of international law to which the late Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld had referred in the Introduction to his last report (A/4800 and Add.1), the organs of the United Nations had consistently maintained that the use of force contrary to the Charter as interpreted by those organs could not yield results which the Organization

could accept as valid and as establishing new rights. If it accepted the illegal occupation of Palestine by foreign Zionist invaders, the United Nations would be depriving the principles of the Charter of all substance and significance.

34. There were two ways of resolving the Palestine problem. The first was the peaceful way, through the application of the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international law and justice.

35. The second way was the way of force. The Palestine refugees sincerely hoped that the United Nations would not compel them to resort to force, but if the Organization was incapable of bringing about a just settlement, they would be obliged to liberate their country themselves. No one could blame them for wanting to ensure, at whatever price, the emancipation of their people and the liberation of their homeland.

36. In conclusion, he wished to deny an allegation by the representative of Israel (309th meeting) that he himself, in 1948, had admitted the responsibility of the Arabs for the flight of the Arab refugees. He also protested against the attacks on the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, the Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee.

37. Mr. LOKMAN (Mauritania) deplored the fact that the United Nations, which had itself created the Palestine refugee problem, had not found it possible, in the space of fourteen years, to bring about a satisfactory solution. Approximately 1,200,000 persons had been expelled from their country in order to make room for newcomers. It would undoubtedly be in the interests of the United Nations to recognize the rights of those refugees to be reinstated in their lands and to return to their homes. The countries financing UNRWA would thus be freed of their obligations.

38. In a letter addressed to Lord Peel, then the Chairman of the Royal Commission on Palestine, Mr. J. E. Malcolm had upheld the thesis that the Jews, who were being driven out of various countries, must find refuge somewhere, and that other peoples must make room for them. The United Nations, which was the guardian of justice, had been seized of the question for fourteen years. An impressive number of resolutions had been adopted thereon: thirty-two resolutions of the General Assembly, thirty-one of the Security Council and five of the Trusteeship Council. However, most of those resolutions had not been implemented; they had remained dead letters or had been violated. That represented a considerable waste of time and money, and such contempt for its resolutions could only harm the prestige of the Organization and weaken the authority of the principles of the Charter. To obtain peace in Palestine, the United Nations must affirm its authority and implement the resolutions which it had adopted, including the partition resolution (181 (II)) of 29 November 1947. It was said by some that Israel had become a reality which it was impossible to ignore. But the Arab refugees from Palestine were also a reality which could not be ignored for Israel's benefit. Israel existed because the United Nations had created it but, as a result of that decision, 1,200,000 Arab refugees were living in other States and waiting for justice to be done them.

39. Considering the situation in all objectivity, he believed that the area of Jerusalem should be immediately de-militarized and placed under the control of the United Nations, in order that Moslems, as well as Jews and Christians, might visit it. The status quo

of 1947 should be re-established there and the legitimate inhabitants of the area—Jews, Christians and Moslems without distinction—should have their property restored to them. In that way, through the implementation of Trusteeship Council resolutions 32 (II) and 34 (II), more than 100,000 Arab refugees could be repatriated. In addition, the Israel armed forces should be immediately asked to withdraw within the borders fixed by the partition resolution of 29 November 1947, thereby enabling more than 500,000 Arab refugees to be repatriated to Western Galilee, Jaffa, Ramle, Lydda, the Beersheba corridor, Majdal, and more than 200 villages.

40. Only by taking such steps to ensure that its resolutions were implemented could the United Nations bring about a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question. Having accepted the principle of partition and of the creation of Jewish and Arab States, the United Nations must see to it that those States could work together in harmony and peace. The United Nations must not accept a "fait accompli" brought about by force, but must try to solve the problem on a basis of justice. There was no justice in the occupation or expropriation of Arab lands by Israel, and just as the Jewish and other victims had been given back their property after the defeat of Nazism, the Arab refugees in Palestine, who were also victims, should have their homes and lands restored to them. A United Nations custodian could be appointed to protect and administer Arab property and lands and to turn over the income to the rightful owners pending a final solution of the Palestine problem.

41. He shared the hope of the representative of Israel for peace between Israel and the Arab States. That could only come about, however, if Israel were willing to come to an understanding with the Palestine Arabs and with the original inhabitants of Palestine in general. There was room for both Arabs and Jews in Palestine, provided they lived in a democratic State in which all citizens, Arabs or Jews, enjoyed the same rights. But a small minority should not try to rule a majority, or to turn itself into a majority by bringing in people from outside. Such a democratic State could be formed on a federal basis or on any other basis, through the United Nations. Those were the conditions in which an offer of peace could be made. Unfortunately, Israel and its friends apparently wanted the Palestine Arab refugees to forget their homes and settle in neighbouring Arab countries. That was unacceptable, and the mere fact that the Jews had been persecuted by the Nazis gave them no right to persecute the Palestinians in their turn.

42. The Mauritanian delegation would like to see the Arabs and Jews live together, either in two separate States, or as fellow-citizens of one State of Palestine. In Mauritania, for instance, three different races, Africans, Arabs and Berbers all lived together very harmoniously. In order to restore peace in Palestine, due account should be taken of the point of view of the original population. Neither the Arabs nor the Jews should be favoured, but it should be remembered that 1,200,000 people who were the rightful inhabitants of Palestine were being forced to live outside the country. The Jewish immigrants should understand the viewpoint of the Palestinians, and *vice versa*. In that way, the question could be solved, not by force and by a "fait accompli", but in a manner in keeping with justice and with the principles of the Charter.

43. Mr. COMAY (Israel) pointed out that Mr. Ghory had said that he was speaking in the name of the

Palestine Arab delegation. He recalled that Mr. Ghory had been heard pursuant to a ruling made by the Chairman at the 306th meeting and that no "Palestine Arab delegation" had ever been recognized as such by the Committee.

44. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) disputed that the Chairman had made any ruling in connexion with the request for a hearing contained in letter A/SPC/58 and Add.1. That letter had been approved by the Committee without objection, and Mr. Ghory had spoken in the name of the Palestine Arab delegation, in accordance with the wording of the letter.

45. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia) did not see why the representatives of the Palestine Arabs should not be given the title that they had chosen for themselves.

46. Mr. COMAY (Israel) said that the request for a hearing did not determine Mr. Ghory's status before the Committee. At the 306th meeting, the Chairman had said that he proposed when the time came to give a hearing to a spokesman of a group, in accordance with past practice. That decision was the only pertinent one.

47. The CHAIRMAN said that he stood by the very careful wording used by the Chair at the 306th meeting, which appeared in the official documents of the Committee. He had nothing to add to what he had said in that connexion.

48. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) proposed that the Secretariat should arrange for the text of Mr. Ghory's statement to be distributed to the Members of the Committee.

49. Mr. COMAY (Israel) said that he had no objection, provided it was not distributed under the name of the "Palestine Arab Delegation"; moreover, there was to his delegation's knowledge no such country as Palestine. That title represented an attempt to undermine the status of Israel in the United Nations and to provoke a political controversy. If it were retained in one form or another, he would have no option but to explain his objections fully. He suggested that the statement should be distributed simply as a statement by Mr. Ghory, or that it should have an attached note saying that it had been made in accordance with the Chairman's ruling at the 306th Meeting.

50. The CHAIRMAN said that he wished to avoid polemics and to remain strictly impartial, while following previous practice. He considered that it was not advisable to have the statement distributed in the form in which it had been submitted to the Chair, an account of the wording used in the title. However, he was prepared to have it distributed if the title were made to read "A Palestine Arab Delegation". He believed that the representative of Saudi Arabia would have no objection to that slight change.

51. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan) expressed surprise that the representative of Israel should object to the use of the word "Palestine". He pointed out that the question being considered, on which the Israel delegate had been speaking, was described in the agenda as the "Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East". That being so, it was impossible either for the Committee, or for the Israel delegate to escape the use of the word "Palestine".

52. Mr. DIMECHKIE (Lebanon) agreed with the observation made by the representative of Pakistan. The reservations voiced by the representative of Israel, whatever they might be, should not deprive the Com-

mittee of an opportunity to study Mr. Ghory's statement.

53. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia) considered that the Palestine Arab delegation could not be denied the use of its proper title. Was it not composed of Arabs from Palestine? The title page of Mr. Ghory's statement bore the words "Palestine Arab Delegation". That formulation, which was preceded by no article, seemed in keeping with the wishes of the Chairman. However, the Saudi Arabian delegation would abide by his decision. As to the word "Palestine", which designated the area known under that name, it could be found both in the title of the Conciliation Commission and in the heading of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), to which Israel had referred so often.

54. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) stressed that the document under discussion was not an official United Nations document; the text was the responsibility of Mr. Ghory alone, and nobody else was entitled to alter it. He concurred with the representatives of Saudi Arabia and of Pakistan with regard to the use of the word "Palestine".

55. Mr. LOKMAN (Mauritania) observed that the Israel delegation itself did not hesitate to use the word "Palestine" in documents which it distributed.

56. Mr. COMAY (Israel) said that the debate suggested that the Arab delegations were interested less in the circulation of Mr. Ghory's statement than in the title of the document. In order to facilitate the work of the Committee, he would agree to the document being distributed in the name of a group of Palestinian Arab refugees, since it was as their spokesman that Mr. Ghory had been heard.

57. Mr. OTO (Cameroun) proposed that the discussion regarding the title of Mr. Ghory's statement be deferred to the next meeting.

58. After a procedural discussion regarding the interpretation to be placed on that proposal and the question whether it came under rule 117, 118 or 119 of the Rules of Procedure, in which the CHAIRMAN, Mr. OTO (Cameroun), Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDÓ (Mexico), Mr. CROWE (United Kingdom), Mr. DIMECHKIE (Lebanon), Mr. COMAY (Israel), Mr. HOOD (Australia), Mr. GALLEGOS (Ecuador), Mr. SULEIMAN (Sudan) and Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq), took part, the CHAIRMAN declared that rule 119 was applicable in the circumstances.

The motion for adjournment was adopted by 33 votes to none, with 30 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 7.10 p.m.