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Organization of the
United Nations



World Food
Programme

Hunger Hotspots

FAO–WFP early warnings
on acute food insecurity

June to October 2025 outlook



**Global Network
Against Food Crises**
INTEGRATED ACTIONS FOR LASTING SOLUTIONS



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
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Map of early warning hunger hotspots: June to October 2025



Source of data: WFP and FAO. 2025. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (June to October 2025)*. Rome.

Source of map: United Nations Geospatial. 2025. Map of the World. In: *United Nations*. [Cited 7 April 2025]. <https://www.un.org/geospatial/content/map-world-1>. Refer to the disclaimer on page ii for the names and boundaries used in this map. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

Note: The displacement icon is used when displacement is a key driver of acute food insecurity, or when it is a significant factor contributing to vulnerability, even if not a direct driver. It applies to internally displaced persons as well as migrants and refugees.

Abbreviations

CARI	Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
ENSO	El Niño-Southern Oscillation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GAM	global acute malnutrition
GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
GRFC	Global Report on Food Crises
HNRP	Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDP	internally displaced person
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SEFSec	Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey
WASH	water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme



Executive summary

For the outlook period from June to October 2025, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) warn that acute food insecurity is likely to worsen across 13 countries and territories identified as hotspots and are issuing an early warning for urgent humanitarian action in these hotspots.

The Sudan, Palestine, South Sudan, Haiti and Mali remain at the highest concern level, necessitating the most urgent attention. **Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar and Nigeria** are classified as hotspots of very high concern and require urgent attention to save lives and livelihoods and for preventing further deteriorations. Other hotspots are **Burkina Faso, Chad, Somalia** and the **Syrian Arab Republic**.

Armed violence remains the primary driver of acute food insecurity in 12 of the 13 hotspots. In all the hotspots of highest concern, widespread and escalating armed violence is a major driver of the deterioration in food security, contributing to Catastrophe (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]/Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 5) outcomes in affected areas. In the **Sudan**, Famine-like conditions (IPC Phase 5) may persist due to the ongoing conflict and the approaching lean season.* In the **Gaza Strip**, the risk of Famine is becoming increasingly likely due to the protracted and large-scale military operations and the fact that humanitarian agencies are unable to provide adequate assistance. In **South Sudan**, subnational violence and political tensions are compounding macroeconomic challenges and flood risks. In **Haiti**, record levels of gang violence and insecurity are forcing mass displacement and obstructing humanitarian operations, perpetuating catastrophic food insecurity among displaced populations in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. In **Mali**, persistent conflict and very high access constraints in northern and central regions continue to disrupt food systems and limit assistance.

Global economic fragility, high debt burdens, geopolitical volatility and trade disruptions continue to deepen food insecurity in several hunger hotspots. In the **Sudan**, conflict drives the risk of partial economic collapse in 2025, with high inflation severely limiting food access. In **Palestine**, the elevated food prices coupled with exhausted livelihoods

will accelerate the collapse of household purchasing power. In **South Sudan**, macroeconomic instability and currency weakness have driven staple food prices to levels five times higher than last year, severely eroding household purchasing power. In **Haiti**, the protracted economic crisis and market disruptions driven by gang violence are sustaining elevated food prices and severely eroding purchasing power. In **Mali**, high grain prices and ongoing conflict are eroding the coping capacities of the most vulnerable households, particularly in conflict-affected areas.

Beyond conflict and economic crises, **weather extremes and increased climate variability are exacerbating acute food insecurity in many regions.** Neutral El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) conditions are forecast for June to October 2025, but weather anomalies such as floods, droughts, cyclones and erratic rainfall are expected to persist. In **South Sudan**, above-average rainfall forecasts are heightening flood risks, while in **Haiti**, the predicted above-average 2025 Atlantic hurricane season increases threats to food production and livelihoods.

Currently, funding for food, emergency agriculture, and nutrition assistance falls critically short, and the outlook is increasingly constrained. These funding shortfalls, compounded by severe access constraints, risk drastically reducing the delivery of food and nutrition support in several hunger hotspots – potentially leaving millions without assistance and deepening the severity of acute food insecurity.

Funding for humanitarian assistance must not be reduced. On the contrary, urgent support should be scaled up to boost emergency food production and improve food access across all hunger hotspots. Without immediate humanitarian action and coordinated international efforts to address access constraints and advocate for conflict de-escalation, further starvation and loss of life are likely in the **Sudan, Palestine, South Sudan, Haiti and Mali**.

* The Government of the Sudan did not endorse the December 2024 IPC analysis.

In parallel, investment in anticipatory action should continue in order to anticipate and mitigate emerging needs and minimize the impact of disasters, as early intervention saves lives, reduces food gaps and protects assets and livelihoods at a significantly lower cost than delayed humanitarian action.

This report outlines country-specific recommendations for urgent emergency responses, as well as anticipatory actions to meet existing humanitarian needs and implement short-term protective interventions before new crises emerge.




Introduction

In this report covering June to October 2025, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) identify 13 hunger hotspots – compared to 16 hunger hotspots in the October 2024 edition.

The **Democratic Republic of the Congo** has been classified as hotspot amid intensifying conflict. Conversely, regional clusters in East Africa (Ethiopia and Kenya) and Southern Africa (Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe), as well as the Niger are no longer classified as hotspots due to improvements in climatic conditions.

Although these countries are no longer considered hotspots for the outlook period, future climatic shifts could lead to their reclassification. Additionally, Lebanon is no longer classified as a hotspot following a reduction in the intensity of military operations.

Figure 1. The categories of Hunger Hotspots



Countries requiring monitoring:

Several other countries or situations, while not identified as hunger hotspots in this report, merit close monitoring. These include:

- countries or situations where data were insufficient or not available to allow for a comparative assessment based on the applied methodology, but which were flagged as concerning during the discussions based on other evidence, as described below; and
- countries or situations in protracted crisis with high numbers and/or high prevalence of people in acute food insecurity, but without clear evidence for a likely food security deterioration of a level comparable with trends observed in countries selected as hunger hotspots

Source: Authors' own elaboration.


Methodology

The identification of hunger hotspots is based on a forward-looking analysis that highlights where acute food insecurity is most likely to significantly worsen.

This process is grounded in consensus among food security experts, conflict analysts and specialists in economics and natural hazards from both FAO and WFP, at headquarters and in the field.

Hotspot identification is informed by an initial prioritization using a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Qualitative and quantitative indicators used to provide the Hunger Hotspots analysis



Source: Authors' own elaboration.

The report prioritizes the use of IPC and CH data to assess populations in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). Where recent IPC/CH data are not available, estimates are derived, if available, from CARI. Populations classified as “moderately acute food insecure” and “severely acute food insecure” under WFP’s CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations in Crisis or worse

(IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). Additional sources include estimates of people in need of food and livelihood assistance from the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans (HNRPs).¹

Further details are available in the hotspots selection process appendix at the end of the report. The cutoff date for analysis and information in this report was 4 June 2025.

Anticipatory action and emergency response

Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods across all hunger hotspots. In hotspots of highest concern, such action is critical to prevent starvation and loss of life.

To support this, the report provides recommendations for anticipatory actions and emergency responses, tailored to the identified risks:

- **Anticipatory actions** refer to short-term disaster risk management interventions implemented in the critical window between an early-warning trigger –when forecasts indicate a likely hazard – and the impact of that hazard on lives and livelihoods. These actions aim to protect the most vulnerable populations and their livelihoods before a shock occurs. In protracted crises, anticipatory actions are recommended where appropriate.²
- **Emergency response** involves actions aimed at addressing current or emerging humanitarian needs and is determined by rapid assessment of the

usefulness of emergency assistance. The essential information that determines whether extraordinary food resources are required comes from two basic areas:

- early warning and emergency preparedness, supported by baseline vulnerability analysis; and
- essential needs analysis, covering nutritional conditions and of the extent to which food scarcity for vulnerable populations is a result of lack of availability and/or a lack of access.

Given the extended outlook period of this report, recommendations for both anticipatory actions and emergency response are indicative.

They are intended for implementation only if early-warning triggers are met or clear early warning signs manifest. Some recommendations also include preparedness measures, which are crucial for enabling the timely and effective implementation of anticipatory actions.

Figure 3. IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

PHASE	TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION	PRIORITY RESPONSE OBJECTIVE
1 None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Resilience building and disaster risk reduction.
2 Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Disaster risk reduction and protection of livelihoods.
3 Crisis	Households either: Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; OR are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
4 Emergency	Some households either: Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; OR are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to save lives and livelihoods.
5 Catastrophe/ Famine*	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality).	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

* Some households can be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if areas are not classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). Given the severity and implications of classifying Famine, specific IPC protocols have been developed, and special considerations are identified in the IPC Technical Manual 3.1 (see pp. 24–25 for more details on criteria: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en). A Famine classification requires evidence on food security, nutrition and mortality at or above IPC/CH Phase 5 thresholds. Depending on the quality and quantity of evidence available, Famine can be classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) with solid evidence or as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) with reasonable evidence.

Source: IPC. 2021. *IPC Technical Manual 3.1. Evidence and Standards for Better Food Security and Nutrition Decisions*. Rome. https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en

Global Network Against Food Crises

This report is part of a series of analytical products produced under the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) initiative, which aims to enhance and coordinate the generation and dissemination of evidence-based information and analysis to prevent and address food crises.

In May 2025, the GNAFC – together with the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) – released the *2025 Global Report on Food Crises* (GRFC). The report presents the number and share of the population analysed estimated to be facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above)

levels of acute food insecurity in 53 countries/territories affected by food crises in 2024. The report is available at: fsinplatform.org/grfc2025

While the GRFC provides a retrospective overview of food crisis contexts – reporting on the previous year’s food security situation and offering preliminary forecasts for the current year – the *Hunger Hotspots* report offers a forward-looking early-warning analysis. It identifies countries and contexts where acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate over a five-month outlook period.



Upcoming trends of acute food insecurity drivers

Organized violence and conflict risks

The link between armed violence and food insecurity is becoming increasingly evident, as both the number and intensity of conflicts – and their impact on civilians – continue to rise. In 2024, conflict events globally increased by 25 percent compared with 2023, and early 2025 data indicate that high levels of violence are likely to persist.³ Civilians are bearing the brunt of violence, with 2024 recording unprecedented numbers of civilian casualties, as aerial bombardments, heavy artillery in populated areas and the use of remote warfare – including explosive ordnance – become more prevalent.^{4, 5, 6, 7}

Armed violence is a primary driver of acute food insecurity – often compounded by economic challenges and extreme weather events – in 12 out of the 13 hunger hotspots featured in this report. **In all hotspots of highest concern – the Sudan, Palestine, South Sudan, Haiti and Mali – widespread and escalating armed violence is a major driver of the deterioration in food security, including Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) outcomes in affected areas.** The report also highlights the spillover effects of conflict, as rising food insecurity spreads across borders due to forced displacement and economic disruptions.

Famine in the **Sudan** was confirmed in 2024.* Conditions are expected to persist due to the continuing conflict and ongoing displacement, particularly in the Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur regions. This deterioration will continue to drive high needs across the region, with cross-border movements to neighbouring states – primarily Chad, Egypt and South Sudan – continuing to rise. These movements will add to the 12.8 million forcibly displaced inside and outside the Sudan since the outbreak of conflict in April 2023.⁸

In the **Gaza Strip**, the risk of Famine is becoming increasingly likely following announcements in May 2025 regarding the expected scale of military operations and the absence of adequate plans to deliver food and non-food items across the Strip. In **Yemen**, escalating conflict and regional tensions are exacerbated by extreme humanitarian access constraints. In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, the political transition remains fragile, while ongoing localized hostilities continue to drive displacement and hinder return movements.

In **South Sudan**, escalating subnational violence and political tensions are compounding severe macroeconomic challenges and the potential impact of expected flooding in the coming months. In **Somalia**, conflict-driven humanitarian access constraints, displacement and market disruptions are intensifying the impact of a likely second consecutive poor agricultural season – caused by poorly distributed seasonal rains – on food security.

The escalation of conflict in early 2025 in the **Democratic Republic of the Congo** has triggered a sharp rise in displacement, including into neighbouring countries, with the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity now projected to reach a record 27.7 million.

In **Mali**, food systems remain severely disrupted by conflict and very high access constraints in northern and central regions. Meanwhile, in **Burkina Faso** a significant increase in violent incidents – mainly in northern and eastern areas – combined with rising food prices, is likely to worsen food insecurity during the upcoming lean season. In **Nigeria**, escalating violence in northern states is likely to drive widespread displacement, reduce access and hinder agricultural activity.

In **Latin America and the Caribbean**, **Haiti** stands out as the hotspot of highest concern. The country faces record levels of displacement and pockets of populations are facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Acute food insecurity is driven by rampant armed gang violence and elevated food inflation.

In **Asia**, the impact of the recent earthquake is likely to worsen the already dire acute food insecurity situation in **Myanmar**, driven by conflict, widespread displacement, severe access restrictions and high food prices. The reduction in humanitarian funding contributed to food insecurity among the most vulnerable population such as IDPs in Rakhine.

Economic risks

In the current global economic landscape, a combination of persistent challenges is driving acute food insecurity across vulnerable countries/territories over the outlook period.

* The Government of the Sudan did not endorse the December 2024 IPC analysis.



Global economic growth is projected to slow to 2.8 percent in 2025, down from the 3.3 percent forecast made by the IMF in January. Growth in developing economies—including both emerging markets and low-income countries—has also been revised downward and remains below historical averages. This slower pace is insufficient to drive meaningful poverty reduction or support a full recovery from recent shocks.⁹ This subdued outlook is further exacerbated by debt vulnerabilities, declining concessional financing, climate shocks, conflict, and geopolitical risks, all of which are contributing to increased trade disruptions. These disruptions – driven by new tariffs and heightened uncertainty – are expected to weigh on global trade growth in 2025. For developing economies, the combination of weak economic growth, elevated risks, and persistent uncertainty is placing mounting pressure on fiscal and debt positions. This situation poses significant downside risks to food security, particularly in net food-importing countries.

This challenging economic landscape is unfolding against a backdrop of already severe stress affecting numerous developing economies. These include high debt-servicing costs – which severely limit fiscal space for social protection and food security interventions – and the predominance of foreign currency-denominated debt, which continues to expose developing economies to the impacts of exchange rate vulnerability.

Heightened policy uncertainty is further exacerbating financial pressures, likely increasing risk aversion among international investors. This could raise borrowing costs for governments and accelerate capital outflows, resulting in a severe credit squeeze among countries most in need of financing at a time of heightened fiscal needs.

Adding to these pressures, official development assistance (ODA) is expected to contract from USD 213 billion in 2023 to USD 173 billion in 2025, creating further significant constraints on the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance.¹⁰

Persistently high domestic prices of food, with nearly 80 percent of low-income countries experiencing an annual food inflation rate above 5 percent as of March 2025,¹¹ heightens vulnerability for populations whose economic resilience has been severely eroded by high living costs.

In **Asia, Myanmar** faces severe economic challenges resulted from ongoing conflict, which has been amplified by the recent earthquake. Projected economic contraction, rapid currency depreciation and supply chain disruptions affect food availability and costs.¹²

East Africa faces a confluence of conflict, climate shocks and severe economic pressures. In particular, **South Sudan** will continue to face serious economic challenges due to the residual effects of the severe disruption of oil revenues in most of 2024. Sharp depreciation of the South Sudanese pound resulted in staple food prices nearly five times higher year-on-year as of March 2025.¹³ Despite signs of currency stabilization, inflationary pressures will persist due to the slow recovery of oil exports. In **Somalia**, economic challenges persist due to high food prices, which are expected to remain high due to projected below-average harvests, depleted stocks and high shipping rates.¹⁴

In **Latin America and the Caribbean**, **Haiti** contends with a protracted economic crisis and escalating violence that severely impact food security. Annual food inflation

remained high at 37 percent in February 2025, continuing to erode purchasing power among vulnerable populations.¹⁵ Domestic supply shocks, driven by persistent insecurity, climate disruptions¹⁶ and currency instability, are expected to maintain high food prices throughout 2025.¹⁷

In the **Near East and North Africa**, economic deterioration, conflict and market disruptions continue to drive severe levels of acute food insecurity. In the **Sudan**, the ongoing conflict has compounded a severe economic crisis, further undermining food security. Widespread insecurity and high intensity military operations have severely disrupted livelihoods, destroyed key economic infrastructures, constrained humanitarian access and triggered large-scale population displacements. Disruptions to Red Sea shipping have further constrained essential imports, exacerbating foreign currency shortages.¹⁸

In **Palestine**, in addition to the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, elevated food prices, exhausted livelihoods, and the ongoing commercial blockade are accelerating economic collapse. Meanwhile, the West Bank is also facing an economic crisis, driven by high unemployment and severe fiscal constraints that are limiting public services and reducing salaries.¹⁹ In **Yemen**, severe economic decline and persistent disruptions to commercial imports, worsened by conflict and regional tensions, remain a primary driver of widespread acute food insecurity.²⁰ Similarly, in the **Syrian Arab Republic**, ongoing economic deterioration continues to severely undermine food security, with limited prospects

for improvement in 2025. Market disruptions caused by hostilities, high agricultural input costs, low wages and exacerbated by reductions in humanitarian aid further hamper access to basic necessities.²¹

In **West Africa**, **Mali** and **Burkina Faso** are facing conflict-related market disruptions which have significantly increased food prices, severely eroding household purchasing power and intensifying food insecurity.²² **Nigeria** faces severe macroeconomic challenges, including high inflation, drastically increasing the cost of living and pushing millions into hunger.²³

Natural hazard risks

The global climate outlook for June to October 2025 is shaped by neutral ENSO conditions,²⁴ following several years of alternating El Niño and La Niña events that had widespread regional impacts. Despite neutral ENSO conditions, persistent weather anomalies – including floods, droughts, cyclones and erratic rainfall – will remain key drivers of acute food insecurity, often compounding the adverse effects of conflict, displacement and economic shocks.

In **Asia**, the aftermath of a devastating 7.7-magnitude earthquake in **Myanmar** in March 2025,²⁵ compounded by flooding in July and September 2024,²⁶ has severely disrupted infrastructure and humanitarian operations. These combined shocks continue to affect the country as the 2025 season unfolds.



In **East Africa**, following a poor October–December 2024 rainy season in **Somalia**,²⁷ the March–May 2025 rains have shown mixed performance as of late April 2025. While most areas received above-average precipitation in March – except predominantly pastoralist areas in northern Somalia – rainfall deficits in April raised growing concerns. These deficits may compromise crop and pasture development in some areas, despite the initial support provided by earlier rains. In **South Sudan**, where the rainy season typically begins in April in southern bimodal key cropping areas and in May in central and northern unimodal rainfall areas, April rainfall in the south was below average but sufficient to support crop germination. As of late April, vegetation conditions were above average. Forecasts of above-average rainfall from May to July across most of the country are expected to benefit crop yields but also heighten the risk of flash floods and river overflows – particularly in areas still recovering from the severe floods of 2024. These compounded risks may lead to further displacement and disrupt agricultural production.²⁸

In **Latin America and the Caribbean**, extreme weather events remain a significant threat. In **Haiti**, the forecast for an above-average 2025 Atlantic hurricane season²⁹ – driven in part by warmer-than-average tropical sea surface temperatures – raises serious risks to food production and livelihoods – already strained by repeated climate shocks in recent years.

In the **Near East and North Africa**, forecast above-average rainfall from June to September may benefit crop yields in 2025 in the **Sudan**. However, this also raises the risk of flooding across central and southern parts of the country. Flooding could damage infrastructure, raise the risk of water-borne diseases and malnutrition, and displace more communities.^{30, 31}

In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, cereal production in 2025 is forecast to fall to a historical low due to record drought conditions³² compounding the effects of delayed planting, conflict-related disruptions, subsidy removals, high input costs and restricted access to farmland.³³ Initial projections point to a likely wheat production deficit of 2.7 million metric tonnes – the equivalent of the annual dietary needs of approximately 16.2 million people.³⁴

Below-average rainfall during the 2024 rainy season has also severely impacted agricultural production in **Yemen**,³⁵ particularly in rainfed areas. Despite the overall rainfall deficit, isolated episodes of intense rainfall triggered flash floods, causing infrastructure damage, displacement and disruptions to livelihoods.³⁶


In **Southern Africa**, although climatic conditions have improved compared to 2024, when the region experienced widespread and intense drought, a combination of flooding, cyclones and dry spells in some areas is likely to continue posing a significant risk to food insecurity.

In **West Africa and the Sahel**, floods remain a key concern for the outlook period. In **Mali** and **Burkina Faso**, the forecasted above-average rainfall from July to September may trigger localized flooding, posing risks to crops and livelihoods.³⁷ In **Nigeria**, adverse weather conditions are expected across most of the country in 2025, likely leading to deteriorating food security levels when combined with escalating violence.³⁸ In **Chad**, the southern regions may face flooding during the rainy season, which could have significant consequences for crop production and food security.^{39, 40}



The number of people in acute food insecurity in hunger hotspots

In 2025 (where available, most recent data), in millions¹



- IPC/CH Phase 3
- IPC/CH Phase 4
- IPC/CH Phase 5
- Moderately acute food insecure (WFP CARI scale)⁷
- Severely acute food insecure (WFP CARI scale)⁷
- People in need (food security and livelihoods), HNRP – severity level 3
- People in need (food security and livelihoods), HNRP – severity level 4

NOTES

- The data presented are the most recent projections; data are from 2025 except for Burkina Faso and the Syrian Arab Republic (both 2024).
- The Government of the Sudan did not endorse the December 2024 IPC analysis. Most current data reported are non-peak. Peak numbers are presented in the graph on page 15.
- HNRP food security people in need estimates are used for areas controlled by the De Facto Authorities (DFA), while IPC analysis is used for areas under the control of the Government of Yemen (GoY). Severity Level 4 includes 1.1 million people facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in areas controlled by the GoY.
- Updated 2025 lean season projection.
- Based on WFP CARI. Data are from 2024. Refers to the number of people in need of food security and livelihood assistance.
- Includes refugees and returnees calculated from an additional CH analysis.
- Populations that are classified as moderately acute food insecure and severely acute food insecure as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).
- Prevalence of the population analysed expressed in percentage terms.

The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator sits within the IPC analytical framework. For details see: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en.

Regional ramifications of the crisis in the Sudan

With no political solution in sight, the conflict in the Sudan is entering its third year, worsening the world's largest regional humanitarian crisis.

In recent months, violence has spread further, engulfing additional states also in northern Sudan. Notably, in early May 2025, fighting reached the city of Port Sudan on the Red Sea for the first time since the conflict began.⁴¹ The risks of further escalation are significant.⁴²

Against this backdrop, the world's largest regional displacement crisis is expected to deepen further. By mid-May 2025, the number of people forcibly displaced since April 2023 reached a staggering 12.4 million,⁴³ including 8.1 million IDPs.^{44, 45} This represents an increase of over one million people since the previous *Hunger Hotspots* report.^{46, 47}

Across the border, increasing flows of people seeking refuge and safety from violence and escaping hunger are compounding humanitarian needs. In the last six months alone, around 1.6 million more people fled into neighbouring countries, bringing the total refugee and returnees population to a record 3.9 million by early May 2025.⁴⁸ This surge increases competition over scarce local resources and strains humanitarian operations amid an uncertain funding outlook. Sudanese nationals and others are expected to continue arriving in neighbouring countries in the months ahead, fleeing escalating conflict, economic collapse⁴⁹ and worsening hunger.

Chad, Egypt and South Sudan are likely to continue experiencing the highest increases in arrivals within the region.⁵⁰ By early May, over 794 000 refugees had arrived in **Chad**, including 100,000 in the past six months alone.⁵¹ Many crossing the borders are arriving in poor nutritional condition. In March 2025, approximately 456 000 refugees and returnees in Chad were projected to be acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance, including 80 000 facing critical food insecurity (CH Phase 4).⁵² The influx has placed significant strain on Chad's isolated and already impoverished eastern provinces, stretching limited resources beyond capacity.⁵³ **Egypt** is reportedly hosting 1.5 million Sudanese refugees, intensifying pressure on urban services and public health infrastructure.^{54, 55} Meanwhile, the number of refugees and returnees in **South Sudan** has exceeded one million, up from 800 000 in October 2024.⁵⁶ These populations are among the most vulnerable, arriving in already strained and fragile communities, particularly in Unity and Upper Nile states where food insecurity is rapidly worsening.⁵⁷ Between April and July 2025, an estimated 31 000 returnees in South Sudan are projected to face Catastrophic food insecurity (IPC Phase 5).⁵⁸

The conflict in the Sudan is significantly impacting South Sudan's economy, primarily due to substantial losses in oil revenue following a break in one of the main pipelines transporting South Sudanese oil through the Sudan. This interruption has worsened inflation amid already severe macroeconomic challenges. Consequently, the national currency has depreciated sharply, driving food prices even higher from their already exceptionally elevated levels.

Libya has registered a notable surge of arrivals, which is likely to continue, with over 75 000 people recorded in the past six months alone – surpassing earlier predictions.⁵⁹ As a result, Libya has become a key transit route for Sudanese fleeing northward.⁶⁰ By early May 2025, the total number of registered arrivals in Libya had exceeded 300 000.⁶¹ In **Ethiopia**, more than 70 000 Sudanese refugees are being hosted, primarily in the Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regions, where new arrivals face internal tensions and limited resources.⁶² The **Central African Republic** has also seen an increase in arrivals, with the total surpassing 43 000, up from 35 000 in mid-September 2024.⁶³ Similarly, **Uganda** has recorded rising numbers, with over 74 000 Sudanese arrivals by early May.⁶⁴


Reduction of humanitarian assistance

As of early May 2025, global funding requirements outlined in coordinated humanitarian response plans amounted to USD 12.2 billion for the food security sector and USD 2.6 billion for the nutrition sector. At the time of writing, only 9 percent of the required funding for food security and 4 percent for nutrition had been received.⁶⁵

The funding outlook for the food, nutrition and agriculture sectors is increasingly constrained. The year 2025 began with significant cuts to ODA from major donors, despite record numbers of people in need. In a context where 75 percent of humanitarian funding for food security and nutrition in food crisis contexts is provided by just four donors – half of it from the United States of America – any change in funding allocations by these actors can have a substantial impact on the delivery of life- and livelihood-saving assistance.⁶⁶

According to preliminary data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ODA declined in 2024 for the first time after five consecutive years of growth.⁶⁷ Following a 7 percent drop in 2024, a further 13 percent decline is projected in 2025.⁶⁸ Preliminary findings from a GNAFC financing analysis indicate that humanitarian allocations to the food sector in food crisis contexts could fall by as much as 45 percent – if donor funding does not increase beyond current projections – heightening the risk of a deterioration in acute food insecurity in 2025, as shown in Figure 4.⁶⁹

Figure 4. Humanitarian allocations to food sectors in food crisis contexts (USD billion, 2016–2024 actual, 2025 projection)



Source of data: GNAFC. (forthcoming). *Humanitarian assistance to food sectors in food crisis contexts: Initial estimates and insights 2025*. Rome.

Current cuts to food, agricultural and nutrition assistance – combined with severe access constraints – risk significantly reducing the delivery of food, agricultural and nutrition support, including in countries facing the most severe food crises. This could leave millions in need, further worsening the severity of acute food insecurity.⁷⁰

Operations have been disrupted in some of the most severe and largest food crises worldwide, including in the Sudan, South Sudan, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Yemen.⁷¹ In this context, preventing further deteriorations in acute food

insecurity in the short term may be prioritized over addressing underlying drivers and structural causes of food insecurity in the long term.

The alert issued by FAO and WFP on the potential deterioration of food insecurity in countries identified as hunger hotspots is critical to ensure appropriate prioritization and to sustain both emergency response and long-term resilience efforts. Urgent food and agricultural assistance is needed across all hunger hotspots to protect lives and support livelihoods.

If current projections for 2025 hold and donor support continues to decline, vital humanitarian operations could be scaled back or discontinued, while data collection and analysis efforts essential for effective coordination and response could face significant strain. This would exacerbate hunger, malnutrition and socioeconomic instability in the world's most fragile regions. Urgent action is needed to prevent a further deepening of current food crises, including safeguarding partners' capacities to produce high-quality data and analysis to guide the humanitarian response.



Highest concern: Hunger hotspots with catastrophic conditions

In the **Sudan**, famine conditions were projected through May 2025. Famine-level acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 5) was already confirmed in at least five areas between October and November 2024, primarily in North Darfur, including Zamzam, Ar Salaam and Abu Shouk camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as in the Kordofan states. Between December 2024 and May 2025, an additional five areas are projected to face Famine, while 17 localities remain at risk of Famine.^{72,*} This analysis indicates that the critical situation is likely to persist and worsen during the outlook period,⁷³ particularly in North Darfur and Kordofan. This is expected to drive further displacement beyond the 8.1 million IDPs as of May 2025 (displaced since 2023), and the 3.9 million people who have fled to neighbouring countries.^{74,75} An estimated 24.6 million people were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity during the post-harvest season from December 2024 to May 2025, including 8.1 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and over 637 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).^{76,*} Without scaled-up assistance and a cessation of hostilities, amid extreme

access constraints,⁷⁷ acute food insecurity and malnutrition are expected to deteriorate further during the lean season starting in May 2025.

In **Palestine**, the risk of Famine in the **Gaza Strip** is becoming increasingly likely, as protracted and large-scale military operations are expected to continue causing widespread destruction, mass displacement and the near total collapse of the food system. Moreover, a continuation of the humanitarian and commercial blockade would lead to a critical lack of access to supplies and services that are essential to survival.⁷⁸ The latest IPC analysis released in May 2025 indicates that, between May and September 2025, the entire population – 2.1 million people – is projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, including over one million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 470 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).⁷⁹ Although the **West Bank** has not experienced the same level of conflict escalation as in the Gaza Strip, the situation is worsening due to intensified military operations, forced displacement, movement restrictions and high unemployment.



* The Government of the Sudan did not endorse the December 2024 IPC analysis.



In **South Sudan**, already catastrophic levels of food insecurity are expected to worsen among parts of the population in the coming months, driven by escalating conflict, rising political tensions and a strained peace agreement. This situation is particularly severe in Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity states, where extreme humanitarian access constraints persist.⁸⁰ Additionally, the continued influx of returnees and refugees fleeing the conflict in the Sudan is likely to place further strain on overstretched host communities. This is occurring in a context where food prices were nearly five times higher year-on-year as of March 2025.⁸¹ The high risk of continued flooding⁸² – already a driver of displacement and livelihood losses in late 2024⁸³ – raises further concerns for agricultural production and food security. Between April and July 2025, around 7.7 million people – 57 percent of the population – are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 2.5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Moreover, 63 000 people are projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), particularly in Jonglei and Upper Nile states and among returnees from the Sudan.⁸⁴



In **Haiti**, critical levels of acute food insecurity are likely to worsen, with pockets of the population already facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between March and June 2025.⁸⁵ Elevated levels of violence are likely to persist, as gang activity intensifies and expands within and beyond Port-au-Prince. This is driving further displacement, disrupting livelihoods and supply chains and constraining humanitarian access.⁸⁶ Flooding and landslides in the first half of 2025,⁸⁷ along with a likely above-average 2025 Atlantic hurricane season,⁸⁸ are also increasing risks to agricultural production.

This could drive food prices – already at high levels⁸⁹ – even higher, further limiting access to food. Over 5.7 million people – the highest number recorded since 2017 and equivalent to half of Haiti's population – were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity from March to June 2025. This includes 2.1 million people (19 percent of the analysed population) in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and over 8 400 IDPs in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).⁹⁰

In **Mali**, critical levels of acute food insecurity are likely to deteriorate further, with some populations in the north projected to face Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) conditions. Persistent conflict in central and northern regions continues to severely disrupt agricultural activities, livelihoods and markets.^{91,92} High food prices are also constraining access to food across the country, with northern regions facing the highest food basket costs due to restricted supply routes and ongoing armed violence.^{93,94,95} Forced displacement is also intensifying, with both an increase in internal displacement and a 50 percent year-on-year increase in the number of refugees hosted by Mali, placing additional strain on overstretched host communities. At the same time, humanitarian assistance remains constrained by severe funding shortfalls and extremely limited access.^{96,97,98} According to the latest available analysis, around 1.5 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) during the June–August 2025 period, including 64 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) in Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Tombouctou, and 2 600 people in Ménaka are at risk of Catastrophe (CH Phase 5), if timely assistance is not delivered.⁹⁹

Acute food insecurity trends in hunger hotspots of highest concern

2020–2025¹ peak numbers and prevalence



NOTES

- 1 Data for 2025 are considered as the expected peak, based on information available as of June 2025. For the Sudan, no data are available for the projected peak period in 2025.
- 2 Although a projection covering up to May 2025 is available, it covers the post-harvest period and may not reflect the peak in needs amid escalating conflict.
- 3 Data for 2023, 2024 and 2025 come from IPC analyses. Data for 2022 are from HNOs, while figures for 2020–2021 are based on the Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey (SEFSec) methodology, with prevalence of acute food insecurity referring to households rather than individuals. These sources apply different methodologies, limiting comparability. The 2020 and 2021 figures refer to the same SEFSec analysis (2020 assessment published in 2021); therefore, the 2020 estimate does not align with the source used in the GRFC.

Comparison over time indicates a general trend; however, comparability is affected by:

- (i) coverage differences for Haiti, where urban areas had larger coverage in 2020; and for Sudan, where country total population estimates increased between 2020 and 2023; and
- (ii) differences in analysis time periods for Haiti and Palestine.

Caution in reading and using this analysis should be observed. Trends of prevalence and total numbers can diverge due to changes in population covered. Populations that are classified as “moderately acute food insecure” and “severely acute food insecure”, as per WFP’s CARL methodology, are reported as an approximation to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).

Very high concern: Hotspots with deteriorating critical conditions

Armed conflict in eastern **Democratic Republic of the Congo** is expected to continue driving mass displacement and worsening food insecurity, with more than 7.8 million IDPs recorded as of March 2025.¹⁰⁰ Ongoing fighting – particularly in North and South Kivu – is likely to disrupt agricultural activities and markets, while persistently high food prices will further erode the purchasing power of vulnerable households. Between January and June 2025, nearly 3.9 million people were projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In some of the conflict-affected regions, the share of populations facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity is expected to rise significantly during the outlook period.¹⁰¹

In **Myanmar**, already critical levels of acute food insecurity have deteriorated further due to conflict and a prolonged economic crisis, exacerbated by the devastating impact of the March 2025 earthquake and its impact on already extreme access constraints.¹⁰² Following the earthquake, an estimated 2.8 million people are projected to face Emergency (equivalent to IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity between June and August 2025.¹⁰³


Acute food insecurity in the northeast and northwest regions of **Nigeria** is expected to deteriorate, with escalating violence driving further civilian casualties and widespread displacement.¹⁰⁴ Persistent high food inflation and extreme weather conditions are likely to exacerbate food insecurity.¹⁰⁵ In the June to August 2025 period, 1.2 million people are projected to face Emergency (CH Phase 4) level of acute food insecurity, 1.1 million of which are located in the violence-afflicted northeast and northwest regions.¹⁰⁶

In **Yemen**, high levels of acute food insecurity are likely to deteriorate in the outlook period, driven by a combination of factors including economic collapse, ongoing conflict, adverse weather conditions and constrained humanitarian access. Continued currency depreciation,¹⁰⁷ disruption to imports and damage to agricultural systems are expected to deepen food insecurity, particularly in a context of extreme and worsening humanitarian access constraints.¹⁰⁸ In 2025, 5.1 million people are projected to face critical levels of acute food insecurity (Severity level 4), including around 4 million in areas under the control of the De-Facto Authorities.¹⁰⁹



Acute food insecurity trends in hunger hotspots of very high concern

2020–2025¹ peak numbers and prevalence



NOTES

- 1 Data for 2025 are considered as expected peak based on information available as of June 2025.
 - 2 Geographical coverage increased from 85 territories and 18 urban areas in 2020 to 145 territories and 41 urban areas in 2025; therefore, comparability is limited.
 - 3 Data for 2023 come from a pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP, which served as the basis for generating the 2024 projections used in the Myanmar HNRP 2024, and are IPC-equivalent. Data for 2024 are based on the Myanmar HNRP 2024 and are also IPC-equivalent. Data for 2025 are based on the updated lean season projection.
 - 4 Geographical coverage expanded from 16 states and the Federal Capital Territory in 2020 to 26 states and the Federal Capital Territory in 2025; therefore, comparability over time is limited.
 - 5 Data from 2020 to 2022 come from the IPC; data for 2023 and 2024 come from FEWS NET and correspond to the upper bound of a range. Data for 2025 come from the HNRP. Comparability across years is limited.
- Comparison over time indicates a general trend; however, comparability is affected by:
- (i) varying coverage of: the Democratic Republic of the Congo – from 65 percent in 2020 to 91 percent in 2021, 94 percent in 2022–2023, and 98 percent in 2024–2025; Nigeria: population coverage increased from 49 percent in 2020, to 73 percent in 2021, 91 percent in 2023, and 89 percent in 2025.
 - (ii) differences in analysis time periods for all countries (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, Nigeria and Yemen).

Source of data: FAO and WFP. 2025. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (June to October 2025)*. Rome.

Other countries or situations that require monitoring

Several other countries or situations, while not identified as hunger hotspots in this report, merit close monitoring. These include:

- countries or situations where data was insufficient or not available to allow for a comparative assessment based on the applied methodology, but which were flagged as concerning during the discussions based on other evidence, as described below; and
- countries or situations in protracted crisis with high numbers and/or high prevalence of people in acute food insecurity, but without clear evidence for a likely food security deterioration of a level comparable with trends observed in countries selected as hunger hotspots.

Such situations of concern include, but are not limited to, the following countries:

Afghanistan: The latest IPC analysis shows significant improvements compared to 2022, owing to a better economic situation, reduced conflict, and an increase in emergency food and agricultural assistance, alongside a projected five-year record wheat harvest.¹¹⁰ However, acute food insecurity remains of concern as the period from October 2024 to May 2025 was unusually dry,¹¹¹ resulting in localized crop losses and water shortages, with high temperatures expected during June to August 2025.¹¹² Moreover, while the latest IPC figures reflect funding cuts,¹¹³ significant resource constraints remain a key risk to food security, while the impact of over one million Afghan returnees since late 2023 adds further pressure on already fragile livelihoods.¹¹⁴ Between May and October 2025, around 9.5 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 1.6 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).^{115,116}

Bangladesh: Nearly 292 000 Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals in Cox's Bazar and Bhasan Char (about 30 percent of the analysed population) faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity from October to December 2024.^{117,118} This critical situation is expected to worsen due to the escalating conflict in neighbouring Myanmar, prompting further displacement of civilians and the influx of refugees into Bangladesh.¹¹⁹ Additionally, critical funding shortfalls could severely

undermine the food security and nutrition situation of Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals, who are heavily reliant on humanitarian assistance.¹²⁰

Bolivia: Acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate during the outlook, due to sustained high inflation and declining foreign reserves. This is projected to continue to erode import capacity and household purchasing power, further limiting food access.^{121,122} Fuel shortages are also projected to hinder agricultural activities,¹²³ further reducing maize production following an already below-average harvest attained in 2024.^{124,125} As of October 2024, 2.2 million people (19 percent of the population) were acutely food insecure based on WFP's CARI methodology.¹²⁶

Colombia: Around 7.8 million people (15 percent of the population) were estimated to be acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance in 2025.^{127,128} Continuing violence against civilians risks further exacerbating the situation.¹²⁹ Despite continued peace dialogue efforts by the government, intensified violence resulted in a sharp increase in displacements during the first two months of 2025,¹³⁰ with significant implications for acute food insecurity in affected areas.¹³¹ As of mid-March 2025, over 695 000 people had been affected by displacements, confinements, mobility restrictions and natural disasters.¹³²

Lebanon: Military operations during the outlook period may severely restrict humanitarian access, particularly in the South, despite the launch of negotiations for a pause in hostilities.¹³³ Disruptions in essential food supplies are expected to persist, worsening food insecurity in the South and El Nabatieh.¹³⁴ Between July and October 2025, approximately 1.2 million people – including Lebanese residents as well as Syrian and Palestinian refugees – are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above),¹³⁵ driven by conflict, economic collapse, displacement and reduced aid.

Ethiopia: Although conditions have improved since the 2020–2023 drought and the height of the Tigray conflict, food security is worsening in several regions of the country. *Belg*¹³⁶ rains have been mixed in 2025, with below-average rainfall in north-central areas such as eastern Amhara, Afar and the far northern Somali region likely to reduce crop and pastoral



outputs.¹³⁷ Ongoing conflict in Amhara and Oromia continues to disrupt livelihoods and impose very high access constraints for humanitarian operations.^{138, 139} In addition, cuts to aid and sustained above-average food prices are expected to further exacerbate food insecurity in the coming months.^{140, 141}

Malawi: Acute food insecurity in Malawi is expected to remain concerning, primarily due to record-high maize prices driven by an El Niño-related harvest decline in 2024 and a weakening national currency.^{142, 143} While a seasonal upturn in supplies following the 2025 harvest may provide temporary relief, price pressures are likely to persist amid expectations of only a partial recovery in production.¹⁴⁴ As a result, food access is expected to remain a major challenge. Between October 2024 and March 2025, an estimated 5.7 million people (28 percent of the population) faced high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above),¹⁴⁵ including around 416 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), marking a significant year-on-year increase.

Mozambique: Food insecurity is expected to remain of serious concern in Mozambique, primarily driven by persistent armed conflict in Cabo Delgado, which continues to disrupt livelihoods, hinder agricultural production and cause very high access constraints.^{146, 147} Additionally, during the past rainy and agricultural season, Mozambique was heavily affected by three cyclones Chido, Dikeledi and Jude, as well as by a widespread dry spell in northern provinces including some areas that were already impacted by the El Niño-induced drought in 2024.¹⁴⁸ Additionally, poor harvests linked to extreme weather events are likely to push food inflation

beyond the 12 percent recorded in March 2025,^{149, 150} further straining regional cereal markets already impacted by the 2024 El Niño-induced drought.¹⁵¹ Between October 2024 and March 2025, an estimated 4.9 million people faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity – representing 24 percent of the population analysed – including 912 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).¹⁵²

Cameroon: Acute food insecurity is worsening in Cameroon amid very high access constraints,¹⁵³ mainly driven by conflict and climate-related shocks. From June to August 2025, 2.6 million people (9 percent of the population) are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity.¹⁵⁴ This includes 307 000 people expected to face Emergency (CH Phase 4). The Far North is particularly affected, following heavy floods at the end of 2024 that displaced communities, damaged critical infrastructure and led to the loss of 85 000 hectares of arable land.¹⁵⁵

Guinea: In Guinea, 1.8 million people (13 percent of the population) are projected to be acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance (CH Phase 3 or above) between June and August 2025, including 91 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4),¹⁵⁶ compared to one million people a year earlier.¹⁵⁷ Severe flooding in 2024 affected livelihoods and led to a below-average cereal output, which is expected to keep cereal prices elevated in the outlook period.¹⁵⁸ Below-average rainfall forecast between June and September 2025 is likely to affect crop and livestock production, further compounding the food security situation.



Country risk narratives

Asia and the Pacific

Myanmar

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, earthquake, economic crisis

The impact of the March 2025 earthquake is expected to exacerbate an already critical acute food insecurity situation, driven by years of conflict and a protracted economic crisis. The reduction in humanitarian funding deepens the food insecurity of the most vulnerable population such as IDPs in Rakhine.

Broader geographic spread and more intense fighting are anticipated in the coming months, leading to further displacement beyond the 3.6 million people already displaced as of end-March 2025.¹⁵⁹ The conflict has also disrupted access to health care and water/sanitation facilities, exacerbating malnutrition rates.¹⁶⁰

The earthquake has compounded pre-existing vulnerabilities, particularly in Mandalay and Sagaing – regions already heavily impacted by conflict and hosting over 2 million IDPs.^{161, 162} More than 3.7 million hectares of cropland in the key agricultural areas were affected.¹⁶³ The quake severely disrupted food production, which is expected to contribute significantly to worsening acute food insecurity in the outlook period.¹⁶⁴

The earthquake is also likely to deepen the country's economic crisis, given widespread damage to public infrastructure and industrial facilities.¹⁶⁵ Even before the quake, Myanmar's economy was projected to contract by 1 percent in the fiscal year ending March 2025,¹⁶⁶ while the cost of the food basket stood at 45 percent above year-on-year levels in February 2025.¹⁶⁷ Earthquake-related disruptions are also expected to further constrain aid delivery, exacerbating the challenges posed by the conflict and funding shortfalls.^{168, 169}

Following the March 2025 earthquake, and decreased funding for humanitarian assistance, 16.7 million people (29 percent of the total population) were projected to

face high levels of acute food insecurity (equivalent to IPC Phase 3 or above) between June and August 2025, including 2.8 million people in Emergency (equivalent to IPC Phase 4).¹⁷⁰ This represents a significant deterioration compared with 13.3 million people in 2024.¹⁷¹ In addition, 540 000 children are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition in 2025 – a 26 percent increase from the previous year.¹⁷² Large reductions in humanitarian assistance, linked to global funding cuts, are likely to worsen these underlying rates of food insecurity and malnutrition.¹⁷³



RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Myanmar 2025 HNRP calls for USD 306 million to support food security interventions, with USD 202 million noted as needed urgently, and USD 68 million for nutrition.¹⁷⁴

- Resume and expand general food distributions and cash-based transfers for acutely food-insecure households affected by conflict, displacement and natural disasters, with strong linkages to nutrition interventions – especially during the peak lean season.
- Maintain humanitarian supply chains where access constraints exist by using all available channels – including local networks, crossline and cross-border operations – to reach communities in need.
- Distribute agricultural inputs and emergency animal feed to protect livestock assets and enable increased crop production.
- Support the recovery of fishing-based livelihoods through the distribution of fishing gear and rehabilitation of fishponds, including via cash-for-work initiatives.
- Provide immediate financial assistance to vulnerable farming households to safeguard their livelihoods and enable them to resume food production ahead of the upcoming planting seasons.
- Engage communities in labour-intensive interventions public works to rehabilitate critical agricultural infrastructure, including storage facilities, irrigation systems and rural roads essential to food production and market access.
- Prioritize the prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition in earthquake- and conflict-affected provinces, particularly among children under 5 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women.
- Pilot and scale up innovative food assistance and nutrition treatment delivery mechanisms that address context-specific operational constraints.

Other actions

- Engage early with local authorities and partners to monitor cyclone-related risks and pre-negotiate access to potentially affected communities, enabling rapid early action.



East Africa

South Sudan

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of food insecurity: severe macroeconomic difficulties, conflict, floods

Macroeconomic instability, conflict and flooding are expected to worsen food insecurity in South Sudan – already at catastrophic levels for parts of the population – during the outlook period.

The country will continue to face serious economic challenges due to the residual impacts of the prolonged disruption of oil revenues in 2024.^{175, 176} Despite some signs of currency stabilization, inflationary pressures persist amid the slow recovery of oil exports.¹⁷⁷ The sharp depreciation of the South Sudanese pound in 2024 continues to drive staple food inflation, with prices in March 2025 nearly five times higher than the same month the previous year.¹⁷⁸

The 2018 peace agreement that ended the civil war is increasingly fragile, with tensions escalating into violent clashes in several counties, particularly in Upper Nile and Jonglei states.¹⁷⁹ Subnational violence – especially in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states – is likely to intensify, driving further displacement and disrupting agricultural production.¹⁸⁰ As of March 2025, more than 1.8 million remain internally displaced,¹⁸¹ compounded by over one million returnees, refugees and asylum seekers fleeing conflict in the Sudan as of April 2025.¹⁸² These arrivals are expected to increase during the outlook period amid continued instability in the Sudan. South Sudan also faces extreme and worsening humanitarian access constraints.¹⁸³

Forecasts for above-average rainfall between May and November 2025 could support improved crop yields in southern bimodal areas, where harvests are expected to begin in August.¹⁸⁴ However, the risk of severe flooding remains high in flood-prone areas, particularly in the Sudd wetlands. Although floodwaters began to recede in April 2025, river levels remain elevated due to ongoing outflows from Lake Victoria. Projections suggest that flooding could peak again between September and November 2025, potentially matching the scale of 2024 floods that affected over one million people.¹⁸⁵ These conditions are likely to further disrupt livelihoods and agricultural activities, particularly where planting has only recently resumed.

Approximately 7.7 million people (57 percent of the population) are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between April and July 2025, an increase of 665 000 people compared to the same period in 2024. This includes 2.5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 63 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), half of whom are returnees.^{186, 187}

The nutrition situation is equally alarming. Over half the country reports a global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence exceeding 15 percent.¹⁸⁸ By June 2025, approximately 2.1 million children and 1.1 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are expected to be acutely malnourished – representing a 26 percent year-on-year increase.¹⁸⁹ Refugees from the Sudan and South Sudanese returnees also exhibit critically high malnutrition rates, with GAM prevalence ranging from 23 to 28 percent.¹⁹⁰

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Disseminate flood-risk and early-warning information to at-risk communities through radio and existing Disaster Risk Management committees in flood-prone areas, enabling populations to relocate and safeguard productive assets.
- Provide livestock vaccination and prophylactic treatments to prevent flood-related livestock diseases, particularly Anthrax, which poses risks to both animals and humans.

Emergency response

The South Sudan 2025 HNRP calls for USD 475 million for food security and livelihoods and USD 198 million for nutrition interventions. An additional USD 468 million is required for the refugee response, which includes dedicated food security and nutrition assistance for refugees seeking asylum in South Sudan.¹⁹¹

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

- Distribute agricultural inputs – such as vegetable and crop kits – through direct distribution, voucher programmes and seed fairs, to support local food production and improve dietary diversity, and provide nutritional vouchers, and vegetable and fishing kits, to enhance nutrition and food access.
- Support destocking and restocking of livestock to preserve productive assets and enhance food security.
- Deliver food assistance, unconditional cash transfers, life-saving nutrition support and emergency livelihood interventions to vulnerable populations, including

refugees, returnees (particularly those arriving from the Sudan) and IDPs in conflict-affected areas of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states.

Other actions

- Strengthen local capacities in disaster risk reduction and the sustainable, climate-sensitive management of natural resources.
- Provide training on agricultural best practices and support access to irrigation tools (e.g. portable solar-powered pumps) and post-harvest equipment to reduce food losses.



East Africa

Somalia

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of food insecurity: dry spells, conflict, localized flooding, above-average food prices

During the outlook period, the impacts of poorly distributed *Gu*¹⁹² seasonal rains are likely to result in a second consecutive poor agricultural season. This, combined with ongoing conflict, displacement, localized flooding in riverine areas, and persistently high food prices, is expected to further deteriorate food security conditions.

Following the poor October–December *Deyr* 2024 rainy season,^{193, 194} Somalia has already experienced below-average harvests and degraded rangeland conditions.¹⁹⁵ While the 2025 *Gu* season (April–June) began on time with above-average rainfall,¹⁹⁶ mid- to late-April brought widespread dry spells.¹⁹⁷ Forecasts indicate an increased likelihood of below-average rains for the remainder of the season, particularly in key agricultural zones in the south.^{198, 199, 200, 201} This raises concerns for another poor harvest, worsening conditions for pastoralists, reduced water access, livestock stress and increased risk of resource-based conflict. Localized *Gu* flooding in riverine areas is expected to further hamper crop production.²⁰²

Conflict will continue to contribute to severe humanitarian access constraints, displacement and market disruptions.^{203, 204} Since early 2025, conflict-related fatalities have risen,²⁰⁵ and 88 000 people have been newly displaced – 59 percent due to violence.²⁰⁶ Escalating tensions ahead of the 2026 elections and increasing militarization are expected to heighten violence, displacement and access challenges.²⁰⁷ Forced displacement is anticipated on a similar scale to 2024, linked to climate shocks and conflict, notably inter-clan fighting, which may be compounded by drier than usual conditions.^{208, 209, 210}

As of February 2025, year-on-year cereal prices were 12 to 24 percent higher in urban centres such as Baidoa, Marka and Mogadishu.²¹¹ These elevated prices are expected to persist due to poor past harvests (*Deyr*), anticipated *Gu* season shortfalls, depleted stocks and high shipping costs,²¹² constraining access to food. Reductions in humanitarian assistance are compounding the crisis. As of March 2025, humanitarian food and cash assistance had already been reduced in several areas.²¹³

Between April and June 2025, 4.6 million people (24 percent of the population) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of food insecurity,²¹⁴ a 33 percent increase compared to the same period in 2024.²¹⁵ This includes 784 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In 2025, 1.8 million children under 5 years of age are expected to be acutely malnourished.²¹⁶

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Somalia 2025 HNRP calls for USD 515 million to deliver life-saving food security and livelihoods assistance and USD 117 million for nutrition interventions.²¹⁷

- Provide conditional and season-specific cash transfers to improve immediate access to food and increase household income, while supporting the rehabilitation of critical community assets.
- Implement cash+ interventions – combining cash assistance with agricultural inputs – to ensure immediate access to food, sustain animal health, support food production and prevent further depletion of livelihood assets.
- Scale up integrated emergency food and livelihood assistance in hotspot districts and underserved rural areas, targeting populations at risk of Emergency-level food insecurity (IPC Phase 4).

Latin America and the Caribbean

Haiti

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of food insecurity: gang violence, economic crisis

Haiti remains a hotspot of highest concern for the third consecutive edition, driven by escalating gang violence and protracted economic decline, as well as concerns over recent flooding and landslides and the risk of an above-average hurricane season. Over 8 400 people living in displacement camps were expected to experience Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between March and June 2025,²¹⁸ and acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further through the outlook period.

Elevated levels of violence will persist, as armed groups have expanded their reach in and beyond the capital Port-au-Prince, with violence continuing to displace civilians at a rapid pace. As of late March 2025, the United-Nations-authorized Multinational Security Support Mission remained at only half its planned 2 500 personnel, limiting its ability to curb the violence.²¹⁹ By the end of 2024, the number of IDPs had surged to over one million, up from 300 000 the previous year²²⁰ – a staggering increase that is expected to accelerate further.

Following 6 years of economic contraction, the economy is forecast to shrink further in 2025, driven by stagnant agricultural production and declining export revenues.²²¹ Domestic supply shocks, linked to insecurity and climate-related market disruptions, are likely to be further exacerbated by a weak currency. While the exchange rate has remained relatively stable since late 2023,²²² currency weakness continues to fuel high food prices, with year-on-year food inflation reaching 37.5 percent in February 2025.²²³ In addition, expected reductions in humanitarian funding are likely to impair the delivery of critical humanitarian operations.²²⁴

Although the harvest of second-season rice concluded in March 2025 under favourable conditions,²²⁵ national cereal output remains below average due to land abandonment and high production costs.²²⁶ As of the end of April 2025, favourable rainfall had supported planting of spring cereals, but heavy rains caused flooding and landslides, likely resulting in crop losses.²²⁷ In addition, the 2025 Atlantic hurricane season, typically between June and November, is forecast to feature above-normal activity,²²⁸ posing further risks to crops, infrastructure and livelihoods.

Between March and June 2025, more than 5.7 million people (51 percent of the analysed population) were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity – the highest number recorded since IPC analyses began in Haiti in 2013. This includes 2.1 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and over 8 400 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), primarily IDPs in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.²²⁹ The situation is likely to deteriorate further, as violence, displacement and economic pressures intensify.



RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Distribute multipurpose cash; facilitate livestock evacuation; and pre-position shelter kits, fishing boat reinforcement kits, waterproof silos and protective materials for early harvest and dry storage sites when hurricane or flood early-warning triggers are activated.
- Disseminate early-warning messages along with tailored advice to help communities protect lives, livelihoods and food security ahead of potential hurricane or flood events.

Emergency response

The Haiti 2025 HNRP calls for USD 425 million for food security and USD 39.9 million for nutrition interventions.²³⁰

- Expand the national social protection system to serve as the primary mechanism for responding to acute humanitarian needs, enabling a shift from reactive emergency assistance to predictable, scalable assistance.
- Provide emergency food assistance – using context-specific modalities – to affected populations, including IDPs, with a focus on improving food availability and

access, particularly for women, children and other vulnerable groups, while preventing and treating acute malnutrition.

- Scale up synergies between food assistance and emergency food production by combining cash-based or in-kind food distributions with the distribution of short-cycle vegetable production kits to increase food access and availability for households facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above).
- Support local food production and restore productive livelihoods through the provision of improved seeds and small livestock, helping to stabilize markets and improve food access in vulnerable areas.
- Promote climate-resilient agricultural practices, including livestock vaccination and the rehabilitation or construction of key food-production infrastructure.

Other actions

- Strengthen synergies between food production and school meal programmes through local procurement from smallholder farmers, aiming to support and stimulate local economic activities.



Near East and North Africa

Sudan

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, macroeconomic challenges

The drivers that led to the famine confirmation in the Sudan in late 2024 – ongoing conflict, restricted humanitarian access, and increased displacement – are expected to worsen.²³¹

The IPC Famine Review Committee confirmed Famine (IPC Phase 5) occurred between October and November 2024 in five areas – including Zamzam, Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps in North Darfur, as well as parts of South and West Kordofan in the Western Nuba Mountains. It further projected that five additional areas in North Darfur would face Famine (IPC Phase 5) between December 2024 and May 2025, while 17 other areas across North and South Darfur and the Central Nuba Mountains would face a heightened risk of Famine.^{232,*}

Ongoing conflict is likely to persist in several parts of the country.²³³ Displacement is likely to increase further during the outlook period.²³⁴ As of April 2025, the Sudan hosted 10.5 million IDPs, including 8.1 million displaced since the outbreak of the current conflict.²³⁵ An additional 3.9 million people have fled to neighbouring countries.²³⁶

The country's economy is expected to remain in steep decline through 2025.^{237,238} Inflation remains extremely high, standing at 174 percent in March 2025.²³⁹ WFP's minimum food basket cost also rose by 329 percent as of January 2025, compared to pre-conflict levels.²⁴⁰ The exceptionally high level of cereal prices is severely constraining food access in the context of reduced households' purchasing power, undermined by a sharp reduction of employment opportunities.²⁴¹ Cereal production in 2024 (sorghum, millet, and wheat) is estimated at about 6.7 million tonnes – approximately 7 percent above the average of the previous five years – mainly due to favourable weather conditions that boosted yields. These gains offset the negative impact of conflict on agricultural activities, including the limited availability and high prices of agricultural inputs, which inflated production costs due to supply chain disruptions.²⁴²

However, the improved cereal availability at national level is unlikely to result in a significant improvement of the food security situation in the outlook period, as the high production costs and the trade flow disruptions are resulting in exceptionally high food prices in the context of reduced households' purchasing power, undermined by a sharp reduction of employment opportunities. As of April 2025, prices of sorghum and millet remained more than four times their pre-conflict levels.²⁴³ In addition, the severe constraints to trade and marketing operations are hindering the trade flows from surplus producing areas to deficit areas, characterized by higher levels and prevalence of food insecurity. Although forecast above-average rainfall from June to September may benefit crop yields in 2025, it also raises the risk of flooding across central and southern Sudan. This could damage infrastructure, raise the risk of water-borne diseases and malnutrition and displace more communities.^{244,245}

According to the latest IPC analysis, even during the post-harvest period from December 2024 to May 2025 – typically a time of improved food access – conflict was expected to continue driving acute food insecurity, with Famine conditions (IPC Phase 5) projected to expand to new areas. An estimated 24.6 million people (over 50 percent of the population) were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, including 8 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 637 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).^{246,247,*} Severe acute malnutrition was also surging, with 772 200 children under 5 years of age projected to be affected in 2025.²⁴⁸ Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions surveys conducted in 50 localities during the second half of 2024 found that 72 percent of surveyed areas had GAM rates exceeding 15 percent – classified as “very high” by WHO standards.²⁴⁹

The onset of the lean season, starting in May is expected to compound critical levels of acute food insecurity, already exacerbated by declining funding and varied levels of access due to the ongoing conflict.²⁵⁰

* The Government of the Sudan did not endorse the December 2024 IPC analysis.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Share early-warning messages with populations at risk of flooding during the June–September rainy season, should flood thresholds be surpassed.
- Preposition food stocks in advance of the rainy season in areas typically cut off by flooding during the rains.
- Construct rainwater harvesting or diversion channels to manage runoff in flood-prone areas.
- Strengthen livestock disease surveillance and expand livestock vaccination campaigns ahead of the rainy season.

Emergency response

The Sudan 2025 HNRP requires USD 1.5 billion for food security and livelihoods interventions, and USD 471.7 million for nutrition assistance.²⁵¹

- Enable food production and restore livelihoods by providing emergency agricultural inputs, supporting

farming, fisheries and livestock production, and enhancing household access to food through social protection measures.

- Provide immediate life-saving assistance to the most acutely food-insecure populations, prioritizing those in Famine (IPC Phase 5) and at risk of Famine, including IDPs, refugees and host communities.

Other actions

- Advocate for safe, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access to populations in need, particularly in areas facing or at risk of Famine, to avert further loss of life.
- Raise awareness and deliver critical safety messaging regarding landmines and explosive remnants of war, especially in farming areas, to protect civilians and enable safe resumption of agricultural activities.



Near East and North Africa

Palestine

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, economic collapse

In the Gaza Strip, the risk of Famine is becoming more likely following announcements in May 2025 regarding the expected scale of military operations and inadequate plans for delivering food and non-food items across the Strip, amid extreme humanitarian access constraints.²⁵²

According to the latest IPC projections through September 2025, the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) across the whole Gaza Strip is expected to persist as long as the conflict continues and humanitarian access remains restricted.²⁵³

The resumption of military operations and the continued closure of borders are not only reversing the limited humanitarian gains achieved during the eight-week ceasefire – but are also escalating the crisis to unprecedented levels.²⁵⁴ Since 2 March 2025 and up to this report's cutoff date of 4 June, no adequate humanitarian aid or commercial supplies had entered the Gaza Strip – the longest interruption since the start of the conflict.^{255, 256} Humanitarian efforts remain severely constrained by ongoing hostilities, aid blockades, movement restrictions, mounting insecurity and critically depleted food stocks.^{257, 258, 259}

Over a year and a half into the conflict, approximately 80 percent of cropland in the Gaza Strip had been damaged and around 83 percent of agricultural wells rendered inoperative.²⁶⁰ The extensive losses in agricultural and fishing capacity are expected to further constrain food supply availability throughout 2025. Meanwhile, extensive damage to water and sanitation infrastructure is posing serious public health and environmental risks to nearby residential areas.²⁶¹

Staple food prices have increased drastically since the blockade of border crossings in early March 2025 and – combined with the collapse of livelihoods – are accelerating the erosion of household purchasing power and worsening food insecurity.²⁶²

The situation in the **West Bank** is rapidly worsening. The economic growth is forecast at only 1.8 percent in 2025.²⁶³ Unemployment remained high at 35 percent, largely due to movement restrictions and significant job losses.²⁶⁴ The Palestinian Authority continues to face

severe fiscal constraints, limiting public services and reducing salary payments. Although the West Bank has not experienced the same level of conflict escalation as the Gaza Strip, intensified military operations – particularly in refugee camps – and an increase in settler violence have triggered new displacement since January 2025.²⁶⁵ As of October 2024, the number of acutely food-insecure people had nearly doubled compared to pre-October 2023.²⁶⁶

According to the IPC analysis released in May 2025, the entire population of the Gaza Strip (around 2.1 million people) were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between May and September 2025. This includes 470 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and over one million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).²⁶⁷ Even if essential supplies are permitted to enter, the quantity, distribution mechanism and timing may be inadequate to prevent a rapid and uncontrollable collapse into famine.²⁶⁸ Concerns remain extremely high, as the key drivers of food insecurity continue to deteriorate. Households are increasingly resorting to extreme coping strategies, including collecting garbage to sell for food. Observations reveal that social order is breaking down.²⁶⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2025 Flash Appeal for the Occupied Palestinian Territories – which covers both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – calls for USD 1.3 billion for food security and livelihoods interventions. The nutrition sector component requires USD 203 million.²⁷⁰

- Allow the entry of fuel and cooking gas to sustain humanitarian operations and keep essential services – such as mills and bakeries – functioning in the Gaza Strip. These efforts are also critical for rehabilitating the agriculture, livestock and fishing sectors to maintain local food production.
- Establish and maintain safe, unhindered and sustained humanitarian access across the entire Gaza Strip, to enable the delivery of food and

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

agricultural assistance to the most food-insecure populations.

- Support the restoration of critical infrastructure to ensure access to safe drinking water and functional sanitation facilities.
- Facilitate the reopening and functioning of markets and bakeries to support the delivery of commercial goods and improve food access.
- Expand blanket supplementary feeding and infant and young child feeding programmes to prevent and treat acute malnutrition.
- Resume distributions of animal fodder, veterinary kits, vaccines and animal shelters, and provide live animals for herd restocking among livestock-keeping households.
- Provide essential agricultural inputs – including seeds, organic fertilizers, greenhouse materials, sheds, irrigation

systems and water tanks – in the West Bank, and in the Gaza Strip as soon as aid resumes at a scale, to help farming households restore production and increase the availability of fresh and nutritious food.

Other actions

- Remove restrictions on commercial and humanitarian food imports to enable uninterrupted food supply across the Gaza Strip.
- Integrate agriculture-based assistance into broader humanitarian planning and food security assessments, to ensure coordinated and effective response.
- Scale up cash-based assistance to help households meet immediate needs and restore livelihoods in the West Bank, and in the Gaza Strip as soon as aid resumes at scale.



Near East and North Africa

Yemen

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic deterioration, localized conflict, below-average rainfall, floods

Acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate further due to severe economic decline, ongoing conflict, regional tensions, and the compounded effects of prolonged dry conditions, rising temperatures and seasonal flooding. These challenges are further exacerbated by extreme humanitarian access constraints.²⁷¹

In areas controlled by the Government of Yemen, the local currency is projected to depreciate in 2025 due to limited foreign currency reserves. Economic conditions are likely to deteriorate further amid growing regional tensions.²⁷² Fuel shortages are threatening food market activities, including milling and transportation.²⁷³ Competition between the Government of Yemen and De Facto Authorities over control of financial institutions has deepened the crisis, driving sharp increases in food prices.²⁷⁴

Humanitarian access is increasingly constrained,²⁷⁵ particularly in the north where the prevalence of critical food insecurity is highest.²⁷⁶ Growing insecurity in the Red and Arabian Seas – marked by increased vessel attacks – and mounting pressures on the port of Al Hodeidah have severely disrupted both humanitarian operations and commercial imports.²⁷⁷ The escalation of military activity has also damaged key infrastructure, including seaports and storage facilities, hampering food distribution. Humanitarian assistance remains limited and uncertain due to political and operational access constraints.²⁷⁸ As of April 2025, Yemen's HNRP was only 8.4 percent funded, forcing agencies to reprioritize and focus on life-saving assistance in areas with severity of needs level 4 or above for both Food Security and Agriculture, and Nutrition.

Agricultural production continues to suffer from conflict and climatic shocks. An extended dry period from October 2024 to February 2025, combined with flood damage during July–September 2024, is expected to significantly undermine the 2025 harvest.²⁷⁹

In 2025, 17.1 million people (49 percent of the population) are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (Severity levels 3 or above), requiring urgent humanitarian assistance. Of these, 5.1 million are projected to experience Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (Severity level 4), including 4 million in De Facto Authorities-controlled areas and 1.1 million in the

Government of Yemen-controlled areas.²⁸⁰ Malnutrition remains critical – mostly along the West Coast where treatment services are at risk of suspension due to funding gaps or access constraints, and where IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 5 levels were already reached by October 2024. The situation in Yemen will require close monitoring during the second half of 2025.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Yemen 2025 HNRP calls for USD 1.1 billion for food security and livelihood interventions and USD 237.9 million for nutrition interventions.²⁸¹

- Ensure and maintain safe and constant humanitarian access to food insecure populations, particularly across the northern part of the country.
- Scale up unconditional in-kind and cash-for-food assistance and emergency agriculture interventions, aligned with reprioritized targets under the 2025 HNRP.
- Support vulnerable farming, fishing and livestock-keeping households through livelihood protection and production support, while rehabilitating community agricultural infrastructure and helping meet immediate basic needs.
- Expand integrated, cross-sectoral responses linking food security, nutrition, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) to prevent and treat acute malnutrition in the most at-risk districts.
- Strengthen operational preparedness for potential conflict-escalation scenarios, including both first-line rapid response mechanisms and second-line food security responses.

Other actions

- Provide timely, high-frequency and accurate food security and nutrition data and trend analysis, to detect localized spikes in emergency needs and inform response.
- Enhance the national Emergency Preparedness and Anticipatory Action system to enable earlier, more effective interventions and mitigate the impacts of both natural and conflict-driven shocks.

Near East and North Africa

Syrian Arab Republic

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of food insecurity: localized violence, economic deterioration, drought

Fourteen years of conflict, economic collapse and institutional instability have left the Syrian Arab Republic facing one of the world's largest food security crises. The cumulative impacts of localized violence, displacement, humanitarian access constraints,²⁸² deteriorating economic conditions, disruption of basic services, restricted access to agricultural land, and shortages of quality agricultural inputs – compounded by the effects of longstanding sanctions, partially lifted on 23 May by the United States Department of the Treasury²⁸³ and the European Union²⁸⁴ – as well as drought, are expected to continue driving high levels of acute food insecurity during the outlook period.²⁸⁵

The economic outlook for 2025 remains uncertain. Continued hostilities have disrupted markets, causing sharp increases in food prices and severely limiting household access to food.²⁸⁶ In December 2024, the Syrian Interim Government first reduced, then halted broad-based subsidies – including for bread and fuel – resulting in a 486 percent increase in bread price. Although the cost of the minimum expenditure basket fell by 20 percent year-on-year in March 2025 – primarily due to a temporary appreciation of the Syrian pound – the minimum wage still covers only 13 percent of the food component of the minimum expenditure basket, highlighting a severe affordability gap.²⁸⁷

The political transition remains fragile, with intensified localized hostilities since 2024 resulting in increased civilian casualties, new displacements and infrastructure damage. Humanitarian access remains limited, particularly in parts of Central, Coastal and Southern Syria affected by sectarian violence and ongoing instability linked to armed conflict, terrorism and criminal activity.²⁸⁸ As of late 2024, approximately 7.4 million people remained internally displaced, mostly in Northwest Syria.²⁸⁹ In addition, 4.5 million Syrians are registered as refugees in neighbouring countries.²⁹⁰ According to the United Nations Refugee Agency, up to 3.5 million refugees and IDPs may return in 2025 under challenging conditions marked by damaged housing, inadequate services and limited asset recovery.²⁹¹

Cereal production in 2025 is forecast to fall to a historical low due to record drought conditions²⁹² compounding the

effects of delayed planting, conflict-related disruptions, subsidy removals on key commodities, high input costs and restricted access to farmland.²⁹³ Initial projections point to a likely wheat production deficit of 2.7 million metric tonnes – the equivalent of the annual dietary needs of approximately 16.2 million people.²⁹⁴

At this critical transition period, reductions in humanitarian funding have led to extreme prioritization of emergency activities by WFP, constraining the country's fragile recovery efforts and limiting progress toward alleviating the severe humanitarian situation.²⁹⁵

Approximately 9.1 million people were estimated to face acute food insecurity in 2024 prior to the transition and the onset of ongoing severe drought, including 1.3 million experiencing severe acute food insecurity. An additional 5.4 million people are considered at risk.²⁹⁶

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Syrian Arab Republic 2025 HRP calls for USD 694.5 million for food security and agriculture interventions and USD 65.9 million for nutrition interventions.²⁹⁷

- Implement supplementary nutrition interventions for children and pregnant and breastfeeding women and girls in eligible households, alongside treatment services for moderately malnourished children.
- Sustain investments to improve access to bread by rehabilitating bakeries, strengthening the bread value chain, and supporting wheat flour fortification – alongside other critical rehabilitation efforts, such as irrigation systems and support to relevant community groups.
- Scale up emergency agriculture interventions to rapidly restore food production for the most vulnerable households, with particular focus on the 2025/26 wheat planting season, emergency livestock support, cash and voucher assistance, and urgent repairs to productive infrastructure.

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

- In areas with high numbers of returnees, restore agriculture-based livelihoods through emergency distribution of inputs, support to farming, livestock and fisheries, and improved food access for vulnerable households.
- In the country's coastal, central, southern and northwestern areas, strengthen local food production and livelihoods by supporting climate-resilient agriculture, livestock protection, family farming, rural employment, and the rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure. Efforts should also include capacity-building for farmers and national staff, with particular attention to women's nutrition and income generation.

Other actions

- Strengthen anticipatory actions by maintaining and enhancing early-warning systems to monitor natural hazards, conflict and economic shocks that may impact agriculture and food security.
- Continue advocacy for safe, inclusive and unhindered access to food for the most vulnerable populations, ensuring humanitarian assistance is not obstructed by political or economic barriers.
- Enhance coordination with mine-action partners to facilitate the clearance of agricultural land and ensure safe access to productive land and water resources.



Southern Africa

Democratic Republic of the Congo

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict

During the outlook period, large-scale conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo is expected to intensify and spread further across the four provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika,²⁹⁸ likely worsening already critical levels of acute food insecurity and compounding severe access constraints.

Since January 2025, the conflict has escalated significantly, marked by major territorial gains by non-state armed groups and intensified clashes with government forces.²⁹⁹ This escalation continues to drive large-scale displacements and disrupt agricultural production and markets. As of March 2025, the number of IDPs had risen to over 7.8 million – up from 7.4 million in April 2024 – reflecting a sharp increase in displacement due to the conflict.^{300, 301} Additionally, nearly 140 000 people fled into neighbouring countries, mainly Burundi and Rwanda, between January and end-April 2025.³⁰²

In the conflict-affected provinces of Ituri and North Kivu, approximately 60 percent of farming households have been forced to abandon their land due to escalating violence and insecurity. Agricultural activities have been severely disrupted, limiting farmers' access to inputs and markets, and further aggravating food insecurity.³⁰³ The humanitarian response has also been weakened by the looting of food supplies and the destruction of warehouses.³⁰⁴

According to the March 2025 IPC projection, the situation is more severe than previously anticipated: over 27.7 million people (24 percent of the analysed population) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between January to June 2025, including nearly 3.9 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).³⁰⁵ In North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika, more than 10.3 million people – including 2.2 million IDPs – are facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). Malnutrition is also worsening, with nearly 4.5 million children under 5 years of age expected to suffer from acute malnutrition through mid-2025, including 1.4 million with severe acute malnutrition.³⁰⁶

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Democratic Republic of the Congo 2025 HNRP calls for USD 1.1 billion for food security and livelihoods and USD 275.2 million for nutrition interventions.³⁰⁷

- Preposition food stocks in neighbouring countries to ensure a steady supply and timely delivery of food commodities.
- Provide targeted supplementary feeding for children aged 6–59 months and pregnant and breastfeeding women and girls with moderate acute malnutrition, alongside integrated nutrition messaging, screening and referral services, in collaboration with community health systems.
- Distribute livelihood protection and rehabilitation kits – including agricultural and livestock support – to IDPs, returnees and host communities, to help mitigate the impacts of displacement and conflict on food security.
- Support fish production and processing activities to diversify income and improve access to protein-rich foods.
- Provide conditional and unconditional cash transfers to enhance livelihoods and improve food availability in food-insecure areas.

Other actions

- Facilitate the movement of humanitarian staff and relief supplies to ensure access to affected populations.
- Update beneficiary registration systems and verify existing caseloads to ensure accurate targeting, especially in newly displaced or returnee communities.

West Africa

Mali

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, high food prices, flooding

Acute food insecurity in Mali is expected to worsen during the outlook period, driven by the combined impacts of conflict, persistently high food prices and the heightened risk of flooding during the lean season (June to August 2025).

Ongoing conflict in central and northern regions is likely to continue throughout the outlook period, driving displacement, impeding humanitarian access and disrupting livelihoods and agricultural activities.^{308, 309} This is placing additional pressure on overstretched host communities.³¹⁰ The number of IDPs increased by 14 percent between July and September 2024, rising from 330 713 to over 378 000.³¹¹ In addition, the number of refugees hosted by Mali surged to over 135 000 by March 2025 – a 53 percent increase year-on-year.³¹²

Access to markets and agricultural land is expected to remain severely constrained, limiting both income-generating opportunities and access to food.³¹³ Staple food prices in conflict-affected areas are projected to remain high during the outlook period.^{314, 315} Markets in the northern regions of Kidal, Ménaka, Gao and Tombouctou are particularly affected, reporting the highest food basket costs. Prices have been driven up by restricted supply routes and armed violence.^{316, 317}

The risk of flooding remains high in 2025, following severe floods in 2024. Above-average rainfall and river flows forecast for the upcoming rainy season, combined with dry spells, may disrupt agricultural production and exacerbate food insecurity.³¹⁸

Approximately 1.5 million people (6 percent of the population) are expected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between June and August 2025. This includes 2 600 people in Ménaka at risk of Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) if assistance is not provided on time,^{319, 320} and 64 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) across the regions of Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou and Kidal.³²¹ These figures represent a slight increase compared to the 2024 lean season, when 1.4 million people were projected to be acutely food insecure, and they are likely to increase further amid persistent conflict and displacement.^{322, 323}

Malnutrition remains a major concern, particularly in conflict-affected areas and IDP settlements classified in IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 4. Approximately 1.6 million children under 5 years of age are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition between June 2024 and May 2025 – an 11 percent increase compared to the previous year. Severe Acute Malnutrition cases have surged by 26 percent, affecting more than 424 000 children.³²⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Disseminate timely early-warning messages to populations at risk of flooding during the June–September rainy season, particularly when forecast indicators exceed flood thresholds.
- Strengthen flood preparedness by maintaining and rehabilitating dikes, drainage systems and protective infrastructure in flood-prone areas.
- Expand livestock vaccination campaigns ahead of the rainy season to mitigate the risk of disease outbreaks and protect pastoral livelihoods.

Emergency response

The Mali 2025 HNRP calls for USD 254.9 million for food security and livelihoods and USD 71.5 million for nutrition interventions.³²⁵

- Provide emergency food assistance and/or cash transfers to populations facing Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Ménaka and those in Emergency (CH Phase 4) in Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou and Kidal, particularly during the lean season (June–August).
- Ensure access to nutritious and affordable diets, along with essential health, WASH and social protection services for pregnant and breastfeeding women, infants and young children – especially in high-priority regions (Ménaka, Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou and Kidal). Scale up early detection and community-based treatment of wasting.

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

- Support displaced and host farming households in IDP-hosting areas with seeds, inputs and agricultural tools for the 2025 rainy season to sustain food production.
- Promote climate-resilient agricultural practices, including the use of water-tolerant and drought-resistant crop varieties, particularly in the Niger River Basin where above-average rainfall and flood risks are anticipated.
- Provide emergency livestock feed and veterinary inputs to vulnerable and internally displaced herders to protect livestock from the impacts of the lean season, drought and conflict-related displacement.

Other actions

- Strengthen community awareness and coordination on disaster risk reduction and public health risks associated with flooding.



West Africa

Nigeria

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, economic challenges, adverse weather conditions

Already critical levels of acute food insecurity are expected to deteriorate throughout the outlook period due to an intensification of conflict, persistent economic challenges, and adverse weather conditions which are likely to negatively impact planting, crop production and yields.³²⁶

Escalating violence in the Northeast and Northwest regions – concentrating large segments of the population in Emergency (CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity³²⁷ – is likely to contribute to very high access constraints for humanitarian operations^{328, 329, 330} and drive widespread displacement, with the number of IDPs estimated to increase beyond the 3.6 million people as of end April 2025.³³¹ The uptick in deadly attacks in early 2025 in Borno state³³² resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of people.^{333, 334, 335}

Armed violence further hinders agricultural activities, already constrained by increased production costs and households' limited liquidity.³³⁶ Headline inflation – at 23.7 percent in April 2025³³⁷ – is projected to remain elevated,³³⁸ driven by currency volatility and challenges with foreign reserves.^{339, 340} Food inflation recorded a 21 percent year-on-year increase in April 2025, further constraining food access.³⁴¹

As of early June 2025, the below-average rainfall forecasts for central and northern areas³⁴² had materialized, likely causing crop production shortfalls. In addition, flooding may occur during peak rainfall months (July–September) in northern areas.³⁴³ Recent floods already disrupted livelihoods and supply chains,^{344, 345} and are expected to continue impeding access to safe water in areas prone to seasonal floods during the lean season.³⁴⁶

According to the March 2025 CH analysis, over 30.6 million people (15 percent of the analysed population) were projected to face Crisis or worse acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above) from June to August 2025. Of these, 15.6 million were in the conflict-affected Northwest and Northeast, which also host 1.1 million of the 1.2 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).^{347, 348} More than 5.4 million children – the highest figure globally – and nearly 800 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women were projected to be acutely malnourished by April 2025.³⁴⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide early warning messages on extreme weather condition forecasts to farmers and herders in vulnerable regions. Support farmers with resistant and early maturing crop varieties and tools to help them cope with these conditions.
- Preposition ready to eat food and/or unconditional cash transfers as an anticipatory action intervention in extreme weather prone areas.
- Invest in rainwater harvesting for crop production and livestock water points especially during the dry season.
- Promote fodder production and preservation to mitigate the effects of droughts on livestock feed.

Emergency response

The Nigeria 2025 HNRP calls for USD 352.2 million for food security, and USD 132.1 million for nutrition interventions.³⁵⁰

- Continue providing unconditional cash transfers and emergency food assistance to populations in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), with a focus on the Northeast, Northwest and other high-risk and conflict-affected areas.
- Provide emergency crop, livestock and aquaculture inputs to populations facing Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), with a particular focus on the Northeast, Northwest, and other high-risk or conflict-affected areas – targeting IDPs, returnee households and host communities.
- Provide life-saving prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition, alongside gender-transformative social and behaviour change interventions, for children aged 6–59 months and pregnant and breastfeeding women in crisis-prone and conflict-affected areas.



West Africa

Burkina Faso

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, high food prices

High levels of acute food insecurity are likely to persist across Burkina Faso during the June–August 2025 lean season, driven by sustained conflict, widespread displacement, rising food prices and severe humanitarian access constraints.³⁵¹

Conflict continues to affect large parts of the country,³⁵² particularly in the northern and eastern regions, where humanitarian access remains extremely limited.³⁵³

A sharp increase in violent incidents and related fatalities was recorded in early 2025, notably in the Eastern, Central-Eastern, Sahel and Centre-Nord regions.^{354,355} The most recent displacement figures, from March 2023, indicated over 2 million IDPs.³⁵⁶

Food access remains constrained by high prices. In March 2025, the prices of locally produced sorghum and millet had increased year-on-year by 27 and 60 percent, respectively.³⁵⁷ By June 2025, cereal prices are projected to rise by 31 percent above the five-year average, with millet prices in the Sahel expected to increase by as much as 50 percent.³⁵⁸ Price surges are likely to be more pronounced in areas affected by armed violence or disrupted trade flows.

According to the March 2024 CH analysis, 2.7 million people (12 percent of the population) were facing Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity during the 2024 lean season (June to August), including nearly 423 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).^{359,360} With conflict projected to remain at very high levels and potentially spread, acute food insecurity is likely to persist or worsen in the upcoming lean season, particularly in the most insecure areas.

Malnutrition is also expected to deteriorate between May and July 2025, with IPC Acute Malnutrition Phase 4 conditions in the Sahel and Centre-Nord provinces. Over 425 000 children under 5 years of age are anticipated to suffer from acute malnutrition during this period.³⁶¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Burkina Faso 2025 HNRP calls for USD 273.1 million for food security and livelihoods and USD 53.3 million for nutrition interventions.³⁶²

- Provide emergency food assistance, cash transfers, and cereal-crop inputs to populations facing Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in the Sahel and other provinces classified as food insecure (CH Phase 3 or above) in the most recent CH analysis.
- Deliver livelihood protection, WASH, education and rehabilitation kits (agriculture and livestock) to IDPs, returnee households and host communities, to mitigate the impact of displacement on food security.
- Provide emergency nutritional assistance, including distribution of nutritional supplements, to vulnerable groups – particularly children and pregnant and breastfeeding women – in areas classified in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above). This should include IDPs in the Sahel and other affected provinces.

Other actions

- Provide logistical and operational support to humanitarian actors, including air services, transport and storage of supplies, and communication and coordination assistance, to ensure efficient and effective delivery of aid.
- Advocate for timely resource mobilization ahead of the rainy and lean seasons, when food security interventions are most impactful.

West Africa

Chad

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of food insecurity: refugee influx, high food prices, risk of flooding

Critical levels of acute food insecurity are likely to persist in Chad during the outlook period, driven by the ongoing influx of people fleeing conflict in the Sudan, persistent insecurity, elevated food prices and heightened flood risks.

With the conflict in the Sudan expected to escalate, the arrival of Sudanese refugees and Chadians returnees is likely to increase. As of April 2025, 776 000 people had crossed into Chad, primarily settling in the regions of Ouaddaï, Sila, Wadi Fira and Ennedi Est. This influx is placing significant pressure on already overstretched local resources and deepening pre-existing vulnerabilities.³⁶³ According to government estimates, the number of arrivals could reach 973 000 by the end of 2025, further exacerbating acute food insecurity in host communities.³⁶⁴

Civil insecurity persists in several regions, particularly in the Lac region, where the number of IDPs rose by 10 percent between November 2023 and January 2025, reaching 226 000.³⁶⁵ Insecurity is expected to continue disrupting livelihoods and limiting agricultural production throughout 2025. In southern areas, tensions between farmers and herders remain a potential risk.

Cereal prices are expected to remain high, driven by 2024 production shortfalls, strong domestic demand, and supply chain disruptions linked to high fuel prices and insecurity in border regions.³⁶⁶ While forecasts predict above-average rainfall between June and September 2025 in key producing areas,³⁶⁷ which could boost crop yields, the increased risk of flooding may offset these gains and threaten both food production and access.

During the June–August 2025 lean season, over 3.3 million Chadian residents (19 percent of the population) are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above), including 289 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).³⁶⁸ In addition, more than 456 000 refugees and returnees (28 percent of the analysed population) are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, with nearly 80 000 in Emergency (CH Phase 4).³⁶⁹

Malnutrition remains a critical concern, with over 2 million children under 5 years of age projected to be acutely

malnourished between October 2024 and September 2025. This figure includes more than 90 000 refugees, 27 000 IDPs and 42 000 returnees.^{370, 371, 372}

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide conditional and unconditional cash transfers to newly displaced people and refugees from the Sudan, as well as to households at risk of flooding, including through high labour-intensity schemes.
- Procure and distribute Purdue Improved Crop Storage bags and plastic airtight drums for secure storage of food, seeds and essential household items, alongside awareness-raising on proper usage and asset protection during floods.
- Conduct awareness campaigns on flood risks and protective measures to safeguard lives and livelihoods.

Emergency response

The Chad 2025 HNRP calls for USD 286.9 million for food security and livelihoods and USD 151.3 million for nutrition interventions.³⁷³

- Deliver immediate food assistance through cash transfers, vouchers or in-kind aid, tailored to beneficiary needs – including refugees, IDPs, host communities and other food-insecure populations – aligned with local market conditions.
- Promote access to nutritious and affordable diets and essential services for pregnant and breastfeeding women, infants and young children through integrated actions across food, health, WASH and social protection systems.
- Distribute agropastoral inputs and post-harvest processing kits (e.g. seeds, tools) to strengthen medium-term production capacities and reduce post-harvest losses.
- Support climate-resilient agriculture and promote sustainable resource management to help reduce vulnerability to future shocks.



Glossary

IPC/CH PHASE 5 EXPLAINED

Catastrophe and Famine both refer to IPC/CH Phase 5, indicating the most extreme food insecurity situations. However, there are notable differences between the two as Catastrophe is a household-level classification and Famine is an area-level classification.

CATASTROPHE

Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) can only be classified at the household level. In this phase, household members experience an extreme lack of food and exhaustion of coping capacities, facing starvation and a significantly increased risk of acute malnutrition and death. Households may be classified as Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if the broader area is not classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). This occurs when less than 20 percent of the population is experiencing Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) conditions and/or when malnutrition and/or mortality levels have not yet reached the thresholds for Famine.

FAMINE

Famine is an IPC classification at the area level. The IPC defines Famine as a situation in which at least one in five

(20 percent) households experience an extreme lack of food and face starvation and destitution, resulting in extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition and death. In this phase, the prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 years of age reaches or exceeds 30 percent, households are destitute, and excess mortality is prevalent, with at least two deaths per 10 000 people per day.

FAMINE WITH SOLID EVIDENCE: An area is classified as Famine with solid evidence when clear and compelling data on food insecurity (including food deprivation and livelihood collapse), acute malnutrition and mortality sufficiently support the classification.

FAMINE WITH REASONABLE EVIDENCE: An area is classified as Famine with reasonable evidence if clear evidence shows that two of the three thresholds – acute food insecurity (food deprivation and livelihood collapse), acute malnutrition and mortality – have been reached, and analysts reasonably assess from the broader evidence that the third threshold has likely been met.

Acute food insecurity

Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods, regardless of the causes, context or duration.

The IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity scale categorizes acute food insecurity into five phases of severity, ranging from IPC/CH Phase 1, corresponding to No/Minimal acute food insecurity, to IPC/CH Phase 5, corresponding to Catastrophe/Famine. Each of these phases has important and distinct implications for where and how best to intervene.

Cadre Harmonisé (CH)

The Cadre Harmonisé is the multidimensional analytical framework used by the Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), for the analysis

and identification of areas and groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon.

Coping strategies

Activities to which people resort in order to obtain food, income and/or other essential goods or services when their normal means of livelihood have been disrupted or other shocks/hazards affect their access to basic needs.

Emergency – IPC/CH Phase 4 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is a critical level of acute food insecurity in which households experience large food consumption gaps – often reflected in very high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality – or can only avoid such gaps by resorting to emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. At this phase, households face critical

acute food insecurity, and urgent action is required to save lives and livelihoods. Without timely intervention, affected populations risk starvation and death.

Food access

Access by households/individuals to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet.

Food availability

The availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports.

Food security

A situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. There are usually four dimensions of food security: food availability, food access, food utilization and stability over time.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

The IPC results from a partnership of various organizations at the global, regional and country levels, and is widely accepted by the international community as a global reference for the classification of food insecurity.

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Livelihoods

People's capabilities, assets – both material and social – and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well-being; including the policies and institutions that shape or constrain access to assets and choices about livelihood activities.

Malnutrition

Malnutrition is an umbrella term that covers undernutrition and overweight, obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes and cancer. Undernutrition is a consequence of inadequate nutrient intake and/or absorption, and/or illness or disease. Acute malnutrition, stunting, underweight and micronutrient deficiencies are all forms of undernutrition.

Risk of Famine

Risk of Famine refers to the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine in the projected period. While this is not perceived necessarily as the most-likely scenario, it is a worst-case scenario that generally has a realistic chance of occurring.

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Appendices

1. Hotspots selection process

The countries and territories selected for inclusion as hunger hotspots in this report are those assessed as facing a potential deterioration in acute food insecurity during the outlook period. The analysis focuses specifically on acute food insecurity – rather than broader measures of food insecurity or malnutrition. Countries experiencing protracted crises with persistently high levels of acute food insecurity, but without clear evidence of likely deterioration, are typically not classified as hotspots.

The selection of hotspots follows a two-step approach, combining quantitative analysis with expert qualitative assessments to identify the countries and territories at highest risk.

The **quantitative analysis** is used to measure and prioritize the extent of deterioration in acute food security expected across different contexts. This involves compiling a range of acute food insecurity indicators, including absolute numbers and of prevalence, and changes in populations classified in Crisis and Emergency (IPC/CH Phases 3 and 4), WFP CARI Moderate and Severe acute food insecurity, and the number of people in need of food security and livelihoods assistance. In addition, indicators related to conflict, economic shocks and natural hazards, and on other aggravating factors including humanitarian access, agricultural seasonality, coping capacity, malnutrition and population displacement are considered. All indicators are compiled into a structured data matrix and normalized, to ensure comparability, by transforming values to a standard scale.

The normalized acute food insecurity data are then ranked using a distribution-based quintile method. All low- and

middle-income countries and territories with available food security data are ranked by each indicator and divided into quintiles. Countries falling into the top quintile (scoring of "5") for at least one indicator are preselected, as this reflects the most severe deterioration, regardless of country size or baseline conditions. This methodology helps identify contexts where food security crises are rapidly emerging or intensifying. Countries with populations estimated or projected to be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) are automatically included due to the extreme severity of their conditions. This method focuses on the magnitude of change rather than absolute numbers, thereby highlighting emerging hotspots requiring urgent attention.

The **qualitative assessment** builds on findings from the quantitative step and incorporates expert judgment to contextualize the data. It takes into account forward-looking risks and dynamic factors that may not be fully captured by quantitative indicators alone. The final selection of hotspot countries and territories is informed by consultations and discussions with technical experts during regional selection meetings. These experts include food security specialists, conflict, climate, and economic risk analysts, as well as emergency preparedness officers with expertise in the specific region. They assess both the data-driven rankings and the broader humanitarian and contextual situation.

The final list of hotspots is validated through consultation with headquarters-based technical teams and ad hoc discussions with experts in relevant thematic and geographic areas. This process ensures consensus on prioritization and strengthens the evidence base guiding early warning and anticipatory action.

2. Acute food insecurity data sources excluding IPC/CH by country

The acute food insecurity figures presented in this report for Colombia, Myanmar, the West Bank and Yemen are extracted from the HNRPs. For Myanmar, IPC-equivalent analysis was conducted for the 2025 HNRP, released in December 2024. For Yemen, figures are based on the 2025 HNRP as well.

Among the countries or territories that require monitoring, estimates for Colombia are based on calculation of the

number of people in need of food security and livelihood assistance within the framework of the 2025 HNRP. For the West Bank, figures are derived from the Flash Appeal for the Occupied Palestinian Territory 2025, released by OCHA in December 2024. For Bolivia, estimates are based on WFP's CARI methodology.

For all the other countries where data are available, acute food insecurity figures are based on IPC or CH analyses.



Notes

- 1 The title of the humanitarian plan varies depending on the context and humanitarian coordination structure in each country. It may be referred to as a Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), a Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), or a Flash Appeal, among others. In addition, the structure and scope of humanitarian Clusters differ across countries, leading to a range of food security-related interventions. These may focus solely on food security or encompass broader areas such as food security and livelihoods, or food security and agriculture. Regardless of this variation, all such interventions fall within the scope of the Food Security Cluster or Sector.
- 2 Anticipatory action recommendations are included only when the risk analysis identifies a hazard or shock that is likely to occur but has not yet materialized during the outlook period. If a hazard or shock has already impacted agricultural livelihoods and food security, the window for anticipatory action is considered closed – even if the effects are expected to persist into the present and future. In such cases, this report includes only emergency response recommendations.
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The Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) is a multistakeholder initiative of humanitarian and development actors, united by a commitment to tackle the root causes of food crises and to promote sustainable solutions. GNAFC produces and shares analyses and knowledge, and strengthens the coordination of evidence-based responses across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus. It operates at national, regional, and global levels.

Within GNAFC's approach and framework, FAO and WFP, together with relevant partners, have established a coordinated monitoring system for food security, livelihoods and value chains in order to identify and inform critical anticipatory actions.

This report is part of a series of GNAFC's analytical products contributing to the generation and sharing of consensus and evidence-based information for preventing and addressing food crises.

 www.fightfoodcrises.net

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 YouTube

Contact information

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Viale delle Terme di Caracalla

00153 Rome, Italy

T +39 06 57051 fao.org

Office of Emergencies and Resilience OER-Director@fao.org

World Food Programme

Via Cesare Giulio Viola 68/70

00148 Rome, Italy

T +39 06 65131 wfp.org

wfpinfo@wfp.org

GNAFC Members



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