

# **MOPAN ASSESSMENT REPORT UNRWA**

## **Part II. Technical and Statistical Annex**

## Explanatory Note

MOPAN is the only collective action mechanism that meets member countries' information needs regarding the performance of multilateral organisations (MOs). Through its institutional assessment report, MOPAN provides comprehensive, independent, and credible performance information to inform members' engagement and accountability mechanisms.

MOPAN's assessment reports tell the story of the multilateral organisation (MO) and its performance. Through detailing the major findings and conclusions of the assessment, alongside the MO's performance journeys, strengths, and areas for improvement, the reports support member's decision-making regarding MOs and the wider multilateral system.

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## PART II: Technical and Statistical Annex

**Part II: Technical and Statistical Annex** provides the background to the key findings and scores presented in the first part of the report. It starts by outlining the underlying analysis of each score by key performance indicators, micro-indicators and elements. Then, it lists the documents used as evidence for analyses and scores. Last, it summarises the results of the external partner MOPAN survey that fed into the assessment.

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## Annex A: Performance analysis

### Methodology for scoring and rating

The approach to scoring and rating under MOPAN 3.1 is described in the 2020 Methodology Manual<sup>1</sup>, which can be found MOPAN's website.

Each of the 12 key performance indicators (KPIs) contains several micro-indicators (MIs), which vary in number. The KPI rating is calculated by taking the average of the ratings of its constituent MIs.

#### **Scoring of KPIs 1-8**









The scoring of KPIs 1-8 is based upon an aggregated scoring the MIs. Each MI contains a several elements, which vary in number, that represent international good practice. Taking the average of the constituent scores per element, a score is then calculated per MI. The same logic is pursued at aggregation to the KPI level, to ensure a consistent approach. Taking the average of the constituent scores per MI, an aggregated score is then calculated per KPI.

#### **Scoring of KPIs 9-12**

The scoring of KPIs 9-12 is based upon a meta-analysis of evaluations and performance information, rated at the MI level and aggregated to the KPI level. For KPI 9, results against the mandate and contribution to cross-cutting results are given equal weight. KPIs 9-12 assess results achieved as assessed in evaluations and annual performance reporting from the organisations.

#### **Rating scales**

Whenever scores are aggregated, rating scales are used to translate scores into ratings that summarise the assessment across KPIs and MIs. The rating scale used under MOPAN 3.1 is shown below.

 <b>Highly satisfactory</b> (3.51-4.00)	 <b>High evidence confidence</b>
 <b>Satisfactory</b> (2.51-3.50)	 <b>Medium evidence confidence</b>
 <b>Unsatisfactory</b> (1.51-2.50)	 <b>Low evidence confidence</b>
 <b>Highly Unsatisfactory</b> (0.00-1.50)	
 <b>No evidence / Not applicable</b>	

A score of “N/E” means “no evidence” and indicates that the assessment team could not find any evidence but was not confident of whether or not there was evidence to be found. The team assumes that “no evidence” does not necessarily mean that the element is not present (which would result in a zero score). Elements rated N/E are excluded from any calculation of the average. A significant number of N/E scores in a report indicates an assessment limitation (see the Limitations section at the beginning of the report). A note indicating “N/A” means that an element is considered to be “not applicable”. This usually owes to the organisation’s specific nature.


<sup>1</sup> MOPAN 3.1 Methodology Manual, 2020 Assessment Cycle,  
[http://www.mopanonline.org/ourwork/themopanapproach/MOPAN\\_3.1\\_Methodology.pdf](http://www.mopanonline.org/ourwork/themopanapproach/MOPAN_3.1_Methodology.pdf)

## Changes to MOPAN's rating system

MOPAN's methodology is continuously evolving, and a recent notable change concerns how ratings (and their corresponding colours) are applied based on the scores at micro indicator (MI) and key performance indicator (KPI) levels. Compared to the pre-2019 rating scale, the threshold for each rating has been raised to reflect the increasing demands of organisational performance in the multilateral system. The underlying scores and approach to scoring are unaffected.

## UNRWA's performance rating summary

The graphic below provides a "snapshot" of UNRWA's scoring against the MOPAN framework of key performance indicators (KPIs), Micro-Indicators (MIs), and elements by the five performance areas.





## UNRWA's performance rating matrix

<b>Strategic management</b>									
KPI 1: Organisational architecture and financial framework									3.00
1.1 Long-term vision	3	3	3	3					3.00
1.2 Organisational architecture	3	3	3	3	2				2.80
1.3 Supports normative frameworks	3	3	3						3.00
1.4 Financial framework	3	3	4	3	3	NA			3.20
KPI 2: Cross-cutting issues									2.29
2.1 Gender equality	3	3	2	2	2	3			2.50
2.2 Environment	2	2	1	2	2	2			1.83
2.3 Human rights (protection)	3	3	3	2	2	3			2.67
2.4 Other cross-cutting issues - disability	3	2	2	2	2	2			2.17
<b>Operational management</b>									
KPI 3: Operating model and resources support relevance and agility									2.52
3.1 Resources aligned to functions	3	2	3	2	NA	NA			2.50
3.2 Resource mobilisation	2	3	4	NA	NA				3.00
3.3 Decentralised decision-making	2	2	2	2					2.00
3.4 Performance-based human resources	3	3	2	2	3				2.60
KPI 4: Cost and value consciousness, financial transparency									2.74
4.1 Transparent decision-making	3	2	3	3					2.75
4.2 Disbursement as planned	NA	NA	3	3					3.00
4.3 Results-based budgeting	4	3	2	2					2.75
4.4 Audit	4	3	3	3					3.25
4.5 Control mechanisms	3	3	3	3	3				3.00
4.6 Anti-fraud procedures	3	3	2	3	3	3			2.83
4.7 SEA prevention/response	3	3	2	2	3	3	2	2	2.50
4.8 SH prevention/response	2	1	2	2	2	NE	2		1.83
<b>Relationship management</b>									
KPI 5: Planning and intervention design support relevance and agility									2.64
5.1 Alignment to country	NA	NA	NA	NA					NA
5.2 Context analysis	3	3							3.00
5.3 Capacity analysis	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA				NA
5.4 Risk management	3	3	3	3	2				2.80
5.5 Cross-cutting issues in intervention design	3	2							2.50
5.6 Sustainability	NA	NA	NA	NA					NA
5.7 Implementation speed	3	2	2	2					2.25
KPI 6: Work in coherent partnerships									2.76
6.1 Agility	2	2	2						2.00
6.2 Comparative advantage	3	2	3	3	NE				2.75
6.3 Use Country systems	NA	NA	NA	NA					NA
6.4 Synergies	3	4	3	NE					3.33
6.5 Co-ordination	3	3	3						3.00
6.6 Information sharing	4	4	2						3.33
6.7 Accountability to beneficiaries	2	0	3	2	0				1.40
6.8 Joint assessments	NA	NA	NA						NA
6.9 Knowledge	4	NA	3	NA	NA	NA			3.50
<b>Performance management</b>									
KPI 7: Transparent results focus, explicitly geared to function									2.81
7.1 RBM applied	4	3	3	3	2				3.00
7.2 RBM in strategies	3	3	4	3	3				3.20
7.3 Evidence-based targets	3	3	4	3	0				2.60
7.4 Effective monitoring systems	3	3	3	3					3.00
7.5 Performance data applied	1	2	2	4					2.25
KPI 8: Evidence-based planning and programming applied									2.73
8.1 Independent evaluation function	4	0	1	1	4	4			2.33
8.2 Evaluation coverage	3	2	2	3	3				2.60
8.3 Evaluation quality	3	3	3	4	3				3.20
8.4 Evidence-based design	2	2	2	NE	0				1.50
8.5 Poor performance tracked	4	2	2	4					3.00
8.6 Follow-up systems	4	4	4	4					4.00
8.7 Uptake of lessons	3	2	3	2					2.50
<b>Results</b>									
KPI 9: Achievement of results									2.84
9.1 Results attained	3								3.00
9.2 Gender equality	3								
9.3 Environment/Climate change	2								2.67
9.4 Human Rights	3								
[9.5 Other cross-cutting issues]	NA								NA
KPI 10: Relevance to partners									3.00
10.1 Responsive to needs	3								3.00
KPI 11: Efficient delivery									3.00
11.1 Cost efficiency	3								3.00
11.2 Timeliness	3								3.00
KPI 12: Sustainability									NA
12.1 Sustainable benefits	NA								NA

## Strategic management

*Clear strategic direction geared to key functions, intended results and integration of relevant cross-cutting priorities*

KPI 1: Organisational architecture and financial framework enable mandate implementation and achievement of expected results	KPI score
Satisfactory	3
<p><b>UNRWA is one of the oldest and largest United Nations entities. Its unique mission and ‘temporary’ mandate to provide services to Palestine refugees is contingent on the realisation of a political solution to the situation of Palestine refugees.</b> The Agency’s provision of services is essential for the well-being, human development, and protection of its beneficiaries, and is widely viewed as a contributor to regional stability. Operating in a politically charged, volatile and oftentimes insecure context, the Agency’s performance is to a large extent determined by political circumstances and subjected to considerable politicized scrutiny.</p> <p><b>UNRWA has a humanitarian, development, and protection mandate only; unlike UNHCR, UNRWA is not mandated to provide durable solutions.</b> Its services cover protection, education, health, relief and social services (food, cash assistance), livelihood improvement through micro-finance, infrastructure and camp improvement (including water and sanitation), and emergency assistance. Its services are extended to Palestine refugees, Palestinian women married to non-refugees (MNR), and to “Non-registered Eligible Persons”. Most of its services are offered in or near the 58 official refugee camps in its five ‘Fields of Operation’ (Fields): Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank including East-Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. By the end of 2022, there were 6.65 million registered persons across five Fields, an increase of 8 per cent compared with 2018. Of these, approximately 2.6 million access UNRWA services.</p> <p>As of December 2022, the Agency employed 27 756 staff, a decrease of 7 per cent compared to 2018. The Lebanon and West Bank Field Offices decreased by 13 and 11 per cent, respectively. Headquarters experienced an increase of 14 per cent, thanks to the approval of posts funded through the UN’s regular budget. The large majority (90 per cent) of staff are themselves Palestine refugees.</p> <p><b>According to rapid surveys conducted by UNRWA in 2021 and 2022, poverty rates amongst Palestine refugees have increased to 81.5 per cent in the Gaza Strip, 83 per cent in Syria and 93 per cent in Lebanon.</b> The most recent poverty data for Jordan (15.7 per cent) and West Bank (14 per cent) dates from 2019 and 2016-17 respectively and are likely to have increased considerably since then, primarily as a result of COVID-19.</p> <p><b>UNRWA’s comparative advantage is enshrined in its mandate, and its application is closely scrutinized. Contrary to other UN entities, it delivers practically all its services directly to its beneficiaries, rather than through implementing partners. UNRWA has strategic partnerships with WHO and UNESCO.</b> Collaborating with others, even sister UN agencies, has proven to be politically sensitive, with some fearing that UNRWA may eventually discharge responsibilities to others and – thus – undermine the political right of return of Palestine refugees. Caught between a rock and a hard place, UNRWA increasingly emphasizes the importance of ‘collective responsibility’ – of the United Nations system, the international community, and of host nations/duty bearers – to provide essential services to Palestine refugees. Thus far, this has largely been met with verbal consent only.</p> <p><b>Whereas UNRWA’s mandate is periodically extended for periods of 3 years, most recently until 2026, the Agency sets out its statement of intent for its operations for 6-year periods.</b> These are then operationalized on an annual basis and have remained stable over the years. The strategic plans are aligned to the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. The strategies are based on certain planning assumptions, including <i>inter alia</i> projected increases in the provision of voluntary contributions. Because these funding assumptions were not met, the mid-term strategy 2016-2022 and strategic plan 2023-2028 provide limited guidance for operational decisions which, in practice are informed by operational plans which are effectively determined by the availability of funds and urgent needs.</p> <p><b>UNRWA’s organisational structure reflects its mandate and – thus – of its strategic plan. The assessment found that the HQ has demonstrated a tendency to centralise decision-making and exercised a high level of direction over Field Offices, both substantively and on matters related to programme budget-funded expenses (most of which are staff-related). This practice intensified as the financial constraints worsened.</b></p> <p>Originally headquartered in Vienna until 1996, the Agency now maintains three headquarters (Amman, East-Jerusalem, and Gaza</p>	

City), five field offices, and five liaison offices. Compared to other UN (humanitarian / development) agencies, UNRWA's Headquarters and Field Offices are relatively small, with a very low number of international staff. Over the years, ensuring programme delivery to meet immediate needs of refugees was oftentimes prioritised over other critical roles and responsibilities, leading to chronic understaffing of HQ and Field Office functions such as executive management, human resource management, oversight and accountability, resource mobilisation, communication, ethics, Gender, PSEAH, staff security, and others. The recent increase of 62 Regular Budget-funded posts, while a step in the right direction, does not meet the Agency's needs and growing demands from Member States. Voluntary contributions to enable adequate staffing of these and other HQ-functions are equally insufficient.

**Confronted with a growing number of eligible beneficiaries, an unfavourable external context, and chronic financial challenges, UNRWA's operating model is becoming increasingly unsustainable.** These external conditions are having a significant detrimental effect on the Agency's operations, with no lasting solution in sight. UNRWA operates in a highly resource-constrained environment, and demand for the Agency's services has consistently outstripped the availability of funding for at least the last decade. During the period 2018-2022, UNRWA's revenues amounted to \$5.7bn, while expenditures exceeded \$6bn. At 61 per cent of all Agency expenses, staff costs are by far the largest expense category. During the 2018-2022 period, UNRWA endured its heaviest financial crisis, when first the US and afterwards several Gulf States issued drastic funding cuts. Despite efforts to diversify its funding, UNRWA continues to rely almost entirely on voluntary contributions from a small number of UN Member States.

MI 1.1: Strategic plan and intended results based on a clear long-term vision and analysis of comparative advantage in the context of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda	Score
Overall MI rating	Satisfactory
Overall MI score	3.00
Element 1: A publicly available strategic plan (or equivalent) contains a long-term vision	3
Element 2: The vision is based on a clear analysis and articulation of comparative advantage	3
Element 3: The strategic plan operationalises the vision and defines intended results	3
Element 4: The strategic plan is reviewed regularly to ensure continued relevance and attention to risks	3
MI 1.1 Analysis	Evidence documents
<p><b>Element 1:</b></p> <p>UNRWA is a United Nations Organisation, responsible for service provision to Palestine refugees pending a just and lasting solution to their plight. UNRWA's mission, enshrined in its "temporary" mandate that dates back to United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 194 (1948) and 302 IV of 8 December 1949, when UNRWA was established to "carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works programmes" and "to consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available."</p> <p>UNRWA's services are extended to Palestine refugees (i.e., "persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict and include descendants through the male line" – UN Doc. A/75/13), Palestine women who are, or were, married to men who are not Palestine refugees (MNR), and to "Non-registered Eligible Persons". According to UNHCR, one-fourth of all recognized refugees worldwide are Palestinian. There are an estimated 9 million Palestinian refugees globally, of which 5.8 million live in UNRWA's fields. About one-third of these live in the 58 official Palestinian refugee camps. In 2022, approximately 2.6 million persons accessed UNRWA services.</p> <p>The Agency's provision of services is essential for the well-being, human development, and protection of a constantly growing Palestine refugee population. UNRWA has a humanitarian, development, and protection mandate. Its services cover protection, education, health, relief and social services (food, cash assistance), livelihood improvement through micro-finance, infrastructure and camp improvement (including water and sanitation), and emergency assistance. Most of its services are offered in or near official refugee camps. Unlike UNHCR, UNRWA is not mandated to provide durable solutions.</p> <p>While its performance is to a large extent determined by political circumstances, and subjected to considerable (oftentimes politicized) scrutiny, and while the UN reaffirmed its "permanent responsibility for the question of Palestine until it is resolved in all its aspects in accordance with international law" (UNGAR A/RES/71/23 – adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in November 2016), the Agency itself does not engage in</p>	<p>5- 9, 11-19, 27-35, 37-40, 43, 56, 134, 171-174, 190, 194, 196, 201-206, 223, 315, 417, 419, 422</p> <p>MOPAN survey</p>

political negotiations on the situation of Palestine refugees.

Whereas UNRWA's mandate is periodically extended for periods of 3 years, most recently until 2026, the Agency sets out its statement of intent for its operations for 6-year periods, which is then operationalized on an annual basis. The UNRWA Medium-Term Strategy 2016-2022 (MTS – extended with 1 year until 31.12.2022) laid out five (5) Strategic Outcomes designed to address certain needs of Palestine refugees:

1. UNRWA will ensure that its own operations meet minimum protection standards. UNRWA will further protect and promote the rights of Palestine refugees under international law.
2. UNRWA will protect refugees' health and reduce the burden of disease.
3. UNRWA will ensure school-aged children complete quality, equitable and inclusive basic education to enable students, over time, to develop the cognitive, social, cultural, and personal capabilities to best equip them to realize their potential as an individual and as a member of their society.
4. UNRWA will increase the capabilities of refugees – particularly youth, women, the poor and other vulnerable groups – to take advantage of livelihood opportunities.
5. UNRWA will ensure refugees are able to meet their basic human needs of food, shelter, and environmental health to ensure that its efforts to build the human capability of refugees are not undermined.

The 2023-2028 Strategic Plan identifies seven objectives, two more than the MTS. The 5<sup>th</sup> Strategic Outcome in the MTS has now been split into two objectives (5 and 6), and a new priority, addressing UNRWA's organisational performance (objective #7) against a background of a protracted financial crisis and challenges in the Agency's operating environment, has been added:

1. Palestine refugees are protected through the realization of their rights under international law.
2. Palestine refugees lead healthy lives.
3. Palestine refugees complete inclusive and equitable quality basic education.
4. Palestine refugees have improved livelihood opportunities.
5. The most vulnerable Palestine refugees have access to effective social assistance.
6. Palestine refugees are able to meet their basic human needs of shelter, water and sanitation.
7. UNRWA's mandate is implemented effectively and responsibly.

Despite the volatility of the context in which the Agency operates, UNRWA's priorities, programmes and areas of operation have remained stable over the years, reflecting the Agency's mandate. Programmatic priorities are set by the United Nations General Assembly and were not amended during the period under review, nor for the first years of the 2023-2028 Strategic Plan. Responding to the statement that UNRWA has a clear strategy that identifies its role and intended results, 25 per cent of MOPAN survey respondents strongly agreed, 45 per cent agreed, and 19 per cent somewhat agreed.

Both the MTS 2016-2022 and its successor, the Strategic Plan 2023-2028 include specific funding assumptions and fully developed budgets. However, funding received has not allowed these forecasts to be achieved. Consequently, the medium-term strategy and strategic plan provide more limited guidance for operational decisions which are often determined by operational plans, the availability of funds and urgent needs. Nevertheless, the independent evaluation of the MTS concluded that "the MTS has proved to be a useful strategic framework for guiding the Agency's work and aligning it with the SDGs. While it was comprehensive in outlining what UNRWA set out to achieve, funding shortfalls have limited the Agency's ability to address fully the needs of Palestine refugees."

#### **Element 2:**

UNRWA is a unique Agency within the UN system. It is the only agency with responsibility for a specific population group and to have an explicit 'temporary' mandate. It is the lead international actor for Palestine refugees, delivering essential services, which are ordinarily provided by a government, in its five areas (fields) of operation: Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), and the Gaza Strip. In light of its mandate, as well as its sheer size and volume, UNRWA assumes several state-like responsibilities such as provision of education and health services, but without state-like attributes such as taxation and law enforcement.

Both the MTS 2016-2022 and the Strategic Plan 2023-2028 include an overall context analysis as well as specific context analyses for each strategic priority. They also include analyses of past performance, beneficiary needs, priorities, financial requirements, effects of underfunding, detailed indicator frameworks at output and outcome levels, an evaluation plan, and enterprise risks. As part of the planning process for the MTS and SP, UNRWA

conducted several studies and gathered and analysed data on the conditions of Palestinian refugees in several ways. UNRWA has robust understanding of the working environment and contextual analysis is part and parcel of its Emergency Appeals, Projects, Flash Appeals and Annual Operational Reports. Context analysis is integrated in the risk analysis section and planning assumptions of the Annual Operational Plans, the programme budget proposals, and the biennial programme budgets ('Blue Book').

UNRWA's comparative advantage is enshrined in its mandate, and its application is closely scrutinized. Contrary to other UN entities, it delivers practically all its services directly to the refugees, rather than through third parties (e.g., implementing partners). The Agency identifies its comparative advantages in terms of the scale and geographic coverage of its operations, its coordinated and diversified programming and, above all, its workforce – the majority of whom are Palestine refugees themselves.

UNRWA has enjoyed long-term institutionalized partnerships with UNESCO for the education programme and WHO for the health programme. These agencies second key programme staff to UNRWA and provide a range of other support. UNRWA has also built partnerships with a number of other UN agencies, including WFP (on food distributions), UN-Habitat (United Nations Human Settlements Programme under ICIP in Syria), UNFPA, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to support Palestine refugee access to services. It also partners with the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement and local and international NGOs, including the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The more strategic partnership agreements are reviewed on a regular basis. (134. MTSE p. 42). In field-level partnerships, both UN and NGO partners tend to fill gaps in UNRWA service delivery, with refugees being referred to them for services that UNRWA cannot provide mainly due to lack of funding. Partners also provide alternative or complementary activities that add to what UNRWA does. Sometimes, UNRWA undertakes joint advocacy work and coordination with other UN agencies including as part of the cluster system, but the extent of this engagement differs by field location and organisation (ibid, p. 43). Survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed that UNRWA brings clear added value to its partnerships, whilst 61 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that UNRWA participates constructively in humanitarian coordination and response structures and processes.

Increasingly, UNRWA emphasizes the importance of 'collective responsibility' – of the United Nations system, the international community, and of host nations/duty bearers – to provide essential services to Palestine refugees. In most contexts, calls for a comprehensive and coordinated response by all parties acting in concert and in partnership would be welcomed, as this would be seen as appropriate ways to bolster efficiency and effectiveness. In the case of UNRWA, however, initiatives taken by the Agency to engage more closely and strategically with other parties have proven to be politically sensitive, with some fearing that UNRWA may eventually discharge responsibilities to others, and – thus – undermine the political right of return of Palestine refugees. As stated in the MTS evaluation and confirmed during interviews, organisational and programmatic reforms as well as adjustments to its business model are often perceived as (existential) threats: "For Palestine refugees, UNRWA and its services have a symbolic meaning beyond the assistance provided. Host governments also resist change because they are reluctant to take over responsibility for UNRWA activities. UNRWA staff fear the loss of jobs on which they and their families rely." (134. MTSE, p. 5).

As the MTS Evaluation states, more mundane challenges to the success of partnerships and activities also persist, such as the high level of UNRWA bureaucracy and centralised decision making. Also, some partners perceived UNRWA as a large and complex organisation whose hierarchy and structure were not always clear to them, generating confusion about how best to follow up on issues. In addition, evidence from interviews for this assessment points to a lack of human capacity to fully participate in local coordination structures, despite UNRWA being by far the largest actor on the ground.

### **Element 3:**

The MTS operationalises the vision and mandate and defines intended results. It was originally intended to be operationalised through the five Strategic Response Plans (SPs) at field office level. Each of these SPs were supposed to be aligned to the same Agency-wide strategic outcomes, with common programme outputs across field offices. In practice, except for the Jordan Field Office, this did not transpire, nor was it deemed mandatory any longer once the financial crisis erupted. Instead, the MTS was operationalized at field level through the Annual Operational Plans (AOPs), designed to ensure alignment between the Agency's day-to-day work with the strategic priorities elaborated in the MTS.

Led by the Department of Planning, the AOPs are developed on the basis of HQ-driven programmatic and financial guidelines, in a highly structured and well-orchestrated fashion. The AOPs list departmental and Field

Office priorities and activities, but do not detail targets at the output level of UNRWA's results framework. The AOPs are aligned with the budgeting cycle, resource mobilization calendar, reporting cycle, internal oversight calendar, procurement plans, workforce and recruitment plans, and performance management cycle for staff and managers. See KPIs 5 and 7 for a detailed analysis of programming and results management processes and practices.

Political, socio-economic, security and operational conditions in UNRWA's five fields vary considerably, as do the legal status and the socio-economic situation of Palestine refugees in each of these. Whereas these differences do not necessarily affect the overall vision and mission of the Agency, which are determined by the mandate given to the Agency by the General Assembly, they nevertheless do affect the conditions of the beneficiaries and the circumstances under which UNRWA delivers its services. These differences do not appear to transpire clearly at the operational level. The balance between standardization (of PB-funded programmes and services) and the tailoring of programmes to local context, was seen to be skewed towards the former. Whilst understandable from a mandate perspective, interviews suggested that it does tend to limit the potential for more agile, context-specific, field-level operationalization modalities, something field offices have been calling for. Emergency Appeals and Projects are more explicitly directed towards addressing specific contextual needs.

Because of the discrepancies between the Agency's historically consistent strategic intent on the one hand, and the very hands-on day-to-day crisis management practices on the other, the MTS is less of a guiding document than the AOP. Whereas the 2021 external evaluation of UNRWA found that, "(t)he MTS has proved to be a useful strategic framework for guiding UNRWA's work and aligning it with the SDGs, the unpredictable conditions on the ground, coupled with chronic financial shortages and cash-flow challenges, undercut UNRWA's ability to use the MTS as an Agency-wide management instrument.

#### Element 4:

UNRWA's mandate is reviewed and renewed periodically by the United Nations General Assembly, most recently in draft resolution GA/12481 in December 2022, in which the mandate was extended until June 2026.

The envisaged mid-term evaluation of the MTS, foreseen for mid-2018, did not take place. This decision was taken in close consultation with UNRWA's AdCom, for two reasons: the fact that it coincided with the previous MOPAN assessment, and the United States government's defunding of UNRWA. However, the MTS was evaluated independently by an external company in 2021. The main conclusions of the MTS evaluation were:

1. The MTS has proved to be a useful strategic framework for guiding UNRWA's work and aligning it with the SDGs though funding shortfalls have limited its ability to address fully the needs of Palestine refugees.
2. UNRWA has been able to deliver significant achievements under the MTS, despite a chronic funding crisis and other challenges. This is largely because of its dedicated workforce.
3. UNRWA's chronic funding crisis is having an impact on the quantity of assistance, the ability to maintain service quality and the ability to invest in operations. While UNRWA could take steps to strengthen resource mobilization, ultimately, it is reliant on donors to deliver on the recommendations and commitments to which they have signed up.
4. UNRWA has a unique relationship with Palestine refugees, so its accountability measures need to go beyond a focus on complaints and feedback mechanisms.
5. While UNRWA has sought to mainstream gender and address the needs of persons with disabilities (within its funding constraints), it needs a vision for how to engage with youth.
6. UNRWA has effective planning and coordination processes and clear structures and systems to link headquarters to field offices. However, it could improve decision-making mechanisms.

In practice, UNRWA has other mechanisms to ensure continued relevance and attention to risks, including biannual results reviews and quarterly expenditure reviews. Additional mechanisms include the Annual Operations Planning and reporting processes and the quarterly results reviews, the bi-weekly meetings that are held to monitor and address financial and human resource challenges, internal task forces established to deal with context-related events, and – increasingly so – the regular meetings of the Advisory Committee and Sub-Committee. The AOPs include detailed operational and financial risk registers.

#### MI 1.1 Evidence confidence

High



MI 1.2: Organisational architecture congruent with a clear long-term vision and associated operating model					Score																																																																																																
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Element 1: The organisational architecture is congruent with the strategic plan					3																																																																																																
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<p><b>Element 1:</b></p> <p>UNRWA sees itself primarily as a humanitarian agency providing human development and humanitarian services to Palestine refugees, Palestinian women married to non-refugees (MNR), and “Non-registered Eligible Persons”.</p> <p>By the end of 2022, UNRWA serviced 6.65 million registered persons across five Fields, an increase of 8 per cent compared with 2018. Of these, 38 per cent are in Jordan, 26 per cent in the Gaza Strip, 17 per cent in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), 10 per cent in Syria, and 8 per cent in Lebanon (figures have been rounded).</p> <p><b>Table 1: Registered Population by category, 2018-2022</b></p> <table><tr><th>Registered Population</th><th>2018</th><th>2019</th><th>2020</th><th>2021</th><th>2022</th></tr><tr><td>Registered refugees</td><td>5 545 540</td><td>5 629 829</td><td>5 703 521</td><td>5 792 907</td><td>5 889 633</td></tr><tr><td>Other registered persons*</td><td>626 253</td><td>663 561</td><td>685 366</td><td>727 876</td><td>762 957</td></tr><tr><td>Total registered population</td><td>6 171 793</td><td>6 293 390</td><td>6 388 887</td><td>6 520 783</td><td>6 652 590</td></tr><tr><td>Registered population – female (%)****</td><td>50.1</td><td>50.1</td><td>50.1</td><td>50,2</td><td>50,2</td></tr><tr><td>Registered population – male (%)</td><td>49.9</td><td>49.9</td><td>49.9</td><td>49,8</td><td>49,8</td></tr><tr><td>Registered population – youth (%)**</td><td>17.7</td><td>17.5</td><td>17.3</td><td>17,3</td><td>17,3</td></tr><tr><td>Registered population – youth, female (%)***</td><td>17.7</td><td>17.5</td><td>17.3</td><td>17,1</td><td>17,1</td></tr><tr><td>Registered population – youth, male (%)***</td><td>17.7</td><td>17.6</td><td>17.4</td><td>17,4</td><td>17,4</td></tr></table> <p><b>Table 2: registered population by location, 2018-2022</b></p> <table><tr><th>Registered population by location</th><th>2018</th><th>2019</th><th>2020</th><th>2021</th><th>2022</th></tr><tr><td>The Gaza Strip Field Office</td><td>1 570 295</td><td>1 622 121</td><td>1 643 551</td><td>1 705 352</td><td>1 754 309</td></tr><tr><td>Jordan Field Office</td><td>2 376 481</td><td>2 419 662</td><td>2 307 011</td><td>2 499 905</td><td>2 542 999</td></tr><tr><td>Lebanon Field office</td><td>533 885</td><td>538 692</td><td>543 824</td><td>549 692</td><td>557 342</td></tr><tr><td>Syria Field Office</td><td>643 142</td><td>647 143</td><td>655 730</td><td>665 866</td><td>674 455</td></tr><tr><td>West Bank Field Office</td><td>1 047 990</td><td>1 065 772</td><td>1 082 653</td><td>1 099 968</td><td>1 123 485</td></tr><tr><td>Total Agency</td><td>6 171 793</td><td>6 293 390</td><td>6 388 887</td><td>6 520 783</td><td>6 652 590</td></tr></table> <p><i>* Note 1: “other registered persons” refer to those who, at the time of original registration, did not satisfy all of UNRWA’s Palestine refugee criteria, but who were determined to have suffered significant loss and/or hardship for reasons related to the 1948 conflict in Palestine; they also include persons who belong to the families of other registered persons.</i></p> <p><i>** Note 2: The age range applied to ‘youth’ is 15-24 years.</i></p> <p><i>*** Note 3: the registered population – youth, female/male (%) is based on the total registered female/male youth population out of the total female/male registered population.</i></p>					Registered Population	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Registered refugees	5 545 540	5 629 829	5 703 521	5 792 907	5 889 633	Other registered persons*	626 253	663 561	685 366	727 876	762 957	Total registered population	6 171 793	6 293 390	6 388 887	6 520 783	6 652 590	Registered population – female (%)****	50.1	50.1	50.1	50,2	50,2	Registered population – male (%)	49.9	49.9	49.9	49,8	49,8	Registered population – youth (%)**	17.7	17.5	17.3	17,3	17,3	Registered population – youth, female (%)***	17.7	17.5	17.3	17,1	17,1	Registered population – youth, male (%)***	17.7	17.6	17.4	17,4	17,4	Registered population by location	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	The Gaza Strip Field Office	1 570 295	1 622 121	1 643 551	1 705 352	1 754 309	Jordan Field Office	2 376 481	2 419 662	2 307 011	2 499 905	2 542 999	Lebanon Field office	533 885	538 692	543 824	549 692	557 342	Syria Field Office	643 142	647 143	655 730	665 866	674 455	West Bank Field Office	1 047 990	1 065 772	1 082 653	1 099 968	1 123 485	Total Agency	6 171 793	6 293 390	6 388 887	6 520 783	6 652 590	1, 2, 10-12, 134, 208-213, 222, 224, 231, 236-255, 276, 315, 417, 419, 422
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**And:**  
UNRWA  
website

\*\*\*\* Note 4: All Agency-wide percentages and averages are calculated on the basis of weighted averages across all fields of UNRWA operation.

Source: UNRWA

As of December 2022, the Agency employed 27 756 staff, a decrease of 7 per cent compared to 2018. The large majority (90 per cent) of staff are themselves Palestine refugees. There are only 213 international staff within UNRWA; all others are national (Area) staff. UNRWA's large staff size can be explained by the fact that, uniquely among UN agencies, it delivers services directly to its beneficiaries. The majority of UNRWA's staff are therefore engaged as teachers, primary healthcare workers, social workers, and administrators.

Because of the varying conditions in each of the 5 Fields, there is no direct correlation between the number of registered persons and the number of staff. Rather, the distribution of staff is more strongly correlated with the level and volume of services delivered, based on the technical norms and standards developed for each programmatic area.

Except for its unusual HQ structure, overall, UNRWA's organisational structure reflects its mandate and – thus – its strategic plan. There is a **strong focus on primarily standardised, decentralised programme delivery in the five Fields**. The Agency maintains field offices in each of its five areas of operation (Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, West Bank including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip). UNRWA also maintains liaison offices in New York, Brussels, Washington, and Cairo; although their roles differ from location to location, they are first and foremost lobby and advocacy 'outposts'.

Compared to other UN (humanitarian / development) agencies, UNRWA Headquarters and Field Offices are relatively small, with an unusually low number of international staff. Confronted with a continuous increase in the number of beneficiaries, budget constraints and an almost complete reliance on extrabudgetary (voluntary) contributions to cover expenses, ensuring programme delivery was oftentimes prioritised over other organisational functions. Although long overdue, the 62 additional assessed contributions-funded posts have boosted UNRWA's resources at HQ levels to improve its capacities in several areas: resource mobilisation, communications, executive oversight and direction, accountability and oversight, and the Protection programme, and bolstered its representative offices' capacities. Nevertheless, capacity in these and other HQ functional areas (such as human resource management, evaluation, cross-cutting themes and issues) and at the Field Offices remain insufficient (see MI 3.1. for further analysis).

Whereas 'Protection' features prominently in UNRWA's strategic objectives and priorities, this is not reflected as such in the Agency's organisational structure. The Protection programme is structurally located under the Chief of Staff (COS) and has the status of a division, whereas all other programmes are Departments. Protection is fully funded through voluntary contributions (with two thirds of staff covered through the project funding) from the United States government and as a result was severely affected by the 2018/19 funding crisis.

The Executive Office in Amman comprises the Office of the Commissioner-General, the Deputy Commissioner-General, the Chief of Staff, and Strategic Communications. The Ethics Office is administratively attached to the Executive Office, whilst operationally independent. Programme Departments and Support Departments and Divisions are dispersed across the Amman and Jerusalem headquarters; most (13 out of a total of 16 departments) are based in Amman, i.e.: Department of Education, Health, Infrastructure and Camp Improvement, Relief and Social Services, Protection, Finance, Information Management and Technology, Internal Oversight Services, Human Resources, Planning, Security and Risk Management, as well as the Central Support Services Division and the UNRWA Dispute Tribunal. Only the departments of Microfinance, Legal Affairs and External Relations and Communications are based in Jerusalem. Some departments have units in the Gaza Strip: IMT, micro-finance, human resources, finance, ECRD and ICID.

Originally headquartered in Vienna, UNRWA is now headquartered in three locations: Amman, Jerusalem, and Gaza City. Of these three, in terms of functions and staffing, Amman is the largest HQ, followed by Jerusalem and Gaza City. The move (in 1996) from Vienna to the region took place against the background of the Oslo process and the Agency's temporary mandate. As a result, whilst being closer to the point of delivery, and the people it serves, the move also made UNRWA more susceptible to the political forces at play. Retaining HQ functions across three locations is largely politically inspired, and not necessarily efficient or effective.

Besides having a unique mandate, UNRWA also has a distinctive governance structure. The Agency's official



governing body is the United Nations General Assembly. UNRWA is led by a Commissioner General and a Deputy Commissioner General that are appointed by the United Nations Secretary General, yet answerable to the United Nations General Assembly. Instead of a Governing Board, UNRWA has an “Advisory Commission” (a.k.a. AdCom) currently comprised of 29 donor and host government representatives and 4 observers (Palestine, the European Union, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the League of Arab States). The AdCom advises the Commissioner General in carrying out UNRWA’s mandate. It meets twice a year in Amman, though a subset of members and observers meet more regularly through the Sub-Committee (SubCom) of the AdCom. The role of the Sub-Committee is to support the AdCom in fulfilling its mandate through the provision of technical advice, suggestions, and recommendations. An AdCom Secretariat is responsible for ensuring an effective relationship between UNRWA and the AdCom through support to formal meetings, informal briefings and consultations, meetings of the Sub-Committee, workshops, and field visits among other activities.

In practice, the AdCom and SubCom appear to engage largely on policy development, oversight as well as tactical and operational matters related to UNRWA’s financial challenges, and less on political-strategic guidance. This is partly explained by the AdCom’s heterogeneous composition, with members entertaining diverging perspectives on what the Agency is and should (not) do.

#### **Element 2:**

The independent evaluation of the MTS noted that “UNRWA’s coordination and planning processes for translating the MTS into practice and for reporting against the Common Monitoring Matrix (CMM) indicators work well. Where necessary, the Agency improved systems and processes, for example in the area of project management.” The quarterly results reviews are seen as an effective management tool to assess progress and adjust where necessary, resources allowing. UNRWA also has biannual results reviews and quarterly expenditure reviews.

As UNRWA has had to operate under increasingly challenging and unpredictable conditions – with both external and internal shocks and stresses such as the 2018 funding crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, deteriorating political, economic and security conditions in all five Fields and the management crisis, to name a few – the day-to-day practice during the past four years has been one of chronic underfunding and cash flow unpredictability. This is seen as harming the Agency’s ability to link operations with strategic priorities and overcome structural challenges. Although UNRWA has managed to continue its operations, funding shortfalls have caused significant damage to the quality of its services, according to interviewees, corporate reporting and the MTS evaluation. During these past years, a disproportionate amount of executive time has been spent on fundraising and day-to-day financial oversight / troubleshooting to ensure business continuity, at the expense of strategic oversight and engagement with the Field. Not surprisingly, the focus has been more on Agency survival than on operationalising and implementing the strategic plan and ensuring that the overall structure and operating model match the MTS’s aspirations.

Meanwhile, every year, a considerable amount of effort is spent on the annual planning and budgeting cycle, linking operational plans to the strategic Priorities of the MTS (and now Strategic Plan). Despite the high level of internal consultations and coordination involved, at the time of drafting, the uncertainty and unpredictability of funding means that AOPs are developed based on past resource mobilisation trends, rather than on guaranteed income streams. The financial envelopes that are then in principle approved and allocated, do not necessarily reflect what was originally planned for. In reality, UNRWA’s plans – be it the MTS, the Strategic Resource Plans or the AOPs – are constantly overtaken by events, rendering them less effective as management instruments than intended. It begs the question whether it is necessary to continue to conduct annual planning processes in the same way, and instead, consider ‘lighter’ versions and/or multi-annual indicative plans – all the more so, since most of UNRWA’s work is of a repetitive nature.

#### **Element 3**

Some aspects of the operating model are reviewed and updated regularly, most recently in June 2022 with Organisational Directive (OD) No. 2 – describing the basic organisation of UNRWA and the major functions and responsibilities of Headquarter Offices in Amman, Gaza, and Jerusalem, and of their principal officers. Previously, adjustments to OD No. 2 had been made in 2018 and 2006. In the 2023-2028 Strategic Plan, UNRWA expresses an intent to “implement its mandate in an effective and responsible manner. This will involve working towards a predictable, sustainable, and diversified funding base, effectively managing security risks, and strengthening enterprise risk management. In addition, human resources and procurement systems, structures and processes will be reinforced, a renewed focus will be placed on staff wellbeing, alternative dispute resolution will be promoted through the Office of the Ombudsperson and the Secretary-General’s system-wide Strategy on

Gender Parity will be advanced. Independent audit, evaluation and investigation functions will enhance accountability, integrity, transparency, and learning.” As part of this, the Agency will review and update other ODs and Technical Instructions (TI), some of which date back to the 1960s and 1970s and no longer match the Agency’s current realities.

Triggered by UNRWA’s management crisis in 2018/19, the “**Management Initiatives**” provided an opportunity for what was perceived as much-needed change. Close to 100 separate actions across 36 different areas of improvement were identified at the time, several of which could be implemented at no cost, while others would need additional funding (most of which was not provided). The aim was to complete all actions by December 2021.

**Table 3: UNRWA Management Initiatives areas of improvement**

CATEGORY	AREA OF IMPROVEMENT
Accountability	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Restructuring the UNRWA ethics function</li> <li>2. The establishment of an UNRWA Ombudsperson’s Office</li> <li>3. Administration of justice review</li> <li>4. Department of Internal Oversight Services review</li> <li>5. Investments in the Department of Internal Oversight Services</li> <li>6. Advisory Committee on Internal Oversight review</li> <li>7. UNRWA participation in the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)</li> <li>8. Enhanced reporting to the UNRWA Advisory Commission</li> <li>9. Enhanced interaction between UNRWA and the Advisory Commission</li> </ol>
Management	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10. Review of the UNRWA regulatory framework: coordination</li> <li>11. Review of the UNRWA regulatory framework: financial regulations and rules</li> <li>12. Review of the UNRWA regulatory framework: procurement</li> <li>13. Specific human resource amendments to the UNRWA regulatory framework</li> <li>14. Review of the UNRWA regulatory framework: information systems infrastructure and solutions</li> <li>15. Develop a needs-based budget for 2021 and enhance the budget planning system</li> <li>16. Delegation of authority: UNRWA field offices</li> <li>17. Provide effective guidance and advice to the Office of the Commissioner-General (to further ensure accountable Agency decision making)</li> <li>18. Resource mobilization and fundraising</li> <li>19. Communications: establish a strategic communications task force and develop and introduce innovative approaches in relation to the transformation of UNRWA communication processes</li> <li>20. Review of organisational, human resource and recruitment management to ensure that procedures are streamlined, simplified, transparent and people focused, facilitating effective management support to mandate and programme delivery.</li> <li>21. Adopt the INSPIRA recruitment platform</li> <li>22. Develop rosters to fill existing and future vacancies on temporary and fixed term modalities</li> <li>23. Develop and implement enhanced strategic workforce planning, monitoring (dashboards) and reporting</li> <li>24. Review of the contractual framework in support of retaining area staff</li> <li>25. Amend the UNRWA regulatory framework to mandate that, for the purposes of official travel, the CG and DCG fly in economy class on all flights of a duration less than four hours.</li> <li>26. Develop a ten-year Palestine refugee sustainable development vision and an Agency-wide environmental management strategy</li> </ol>

Organisational culture change	27. Enhance staff morale / empowerment and organisational accountability. 28. Reinforce conduct and conflict of interest rules and regulations capacity development. 29. Review and strengthen ethics and investigations training. 30. Review and strengthen neutrality training. 31. Review and strengthen protection training. 32. Review and strengthen UNRWA's policies and procedures in relation to misconduct, disciplinary measures and disciplinary consistency. 33. Review and strengthen learning management systems. 34. Develop an UNRWA staff wellbeing strategy, messaging and training. 35. Strengthen senior and middle management staff care and teambuilding. 36. Enhance transparency through a variety of measures.
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In practice, progress was made in most areas, such as the restructuring of the ethics function, the establishment of an Ombudsperson function, strengthened oversight capacity and resource mobilisation capacity, agency decision-making, strengthened some elements of human resource management, providing more training, renewing policies and procedures in relation to misconduct, disciplinary measures and disciplinary consistency, and some of the envisaged reviews of UNRWA's regulatory framework components. Others, such as Delegation of Authority and the formulation of a Staff Union Engagement Strategy, have been postponed.

Rather than finalising all detailed actions of the Management Initiative, UNRWA's leadership decided to consider the MI exercise as completed and instead to embed change management initiatives within its 2023-2028 Strategic Plan priorities (Objective # 7: UNRWA's mandate is implemented efficiently and effectively). A new "Director for Strategic Positioning and Change" position has been created within the Executive Office to lead on this and "help create a long-term vision and plan of interconnected initiatives that will modernize, in the broadest sense, Agency management." (419. SP 2023-2028, p. 47). However, these initiatives have not been costed, nor are they part of UNRWA's capital investment plan. Because UNRWA lacks appropriate funding to conduct the necessary comprehensive reviews of its structure, accountability, governance, business processes, oversight and management practices, internal reforms appear to take place to the extent possible, rather than to the extent necessary. Moreover, some behavioural changes that were highlighted in the Management Initiatives, require far more capacity development training and mentoring than the Agency is currently capable of offering. Thus, it would seem that the momentum for change that was initially established with the Management Initiatives, may prove difficult to maintain. The appointment of a Director-level executive, whilst positive, needs to be complemented with other measures and resources.

#### Element 4:

The independent evaluation of the MTS observed that:

- UNRWA has established clear planning processes to ensure that the Strategic Outcomes identified in the MTS guide operational plans, and that field office and programme operational plans are coherent. There is a requirement that all UNRWA's policies are coherent with the objectives of the MTS and some policies (e.g., on gender equality and on infrastructure and camp improvement) are developed to the same timeframe as the MTS. The MTS establishes a framework that allows UNRWA to track results throughout the MTS period.
- UNRWA staff outlined clear structures and systems to ensure coherence between headquarters and field offices. The midyear and annual results reviews are an opportunity for a variety of headquarters and field staff to come together, while field office and headquarters directors can exchange information through Senior Management team meetings. Individual programme departments at headquarters provide technical guidance and support to programme staff in the field offices and convene meetings with field offices. Operational functions such as finance also have mechanisms to bring together headquarters and field office staff. The Department of Planning brings together the Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan field offices for annual planning meetings on the Syria crisis. Despite this, some staff felt that there was a lack of mechanisms for ongoing communication and information sharing between peer groups in field offices, e.g., field office directors or deputy directors or at programme level (outside the various annual meetings). They felt that this would enable them to share experiences on a more regular basis and to learn from each other.
- Field office staff felt that it would be helpful to have mechanisms in place for more frequent communication between peer groups across field offices, such as directors, deputy directors and staff within specific programmes."

UNRWA does not have a separate (decision-making) forum consisting of the CG, DCG and the 5 DUAs, arguably the most senior leaders within the Agency. Day-to-day crisis management is done through ad hoc task forces and working groups. Since 2021, in response to the MTS comments and the perspectives of the new executive leadership, UNRWA has established new coordination structures in the form of the Executive Advisory Group (EAG) and the Senior Management Team (SMT). Both are advisory organs to the Commissioner-General. The SMT is meant to meet quarterly and provides a space for information sharing and discussion. It is used as a preparatory forum for decision-making by the Executive leadership. The EAG is regarded as the Agency's senior advisory body to the Commissioner-General, and its TORs are described in Organisational Directive 34 (8 October 2021). The EAG meets every month or more often, if necessary, and discusses policies, priorities, and budget orientations. The EAG is chaired by the CG; standing members are the DCG, COS and some of the Agency's Directors; rotating members are the Field Directors and Directors of UNRWA's Representative Offices. Others may also join the EAG meetings on an ad hoc basis. SMT membership is broader and includes all Directors and some of the Chiefs of programmes or divisions. Both organs seek to engage senior managers in the organisation more, something UNRWA's previous leadership had allegedly failed to do, according to interviewees. Although the initiative itself has been welcomed, evidence from the interviews shows that there are mixed views on whether these two organs add value and enhance strategic decision-making, with some suggesting to reduce their size and add greater focus.

Depending on one's position and location, there are varying levels of support for standardised business processes. Staff based in Headquarters stressed the importance of standardisation, for reasons of efficiency and quality assurance (i.e., ensuring the quality of services across all five Fields). By contrast, interviewees located in Field Offices questioned what they saw as UNRWA's "one size fits all" approach, whereby generic instructions from Headquarters take insufficient account of context-specific conditions and dynamics, citing several examples of misalignment between directives and on-the-ground realities. This points to a more general observation of the need to strike a better balance between standardisation (which serves Headquarters' needs) and contextualisation (which is in the interest of the Field Offices, where the services are delivered).

#### **Element 5:**

Considering its size and the complexity of the context in which it operates, the Agency has a relatively small team of executives: the Commissioner-General (CG) is the chief executive officer of the Agency, providing strategic leadership and guidance and responsible for the operation of the programmes. To assist the CG, a Deputy Commissioner-General (DCG) and Chief of Staff (COS) are appointed. A second DCG position was approved in 2022 and will be filled in 2023. Within UNRWA, ultimately, decision-making power is vested in the hands of the CG and DCG.

The Agency's organigramme and OD No. 2 (describing the basic organisation of UNRWA and the major functions and responsibilities of Headquarter Offices in Amman, Gaza, and Jerusalem, and of their principal officers) were last updated in June 2022. The Representative Offices in Cairo, Washington, New York, and Brussels, as well as the Department of Internal Oversight Services, Strategic Communication, and the Ethics Office all report directly to the CG. All Field Offices, 4 Programme Departments (Education, Health, Relief & Social Services, and Microfinance) and some support Departments (External Relations and Communications, Finance, Human Resources, Legal Affairs, Planning, and Information Management & Technology) report to the Commissioner-General via the Deputy Commissioner General. All others (Department of Infrastructure and Camp Improvement, Security & Risk Management, Protection Division, and the Central Support Services Division) report to the Chief of Staff.

OD No. 2 states that "Heads of Departments and Divisions are responsible for advice to the CG on designated aspects of Agency administration and operations, for the supervision, where appropriate, of policies, programmes and procedures approved, and where appropriate, for the direction, coordination, and control of designated central services. Field Directors are responsible to the CG for the direction, coordination, and control of Agency operations in the field to which they are assigned. The Department of Internal Oversight Services (DIOS) is tasked with ensuring that evidence of results from evaluations are available; the Department of Planning is tasked to ensure that these are used during the planning process (annual and strategic)."

The DCG has an exceptionally wide span of control, covering the bulk of programmes, operations, and change management, while also practically engaging in fundraising and outward-facing dialogue (with AdCom, host nations and donors). With the CG and DCG's preoccupation with fundraising and troubleshooting, the time spent on programmatic matters with Directors in the field is limited.

The Commissioner-General is required to enter into a management compact with the Deputy Commissioner-General and each Director (Field, Programme etc.) setting out the results expected of the Director. The MTS evaluation found that “UNRWA’s use of ‘management compact letters’ between the Commissioner-General and responsible directors for the delivery of annual operational plans [had] established accountability.”

In 2017, as part of the OIOS evaluation of UNRWA, one of the two key recommendations centred on the need to strengthen the accountability framework, including by better clarifying roles and responsibilities, enhancing organisation-wide planning, and paying attention to cross-cutting issues and the strengthening of monitoring and evaluation functions. In its 2020 triennial review, OIOS concluded that its recommendations had been fully implemented. On the need to clarify roles and responsibilities, OIOS concluded that the introduction in 2016 of management compact letters between senior management staff (executive function directors, support function directors, programme directors and field directors) in field offices and headquarters departments and the Commissioner-General had clarified the accountability structures that accompany annual operational plans and had also served to set out the programmatic and operational priorities linked to the realization of the strategy outcomes. The letters also described risk management requirements and the budget framework for that year.

However, judging by the documentation and interview evidence collected for this assessment, these management compact letters – described as “Instruments governing Agency Administration and Operations” are no longer intended to articulate responsibility and accountability in full. Rather, they are viewed by the Executive Office primarily as a way to engage Field Directors on organisation-wide commitments such as gender equality and financial sustainability. The UN Board of Auditors 2021 report found that management compact letters were not being utilized as management tools, nor were they always issued in a timely manner. The UNBOA drew attention to their potential, stating that “Management compacts are an important management tool of the Agency to ensure the chain of command from the Commissioner-General to Directors, while also holding them accountable, and are used as a basis for Directors’ performance evaluations” and recommended that they be used as such and issued on a timely basis following a strict annual cycle to strengthen management and facilitate performance evaluation. (Doc 276, p. 28). In response, the Compacts were redrafted in 2022.

Whereas the structure is mostly congruent with the mandate and strategic plan, the roles and responsibilities of the Field Offices are less clear. Decentralised delivery of services is not (yet) matched by a clear delegation of authority and accountability to the five Field Offices’ Directors of UNRWA Affairs (DUA). Many operational decisions at Field Office level appear to be taken by Headquarters at an executive level, in part in response to the financial challenges which led to tightly controlled decision-making, in part because a comprehensive framework of accountability is still lacking. The evaluation of the MTS also points to this: “UNRWA staff also felt that decision making could be more decentralised and inclusive while responses to the staff online survey indicated that staff performance management could be improved.” This observation was corroborated during data collection for this assessment. Thus, decentralization has not been accompanied by devolution, and many interviewees at field level expressed a need for delegation to enable them to meet the constant flow of challenges at the local level.

#### MI 1.2 Evidence confidence

High

#### MI 1.3: Strategic Plan supports the implementation of global commitments and associated results

Score

#### Overall MI rating

Satisfactory

#### Overall MI score

3.00

Element 1: The strategic plan is aligned to the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, wider normative frameworks and their results (including, for example, the Grand Bargain and the QCPR)

3

Element 2: A system is being applied to track normative results for the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and other relevant global commitments (for example, the QCPR and the Grand Bargain, where applicable)

3

Element 3: Progress on implementation and aggregated results against global commitments are published at least annually

3

#### MI 1.3 Analysis

Evidence documents

#### Element 1:

UNRWA’s 2016-2022 MTS states that it “is aligned the international community’s post-2015 sustainable

7-12, 15-17, 134, 197, 199,

development agenda, and contributes to 11 of the 17 SDGs... The Agency is committed to achieving tangible and measurable results in these areas in the strategic period.” (MTS, p.28-29). SDG 1: No Poverty; SDG 2: Zero Hunger; SDG 3 Good Health and Well-Being; SDG 4: Quality Education; SDG 5: Gender Equality; SDG 6: Clean Water and Sanitation; SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth; SDG 10: Reduced Inequalities; SDG 13: Climate Action; and SDG17: Partnerships ([https://www.unrwa.org/sdg\\_2020](https://www.unrwa.org/sdg_2020)). In a separate communication (“UNRWA and the SDGs” factsheet), the Agency states that “Like the SDGs, the UNRWA MTS recognizes that advancing human development for Palestine refugees requires a multi- dimensional approach involving poverty alleviation, respect for human rights, access to quality health and educational services and reductions in inequality and economic growth.” The 2023-2028 Strategic Plan reiterates this commitment, stating that the plan contributes to the achievement of all 17 goals, but directly contributes to the aforementioned 11 SDGs. (p. 6).

200-202, 315, 417, 419, 422

UN IASC Grand Bargain self-reporting 2018, 2020, 2021, 2022 (IASC website)

UNRWA conducts its emergency response in accordance with the Humanitarian Principles and the international normative legal framework as it relates to humanitarian action and in particular the protection of human rights as an integral part of this. The Grand Bargain, launched at the World Humanitarian Summit held in Istanbul in 2016, sets out 51 mutual commitments across 10 different workstreams. UNRWA made commitments against seven of these workstreams. In June 2021, as a signatory to the Grand Bargain, the Agency also endorsed the framework and structures of the revised Grand Bargain 2.0.

### Element 2

According to the MTSE, there is broad alignment between the SDG targets and the Common Monitoring Matrix (CMM) indicators. By the time the 17 SDGs came into effect on 1 January 2016, UNRWA had finalized the MTS along with a comprehensive set of indicators to monitor its implementation. An UNRWA factsheet on the SDGs outlines in broad terms how UNRWA is delivering against 11 of the 17 SDGs (with the others being outside the scope of its mandate). The [evaluation] team also reviewed the CMM indicators more specifically against SDG targets and identified broad alignment. (134.MTS Evaluation, p. 17).

The Strategic Plan 2023-2028 includes an indicator framework that aligns UNRWA’s output and outcome indicators with corresponding SDG targets. In response to one of the recommendations of the MTS evaluation on strategic alignment with the SDGs, in its 2023-2028 Strategic Plan, UNRWA has linked its work on gender equality more clearly to SDG 5.

### Element 3

UNRWA issues annual Grand Bargain self-reports, reporting on actions against GB enabling priorities: transparency, cash-based programming, reducing management costs, enhanced quality funding, harmonized reporting, humanitarian-development-protection nexus, gender equality and women’s empowerment, humanitarian-development nexus mainstreaming, and – since 2021 – enterprise risk sharing. Summaries of these are also published in the publicly available UNRWA Annual Operational Reports.

The evaluation of the Medium-Term Strategy monitoring and reporting (2022) concluded that the AOR aligns closely to the Grand Bargain harmonized reporting template, it consolidates all of UNRWA’s results reports, and donors have been engaged in defining its scope and the indicators featured. As a result, the AOR gives donors the information they need to report progress on outcomes specifically relevant to their governments. From 2020 onwards, the Agency’s presentation of results includes a bespoke trend analysis.

UNRWA does not issue progress reports on its implementation and aggregation of performance against the SDGs. Since most SDG reporting takes place at country level, UNRWA, in common with most other UN agencies, does not explicitly provide external reporting on its contributions to SDGs. However, its management results reporting does frame achievements in terms of contributions to SDGs. According to interviews, donors have not asked UNRWA to report on SDGs systematically (as opposed to the Grand Bargain commitments).

### MI 1.3 Evidence confidence

Medium

### MI 1.4: Financial framework supports mandate implementation

Score

### Overall MI rating

Satisfactory

### Overall MI score

3.20



Element 1: Financial and budgetary planning ensures that all priority areas have adequate funding in the short term or are at least given clear priority in cases where funding is very limited	3
Element 2: A single integrated budgetary framework ensures transparency	3
Element 3: The financial framework is reviewed regularly by the governing bodies	4
Element 4: Funding windows or other incentives in place to encourage donors to provide more flexible/un-earmarked funding at global and country levels	3
Element 5: Policies/measures are in place to ensure that earmarked funds are targeted at priority areas	3
Element 6: [UN] Funding modalities with UN reform: 15% of total resources are from pooled funding	NA
<b>MI 1.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
<p><b>Element 1</b></p> <p>With the exception of 201 international staff posts funded by the UNGA through the UN regular budget, UNRWA operations are supported through voluntary contributions. The Agency receives funding through: (i) a programme budget fund that supports core operations (including recurrent staff and non-staff costs), including education, health, camp improvement, relief and social services (RSS), protection and support systems and structures; (ii) Emergency Appeals for humanitarian interventions; and (iii) specific, time-bound projects that improve services without increasing recurrent costs.</p> <p>UNRWA has three types of budgets: the Programme Budget, Emergency Appeals, and Projects. The <b>Programme Budget</b> is primarily funded by UN Member States and other donors, voluntarily, on an annual basis. It supports the Agency's core activities (including recurrent staff and non-staff costs), such as its education, health, camp improvement, relief and social services programmes, as well as the support services that enable UNRWA to operate. The majority of the Programme Budget, 93 per cent, is funded by voluntary, unearmarked contributions; 6 per cent of the budget comes from assessed contributions from the UN System, which covers the costs of the Agency's international staff posts; and the remaining one per cent comes from other sources. In excess of 80 per cent of the Programme Budget is spent on salaries, chiefly for education (e.g., teachers, school principals, instructors), health (e.g., doctors, nurses, midwives, pharmacists) and relief and social services (e.g., social workers, relief workers, registration staff), in addition to other programme and support functions.</p> <p><b>Projects and Emergency Appeals</b> constitute the Agency's non-core funding portals. Projects fund specific, time bound activities, such as construction works (post-conflict and linked to population growth), as well as reform activities and technical assistance. Projects are resourced by 100 per cent voluntary earmarked contributions for specific, time-bound activities, with a view to improve services without increasing recurrent costs. Emergency Appeals raise earmarked and unearmarked funds in full, from voluntary contributions in response to humanitarian crises created by external factors, where assistance is expected to be provided for as long as the external conditions prevail. UNRWA emergency interventions include emergency education (e.g., remedial education), emergency health (e.g. mobile health clinics), and additional food and cash assistance.</p> <p>Each year, as part of the planning and budgeting planning process, UNRWA develops a Budget Guide (instructions) for developing the proposed annual budget, setting out key principles, assumptions, and parameters. Budgeting instructions are linked to programme-specific technical norms and standards which define procedures for determining staffing levels and composition for the different services that UNRWA offers. Over the years under review, these instructions have become more detailed and elaborate. Annual budgets are driven by an extensive planning process, informed by a comprehensive assessment of forecasted income and expenditure over the previous two years.</p> <p>The 2022 budget was developed with the aim to achieve (i) Recommended PB envelope per Field / HQ Department in accordance with approved 2022 aspirational standards and norms, where applicable; (ii) Recommended Emergency Appeal (EA) and Humanitarian Operations Plan (HOP) Budgets per Field; and (iii) a Priority Projects List which, in view of financial constraints, should contribute directly to the MTS strategic outcomes.</p> <p>Despite joint budgeting methods (combining all three budgets and funding sources) and the systematic and well-orchestrated planning and budgeting processes that are also closely coordinated with AdCom and SubCom members, the Agency remains in a chronic state of funding shortfalls and funding unpredictability. This was acknowledged by 51 per cent of the MOPAN survey respondents; by contrast, 23 per cent (strongly) agreed that</p>	7 -13, 15-18, 56, 173, 174, 188, 190, 201-206, 223, 423-430

UNRWA is able to raise the funds that it needs to deliver on its strategy, while 25 per cent somewhat agreed.

Chronic underfunding has a significant detrimental effect on the Agency's operations. As noted by the 2021 evaluation of the Medium Term Strategy, underfunding has forced UNRWA to cut expenditure through several measures, including increasing vacancy rates, reducing the number of frontline staff providing services, and cutting programme budget investment in information technology and maintenance of vehicles and premises. The evaluation also indicated that while these measures are often portrayed as 'efficiency gains', their effect is to make the Agency more inefficient, "particularly when senior managers have to spend considerable time and effort mobilising the last few per cent of annual funding requirements instead of managing the expenditure of around \$1 billion per year in an effective manner". To mitigate this issue, UNRWA has sought flexibility from donors to move funding between portals to address pressing cashflow needs, using EA resources to cover gaps in PB funding.

Table 4 shows expenditure by department during the period 2018-2022 and illustrates that most expenditures (84 per cent) went to the programme areas of education, health, and relief and social services.

**Table 4: Actual expenditure by Programme (all funding streams, US\$ million)**

Actual Expenditure by Programme (All funding streams – US\$ m)					
	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Education	517,6	515,5	516,3	549,7	557,5
Health	158,6	157,3	151,9	164	173,8
Relief and Social Services	300,7	267	251,8	290,6	360,9
Infrastructure	79,4	94,1	73,7	63,8	74,9
Executive Direction	50,3	41,3	42,4	47,7	49,7
Protection	7	5,3	5,2	4,9	5,1
Support	68	80,3	76,8	77,3	81,2
Microfinance	8,5	9,1	9,9	8,5	8
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1190,2</b>	<b>1169,9</b>	<b>1128,1</b>	<b>1206,7</b>	<b>1311,4</b>

Source: UNRWA Annual Operational Reports 2018-2022

Of all five fields, financially speaking, the Gaza Strip is by far the largest. Total expenditures have increased significantly since 2020, increasing by 24 per cent, reflecting both the increase of the refugee population as well as the continuously deteriorating situation on the ground. In 2021, the average expenses per registered refugee was \$349 in Lebanon, \$344 in the Gaza Strip, \$241 in Syria, \$181 in the West Bank and \$80 in Jordan (source: UNBOA 2021); in 2018, the amounts were \$373 in Lebanon, \$344 in the Gaza Strip, \$287 in Syria, \$185 in the West Bank, and \$75 in Jordan. These amounts fluctuate slightly over the years, as table 4 illustrates.

**Table 5: Actual expenditures by Location 2018-2022 (US\$ million)**

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
West Bank	156,8	145,6	150,7	160	161,1
Syria	160,7	137,7	131,1	138,6	162,7
The Gaza Strip	489,3	488,2	457,8	521	568,1
Lebanon	177,3	192,1	170,7	168,5	192,1
Jordan	168,3	171,1	181,7	186,6	185,4
Headquarters	37,8	35,2	36,1	32	41,9
<b>Total</b>	<b>1190,2</b>	<b>1169,9</b>	<b>1128,1</b>	<b>1206,7</b>	<b>1311,4</b>

Source: UNRWA Annual Operational Reports 2018-2022




**Table 6: Average expenses per registered refugee by Field (US\$ million)**

Field	2018	2019	2020	2021
West Bank	185	168	173	181
Syria	287	239	300	241
The Gaza Strip	344	332	310	344
Lebanon	373	403	379	349
Jordan	75	75	57	80

Source: UNBOA 2018-2021

According to the 2021 UN Board of Auditors report, the Agency spent a total of \$1,206.7 million in 2021. Staff costs of \$741.9 million represented 61 per cent of total expenses. For the Regular Budget, the share of staff costs is in excess of 80 per cent.

**Figure 1: Categories of expenditures, 2021**

Source: UNBOA 2021

## Element 2

UNRWA has a single integrated budget framework, incorporating all three budget portals. UNRWA operates in a highly resource-constrained environment, and demand for the Agency's services has consistently outstripped the availability of funding for at least the last decade. During the period 2018-2022, UNRWA's revenues amounted to \$5.7bn, while expenditures exceeded \$6bn. In 2019, 2021 and 2022, the funding received was not sufficient to cover the cost of UNRWA's operations. In 2021, the Agency closed the year with \$62 million in unpaid liabilities, which were carried over to 2022. Liabilities carried forward from 2022 to 2023 amounted to US\$ 75 million, including a CERF loan of US\$ 30 million. In 2018, the Agency succeeded in mobilising additional resources to offset the immediate effect of the United States Government's decision to withdraw funding. As the table illustrates, this surplus was temporary, and both income and expenditure declined rapidly between 2019 and 2021.

**Table 7: Income vs. expenditure across all funding streams 2018-2022 (US\$ million)\***

	Revenue-2018	Expenses-2018	Revenue-2019	Expenses-2019	Revenue-2020	Expenses-2020	Revenue-2021	Expenses-2021	Revenue-2022	Expenses-2022
<b>Programme Budget</b>	864.3	764.0	621.0	765.0	591.0	774.6	725.6	816.9	765.6	832.8
<b>Restricted Funds</b>	23.0	22.5	23.6	22.3	24.1	22.6	24.4	24.3	28.9	30.5
<b>Microfinance</b>	12.8	8.5	12.9	10.4	7.5	9.9	7.8	8.5	9.9	7.9
<b>Emergency Appeals</b>	266.2	276.9	213.9	264.7	284.8	261.7	433.4	324.6	209.4	386.6
<b>Projects</b>	164.9	154.0	162.4	144.1	101.7	85.8	130.4	69.7	106.4	82.7
<b>Inter-Fund elimination</b>	-36.1	-35.5	-33.0	-33.3	-26.6	027.0	-37.9	-37.3	-45.2	-43.8
<b>Total</b>	1295.24	1190.22	1000.8	1173.1	982.52	1127.62	1283.7	1206.7	1175.3	1296.7

Source: UNBOA, UNRWA

\*Note 1: figures for 2022 are unaudited.

### Element 3

UNRWA is confronted with an increased demand for services resulting from a growth in the number of registered Palestine refugees and other eligible for UNRWA's assistance, the extent of their vulnerability and their deepening poverty. UNRWA is funded almost entirely by voluntary contributions and financial support has been outpaced by the growth in needs. As a result, the UNRWA programme budget, which supports the delivery of core essential services, operates with a large shortfall.

The impact of differences between budget and realised funding which is well-documented in annual reports and most recently also in the Strategic Plan is shared publicly. The Agency endeavours to secure long-term, predictable and unearmarked funding through longer term planning and engagement with traditional and emerging donors. However, because of the severe and chronic financial crisis UNRWA is experiencing, the financial framework is reviewed closely and regularly by the organisation's governing body (United Nations General Assembly 4th Committee) and the Advisory Committee (AdCom). The Agency's financial situation has been a recurrent priority agenda item on all AdCom and SubCom meetings, and other dialogues with UN member states (ref. UNRWA <https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are/advisory-commission/adcom-news>), whereas Donors and host nations repeatedly call for updates.

Because of the unsustainable financial situation and the constant cash flow uncertainties, according to interviews, UNRWA's Executives, Field Directors, Director of Finance, External Relations and Communications Department and Department Heads are forced to spend an excessive amount of time and effort on fundraising and financial crisis management, at the expense of strategic and operational management tasks.

### Element 4

UNRWA relies almost entirely on voluntary contributions. Over the years, it has consistently called upon donors to provide more flexible/un-earmarked funding for its operations listed in the Programme Budget, as well as for its (irregular) Emergency Appeals. Project Funding involves earmarked funding for bespoke, time-bound activities.

**Table 8: Top 20 Donor pledges towards UNRWA Programmes 2018-2022 (in USD)**

Rank	Donor	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Total
1	Germany	177439447	169924991	210384339	176979810	202054285	936782872
2	USA	60429282	0	0	338400000	343937718	742767000

3	EU	178989326	131742673	157059235	117653367	114199150	699643751
4	Sweden	64999762	64544971	60420012	54240009	60969987	305174741
5	UK	92754569	76259850	64129434	40104619	21158281	294406753
6	Saudi Arabia	159956771	49536960	28933333	0	27000000	265427064
7	Japan	44999224	43438361	33080021	50510511	30152202	202180319
8	Norway	36278753	29539249	27877600	29988568	34180677	157864847
9	France	15261693	45924606	22986067	27958309	28909838	141040513
10	Qatar	51499779	41720520	8000000	17000000	10500000	128720299
11	Canada	26746123	18618549	24083407	27614551	23713560	120776190
12	Netherlands	22677756	21710232	22130814	27007706	21189038	114715546
13	UAE	53800000	51800000	1000000	0	0	106600000
14	Turkey	18774000	11099308	20561025	20471544	25199080	96104957
15	Spain	19055991	9216072	14358262	17720114	13797995	74148434
16	Italy	17090974	15238757	17714100	15804547	18033970	83882348
17	Kuwait	50000000	5000000	0	11500000	12000000	78500000
18	Denmark	14475903	10822103	15717155	21139515	15885563	78040239
19	Belgium	15498794	13503431	13203288	13901370	12558653	68665536
20	Australia	16017103	13853706	8393204	7551819	13797995	59613827

Source: UNRWA

Following its most severe financial crisis in 2018, UNRWA developed a new 2019-2021 resource mobilisation strategy (RMS). The RMS aims at (1) expanding and deepening relations with UN Member States; (2) diversifying the donor base through new funding streams – notably the establishment of a “Waqf” by the Islamic development Bank and the World Bank Multi Donor Trust fund; (3) mobilising strategic advocates; and (4) strategic communication and donor visibility.

The Evaluation of the Medium-Term Strategy found that “UNRWA’s traditional donors are sympathetic to the Secretary-General’s 2017 call to make multiyear commitments and have sought to make contributions early in the year”. Whilst progress has been made, many donors remain constrained by their national budget and political systems. Furthermore, the evaluation noted that UNRWA was making progress in reaching out to non-traditional donors and exploring alternative fundraising methods, but that these would not be sufficient to meet UNRWA’s needs.

Whilst still below target, since 2015, UNRWA has benefited from a gradual increase in the volume of multiyear funding contributions and of unearmarked funding, in line with Grand Bargain commitments. In 2020, 48 per cent of funding from government donors was given under multiyear funding arrangements. In 2022, the number of active MYAs was 30, with 24 countries. These agreements covered core and emergency activities and constituted US\$ 430.2 million of all funding raised in 2022. UNRWA also made significant headway with regard to flexible funding by encouraging two major donors to provide funding towards a “single budget” model, meaning that funds could be used flexibly across the Agency’s three funding portals (programme budget and EAs) in a given year, thereby smoothing cashflow bottlenecks and enabling better financial management and programme/needs prioritization (source: 315. AOR 2022).

Non-earmarked funding for the programme budget and EAs increased by 2.5 per cent, with US\$ 737.6 million committed over the course of 2022 compared to US\$ 719.3 million the previous year, and 54.1 percent increase compared with 2020 when US\$ 478.5 million was raised. This development marked a major step forward in ensuring quality funding for the Agency and enabled better financial management and programme prioritization.

Most donors consider that UNRWA's reporting is strong and meets their needs – particularly the AOR. They expressed satisfaction with the quality and timeliness of reporting. In 2022, the number of donors subscribing to the AOR to reduce contribution-specific reporting requirements under the programme budget and EAs increased significantly (from 17 to 27) and surpassed the target (19). This positive development is largely attributable to a number of emerging donors subscribing to the AOR.

Thus, in terms of securing unearmarked funding as opposed to earmarked funding, the trend is relatively positive. While still early days, the recent restructuring and strengthening of UNRWA's External Relations and Communications Department seems to be having a positive effect in this area.

#### Element 5

UNRWA has several measures in place to ensure that earmarked funds are targeted at priority areas. The first is the emergency appeals funding mechanism. Emergency appeals are based on analyses of contextual needs deriving from specific emergencies or protracted crises, and direct resources (of which some are earmarked) accordingly. They are also used to support several interventions (i.e. cash and food assistance, winterisation support) that are targeted using data from vulnerability assessments. EAs are also aligned with Humanitarian Response Plans for both the Syria Regional Crisis and the occupied Palestinian territories.

Another measure is the project priority list: projects proposed for a specific calendar year that are meant to contribute directly to the MTS strategic outcomes. In 2022, the suggested criteria guiding the development of the 2022 priority project list were:

- Projects dedicated to meeting additional needs linked to COVID-19, including new interventions and/or adjustments to existing services, where these requirements are not included in EAs.
- Projects earmarked to a specific activity aimed at reducing the burden on the PB, for example in relation to replacement of rented facilities.
- Construction projects, particularly those: (a) resulting from conflicts that have led to ongoing displacement (e.g., Nahr el-Bared Camp reconstruction in Lebanon, Gaza reconstruction and shelter rehabilitation in Syria); and (b) relating to UNRWA's efforts in support of strengthened environmental sustainability.
- Projects designed to meet 2022 MTS targets and improve management and operational effectiveness, in areas where progress is lagging, including those areas encompassed under the Agency's Management Initiative, including initiatives dedicated to enhanced UNRWA accountability, transparency, governance and management.
- Projects aimed at: (a) completing programmatic reforms (e.g., e-Health); (b) supporting digitization efforts; and (c) strengthening programmes (e.g., diabetes / hypertension interventions, psychosocial integration, environmental health, strengthening UNRWA's work on gender, Protection Against of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and disability), where activities directly contribute to core programmes; and/or
- Projects covering the "one-time capital investment" needs (reflected in the 2023-2028 Strategic Plan)

#### MI 1.4 Evidence confidence

High

#### KPI 2: Structures and mechanisms in place and applied to support the implementation of global frameworks for crosscutting issues at all levels, in line with the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda principles

KPI score

Unsatisfactory

2.29

**UNRWA has dedicated policies and strategies relating to gender equality, environmental sustainability, protection, and persons with disabilities.** These seek to ensure that cross cutting priorities are mainstreamed through UNRWA's programme delivery and addressed through direct interventions in some instances. UNRWA's gender policy has been in place since 2007, and is operationalised through successive Gender Equality Strategies, the most recent of which corresponds to the 2016-2022 strategic period. The Agency's Environmental Sustainability Policy and its Environmental and Social Management framework are new, having been finalised in 2022, and as such have not yet been implemented. Human rights are addressed principally through UNRWA's protection mainstreaming programming and advocacy, which seeks to ensure that programme delivery upholds the economic, social, civil, and political rights of Palestine refugees. The Agency's protection policy dates to 2012, and a further Protection Strategic Framework was developed, which was shared with member states. UNRWA's 2010 policy on persons with disabilities was updated in 2021 and is complemented by detailed set of disability

inclusion guidelines.

**There is variable integration of indicators and targets relating to cross cutting issues in the Common Monitoring Matrix (CMM) that accompanies UNRWA's 2016-2022 MTS.** Although several indicators in the CMM are disaggregated by sex, it includes no higher-level result relating to gender equality and women's empowerment. That said, the 2023-2028 Strategic Plan, which was under development while the MOPAN assessment was taking place, does include high level results on gender equality and women's empowerment. Indicators relating to environmental sustainability and climate change are entirely absent from the CMM - but have now been incorporated into the 2023-2028 Strategic Plan. The CMM contains several indicators relating to UNRWA's protection programming, but the Agency was not able to consistently report against all of these during the assessment period. There is one disability-specific indicator in the CMM, against which UNRWA reported consistently throughout the assessment period. Emergency Appeals have also begun to disaggregate indicators by disability and sex where appropriate and contain indicators to track protection-specific interventions where relevant.

**Existing accountability and reporting mechanisms for cross cutting issues have been inconsistently implemented, and therefore do not permit a systematic appraisal of the extent to which UNRWA's commitments in this regard have been realised.** The 2016-2022 Gender Equality Strategy itself includes a monitoring framework with indicators to track its implementation. Subsequent annual implementation reports, however, do not provide updates to these indicators, and instead provide narrative descriptions and examples of actions undertaken (and not undertaken) to implement the strategy. Among other initiatives, the Gender Equality Strategy established a 'gender marker' to regularly monitor the proportion of programme budget resources contribute to gender equality commitments. During the assessment period, however, this marker was only applied once, in 2018. A planned evaluation of UNRWA's Gender Equality Strategy had not been completed at the time of writing. UNRWA aims to regularly assess the degree to which its programme delivery aligns with protection standards through biennial 'Protection Alignment Reviews' (formerly known as 'Protection Audits'), which cover all programmatic areas across all fields of operation. A recent evaluation concluded that these reviews were highly valuable. During the assessment period, protection alignment reviews were carried out in 2018 and 2022. Results of the 2022 Protection Alignment Review have not yet been made available. UNRWA's disability policy does not include a monitoring framework to track implementation.

**Available human and financial resources are generally considered to be insufficient to fully address cross cutting issues.** The 2021 UN SWAP report, for instance, indicates that there is no budget assigned to gender equality, and successive implementation reports for the Gender Equality Strategy have highlighted limited human resource capacity across fields of operation to implement gender specific action plans. Although protection is identified by the 2016-2022 MTS as a key strategic priority, UNRWA's protection division and protection activities receive very little funding from the Agency's programme budget and are instead mostly reliant on project funding. Although field office-based protection teams are now well staffed, the sustainability of this arrangement is uncertain. With respect to disability inclusion, the 2022 UNDIS report highlighted challenges relating to financial resources for disability mainstreaming and programming.

**Resources for staff capacity development on cross cutting issues are limited.** UNRWA makes heavy use of mandatory e-learning modules for improving staff awareness of gender equality policies and commitments. Uptake of these courses has improved, but their effectiveness is uncertain. These e-course have, however, been complemented by other in-person training initiatives in gender equality across fields of operation. The number of staff in receipt of protection trainings increased year on year during the assessment period, across most field offices. Some of this training has been funded through Emergency Appeals contributions. There is also evidence that trainings in disability inclusion have been conducted, and the 2022 UNDIS report indicates that UNRWA is approaching requirements in this regard.

**MI 2.1: Corporate/sectoral and country strategies respond to and/or reflect the intended results of normative frameworks for gender equality and women's empowerment**

Score

**Overall MI rating**

Unsatisfactory

**Overall MI score**

2.50

Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on gender equality available and showing evidence of application

3

Element 2: Gender equality indicators and targets fully integrated into the MO's strategic plan and corporate objectives

3

Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect gender equality

2

indicators and targets	
Element 4: Gender equality screening checklists or similar tools inform the design for all new interventions	2
Element 5: Human and financial resources are available to address gender equality issues	2
Element 6: Staff capacity development on gender is being or has been conducted	3
<b>MI 2.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
<p><b>Element 1:</b> UNRWA has a Gender Policy that was adopted in 2007 and which is operationalised through successive strategic documents, the most recent of which is the 2016-2022 Gender Equality Strategy. The 2016-2022 Gender Equality Strategy focuses on the delivery of four “drivers of change”:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthening the Agency’s gender architecture to ensure that structures and coordinating mechanisms provide appropriate technical inputs to programming and facilitate gender mainstreaming.</li> <li>2. The establishment of a ‘Gender Marker’ to monitor the allocation of financial resources for Gender mainstreaming.</li> <li>3. Ensuring the commitment of leadership to bring about changes to the Agency’s organisational culture and operations.</li> <li>4. The development of framework for monitoring gender mainstreaming at different levels for improved accountability.</li> </ol> <p>The 2016-2022 Gender Equality Strategy also sets out in detail how the Agency plans to mainstream gender considerations into its programming. This includes detail relating to actions that will be undertaken promote the specific rights of women, men, boys and girls through protection programming, as well as mainstreaming priorities for health, education, and livelihoods programming. Preventing and addressing gender-based violence</p> <p>Is a recurrent theme across each of these areas. The priorities for mainstreaming in the education programme area include addressing the risk of child marriage for girls.</p> <p>In addition to the Agency-wide Gender Equality Strategy, UNRWA’s department of Human Resources has an HR Action Plan for Gender Parity that was adopted in December 2017, and which aims to support the Agency in achieving gender among staff at all levels. The Action plan adopts a two-pronged approach, comprising:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A series of measures regarding recruitment procedures that are being utilised to ensure that more female candidates are considered for and appointed to senior positions; and</li> <li>2. The creation of an enabling environment and organisational culture that are more conducive to the career advancement of female staff.</li> </ol> <p>UNRWA has reported annually on the implementation of the 2016-2022 Gender Equality Strategy through dedicated implementation reports. These detail actions undertaken in support of the four drivers of change identified in the 2016-2022 Gender Equality Strategy. These implementation reports provide evidence of gender mainstreaming actions across various programmatic areas, but also consistently highlight limited capacity within the Agency for supporting the implementation of field-specific Gender Action Plans. Analysis of implementation reports reviewed by the Assessment team indicates that the Gender Marker, which was established to track and monitor resources for gender mainstreaming, was applied to the Agency’s Programme Budget only once during the assessment period (between 2018 and 2022). UNRWA notes, however, that a Gender Marker is now applied by the Project Review Committee to ensure that project’s meet minimum mainstreaming requirements. Implementation reports include dedicated sections detailing the Agency’s actions on gender mainstreaming. These updates include sub-sections detailing actions to address gender-based violence, include men in pre-conception care and family planning, promote women’s economic empowerment and leadership, address school dropout, and raise awareness of women’s rights.</p> <p>With respect to leadership, UNRWA reported under its 2021 UNSWAP assessment that the Agency meets requirements and indicates that the Agency’s senior management internally and externally champions gender equality women’s empowerment. However, there are indications of room for improvement with respect to the Agency’s organisational culture vis-à-vis gender equality and women’s empowerment. The 2021 evaluation of UNRWA’s MTS, for instance, found that while the Agency had generally performed well against UN indicators on gender equality, there had been a strong backlash among male staff to measures aimed at ensuring gender parity</p>	<p>10-12, 17, 16, 20-22, 27-30, 52, 108-110, 134, 355, 356, 358, 359, 361, 362, 417</p>

within the Agency. The 2021 UN SWAP report found that UNRWA is approaching requirements with respect to developing an organisational culture that is conducive to gender equality.

Regarding the HR Action Plan for Gender Parity, figures for 2022 indicate that 47 per cent of international staff and 55 per cent of area staff are female. However, as of the end of 2021, female representation in senior leadership positions was 33 per cent.

#### **Element 2:**

As noted by the 2021 UNSWAP report, UNRWA has embedded gender equality across all dimensions of the 2016-2022 MTS strategic outcomes, as well as in management and operational objectives, where appropriate, indicators and targets in the Agency's CMM are disaggregated by sex, which aims to ensure that the needs and interests of women and men, girls and boys, receive specific attention at different stages of the management cycle. Annual Operational Plans also consistently include priorities relating to gender mainstreaming and addressing GBV. Field offices have also developed gender action plans that focus on developing staff capacity on gender mainstreaming and GBV, supporting gender parity among senior UNRWA managers, and gender sensitive programming. However, annual implementation reports of the Agency's Gender Equality Strategy have highlighted insufficient capacity to support field offices in implementing these plans.

The 2021 UNSWAP report also indicates that while gender considerations are mainstreamed across the different strategic objectives of the strategy, gender considerations are not reflected in the high-level anticipated results of the strategy. The 2021 evaluation of the Agency's MTS also highlighted the absence of a high-level result on Gender Equality. It is understood that the draft monitoring matrix for the Agency's Strategic Plan 2023-2028 includes a high-level indicator for gender equality, which focuses on the percentage of UN-SWAP indicators assessed as meeting or exceeding requirements, and metrics of gender parity within the organisation.

#### **Element 3:**

The monitoring and evaluation of the Agency's gender mainstreaming activities is one of the four "Drivers of Change" identified in the 2016-2021 Gender Equality Strategy, which also sets out an accountability framework for the Agency's gender commitments. The Gender Equality Strategy itself includes a monitoring matrix, with several indicators for tracking progress against the four drivers of change, organisational gender mainstreaming, and programmatic gender mainstreaming. This includes indicators to track the implementation of gender related recommendations from protection audits, staff perceptions relating to the Agency's gender mainstreaming, etc. The matrix clearly indicates that annual implementation reports for the Gender Equality Strategy will provide updates on most of the indicators at specified intervals. However, none of the Gender Equality Strategy Annual Implementation Reports reviewed provide any updates to the monitoring matrix included within the Gender Equality Strategy. They instead provide narrative updates relating to the drivers of change identified in the Gender Equality Strategy, as well examples of gender mainstreaming. UN SWAP reports do provide updates on three of the nine indicators included in the matrix (relating to the gender architecture, leadership, and financial tracking), but the remaining six indicators do not appear to be tracked through any reporting mechanism. This key accountability mechanism for monitoring the Agency's commitments to gender equality cannot be considered to be fully implemented.

UNRWA does maintain other accountability systems and initiatives to track the agencies commitments to gender mainstreaming. These include:

- a) A gender marker, identified as another "Driver of Change" in the 2016-2021 Gender Equality Strategy, which monitors the proportion of financial resources that contribute to gender mainstreaming. Analysis of implementation reports reviewed by the Assessment team noted that this has only been applied once during the assessment period. It is also applied to projects through the Project Review Committee.
- b) The Common Monitoring Matrix that accompanies the 2016-2022 includes numerous indicators and targets that are disaggregated by sex. Results frameworks for Emergency Appeals also disaggregate data by sex. As noted, however, the Common Monitoring Matrix does not include high level results relating to gender equality and women's empowerment.
- c) Efforts have been made to ensure that gender considerations are addressed by the Agency's internal audit and evaluation functions. In 2020-2021, for instance, the Internal Audit Division held consultations with UNRWA's gender focal points as part of its risk assessment and included gender mainstreaming in its 2021 workplan.



- d) The 2016 Evaluation Policy, which is currently being updated, does not mention gender, but several evaluations reviewed included a focus on gender dimensions, and in 2019, an independent longitudinal study of the Agency's GBV prevention framework was completed. The Department of Internal Oversight's 2022 workplan indicates that an evaluation of the Agency's Gender Equality Strategy 2016-2022 was underway. At the time of writing, however, this had not been completed. The 2021 SWAP assessment indicated that UNRWA meets the United Nations Evaluation Group's norms and standards in relation to gender equality, noting that gender considerations were consistently integrated into the scope and analyses of evaluations.
- e) Protection Alignment Reviews also serve as a means of monitoring gender mainstreaming. A 2021 evaluation of UNRWA's Protection Alignment Review (formerly known as Protection Audits) methodology found that these were coherent with the Gender Equality Strategy, and that they included checklists that disaggregate women to different stages and circumstances (including those that are pregnant, lactating, separated, divorced or elderly) and posed relevant questions. However, though UNRWA aims to conduct Agency-wide Protection Alignment Reviews on a bi-annual basis, during the assessment period Protection Alignment Reviews were carried out only twice, 2018 and 2022.

The above indicates the presence of a multidimensional accountability framework for monitoring UNRWA's commitments to gender equality and women's empowerment. Implementation of some aspects of this framework has been inconsistent, however. As noted, Annual Implementation Reports for the Gender Equality Strategy do not provide updates to the indicators contained within the Strategy's monitoring matrix. The Gender Marker was only applied to the programme budget once during the assessment period, and Protection Alignment Reviews have not been conducted biannually as envisaged. Though UNRWA's evaluations have included gender equality considerations within their scope and analysis, the Agency has yet to complete a planned evaluation of the 2016-2022 Gender Equality Strategy.

#### Element 4:

UNRWA's 2016-2022 Gender Equality Strategy does not include any detailed checklists or guidelines to support organisational or programmatic mainstreaming of gender equality and women's empowerment considerations. Reviewed programmatic norms and technical instructions, which shape UNRWA's service delivery, also do not include checklists or guidelines relating to gender equality considerations. UNRWA does however have some other checklists in place that aim to support the integration of gender equality considerations into projects and programming. These include:

- i) The recently (2022) revised Project Procedures Manual, which contains mandatory checklists that cover gender equality and inclusion dimensions for all new/proposed projects. As noted, the Project Review Committee is required to ensure that proposed project meet minimum requirements with respect to gender equality and mainstreaming. These requirements apply only to projects funded by earmarked/restricted funds which constitute a small proportion of UNRWA's overall budget (5 per cent in 2022).
- ii) All programmes are required to adhere to minimum protection standards. Gender considerations are mainstreamed across the Agency's four protection standards and are addressed explicitly under the "participation and empowerment" protection standard, which among other objectives aims to ensure the application of cross-cutting policies and guidelines, including on gender. A Protection Mainstreaming Tool is available, but this does not provide any detailed guidance on ensuring the integration of the degree of alignment to Agency-wide standards is assessed through periodic Protection Alignment Reviews (formerly protection audits). As noted above, the methodology for these reviews involves the use of checklists that align with the Agency's Gender Equality Strategy. The most recently conducted Protection Alignment Reviews (2018) highlighted generally low levels of alignment against all protection standards across all field offices, with the exception of the Gaza Strip (43 per cent overall alignment in Lebanon, 48 per cent in Jordan, 53 per cent in the West Bank, Including East Jerusalem, 68 per cent in the Gaza Strip, and 48 per cent in Syria).
- iii) The recently updated (2021) procurement manual includes detailed instructions on gender-responsive procurement, which aims to ensure that women-owned enterprises are provided with opportunities for effective participation in procurement processes. However, interviews with staff indicated that gender-responsive procurement, as prescribed by the manual, is not implemented. This was attributed to a lack of capacity and contextually appropriate guidance. The Central Support Services division has plans to integrate gender criteria into its tenders, and to develop means of reporting on this issue.



- iv) UNRWA's mandatory e-course on Gender Equality includes a module on gender mainstreaming, gender analysis, and practical strategies for integrating gender perspectives into UNRWA service delivery. The latest available figures indicate that 73 per cent of UNRWA's staff have completed this course.

#### Element 5:

The evidence reviewed points to consistent shortcomings in the availability and allocation of the financial and human resources needed to implement UNRWA's commitments to gender equality and women's empowerment. This shortcoming is highlighted consistently by annual implementation reports for the 2016-2021 Gender Equality Strategy and was also emphasised by several interviewees. As noted, UNRWA has a gender marker to track what proportion of the programme budget contributes to gender mainstreaming. In 2018, this figure was 58 per cent, but this has not since been updated, and is cited as the latest available data in the most recently available Gender Equality Strategy Annual Implementation Report. The 2021 UN SWAP report highlights that there is no budget allocated to gender equality, and there is no system for benchmarking. The 2021 Gender Equality Strategy Annual report highlights that financial constraints and limited capacity continued to limit the capacity for gender mainstreaming in UNRWA services delivery in times of heightened needs.

In terms of human resources, the main coordination mechanism for gender mainstreaming is the Gender Task Force, comprising 70 Gender Focal Points from various field offices and programmes. The 2021 Annual Implementation report for the 2016-2021 Gender Equality Strategy indicates that this mechanism was affected by staff losses and COVID-19, and that meetings were infrequent. The same 2021 report also points to limited capacity across fields of operation for implementing field-specific gender action plans; "both the Gaza Strip and Jordan Field Offices lost their dedicated gender officer because of lack of resources, leaving the Agency with no gender expert in all the fields of operation" (p.9). The implementation report also noted that the lack of technical expertise for an agency the size of UNRWA continued to be the major challenge in the area of gender mainstreaming. The 2019 endline report for a longitudinal study of UNRWA's GBV prevention framework found that staff perceived there to be insufficient human and financial resources and leadership support dedicated to the issue.

#### Element 6:

UNRWA regularly conducts capacity development activities on gender equality and related areas across all fields of operation, albeit in a context of resource scarcity. UNRWA's approach to capacity development on gender equality includes a mandatory gender awareness e-learning course for all staff, which focuses on:

- i) What gender means and ways of promoting gender equality.
- ii) Gender mainstreaming, gender analysis, and practical strategies for integrating gender perspectives into UNRWA service delivery.
- iii) International standards on women's rights and gender equality.

The latest available figures indicate that as of the end of 2022, 73 per cent of staff had completed this course.

There is also evidence of capacity development initiatives in gender equality and related areas across different fields of operation, where materials and training programmes have been developed in response to contextual needs. The 2021 Gender Equality Strategy 2016-2021 implementation report lists several of these. For example, in the Gaza Strip, 15 face to face and virtual training courses on women's rights and GBV were provided to 390 teachers in partnership with the Palestinian Centre for Human rights. In Lebanon, the Education Programme conducted GBV training for school counsellors and clerical assistance, and both the Youth Unit and the RSS department carried out trainings on various topics related to GBV. In the West Bank, the RSS programme "Promoting Gender Equity within UNRWA schools: Alternative Masculinities" has continued to build staff capacity on the promotion of gender equality through training sessions that have targeted 1,502 staff members. The 2019 endline study on the Agency's GBV prevention framework highlighted that targeted staff found UNRWA's GBV training package and e-learning course to be very helpful, though they also felt there was need for additional recognition of the added workload that training entailed. At the same time, resource constraints have posed challenges. In 2021, the Agency was unable to conduct capacity assessments of relevant staff in gender equality. As noted above, capacity constraints in this area continue to pose one of the principal challenges to effective gender mainstreaming.

#### MI 2.1 Evidence confidence

High

MI 2.2: Corporate/sectoral and country strategies respond to and/or reflect the intended results of normative frameworks for environmental sustainability and climate change	Score
Overall MI rating	Unsatisfactory
Overall MI score	1.83
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on environmental sustainability and climate change available and showing evidence of application	2
Element 2: Environmental sustainability and climate change indicators and targets fully integrated into the MO's strategic plan and corporate objectives	2
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect environmental sustainability and climate change indicators and targets	1
Element 4: Environmental screening checklists or similar tools inform design for all new interventions	2
Element 5: Human and financial resources are available to address environmental sustainability and climate change issues	2
Element 6: Staff capacity development on environmental sustainability and climate change is being or has been conducted	2
MI 2.2 Analysis	Evidence documents
<p><b>Element 1:</b></p> <p>In 2022, UNRWA finalised its first Environmental Sustainability Policy and Environmental and Social Management Framework. The stated purpose of the policy is to articulate UNRWA's commitment to environmental sustainability while providing the framework and overarching principles to guide the mainstreaming of environmental sustainability considerations into UNRWA interventions. It aims to ensure that all UNRWA interventions contribute to protecting the environment and that, at a minimum, do not have a negative impact on climate change. The policy requires environmental sustainability implementation plans to be developed for each organisational unit, and articulates seven principles to guide mainstreaming:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) Sound environmental stewardship</li> <li>ii) Efficient use of resources</li> <li>iii) Stakeholder participation</li> <li>iv) Catalytic approach</li> <li>v) Environmental sustainability in UNRWA programming</li> <li>vi) Innovation</li> <li>vii) Modelling best practice</li> </ul> <p>The policy is aligned with the UN's system-wide strategic direction, requirements and best practices as provided by UNEP and the United Nations Environment Management Group. It is also aligned with the Environmental Policy for the UN Secretariat and the Secretary General's action plan for integrating sustainable development practices into Secretariat-wide operations and facilities management.</p> <p>UNRWA's recent (2022) Environmental and Social Management Framework relates specifically to activities carried out under the Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme (ICIP). It provides a framework for assessing, managing and monitoring environmental and social impacts resulting from ICIP activities.</p> <p>Both policies were developed in 2022, and were, as such, not implemented during the assessment period. Though UNRWA's 2022 Annual Operational Plan identifies the finalisation and roll out of the Environmental Sustainability Policy -as a key organisational priority, the 2022 Annual Operational Report indicates that implementation plans to operationalise the policy will be developed in 2023. Interviewees indicated, however, that prior to the development of the Environmental and Social Management Framework, the ICIP department did conduct environmental impact assessments for all infrastructure projects.</p> <p><b>Element 2:</b></p> <p>During the assessment period, there were no indicators, targets, or results relating to environmental sustainability and climate change in the UNRWA's medium term strategy and accompanying results framework.</p> <p>The new Environmental Sustainability Policy indicates that progress will be monitored through indicators housed within the Agency's RBM system, and reported through Annual Operational reports, as well as UN system-wide reporting mechanisms relating to environmental sustainability. The policy also commits to an evaluation of its implementation by the Department of Internal Oversight Services within five years of its entry into force. The new Strategic Plan 2023-28 includes a high-level result on environmental sustainability in its Common</p>	20-22, 27-30, 52, 57, 87, 315, 417

## Monitoring Matrix.

### Element 3:

UNRWA's Environmental Sustainability Policy and Environmental and Social Management Framework were finalised towards the very end of the assessment period (in 2022). Therefore, for the majority of the assessment period, neither policy was in force, and as such, environmental and climate change indicators and targets did not feature in accountability systems.

Both policy documents commit to the development of accountability systems, however. The Environmental and Social Management Framework, for instance, requires all ICIP projects to be informed by Environmental and Social Impact Assessments, complemented by Environmental and Social Management Monitoring Plans to:

- a) Assess compliance with mitigation and control measures, standards and limits assessed in management plans.
- b) Facilitate the measurement of progress against environmental and social targets.
- c) Track progress of pollution and resource conservation measures.
- d) Inform management, regulators, and other stakeholders of localised nuisance and disturbance aspects.

As noted, the Environmental and Social Management Framework is limited in scope to projects and programmes delivered by the ICIP department. There is no equivalent framework for projects and programmes delivered by other departments. That said, the Environmental Sustainability Policy does envision that environmental sustainability implementation plans will be elaborated for each organisational unit of UNRWA, detailing areas of improvement, actions to be undertaken, accountability lines, implementation timelines and resource requirements.

### Element 4:

UNRWA's Environmental and Social Management framework requires screening activities that determine the interventions required to safeguard the environment and address the social impact for all ICIP projects/interventions. Responsible field officers are required to screen all projects/interventions to determine the extent of the environmental and social assessment that needs to be done prior to implementation, which itself can be considered a checklist to inform the design of interventions. The screening checklist is comprehensive and aims to identify all potential environmental and social impacts of the proposed intervention, plausible alternatives, and implications for occupational health and safety. Once the screening process is concluded, it is used to inform the design of the ICIP intervention. Interviews confirmed that all ICIP projects are accompanied by environmental impact assessments.

While this certainly constitutes an environmental checklist/screening tool, its scope is limited to ICIP interventions. ICIP interventions typically include civil works, repair and rehabilitation works, and municipal infrastructure projects, with potentially greater direct environmental implications than other UNRWA programme areas.

With respect to the overarching Environmental Sustainability Policy, this envisions that environmental sustainability implementation plans will be elaborated for each organisational unit of UNRWA, detailing areas of improvement, actions to be undertaken, accountability lines, implementation timelines and resource requirements. The policy also indicates that UNRWA will progressively develop detailed tools and guidelines to enhance staff understanding in this area. During the assessment period, no environmental screening checklists or other tools were developed to ensure the integration of environmental sustainability considerations into other areas of UNRWA programming.

### Element 5:

UNRWA's Environmental Sustainability Policy was only developed towards the very end of the assessment period, and as such, implementation plans for operationalisation have yet to be developed. That the Policy itself was developed indicates that some human and financial resources were dedicated to environmental sustainability and climate change during the assessment period. However, during the assessment period, UNRWA did not allocate dedicated human and financial resources for implementing the Environmental Sustainability Policy. Interviewees indicated that the ICIP department faced capacity and resources constraints at the field level, which constituted a challenge to consistently fulfilling the technical requirements of the Environmental and Social Management Framework.

In terms of intent, the Environmental Sustainability Policy indicates that because environmental sustainability can only be achieved through collective action, “all UNRWA staff, personnel and organisational units will strive to apply guiding principles to all aspects of Agency operations and management, irrespective of location or funding source”. It also indicates that UNRWA will use all available means to enhance funding for environmental sustainability.

The Environmental and Social Management Framework is more specific about roles and responsibilities. It identifies the ICIP department at HQ level as responsible for ensuring that the framework is delivered in the fields of operation adequately and that assessments are conducted. In addition to the field-level capacity constraints noted above, interviews also indicated that the Environmental Division of the ICIP was established in September 2022, with 2 staff funded through the programme budget, and that more staff would be hired using project funding.

#### Element 6:

During the assessment period, UNRWA provided training to ICIP staff in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria on the practical application of the Environmental and Social Management Framework. The 2022 Annual Operational Report indicates that similar trainings will be conducted for ICIP staff in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 2023. This was the only training conducted by UNRWA of relevance to environmental sustainability and climate change during the assessment period.

UNRWA’s Environmental Sustainability Policy includes several statements of intent relating to staff capacity development. The policy explicitly requires UNRWA to provide the necessary skills and capacity development required for Agency staff and personnel to implement new responsibilities associated with the implementation of the policy, and also commits to the development of tools and guidelines to facilitate implementation. The 2022 Annual Operational Plan identifies staff capacity development on environmental management and health and safety as a key priority area.

#### MI 2.2 Evidence confidence

High

#### MI 2.3: Corporate/sectoral and country strategies respond to and/or reflect the intended results of normative frameworks for human rights including the protection of vulnerable people (those at risk of being “left behind”)

Score

#### Overall MI rating

Satisfactory

#### Overall MI score

2.67

Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on human rights available and showing evidence of application

3

Element 2: Human rights indicators and targets fully integrated into the MO’s strategic plan and corporate objectives

3

Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect human rights indicators and targets

3

Element 4: Human rights screening checklists or similar tools inform design for all new interventions

2

Element 5: Human and financial resources are available to address human rights issues

2

Element 6: Staff capacity development on human rights is being or has been conducted

3

#### MI 2.3 Analysis

Evidence documents

#### Element 1:

UNRWA’s overarching mission is to help Palestine refugees achieve their full potential in human development under the difficult circumstances in which they live. UNRWA works towards the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for Palestine refugees, including the right to health, education, zero hunger, gender equality, decent work and economic growth, and peace, justice and strong institutions.

10-12, 91-101, 133, 136, 173, 174, 277, 315, 417

UNRWA’s contributions to normative frameworks for human rights are covered primarily by its protection agenda, which constitutes a major cross-cutting component of the Agency’s programming. Protection is defined as “all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law”. In UNRWA’s case, the protection mandate pertains specifically to the safeguarding of the rights of Palestine refugees.

UNRWA has a dedicated protection policy, developed in 2012, which establishes the Agency's approach to safeguarding and advancing the rights of Palestine refugees. The policy indicates that UNRWA's mandate is concerned with promoting the legal rights of Palestine refugees, including economic and social rights related to UNRWA's core areas of service delivery, such as the right to education, physical and mental health, adequate standards of living, as well as civil and political rights such as the right to life, security, freedom of movement etc. In addition to the protection policy, UNRWA has an International Protection Framework, developed in 2018, which sets out the Agency's approach to monitoring, reporting, and advocating for the rights of Palestine refugees to be respected and protected in accordance with international law. Protection Alignment Reviews, as well as protection related indicators in UNRWA's CMM and Emergency Appeal results frameworks, indicate that the Agency consistently sought to implement its protection mandate during the assessment period.

Successive strategies have placed protection at the forefront of UNRWA's work. The 2016-2022 MTS identifies protection as its first strategic outcome, which states that "refugee rights under international law are protected and promoted". The MTS identifies three priority areas for advancing the protection of Palestine refugee rights:

- 1) Protection mainstreaming through UNRWA service delivery: this focuses on addressing protection challenges that arise from the Agency's own programme service delivery in education, health, RSS, microfinance, and ICIP.
- 2) Case tracking and referral of protection cases affecting at-risk groups: this focuses on identifying and addressing cases of violence, abuse, neglect, and exploitation of vulnerable groups, including women, children and persons with disabilities.
- 3) Protection programming: this involves the implementation of dedicated protection programmes to provide assistance to individuals, families, and communities experiencing specific protection concerns.

The most recently available protection alignment review results, however, do suggest that the level of programmatic alignment with the UNRWA's own minimum protection standards remains generally low across all programmes and fields of operation. A summary of these reviews indicated that in the face of funding shortfalls, protection standards were not consistently prioritised. Though several good practices were identified by the reviews, they did highlight gaps and scope for improvement in UNRWA's efforts to prioritise safety and dignity and avoid harm, ensure accountability and meaningful access, and support refugees' participation and empowerment.

Despite the prominence accorded to protection in UNRWA's MTS, documentary and interview evidence highlights a degree of uncertainty among staff about how the Agency's protection mandate relates to other programme department policies and field-level operations in practice. The 2021 review of UNRWA's Protection Strategic Framework, for instance, noted that "across UNRWA, the vision for protection appears to be less clear and this is a cause for concern both at HQ, within fields, and among beneficiaries", and that "the role and remit of the protection division and its positioning within the Agency needs to be better understood, strengthened, and made more viable". It also noted that while protection was at the forefront of UNRWA's MTS, past reviews had emphasised limitations in implementation, and that there was a "lack of focus, clarity and approach to operational implementation".

Interviews with staff at multiple levels of the organisation corroborated this sentiment. For instance, several interviewees at different levels of the organisation expressed ambivalence about the value that stand-alone protection division brings. According to this view, the existence of a separate protection division risks obscuring or detracting from the roles and responsibilities of the programme departments vis-à-vis delivery of the protection mandate. This is linked to a perception that a "protective response" should be embedded within existing programmes, and that front line staff across the Agency's, such as social workers, teachers, counsellors, and healthcare workers, are very well placed to identify and address protection issues and should be empowered to do so. The recent review of the Agency's protection strategic framework also notes that teams within Education, Health, ICIP, and RSS are closest to the populations that UNRWA serves on the frontline, and therefore regularly identify who is at a protection risk in schools, clinics, and communities. It also notes that responsibility for handling individual cases (identified in schools, clinic and community) sits with RSS. Conversely, others questioned why protection was not awarded the status of a department, and resourced accordingly, including through the Programme Budget.

#### **Element 2:**

Protection is identified as the first strategic outcome area by the 2016-2022 MTS, and the accompanying CMM

contains several indicators to track progress in delivering the protection agenda. However, during the assessment period, reporting against these indicators has been inconsistent. For instance, the recent evaluation of UNRWA's monitoring and reporting systems highlights that four protection indicators in the CMM were removed in 2018, because of a lack of field-level capacity to collect the necessary information. Three of these indicators aimed to track progress relating to the percentage of individuals identified as experiencing a protection risk that were provided with assistance. A fourth indicator sought to monitor the percentage of UNRWA facilities that operated as part of a functional referral system for protection cases. The recent evaluation of the Agency's MTS found that in addition to inconsistent reporting against these indicators, UNRWA has "no way of assessing whether the assistance provided met the needs of the individuals or their experience of the assistance" (p.22).

UNRWA's Emergency Appeals results frameworks for the occupied Palestine territories and the Syria regional crisis also contain protection-specific strategic outcomes and related indicators, which were reported against relatively consistently throughout the assessment period.

A recent evaluation of UNRWA's protection audit mechanism reveals that protection audits, which are carried out every two years, are a key data source for indicators that monitor progress against UNRWA's protection strategic outcome. This includes indicators that measure the degree of alignment of programmes with protection mainstreaming principles, and the percentage of protection mainstreaming. The indicators seek to assess the degree to which UNRWA supports safety, dignity and doing no harm, meaningful access, accountability and refugee empowerment and participation in its service delivery. The evaluation also recommended that there was scope for including more indicators from protection audits within the wider RBM system (currently, the results from protection alignment reviews inform one indicator in the Common Monitoring Matrix; "degree of alignment with UNRWA protection standards". The integration of additional indicators drawing on data from protection alignment reviews did not occur during the assessment period, given concerns relating to the reliability and consistency of reporting by some field offices.

### **Element 3:**

UNRWA aims to conduct biennial Protection Alignment Reviews (previously known Protection Audits) to systematically assess the degree to which programmatic service delivery aligns with the Agency's protection standards. These reviews serve as the principal accountability mechanism for the UNRWA's protection mandate. The three specific objectives of the reviews are:

- i) To provide a qualitative and quantitative measurement of the degree of alignment of programme service delivery with Agency protection principles across fields of operation.
- ii) To provide a qualitative and quantitative measurement of actions taken to mainstream protection in the Agency's programmes.
- iii) To identify structural and/or specific protection challenges in the Agency's service delivery programmes.

The methodology for these reviews has been revised on several occasions, most recently in 2022 following an independent evaluation of the mechanism. Upon the recommendation of the 2021 evaluation of the mechanism, UNRWA has committed to conducting meta-analyses of the results of these reviews every five years, with the first such meta-analysis scheduled for 2022. Information from the Protection Alignment Reviews also feeds into the Agency's overall RBM system. The 2021 evaluation of the audit/alignment mechanism found that the reviews "aligned firmly with global frameworks and standards on protection and represent a pioneering response to monitoring the mainstreaming of protection principles within service delivery". It also found that UNRWA was looked at as an example of an organisation attempting to systematically monitor and assess the mainstreaming of protection within its services.


That said, the 2021 Protection Strategic Framework also identified a strong need for clarifying lines of accountability in the area of protection. More specifically, it noted the need for improvement in how UNRWA assesses, prioritises, communicates, reports and demonstrates the impact of its protection activities. This included clarification on who is accountable for what and to whom. At the same time, the Framework noted that "everyone within UNRWA is responsible for preventing or mitigating protection risks...not just protection teams". This ambiguity was also reflected in the views expressed in several interviews, whom, as noted above, felt that the existence of a stand-alone protection division reduced clarity with respect to responsibilities and accountabilities for delivery of the protection mandate.

During interviews, staff at the field level were generally of the view that protection alignment reviews were a



useful mechanism for identifying areas for improvement in the Agency's efforts to protect the rights of Palestine refugees. The recent evaluation of the mechanism also found that field level managers were systematically engaged in the reviews, but that engagement from HQ level staff was more ad hoc. It also noted that the majority of recommendations emanating from reviews were only partially implemented, as illustrated by the graph below:

**Figure 2: Implementation of 2018 Recommendations by Programme**



Source: 133. UNRWA, Evaluation of the Protection Audit Mechanism, 2021

During the assessment period, UNRWA conducted Protection Alignment Reviews in 2018 and 2022. Interviewees indicated that the absence of more recent Protection Alignment Reviews was attributable to funding shortfalls and COVID-19 restrictions.


#### Element 4:

UNRWA has developed a Protection Mainstreaming Toolkit, but this does not provide any detailed checklists or other guidance for ensuring the integration of protection principles and standards into service delivery. However, Protection Alignment Reviews are conducted using checklists that reflect UNRWA's protection principles for each programme. The protection principles covered by the checklists are:

- I) Safety and dignity
- II) Meaningful access
- III) Accountability
- IV) Participation and empowerment

A recent evaluation of the UNRWA's protection audits found that their methodology was fully aligned with global frameworks and standards on protection, as well as with other cross-cutting issues such as gender mainstreaming, child protection, and disability. During Protection Alignment Reviews, these checklists are used to rate programmes as either "compliant", "partially compliant", or "not compliant" with respect to each of these criteria. Interviews indicated that staff are familiar with the contents of these checklists. The most recently available results (from 2022) point to variable levels of alignment with protection principles across programmes and field offices. This is illustrated by the graph below.


**Figure 3: Agency-wide and field level degree of alignment scores for the 2022 PAR**



#### Element 5:

Interviews with staff carried out for this assessment revealed a widely held perception that UNRWA's strategic commitment to protection is not matched with the requisite human and financial resource allocation to ensure fully effective delivery. Indeed, the Agency's protection agenda is almost entirely project funded. As noted in the 2021 evaluation of the Agency's MTS, programme budget expenditure on protection was less than \$1 million a year between 2016 and 2020. The figure below, from the 2021 UNBOA financial report and audited financial statements, illustrates the limited expenditure on protection in comparison to other areas:

Figure 4: UNBOA's reported expense analysis by programme 2021



Source: UNBOA 2021

Many staff interviewed felt that the low level of programme budget funding provided to protection was not congruent with the strategic emphasis placed on protection in the 2016-2022 MTS. Moreover, several were of the view that the project-based approach to funding UNRWA's protection agenda was neither sufficiently predictable nor sustainable, especially in light of the high level of reliance on the United States as the major donor for this thematic area.

The 2021 independent evaluation of the Protection Alignment Reviews found that the staffing levels at the protection division in UNRWA's had declined significantly following the withdrawal of US funding in 2018. In 2017, there were approximately 112 staff members working in the Agency's protection funding, but by the time




that the evaluation was carried out in 2021, this had reduced to 41. The same evaluation found that UNRWA's funding crisis had hit protection services particularly, especially at the field office level. Following the withdrawal of US funding, a third of field protection staff positions were lost, and all staff working in as Operations Support Officers were eliminated. This had severe implications for protection work and led to scheduled protection audits being cancelled in 2020. The evaluation also noted that the ongoing financial crisis had implications for the implementation of protection-related recommendations, which required financial investments or significant human resources. Interviews with staff indicated that funding for protection initiatives had, to a considerable degree, recovered since this period. Steps were made towards more sustainable funding, with at least 12 new international posts secured from the UN Regular Budget in 2022. The Department of Legal Affairs (DLA) also received 1 additional legal officer protection post and 1 legal officer neutrality post.

#### Element 6:


The 2021 Protection Strategic Framework indicates that protection teams are required to provide protection training to all staff to ensure that they have the capacity to integrate protection considerations into UNRWA services. As indicated above, protection teams suffered during UNRWA's funding cuts. An evaluation of the protection audit mechanism in 2021 found that resource constraints had a very significant impact on protection audits as well as efforts to improve protection awareness among staff.

That said, there is evidence that training of staff has occurred in all field offices over the period 2016-2021, particularly through as part of Emergency Appeals in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) and in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria as part of the Syria regional crisis emergency appeals. This is illustrated by the graphs below, which draw on Emergency Appeals reporting data from Annual Operational Reports between 2016 and 2021, as well as the proposed programme budgets for 2022 and 2023.

**Figure 5: The Gaza Strip - Number of staff members trained on protection**



**Figure 6: Syria - Number of staff members trained on mine risk awareness (included under protection strategic outcome area)**



**Figure 7: Lebanon - Number of staff members trained on protection**




Figure 8: Jordan - Number of staff trained on protection





Figure 9: Performance measure: number of additional UNRWA staff trained in protection



**Performance measure**

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (planned)	2023 (planned)
6,544 UNRWA staff trained on combating gender-based violence, mainstreaming core protection standards, international protection standards and addressing violence against children	4,620 UNRWA staff trained on combating gender-based violence, promoting disability inclusion and addressing violence against children	4,344 UNRWA staff trained on combating gender-based violence, mainstreaming protection standards, promoting disability inclusion, the prevention of sexual harassment, exploitation and abuse, and addressing violence against children	2,650 UNRWA staff to be trained on combating gender-based violence, disability inclusion and mainstreaming protection standards	2,650 UNRWA staff to be trained on combating gender-based violence, disability inclusion and mainstreaming protection standards


MI 2.3 Evidence confidence

High

MI 2.4: Corporate/sectoral and country strategies respond to and/or reflect the intended results of normative frameworks for people with disabilities	Score
Overall MI rating	Unsatisfactory
Overall MI score	2.17
Element 1: Dedicated policy statement on people with disabilities available and showing evidence of application	3
Element 2: Cross-cutting issue indicators and targets fully integrated into the MO's strategic plan and corporate objectives	2
Element 3: Accountability systems (including corporate reporting and evaluation) reflect cross-cutting issue indicators and targets	2
Element 4: Cross-cutting issue screening checklists or similar tools inform design for all new interventions	2
Element 5: Human and financial resources (exceeding benchmarks) are available to address cross-cutting issues	2
Element 6: Staff capacity development on cross-cutting issue is being or has been conducted	2
MI 2.4 Analysis	Evidence documents
<p><b>Element 1:</b> UNRWA's original 2010 policy on disability was updated in 2021 to revise the language around disability and disability rights and identify new principles of disability mainstreaming and inclusion. The policy adopts the concept of disability adopted by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and commits UNRWA to ensuring that all policies, programmes, services, and internal processes address the rights, needs and interests of Palestine refugees with disabilities.</p> <p>The policy is accompanied by a set of disability inclusion guidelines, which provide guidance to staff for ensuring that disability considerations are mainstreamed into UNRWA's programmes and services. The guidelines identify a two-track approach to disability inclusion. Track one involves mainstreaming disability as a cross cutting issue within all programmes and services to ensure that these are inclusive, equitable, non-discriminatory, and do not create barriers, while track 2 focuses on supporting the specific needs of refugees with disabilities to ensure that they have equal opportunities for participation in society. The 2022 Annual Operational plan indicates that these guidelines will be updated.</p> <p>With respect to implementation of the strategy and inclusion guidelines, the 2022 United Nations Disability Strategy (UNDIS) report indicated that UNRWA met or was approaching requirements in all applicable areas, with two exceptions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Consultation with persons with disabilities; this aligns generally with the findings summarised under M.I. 6.7 relating to accountability to affected populations</li> <li>2. Evaluation, though this was later upgraded to "approaching requirements"</li> </ol> <p>The 2021 evaluation of UNRWA's MTS found that while the Agency provides a range of targeted assistance and services to persons with disabilities across field offices and programmes and ensures that its premises comply with international technical standards for accessibility, it also recognises that a lack of reliable data across its programmes is a barrier to disability inclusion. Recently, however, UNRWA has made efforts to improve reporting through the Education Information Management system to include information on the number of students with additional needs, including those with disabilities, and the Washington Group Questions have also been integrated into UNRWA's e-health platform, with the aim of systematically identifying persons with disabilities through UNRWA health centres. This is anticipated to improve the availability of data to assist disability inclusion in programming.</p> <p>The most recently available protection alignment reviews (from 2018) were generally positive about efforts made by field offices to ensure access to installations for persons with disabilities in new ICIP construction, and that there were high levels of compliance with the relevant policies and guidelines. Interviews indicated, however, that the renovation of existing infrastructure to ensure accessibility for persons with disabilities remains a challenge.</p> <p><b>Element 2:</b> The 2016-2022 MTS does not contain any high-level results indicators relating specifically to disability. However, it does include one output level indicator to track the percentage of students in UNRWA schools that are identified with a disability and are receiving support meeting their specific needs. UNRWA has reported consistently against this indicator through its online statistics bulletin. As the graph below illustrates, the</p>	20-22, 27-30, 94-99, 102-105, 315, 417

percentage of students identified as living with disabilities and receiving support grew from less than 31per cent in 2017/18 to 72per cent in 2019/2020 but fell back to 32per cent in 2021/22 due to the COVID-19 pandemic when in-person learning at UNRWA schools was inconsistent.

**Figure 10: Percentage of students identified as living with disabilities and receiving support from UNRWA**



Some indicators for emergency appeals are disaggregated by disability. In 2021, the Department of Planning increased the number of indicators that were reporting results disaggregated by disability. For example, the 2021 emergency appeal for the oPt had 15 results that had disaggregated data for disability, and the 2021 emergency appeal for the Syria regional crisis had 37 indicators disaggregated by disability. The 2021 independent evaluation of the MTS, however, did find that UNRWA itself acknowledges that a lack of data on disability is a key barrier to inclusion of persons with disabilities in the Agency's programming. As noted above, improvements to the Agency's Education Management Information System and the incorporation of the Washington Group questions into the e-health programme should improve the availability of data on disability.

UNRWA's 2022 Disability Policy itself includes no results framework or indicators for systematically monitoring progress on implementation.

### Element 3:

The implementation of UNRWA's 2021 disability policy is reported through annual disability inclusion reports, as well as through annual reports to the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy. Annual disability inclusion reports provide an overview of the main actions taken to promote disability inclusion across each programmatic area, and also highlight the main challenges encountered by the Agency in this regard. The policy lacks a results framework, indicators and targets, and it is therefore not possible to systematically assess the extent to which UNRWA is achieving its commitments relating to disability inclusion.

The Disability Policy itself does commit UNRWA to ensuring that its approach to disability is reflected in monitoring frameworks and results. However, as indicated above, the CMM for the 2016-2022 MTS only includes one disability-related indicator. Emergency Appeals now include several indicators that are disaggregated by disability status, but do not include disability-specific results.

Protection Alignment Reviews serve as an additional accountability mechanism for UNRWA's disability inclusion. As part of the 'meaningful access' protection criterion, these reviews assess whether or not UNRWA staff conducted accessibility audits (in partnership with persons with disabilities) to identify the physical, communication, policy, and attitudinal barriers that may prevent persons with disabilities from effectively and safely using UNRWA services and participating in UNRWA programmes and deciding on priority adaptations required to ensure accessibility. They also assess the extent to which persons with disabilities are able to access UNRWA installations (Doc 104). The latest available protection alignment review results (from 2018) indicate an Agency-wide alignment with the meaningful access criterion of 53per cent. The protection division also conducts quarterly assessments of up to 1,000 installations to assess accessibility.

**Element 4:**

UNRWA has a very comprehensive set of disability inclusion guidelines, developed in 2017, to support staff in integrating disability considerations into programming and service delivery. These are aligned with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and adopts a multidimensional definition of disability that considers attitudinal, physical, communication, and institutional barriers. The guidelines include checklists for each stage of the programme/project cycle – planning and design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. As noted above, Washington Group Questions (WGQ) screening questions have been integrated into the e-health tool for identifying vulnerabilities and risks at UNRWA health centres. Disability questions have also been integrated into the checklists that underpin the Protection Alignment Reviews. The procurement manual also includes a detailed checklist on ensuring that procurement processes are inclusive of persons with disabilities.

As noted above, during the assessment period, the only mechanism for systematically assessing the extent to which these guidelines were implemented are protection alignment reviews, which assess both accessibility and also the degree of consultation with persons with disabilities. Protection Alignment Reviews took place in 2022 but the results were not available for the Assessment Team to review.

**Element 5:**

The Disability Inclusion Guidelines indicate that UNRWA maintains Disability Programme Officers in all fields working to implement disability-specific support activities under RSS programmes, and a Disability Advisor in the Protection Division at the Agency's Headquarters, who provides support for mainstreaming disability considerations within all programmes. UNRWA also has a Disability Task Force, comprised of disability focal points in each programme within *most* field offices. The purpose of this task force is to ensure that persons with disabilities are mainstreamed across services. In 2021, a focal point was assigned in the human resources department to handle the department's participation in and implementation of the Agency's disability inclusion policy.

The 2022 UNDIS report highlighted several challenges relating to financial resources for disability mainstreaming and programming, however. It noted that the limited and sometimes unavailable budget to carry out disability inclusion activities and adaptations to programme services was a major challenge. It identified ICIP improvements to ensure inclusivity were particularly challenging in light of scarce resources, particularly given the old and deteriorated state of many UNRWA premises, both inside and outside camps. The 2021 Annual disability inclusion implementation report highlighted similar challenges. It also noted that due to funding constraints, there was a high turnover of staff with specialised skills in this area and pointed to a general shortage of disability specialists leaving frontline staff struggling to accommodate adults and children with disabilities.

**Element 6:**

The 2021 Annual implementation report on disability inclusion identifies numerous trainings on disability delivered to frontline and management staff across all areas of operation. This included trainings on the protection of children with disabilities from sexual harassment, violence, and abuse; trainings on the sexual and reproductive health rights of children with intellectual disabilities; training modules in community-based rehabilitation; and trainings on disability inclusion for school counsellors. The report highlights the need for an increased focus on capacity building in disability for staff at both the HQ and Field level, and points to the need for longer term funding to support this. The 2022 UNDIS report also indicates that UNRWA is approaching requirements with respect to ensuring sufficient staff capacity in the area of disability.

**MI 2.4 Evidence confidence****Medium**

## Operational management

*Assets and capacities organised behind strategic direction and intended results, to ensure relevance, agility and accountability*

**KPI 3: Operating model and human and financial resources support relevance and agility****KPI score****Satisfactory****2.52**

**Staff are UNRWA's largest asset and play a central role in the realisation of UNRWA's mandate.** At the end of 2022, UNRWA employed 27,756 staff, of whom 213 (0.7 per cent) were international staff. With over 90 per cent of Area staff registered as refugees, UNRWA is both a critical service provider to, and employer of Palestine

refugees. Area staff turnover is reportedly low, as opposed to international staff turnover.

**Resource allocations across functions reflect organisational priorities, i.e., service delivery programmes and the growing importance attached to external relations & communications.** Conceptually, protection is becoming more important, but this is not yet reflected in RB-funded (international) posts, nor in expenditures. 84per cent of total expenditures went to education, health and relief and social services (RSS). Emergency Appeals funding and Project funding revenues are an important source of income for earmarked activities, accounting for 24.5per cent and 11.6per cent of total revenue received between 2018 and 2022, respectively.

**During the July 2018- April 2023 period, certain functions at Headquarters Amman and Jerusalem underwent a partial restructuring. More steps are needed to ensure the Agency can indeed modernize itself and meet the desired standards, some of which are alluded to in the 2023-2028 Strategic Plan.** Driven in part by a change of leadership and the Management Initiative that was developed in response to the 2018-19 management crisis and supported by an increase in the number of assessed contributions by the UN, the Executive Office has been expanded and renewed, oversight functions have been strengthened, the Ombudsperson function has been established, and the ethics function and finance and human resource departments have been (partly) restructured. Similarly, the External Relations and Communications Department (ERCD), operating out of Jerusalem, was both restructured (late 2020) and expanded. In 2022, a restructuring effort of the communications division within ERCD itself was underway to align the division with the Agency's internal and external communications priorities. Some relatively minor restructuring efforts also took place in the human resource and finance departments. Rather than a continuation of recent practices, which reflect a piecemeal approach at departmental or divisional levels, a comprehensive set of measures, appropriately costed and funded, based on a clear and well-aligned vision of the organisation, will be necessary.

**There is broad recognition among stakeholders of the stabilising effect UNRWA has on the socio-economic, political and security situation in the region; however, this is not matched with adequate and predictable funding.** The financing and funding models supporting UNRWA operations are inadequate; decisions are often motivated by political and policy decisions of donors that lie beyond UNRWA's sphere of influence. Nevertheless, UNRWA's resource mobilisation and external communication are – finally – being professionalised, with the aim of achieving greater diversification, predictability, and flexibility of funding. Whereas Field Offices play a potentially important role in resource mobilisation, UNRWA has centralised resource mobilisation at HQ level.

**Although UNRWA has several tools that articulate roles and responsibilities, delegate authority and structure accountability, it does not yet have one consolidated Accountability Framework that clearly delineates roles and responsibilities, delegation of authority, and principles and methods of accountability.** UNRWA's approach to (de-) centralised decision-making and delegation of authority appears to fluctuate, depending on the severity of its financial predicaments, and the leadership styles within the executive office. Financial austerity reinforces centralised decision-making, with senior leadership at HQ taking very operational decisions on Field-level matters. Whereas the intent of the current leadership has been to decentralise and delegate decision-making authority, there is still considerable room for improvement. At present, there is a degree of ambiguity around roles and responsibilities that comes at the expense of efficiency, coordination, and informed decision-making. Delegation of authority is among the priorities listed in the Strategic Plan 2023-2028.

<b>MI 3.1: Organisational structures and staffing ensure that human and financial resources are constantly aligned and adjusted to key functions</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.50</b>
Element 1: Organisational structure is aligned with, or being reorganised to, requirements set out in the current strategic plan	3
Element 2: Staffing is aligned with, or being reorganised to, requirements set out in the current strategic plan	2
Element 3: Resource allocations across functions are aligned to current organisational priorities and goals as set out in the current strategic plan	3
Element 4: Internal restructuring exercises have a clear purpose and intent aligned to the priorities of the current Strategic Plan	2
Element 5: [UN] Engagement in supporting the resident coordinator systems through cost-sharing and resident coordinator nominations	NA
Element 6: [UN] Application of mutual recognition principles in key functional areas	NA

MI 3.1 Analysis	Evidence documents
<p><b>Element 1</b></p> <p>UNRWA's organisational structure reflects its mandate and – thus – its strategic plan, with a strong focus on primarily standardised/uniform, decentralised programme delivery in the five Fields. In principle, UNRWA's organisational structure is based on the principle of subsidiarity, with policy, strategic direction, oversight, and monitoring and evaluation being HQ-led, and operations and contextualisation being Field-led.</p> <p>Compared to other UN agencies, UNRWA has a relatively 'light' senior management setup. Informed by the latest organigrammes (December 2022), UNRWA has one USG, one ASG, ten D-2 and thirteen D-1 positions. A second ASG position was approved in 2022. The Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and West Bank Field Offices are headed by a D2, while Jordan and Syria are led by a D1. ERCD has one D2 and two D1s – Dir Comms and Dir Partnerships. Protection and CSSD are headed by a P5, while Microfinance is headed by an M19.</p> <p>In the current structure, the DCG has a large span of control, covering the bulk of programmes and operational support, as well as parts of change management and external outreach. In this organigramme, the Chief of Staff also leads on two programmes. Following the approval of a second DCG position in 2023, UNRWA has reallocated roles and responsibilities formerly residing under the DCG and the Chief of Staff, with one DCG focusing on programmes and the modernization agenda, and a second taking on most parts of operational support (e.g., HRM, Finance, Legal Affairs, Security and Risk Management).</p> <p>As stated in MI 1.2., compared to other UN (humanitarian / development) agencies, UNRWA Headquarters and Field Offices are relatively small, with an unusually low number of international staff. Expanding Headquarters' capacity to meet today's organisational performance requirements has been challenging; ensuring programme delivery was oftentimes prioritised over other organisational functions. Although long overdue, the 62 additional regular budget-funded posts have increased UNRWA's capacity at HQ levels to improve its capacities in several areas: resource mobilisation, communications, executive oversight and direction, accountability and oversight, and protection, and increase its representative offices' capacities. Nevertheless, capacity in these and other functional areas remain insufficient.</p> <p>This is particularly evident in functional areas such as human resource management, planning, monitoring, and evaluation, but also in cross-cutting themes and issues such as Gender, Ethics, PSEAH, Investigations, Dispute Tribunal, and Risk Management. By way of illustration: of a total staff of 27,756 (not including the more than 3000 daily paid employees), the Agency has one Ethics officer (P5) and one PSEAH officer (P4). The Ombudsperson function wasn't established until 2022. Considering the Agency's challenges and aspirations in these areas (articulated in the Management Initiative, as well as Agency-wide policies and guidelines – see also KPI 4), the Agency clearly lacks the capacity needed to meet the required standards. Noting UNRWA's almost complete dependence on voluntary contributions, its ability to match its own expectations and those of its donors with actual performance in these areas depends to a large extent on the willingness of its donors to provide the necessary resources. Regrettably, this has not been forthcoming: most donors prefer to fund programme service delivery rather than non-programme / back-office functions, and even small contributions have proven hard to obtain.</p> <p>In general, Field Office level structures mirror those of Headquarters, although in some cases, adjustments are made at the initiative of the Front Office (The Gaza Strip LFO, JFO). In the Gaza Strip, for instance, the roles and responsibilities of Area Chiefs were adjusted to provide them with a stronger liaison role and less of a supervisory role (except during emergencies).</p> <p><b>Element 2</b></p> <p>Staff are UNRWA's largest asset. At the end of 2022, UNRWA employed 27 756 staff, of whom 213 were international staff. With over 80 per cent of Area staff registered as refugees, UNRWA is both a critical service provider to, and employer of Palestine refugees.</p> <p>UNRWA's staff are spread across five Areas of Operation and three Headquarters. The total number of staff in 2022 was 2 060 less than in 2018. Of these, 213 (0.7 per cent) are international staff. Of all staff, 542 (almost two per cent) were located at the three HQs: 373 in Amman, 60 in Jerusalem, and 109 in Gaza. There are no international staff positions at HQ in the Gaza Strip. In addition to these 27 756 UNRWA staff that are employed on a permanent or fixed-term basis, UNRWA also employs over 3 000 workers on 'daily paid' contracts, many of</p>	<p>11- 13, 201, 202, 208, 236-358, 417,419, 422, 429, 431</p>



which are employed through cash-for-work programmes and emergency programmes.

**Table 7: UNRWA human resources by category and location**

UNRWA HUMAN RESOURCES TOTAL	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
<b>Total number of staff</b>	<b>29 816</b>	<b>28 012</b>	<b>28 756</b>	<b>28 044</b>	<b>27 756</b>
Total number of international staff	188	171	193	192	213
Number of international staff – female	83	74	90	89	100
Number of international staff – male	105	97	103	103	113
Total number of area staff	29 628	27 841	28 563	27 852	27 543
Number of area staff – female	15 631	14 969	15 495	15 179	15 114
Number of area staff – male	13 997	12 872	13 068	12 673	12 429

UNRWA HUMAN RESOURCES/ LOCATION	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
The Gaza Strip Field Office	12 416	11 993	12 148	11 889	11 908
Jordan Field Office	6 314	5 973	6 103	5 963	5 854
Lebanon Field Office	3 206	2 993	3 059	2 929	2 775
Syria Field Office	3 245	2 656	3 027	3 018	2 956
West Bank Field Office	4 153	3 887	3 866	3 708	3 716
Headquarters	482	510	542	525	537
<b>Total Agency</b>	<b>29 816</b>	<b>28 012</b>	<b>28 756</b>	<b>28 044</b>	<b>27 756</b>

Source: UNRWA AORs 2018-2022

Note 1: Human resources data has been rounded.

Note 2: The number of Agency-wide international staff in 2021 includes 12 staff based in UNRWA liaison offices (five female and seven male).

In 2022, the number of international staff includes 10 staff based in Agency liaison offices (four female and six male).

International Staff turnover is reportedly high, at all levels, notably in the Fields. The jobs are seen as very demanding, with staff having to work and live in challenging, oftentimes difficult and hostile working conditions. By contrast, Area staff turnover is very low, with many employees working on permanent employment terms and conditions for decades.

Although long overdue, in 2022, 43 new RB-funded international staff posts were approved: fourteen were for Field Offices, and twenty-nine for HQ functions (seven in Operations Departments, six in External Relations, four in the Executive Office, three in the Human Resource Department, two in Legal, one in Finance, one in Internal Oversight, two in Information Management, one in Corporate Services, one in Dispute Tribunal, one in Planning). This involved one P5, 14 P4, 21 P3, three P2 and four GS posts (= close protection officers).

An additional nineteen RB-funded international staff posts and one upgrade (from P5 to D1) were requested in 2022 for 2023 and beyond: three for Field Offices, two for Operations Departments and 15 for other HQ functions (two for internal oversight, two for Executive Office, two for External Relations and Communications, two for Legal Department, two for Human Resource Department, two for Information Management, one for Finance Department, one for the Department of Planning, and one for the New York liaison office). This involved one D1, four P5, seven P4, seven P3 and one PS posts. Two GS (OL) posts would be abolished, bringing the total increase to eighteen posts.

The funding crisis in 2018, alongside UNRWA's structural funding shortfalls, has impacted on the quality of UNRWA's services. The evaluation of the MTS found that UNRWA had responded to its chronic funding crisis by cutting expenditure. The variety of measures taken include increasing vacancy rates (in some cases twice as high as the corporate vacancy rate target of seven per cent), reducing the number of frontline staff providing services, hiring staff on cheaper daily wage contracts even for long-term positions, and cutting Programme Budget investment in information technology and in maintaining vehicles and premises. In addition, UNRWA reduced its travel and training budget for field offices by fifty per cent in 2020, leaving one office with \$3.80 per staff member to cover training costs. The level of area staff vacancy rates had implications for the delivery of UNRWA services. Under the health programme, there had been a reduction in average daily medical consultations due to (i) rationalization of the services; (ii) introduction of appointment systems; and (iii) introduction of the family health team approach. Altogether, the MTS evaluation concluded that, to some extent, the Agency had achieved results at the expense of staff well-being.

### Element 3

Resource allocations across functions reflect organisational priorities, i.e., service delivery programmes (field

offices, operations departments) and the growing importance attached to external relations & communications. Nonetheless, whilst Protection is becoming strategically more important, this is not yet reflected in RB-funded (international) posts, nor in PB allocations; on the contrary, Protection is almost entirely project-funded, making it more vulnerable to funding unpredictability than programmes.

As was shown in MI 1.4. (Table 2), 84 per cent of total expenditures went to education, health and relief and social services. Education is by far the largest programme (44.2 per cent of all funding streams), followed by RSS (24.5 per cent), Health (13.4 per cent); Infrastructure and Camp Improvement (6.4 per cent), and Protection (0.4 per cent). Executive Direction (3.8 per cent) and Support (6.4 per cent) cover senior management and back-office expenses. Microfinance, a self-financing revolving fund that is not part of the regular budget, accounted for 0.7 per cent of total expenditures.

Emergency Appeals (EA) funding and Project funding revenues were an important source of income for earmarked activities, accounting for 24.5 per cent and 11.6 per cent of total revenue received between 2018 and 2022, respectively. These are, by definition, driven by priority needs resulting from violent conflict (Syria and the Gaza Strip) and/or deteriorating socio-economic conditions of beneficiaries (e.g., emergency cash assistance to Palestine refugees in Syria and to abject poor, food assistance in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon). The share of registered beneficiaries that call on UNRWA for assistance is highest in the Gaza Strip, and lowest in Jordan. Occasionally, EA funds are temporarily reallocated to cover RB service delivery funding gaps.

UNRWA's services are spread over the five Fields as follows (based on 2023 data reported by UNRWA):

- The Gaza Strip field office supports eight camps, 278 schools, two vocational and technical training centres, 22 primary health centres, seven community rehabilitation centres and seven women's programme centres.
- The Lebanon field office supports 12 camps, 65 schools, one vocational and technical training centre, 27 primary health centres and eight women's programme centres. Average expense is higher in Lebanon owing to higher hospitalization and schooling costs.
- The West Bank field office supports 19 camps, 96 schools, two vocational and technical training centres, 43 primary health centres, 15 community rehabilitation centres and 19 women's programme centres.
- The Syria Field Office supports nine camps, 102 schools, the Damascus Training Centre, 23 primary health centres, nine community rehabilitation centres and 12 women's programme centres.
- The Jordan field office supports 10 camps, 169 schools, two vocational and technical training centres, 25 primary health centres, 10 community rehabilitation centres and 14 women's programme centres.

#### **Element 4**

During the 2018-2022 period, certain functions at Headquarters Amman and Jerusalem underwent a partial restructuring. Driven in part by a change of leadership and the Management Initiative that was developed in response to the 2018-19 management crisis and supported by an increase in the number of assessed contributions by the UN, the Executive Office has been expanded and renewed, oversight functions have been strengthened, the Ombudsperson function has been established, and the ethics function and finance and human resource departments have been (partly) restructured.

Similarly, the External Relations and Communications Department (ERCD), operating out of East-Jerusalem, Amman and Gaza City, was both restructured (late 2020) and expanded. The restructuring led to: (i) a clearer delineation between the communication and fundraising functions; (ii) the creation of a Partnership Division by merging the Strategic Partnership and Donor Relations Divisions. The new Division is composed of four regional teams and a Private Partnerships team; and (iii) the consolidation of fundraising operations and support services such as, contributions and grants management, donor reporting, and information management under the External Relations Services section. In 2022, a restructuring effort of the communications division within ERCD itself was underway to align the division with the Agency's internal and external communications priorities. Some relatively minor restructuring efforts also took place in the human resource and finance departments.

Further restructuring will be necessary if the organisation is to achieve its modernization / change management aspirations, some of which are alluded to in the 2023-2028 Strategic Plan. The creation of the new position "Director Strategic Positioning and Change" reflects the need for this – be it in terms of business process (re-)engineering, structural adjustments, delegation of authority and accountability frameworks, enterprise risk management, human resource management, or the much-needed changes in UNRWA's organisational culture. Some of these needs are structural, with calls for measures dating back to 2006 and 2010 (as part of earlier

organisational development initiatives). The 'Management Initiatives' included 29 actions across 10 dimensions of 'organisational culture':

**Table 9: Management Initiatives Action Plan: Organisational Culture Change Dimensions and Actions**

<b>Staff engagement</b>	Enhance staff morale / empowerment and organisational accountability through: (i) the development and implementation of a clear staff union engagement strategy that is predicated on mutual trust and relationship building; (ii) the mapping of staff relations areas for improvement as a precursor to the development and implementation of an engagement plan (with clear priorities and goals) to ensure productive union / management engagement; (iii) the elaboration of principles of engagement governing union / management relations and the review the Area Staff Union statute and bylaws; (iv) the development of an expanded list of stakeholders that will be engaged on key union priorities, sensitive staffing issues and conditions of service; (v) convening biannual town hall meetings with the Commissioner-General in each field of Agency operation; and (vi) the engagement of UNRWA staff in the current change management process.
<b>Conflict of interest</b>	Reinforce conduct and conflict of interest rules and regulations through:(i) the development of staff guidance / internal advocacy materials as to conduct that constitutes a conflict of interest; and(ii) the development and introduction of staff member questionnaires / statements that: (a) provide periodic reminders of staff obligations with regard to conflicts of interest, outside employment and broader adherence to the regulatory framework; and (b) allow staff to affirm that they fully comprehend their role in regard to upholding good conduct (on their entry on duty and at set intervals during their service).
<b>Capacity development</b>	(i) Review UN system best practice in relation to ethics and investigations training; and (ii) According to the results of this review, develop / adapt and implement existing UNRWA ethics and investigations trainings.
<b>Capacity development</b>	(i) Review UN system best practice in relation to neutrality training; and (ii) According to the results of this review, develop / adapt and implement existing UNRWA neutrality trainings.
<b>Capacity development</b>	(i) Review UN system best practice in relation to protection training; and (ii) According to the results of this review, develop / adapt and implement existing UNRWA protection trainings.
<b>Capacity development</b>	(i) Review UN system best practice in relation to leadership, operational management, and accountabilities training; (ii) According to the results of this review, develop / adapt and implement existing UNRWA leadership, operational management and accountabilities trainings.
<b>Capacity development</b>	(i) Review UNRWA's policies and procedures in relation to misconduct, disciplinary measures, and disciplinary consistency (including, in relation to sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual harassment, neutrality and violence against children); and (ii) According to the results of this review, develop / adapt and implement existing UNRWA trainings and other relevant initiatives.
<b>Capacity development</b>	(i) Review top-rated learning management systems; (ii) Link the learning management system to the active directory; (iii) Launch the Microsoft Imagine Academy on the current learning management system; and (iv) Host online resources on the current learning management system.
<b>Staff care and teambuilding</b>	Under an on-going, GIZ funded project: (i) In accordance with UN best practice, develop and implement an UNRWA wellbeing strategy, framework and calendar of activities; (ii) Include wellbeing messaging, UN international commemoration days and capacity development for specific groups (sanitation labourers, school attendants, health cleaners, security guards, drivers etc.) in the implementation of wellbeing activities, across the five fields of UNRWA operation and Agency headquarters; and (iii) Develop and implement on-line staff wellbeing trainings.

<b>Staff care and teambuilding</b>	Strengthen senior and middle management staff care and teambuilding through: (i) Senior management staff care and teambuilding workshops; (ii) The establishment of senior staff peer groups; (iii) Middle management staff care and teambuilding workshops and peer group formation; and (iv) The development and implementation of mentoring (professional development), coaching (enhanced job-related skills) and buddy (providing one-point access to operationally necessary information) programmes that reinforce effective management culture.
<b>Transparency</b>	i. Develop and disseminate a quarterly bulletin on disciplinary measures and other actions taken in response to fraud, corruption, and other wrongdoing, including sexual misconduct. ii. Develop and share monthly and weekly schedules on an on-line platform on: (a) Commissioner-General, Deputy Commissioner-General and Director level missions; and (b) forthcoming Agency-wide workshops. iii. Issue “back to office” reports for circulation to the Management Committee on all Commissioner-General, Deputy Commissioner General and Director missions; iv. Require the Commissioner-General, Deputy Commissioner General and all Director’s to designate an officer-in-charge during any period of absence from the office where they are unable to attend to their regular duties. v. Circulate bi-weekly updates on income and expenditure to the Management Committee; and vi. Enhance organisational transparency through the development and implementation of revised travel management, leave request and purchase and requisitioning systems.

Some positive steps have already been taken to that effect: reinforcing internal communication is high on the agenda, and UNRWA has also developed a Leadership Dialogue initiative in which systematic adherence to UNRWA’s code of ethics, staff regulations and rules, standards of conduct for the international civil service, and the UN Values and Behaviours Framework are to feature. Still, more steps are needed to ensure the Agency can indeed modernize itself and meet the desired standards. Rather than a continuation of recent practices, which reflect a piecemeal approach at departmental or divisional levels, a comprehensive set of measures, appropriately costed and funded, based on a clear and well-aligned vision of the organisation, will be necessary. Ideally, this would already have been an integral part of UNRWA’s Strategic Plan 2023-2028, together with (or as part of) the \$200 million Capital Investment Plan. While the latter involves a series of one-time investments needed to restore seriously depleted assets and modernize business processes and systems, programmes and operations, in particular in the areas of digitalization, environmental sustainability and fundraising and public outreach (mostly ‘hardware’), an equally important “software” investment plan for changes in the organisation’s structure, processes, and people’s behaviours is also needed.

Asked whether UNRWA had taken appropriate measures to enhance management performance in accordance with the Management Initiative proposals, 35 per cent (strongly) agreed with the statement, 19 per cent agreed somewhat, and over one-third of MOPAN survey respondents did not know / had no opinion.

### MI 3.1 Evidence confidence

High

<b>MI 3.2: Resource mobilisation efforts consistent with the core mandate and strategic priorities</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.00</b>
Element 1: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support explicitly aligned to current strategic plan	2
Element 2: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support reflects recognition of need to diversify the funding base, particularly in relation to the private sector	3
Element 3: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support seeks multi-year funding within mandate and strategic priorities	4
Element 4: Resource mobilisation strategy/case for support prioritises the raising of domestic resources from partner countries/institutions, aligned to goals and objectives of the strategic plan/relevant country plan	NA
Element 5: [UN] 1% levy systematically collected and passed on to the UN Secretariat	NA
<b>MI 3.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
<b>Element 1</b> There is broad recognition among stakeholders of the stabilising effect UNRWA has on the socio-economic, political and security situation in the region; however, this is not matched with adequate and predictable funding. With a constantly expanding beneficiary population, deteriorating socio-economic conditions, and two-	7-12, 16, 17, 111-113, 134, 315, 417, 419, 422

thirds of its expenses going to staff salaries, UNRWA's chronic underfunding, combined with the funding crisis of 2018, have demonstrated not just the Agency's vulnerability, but also underscored the risks this would pose to local and regional stability.

There is also widespread agreement that the financing and funding models supporting UNRWA operations are inadequate, with over 90 per cent of Agency funding provided on a voluntary basis and with traditional donors providing over 80 per cent of its income. Voluntary contributions are based largely on factors beyond the Agency's control – including changes in donor funding priorities and policies – and although funding picked up after the dramatic decrease of revenues in 2020, there was a 10 per cent fall in revenue between 2018 and 2022. Funding cuts are affecting the Agency efficiency, whilst senior managers must spend considerable time and effort mobilizing the funding instead of managing the expenditure of around \$1 billion per year in an effective manner.

In the absence of any realistic prospect on the political front to resolve the question of Palestine refugees, UNRWA's funding structure and the politics that surround it are likely to persist. This requires that the Agency adopts very robust, well-aligned resource mobilisation methods AND engages very closely with its donors to address these funding challenges and improve funding predictability and flexibility, necessary to meet the requirements set out in the MTS and the Strategic Plan 2023-2028.

The MTS evaluation found that “while UNRWA has broadly implemented AdCom recommendations, repeated recommendations around resource mobilization demonstrate the need for AdCom members to take responsibility for greater engagement and action.” However, while some donors have been able to comply with the Secretary-General's call for multiyear commitments and disbursements early in the year, others are constrained by their national budget and political systems.

Three years into the 2016-2022 MTS, UNRWA launched a new “Resource Mobilization Strategy 2019-2021 (RMS)” to deliver on the Agency's mandate, in line with the five strategic outcomes set out in the UNRWA Medium Term Strategy, for the remaining period of the MTS. The RMS comprised four interrelated components: (1) Expanding and deepening relations with UN Member States; (2) Diversifying the donor base through new funding streams; (3) Mobilizing strategic advocates; and (4) Strategic communication and donor visibility. Each goal has a set of indicators to track progress. In 2020, UNRWA developed a Donor Relations Action Plan, operationalizing, and detailing parts of the RMS. Like the MTS, the RMS was extended for another year, until the end of 2022.

Notwithstanding the critical importance attached to resource mobilization and external communication, multiple interviewees have emphasized how much internal ‘catching up’ the Agency has had to do in these past years to build a more effective structure, streamline business processes, strengthen staff and management capacity, improve coordination across the Agency, and build/upgrade Customer Relationship Management systems, including through digitalization.

The External Relations Department (ERD) was restructured at the end of 2020 and became the External Relations and Communications Department. Besides the restructuring, changes in ERCD management (Director, Head of Partnerships, Chief of Private Partnerships, and a new Head of Communication) have allowed UNRWA to approach donor outreach and resource mobilization more holistically and synergistically, with closer interaction and coordination between teams and the Communications Division (CD). Although many staff are still working on a temporary (fixed term) contract, ERCD has managed to secure 6 additional RB-funded posts in 2022, with 2 more expected from 2023 onwards. Nevertheless, having ERCD staff and functions spread across Amman, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip HQs does pose challenges to practical coordination and policy synergies.

UNRWA reports regularly on its resource mobilisation methods and achievements, notably in the Annual Operational Reports, but also during AdCom and SubCom meetings.

In 2023, a new Resource Mobilization and Outreach Strategy (ReMOS) will be launched, to align with the first three years of the Strategic Plan 2023-28. The ReMOS will take stock of key lessons learned from previous Resource Mobilization Strategy (RMS) periods, in particular that: (i) traditional donors will continue to provide the bulk of the Agency's funding, even if subject to fluctuations based on domestic politics; (ii) public donor diversification must be very well targeted in order to be achieve desired results, but additional support is achievable; (iii) support for UNRWA, including in the Gulf, requires a broader stakeholder approach, beyond traditional MFA officials; (iv) there is significant growth potential in the private sector, however, strategically placed investments are required; and (v) a larger digital footprint is required to achieve outreach, organisational

positioning and resource mobilization objectives

## Element 2

Both the current and the forthcoming resource mobilization strategies have made diversification of the funding base a strategic priority. In addition to UNRWA's traditional donor base, which covers between 80 and 90 percent of UNRWA's revenues, UNRWA distinguishes other categories: regional partners, emergent partners, non-traditional partners, and the private sector.

UNRWA has made efforts to diversify its funding base to try to address its funding shortfalls. The Agency set ambitious targets; however, thus far the results have been disappointing, with the Agency securing only 10.8 per cent of its income from sources other than its traditional donors in 2022.

While traditional donors increased their contributions to offset the US defunding (\$300 million/year) in 2019 and 2020, the sharp decline of revenues from regional partners, from \$340 million in 2018 to \$30.5 million in 2021 was only partially compensated for by increased revenues from other sources (notably, traditional partners and the UN system).

**Table 10: revenues by funding source (in US\$ million)**

Funding source	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Traditional partners	841,45	735,65	783,80	1070,00	1050,00
Regional partners	340,42	188,42	43,30	30,50	51,90
Emergent partners	12,38	17,42	16,90	15,30	14,50
Non-traditional partners	32,16	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Private sector partners	19,5	14,08	19,50	27,80	15,40
UN	n/a	46,28	76,80	45,80	44,60

Source: UNRWA AORs 2018-2022

Note: The titles of donor categories and the categorization of donors were revised under the RMS 2019-2022. Since 2019, the following applies:

- Traditional partners include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, the State of Palestine, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, and the European Union.
- Regional partners include Egypt, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Oman, Qatar, Islamic Development Bank, and the Khalifa Bin Zayed Foundation.
- Emerging donors include Azerbaijan, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Holy See, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Thailand, and Uzbekistan.

In 2022, the Agency developed a new private partnerships strategy, targeting Islamic philanthropy, private philanthropy (notably Foundations and high value individuals) and the general public – to be reached through national committees, of which there are currently two (Spain and US, with two other countries considering the feasibility of establishing national committees (Germany and Japan). The private sector, including individual sponsors, accounts for less than 2 per cent of UNRWA's revenues. UNRWA sees opportunity in private sector resource mobilization, with a cost-to-income ratio of 25 per cent, representing a return on investment of 4:1. The plan is to have a self-sustaining resource mobilization model, but this will require up-front investments in the form of more voluntary contributions at a scale that, thus far at least, has not materialized.

## Element 3

Resource mobilisation efforts aim primarily to increase the share of multi-annual, unearmarked funding for the Programme Budget, which would offer UNRWA the greatest degree of flexibility to allocate resources in accordance with its strategic priorities across the five Fields. In 2021, some 94 per cent of all support received, or US\$ 1.11 billion, was provided by institutional (government) donors, of which 31 per cent was received in the form of multi-year funding agreements (MYFA) and 69 per cent via annual funding agreements. In 2022, the Agency signed one completely new MYA with Norway and renewed or extended 12 MYAs, bringing the total number of active MYAs to 30 with 24 countries. These agreements covered core and emergency activities and



constituted US\$ 430.2 million of all funding raised in 2022 (i.e., 32.8 per cent, an increase of nearly 2 per cent).

Field Offices play an important role in resource mobilization, because of their knowledge of the terrain, their local networks, and proximity to local donor representatives. The MTS evaluation identified a need for improved communication and coherence between donor relations at headquarters and field levels. It had found that “coordination was strong in 2019, with headquarters engaging field office staff on the resource mobilization strategy, communications and working together better. However, with the COVID-19 crisis and other challenges in 2020, this had stopped to the point where a headquarters decision to separate the external relations and communications departments was not communicated to donor relations staff in the field. The failure to provide updates on initiatives at headquarters left field office staff reliant on their donor contacts for information.” Although this is acknowledged by the Agency, it is yet to establish clear processes, responsibilities, and lines of accountability.

Evidence from interviews and the MOPAN survey point to a continuing need to improve communication with stakeholders and partners on what it does and achieves, how it allocates its resources, and which measures it is taking to enhance organisational performance. In response to the survey question whether UNRWA allocates its resources transparently and efficiently across headquarters and field offices, only 39 per cent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed, and 27 per cent did not know. The Agency recognises this and is doubling down on efforts to strengthen both fundraising and (internal and external) communication and outreach, as well as the coordination and synergies between these critical functions.

#### Element 4

UNRWA’s operations are intended for well-defined beneficiary categories and as such, complement those of host authorities in the five Fields. The Agency does not raise domestic resources from host nations; rather, it coordinates efforts with host authorities at strategic, tactical, and operational levels, to the extent possible.

The evaluation of the MTS found that UNRWA provides services that host governments cannot or are unwilling to provide. If these governments or authorities were suddenly required to provide services to Palestine refugees, it could stress their resources and capability to breaking point. UNRWA’s activities are based largely on its comparative advantage, with the vast majority of funds spent on the basic services envisaged by its mandate (health, education and relief and social services). The positions of stakeholders, particularly Palestine refugees, host governments and donors, make it difficult for the Agency to change or cut activities.

#### MI 3.2 Evidence confidence

High

MI 3.3: Resource reallocation/programming decisions responsive to need can be made at a decentralised level	Score
Overall MI rating	Unsatisfactory
Overall MI score	2.00
Element 1: An organisation-wide policy or guidelines exist that describe the delegation of decision-making authorities at different levels of the organisation	2
Element 2: Policy/guidelines or other documents provide evidence of a sufficient level of decision-making autonomy available at the country level (or other decentralised level as appropriate) regarding resource reallocation/programming	2
Element 3: Evaluations or other reports contain evidence that reallocation/programming decisions have been made to positive effect at country or other local level as appropriate	2
Element 4: The MO has made efforts to improve or sustain the delegation of decision-making on resource allocation/programming to the country or other relevant levels	2
MI 3.3 Analysis	Evidence documents
<p><b>Element 1</b></p> <p>UNRWA’s delivery model is based around delivery of primarily standardised programmes in contextually different fields.</p> <p>UNRWA has several tools that articulate roles and responsibilities, delegate authority and structure accountability. These include Organisational Directives, Management Compact Letters, and Technical Instructions. For Security and Risk Management, in 2021 UNRWA aligned its approach to the Framework of</p>	3, 7-9, 134, 175, 208-213, 215, 217, 223, 224-226, 229-232, 235, 297, 315, 417, 419, 422



Accountability of the UN Security Management System (UNSMS). Regarding programme and project cycle management, OD 21 (issued in 2017) describes in detail the roles and responsibilities/accountabilities of the Department of Planning as well as the oversight structures involved. It also has well-established OD's and Technical Instructions for Procurement, Finance and Planning. However, the Agency does not yet have one consolidated Accountability Framework that clearly delineates roles and responsibilities, delegation of authority, and principles and methods of accountability. Delegation of authority is among the priorities listed in the Strategic Plan 2023-2028 and the Terms of Reference of the (new) director for Strategic Positioning and Change.

## Element 2

UNRWA updated its Organisational Directive # 2 on "Organisation of key functions and responsibilities of Headquarters" in July 2022. The OD "prescribes the basic organisation of UNRWA and the major functions and responsibilities of HQ offices in Amman, the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem, and of their principal officers" as follows:

- **Directors of Departments** are responsible for "providing strategic, technical, and operational direction and oversight and monitoring of the Agency's programmes and activities in the five fields of operation.
- **Director DERC** is responsible for developing communications strategies and securing, diversifying, increasing, and sustaining the Agency's funding base.
- **Director Finance** is responsible for receiving and safeguarding the Agency's monetary assets and ascertains the adequacy of the internal control system, maintains the Agency's financial systems and records and the publication of its accounts; coordinates the establishment of the Agency's budget and controlling in expenditure; provides technical direction and advice to the fields finance staff.
- **Director DIMIT** is responsible for the implementation and governance of all information management and technology activities within the Agency.
- **DIOS** exercises operational independence and is responsible for planning, directing, and implementing internal oversight services ensuring accountability, transparency, integrity, and learning.
- **Director of Human Resources** is responsible for providing strategic, technical, and operational direction, supervision and monitoring of the HR policies and procedures Agency-wide; administration of International Staff Agency-wide and for Area Staff in HQ locations.
- **Director Legal Affairs** is responsible for providing authoritative legal advice on all matters affecting the Agency in relation to legal relationships or obligations, legal interpretation, sanctions, procedures, or remedies including the Agency's status and its privileges and immunities.
- **Department of Planning** is responsible for strategic and operational planning, monitoring, and reporting across the Agency's three funding streams (programme budget, EA and projects); quality assurance; for development and maintenance of systems and procedures to capture results against performance indicators.

OD 2 does not prescribe the responsibilities of Corporate Services (CSSD), Security & Risk Management. As regards the delegation of authority to **Field Directors**, OD 2 states in general terms that "Field Directors are responsible to the Commissioner General for the direction, coordination and control of Agency operations in the fields to which they are assigned, in accordance with the policies, programmes and procedures prescribed by Financial and Staff regulations and rules, personnel directives and Manuals, Organisation Directives and HQ instructions and for acting as representatives of the Commissioner-General in those fields."

**Management compact letters**, introduced in 2016, set out the Agency's overarching priorities, programme-specific priorities, and management support priorities. The management compact letters include descriptions of accountability and authorities for Field Directors and Directors of Departments/Divisions, in accordance with published instruments governing Agency Administration and Operations (Financial Regulations and Rules; International and Area Staff Regulations and Rules; Organisation Directives; Headquarters and Field Instructions; and Headquarters and Field Circular Notices).

The first generation of management compact letters were more detailed than the latter ones. Field Directors would receive general instructions, along with sections on e.g., resource management, programme delivery and Human resource management, specific to their duty station. In 2022, the Executive Office adjusted the intent of the management compact letter and – thus – also the template: rather than articulating responsibility and accountability in full, they have become a way to engage senior managers on organisation-wide commitments such as gender equality and financial sustainability.

**OD 21 establishes the Programme and Project Cycle and relevant structures, processes and systems that apply in UNRWA.** The Directive sets out how the Agency establishes medium-term strategic objectives and results; develops medium term plans to achieve those objectives and results; operationalizes the strategic plans on an

annual basis; institutionalizes project management; and manages risk to project / programme implementation.

**Whilst accountability structures are assigned in some areas (e.g., human resource management, finance, procurement, planning and monitoring), this is not the case in all areas.** At present, there is a degree of ambiguity around roles and responsibilities that comes at the expense of efficiency and coordination. For instance, heads of programmes in the Field Offices are programmatically accountable to the Directors of Programmes at HQ level, and administratively to the (Deputy) Director UNRWA Affairs located in the Field Offices, who are tasked with managing the UNRWA programmes in their respective Fields. This has shown to encourage centralised decision-making and micro-management by HQ-level staff of field level operations. In other areas of work however, for instance Investigations, the Head of Division in Amman has no formal hierarchical relationship with investigators on the ground and therefore no authority to guide or direct them substantively.

Over 60 per cent of MOPAN survey respondents agreed to a greater or lesser degree that UNRWA allocates its resources transparently across HQ and field offices. At the same time, 27 per cent of respondents does not know how UNRWA allocates the resources it receives.

### Element 3

Evaluations recognise that the challenging contexts in which UNRWA operates, alongside the funding volatility, necessitates programming adaptation. However specific evidence on the locus of decision making in programme changes is limited. The following evaluations highlight locally-lead adaptation:

- The COVID-19 pandemic necessitated reallocation or reprogramming in many if not all areas of UNRWA's services and activities. The Real Time Evaluations (RTEs) that were conducted confirm that front line staff acted quickly and independently in Jordan, with Area Officers actively engaged with Camp Service Committees to share information, discuss priorities, and mobilize resources for priority needs (e.g. delivering medicines to patients). In the West Bank the Field Management Team quickly established an emergency management approach; although Operational Support Managers effectively adapted, they were understaffed and lacked emergency technical guidance. Nonetheless the West Bank programmes rapidly adapted to meet beneficiary needs with positive effects. In the Gaza Strip context the evaluation found that staff throughout the organisational hierarchy including frontline staff felt their views were heard and influenced operational approaches. However, where GFO Area Offices generally take a leading role in emergencies in devolved contexts, their role throughout COVID-19 response was more complementary as decision making was purposefully centralised.
- The 2020 MADAD II evaluation found that the project was implemented in a challenging context but was successfully adapted to account for funding shortfalls and delays in disbursement of funds, staff turnover and recruitment difficulties.
- The evaluation of the support to the training and professional development of teachers and the teaching of French for quality education in UNRWA schools (2022) found that UNRWA was able to manage the project well given the challenges posed by COVID-19 and was able to re-plan, redesign and coordinate successfully across all stakeholders. The project objectives remained relevant to the professional development needs of educational professionals even as the context changed.
- The Evaluation of Child and Family Protection Services (2019) found that the project was implemented efficiently, although there were issues connected to delays in the financial transfer and execution of funds, the timely recruitment of skilled staff, the re-allocation of funds to unplanned outputs.

One evaluation mentioned a perceived 'top-down' approach to decision making: the evaluation of UNRWA Family Health Team Reform (2021) found that whilst the FHT Approach's adaptability and resilience varies between fields, the FHT model was appropriate for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. Less positively some participants interviewed for the evaluation believe that decisions at UNRWA mirror a top-down approach whereby programmatic changes are decided in "Amman", and then rolled out onto the different fields with little consideration to each field's specific context.

### Element 4:

UNRWA's approach to (de-)centralised decision-making and delegation of authority appears to fluctuate, depending on the severity of its financial predicaments, and the leadership styles within the executive office. Financial austerity reinforces centralised decision-making, with senior leadership at HQ taking very operational decisions on Field-level matters. Whereas the intent of the current leadership has been to decentralise and delegate decision-making authority, there is still considerable room for improvement.

UNRWA's current leadership arrived in 2020, in the aftermath of a leadership crisis and an interim leadership

phase, just when the pandemic struck. One of the priorities of the new leadership was to improve the decision-making structure, transparency, and engagement of senior managers. This led to the creation of the Executive Advisory Group and the Senior Management Team as advisory bodies to the executive. In addition, HQ-level working groups / task forces were established to deal with day-to-day, operational matters (e.g., on finance, human resources).

Within the Agency, different perspectives exist regarding the extent to which decision-making on resource allocation is indeed delegated. HQ-level interviewees speak positively about the changes that had been introduced and appreciate the increased transparency and engagement. Other interviewees expressed disappointment about what they see as high levels of centralisation that had developed over the past decade and still persisted, notwithstanding the creation of new structures. Field Office leadership in particular feel they do not have appropriate levels of decision-making authority commensurate with their tasks and rank (D2 and D1 levels) and day-to-day challenges. Although consultations with the Field do take place during the annual planning process, the latter do not feel consulted on operational budget allocation decisions once the plans come into force and priorities need to be reviewed because of funding challenges. Senior managers, especially those located in the field, are calling for a more robust Accountability Framework that clearly and comprehensively delineates responsibility and accountability for results at different levels of the organisation. Alongside greater clarity and real empowerment, they are urging the Agency to provide the Field Offices the flexibility they need to address field-specific conditions – as opposed to the current primarily standardised approaches.

### MI 3.3 Evidence confidence

Medium

### MI 3.4: HR systems and policies are performance based and geared to the achievement of results

Score

#### Overall MI rating

Satisfactory

#### Overall MI score

2.60

Element 1: A system is in place which requires all staff, including senior staff, to undergo performance assessment

3

Element 2: There is evidence that the performance assessment system is systematically and implemented by the organisation for all staff and to the required frequency

3

Element 3: The performance assessment system is clearly linked to organisational improvement, particularly the achievement of corporate objectives, and to demonstrate ability to work with other entities

2

Element 4: Staff performance assessment is applied in decision-making on promotion, incentives, rewards, sanctions etc.

2

Element 5: A clear process is in place to manage disagreement and complaints regarding staff performance assessments

3

### MI 3.4 Analysis

Evidence documents

#### Preliminary note

UNRWA developed but did not formalise a “People Strategy” 2016-2021, originally meant to accompany the 2016-2022 MTS. Instead, UNRWA focused on more basic, practical needs, such as the need to digitalise manual work processes, develop dashboards, streamline recruitment processes etc. Thus, in terms of HRM policies and processes, during the 2018-2022 period, the Department of Human Resources prioritised HR workforce planning, recruitment policies and practices, digitalisation and streamlining of work processes (e-Per, early voluntary retirement, HR eTicketing system), restructuring of HR functions in Field Offices to align these better with HQ Amman, and improving transparency. The Agency now uses INSPIRA (including UN rosters), has established, tailored online workforce planning process, has reclassified its post structure, developed uniform organigrammes, and supported management in abolishing permanent contract modalities. A new version of the People Strategy, aligned with the 2023-2028 Strategic Plan, is reportedly in an advanced stage of development.

With between 31,000 and 33,000 employees (including daily paid workers and staff on temporary assignments), the workload of UNRWA’s HR Department is high. Recruitment processes are labour-intensive, *inter alia* because of high number of applicants. HR staff are located either at Amman HQ or at the Field Offices; according to UNRWA data, there were 61 posts at Headquarters (54 in Amman, 7 in the Gaza Strip). Each Field Office has a Head of Human Resources Section who administratively reports to the Deputy Director Operations and functionally to the Director Human Resource Department at HQ Amman. There are no HR staff working in

7-12, 16, 17, 25, 117-119, 134, 202, 218, 222, 267, 268, 273-276, 295, 299, 309, 315, 417, 419, 422, 432

refugee camps / at Area level.

#### Element 1

UNRWA has an established staff performance management policy, effective as per 1<sup>st</sup> April 2012 (Organisational Directive No. PD/1/112.6/Rev. 1; and Area Personnel Directive No. PD/A/23). The policy describes the principles of performance management, the annual performance cycle, performance ratings, the rebuttal process, rewards and recognition policies, managing of underperformance, senior management oversight and human resource planning, and the roles and responsibilities of relevant stakeholders.

As part of the Performance Management system, the Agency uses the e-PER, an electronic web-based performance management tool. The e-PER system has two evaluation templates: one for Area Staff grades 16 and below and one for Area Staff Grade 16 and above and international staff. Competencies were unified for all grades following the implementation of e-PER simplification project. Staff are evaluated against their objectives (retrieved from departmental workplans) and competencies. Continuous feedback and dialogue are encouraged during the e-PER cycle, involving objective-setting at the cycle initiation where staff members and supervisors agree on workplans, formal discussion at Mid-Point Review and full Year-End evaluation when final rating is awarded. The performance management policy applies to all staff, i.e. both International and Area staff. For contractors, UNRWA has a separate performance evaluation template which is archived manually. The performance evaluation is completed at the end of each contract so is different to the ePER cycle for staff. In addition to the e-Per system, UNRWA requires all senior managers and Directors to complete Management Compacts, that clarify expectations and strengthen accountability. Compacts are not an alternative to the e-Per system but rather, are complementary to and strengthen UNRWA's performance assessment system.

#### Element 2

The e-PER system and dashboard provide reports that can be generated by e-PER focal Points at Fields/ HQs. Data obtained from UNRWA shows that, at HQ levels, compliance rates are 90 per cent or higher.

**Table 11: HQs completion rates for 2018-2022 as of 28 March 2023**

Cycle	Total no. of reports	Closed and Completed Reports	Pending Reports	Compliance Rate %
2018	331	321	10	97%
2019	368	362	6	98%
2020	415	410	5	99%
2021	452	433	19	96%
2022	462	415	47	90%

Source: UNRWA

In its 2020 audit, the United Nations Board of Auditors found low compliance rate in performance evaluations for non-teaching and teaching staff members (= the largest staff category) in the 2019 and 2020 e-performance cycles. For instance, for the 2019 cycle for non-teaching staff, from January to June 2020, the headquarters compliance rate was only 46 per cent, while the rate of three departments was zero; for the 2020 cycle for non-teaching staff, from July to September 2020, the compliance rate in the submission of the mid-cycle performance review was only 12 per cent, and in 9 of the 19 departments was zero. In response, the Agency took numerous actions, resulting in an Agency-wide completion rate of e-performance evaluations in 2021 of 95.09 per cent. Evidence shared on the completion rate of e-PER for Area Teaching staff shows that approximately 87 per cent had completed the performance report on time.

#### Element 3

At UNRWA, budgets for staff development are extremely low. For instance, in 2022, the Jordan Field Office had a budget of only US\$20,000 for staff development for all 7000 employees. Because UNRWA neither has the funds nor the staff to provide in-person (mandatory) training to all staff, it relies on e-learning as its main training method. UNRWA has developed several e-learning courses, some of which are mandatory (Basic Information Security Awareness, Ethics and Integrity, Gender Awareness, Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Prevention of Sexual Harassment and Abuse of Authority, and Social Media & Neutrality). It also works with other

UN Agencies to ‘piggyback’ on their training material (e.g., WHO, UNESCO).

Implementation of training plans and completion of mandatory training appears to be low, however. Based on its review of the implementation of (mandatory) staff training plans in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 2021, the UNBOA reported that “of the 130 training plans in the West Bank, 20, including a mandatory training plan, were not implemented as planned. The Board also checked 191 online courses of 37 individuals from 16 June 2021 to 15 October 2021 and noted that the viewing time of each individual was less than 1 per cent of the courseware’s running time. In addition, the Board reviewed the implementation of a total of 135 training plans of the Gaza Strip field office in 2021 and noted that, as of the end of October 2021, only 10 training plans had been completed, accounting for 7 per cent of the total training plans. Of the 135 training plans, 60 mandatory plans and 53 important plans were not completed by the end of October 2021.”

The assessment did not find evidence demonstrating that UNRWA’s performance management is aimed at working with others.

#### Element 4

The e-PER report is intended as a key document which records staff learning needs and wishes for development. E-PER is designed to recognize exceptional performance and to address underperformance in a fair and equitable manner. The assessment did not obtain evidence that this was being systematically applied in the majority of cases. Interview evidence suggests that, in practice, performance assessments tend to be viewed as a box-ticking exercise and monitoring of its use is less of a priority. Underperformance tends to be under-reported.

#### Element 5

As part of the performance management system, UNRWA has an established rebuttal procedure to deal with staff complaints:

- Throughout the performance cycle the staff member and immediate supervisor have been involved in regular dialogue. Any comments or ratings in the report should not be unexpected, and they are to be explained fully to the staff member. Any disagreement by the staff member of the report contents should be settled by first the immediate supervisor, and then the second supervisor. If however, this is not achieved the staff member has an opportunity for a formal review.
- If the staff member has been rated “performance falls short of expectations” they have the opportunity to seek a formal review of the rating. This is initiated by the staff member indicating in Part IX of the ePer that they wish to make a written submission. The submission is to be made to the Chair, Performance Management Rebuttal Committee (PMRC) within 30 days of the receipt of the ePer for final sign off by the staff member. Staff awarded a rating of “meets” or “exceeds expectations” cannot seek a review of the rating.
- The immediate and second supervisors are responsible for ensuring the comments support the award of any rating within the report – either with respect to dimensions or the overall rating. If the staff member considers them to be inconsistent, he or she should discuss this first with the immediate supervisor and then the second supervisor. If the matter cannot be resolved informally the staff member may seek a review of the comments insofar as they relate to the ratings awarded in the same manner as described above.
- When making a submission the staff member is to provide an explanation of why they are rebutting the rating and/or comments within their report. They are to outline the steps they took to resolve the disagreement prior to the submission with both their immediate and second supervisor. The Secretary of the PMRC will send copies of the statement to the immediate and second supervisors for comments. The immediate and second supervisors are to forward their comments within 14 days to the Secretary of the PMRC through the Headquarters Department Head (in the case of Headquarters staff) and through the Field Office Director and the appropriate Headquarters Department Head (in the case of Field staff). Copies of all comments received will be sent to the staff member who may submit one final comment within one week.
- Following receipt of the comments, the PMRC will review the staff member’s statement, together with the comments of the supervisors, Field Director, and Department Head, and will record its appraisal in writing. In preparation of the appraisal the committee may seek such input from appropriate stakeholders as it sees fit. A copy of this appraisal will be given to the staff member. The panel may direct that the:
  - dimension and/or overall rating(s) stand; or
  - dimension and/or overall rating(s) be amended; or

- comments remain as written; or
- comments be amended to reflect the rating(s) awarded; or
- a combination of the above.
- Statements of rebuttal submitted after a lapse of one month shall not be accepted or acted upon unless the Chair of the PRMC is satisfied that the delay was reasonably justified.
- The PMRC will be made up of three members with the Deputy Commissioner- General as the Chair and two other members at D1 or D2 level and including one Field Director. The duties may be delegated one grade lower but such delegates must be at least one grade higher than the staff member making the submission, and they must also be from different organisational units. The Chief Personnel Services Division HQ(A) will act as the permanent secretary for the PMRC. If the staff member submitting the request for review is in the reporting chain of the CPSD, then Chief HR Planning & Development Division will act as the alternate.

At UNRWA, staff disputes are recurrent and involve various kinds of complaints. The Agency has different mechanisms in place to handle disputes, such as the independent UNRWA Dispute Tribunal (created in 2011, 3 staff), the internal Investigations Division within the Department of Internal Oversight, the Department of Legal Affairs, and now also the Ombudsperson (created in 2022, one staff, initially XB funded but now covered through assessed contributions). Interviewees pointed to what they described as “an organisational culture of conflict and litigation”; rather than aiming to settle disputes at the staff-member – supervisor level or have others mediate, there was a tendency to escalate and issue formal complaints that would then have to be investigated and eventually end up at the dispute tribunal. UNRWA has established an internal working group called the ‘basket of issues’ to seek ways to lower the caseloads. The Ombudsperson function is clearly filling a vacuum, with staff demand for engagement with the Ombudsperson exceeding capacity. Arguably, more preventative, or curative capacity would help to reduce the number of cases and build levels of trust within the Agency.

#### MI 3.4 Evidence confidence

High

#### KPI 4: Organisational systems are cost- and value-conscious and enable financial transparency and accountability

KPI score

Satisfactory

2.74

**UNRWA operates with a single integrated budget framework, incorporating all three budget portals** (programme budget, priority projects and emergency appeals). In practice, the latter two funding streams are at times also used as a means to cope with Programme Budget funding shortfalls and mobilize and subsequently allocate additional resources. UNRWA uses its three funding streams in a pragmatic and complementary way.

**In 2018, UNRWA moved away from standalone annual operational plans for each field office to a single UNRWA-wide annual operational plan, although this does not preclude field offices from developing their own work plans.** UNRWA employs a wide range of advisory and decision making forums including Executive Advisory Group and Senior Management Team meetings, senior management retreats, mid-year and annual results reviews, biweekly meetings with field offices, meetings of the Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation, Advisory Committee on Human Resources, Project Review and Project Assessment Committee. Alongside formal planning and budgeting and expense review procedures, because of the structural funding and cash flow challenges, the Executive Office, together with the Directors of Finance, Human Resources and Planning, convene on a very regular basis to allocate available resources across the Agency, based on available and forecasted revenue (across all revenue sources) and expenditures data. Over time, these meetings have become the main forum for short-term decision-making, the key aim of which is to keep services flowing, and salaries paid. As a result, principles of results-based budgeting and performance-based (re-)prioritisation are often effectively overtaken by events and the corresponding need to ensure the agency can respond to immediate, critical needs.

**During the 2018-2022 period, UNRWA has made several adjustments to its internal control mechanisms, partly in response to the internal management crisis of 2018/19 that led to the development of the “Management Initiatives”, aimed at strengthening oversight, transparency, and accountability, among others.** In 2020, UNRWA revised its “Charter of the Department of Internal Oversight Services”, as well as the Charter of the Committee on Internal Oversight (ACIO), and in 2021, issued a revised Investigation Policy. Despite these improvements and a few additional staff posts, UNRWA’s internal oversight capacity, including its audit and



investigative capacity, remains insufficient. Moreover, notwithstanding expressed commitments to enhance Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) within the Agency, UNRWA does not yet have a comprehensive ERM Policy.

**Considerable effort has gone into strengthening ethical behaviour in the workplace as a way to prevent misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment. UNRWA has prioritised protection from sexual exploitation and abuse over Sexual Harassment, and its approach to PSEA has been pragmatic.** Rather than drafting a PSEA strategy, the main focus has been to (further) operationalise and/ mainstream PSEA in the work of other Departments. Many positive steps have been taken during the assessment timeframe. Still, with a workforce of 28,000 (not counting the thousands of daily paid employees), ensuring staff are aware and trained in all pertinent areas of misconduct is a major and costly affair. With only three dedicated positions in the entire Agency to work on ethics and PSEA/SH, and with hardly any funds available for staff training, obligations and objectives far outweigh delivery capacity, thereby increasing risk to vulnerable people. These risks are amplified given the apparent lack of trust amongst beneficiaries of UNRWA to raise issues related to SEA allegations, a widely regarded underreporting of cases, and the need for 61contextualised PSEA activity which can only be delivered with significant investment and alignment with accountability to affected populations efforts (AAP).

MI 4.1: Transparent decision-making for resource allocation, consistent with strategic priorities over time (adaptability)	Score
Overall MI rating	Satisfactory
Overall MI score	2.75
Element 1: An explicit organisational statement or policy is available that clearly defines criteria for allocating resources to partners	3
Element 2: The criteria reflect targeting to the highest priority themes/countries/areas of intervention as set out in the current strategic plan	2
Element 3: Resource allocation mechanisms allow for adaptation in different contexts	3
Element 4: The organisational policy or statement is regularly reviewed and updated	3
MI 4.1 Analysis	Evidence documents
<p><b>Element 1</b></p> <p>Owing to its distinct mandate, character, and operational scope, unlike other UN entities, UNRWA operates as a direct service provider, engaging partners only on an ad hoc basis, where the amount of funds involved amount to a small fraction of the overall Agency budget. In this context, no explicit organisational statement or policy is available which clearly defines criteria for allocating resources to <u>partners</u>. Thus, the assessment considers the extent to which UNRWA clearly defines its resource allocation criteria in general.</p> <p>As mentioned in MI 1.4., UNRWA operates with a single integrated budget framework, incorporating all three budget portals (programme budget, priority projects and emergency appeals). For the Programme Budget, both programmatically and geographically, prioritization is largely driven by overarching priorities stipulated in the planning and budgeting preparation instructions, technical criteria (norms and standards), the anticipated scale of demand (based on population data and other statistics generated by UNRWA's programme departments and field Offices), project priority lists (based on priority criteria for the next annual plan), the presence of alternatives (i.e., host nations' provision of services), and Human Resources' operational instructions. These priorities and criteria are for internal planning purposes only. Priority projects and Emergency Appeals provide the Agency with some degree of flexibility to respond to the diverse needs and contexts of different Field Offices.</p> <p>Until 2018, field offices were required to produce standalone annual operational plans, as were headquarters departments and programmes. To streamline internal processes and enhance efficiency, from 2018 onwards, standalone plans were no longer required, and since then, the Department of Planning coordinates a single UNRWA-wide annual operational plan. Annual Operational Plans are required to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Reflect annual priorities set by the Commissioner-General and be aligned with the UNRWA programme/sector/ department policies and strategies.</li> <li>b) Be based on realistic income projections from the Department of External Relations and Communications</li> <li>c) Be consistent with budgets developed under the lead of the Department of Finance.</li> <li>d) Be discussed with the Human Resources Department to assess eventual staffing implications.</li> <li>e) Detail the results that will be achieved in accordance with the Agency's monitoring framework.</li> </ul>	<p>7-12, 15-18, 32, 52, 56, 173, 174, 203-206, 223, 273-276, 295-297, 299, 423-427</p>



- f) Set out the activities that will be conducted to achieve the aforementioned results.
- g) Set out the key risks to be managed during the concerned year.
- h) Take into account relevant audit and evaluation findings.
- i) Encompass all funding streams; and
- j) Set out priority projects for implementation (and resource mobilization) in the course of the relevant year.

The Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation (ACRA) reviews the budgets linked to the annual operational plan in a series of meetings and makes recommendations to the Commissioner-General. Budget allocation discussions also take place within the Executive Advisory Group, offering further advice to the CG. The Commissioner-General then decides and subsequently authorizes each accountable director to implement their relevant annual operational plan.

For the Programme Budget (PB), Organisational Directive 2 in combination with annually updated general guidance for programme planning and budgeting form the basis for Agency-wide annual workplans and corresponding budgets. The guidance is detailed, and the planning process involves several rounds of consultations involving HQ and field-level managers. Within the PB, Health and Education services are prioritised. For these and other programmes, Agency-wide norms and standards have been developed as the basis for budgeting and – eventually – resource allocations. For instance, Class Formation Norms and Standards are used to determine the number of class sections in schools in the forthcoming academic year, with the resultant number of class sections then determining the number of teachers, Deputy and School Principals, and education support cadre. Allocations are adjusted over time, based on changes in demand, which is a function of demography, socio-economic conditions, and access by Palestine refugees to host authority services. This explains, for example, why UNRWA provides secondary education in Lebanon only and also why hospitalization budgets are higher in Lebanon. It also explains why the Agency's single largest intervention is education in the Gaza Strip.

#### Element 2

Due to chronic shortfalls in funding for the Programme Budget, UNRWA uses its three funding streams in a pragmatic and complementary way to meet the needs of Palestine refugees, with each field office working through a combination of funding streams.

UNRWA has managed to maintain programme budget expenditure on its main programmes, despite the decrease in PB income, but expenditure based on other funding streams has varied. UNRWA complements PB-allocations in a targeted manner. Through Emergency Appeals, UNRWA raises earmarked and un-earmarked funds from voluntary contributions in response to humanitarian crises, as is the case in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) and for needs linked to the Syria crisis and the economic collapse in Lebanon, where assistance is expected to be provided as long as these conditions prevail. In practice, targeted emergency assistance tends to be of a structural nature.

Priority Projects funding is secured through voluntary earmarked contributions for specific, time-bound activities with a view to improving services without increasing recurrent costs. Prioritization categories are developed each year for priority projects, to make sure they contribute directly to the Agency's strategic outcomes. For instance, the 2023 guidance states that criteria should reflect programmatic priorities included, accompanying policies and strategies, and strategic enablers (risk management, accountabilities, digitalization, communications, partnerships) reflected in the [draft] Strategic Plan 2023 – 2028.

Every year, an updated Priority Projects List for each FO/HQ Department is developed for endorsement by the Project Review Committee (PRC).

In practice, because of the structural funding and cash flow challenges, the Executive Office, together with the Directors of Finance, Human Resources and Planning, convene on a very regular (bi-weekly) basis to allocate available resources across the Agency, based on available and forecasted revenue (across all revenue sources) and expenditures data. Over time, these 'crisis management' meetings have become the main forum for short-term decision-making, the key aim of which is to keep services flowing, and salaries paid. Evidence collected through interviews and the MOPAN survey suggests that allocation criteria are not necessarily clearly defined in advance, nor communicated afterwards.

#### Element 3

The Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation (ACRA) was established in 2012 to advise the Commissioner-General on matters affecting the Agency's budget (all funding sources) as well as *ad hoc* matters that affect the allocation or reallocation of financial resources to Field Offices or Headquarters' departments. ACRA sets out the process for determining annual budget allocations.

In relation to the allocation and monitoring of resources under UNRWA emergency appeals, every year each field of Agency operation, in coordination with the departments of planning and finance, develop a humanitarian operations plan (HOP) to identify their most critical humanitarian needs. HOPs are based on the income forecast shared by the department of external relations and communications (ERCD) for a given year, as well as any available carry forward from the previous year. HOPs only cover minimum financial requirements related to prioritised emergency appeal interventions that need to continue within available income, including those related staffing needs. HOPs are reviewed on a quarterly basis during the Agency's quarterly expenditure reviews. In addition, the departments of planning and finance and field offices continuously monitor fund allocations against critical needs included in the HOPs to identify any shortfall/possible pipeline break/needed adjustments and to inform decision making on unearmarked contributions. Any additional unearmarked contributions (on top of the forecast) received during the year are allocated against the HOP as a priority, until all HOP needs are covered, after which, additional funds are allocated against other emergency interventions or are used to build up carry forward balances for the following year. HOPs are an internal planning and management tool and are not shared outside of UNRWA.

In addition to the above, UNRWA is able to respond to unforeseen crises through the development and issuance of flash appeals. The UNRWA response to the COVID-19 pandemic reportedly showcased the Agency's strength as a frontline service provider through innovative and adapted service provision. With the onset of COVID-19, UNRWA: (i) maintained core service provision, especially in relation to primary health care, education, sanitation and social protection services; (ii) adapted working modalities, including through the introduction of telemedicine and staggered health clinic appointment and triage protocols, the home delivery of essential medicines and the use of self-learning materials / interactive computer-based learning to minimize the spread of disease; and (iii) scaled up in key areas including in relation to food and cash distributions for the most vulnerable. This response was facilitated through the development and implementation of dedicated COVID-19 response flash appeals, underpinned by the Agency's core infrastructure and staffing.

#### Element 4

Considering that the Agency does not have an organisational policy defining criteria for allocating resources to partners, no updating thereof takes place. However, detailed internal guidance for programming and budgeting – referred to in element 1 – is reviewed on an annual basis and updated as necessary.

#### MI 4.1 Evidence confidence

High

MI 4.2: Allocated resources disbursed as planned	Score
Overall MI rating	Satisfactory
Overall MI score	3.00
Element 1: The institution sets clear targets for disbursement to partners	NA
Element 2: Financial information indicates that planned disbursements were met within institutionally agreed margins	NA
Element 3: Clear explanations, including changes in context, are available for any variances against plans	3
Element 4: Variances relate to external factors rather than to internal procedural blockages	3
MI 4.2 Analysis	Evidence documents
<b>Element 1</b> Owing to its distinct mandate, character, and operational scope, unlike other UN entities, UNRWA operates as a direct service provider, engaging partners only on an ad hoc basis, where the amount of funds involved amount to a small fraction of the overall Agency budget. In this context, no explicit organisational statement or policy is available which clearly defines criteria for allocating resources to partners. Hence, the Agency also does not set clear targets for disbursements to partners. Therefore, this element is considered not applicable.	7-12, 16, 17, 52, 53, 56, 203-206, 223, 273-276, 295, 296, 299
<b>Element 2</b>	

Noting that, in harmony with its mandate as a direct service provider, the Agency does not set clear targets (plans) for disbursements to partners, expenditures (financial information) are not required to be in line with institutionally agreed margins. Therefore, this element is considered not applicable.

### Element 3

UNRWA has established procedures to monitor performance and variance against planned expenditures across all three funding portals, field offices conduct monthly expenditure reviews. That information feeds into Agency-wide quarterly expenditure reviews, in which the information is consolidated to ensure that resource mobilization is carried out according to needs and that funding gaps across the three funding streams (programme budget, emergency appeal and projects) are mapped.

In compliance with the reporting obligations set forth in the MTS and various organisational directives including Budget Technical Instruction No. 07 Quarterly Expenditure Reviews (QER) that were issued in 2019, QERs are conducted to monitor annual budget allocations and ensure that budget holders (field office programme and department managers) comply with their budget allotments. In addition, these reviews serve to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of resource utilization and highlight variances in respect of significant over expenditure and/or under expenditure against the approved budget and expected end-of-year forecasts; they also serve to recommend remedial action. QERs are coordinated by the Department of Finance at the headquarters level and involve meetings with all five field offices. During those reviews, field offices have the opportunity to discuss funding gaps and identify solutions with headquarters. Financial information and funding gaps are also included in the Agency-wide annual operational reports and linked to progress made in achieving strategic outcomes.

Financial information and funding gap updates and their effect on the achievement of the strategic outcomes are regularly submitted to the Advisory Commission. The plenary of the Commission receives detailed information twice a year (in June and November) and has quarterly follow-ups through four meetings of its subcommittee. Financial information is reported to the General Assembly annually.

### Element 4

The UN Board of Auditors (UNBOA) produces an annual financial report and audited financial statements of UNRWA. These include explanations of material differences between the original budget and the final budget, and between the final budget and actual expenditure amounts. Variations in the budgetary utilization of the different budget cost components are recorded and explained as the result of various factors, such as management actions to reduce the cash shortfall (such as requirements to maintain a staff vacancy rate of 9 per cent, budget cuts on staff training, travel and consultancy, but also postponement of projects and/or payments to vendors); late receipt of project funds; additional austerity measures; the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (including lockdowns, restrictions on travel and human gatherings and remote working); and other budget reserves.

## MI 4.2 Evidence confidence

Medium

## MI 4.3: Principles of results-based budgeting applied

Score

### Overall MI rating

Satisfactory

### Overall MI score

2.75

Element 1: The most recent organisational budget clearly aligns financial resources with strategic objectives/intended results of the current strategic plan

4

Element 2: A budget document is available that provides clear costs for the achievement of each management result

3

Element 3: Systems are available and used to track costs from activity to result (outcome)

2

Element 4: There is evidence of improved costing of management and development results in budget documents reviewed over time (evidence of building a better system)

2

## MI 4.3 Analysis

Evidence documents

### Element 1

Results-based budgeting is a programme budget process in which: (a) programme formulation revolves around a set of predefined objectives and expected results; (b) resource requirements are derived from and linked to the outputs required to achieve such results; and (c) actual performance in achieving results is measured by

10-18, 32, 46, 52, 56, 173, 174, 193, 194, 203-

objective performance indicators. (source: Council of Europe, Results Based Budgeting Manual, 2005, p.4).

206,277,295

There are several programme and budgeting mechanisms in place:

- (i) The (initially biennial and now annual) proposed programme budgets to be covered by the UN's Regular Budget. These proposed programme budgets are submitted to the GA for approval and include an overview of past performance and objectives for the next year for each strategic outcome; the corresponding budgets, however, only cover RB-funded posts and non-posts which form a relatively insignificant part of UNRWA's overall budget requirements (for 2022, this amounted to US\$35.3m. only) and which, from an RBB perspective, are not meaningfully connected to strategic outcomes or outputs.
- (ii) The biennial programme budgets ("Blue Book"), the latest one covering the 2022-2023 period, which align budget requirements with high-level strategic objectives and sub-programmes, (e.g., education, health), without disaggregating these further at outcome and output levels.
- (iii) The MTS / strategic plan that set out the Agency's multi-year strategic objectives and their corresponding budgets, i.e., forecast expenditures disaggregated against strategic outcomes and fields of operation. The budgets in the MTS/SP cover all funding streams.
- (iv) The (internal) annual planning and budgeting exercises for PB, EA's and projects, to be funded through voluntary contributions, across all funding streams.

Of these, the latter is arguably the most relevant planning and budgeting process for UNRWA's programming and resource allocation decision-making. It is a closely orchestrated process, overseen by the Departments of Finance and of Planning, and based on detailed and annually updated guidance (planning assumptions, budget principles, human resources operational principles, and others). Recommended PB and EA envelopes are developed at HQ level by the Departments of Finance and of Planning and shared with Fields and HQ Departments, on which basis these then develop detailed plans and budgets.

Budgeting and resource allocations reflect organisational priorities. As was shown in MI 1.4., 84 per cent of total expenditures went to education, health and relief and social services. Education is by far the largest programme (44.2 per cent of all funding streams), followed by RSS (24.5 per cent) and Health (13.4 per cent). The budgets are calculated on the basis of programme-specific technical norms and standards which define procedures for determining staffing levels and composition for the different services that UNRWA offers. Staff salaries constitute the largest expense category. Approved annual budgets indicate the expected costs for the achievement of *strategic objectives* at Field and Department levels – these are not costed at output and outcome levels.

## Element 2

UNRWA's Annual Operational Plans (AOPs), internal management documents not intended for external release or publication, include detailed lists of priority activities, both Agency-wide and at Field and Department levels, and identified risks. These priorities are not costed in the AOP, nor is there a clear link between the AOPs and other programme and budget documents, or between the priority activities listed in the AOPs and the common monitoring matrix.

With the exception of the Management Initiative, which added a cost to the envisaged activities and expected results, UNRWA does not systematically cost organisational management results envisaged in Strategic Plans (2016-22, 2023-28) and Annual Operational Plans.

## Element 3

The Agency has different tracking mechanisms in place to track expenditures and achievements of the MTS at results and indicator levels. All UNRWA field offices, programme and support departments and the executive office report against these indicators within the Results-Based Monitoring (RBM) system. The Annual Results Reviews (ARR) are held under the leadership of the Deputy Commissioner General, and review and analyse MTS programme results achieved and not achieved under Agency-wide common indicator targets listed within the Common Monitoring Matrix (CMM), results achieved and not achieved under indicator targets listed within the 2021 oPt EA and Syria regional crisis EA; and risk management. ARR's are very detailed (200 page) documents that present Agency-wide and Field level achievements against targets for each CMM indicator. Whilst progress is measured for each outcome and output indicator against baselines and results targets, expenditures are not considered.

A tracking system is in place for Emergency Appeals. Another tracking mechanism is the Quarterly Expenditure

Review (QER) process. QERs monitor actual expenditures against budget allocations, highlighting significant variance in over and under expenditures. Besides this formalized quarterly process, regular (bi-) weekly meetings have been put in place to review expenditures and funding forecasting and 'crisis-manage' structural cash flow challenges more frequently. Thus, tracking expenses from activities to outcomes is not part of the ARR, nor of the QER.

#### Element 4

During the past 4 years, UNRWA has taken steps to improve the costing and monitoring of development results. The independent evaluation of UNRWA's Monitoring and Reporting found that "[This] work to identify investments according to strategic objectives represents a step towards results-based budgeting (RBB), which in turn is characterized by many RBM advocates – most notably MOPAN – as a critical step towards full RBM." That said, the evaluation casts doubt on the utility of RBB for UNRWA, given its persistent funding challenges: "RBB essentially isn't possible for UNRWA given the persistent funding crisis: the RBM system broadly delivers on its results monitoring and reporting aims, but its contribution to a comprehensive RBM approach is not currently feasible, particularly with regards to RBB."

All in all, it appears that in practice, UNRWA's results-based budgeting efforts at the MTS / Strategic Plan level are swiftly overtaken by events. Once the MTS is operationalised into Annual Operational Plans, structural funding shortages and unpredictable funding streams dictate the course of events, necessitating adjustments to the budget on an almost constant basis in accordance with realistic funding forecasts rather than the projected needs stipulated in the MTS. In many respects, keeping the Agency afloat by ensuring continuity of service delivery – through a combination of austerity measures, reallocation of funds from different funding streams, delayed payments to vendors and otherwise – has become management's top priority, rather than better aligning resources with results by applying RBB principles.

#### MI 4.3 Evidence confidence

Medium

#### MI 4.4: External audit or other external reviews certify that international standards are met at all levels, including with respect to internal audit

Score

##### Overall MI rating

Satisfactory

##### Overall MI score

3.25

Element 1: External audit conducted which complies with international standards

4

Element 2: Most recent external audit confirms compliance with international standards across functions

3

Element 3: Management response is available to external audit

3

Element 4: Management response provides clear action plan for addressing any gaps or weaknesses identified by external audit

3

#### MI 4.4 Analysis

Evidence documents

##### Element 1

UNRWA's financial statements are audited annually by the United Nations Board of Auditors, in accordance with the International Standards of Auditing.

##### Element 2

The most recent external audit (2021) states that "the transactions of UNRWA that have come to our notice or that we have tested as part of our audit have, in all significant respects, been in accordance with the Financial Regulations of UNRWA and legislative authority." The UNBOA audit report notes several areas where UNRWA's actions were not in compliance with UNRWA requirements. These involve:

- The not evaluating the performance of existing vendors on a regular basis was not in compliance with the requirements of the UNRWA procurement manual (p. 30)
- Non-compliance of the application for the contract time extension for infrastructure and camp improvement (p. 32)
- Non-compliance with operational manuals (p. 35)

273-276

Building sufficient internal audit capacity has been a recurrent challenge for UNRWA, something the Agency was well aware of. As a result, it was unable to meet international internal auditing standards. During the past years, performance has improved considerably, to the extent that, in 2022, UNRWA's internal audit quality was

externally assessed against professional framework standards and rated as “Generally Conforms”, the highest of three possible ratings.

### Element 3

UNRWA’s management responses to UNBOA recommendations are included in the UNBOA audit reports. The Finance department is responsible for monitoring measures and UNRWA’s compliance with these recommendations. The Agency does not provide a separate management response, as this is not required by UNBOA. However, the Agency does provide management responses to UNBOA recommendations, and regular progress updates on prior recommendation implementation to UNBOA auditors in advance of their biannual review missions.

### Element 4

The external audit reports are public documents. They include overviews of UNRWA’s responses to recommendations in previous audit reports, measures taken, and the UNBOA’s assessment thereof. UNRWA does not issue separate management responses. The external audit reports track the level of implementation of recommendations as far back as five years. The external audit reports also include recommendations pertaining to the assessed calendar year, UNRWA’s response to each, and the UNBOA’s reply to these, if and when necessary.

In 2022, the Board of Auditors noted that there were 51 outstanding recommendations up to the year ended 31 December 2020, of which 29 (57 per cent) had been implemented, 21 (41 per cent) were under implementation and one (2 per cent) had been overtaken by events. The Board acknowledged the efforts made by UNRWA to increase the implementation status of previous recommendations.

## MI 4.4 Evidence confidence

High

## MI 4.5: Issues or concerns raised by internal control mechanisms (operational and financial risk management, internal audit, safeguards etc.) are adequately addressed

Score

### Overall MI rating

Satisfactory

### Overall MI score

3.00

Element 1: A clear policy or organisational statement exists on how issues identified through internal control mechanisms/reporting channels (including misconduct such as fraud, sexual misconduct) will be addressed

3

Element 2: Management guidelines or rules provide clear guidance on the procedures for addressing any identified issues and include timelines

3

Element 3: Clear guidelines are available for staff on reporting any issues identified

3

Element 4: A tracking system is available that records responses and actions taken to address any identified issues

3

Element 5: Governing body or management documents indicate that relevant procedures have been followed/action taken in response to identified issues, including recommendations from audits (internal and external) with clear timelines for action

3

## MI 4.5 Analysis

Evidence documents

### Element 1

In the MTS, UNRWA commits to ensuring that accepted recommendations of audits, evaluations, and inspections, as well as decisions relating to fraud, corruption, and other financial irregularities, are promptly followed up and implemented. The Department of Internal Oversight Services is responsible for tracking, following up and quality checking the implementation of recommendations from Internal Oversight.

During the 2018-2022 period, UNRWA has made several adjustments to its internal control mechanisms, partly in response to the management crisis that then led to the development of the “Management Initiative”, aimed at strengthening oversight, transparency, and accountability, among others.

In 2020, UNRWA revised its Organisational Directive No. 14 “**Charter of the Department of Internal Oversight Services**”, setting out the Department’s terms of reference regarding oversight functions of internal audit, investigation, and evaluation (for the latter, see KPI 8). The 2020 document supersedes and replaces the previous OD No. 14 of 2012.

29, 54, 121-129, 146, 147, 217, 300-306  
(Including: Ethics Annual Reports 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021)



Also in 2020, UNRWA issued a renewed terms of reference (Organisational Directive No. 30) for the Ethics Office, in accordance with the actions listed in the Management Initiative, superseding, and replacing the previous OD 30, issued on 11 April 2011. Until 2020, the Ethics function was administratively attached to the DIOS structure but has always operated independently.

In addition, in 2021, DIOS issued UNRWA's **Investigation Policy** in Technical Instruction 01/2021. The Policy provides the framework and establishes governing principles for the investigations of allegations of misconduct by UNRWA personnel. Misconduct at UNRWA is defined similarly as in other United Nations Organisations and Agencies as a failure by personnel to comply with the required standards of conduct. These include, but are not limited to, fraud; corruption; theft; abuse of privileges and immunities; harassment; sexual harassment; abuse of authority/power; assault; sexual exploitation and abuse; violation of humanitarian principles, including neutrality; or failure to observe regulations, rules, and policies.

DIOS' responsibility for investigation includes the following:

- Maintaining a confidential registry of allegations and complaints in a centralised Case Management System, which is managed and supervised to ensure the timely recording and management of allegations, complaints, and related investigative activity.
- Managing the Agency's telephone hotline email and online complaints system.
- Conducting investigations.
- Providing technical advice, guidance and training to staff who may be required to carry out investigations supervised by Field and Departmental Directors.
- Administering a process of quality assurance by initiating reviews of investigations conducted by other HQ Departments and Field Offices.
- Conducting further investigation if not satisfied with the results or recommendation of any investigation carried out by the Field and Department Directors.
- Maintaining the security and confidentiality of all information and documentary and physical evidence related to DIOS investigations; and
- Respecting the individual rights of staff members and acting with strict regard for fairness and due process for all concerned in accordance with applicable regulations, rules, and administrative issuances.

In 2012, UNRWA established the **Advisory Committee on Internal Oversight (ACIO)**, which serves as an expert advisory panel to assist the Commissioner-General of UNRWA in respect, inter alia, of the Agency's financial reporting, risk management processes, internal control arrangements, evaluation system, ethics function, external audit matters and the internal oversight function, including internal audit, evaluation, and investigation. The ACIO advises on these matters taking into consideration the applicable professional standards and UNRWA regulations, rules and other administrative issuances, policies and procedures, and best practices across the UN system, International Financial Institutions, and private sector. The Charter of the ACIO was updated in 2020.

**Ethics:** Considerable effort has gone into strengthening ethical behaviour in the workplace as a way to prevent misconduct. Despite very limited capacity, the Ethics Office has produced an Ethics Code of Conduct, established an Ethics Focal Point Network, and developed and rolled-out new training courses on Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption, Ethics and Integrity, and developed an Ethics refresher course. Together with the investigations division within DIOS, posters, and pocket cards on the reporting of misconduct were rolled-out across UNRWA facilities and offices.

Notwithstanding expressed commitments to enhance **Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)** within the Agency, UNRWA does not yet have a comprehensive ERM Policy. AOPs reflect a range of political, programmatic, socio-economic, financial, crisis / emergency response, reputational and operational related risks. In 2022, an internal maturity assessment by the internal audit division of DIOS concluded that, despite some progress in several areas, the overall maturity level of ERM was 2 on a scale of 5:



Figure 11: UNRWA internal maturity assessment 2022



The report recommended that:

- To further improve its ERM process, the Agency should work towards further strengthening its risk management culture and building capacity at all organisation levels expanding the knowledge at limited groups across all layers.
- Agency should expedite the finalization and issuance of a comprehensive ERM policy, that takes into consideration the linkage of risks to the UNRWA new strategic plan and formalizes most of the activities that are already systematically taking place.
- The Agency should continue to seek requisite resources to establish a dedicated structure for ERM preferably within Department of Planning (DP) to perform all activities currently carried out by the DP and other stakeholders, to address the risks facing the organisation at the consolidated aggregate level. The risk function should include clearly defined roles and responsibilities, delegated authority, and reporting lines.

#### Element 2

The Investigation Policy describes the investigation process (from intake to closure), governing principles (rights and obligations of all UNRWA personnel, of complainants, of subjects of investigations), and steps to be taken in the event of a conflict of interest. UNRWA has also updated internal guidelines for staff on protection against retaliation for reporting misconduct (October 2022), and an accompanying information pamphlet on whistleblower protection, describing the procedures, actors and actions covered by the policy. In 2021, the investigations division also revised its 'Guide to Conducting Investigations', its guidance on referral of allegations of serious misconduct to DIOS, and updated investigation templates.

#### Element 3

The guidelines for staff are well-documented and available for all staff. In addition, posters and other awareness-raising material is present in UNRWA facilities, whilst DIOS also conducts training sessions, targeting middle managers, to draw attention to the policies and guidelines and to promote dissemination of these to frontline staff. Nonetheless, with approximately 28,000 staff on the one hand, and very limited capacity within DIOS's investigations department (8 staff in 2021, 9 in 2022) and the independent Ethics Office (3 staff: 1 P5 Head (RB-funded), 1 P4 Sexual Misconduct Task Force coordinator (contracted), and 1 G17 Area Officer) on the other, raising awareness among staff about (new/updated) policies, procedures and referral mechanisms whilst responding to increasing demand from staff, is extremely challenging.

#### Element 4

DIOS has tracking systems in place to monitor compliance with recommendations from internal oversight. DIOS maintains a central case management system (i-Sight) to track its investigation cases. Audit and evaluation recommendations are also tracked in the Agency Results Based Monitoring system as well as internally, within the DIOS Internal Audit and Evaluation Divisions.

DIOS issues annual reports with separate chapters for the three divisions: internal audit, investigations, and evaluation. These reports also include 4-year overviews of the status of recommendations under

implementation for the internal audit and evaluation function. On investigations, DIOS reports include quantitative and qualitative analyses of trends, typologies of cases and their evolution, allegations received, timeliness of investigations, substantiation rates and backlog of open cases. Moreover, summaries of Internal Oversight highlights are included in Annual Operational Reports. These reports are open-source documents and are shared and discussed with UNRWA's Advisory Commission annually.

Similarly, the Ethics Office also issues annual reports, in accordance with UN-system wide instructions and UNRWA's own OD 30.

#### Element 5

Issues or concerns raised by internal control mechanisms (operational and financial risk management, internal audit, safeguards etc.) are reported in DIOS annual reports and annual operational reports. In addition, DIOS and Ethics Office give oral presentations to the Advisory Commission on a regular basis. Clear timelines for action are not included.

#### MI 4.5 Evidence confidence

High

#### MI 4.6: Policies and procedures effectively prevent, detect, investigate and sanction cases of fraud, corruption and other financial irregularities

Score

#### Overall MI rating

Satisfactory

#### Overall MI score

2.83

Element 1: A clear policy/guidelines on fraud, corruption and any other financial irregularities is available and made public

3

Element 2: The policy/guidelines clearly define/s the roles of management and staff in implementing/complying with them

3

Element 3: Staff training/awareness-raising has been conducted on policy/guidelines

2

Element 4: There is evidence of policy/guidelines implementation, e.g. through regular monitoring and reporting to the governing body

3

Element 5: There are channels/mechanisms in place for reporting suspicion of misuse of funds (e.g. anonymous reporting channels and "whistle-blower" protection policy)

3

Element 6: Annual reporting on cases of fraud, corruption, and other irregularities, including actions taken, and ensures that they are made public

3

#### MI 4.6 Analysis

Evidence documents

#### Element 1

UNRWA's 2015 **Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Policy** remains the basis for preventing and dealing with cases of fraud and corruption. It describes principles, roles, and responsibilities of UNRWA personnel, an Agency-wide policy framework to prevent, detect and deter fraud and corruption, reporting and investigating allegations, actions to be taken, and the annual reporting on allegations and investigation cases by DIOS to the Advisory Commission and the ACIO (see 4.5.1.).

#### Element 2

The anti-fraud and anti-corruption policy of 2015 provides clear guidelines on the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders involved:

- a. **"The Commissioner-General:** The Commissioner-General is ultimately responsible for the implementation and communication of the Agency's zero tolerance approach fraud and corruption. As the custodian of the Agency's Anti-fraud and Anti-corruption Policy, the Commissioner-General or his delegate approves the Policy and its subsequent revisions.
- b. **Managers:** UNRWA Personnel with any supervisory role should act as role models and are required to take active steps to prevent, detect, deter, and resolve fraud and corruption through oversight and compliance with UNRWA's Regulatory Framework. In addition to their general obligations as Personnel as listed below, managers are expected to implement appropriate controls to prevent, detect, deter, and resolve fraud and corruption, in particular:
  - i. Identify the potential fraud risks to which their assets, programmes, activities, and interests are exposed.
  - ii. Assess the identified risks, select risk-avoidance options, design and implement cost effective prevention, mitigation, and control measures.

10-12, 147, 272-276, 303-308, 318-321, 325, 349, 352, 383-385

- iii. Adhere to the provisions of this Policy in exercising their delegated authority, as applicable, when entering contractual arrangements with suppliers and/or other third parties; and
  - iv. Ensure that all personnel take the mandatory ethics e-learning course and that new recruits who are expected to work for the Agency for a period of at least three months, do so within one month of their entry on duty.
- c. **Individual members of Personnel:** individual members of Personnel shall:
- i. Adhere to the UNRWA Regulatory Framework, including the Standards of Conduct of the International Civil Services, and act at all times in accordance with the highest standards of fairness, integrity, transparency, ethical conduct, and accountability.
  - ii. Exercise due care in managing the funds, resources, and other assets of UNRWA, applying established risk-control measures to mitigate the risk of fraud and corruption.
  - iii. Under no circumstances engage in, condone or facilitate, or appear to condone or facilitate, fraud and/or corruption.
  - iv. Promptly report any practice contrary or reasonably suspected of being contrary to the provisions of this Policy.
  - v. Follow any training on fraud and corruption as may be prescribed by
  - vi. the Agency; and
  - vii. Cooperate with a duly authorized oversight activity.
- d. **Department of Internal Oversight Services:** In accordance with Organisation Directive 14, the Department of Internal Oversight Services (DIOS) has a key role in preventing, detecting, deterring, and effectively responding to acts of fraud and corruption. In particular, DIOS will:
- i. Provide assurance that the Agency's control environment is conducive to preventing, detecting, deterring, and responding to fraud and corruption.
  - ii. Raise awareness of risks of fraud and corruption through guidance and/or training to Agency Personnel.
  - iii. Consider fraud and corruption red flags and risk factors in audit planning and reporting, consistent with applicable auditing standards.
  - iv. Provide 'lessons learned' from oversight work relevant to the further development of the Agency's risk management framework.
  - v. Be responsible for investigating fraud and corruption and assisting investigation of fraud and corruption carried out by investigators designated by Field Office Directors; and with the assistance of other relevant Departments, take prompt and reasonable action to recover misappropriated funds or losses caused by fraud and corruption."

In practice, due to insufficient capacity within the investigations division and field (deputy) directors' conflicting priorities, acting on these roles and responsibilities has proven to be challenging.

### Element 3

With a workforce of 28,000 (not counting the daily paid employees), ensuring staff are aware and trained in all pertinent areas of misconduct is a major and costly affair. UNRWA lacks the resources to provide adequate, face-to-face training, and instead has relied on e-learning as a relatively cost-efficient alternative, whilst recognizing its deficiencies. In 2020-21, the Ethics Office developed a self-learning Ethics Training course (mandatory for all UNRWA personnel), covering aspects of fraud, corruption, and conflicts of interest. The training was rolled out in 2021 and 4,173 staff members conducted the e-learning training. The UN Board of Auditors agrees with the Agency that the only cost-effective way to provide baseline ethics training to a workforce of the size of UNRWA is through e-learning courses.

The Ethics Office also created an ethics refresher course that cover the same topics. In 2021, 657 staff were trained, both online and in-person. In 2022, the total number of staff that completed the Ethics refresher course was 220 (mainly managers, PSEAH and Ethics focal points, and finance department).

### Element 4

DIOS issues Annual Reports that catalogue trends and cases by category, as illustrated in the following table:

**Table 12: New cases by year, ordered by criticality of allegation type**

Category of cases	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
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Sexual Exploitation and Abuse	9	4	10	5	6
Sexual Harassment	3	6	7	3	4
Corporal Punishment	87	62	86	23	23
Breach of Neutrality	55	10	9	7	27
Assault (not CP)	13	20	22	9	9
Retaliation	4	2	2	2	3
Harassment/Discrimination/Abuse of Power	52	18	52	43	43
Recruitment Irregularity	13	8	16	10	5
Fraud, Theft & Loss to the Agency	55	43	65	51	49
Other Cases	76	98	74	64	91
Total	367	271	282	172	210

Source: UNRWA (2022)

The 2021 Annual Report also includes a 5-year overview of Agency-wide investigations backlog (2017-2021), showing that the open case backlog averaged 260 cases per year.

In addition, the Ethics Office Annual Reports provide evidence as to the implementation of UNRWA efforts to prevent, detect, investigate, and sanction cases of fraud, corruption, and other financial irregularities (ref. element 3).

#### Element 5

UNRWA General Staff Circular No. 03/2022 “Protection against Retaliation for Reporting Misconduct” (whistle-blower protection) was issued in 2022, replacing a 2007 Circular (GSC 05/2007). The new circular provides updated internal guidelines for staff and builds upon the Secretary General’s 2017 Bulletin and the Joint Inspection Unit’s 2018 recommendations. It also includes some UNRWA-specific provisions. It is accompanied by a 4-page information pamphlet on whistle-blower protection, describing the procedures, actors and actions covered by the policy. Together with the investigations division within DIOS, the Ethics Office developed posters and pocket cards on the reporting of misconduct that were rolled-out across UNRWA facilities and offices to all staff.

#### Element 6

DIOS submits detailed reports to the AdCom on an annual basis. These annual reports are publicly available and provide information on the Agency’s investigation of cases and disciplinary actions taken in relation to cases investigated by DIOS. The reports detail the number of new cases opened, differentiated by category (see table 10 above) and include a description of the types of misconduct investigated, an analysis of the investigations, their timeliness, the substantiation and closure rates, and case disposal decisions taken. The Agency also prepares an annual disciplinary digest.

#### MI 4.6 Evidence confidence

High

#### MI 4.7: Prevention and response to sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA)

Score

#### Overall MI rating

Unsatisfactory

#### Overall MI score

2.50

Element 1: Organisation-specific dedicated policy statement(s), action plan and/or code of conduct that address SEA are available, aligned to international standards, and applicable to all categories of personnel

3

Element 2: Mechanisms are in place to regularly track the status of implementation of the SEA policy at HQ and at field levels

3

Element 3: Dedicated resources and structures are in place to support implementation of policy and/or action plan at HQ and in programmes (covering safe reporting channels, and procedures for access to sexual and gender-based violence services)

2

Element 4: Quality training of personnel / awareness-raising on SEA policies is conducted with adequate frequency

2

Element 5: The organisation has clear standards and due diligence processes in place to ensure that implementing partners prevent and respond to SEA

3

Element 6: The organisation can demonstrate its contribution to interagency efforts to prevent and respond to SEA at field level, and SEA policy/best practice coordination fora at HQ

3

Element 7: Actions taken on SEA allegations are timely and their number related to basic information and actions

2

taken / reported publicly	
Element 8: The MO adopts a victim-centred approach to SEA and has a victim support function in place (stand-alone or part of existing structures) in line with its exposure/risk of SEA	2
<b>MI 4.7 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
<p><b>Element 1</b></p> <p>Sexual exploitation and abuse are prohibited through the Secretary-General's Bulletin on sexual exploitation and abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13) and applies to all staff at the United Nations. Whereas UNRWA has a zero-tolerance approach to SEA, it does not (yet) have an Agency-specific policy on Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA). Rather, drawing on the SGB of 2003, it has developed and refined policy elements, such as an Ethics Code of Conduct, and taken several measures to raise awareness (e.g., training courses and other material – see element 4), enhance internal and external reporting (see element 2), build internal resources and structures (element 3), develop/refine response mechanisms (elements 5, 7 and 8), and engage with others (element 6).</p> <p>The genesis of UNRWA's policies and actions on sexual exploitation and abuse dates back to 2010 when, building on SGB 2003/13, the Agency issued a General Staff Circular (GSC 07/2010) detailing the Agency's special complaints procedure for sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). The GSC expanding on the GSC 05/2007 that set out the Agency's approach to allegations and complaints procedures and protection against retaliation for reporting misconduct. In 2016, Area Staff Personnel Directives were updated to incorporate priority misconduct areas, including SEA. Thus, the Agency's initial approach was focused on establishing and applying response mechanisms and less so on prevention measures.</p> <p>In 2018, the CG established a Task Force to review the Agency's approach to SEA and develop approaches that would eliminate SEA altogether. That same year, an action plan was developed prioritising (1) policy development and implementation; (2) cooperative arrangements; (3) appointment of SEA focal points; (4) communication on beneficiary awareness on prevention of SEA; (5) establishment of effective complaints mechanisms, including victim assistance; (6) recruitment and performance management; (7) effective awareness raising among UNRWA staff; and (8) putting in place internal complaints and investigation procedures. For each priority area, actions were identified. Since then, detailed annual plans have been developed, identifying for each of these 8 priority areas what UNRWA is doing/has accomplished, what new actions are envisaged, the key performance indicators for each, timing, and assigned responsibilities.</p> <p>Between 2018 and 2020, policy development itself was not prioritised. Although policy gaps had been identified, further improvements were hampered by capacity shortages. Rather, emphasis was put on concrete measures such as raising staff awareness, establishing a sexual misconduct microsite on the UNRWA intranet, and community outreach. In 2019, an SEA task force was established, and 2 mandatory online training courses were introduced.</p> <p>With the appointment of the first dedicated PSEAH coordinator (P4) in 2020, a new results-oriented 'Action Plan to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse' was developed. The Action Plan comprises 5 priority outcomes – very much inspired by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidelines and the MOPAN assessment framework – with refined outcomes, indicators, targets/benchmarks, key actions, timeframe, and lead responsibilities:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Policy and entity oversight: Entity-specific dedicated policy statement(s) and/or code of conduct that address sexual exploitation and abuse are available and applicable to all categories of personnel, and dedicated resources and structures are in place to support implementation of policy.</li> <li>2. Quality victim/survivor assistance: The entity adopts a victim-centred approach to SEA and has a victim-centred support function in place (stand-alone or part of existing structure)</li> <li>3. Investigations: The entity has clear standards and due diligence processes in place to ensure actions are taken on sexual exploitation and abuse allegations are timely and their number related to basic information are reported publicly</li> <li>4. Accountability and training: Human resource mechanisms and quality training of personnel/awareness-raising on SEA policies is conducted with adequate frequency</li> <li>5. Risk management and partners assessment: Intervention design is based on contextual analysis including of potential risks of sexual exploitations and abuse and measures are in place when working with implementing partners</li> </ol>	<p>161, 149- 155, 162, 163, 176, 209, 218, 258-267, 269, 301, 306-308, 318-354, 433</p>

Given the size of the Agency, prevailing cultural sensitivities and practices surrounding the topic, an apparent lack of trust among beneficiaries in UNRWA to address SEA allegations effectively, as well as the very limited resources available, the approach has been pragmatic and action oriented. The main focus has been to further operationalise and/or incorporate existing PSEA principles across priority areas 2-5, thereby mainstreaming PSEA in the work of other Departments. Thus, the focus lay less on developing an UNRWA-specific PSEA policy (outcome 1); instead, existing policy frameworks (SGB, Personnel Directives and GSCs) were once again distributed to all staff, whilst new material developed by the Ethics Office (e.g., Code of Ethics, Ethics Refresher courses, Leadership Dialogue) was drawn attention to.

For instance, during 2021, UNRWA began the process of updating standard staff contracts to include a specific requirement to adhere to PSEA and SH policies. Since 2010, complementary personnel (Daily Paid Workers, Individual Service Providers, and Interns/Volunteers) at UNRWA have express prohibitions against SEA and SH included in their contracts. As of 2023, this amounts to 16 percent of the workforce. In recent years, UNRWA began updating all categories of personnel contracts to standardize specific language on standards of conduct, including SEA and SH. Approximately 4 percent of staff have this new language included, and this applies to new staff. The Appointment Letters of all new Area Staff (both temporary and fixed term) includes references to UNRWA's Code of Ethics, and the Agency's policies on Prohibition of Discrimination, Harassment – including sexual harassment – and Abuse of Power, Prohibition of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. Senior management KPIs were amended to include reference to PSEA responsibilities, including ensuring a workplan is in place. UNRWA also secured project funding to update its key policies on: (i) PSEA; and (ii) prevention of sexual harassment and abuse of authority (PSHAA). These updated policies are scheduled to be introduced in 2023. PSEA and SH risks were also incorporated into the revised checklist for quarterly, Agency-wide installation inspections conducted through the Humanitarian Principles project. UNRWA's renewed Investigation Policy 2021 also includes reference to SEA, as does the 2021 Procurement Manual. All contractual modalities prohibit SEA. Also, the updated Protection Alignment Review Methodology was refined in 2022 to incorporate PSEA considerations, as was the Whistle-blower Protection policy. The senior management compact letters also include references to a commitment to effective protection from, and response to SEA and SH.

The 2022 UNRWA Code of Ethics states that *"We never exchange money, employment, goods or services for sex, sexual favours, or other forms of humiliating, degrading treatment, or exploitative behaviour. This includes any exchange of assistance that is due to beneficiaries. We never engage the services of sex workers. We must not engage in any sexual activity with children (under 18 years of age). Sexual exploitation or abuse is a catastrophic failure by members of UNRWA personnel to adhere to the Agency's ethical obligations. Sexual exploitation is any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes. This may include profiting monetarily, socially, or politically from the sexual exploitation of another. Sexual abuse is the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature against a person, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions."* (p. 11).

According to the 2022 SEA survey (1269 respondents; 4 per cent of UNRWA staff excluding daily paid labourers), the share of staff strongly agreeing that UNRWA has clear policies on PSEA, increased from 40 per cent in 2018 to 66 per cent in 2022, with only 1 per cent disagreeing strongly. While the trend is positive, some caution is needed, given the low sample of staff participating. Interviewees expressed strong appreciation for UNRWA's zero tolerance principle, the stances taken by UNRWA's leadership on SEA and the work done thus far, but also highlighted the many challenges involved. Rather than protecting victims/survivors (mainly women and girls), some observers have noted a tendency among the beneficiary communities to stigmatise / blame victims and 'resolve' cases through other, traditional methods. Victims/survivors are said to be put under pressure not to report to UNRWA, not only because UNRWA staff themselves constitute an integral part of the community, but also because they fear confidentiality breaches and long investigation procedures. Moreover, few staff allegedly dare to speak out as to whether they have or have not reported SEA instances, for fear of retaliation.

## Element 2

All Agency-wide PSEA Action Plans include targets and performance indicators; since 2021, these have been refined and adjusted to match better with IASC and MOPAN benchmarks.

Since 2018, reporting on the implementation of PSEAH efforts is included in UNRWA's Annual Operational Reports. The 1–2-page sections on AORs reiterate UNRWA's zero tolerance rules and regulations, and list key features of the Agency's performance across different areas: policy development and management; awareness building, training, and capacity building; interagency coordination and participation; and its responses to allegations of SEA. In addition, since 2019, UNRWA issues annual "Attestation Letters", sent by the



Commissioner-General to the UNSG, reporting progress made in the past calendar year. The content resembles that of the AORs.

DIOS Annual Reports include a section on the responses to allegations of SEA and SH during the past calendar year. All UNRWA personnel have the duty to report concerns or suspicions of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) involving beneficiaries and members of the local community. Nevertheless, the number of reported allegations and cases is very low; interviewees believed SEA incidents were being grossly and structurally underreported. Besides cultural restrictions and fear among victims for retaliation, interviewees also alluded to the perceived desire among staff to control what is and isn't being reported.

**Table 13: New cases by year, ordered by criticality of allegation type**

Category of cases	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse	9	4	10	5	6
Sexual Harassment	3	6	7	3	4
Corporal Punishment	87	62	86	23	23
Breach of Neutrality	55	10	9	7	27
Assault (not CP)	13	20	22	9	9
Retaliation	4	2	2	2	3
Harassment/Discrimination/Abuse of Power	52	18	52	43	43
Recruitment Irregularity	13	8	16	10	5
Fraud, Theft & Loss to the Agency	55	43	65	51	49
Other Cases	76	98	74	64	91
<b>Total</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>271</b>	<b>282</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>210</b>

Source: UNRWA

Since 2020, the Agency records all SEA allegations and reports on these in the UN-system wide iReport Tracker system, showing the number of allegations, victims, and perpetrators, disaggregated by gender, child/adult, and type of allegation (SEA/SH/other). Meanwhile, UNRWA's new Guidance on New Integrated Assessments (updated in 2022) includes tracking of the use of posters or other informational materials on PSEAH and the presence of referral systems for PSEAH.

### Element 3

In 2010, UNRWA established an internal Network for the Protection from SEA (PSEA) with a PSEA Coordinator and PSEA focal points in each of its headquarters and field locations to deal with SEA complaints. The Network was also tasked to share and implement best practice in preventing and responding to SEA. The Senior Ethics Officer – only just recruited – was designated as the PSEA Coordinator. The SEA focal points were staff members on an existing post. Their tasks were vaguely defined: “provide guidance, support and information on SEA matters; assist complainants; refer cases to Field Directors and HRD and providing recommendations to Agency Coordinator for annual monitoring and evaluation report on SEA for Senior Management.”

In practice, the focal points network proved challenging, and with the creation of the new post of the Sexual Misconduct Task Force (SMTF) Coordinator (P4, who reports to the Chief Ethics (P5) who has a direct reporting line to the Commissioner General), the TORs of the Network itself were refined and efforts were initiated to better structure, professionalise, and institutionalise it. Roles and responsibilities as well as profile requirements for focal point candidates were more clearly defined, and a structured vetting process was initiated. By the end of 2022, the network consisted of 15 members, a mix of Area staff and international staff. Their main tasks are to attend and participate in Task force meetings and inter-agency network meetings; review and adapt the Agency's strategy and Action Plan to combat SEA and SH; develop and implement a field workplan; make recommendations to the SMTF Coordinator; lead on PSEA activities and initiatives at field level; review, monitor and evaluate progress; review institutional mechanisms for coordination and oversight on PSEA activities; and participate in PSEA-related training. The TORS also explicitly articulate what PSEA focal points do NOT do, namely: they do not investigate allegations of misconduct; provide informal dispute resolution services such as mediation; or provide legal advice to personnel.

Recognising the high level of ambition expressed in the PSEA Action Plans and the tasks highlighted in the TORs of the focal points network, expectations are unrealistically high. Despite the many efforts made by the Ethics



Office, the SMTF Coordinator and others (Management, Protection Division, Human Resource Department, DIOS, Office of Legal Affairs, PSEA focal points and frontline area staff) and the considerable progress made during the 2018-2022 period, UNRWA's capacity to achieve the strategic outcomes is clearly inadequate – both quantitatively and qualitatively. The priority attached to PSEA (and SH) by both UNRWA and its donors is not reflected in terms of regular budget-funded staff and budget for non-staff costs. In 2022, the Agency sought the ACABQ's approval to regularise the post of the Sexual Misconduct Task Force Coordinator, approval is pending. Modest donor project funding has helped kick-start some activities but is insufficient to meet the challenges of an Agency with such direct delivery of services, proximity to vulnerable people, significant staff numbers of this size, in a region where victims are blamed rather than protected, and where cases are resolved through other, traditional methods.

At the end of 2022, the absolute amount available for PSEAH/SH was USD 796,800/year. This covers costs associated with the Sexual Misconduct Task force, the Ethics Office staff and programme budget supporting PSEAH activities, the dedicated Sexual Misconduct Task Force Coordinator P4 position, PSEA focal points, field Office resources dedicated to PSEAH, related project funds, and costs related to administration of justice matters.

#### Element 4

Prevention through outreach, awareness raising, training and communication is a key focus of UNRWA's SEA Action Plans. In 2019, 2 mandatory online UN training courses were introduced – "Prevention of Sexual Harassment and Abuse of Power" and "Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse". In 2021, an improved version of the mandatory e-learning course was developed (in English and Arabic). Staff circulars and SOPs on mandatory training were updated in 2020 and again in 2022, and monitoring of staff compliance with training was digitized. Also, face-to-face training courses were developed, targeting manual workers and those who are either computer illiterate or do not have access to computers. A dedicated training for frontline staff was also developed; by the end of 2022, 3100 staff (teachers, doctors, pharmacists) had been trained. According to UNRWA, the content of these trainings is in accordance with industry standards and therefore of satisfactory quality.


In addition, SEA and sexual harassment awareness components were integrated within other training modules such as the Ethics Induction training, Ethical Leadership course, the General Ethics Awareness training, and the Ethics Refresher course. Although the pandemic largely prevented in-person training from in 2020 and 2021, in 2020 approximately 70 per cent of Agency personnel had completed the mandatory online PSEA course and the PSHAA e-course; in 2021, this had increased to approximately 80 per cent. In 2022, completion rates of the PSEA course stood at 88 per cent. In 2022, 78 per cent of UNRWA respondents to the 2022 SEA survey stated that they had received SEA training in the past 12 months, an increase from less than 30 per cent in 2018.

Besides e-learning mandatory courses and face-to-face trainings, UNRWA has also invested in several other awareness raising efforts. It produced pamphlets, leaflets, posters for UNRWA installations. In 2022, the Agency launched a campaign "*We Say NO to Sexual Misconduct*" to further raise awareness on SEA and SH. Events include a Facebook Live session, Townhall meetings, dissemination of posters and wallet cards, and a video message campaign, starting with the CG, and information about sexual misconduct reporting.

Feedback on the various trainings is being collected through a variety of methods: comparison of pre and post test results; a feedback evaluation form; and dedicated discussion sessions with PSEA and Ethics Focal Points on training issues. As a result of feedback received, the HQ PSEAH training session has already been adapted for different Field contexts. A full revision of the HQ-based PSEAH training materials is currently underway, which will take into account feedback collected since the development of the original training in 2021 and the issuance of UNRWA's new PSEA policy. It will also include an FAQ document for trainers on difficult questions that have been raised by training participants.

Despite the greater coverage and increased awareness achieved through e-learning and face-to-face training, interviewees highlighted a need to further invest in these to make sure that frontline staff and beneficiaries, who are most affected by but generally least aware of SEA, are better targeted. Another challenge relates to the fact that not all UNRWA staff and daily paid employees have an email address and/or access to internet. While understandable from a cost-efficiency point of view, a too heavy reliance on e-learning poses limitations to effectively change behaviour (= the ultimate objective of prevention).

Figure 12: Zero tolerance for sexual misconduct by UNRWA personnel poster



### Element 5

As a direct service provider, UNRWA's main PSEA target groups are UNRWA staff and – to a lesser extent – beneficiaries, notably children. As stated in element 1, UNRWA has sought to mainstream PSEA across the Agency, thereby building awareness and capacity of UNRWA staff. In addition to the examples listed above, and drawing on an historical analysis of cases, UNRWA's Health Department worked on addressing risks during medical visits, including updating the Medical Examination Requiring Chaperone TI para. II (2019), as well as developing informational materials such as Medical Chaperone roll ups and posters.

The 2022 Staff survey results show that 95 per cent of staff agree (strongly) that UNRWA provides clear information on how to report SEA. An important part of this has been the development of a flowchart highlighting how SEA allegations at UNRWA are managed. See elements 7 and 8 for more information on UNRWA's response mechanisms.

Meanwhile, attention has also been given to implementing partners (IP) and vendors. According to interviewees, on average, IP capacity on PSEA matters is low; in some cases, UNRWA has provided training to IPs. In 2022, a tool was developed to assess IP capacity on SEA in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, which was then incorporated

into an Agency-wide partner assessment tool. All UNRWA contracts with vendors and suppliers are based on UN General Conditions of Contract which include clear SEA prohibitions. UNRWA's Education Department updated contracts with school canteen operators to ensure stronger safeguards are in place related to SEA, in particular a Revised Canteen Contract (2022). UNRWA also updated its Procurement policies and processes to ensure stronger SEA safeguards for suppliers and vendors (Supplier Code of Conduct (para. 11); Invitation to Bid (Tender Template) 2021 (pg. 3, 5); Procurement Manual (2021) (Section 3.3.1); and General Conditions of Contract (para. 25.1.4). All MoUs with downstream partners include a clause on SEA prohibition and prevention.

UNRWA's risk register is part of the Annual Operational Plan. It focuses on operations, rather than all corporate risks. It did not include PSEAH risks during the assessment timeframe.

#### Element 6

UNRWA is a regular participant in SEA Working Group meetings at the global and local levels, and the CEB Task Force on Sexual Harassment meetings at the global level. Despite not being an official member of the IASC, UNRWA participates irregularly in the IASC Technical Assistance Group forum on PSEA. At the local level, designated PSEA Focal Points are now expected to participate regularly in PSEA Country Networks. In 2022, UNRWA gave a presentation to inter-agency peers on its Incident Reporting Form. UNRWA participated in the UN system-wide SEA survey and provided input to the development of the UN-wide 'Clear Check' database, intended to prevent rehiring of personnel who have been found guilty of SEA or SH. ClearCheck screening is done for all selected candidates for area and international posts, in addition to complementary personnel (interns/volunteers, daily paid staff, individual service providers) who onboard. UNRWA began screening staff in 2020 and has updated almost all of the relevant selection policies to include the ClearCheck screening requirement. The final policy update for Individual Service Providers (ISPs) is expected in 2024.

#### Element 7

UNRWA reports publicly on SEA cases in the DIOS annual reports as well as the Annual Operational Reports. These reports specify the number of SEA cases, the number of investigations (opened, ongoing and completed), and – depending on whether the allegations are substantiated – the resulting disciplinary measures taken.

Since 2020, the Agency records all SEA allegations and reports on these in the UN-system wide iReport SEA Tracker system, the system-wide effort to centralise real-time reporting of SEA allegations through the UN Chief Executive Board (<https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/data-allegations-un-system-%20wide>).

The Commissioner-General reports annually to the Secretary General on all allegations of SEA that are brought to the CG's attention, and the measures taken in accordance with relevant Agency rules and regulations. These Management Letters provide summaries of the DIOS and AOR annual reports. Based on the certification letters and the AORs, the following data can be derived:

**Table 14: SEA cases reporting in Commissioner-General annual reports**

	2018	2019	2020*	2021*	2022
No. of SEA cases completed	2	8	7	8 (4)	5
No. of cases resulting in disciplinary measures	1	0	4 (3)	4 (3)	n/a
No. of decisions pending	0	2	2	n/a	n/a

\* Numbers in CG certification letters are higher than the numbers listed in the AOR 2021 (in brackets)

DIOS sets clear targets related to timeframes for all investigations. It aims to investigate 70 per cent of allegations within a six-month timeframe. DIOS records and reports on the timeliness of investigations annually but doesn't differentiate between categories of cases in its annual reports. The average age of closed cases is 437 days (15 months). Interviewees pointed out that SEA investigation cases tend to take long before a conclusion is reached. DIOS's investigative capacity is limited, and SEA allegations and cases compete with other more frequently reported forms of misconduct such as fraud, neutrality breaches, and abuse of power. The longer the investigation lasts, the greater the pressure on victims/survivors from members of the community and the less inclination for other victims to report. Lengthy investigations, a perceived lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities of UNRWA functions, and, in some cases, perceived impunity of perpetrators, also reduce trust in UNRWA SEA policies and processes. As one of several measures to address these concerns, UNRWA announced that it will establish a dedicated sexual misconduct investigation unit in 2023 to strengthen the

Agency's response to allegations of SEA and sexual harassment (SH).

#### Element 8

UNRWA uses a Victim-Centred Approach to SEA (VCA) in accordance with guidance from the Office for the Special Coordinator on improving the United Nations response to sexual exploitation and abuse (OSCSEA) and has developed a victim support function through the PSEA Focal Points. The VCA was reinforced after the Ethics Office took over the coordination of the sexual misconduct task force in 2020, and since then is highlighted in CG certification letters and several other SEA materials (e.g., the flowchart on the management of SEA allegations at UNRWA). Nevertheless, most internal UNRWA publications and materials shared for this assessment, including ones developed since 2020, do not *explicitly* highlight the VCA as such. Whereas interviewees appreciate UNRWA's adoption of a VCA, both its content and implications for prevention and response measures, procedures etc. are not clearly described.

#### MI 4.7 Evidence confidence

High

#### MI 4.8: Prevention of and response to sexual harassment (SH)

Score

#### Overall MI rating

Unsatisfactory

#### Overall MI score

1.83

Element 1: Organisation-specific dedicated policy statements and/or codes of conduct that address SH available, aligned to international standards and applicable to all categories of personnel

2

Element 2: Mechanisms are in place to regularly track the status of implementation of the policy on SH at HQ and at field levels

1

Element 3: The MO has clearly identifiable roles, structures, and resources in place for implementing its policy/guidelines on SH at HQ and in the field: support channel for victims, a body coordinating the response, and clear responsibilities for following up with victims

2

Element 4: All managers have undergone training on preventing and responding to SH, and all staff have been trained to set behavioural expectations (including with respect to SH)

2

Element 5: Multiple mechanisms can be accessed to seek advice, pursue informal resolution, or formally report SH allegations

2

Element 6: The organisation ensures that it acts in a timely manner on formal complaints of SH allegations

NA

Element 7: The organisation transparently reports the number and nature of actions taken in response to SH in annual reporting and feeds into inter-agency HR mechanisms

2

#### MI 4.8 Analysis

Evidence documents

#### Element 1

Compared to SEA, UNRWA's internal policies on Sexual Harassment (SH) are relatively 'light' and not fully up to date. The General Staff Circular 06/2010 "Prohibition of Discrimination, Harassment – Including Sexual Harassment – And Abuse of Power" expresses UNRWA's commitment to a safe and secure working environment, *"ensuring all UNRWA staff can work in an environment free from discrimination, harassment, abuse of power, and from retaliation for reporting such behaviour. Discrimination, harassment, and abuse of power are unacceptable, and will not be tolerated under any circumstances. The Agency is committed to a 'zero tolerance' approach to such behaviour, which means that any complaints will be dealt with promptly in accordance with the Agency's Staff Regulations and Rules and the procedures set out in this Circular."*

UNRWA adopted the 2019 UN system Model Code of Conduct to prevent harassment including sexual harassment. The Code of Conduct is applicable to all personnel. The 2022 UNRWA Code of Ethics also mentions SH as prohibited conduct: *"We do not commit any form of harassment, sexual harassment, discrimination and abuse of power and will report such acts whenever we witness them."*

Since 2020, UNRWA describes elimination of SH as an Agency-wide priority in its Annual Operational Reports. However, PSEAH Action Plans do not include specific actions on SH, which illustrates the Agency's prioritisation of SEA over SH. With regard to SH, UNRWA's approach taken has been pragmatic: existing policy frameworks (SGB, Personnel Directives and GSCs) were once again distributed to all staff, whilst new material developed by the Ethics Office (e.g., Code of Ethics, Ethics Refresher courses, Leadership Dialogue) was drawn attention to. During 2021, UNRWA began the process of updating standard staff contracts to include a specific requirement to adhere to PSEA and SH policies. The Appointment Letters of new Area Staff (both temporary and fixed term)

160, 209, 252-254, 258-260, 264-268, 318, 324-338, 344, 346-349, 352-354

includes references to UNRWA's Code of Ethics, and the Agency's policies on Prohibition of Discrimination, Harassment – including sexual harassment – and Abuse of Power, Prohibition of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. Senior management KPIs were amended to include reference to SH responsibilities, including ensuring a workplan is in place. UNRWA also secured project funding to update its key policies on prevention of sexual harassment and abuse of authority (PSHAA). These updated policies are scheduled to be introduced in 2023. PSEA and SH risks were also incorporated into the revised checklist for quarterly, Agency-wide installation inspections conducted through the Humanitarian Principles project.

#### **Element 2**

In the absence of an Agency-specific SH policy, UNRWA therefore does not track the status of implementation of the (non-existent) policy. Then only tracking that is conducted on SH is the tracking of the number of new sexual harassment cases and reports on these in its Annual Reports; besides quantitative trends, it does not provide additional information or analysis on SH.

#### **Element 3**

The Code of Ethics describes the resources available to individuals affected by SH and the roles of various functions within UNRWA that may be involved: Ethics Office, Ethics focal points, External Staff Counsellor, the Legal Office of Staff Assistance, the Department of Security and Risk Management, the Health Department, the Manager/Supervisor, the Ombudsperson Office, and Department of Internal Oversight Services. UNRWA does not have one consolidated overview of the roles and responsibilities of SH-related functions within the Agency. Instead, it has a poster (see above), distributed to all UNRWA Offices and installations, describing the resources available and their roles, including the reporting channels on SH. The UNRWA website also includes information on reporting channels (<https://www.unrwa.org/how-report>).

The roles of PSEA focal points and Ethics focal points are less detailed on SH than they are on SEA. For instance, the 2020 TORs for PSEA focal points are responsible for "reviewing and adapting the Agency's Strategy and Action Plan to combat SEA and SH", which, as stated, does not include specific SH objectives or measures. Recent designation letters for PSEA focal points do not mention SH at all. Ethics focal points are required to provide "information on the available options for informal and formal dispute resolution channels, in line with a victim centred approach, as well as providing information on the support available and coordinating referrals to relevant internal and external departments and services."

The absolute combined amount for the PSEA/SH budget as of the end of 2022 is approximately 796,800 USD per year, and the trajectory is positive. This includes costs associated with the Sexual Misconduct Task Force, Ethics Office staff and programme budget supporting PSEAH activities, the dedicated Sexual Misconduct Task Force Coordinator P4 position, PSEA Focal Points, Field Office resources dedicated to PSEAH, related project funds, and costs related to administration of justice matters. Although several resources within UNRWA have been identified, their roles and structures are ambiguous, as are the processes involved in reporting and responding to SH allegations. The absence of more dedicated resources is clearly felt and has only partially been mitigated.

#### **Element 4**

Within UNRWA, there are three courses on Sexual Harassment: the mandatory e-learning course "Prevention of Sexual Harassment and Abuse of Power" (PSHAA course, introduced in 2019), the "United to Respect: Preventing Sexual Harassment and Other Prohibited Conduct Mandatory Programme" and the "Guide for Managers: Prevention of, and Response to, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace" (2021), developed by UNRWA itself. Staff circulars and SOPs on mandatory training were updated in 2020 and again in 2022, and monitoring of staff compliance with training was digitized. By the end of 2021, 79 per cent of UNRWA staff had completed the mandatory PSHAA e-course, while 156 senior management staff in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank participated in awareness-raising sessions on SH. By the end of 2022, completion rates of the PSHAA course stood at 85.5 per cent.

#### **Element 5**

As mentioned under items 2 and 3, multiple resources exist for victims of SH. Field offices share an annual circular to remind staff about the Ethics and PSEA focal points and their role in providing information and coordinating support. Other material and awareness raising materials are available in every building across the Agency. Compliance is monitored on the Agency's integrated assessment questionnaire, which is administered quarterly. However, UNRWA does not yet have a flowchart for the management of SH allegations/incidents, nor does it report on case management, investigations and measures taken in the event that the allegations are substantiated. As a result, there is limited clarity on how allegations of SH are handled, and on their timeliness.



**Element 6:** No concrete evidence was available to assess the element. As in the case of SEA, the number of allegations is very low, and interviewees felt that SH was also grossly underreported. With both SEA and SH, observers noted a tendency to stigmatise / blame victims and ‘resolve’ cases through other, traditional methods, rather than report incidents. Victims are said to be put under pressure by peers and other members of the community not to report. Moreover, the level of trust in UNRWA’s processes is insufficient: Staff allegedly fear confidentiality breaches, long investigation procedures, and the risk of retaliation.

#### Element 7

Annual reports of the Ethics Office include sections on SEA and SH combined. DIOS tracks the number of new sexual harassment cases and reports on these in its Annual Reports; besides quantitative trends, it does not provide additional information or analysis on SH. Since 2020, the Agency records all SH allegations and reports on these in the UN-system wide iReport SEA Tracker system, the system-wide effort to centralise real-time reporting of SEA allegations through the UN Chief Executive Board (<https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/data-allegations-un-system-%20wide>). All UNRWA recruitment processes require mandatory screening against the ClearCheck database. Clear Check is currently only designed to be used for international UN personnel. CG certification letters to the UN Secretary General do not include information on SH.

Figure 13: Resources available to individuals affected by sexual harassment.

**RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO INDIVIDUALS AFFECTED BY SEXUAL HARASSMENT**

**Additional Information and Contact Details**

<p><b>Ethics Focal Point/ Ethics Office</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provides confidential information to staff and management on options available to address the situation</li> <li>Ethics Focal Point in each Field assist complainants with advocacy and coordination of support across UNRWA departments, with the consent of the affected individual.</li> <li>Document informal SH cases to track resolution</li> <li>Receives complaints from personnel about potential retaliation they face for reporting formal complaints or participating in an authorized investigation.</li> <li>Conducts preliminary assessment to determine if there is evidence of retaliation. If yes, refers complaint to DIOS for full investigation</li> <li>Myriam Baile, Natalie Tabar, Amer Dababneh, <b>Ethics Focal Points</b></li> <li>Email: <a href="mailto:ethicsoffice@unrwa.org">ethicsoffice@unrwa.org</a></li> <li>Phone: +962 6 5808 171</li> </ul>	<p><b>Manager/Second Supervisor</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Listens to the affected individual and informs that confidential advice about options and services available may be obtained from the Ethics Office/Ethics Focal Points</li> <li>With the affected individual's consent, may facilitate discussion with relevant colleagues about the conduct in question.</li> <li>With consent, may ask Ethics Focal Point, Ombudsman, or Human Resources Dept for support</li> <li>Will make a formal report to DIOS if the conduct amounts to serious misconduct, taking consent to share name of individual.</li> <li>Following an informal or formal complaint, considers interim or protective measures including physical separation of the affected individual from the alleged offender; reassignment (with consent); flexible work arrangements; granting unplanned annual leave; consideration of special leave; change in reporting lines; other measures, such as training.</li> <li>Following an informal or formal complaint, considers accommodations for potential work performance issues relating to the incident, including new work plan for the affected individual; providing leave and/or other working arrangements.</li> <li>Contact: ask or send an email to set up a meeting.</li> </ul>
<p><b>External Staff Counselor</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provides confidential psycho-social support to personnel through individual counselling</li> <li>International personnel (all categories):</li> <li>Abdalla Mansour Amer, UNODS Regional Counselor (MENA)</li> <li>Email: <a href="mailto:mansouramer@un.org">mansouramer@un.org</a></li> <li>Rome Institute (covered through available private health insurance)</li> <li>Email: <a href="mailto:petra.misic@romeinstitute.org">petra.misic@romeinstitute.org</a></li> <li>Area personnel (all categories):</li> <li>Elise Ittar: <a href="mailto:e.ittar@unrwa.org">e.ittar@unrwa.org</a> +961 03002491</li> <li>Maria El Khazem: <a href="mailto:m.elkhazem@unrwa.org">m.elkhazem@unrwa.org</a> +961 76930040</li> <li>Eltessam Khawarneh: <a href="mailto:e.khawarneh@unrwa.org">e.khawarneh@unrwa.org</a> +962 790332640</li> <li>Sabah Saliba: <a href="mailto:s.saliba@unrwa.org">s.saliba@unrwa.org</a> +961 81477367</li> <li>Kim Ward: <a href="mailto:k.ward@unrwa.org">k.ward@unrwa.org</a> +961 76999512</li> </ul>	<p><b>Ombudsman Office</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provides confidential information and advice on options to address the incident</li> <li>Provides informal conflict resolution through shuttle diplomacy or mediation, with the individual's consent</li> <li>Maria Montiel, Ombudsman</li> <li>Email: <a href="mailto:ombudsman@unrwa.org">ombudsman@unrwa.org</a></li> <li>Online booking: <a href="https://outlook.office365.com/owa/calendar/RegionalOmbudsmanUNRWA@unrwa.org/bookings/">https://outlook.office365.com/owa/calendar/RegionalOmbudsmanUNRWA@unrwa.org/bookings/</a></li> </ul>
<p><b>Legal Office of Staff Assistance (LOSA)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provides confidential legal advice and assistance to UNRWA personnel about administrative review processes</li> <li>Amer Abu Khalaf, Senior Legal Officer (Staff Assistance)</li> <li>Email: <a href="mailto:LAssistance@unrwa.org">LAssistance@unrwa.org</a></li> <li>Phone: +972 54 216 8308</li> </ul>	<p><b>Department of Internal Oversight Services (DIOS)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Determines if complaint should be investigated</li> <li>If yes, conducts fact-finding investigation to determine if misconduct occurred</li> <li>Issues an investigation report to management with findings</li> <li>Email: <a href="mailto:hotline@unrwa.org">hotline@unrwa.org</a></li> <li>Phone: Jordan: 06 580 8686; Gaza: 08 288 7127; Jerusalem and West Bank: 02 589 0772; Syria: 01 16 11 67 17; Lebanon: 01 830 441</li> <li>Online form: <a href="https://www.unrwa.org/online-complaint-form">https://www.unrwa.org/online-complaint-form</a></li> </ul>
<p><b>Department of Security and Risk Management (DSRM)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provides advice and support on personal security measures to personnel who have experienced or are facing security threats</li> <li>Refers personnel to UNODS to access to an emergency medical Post Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) kit</li> <li>Yara Dababneh, Senior Security and Training Officer</li> <li>Email: <a href="mailto:y.dababneh@unrwa.org">y.dababneh@unrwa.org</a></li> <li>Phone: +962 79 1300 859</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Health Department</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provides medical care or referral to medical services for individuals affected by sexual violence</li> <li>Mai Ogawa, Public Health Specialist</li> <li>Email: <a href="mailto:m.ogawa@unrwa.org">m.ogawa@unrwa.org</a></li> <li>Phone: +962 77 0367 147</li> </ul>	

MI 4.8 Evidence confidence

Medium

## Relationship management

*Engaging in inclusive partnerships to support relevance, leverage effective solutions and maximise results*

KPI 5: Operational planning and intervention design tools support relevance and agility within partnerships	KPI score
Satisfactory	2.64
<p><b>Preliminary note:</b> Owing to its distinct mandate, character, and operational scope, unlike other UN entities, UNRWA operates as a direct service provider, engaging partners only on an ad hoc basis. The KPI and MI-level analyses provided below therefore focus primarily on operational planning and intervention design tools relating to UNRWA's direct service provision.</p> <p><b>Documentation and interview evidence shows that UNRWA adopts a primarily standardised approach to Programme Budget-funded core service delivery across its five fields of operation.</b> Agency-wide technical norms and standards are used to determine the staffing levels (the Agency's main expense) required to deliver frontline services to Palestine refugees across the five fields of operation. Programme Budget allocations to field offices and programmes are derived from these technical norms and standards, and the varying levels of demand for services across different fields of operation, itself a function of demographic and political variation across operating contexts. At the field office level, there is little scope for programmatic adjustment or prioritisation. While UNRWA's primarily standardised approach to core programme delivery aims to ensure minimum quality standards for services and interconnections between the five areas of operation, however, it is perceived by many staff at the field level to limit the scope for context-specific modalities that could potentially enhance the efficiency and relevance of service delivery. It is important to note, however, that UNRWA's ability to make context-driven adaptations to its core service delivery is constrained by political sensitivities surrounding any perceived efforts to modify the nature of the Agency's mandate and the modalities through which it is delivered.</p> <p><b>UNRWA's programmes have in general been evaluated as relevant to Palestine refugee needs.</b> It is evident that UNRWA's staff have a deep understanding of the political and socioeconomic characteristics of their operating contexts and are able to use this knowledge to effectively address day-to-day operational challenges as these arise. UNRWA's strong understanding of the needs, vulnerabilities, and perspectives of Palestine refugees across its fields of operation was remarked upon by external stakeholders consulted for this assessment and is considered to be one of the Agency's key comparative advantages by both staff and partner organisations.</p> <p><b>Emergency Appeal-funded interventions and projects are explicitly designed to specific contextual needs.</b> Activities supported through Emergency Appeals, which constituted approximately 30 per cent of UNRWA's overall expenditure in 2022, are underpinned by detailed contextual analyses that identify the humanitarian needs emanating from specific regional emergencies or protracted crises. Projects, which in 2022 made up approximately 6 per cent of the Agency's expenditure in 2022, involve specific, time-bound activities supported by earmarked funding that are designed to complement UNRWA's core service delivery. By design, they are targeted to address specific contextual challenges.</p> <p><b>There is scope for improvement in the Agency's approach to managing the considerable operational, strategic, political, and reputational risks that emanate from its volatile, and often hostile operating contexts.</b> These risks, some of which lie well beyond the Agency's scope of control, are well understood by leadership, managers, and frontline staff. Although risks are identified alongside mitigation measures in corporate planning, review, and reporting documentation, UNRWA has no explicit Enterprise Risk Management policy, and interviewed staff reported a variety of perspectives and a sense of ambiguity about where overall responsibility for risk management does and should sit within the organisation. As a direct service provider to millions of vulnerable refugees, there is a clear potential risk for SEA in UNRWA installations and service delivery, but these are not addressed separately in documented risk registers. Instead, they are subsumed under the broader category of "safeguarding risks". It is important to note, however, that during the assessment period the Agency did develop structures and systems to detect, prevent, and sanction cases of SEA (for a detailed analysis of these structures, see KPI 4). UNRWA's management response to a JIU assessment of its approach to Enterprise Risk Management indicated that the Agency intends to maintain its current approach to mainstreaming responsibility for risk management through different departments and programmes. However, a risk maturity assessment conducted by UNRWA's Department of Internal Oversight in 2022 recommended that the Agency issues a clear Enterprise Risk Management policy, establishes a dedicated structure for Enterprise Risk Management, and works towards</p>	



strengthening the risk management culture and capacity at all levels within the organisation.

**UNRWA maintains policies that commit to the mainstreaming of gender, environmental sustainability, protection, and disability inclusion considerations into programme delivery, but mechanisms for monitoring compliance are not consistently implemented.** For instance, while UNRWA's 2016-2022 Gender Equality Strategy includes a results matrix with indicators to track, among other initiatives, the extent of gender mainstreaming in programming, annual updates to the strategy do not report on these indicators. Moreover, a gender marker that was established to track the extent to which Programme Budget resources contribute to gender equality has not been applied since 2018 and 2022, and the 2016-2022 MTS Common Monitoring Matrix lacks a specific high-level result relating to gender equality. The Strategic Plan 2023-2028 has a high level result on gender and this demonstrates organizational progress and a positive trajectory. UNRWA aims to carry out Protection Alignment Reviews every two years to monitor the extent to which programmes align with the Agency's minimum protection standards. During the assessment period, Protection Alignment Reviews were carried out in 2018 and 2022.

**UNRWA monitors the percentage of its projects that are completed on time and within budget, but there are no equivalent metrics to track the speed or efficiency of delivery for either Programme Budget or Emergency Appeal-funded services and interventions.** Available results indicate that the majority of UNRWA's projects were completed within time and within budget during the assessment period. As indicated above, however, projects comprise only a small share (approximately 6 per cent in 2022) of the Agency's overall expenditure. There are no metrics in the Agency's Common Monitoring Matrix to track speed and efficiency for the vast majority of UNRWA's services and interventions that are funded through the Programme Budget and Emergency Appeals. UNRWA has noted that the metrics and reporting against these are informed by its donors. There is evidence that procedural bottlenecks have resulted in some delays and inefficiencies relating to programme delivery. These were particularly pronounced in recruitment, and in the delivery of procured goods and services. Though in some cases such delays were the result of factors beyond UNRWA's control (i.e. the ongoing blockade of the Gaza Strip, the COVID-19 pandemic, escalations in hostilities), many interviewed staff acknowledged that several of the Agency's business processes require reform and modernisation to improve efficiency.

#### **MI 5.1: Interventions/strategies aligned with needs of beneficiaries and regional/ country priorities and intended national/regional results**

**Score**

##### **Overall MI rating**

##### **Overall MI score**

Element 1: The organisation's country or regional strategies refer to national/regional body strategies or objectives

NA

Element 2: Reviewed interventions/strategies refer to the needs of beneficiaries, including vulnerable populations

NA

Element 3: The organisation's country strategies or regional strategies link targeted results to national or regional goals

NA

Element 4: Structures and incentives in place for technical staff that allow them to invest time and effort in alignment process

NA

##### **MI 5.1 Analysis**

Not relevant/assessed

##### **MI 5.1 Evidence confidence**

#### **MI 5.2: Contextual/ situational analysis (shared where possible) applied to shape intervention designs and implementation**

**Score**

##### **Overall MI rating**

**Satisfactory**

##### **Overall MI score**

**3.00**

Element 1: Intervention designs contain a clear statement positioning the intervention within the operating context

3

Element 2: Reflection points with partners take note of any significant changes in context

3

##### **MI 5.2 Analysis**

**Evidence documents**

## Preliminary note

*Performance relating to this micro-indicator is assessed with respect to interventions falling under each of UNRWA's three funding streams; 1) the Programme Budget, which funds the core elements of UNRWA's direct, continuous service delivery programmes in education, health, RSS and ICIP across the five areas of operation; 2) Emergency Appeals, which fund interventions to respond to humanitarian crises, but which are also often used to fill gaps in services delivered through the Programme Budget; and 3) Projects, which are funded through grants to implement specific, time-bound activities complementing UNRWA programmes, with a view to improving services. Note that some of the evidence reviewed below would also be relevant to MI 5.1, which was judged to be not relevant during the inception phase of this assessment.*

## Element 1

### Programme Budget:

Evidence from documentation and interviews shows that UNRWA adopts a primarily standardised approach to the delivery of Programme Budget-funded services across each of its five areas of operation. This approach is defined by an Agency-wide Programme and Sub-Programme Structure (last updated in 2017), programme-specific strategies, and aspirational norms and technical standards. As Organisational Directive 02 makes clear, programme strategies and norms and standards are developed by headquarters-based Programme Departments. Planning and Budget Preparation instructions explicitly require all plans and budgets to be based on the Programme and Sub-Programme Structure and these norms and technical standards. Programmatic norms and standards determine resource allocation to different programmes across different fields. These norms and standards seek to uphold standards of service delivery and guide the equitable allocation of resources. For instance, in education, they are used to determine the number of class sections in schools, with this then determining the number teachers, principals, and other education staff required. In the health programme area, technical norms and standards determine both the aspirational norm for patient consultation times, as well as staff levels and composition for medical centres. Programme Budget allocations are based on these norms and standards and vary over time along with the changing level of demand across different fields of operation, which itself is a function of demography, socio-economic conditions, and access by Palestine refugees to host authority services. In this sense, UNRWA's core programme budget service delivery is positioned vis-à-vis the demographic, socio-economic, and political context of each field of operation, albeit in a manner that is mediated by Agency-wide technical norms and standards. As noted in the analysis for KPI 4.1, this approach explains why, for instance, UNRWA provides secondary education in Lebanon only, and why hospitalization budgets are higher in Lebanon. It also explains why the Agency's single largest intervention is education in the Gaza Strip.

1, 16, 17, 20-22,  
27- 30, 36, 134,  
194, 195, 203-  
206, 223, 273,  
274

Neither the Programme and Sub-Programme structure, nor the reviewed technical norms and standards are differentiated by field of operation. Interviews indicated that field offices do not have sufficient flexibility to prioritise or adjust programme delivery in accordance with field-specific contextual demands. Evidence from interviews with field office staff and analysis of UNRWA documentation indicate that this approach to programme delivery means that in practice, UNRWA delivers largely the same core programmes, using the same core modalities, across each of its five areas of operation. This primarily standardised approach is reflected in Programme Budget documentation and Annual Operational Plans, neither of which provide detailed, field-level contextual analyses and accompanying descriptions of how Programme Budget-funded service delivery will be shaped accordingly. Instead, UNRWA's annual operational plans include a summary analysis of major contextual characteristics in each field of operation, phrased as "planning assumptions". The assessment found that the HQ had demonstrated a tendency to centralise decision-making and exercised a high level of direction over Field Offices, both substantively and on matters related to programme budget-funded expenses (most of which are staff-related). In interviews, staff working in Field Offices noted that they consider themselves – rather than colleagues based at HQ - best positioned to assess local trade-offs and make informed decisions without setting Agency-wide precedents. Staff based in Amman HQ had a differing view, suggesting that Field Offices already enjoyed considerable delegation of authority and also had less visibility of the interconnected nature of the five fields than HQ did. In interviews, staff working in Field Offices provided feedback that they submit work plans to staff at HQ who then decides how the available funds are allocated across fields. The level of discretion of Field Offices to re-allocate funds from one budget line to another could not be ascertained by the Assessment Team. The sections of the annual operational reports which cover activities and regular programmes delivered under the Programme Budget also contain context analyses.

UNRWA's primarily standardised approach to Programme Budget-funded service delivery across the five areas of operation was criticised by some staff during interviews carried out for this assessment. It was viewed by

some as an inflexible approach to programming that constrained the ability of field offices to adapt programme budget-funded service delivery to the specific contextual needs of their respective fields of operation. Several staff also reported insufficient levels of consultation between HQ-based programme departments and field offices during updates to programme-specific norms and technical standards and during annual planning cycles.

It is also widely recognised that UNRWA's ability to adapt its programme budget-funded service delivery to address the differentiated contextual needs of Palestine refugees across its five areas of operation is sharply limited by considerable political sensitivities that surround any perceived attempts to modify the Agency's mandate. Interviewees felt that discussions relating to major changes in core programme are sometimes interpreted as efforts to alter the Agency's mandate, and are resisted by beneficiaries, host governments, and many UNRWA staff. This much was recognised by the 2021 independent evaluation of UNRWA's 2016-2022 MTS, which found that:

"When trying to make decisions about its services, UNRWA is often caught between the opposing and sometimes entrenched positions of its different stakeholders. For Palestine refugees, UNRWA and its services have a symbolic meaning beyond the assistance provided. Host governments also resist change because they are reluctant to take over responsibility for UNRWA activities. UNRWA staff fear the loss of jobs on which they and their families rely" (151, 5).

Despite low levels of field-level variation, Programme Budget and Emergency Appeal supported services are clearly positioned within operating contexts and respond to the needs of Palestine refugees. As indicated in the analysis for KPI 10, UNRWA's services are in general consistently assessed as highly relevant to Palestine refugee needs. It is evident from evaluations and interviews conducted for this assessment that UNRWA's staff have a deep understanding of the political and socioeconomic characteristics of their operating contexts and are able to use this knowledge to effectively address day-to-day operational challenges as these arise. UNRWA's strong understanding of the needs, vulnerabilities, and perspectives of Palestine refugees across its fields of operation was remarked upon by external stakeholders consulted for this assessment and is considered to be one of the Agency's key comparative advantages by both staff and partner organisations.

#### ***Emergency Appeals:***

Emergency Appeals are designed to support interventions that respond to humanitarian needs arising from specific emergency situations or protracted crises. By design, they are more grounded in area-specific contextual analyses than interventions funded through the programme budget. Annual Emergency Appeal documents for the Syria Regional Crisis and the occupied Palestinian territory between 2018 and 2022 include relatively detailed contextual analyses which clearly inform the choice of supported interventions. Context analyses for Emergency Appeal-funded interventions in the Gaza Strip, for instance, have consistently stressed that the majority of the Gaza Strip's population is food insecure due to the effects of a profound economic crisis, compounded by the ongoing Israeli blockade and more recently by the COVID-19 pandemic. Emergency food assistance therefore constituted by far the largest Emergency Appeal-funded intervention in the Gaza Strip during the 2016-2022 period. They have also highlighted the traumatic psychological effects of periodic escalations of violent conflict on the refugee population and have accordingly been used to fund psychosocial support interventions. Interventions supported by Emergency Appeals for the Syria Regional Crisis are also clearly informed by accompanying context analyses. In Lebanon and Jordan for instance, contextual analyses have highlighted the multiple needs faced by highly vulnerable Palestine refugees that fled conflict in Syria and have informed interventions to fund cash assistance and the extension of health and education services to cover Palestine refugees from Syria.

#### ***Projects:***

Projects refer to specific time-bound activities designed to complement UNRWA's core service delivery. They are targeted and specific in nature, and therefore need to be clearly positioned vis-à-vis the Agency's operating context.

UNRWA's recently updated Project Procedures Manual requires project proposals to include sections outlining the background and rationale to the project, detailing inter-alia:

- A description of the current situation of the intended beneficiaries.
- An evidence-based explanation of how the problem was identified.
- Policies and programmes of host country authorities and/or other international organisations addressing similar issues.

Project proposals are also required to include a Theory of Change, describing how and why the desired change is expected to happen in a particular context. Most of the sample of project proposals reviewed for this assessment included detailed context analyses.

#### Element 2

UNRWA's approach to programme cycle management provides for periodic reflection points that offer opportunities for staff to identify any changes in context likely to have a bearing on the Agency's operations. These include Agency-wide quarterly and annual results reviews, which provide Field Office and Headquarters-based staff with the opportunity to review operational performance, identify lessons learned, and make adjustments in response to major contextual changes. In general, interviewed staff felt that these were useful, while also noting that UNRWA's mandate and common approach to programmatic service delivery constrain the Agency's ability to make major changes to core programmes in response to contextual developments. Monthly meetings of UNRWA's Executive Advisory Group and quarterly meetings of the Senior Management Team also provide opportunities for discussing contextual changes with Agency-wide implications. Quarterly and annual results reviews, as well as meetings of the Executive Advisory Group and Senior Management Team, are internal exercises, and do not involve the participation of partners. This is unsurprising, given that UNRWA is a direct provider of services, and only engages in partnerships with other organisations on an ad-hoc basis.

With respect to the management of projects, UNRWA's Project Procedures Manual permits project managers to submit requests for changes in response to contextual developments. These are assessed by Project Steering Committees, and in the case of major changes, are sent to the Project Review Committee for review. These reflection points are largely internal, though engagement with project donors do occur in cases where major changes in response to contextual developments require modification of grant agreements.

Biannual meetings of UNRWA's Advisory Commission provide a potential opportunity for the Agency to discuss major changes in context with development partners. However, interviews held with internal and external stakeholders indicate that there is greater scope for this forum to be used for discussing strategic responses to contextual changes.

Interviews with internal and external stakeholders point to active participation by UNRWA in United Nations coordination structures. These structures provide opportunities for UNRWA to jointly take note of changes in context with other UN agencies operating in the region. The degree to which UNRWA has participated in these structures has varied across both time and field of operation but was viewed by most external stakeholders as having improved during the assessment period. Partner UN agencies interviewed for the assessment were, overall, positive about the level of engagement by UNRWA staff in coordination structures and valued the organisation's strong understanding of the regional context. The recent evaluation of the Agency's 2016-2022 MTS found that UNRWA's strategic partnership agreements are reviewed on a regular basis. Several MoUs underpinning such partnerships were reviewed for this assessment, and the majority of these provided for clear arrangements for periodic reflection between the parties to the agreement.

#### MI 5.2 Evidence confidence

High

#### MI 5.3: Capacity analysis informing intervention design and implementation, and strategies to address any weakness found are employed

Score

##### Overall MI rating

##### Overall MI score

Element 1: Intervention designs contain a clear statement of capacities of key national implementing partners	NA
Element 2: Capacity analysis, from the perspective of using and building country systems, considers resourcing, staffing, monitoring and operating structure.	NA
Element 3: Capacity analysis statement has been jointly developed with country partners and shared with development partners	NA
Element 4: Capacity analysis statement includes clear strategies for addressing any weaknesses, with a view to sustainability, where applicable developed jointly with development partners	NA
Element 5: Reflection points with partners take note of any significant changes in capacity	NA

MI 5.3 Analysis	Evidence documents
As a direct service provider itself, UNRWA rarely works with implementing partners; this Micro Indicator is therefore deemed to be not relevant.	
MI 5.3 Evidence confidence	
MI 5.4: Detailed risk (strategic, political, reputational, operational) management strategies ensure the identification, mitigation, monitoring and reporting of risks	Score
Overall, MI rating	Satisfactory
Overall MI score	2.80
Element 1: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for operational risk	3
Element 2: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for strategic risk	3
Element 3: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for political risk	3
Element 4: Intervention designs include detailed analysis of and mitigation strategies for reputational risk	3
Element 5: Intervention design is based on contextual analysis including of potential risks of sexual abuse and other misconduct with respect to host populations	2
MI 5.4 Analysis	Evidence documents
<p><b>Elements 1-4</b></p> <p>UNRWA does not have a comprehensive ERM policy or a dedicated department or division with overall responsibility for risk management. Instead, the agency mainstreams risk management through different departments and programmes, in a process coordinated by the Department of Planning. Operational Directive number 21, which establishes UNRWA's programme and project cycle management, requires Annual Operational Plans to set out the key risks to be managed in the concerned year. It also requires the Department of Planning to report to the Agency's Executive Office on key risks and risk mitigation and management measures on a quarterly basis. The directive does not set out the various types of risks that the Department of Planning is expected to identify in the Annual Operational Plans and monitor thereafter. UNRWA's project procedures manual provides more detailed templates for risk identification and related mitigation measures, and identifies various internal and external categories of risk, including strategic, operational, and political risk. Most of the sample of project proposals reviewed for the assessment contained risk matrices that identifying relevant risks.</p> <p>The Annual Operational Plans reviewed for this assessment contain risk matrices that identify various operational, strategic, political, and reputational risks. These matrices include assessments of the expected likelihood and impact of the identified risks, and corresponding detailed mitigation/management measures. They also identify which department or division is responsible for implementing the mitigating actions and for monitoring the risk level throughout the year. Although the matrices in the AORs do not have an explicit category for SH/SEA, they do have a "safeguarding risks" category which identifies the risks associated with GBV, SEA and incidents of violence against children. Interviews and documents indicate that the risks outlined in Annual Operational Plans are reviewed by the Department of Planning on a quarterly basis. A 2022 report by the Department of Internal Oversight also concluded that structures and processes such as the Project Assessment Committee, the Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation, and bi-weekly HQ meetings with each field office also help to manage operational risk on a continuous basis.</p> <p>Between 2019 and 2020, Emergency Appeal documents also included their own risk registers. Emergency Appeal documents for 2021 and 2022 do not include risk registers, however. The majority of project proposals reviewed for this assessment contained risk registers, as required by the recently updated Project Procedures Manual.</p> <p>A 2020 Joint Inspection Unit assessment of ERM across 28 UN organisations highlighted that UNRWA did not have an enterprise risk management policy or framework. It noted that "there is no specific function or office dedicated to ERM" and that "the lack of resources to establish a dedicated function for risk management have required risk management to be mainstreamed through other departments/programs" (pg. 44). With respect to the finding that UNRWA lacks an ERM policy or framework, the Agency's management indicated that risk management within UNRWA is based on a "three lines model" and is "operationalised through the inclusion of an Agency-wide risk register within the Annual Operational Plan, and that UNRWA will "continue to mainstream risk management through different departments/programmes". However, a DIOS report on the Agency's risk</p>	16-22, 27-30, 52, 53, 190, 194, 196, 223, 233, 259, 365, 364, 367, 370, 359, 435

maturity conducted in 2022 recommended that UNRWA issues a clear ERM policy, seeks resources to establish a dedicated structure for ERM, and works towards strengthening the risk management culture and building capacity at all organisational levels.

Though the available documentation is relatively clear with respect to the role of the Department of Planning in ERM, interviews with staff indicated a sense of ambiguity relating to responsibility for risk management. This was attributed by some staff to the lack of a clear policy on risk management as well as to the lack of clear delegation of authority. Interviewees also reported that security risk management – an area that has shown progress during the 2018-2022 period – is not integrated into the Agency's overall approach to ERM and is instead reviewed as a distinct category of tangible risk with a dedicated department and management framework.

Although not part of the MOPAN assessment framework per se, it is worth noting that during this assessment period, UNRWA has developed a dedicated staff security and risk management (SRM) policy, developed/streamlined relevant business processes, enhanced security risk management training, and overseen their implementation. The SRM has been aligned with the UN-system wide security management system (UNSMS) and policies, and applies to all staff, i.e., international as well as Area staff. UNRWA's SRM policy is updated annually. Although long overdue, these developments mark a significant improvement in the way UNRWA perceives, identifies and manages security risks to all its staff operating in high-risk environments.

Despite the gaps identified above, it is nevertheless clear that the considerable risks that emanate from UNRWA's operating environment are well understood and acted upon by leadership, managers, and frontline staff. Though the absence of an ERM policy was noted as a shortcoming by the JIU assessment, the lack of such a policy has not prevented the Agency from identifying key operational, strategic, political and reputational risks and mitigation measures in corporate planning, review, and reporting documentation. In this sense, UNRWA's approach to mainstreaming risk management through different departments and programmes, though criticised by some interviewees, is consistently implemented. Clearly, an explicit, comprehensive and appropriately funded ERM policy would help solidify and augment UNRWA's approach to risk management.

#### Element 5:

As noted above, risk matrices in annual operational plans and emergency appeals do not include a category that focuses explicitly on SH/SEA. They do, however, include a safeguarding risks category which identifies risks associated with gender-based violence, sexual exploitation and abuse, and violence against children in UNRWA installations. In addition, UNRWA has mainstreamed the assessment of SEAH risks into established Agency-wide processes that regularly assess wider protection risks in UNRWA's programmes and installations. The first process is the Protection Alignment Review (PAR), which is conducted every 2-3 years across all Fields of operation. Several questions related to SEA were incorporated into the PAR methodology in 2021-2022, and following that exercise, results and recommendations are shared, discussed and agreed by Fields and programmes. SEAH risks are also assessed more regularly at the installation level through Integrated Assessments (IA). Several questions related to SEAH risks were included in the IA methodology in 2022, and an assessment of every installation in UNRWA is conducted once per quarter. Results from the Integrated Assessments are collected by each Field and actions related to SEAH risks identified are implemented in response to results (i.e. providing installations with SEAH communications materials; targeted training on PSEAH; other actions related to concerns identified.) A review of both the IA and PAR methodologies is planned in 2024/25. To capture how UNRWA is mitigating the risk of SEA in its work, the organisation would benefit from documenting / recording the preventive efforts it undertakes on PSEAH, and making it available to management and externals.

#### MI 5.4 Evidence confidence

High

#### MI 5.5: Intervention designs include the analysis of cross-cutting issues (as defined in KPI 2)

Score

#### Overall MI rating

Unsatisfactory

#### Overall MI score

2.50

Element 1: Approval procedures require an assessment of the extent to which cross-cutting issues have been integrated in the design

3

Element 2: Plans for intervention monitoring and evaluation include attention to cross-cutting issues

2

#### MI 5.5 Analysis

Evidence documents



**Element 1**

Few formal approval procedures have been identified which require assessments of the extent to which cross-cutting issues have been integrated into programme and project design. One exception is the projects review committee, which applies a gender marker to ensure that projects not meeting a minimum score are not approved (GES Implementation Report, 6). Planning and budget preparation instructions, and reviewed programmatic norms, standards, and technical instructions make no mention of cross cutting issues. However, UNRWA has several frameworks and mechanisms in place to encourage the mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues in service delivery, and to monitor the extent to which this occurs in practice. The Strategic Plan 2023-2028 has a high level result on gender equality and this demonstrates organizational progress in this area.

Organisational Directive 21, which establishes the Agency's programme and project cycle management, does not include specific provisions for the integration of cross cutting issues in programme or project design, but does indicate that the functional units of UNRWA may develop strategies to ensure the mainstreaming of protection standards and other cross cutting issues within service delivery. For instance, in the area of education, UNRWA's Inclusive Education Strategy, the curriculum framework, and the Human Rights, Conflict Resolution, and Tolerance Policy include provision for the mainstreaming of protection, gender, and other cross cutting issues in service delivery. UNRWA now has in place a gender equality strategy, an environmental sustainability policy, a disability policy and guidelines, and a protection strategic framework, all of which call for the mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues into intervention designs. UNRWA's project procedures manual also requires gender and protection considerations to be integrated into project proposals but makes no mention of environmental sustainability considerations. The project proposals reviewed for this assessment did not contain detail analyses of gender, environmental, disability issues.

Compact letters between UNRWAs Commissioner General and field office and programme directors also require directors to implement the Gender Equality Strategy, advance work on disability inclusion, ensure protection standards in UNRWA installations, implement the Agency-wide environmental policy, and advance international protection priorities. These compact letters are viewed as a means of ensuring that managers are aware of their responsibilities vis-à-vis the implementation of these organisation wide commitments. Annual Operational Plans reviewed for this assessment include several priorities relating to cross cutting issues including gender, environmental sustainability, and protection.

As indicated in the analysis for element 2 below, because of inconsistencies in the application of monitoring mechanisms, the extent to which cross-cutting priorities have been integrated into intervention designs in line with commitments cannot be systematically determined for the assessment period.

3, 52, 57, 56,  
94-99, 101,  
103-105, 108,  
110, 136, 181,  
203-206, 223,  
359, 364, 365,  
367, 370

**Element 2**

The implementation of cross-cutting commitments is monitored by selected indicators in the CMM, protection alignment reviews, annual reports on the implementation of the Agency's gender equality strategy, and annual reports on disability inclusion.

As noted in the recent evaluation of UNRWA's monitoring and reporting systems, the Agency has been unable to consistently report against several of the protection-related indicators included in the CMM during the assessment period. UNRWA aims to carry out Protection Alignment Reviews (formerly known as Protection Audits) every two years. During the assessment period, Protection Alignment Reviews were carried out in 2019 and 2022.

With respect to gender, the 2021 UN-SWAP report notes that wherever appropriate, indicators and targets in the CMM are disaggregated by sex and age. A gender marker that was established to track the extent to which Programme Budget resources contribute to gender equality has not been applied between 2018 and 2022, and the 2016-2022 MTS Common Monitoring Matrix lacks a specific high-level result relating to gender equality. The Strategic Plan 2023-2028 has a high level result on gender. The UN SWAP report also indicated that UNRWA incorporates gender equality and women's' empowerment criteria into its evaluations, but that results on gender equality are not consistently included in programmatic initiative planning documents. Annual implementation reports for the Agency's Gender Equality Strategy do not report on the indicators originally defined in the Strategy.

With respect to disability, the latest (2021) Disability Inclusion Annual report indicates that in spite of agency-wide efforts, there is still a lack of reliable and comparable disaggregated data on persons with disabilities due to a lack of dedicated funding and resources. One important recent development in this area, however, has been the integration of the Washington Group questions into the Agency's e-Health system.



The 2021 UN SWAP report is positive with respect to UNRWA's compliance with UNEG norms and standards. It notes that gender equality and women's empowerment considerations were consistently integrated into evaluation criteria and that questions were designed in such a way that data on gender equality and women's empowerment were collected.

#### MI 5.5 Evidence confidence

Medium

#### MI 5.6: Intervention designs include detailed, realistic measures to ensure sustainability (as defined in KPI 12)

Score

##### Overall MI rating

##### Overall MI score

Element 1: Intervention designs include statement of critical aspects of sustainability, including institutional framework, resources and human capacity, social behaviour, technical developments and trade, as appropriate

NA

Element 2: Intervention design defines key elements of the enabling policy and legal environment required to sustain the expected benefits of successful implementation

NA

Element 3: The critical assumptions that underpin sustainability form part of the approved monitoring and evaluation plan

NA

Element 4: Where shifts in policy and legislation will be required for sustainability, the intervention plan directly addresses these reforms and processes in a time-sensitive manner

NA

##### MI 5.6 Analysis

Evidence documents

UNRWA does not have a mandate to ensure the sustainability of its operations. This Micro Indicator is therefore deemed to be not relevant.

NA

#### MI 5.6 Evidence confidence

#### MI 5.7: Institutional procedures (including systems for hiring staff, procuring project inputs, disbursing payment, logistical arrangements etc.) positively support speed of implementation and adaptability in line with local contexts and needs

Score

##### Overall MI rating

Unsatisfactory

##### Overall MI score

2.25

Element 1: The organisation has internal standards set to track implementation speed

3

Element 2: Institutional procedures are adaptable to local contexts and needs

2

Element 3: The organisation benchmarks (internally and externally) its performance on implementation speed across different operating contexts

2

Element 4: Evidence that procedural delays have not hindered speed of implementation across interventions reviewed

2

##### MI 5.7 Analysis

Evidence documents

##### Element 1

The majority of UNRWA's operations involve the provision continuous service delivery. For such operations, which lack a set expiry or end date, the imperative is efficiency, rather than 'implementation speed'. UNRWA's CMM contains a number of indicators which track the efficiency of the continuous services that it delivers through the programme budget. Updates to some of these indicators are published on the UNRWA statistics bulletin, or in Annual Operational Reports. Among the indicators that are routinely updated in these published sources are:

- The percentage of protection mainstreaming recommendations from internal protection audits that are implemented.
- Average daily medical consultations per doctor
- Percentage of women with live birth who received at least four ANC visits.
- Percentage of students identified with a disability receiving support meeting their needs.

52, 136, 230, 231, 250, 273-276, 297, 355-358, 417

Other indicators of efficiency, including 'coefficient of internal efficiency' and 'percentage of planned indicators achieved and ahead of plan during a specific reporting period' are not published in Annual Operational Reports or on the UNRWA statistics bulletin.

UNRWA's CMM also includes an indicator that tracks the percentage of projects that are implemented within the agreed timeframe and budget, and this is reported consistently on the UNRWA statistics bulletin. As illustrated by the graphs below, performance against this metric is strong, and improved during the assessment period. Project Managers are also required to use the Agency-wide RBM system to record the extent to which projects are ahead of plan, on track, or behind plan. However, these metrics apply only to project implementation. There are no equivalent indicators in the CMM to track implementation speed (or other metrics of efficiency) for activities implemented through EA's and the Programme Budget. It should be noted that this is, therefore, an incomplete indicator of the output stated in UNRWA's handbook of common indicators: "UNRWA programmes and projects are effectively managed".

UNRWA's central support services division has systems in place to track delays in the provision of goods and services by vendors, though interviews and reports from the UNBOA indicated that the vendor performance is not, in general, systematically monitored.

**Figure 15: Percentage of projects completed within agreed timeframe and budget**



Source: UNRWA Statistic Bulletin

## Element 2

Many internal stakeholders interviewed for this assessment indicated that several of UNRWA's institutional procedures are often insufficiently adaptable to local contexts and needs. This sentiment was expressed most frequently with regards to UNRWA's approach to planning and budgeting, which is driven primarily by centrally determined programmatic norms and standards. There is a strong feeling among many staff interviewed for this assessment that the budgeting and planning process would benefit from higher levels of consultation between HQ and field offices, in order to ensure that programme delivery is suitably adapted to contextual specificities and local needs.

HR processes were also viewed by several field level staff as highly centralised, and many indicated that contract modalities were not sufficiently suited to local conditions. Interviewed staff reported that there was scope for decisions taken by the HQ HRD in Amman to be better informed by UNRWA's very different operating contexts, characterised by varying costs of living, working conditions, and contracting requirements. Interviewees also reported that policies were often issued by HQ departments with standards and aspirational norms, but with insufficient guidance for operationalisation across different operating contexts or consideration of financial and capacity constraints.

## Element 3

UNRWA only benchmarks its implementation speed with respect to projects, which make up a small proportion of the Agency's overall expenditure. Though data relating to the percentage of projects implemented within the agreed timeframe is disaggregated across field offices, the accompanying targets are not field-specific. As noted, this is the only indicator in the Agency's CMM relating to implementation speed, or implementation efficiency in general. The indicator relates only to projects, and there are no equivalent indicators to track implementation

speed or other metrics of efficiency for activities implemented through emergency appeals or the programme budget.

#### Element 4

Although reporting against the CMM indicator presented above indicates that most projects are completed within time and within budget across all fields, during interviews staff reported experiencing procedural delays relating to several areas, including recruitment, payments to providers, and procurement. Many of these delays were associated with the need to seek approvals from HQ relating to field-level decision making, though some delays were attributable to contextual factors beyond the Agency's scope of control. Several of the Agency's business processes are perceived by staff to be outdated, inefficient, time-consuming, and of questionable value for decision making. This is acknowledged by the Agency's leadership, which is developing a modernisation agenda that will entail increased digitalisation and automation of business processes.

Delays to payments of vendors were reported to be a serious efficiency gap. In some cases, delayed payments have resulted in delayed provision of goods and services, and to understandable frustration among vendors. The recent evaluation of the MTS also noted that UNRWA sometimes adopts a strategy of delaying payments to vendors as a means of managing cash flow challenges and observed that this could affect UNRWA's reputation for reliability and result in higher costs in the future.

UNRWA's 2021 UNBOA financial report noted a high proportion of delayed delivery of goods. Though some of these delays were attributable to port and shipping restrictions in the Gaza Strip, the Board was of the view that the high proportion of delayed deliveries could indicate weaknesses in the management and follow up of purchase orders. Recently, a dedicated supply performance and contract management post has been established to support the monitoring of contract administration processes and the delivery of service. The 2020 UNBOA financial report identified delays in staff recruitment, and noted that for the Jordan Field Office, the average length of recruitment for area staff posts was 196 days (with a maximum of 358 days), and in Lebanon the average was 251 days. It was noted, however, that these exceptionally long delays may have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, but that the better use of remote technologies could have reduced their severity. Delays in recruitment processes were also highlighted in evaluations, including the mid-term evaluation of MADAD III.

#### MI 5.7 Evidence confidence

High

#### KPI 6: Working in coherent partnerships directed at leveraging and catalysing the use of resources

KPI score

Satisfactory

2.76

*In light of UNRWA's specific mandate to deliver services to eligible persons directly, micro-indicators 6.3 and 6.8 were removed from the assessment framework and, thus, not assessed.*

**UNRWA is a direct provider of services, and unlike other UN agencies, does not generally operate through implementing partners/third parties.** However, UNRWA maintains many collaborative arrangements with other organisations that work in its fields of operation. The focus of these collaborative arrangements includes joint efforts to improve the quality or augmenting the scope of the services it offers to eligible beneficiaries, knowledge sharing, technical assistance and support, including staff secondments from other agencies, coordination, and service/facility sharing, among others.

**UNRWA's extensive collaborative arrangements with other organisations are not underpinned by systematic procedures or guidance designed to promote and facilitate joint planning and programming.** UNRWA's partnerships are ostensibly guided by the 2015 Strategic Partnerships Framework, but very few of the staff interviewed for this assessment were aware of the Framework's existence; a clear indication that it is not routinely utilised. Interviews also indicated a lack of clarity regarding central responsibility for and oversight of operational partnerships. UNRWA's partnerships unit, housed within the Department of External Relations and Communications, engages mainly in resource mobilisation, donor relations, outreach, and media engagement. Interviews confirmed that the Agency's partnerships unit is not involved in coordinating or facilitating joint planning and programming with other organisations. UNRWA also has no dedicated partnership officers at the field level, and the considerable workload experienced at all levels since the introduction of cost saving measures has reduced the time available to staff for systematic engagement in joint planning and programming.

**Low levels of central oversight and guidance on operational partnerships permit flexibility but are also perceived to increase exposure to certain risks.** Field level and area level staff are generally free to negotiate collaborative arrangements with other organisations on an ad-hoc, needs-based basis. Some of these

arrangements are codified formally through MoUs, though many are not, particularly at the area level. One area of concern highlighted by both internal and external stakeholders related to the lack of systematic procedures to assess the capacity of operational partners. Though potential partner organisations are screened to ensure that they comply with the Agency's neutrality criteria, there is less due diligence exercised with respect to their ability to deliver high quality services. This is considered a risk, especially in instances where collaborative arrangements entail the referral of refugees for services to external providers.

**UNRWA's engagement in UN coordination structures and mechanisms improved over the course of the assessment period.** External stakeholders consulted for this assessment emphasised the very important role played by UNRWA in humanitarian response in the region, given its considerable reach, existing infrastructure, and knowledgeable staff. The Agency's participation in coordination mechanisms is considered to be essential, and most external stakeholders reported improved performance by UNRWA in this respect, highlighting active engagement in the humanitarian cluster system, alignment with regional Humanitarian Response Plans, and improved information sharing. These improvements have helped redress historical perceptions of less forthcoming participation by UNRWA in coordination mechanisms.

**There is acknowledgement within UNRWA of the need to improve procedures for ensuring adequate accountability to affected populations.** The most prominent critique of UNRWA's current approach to AAP relates to its heavy reliance on feedback and complaints mechanisms as a means of ensuring accountability. Though important, feedback and complaints mechanisms are not considered to be sufficient for ensuring accountability, given the relationship that UNRWA has with its beneficiaries as a supplier of critical public services. UNRWA's AAP framework calls for a multi-dimensional approach to accountability that includes information sharing, consultation, and participation by vulnerable groups, but in practice these principles are inconsistently implemented. These limitations are understood by the Agency's leadership, and the protection division is currently undertaking a comprehensive review of UNRWA's approach to AAP.

**UNRWA does not have a formal mandate to engage in knowledge production, but the Agency routinely monitors protection risks faced by Palestine refugees and uses this to inform its advocacy with duty bearers.** UNRWA tracks the number of advocacy interventions that it undertakes annually, and results indicate that these have increased substantially over the course of the assessment period. The extent to which the Agency's advocacy interventions elicit positive responses from the relevant authorities is not tracked as consistently, however.

**MI 6.1: Planning, programming and approval procedures make partnerships more agile when conditions change**

Score

**Overall MI rating**

Unsatisfactory

**Overall MI score**

2.00

Element 1: Procedures in place to encourage joint planning and programming

2

Element 2: Mechanisms, including budgetary, in place to allow programmatic changes and adjustments when conditions change

2

Element 3: Institutional procedures for revisions permit changes to be made at the appropriate level to ensure efficiency

2

**MI 6.1 Analysis**

Evidence documents

**Element 1**

UNRWA's 2016-2022 MTS contains multiple statements of intent regarding joint planning and programming, indicating inter-alia that the Agency will seek to transform "existing collaborative arrangements with partner organisations into long term strategic engagements that enhance the opportunities available to refugees". Components of the Strategy that deal with individual programme areas (health, education, RSS etc.) each point to the importance of partnerships with other organisations in enhancing both the quality and scope of services that UNRWA offers to Palestine refugees. A 2022 stocktake of UNRWA's partnerships with other UN entities identifies a total of 31 active partnerships during the 2016-2022 period, comprising a mix of thematic areas, Field Office-specific, and Agency-wide arrangements. The 2016 Strategic Partnerships framework and the recent evaluation of the Agency's MTS indicated that, at the time of its development, the Agency had over 600 partnerships with other entities. Considering this, it is clear that UNRWA has engaged in relatively extensive joint planning and programming during the assessment period.

20-22, 27-30, 59, 234, 246-249, 251, 266, 278, 294, 323, 417

However, UNRWA's operational partnerships are not underpinned by systematic procedures or guidance to encourage and facilitate joint planning and programming. Interviews with staff indicated a lack of clarity in

relation to strategic guidance, oversight, and responsibility for joint planning and programming. Although UNRWA's participation in joint planning and programming is ostensibly guided by the 2015 Strategic Partnerships Framework, virtually none of the staff interviewed during the assessment were aware of this document, strongly indicating that it is not fulfilling its intended function. Organisational Directive No. 2, which outlines the organisation of UNRWA and the key functions and responsibilities of Headquarters departments, does not clearly indicate where central responsibility for encouraging joint planning and programming lies. The directive establishes a partnerships unit within the Department of External Relations and Communications, but the unit's primary responsibilities relate to resource mobilisation, outreach for fundraising, and supporting the Agency's media engagement and communication. Though the directive indicates that the unit is also responsible for providing "technical direction to other Departments and Fields in relation to partnerships", interviews confirmed that this support related to resource mobilisation and fundraising, not to joint planning and programming. The Directive does indicate, however, that field office and programme department directors have responsibility for engaging and coordinating with other UN entities, and this is also reflected in compact letters between leadership and management positions, which distribute responsibility for developing internal and external strategic partnerships between field directors, directors of executive departments, and directors of programme departments. No guidance or frameworks appear to exist to assist directors in managing joint planning and programming, beyond the 2015 Strategic Partnerships Framework.

Staff at different levels within the organisation also noted that capacity constraints were an important barrier to effective engagement in joint planning and programming. These constraints included the absence of dedicated partnership officers, but also the considerable workload that staff at all levels of the Agency have been faced with since the introduction of cost saving measures (largely in the form of staff cuts) in 2018, which have seen them fully immersed in the day to day tasks of ensuring the continuity of service delivery, which left little time remaining for systematic engagement in joint planning and programming. As noted by the recent evaluation of UNRWA's MTS (p.45), another barrier to joint planning and programming perceived by both internal and external stakeholders is the Agency's high level of bureaucracy and centralised decision making.

It is important to point out again that political sensitivities surrounding UNRWA's mandate are perceived by both internal and external stakeholders to limit the scope for joint planning and programming. Indeed, staff at all levels emphasised that UNRWA is deliberately cautious about engaging in any form of partnership which could be (mis)construed as an effort to either outsource or transfer the Agency's service delivery to alternative providers. The independent evaluation of UNRWA's 2016-2022 MTS made a similar observation, noting that "external stakeholders see UNRWA as having primary responsibility for assisting Palestine refugees", and that therefore "there are very few opportunities for UNRWA to link to other assistance for the refugees". Given these complications, UNRWA's engagement in joint planning and programming is essentially limited to partnerships which complement or enhance the scope and quality of existing service delivery and developed mostly at the operational level. The limited scope for joint planning and programming was sharply illustrated by the rapid rejection by both internal and external stakeholders of a recent initiative by UNRWA's leadership to launch a dialogue on "transformative partnerships".

## **Element 2**

Centralised planning, budgeting, and approval mechanisms are perceived by field level staff to limit opportunities for changes and adjustments when conditions change. Quarterly and annual results reviews, which feed into annual planning cycles, ostensibly provide a means through which necessary changes and adjustments can be identified and enacted, but the scope of these perceived to be constrained by UNRWA's primarily standardised approach to programme delivery. The view from Field Office staff is that opportunities for even minor programmatic adjustments were limited by high levels of centralisation.

Budgetary mechanisms are also perceived to limit flexibility and opportunities for programmatic changes in response to evolving conditions. This is felt to be especially the case with respect to the Programme Budget, for which preparation and planning instructions are perceived by many staff to be restrictive. Field Offices do not have the flexibility to transfer budgeted funds between programmes or between staff and non-staff costs, and underspends on earmarked budget items cannot be redeployed without prior approval from the Director of Finance. Some staff reported improved flexibility with respect to Programme Budget mechanisms in recent years, though this was a minority view. Field office staff also reported very little scope for making HR decisions at the field level, which was also perceived to limit flexibility.

There is greater flexibility for making changes to interventions funded through Emergency Appeals, as well as specific projects. Emergency Appeals are prepared on an annual basis in response to specific emergencies or protracted crises and can therefore be regularly tailored to reflect evolving humanitarian needs. In practice,

however, Emergency Appeals for the occupied Palestinian territory and the Syria Regional Crisis between 2018 and 2022 have been relatively consistent in terms of the interventions they have supported. The Project Procedures Manual permits ad hoc changes to be made to milestones, deliverables, etc., subject to the approval of the project's steering committee, as well as the Project Review Committee and donor in cases where requested changes are significant and require alterations to the relevant grant agreement.

It is important to highlight that the relative paucity of mechanisms for efficiently facilitating programmatic changes has not prevented UNRWA from demonstrating considerable agility when compelled to do so by dramatic contextual developments. For example, as noted in the independent evaluation of UNRWA's 2016-2022 MTS, the Agency adapted very quickly to COVID-19 restrictions, switching to both remote learning and telemedicine. UNRWA introduced other programmatic reforms during the assessment period, including in social work, hospitalisation, family health and education efficiency. Many of the other programmatic changes during the assessment period have been limited to reductions in staffing for frontline services in an effort to reduce costs in response to the Agency's funding shortfalls.

### Element 3

As noted in the analysis for M.I 3.3, UNRWA has several tools that articulate roles and responsibilities, delegate authority and structure accountability, including Organisational Directives, Management Compact Letters, and Technical Instructions. Regarding programme and project cycle management, OD 21 (issued in 2017) describes in detail the roles and responsibilities/accountabilities of the Department of Planning as well as the oversight structures involved. It also has well-established OD's and Technical Instructions for Procurement, Finance and Planning. However, the Agency does not yet have one consolidated Accountability Framework that clearly delineates roles and responsibilities, delegation of authority, and principles and methods of accountability. Delegation of authority is among the priorities listed in the Strategic Plan 2023-2028 and the Terms of Reference of the (new) director for Strategic Positioning and Change.

There are differing perspectives about the extent to which current institutional procedures enable decisions to be made at the appropriate level to ensure efficiency. While at the HQ level, interviewees emphasised positive changes that have been introduced to enhance transparency, consultation, and engagement, there is a strongly held and widespread view among field level staff that they lack the appropriate levels of decision-making authority required to optimise operational efficiency. Rather, there is a perception of excessive control exercised by Headquarters departments, characterised by time-consuming processes to seek approval for even minor decisions. The concerns related to multiple dimensions, including most prominently budgeting, recruitment, and programme design.

Arrangements within field offices, on the other hand, were characterised by greater clarity around delegated authority. There was little ambiguity expressed concerning the varying roles and responsibilities of area chiefs, programme chiefs, support departments, and field office leadership, and no concerns were expressed regarding the levels of delegated authority within field offices. Inevitably, however, the ability of field office leadership to delegate is limited by the high levels of operational and programmatic control exercised by Headquarters.

### MI 6.1 Evidence confidence

High

### MI 6.2: Partnerships are based on an explicit statement of comparative or collaborative advantage i.e. technical knowledge, convening power/partnerships, policy dialogue/advocacy

Score

#### Overall MI rating

Satisfactory

#### Overall MI score

2.75

Element 1: Corporate documentation contains clear and explicit statement on the comparative advantage that the organisation is intending to bring to a given partnership

3

Element 2: Statement of comparative advantage is linked to clear evidence of organisational capacities and competencies as it relates to the partnership

2

Element 3: Resources/competencies needed for intervention area(s) are aligned to the perceived comparative or collaborative advantage

3

Element 4: Comparative or collaborative advantage is reflected in the resources (people, information, knowledge, physical resources, networks) that each partner commits (and is willing) to bring to the partnership

3

Element 5: [UN] Guidance on implementing the Management and Accountability Framework exist and is being applied

NA



MI 6.2 Analysis	Evidence documents
<p><b>Preliminary note</b></p> <p>Unlike the considerable majority of the organisations assessed by MOPAN, UNRWA is mandated to engage in direct service delivery and therefore does not operate through implementing partners.</p> <p>That said, this Micro Indicator and Micro Indicator 6.4 are considered relevant to this assessment, because UNRWA does have working arrangements with other organisations at the headquarters level, the field level, and the area level, although these are not consistently referred to as ‘partnerships’. These include working arrangements with host-government ministries, other UN agencies and international NGOs, private sector organisations, and local community-based organisations. The focus of these working arrangements is diverse, and includes technical assistance, staff secondments, joint planning and programming, and complementary actions to fill gaps in or enhance the scope of UNRWA’s service delivery. As the Agency’s Strategic Framework for Partnerships makes clear, not all of these working arrangements are underpinned by formal documentation.</p> <p>The assessment included a review of memoranda of understanding and accompanying amendments relating to 15 active partnerships between UNRWA and other UN agencies. These documents were identified using UNRWA’s 2022 stocktake of partnerships with UN agencies, which itself indicates that not all existing partnerships are underpinned by MoUs or similar documentation. The MoUs reviewed typically provide a broad outline of the scope and obligations of the proposed partnership but are not accompanied by analyses outlining the rationale for the partnership and the choice of implementation modalities, or assessments of external coherence. However, some of these dimensions of UNRWA’s partnership arrangements can be inferred through examination of the scope and obligations of proposed partnerships as described in MoUs. Therefore, these MoUs, alongside evidence from interviews with internal and external stakeholders (including organisations that have partnered with UNRWA) and other relevant documentation, are considered to provide an adequate basis for assessment against the elements under this Micro-Indicator.</p> <p><b>Element 1</b></p> <p>UNRWA’s 2016-2022 MTS identifies the Agency’s comparative advantages very broadly as the scale and geographic scope of its operations, its coordinated and diversified programming, and its workforce. UNRWA’s Gender Equality Strategy also indicates that there is a clear recognition among UNRWA and its partners that the Agency has a strong comparative advantage in GBV prevention regarding Palestine refugees. An independent study of the Agency’s violence prevention framework attributes this to UNRWA’s reach and embeddedness in Palestine refugee communities, the quality of its services, and high levels of ownership given that staff are themselves part of the refugee community. Note that these elements correspond strongly to the three areas of comparative advantage articulated in the MTS.</p> <p>The 2015-2016 Partnerships Strategic Framework, which is designed to serve as a handbook for guiding and structuring UNRWA’s partnership activities, identifies the Agency’s comparative advantages as the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) Direct service delivery</li> <li>ii) Diversified programming</li> <li>iii) Extensive workforce, human resource, and network base</li> <li>iv) Access to refugee camps</li> <li>v) Capacity to operate in stable, emergency, fragile, occupied and conflict environments</li> <li>vi) Geographic coverage</li> <li>vii) High levels of trust among Palestine refugees</li> </ul> <p>The framework also encourages staff to clearly articulate the Agency’s comparative advantage when negotiating specific partnership arrangements. Crucially, however, interviews carried out for this assessment revealed extremely limited awareness of the Partnerships Strategic Framework, strongly indicating that it is not systematically applied by staff when developing partnerships arrangements.</p> <p>These are the only statements of comparative advantage available in corporate documentation. They are therefore assumed to be the comparative advantages that UNRWA seeks to bring to its partnerships with other organisations.</p> <p>Although none of the MoUs reviewed contained explicit statements of UNRWA’s comparative advantage, it is very clear from their content in the majority of cases that they outline joint efforts to improve the quality or scope of the Agency’s service delivery to Palestine refugees. In this sense, the partnerships reviewed clearly align</p>	<p>59, 134, 234, 273-277, 388-417</p>



with UNRWA's comparative advantage as the only UN agency mandated to deliver services to Palestine refugees in five areas of operation and across a variety of thematic areas. The MoUs reviewed cover a broad range of UNRWA's diverse programming, including education, health, food, and cash assistance.

## Element 2

The comparative advantage identified in UNRWA's MTS and the Partnerships Framework are broadly phrased but are clearly aligned with the organisation's capacity and core competencies.

By the end of 2022, UNRWA registered 6.65 million eligible persons across its five fields of operations, an increase of eight percent compared with 2018, the starting date of this assessment. Of these, 38 per cent are in Jordan, 26 per cent in the Gaza Strip, 17 per cent in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), 10 per cent in Syria, and 8 per cent in Lebanon. Of the 6.65 million eligible persons, approximately 2.6 million accessed UNRWA services in 2022. As noted in a recent evaluation of UNRWA's 2016-2022 MTS, UNRWA's continued ability to provide services to this population, which host governments are either unable or unwilling to provide, contributes positively to stability in the region. This argument was echoed by several staff interviewed during this assessment. Regarding UNRWA's programmes, corporate results in Annual Operational Reports and the online statistics bulletin illustrate high levels of coverage and performance by services across programmatic areas despite chronic resource shortfalls. Crucially, UNRWA is the only UN agency mandated to deliver these services to Palestine refugees. As the independent evaluation of the Agency's MTS noted, UNRWA has "built up its comparative advantage by providing services in these areas over the 70 years of its existence". With respect to its workforce, UNRWA employed a total of 27,756 staff in as of 2022, 27,543. Around 99 percent are local staff but not all of these are Palestine refugees. However, as noted by the independent evaluation of the UNRWA's MTS, funding shortfalls have recently forced the Agency to adopt a variety of cost saving measures, including staffing cuts, and as such to some degree results have been delivered at the expense of staff well-being. This sentiment was also expressed by several staff during interviews carried out for this assessment.

It is worth noting that UNRWA's Strategic Framework for partnerships also links identified comparative advantages to evidence of the Agency's core competencies in direct service delivery across the areas of protection, health, education, and livelihoods. While this evidence draws on results achieved during the 2008-2014 period, it remains broadly relevant given the continuity of UNRWA's core service delivery, despite considerable cuts to funding. It should be pointed out again, however, that awareness among interviewed staff of the Agency's Strategic Framework for partnerships was extremely limited.

As noted above, the MoUs underpinning UNRWA's partnerships with UN agencies that were reviewed for this assessment do not explicitly identify the respective comparative advantages of the parties to the agreements. They also do not provide any explicit detail of the relevant organisations' capacities and competencies. It is nevertheless clear that the MoUs reviewed detail agreements between UNRWA and UN agencies with organisational capacities and competencies that are relevant to the focus of the partnership. For instance, UNRWA maintains several MoUs with the World Food Programme relating to the food and cash assistance programmes in Lebanon, Jordan, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank including East Jerusalem. The WFP has considerable expertise in this area, and most of the MoUs note that the WFP has existing mechanisms in place for the distribution food and cash assistance in the region. In another example, UNRWA's Agency-wide MoU with UNICEF outlines several thematic areas of potential cooperation, which align with UNICEF's expertise in the area of protecting the rights of women and children. In the education programme area, UNRWA maintains an MoU with UNESCO.


The MoUs reviewed are clearly not representative of the full range of organisations with whom UNRWA partners. Interviews with UNRWA staff conducted during this assessment indicated that the Agency has numerous working arrangements with small NGOs and CBOs at the area level. Staff reported that the purpose of these arrangements is generally to complement the quality or scope of UNRWA's service delivery, including through the provision of services by referral that are not covered by UNRWA's core programming. It is understood from interviews that many of these working arrangements are not covered by official partnership agreements, as detailed in the 2015-2016 Strategic Partnerships Framework. The extent to which these working arrangements are underpinned by clear evidence of organisational capacities and competencies cannot therefore be determined in a systematic manner. Staff indicated that UNRWA screens all organisations with whom it has working relationships against neutrality criteria and UN sanctions lists, but there do not appear to be systematic processes in place for assessing capacities and competencies at this level. Staff also noted that this had been highlighted as an area of concern by some donors.

## Element 3

*N.B. note that the wording of this element implies that it refers to the organisation as a whole, and not to specific partnerships.*

UNRWA's resources are mostly aligned to its perceived comparative advantages. As the recent evaluation of the Agency's MTS found, UNRWA's activities are based largely on its comparative advantages, as the vast majority (~90 per cent) of funds are spent on the provision of education, health, and relief and social services, which represent the basic services that the Agency is mandated to provide. The latest available UNBOA report indicates that in 2021, staff costs comprised approximately 61 per cent of the Agency's expenditure. When analysed programmatically, the majority of expenditure was in education, RSS, health, and ICIP, in that order, as illustrated in the graph below.

**Figure 16: UNBOA reported expenditure by programme area;**



Source: UNBOA report 2022

Protection emerges as a key area where resources do not appear to be fully aligned to comparative advantage. The 2016-2022 MTS identifies protection as the Agency's first strategic outcome area, and the CMM matrix includes several indicators to monitor performance in protection programming and mainstreaming. However, as was made clear by numerous interviewees, the UNRWA's protection activities are entirely project-funded, and this is widely perceived to be unpredictable and hence unsustainable.

#### Element 4

In the MoUs reviewed, the comparative advantages of each organisation are for the most part clearly reflected in the resources brought to partnerships. Most of the organisations whose collaborative arrangements with UNRWA are covered by the MoUs also have programmes of assistance in UNRWA's areas of operation. UNICEF, for instance, has an Area Programme covering Palestinian women and children in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. As noted in interviews, UNICEF has partnered with UNRWA due to its considerable reach in the region. The resources brought by UNICEF to the partnership clearly reflect its comparative advantage in the areas of child protection, education, social protection, and health. Another example involves UNRWA's institutional partnership with the WFP, whereby UNRWA channels its own resources for emergency food and cash assistance to Palestine refugees through existing WFP mechanisms. UNRWA's comparative advantage is also reflected in the resources that it brings to partnerships relating to the provision of support services to the FAO and UNFPA in the Gaza Strip that cover logistics, security, fuel, and vehicle maintenance and which clearly build on UNRWA's large footprint in the area.

As with other elements, the MoUs reviewed do not cover the full range of organisations with whom UNRWA partners. Interviews with staff indicated that at the field and area level, UNRWA partners with NGOs and CBOs that are perceived to have a comparative advantage in complementing the quality and/or scope of UNRWA's service delivery. The absence of available documentation underpinning these partnerships, however, means that this cannot be verified. Interviews did indicate, however, that in the past challenges had arisen due to UNRWA's referral of beneficiaries third-party service providers in the Relief and Social Services programming area who did not meet the relevant standards. These concerns, when identified, were addressed, but there is still scope for a more systematic approach to due diligence in vetting potential partners at the area/field level, a view that was also expressed by several interviewees and that is understood to be shared by some donors.

#### Element 5

No evidence was found to assess this element.	
<b>MI 6.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium</b>
<b>MI 6.3 Demonstrated commitment to furthering development partnerships for countries (i.e. support for South-South collaboration, triangular arrangements, and use of country systems)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	
<b>Overall MI score</b>	
Element 1: Clear statement on how the organisation will support principles of collaboration with countries on their development agenda (Nairobi Principles, 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda)	NA
Element 2: Clear statement/guidelines for how the organisation will support development partnerships between countries	NA
Element 3: Clear statement/guidelines for how the organisation will use country systems	NA
Element 4: Internal structures and incentives supportive of collaboration/cooperation with countries, and use of country systems where appropriate	NA
<b>MI 6.3 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
Removed from framework, in light of UNRWA's specific mandate to deliver services to eligible persons directly. Therefore, not assessed.	NA
<b>MI 6.3 Evidence confidence</b>	
<b>MI 6.4: Strategies or designs identify and address synergies with development partners, to encourage leverage/catalytic use of resources and avoid fragmentation in relation to 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda implementation</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.33</b>
Element 1: Strategies or designs clearly identify possible synergies with development partners and leverage of resources/catalytic use of resources and results	3
Element 2: Strategies or designs clearly articulate responsibilities and scope of the partnership	4
Element 3: Strategies or designs are based on a clear assessment of external coherence	3
Element 4: Strategies or designs contain a clear statement of how leverage will be ensured	NA
<b>MI 6.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
<i>N.B. The preliminary note included in the analysis for Micro Indicator 6.2 is also considered to be relevant for this Micro Indicator.</i>	
<p><b>Element 1</b></p> <p>UNRWA's MTS identifies the need for the Agency to "work with partners to ensure refugees benefit from specialist care that UNRWA is unable to provide and to maximize opportunities to increase resource mobilisation through partnerships". Departmental priorities in Annual Operational Plans between 2019 and 2022 often include ambitions to develop synergistic partnerships with other organisations.</p> <p>It is evident from both documentation as well as interviews that UNRWA's core programmes maintain numerous partnerships with different types of organisations that complement the quality or expand the scope of its service delivery. This includes but is not limited to, partnerships that facilitate referrals for services that UNRWA itself is unable to provide. In the area of health, for instance, the MTS makes clear that UNRWA's service delivery mainly covers primary healthcare, and that the majority of hospitalisations are supported through referrals to public and private hospitals. Between 2018 and 2021, UNRWA supported 85 thousand hospitalisation referrals. Referrals are also common in the protection programming area, under which UNRWA refers individual refugees facing protection risks for third party legal aid. Information from UNRWA's statistics bulletin and AORs indicates that between 2018 and 2021 UNRWA has referred an average of 12.4 thousand refugees per year facing protection risks for legal advice. In the livelihoods area, UNRWA tracks the number of partnerships that it has with other organisations that provide services in support of livelihoods activities, including technical and vocational training. Between 2018 and 2021, UNRWA maintained an annual average of 21 such partnerships. Partnerships also happen in education and RSS – i.e. afterschool activities, support for special needs, etc. but</p>	64, 59, 134, 234, 273-277, 388-417

aren't systematically tracked in the same way as they are for livelihoods. During interviews with staff at the field and area level, it was clear that partnerships with organisations that provided referral services were greatly valued, because of the important role that they play in augmenting the scope and/or quality of UNRWA's service delivery.

The assessment also reviewed several other programmatic strategies and frameworks of relevance to the 2018-2022 period. Some of these contained assessments of potential partnership opportunities with the implicit purpose of maximising potential synergies. The strategy on Information and Communication Technology for Education, for instance, indicates that the Agency could seek partnerships with private sector companies to support the supply of IT devices and internet connectivity to UNRWA schools. It also highlights several other potential inputs by partners to enrich UNRWA's curricula with respect to ICT education. The Agency's Solid Waste Management Framework also indicates UNRWA's ambition to partner with refugees, municipalities, and other actors (including the private sector) in the waste management process. Partnerships are particularly important with respect to solid waste management, given the low levels of funding allocated to this area in the Programme Budget. Interviews with staff at the field level indicated that there were active partnerships for solid waste management, including with local host government authorities. UNRWA's Strategic Framework to Address Violence Affecting and Involving Children in UNRWA Installations and Services also highlights the importance of partnerships in the Agency's efforts to address violence against children. Interviewees confirmed that several partnerships are active in this area. The Agency's 2022 stocktake of UN partnerships also indicates that UNICEF and UNRWA collaborated on child protection throughout the assessment period across all field offices. Interviewees also reported that the Agency has worked extensively with UNICEF in the areas of child protection, social work case management, and gender-based violence. This included UNICEF support to UNRWA to configure and implement the PRIMERO information management system to facilitate case management. The 2021 update to the Agency's Gender Equality Strategy notes that the Lebanon Field Office partnered with local NGOs to provide training sessions for youth on bullying and violence protection.

UNRWA's Partnerships Strategic Framework explicitly calls on staff involved in negotiating partnerships to actively identify programmatic synergies. As noted, this framework is not widely known or used among staff, however. The MoUs reviewed for this assessment did not explicitly identify possible synergies with development partners. However, it is clear from their content that they are designed to maximise potential synergies between development partners through multiple modalities, including technical assistance/knowledge exchange, the shared use of support services or delivery mechanisms, and joint programming. A 2022 stocktake of UNRWA's existing UN partnerships points to numerous agreements with various UN agencies that carry the potential to address synergies across multiple programming areas. Many of these institutional partnerships are long-standing. Collaboration with the ILO, for example, dates back to 1953, and collaboration with UNESCO to 1956.

## **Element 2**

All external partners consulted during the assessment indicated that the roles and responsibilities of UNRWA vis-à-vis its partners were very clearly demarcated. That this is the case is at least in part attributable the fact that UNRWA has a very clear mandate and a very specific beneficiary group. As is made clear by the recent evaluation of the Agency's MTS, there is a widely held understanding among external stakeholders that UNRWA is the organisation with primary responsibility for assisting Palestine refugees. UNRWA is extremely cautious about entering any partnerships that could be potentially perceived as diminishing this responsibility.

The MoUs reviewed clearly reflect the view of external stakeholders that UNRWA's partnerships involve very clear demarcations of roles and responsibilities. The majority of the MoUs reviewed contain a detailed division of the responsibilities and obligations of each partner, including financial and reporting obligations where relevant. A small number of the MoUs reviewed are less specific. This includes the Agency-wide MoU between UNRWA and UNICEF, which outlines broad potential areas of cooperation and cooperation modalities, but does not detail any specific joint activities or programmes etc. The purpose of the MoU, however, is to serve as a general framework for ongoing collaboration between the two agencies. The document indicates that the roles and obligations of the parties to the agreement, as well as implementation arrangements, will be decided on an ongoing basis through designated focal points and reviewed during annual partnership meetings.

## **Element 3**

UNRWA's MTS, EA documents, programme strategies and frameworks, and Annual Operational Plans do not explicitly include assessments of external coherence. The MoU's review also does not include assessments of external coherence. Despite this, interviews with internal and external stakeholders strongly indicate that UNRWA employs a variety of mechanisms to ensure that its interventions are coherent with the actions of its development partners. As discussed at more length in the analysis for Micro Indicator 6.5, external stakeholders

interviewed for this assessment reported that UNRWA actively and consistently participates in UN coordination mechanisms in its areas of operation, helping to ensure coherence. Some stakeholders, including other UN agencies working in the region, also noted that UNRWA's participation in these fora had improved during the assessment period, in the sense that UNRWA had become increasingly pro-active in sharing information to ensure the coherence of its activities those of other organisations. Host government representatives also reported that UNRWA is very proactive in providing information about the services that it provides to Palestine refugees in order to ensure coherence and avoid duplication. A recent evaluation of the Agency's Family Health Team reform found that UNRWA's approach to family health was coherent with their own approaches.

Activities supported through UNRWA's Emergency Appeals are integrated into Humanitarian Response Plans for the occupied Palestinian territories and Syria, as well as the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan. External stakeholders widely reported that UNRWA actively participates in technical working groups relating to these joint response plans. The external coherence of UNRWA's interventions is also supported by its very clear mandate and specific beneficiary group. The high level of awareness among other development partners that UNRWA has primary responsibility for service delivery to Palestine refugees helps to ensure that duplication is avoided.

#### Element 4

No evidence was found to assess this element.

#### MI 6.4 Evidence confidence

Medium

#### MI 6.5: Key business practices (planning, design, implementation, monitoring and reporting) co-ordinated with relevant partners

Score

#### Overall MI rating

Satisfactory

#### Overall MI score

3.00

Element 1: Active engagement in joint exercises/mechanisms (planning, coordination, monitoring, evaluation) to support external coherence

3

Element 2: Participating in joint monitoring and reporting processes with key development partners

3

Element 3: Identifying shared information or efficiency gaps with development partners and developing strategies to address them

3

#### MI 6.5 Analysis

Evidence documents

#### Element 1

Across all fields, there was a high level of consensus among internal and external stakeholders, including some donors, that UNRWA's participation in existing planning and coordination mechanisms had improved considerably over the 2018 to 2022 period. Though some stakeholders and documents expressed the view that there is still scope for more active and consistent engagement, UNRWA's positive trajectory in this respect was widely acknowledged and welcomed. Interviews held with other UN agencies working in the region also indicated that UNRWA's engagement in coordination mechanisms had improved during the 101 assessment period. This included better information sharing with peer organisations, more active engagement in the cluster system, and proactive attempts to identify opportunities for joint programming.

UNRWA is an active member of UN Country Teams across all fields of operation and external stakeholders largely indicated that the Agency participates actively in the UN's cluster system, humanitarian coordination teams, and operational and security management teams. UNRWA's engagement in the protection cluster in particular was highlighted as an example of positive engagement, with work ongoing to develop mechanisms through which different agencies can refer complex protection cases to one another. In the Gaza Strip, UNRWA is a member of the PSEAH network, which provides opportunities for knowledge sharing and joint training, as well as the cash working group.

12, 58, 59, 134, 135, 171

Interviews indicated that in the past, UNRWA's ability to fully engage in the cluster system and other coordination mechanisms was constrained by a lack of dedicated capacity. In recent years, however, there is a view that management staff have increasingly prioritised effective participation in coordination structures. That said, a number of internal stakeholders, however, reported that the capacity and time constraints, as well as high levels of staff rotation, remain an obstacle to full participation. For instance, in the management response to the decentralised evaluation of a project to strengthen the resilience of Palestine refugees from Syria who had fled to Jordan, the JFO indicated that improved coordination and partnerships would require dedicated staff members and noted that such positions could not be financed under the programme budget due to the Agency's



challenging financial situation. Interviews also pointed to the lack of dedicated partnerships officers as a challenge. It was also emphasised by several stakeholders that UNRWA's active participation in coordination mechanisms was strongly driven by leadership, particularly at the field level. A recent evaluation of the Agency's MTS also found evidence that UNRWA field offices participate actively in UN Humanitarian Country Teams as well as the cluster system, though the extent of this varies across field offices.

UNRWA's Emergency Appeals are coordinated with other development partners and are fully aligned with Humanitarian Response Plans for the occupied Palestinian territories and the Syria regional crisis. In the Gaza Strip in particular, where UNRWA plays a particularly dominant role with respect to emergency preparedness and response, the field office has made considerable efforts to coordinate its activities and emergency response plans with other agencies and organisations in the area. This has helped to address a historical perception among external stakeholders in the Gaza Strip of insufficient engagement by UNRWA in this regard.

Interviews also indicated strong, daily coordination with host government authorities at the field, area, and camp level. For example, a recent evaluation of UNRWA's Family Health Team reform found evidence of high levels of coordination between UNRWA and the host government Ministries of Health on maternal health, immunisation, and the response to COVID-19.

### Element 2

The evidence from interviews and documents highlights several examples of UNRWA contributing to joint monitoring and reporting processes with key development partners. This includes contributions to systematic reporting on the implementation of joint development/humanitarian frameworks. In Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories, for instance, UNRWA is part of the UN Sustainable Cooperation Development Framework (UNSCDF) and contributes to related monitoring efforts. Interviews indicated that UNRWA contributes to UN Common Country Analyses in all of its areas of operation. UNRWA's EA's are aligned with HRPs for the occupied Palestinian territories and the Syria regional crisis, and provides data to inform reporting on their implementation (i.e. <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/mid-year-humanitarian-response-dashboard-january-june-2022>).

There are also several examples of UNRWA participation in joint monitoring and reporting processes. For instance, in the Gaza Strip, UNRWA contributed to a joint assessment with the World Food Programme on the viability of cash transfers as opposed to food. UNRWA works closely with the WFP to monitor food distribution in the Gaza Strip with a view to avoiding duplication, given that both organisations are involved in the distribution of substantial quantities of food assistance in the area, albeit to different beneficiary groups. Interviews indicated that UNRWA's periodic crisis monitoring surveys also draw on data collected by other organisations that work with Palestine Refugees. They also indicated that UNRWA contributes to multi-sectoral needs assessments led by OCHA, shares vulnerability assessment tools with the UNHCR, and in Lebanon works with the World Bank, the UNHCR, and other UN partners to ensure that Palestine refugees are included in the activities of the Lebanese vulnerability assessment platform. Also in Lebanon, documents indicate that UNRWA works with other UN agencies to monitor the security situation to actively identify potential security risks (AOR 2019, pg. 105). In the Gaza Strip too, interviews indicate that UNRWA works actively with other Agencies to monitor the security situation in order to ensure emergency and crisis preparedness. UNRWA also provides regular inputs relating to information on the human rights situation of Palestine refugees to international human rights and justice mechanisms through its protection work. The Agency's 2022 stocktake of its UN partnerships provides several other examples of engagement in joint monitoring and reporting exercises.

### Element 3

The available evidence provides some examples of UNRWA working with development partners to identify and address shared information/efficiency gaps. For instance, UNRWA's GFO has MoUs underpinning agreements to provide logistical, fuel and maintenance, and security services to the FAO and the UNFPA on a cost-reimbursable basis. Interviews also indicated that UNRWA has worked on joint feasibility assessments with the UNDP, including in relation to the supply of renewable energy to camps within the West Bank including East Jerusalem. As highlighted above, UNRWA has worked closely with the WFP to explore the possibility of transitioning from food to cash transfers in the Gaza Strip. In Syria, UNRWA has worked with other UN agencies to identify financial service providers capable of providing cash assistance through mobile banking and e payments to improve the operational efficiency of UNRWA's emergency assistance (AOR 2019). In the West Bank, UNRWA has worked with the European Union Representative office and the NGO CESVI to analyse methods for improving the efficiency of Solid Waste Management services in Askar, Am'ari an Dheisheh camps. As noted above, some interviewees reported resistance within the Agency to significant changes to enhance operational efficiency. A recent proposal to lease UNRWA cars to UNICEF in Jordan, for instance, was shelved as a result of internal

resistance to the move.	
<b>MI 6.5 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium</b>
<b>MI 6.6: Key information (analysis, budgeting, management, results etc.) shared with strategic/implementation partners on an on-going basis</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.33</b>
Element 1: Clear corporate statement on transparency of information is aligned to the International Aid Transparency Initiative	4
Element 2: Information is available on analysis, budgeting, management in line with the guidance provided by the International Aid Transparency Initiative	4
Element 3: Responses to partner queries on analysis, budgeting, management and results are of good quality and responded to in a timely fashion	2
<b>MI 6.6 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
<p><b>Element 1</b> As noted in the 2021 Annual Operational Report, UNRWA commenced regular reporting of financial information on the IATI website in 2020. This followed on the back of the 2020 Management Initiative, which among other objectives aimed to strengthen UNRWA's oversight and accountability and enhance budgetary and financial transparency. The June 2022 update to the management initiative indicates that the Agency publishes financial data to the IATI's development portal on a quarterly basis.</p> <p><b>Element 2</b> The IATI's development portal (<a href="https://d-portal.org/ctrack.html#view=search">https://d-portal.org/ctrack.html#view=search</a>) includes information relating to total expenditure and budgeting, as well as information about active projects and ended projects. It does not, however, include information relating to planned projects. UNRWA also has its own transparency portal (<a href="https://open.unrwa.org/">https://open.unrwa.org/</a>) that provides similar information using a map-based, user-friendly layout.</p> <p><b>Element 3</b> With respect to reporting on results, the evidence highlights general satisfaction among external stakeholders. The recent evaluation of the Agency's monitoring and reporting processes indicated that external partners were satisfied with UNRWA's results reporting, and in particular with harmonised reporting through detailed Annual Operational Reports.</p> <p>External stakeholders interviewed for the assessment were less satisfied with UNRWA's ability to provide information in response to queries relating to the Agency's non-programmatic activities. Multiple donors, for instance, felt that there was insufficient reporting on the purpose and impact of activities implemented under the 2020 management initiative. While written updates to management reforms are available in Annual Operational Reports and other documents, there is a perception that there is further scope for reporting on the practical effect that these are having on the Agency's management and operations. There is also a perception that UNRWA is not consistently able to provide financial information, including with respect to resource mobilisation, in a timely manner in response to partner requests. This perception was expressed by some internal stakeholders too, who indicated that much of the Agency's financial information is Excel-based and not real-time and is therefore challenging to access and provide to donors within expected timeframes. It is important to note, however, that recent Annual Operational Reports do include information relating to the implementation of the 2019-2022 resource mobilisation strategy, and that UNRWA also shares budgeting information through the IATI's development dashboard and its own transparency portal.</p> <p>External stakeholders, including those in some of UNRWA's current partner organisations, also indicated that UNRWA could be more proactive in regularly sharing operational information required for effective coordination and coherence. In the Gaza Strip in particular, there was a perception among some external stakeholders that UNRWA had been reluctant to proactively share information, though all external interviewees agreed that the Agency had improved significantly in this respect following the arrival of the Field Office's new leadership. There is also an awareness among stakeholders that UNRWA's ability to proactively share information is sometimes limited by the Agency's current capacity constraints, as well as by stringent rules and regulations pertaining to the sharing of information, especially when this concerns potentially sensitive data relating to beneficiaries.</p>	10-14, 134, 136, 436
<b>MI 6.6 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High</b>



MI 6.7: Clear standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiaries implemented		Score
Overall MI rating		Highly Unsatisfactory
Overall MI score		1.40
Element 1: Explicit statement available on standards and procedures for accountability to beneficiary populations i.e. Accountability to Affected Populations		2
Element 2: Staff guidance is available on the implementation of the procedures for accountability to beneficiaries		0
Element 3: Training has been conducted on the implementation of procedures for accountability to beneficiaries		3
Element 4: Programming tools explicitly contain the requirement to implement procedures for accountability to beneficiaries		2
Element 5: Approval mechanisms explicitly include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for accountability to beneficiaries will be addressed in the intervention		0
MI 6.7 Analysis		Evidence documents
<p><b>Element 1</b></p> <p>UNRWA's 2016-2022 MTS commits the Agency to improving feedback mechanisms and processes, communication, and refugee participation in order to strengthen accountability to beneficiaries. A short document is available that provides a very general overview of the UNRWA's framework for accountability to affected populations. At the time of writing, the framework was being updated.</p> <p>However, there is significant evidence available to indicate that there are several, well-acknowledged shortcomings in the Agency's overall approach to AAP and its implementation of the existing framework. With respect to overall approach, the recent evaluation of UNRWA's MTS found that in practice, the Agency had limited its conceptualisation of AAP essentially to feedback and complaints mechanisms. This is despite the framework calling for a more multi-dimensional approach that involves information sharing and gathering, consultation, and participation of vulnerable groups. The recent evaluation of UNRWA's monitoring and reporting systems also found shortcomings in the Agency's approach to AAP during the assessment period. It found that overall, refugee participation was not well integrated into UNRWA's RBM cycle including results monitoring activities. Furthermore, the evaluation found that there was no consistent, shared approach to AAP across fields, a lack of integration of refugee feedback into decision making, and insufficient consultations during intervention design. As noted, these shortcomings are acknowledged within the Agency, and efforts are underway to improve participation of affected populations in the planning and implementation of programming.</p> <p>Protection audit reports carried out in 2018 found low levels of participation in intervention design and management, as well as low levels of confidence among refugees in UNRWA's feedback and complaints mechanisms. The summary report of the 2017-18 protection audits indicates that the accountability principle scored 50.4 percent overall, with lows of 24.5 and 31 per cent in Lebanon and the West Bank. This document also highlighted the limitations of complaints mechanisms as a means of ensuring accountability, noting that women and children were not empowered by these mechanisms, and a general lack of belief among beneficiaries that complaints or feedback would lead to any lasting improvements (p 12).</p> <p>The most recent protection alignment reviews, released in mid-2023, point to a slight decline in overall scores for the accountability principle, at 48.4% on average across the five fields of operations. Some key findings from the most recent reviews in relation to accountability included some improvements in the availability and diversity of channels for feedback, and the introduction of new methods for obtaining feedback such as client surveys, post-occupancy assessments and post-distribution monitoring. However, they also found no evidence that these new processes had resulted in installation-level staff making changes to service delivery. Negative findings from the most recent protection alignment review in relation to accountability included the absence of a unified system for feedback and complaints, and a lack of confidence among community members in reporting mechanisms for sensitive issues and misconduct.</p> <p>Interviews indicated that parent teacher associations and student parliaments in schools, friendship committees in health centres, and camp service committees were perceived by UNRWA staff to be an important means for securing feedback and participation by UNRWA refugees. However, protection audit documents from 2018 indicate that the composition of these structures is often neither equitable nor representative. The 2021 protection alignment reviews reached a similar conclusion, indicating that community participation was secured</p>		94-99, 134, 136, 173, 375, 376, 417, 437

primarily through engagement with long established community groups such as School Councils, PTAs, School Parliaments and Health Friendship Committees. They also found, however, that respondents consulted for the reviews reported not feeling represented by these groups and that they did not feel that their reviews were reflected in programming and decisions that affected them.

#### **Element 2**

UNRWA's Protection Mainstreaming Toolkit indicates that the Agency's protection division is responsible for supporting and monitoring key protection standards across all programmes, including the accountability and participation and empowerment. However, this document provides no detailed guidance on how the principles of accountability and participation and empowerment can be integrated into the programme cycle. The Agency's AAP framework itself also provides no guidance on how procedures of mechanisms for AAP can be implemented, but it does include a link to AAP tools from the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. At the time of writing, this link did not appear to be functioning.

#### **Element 3**

While there is no evidence that staff have received training that focuses explicitly on AAP, accountability and participation are two of UNRWA's four key protection principles, and the Agency's Protection Division is responsible for supporting and monitoring their integration into all areas of programming. To support the integration of protection principles into programming, the Protection Division regularly provides protection training to UNRWA staff. The Proposed Programme Budget for 2022 indicates that between 2018 and 2020, a total of 13,229 staff members were trained in protection, with training for a further 5,650 planned for 2021 and 2022. It is also worth noting that multiple interviewees noted that the need and demand for training in all areas far exceeded available resources.


#### **Element 4**

Several programming tools reviewed explicitly contain the requirement to implement procedures to ensure accountability for beneficiaries, although they do not provide significant detail or guidance on how this should be accomplished. For example, the ICIP's Environmental and Social Management Framework, the Strategic Framework for Addressing Violence Affecting and Involving Children in UNRWA Installations and Services, the Solid Waste Management Framework, and the School Health Strategy, all indicate the need to include procedures and mechanisms for ensuring AAP. The technical norms and standards for health and education programming do not reference procedures or mechanisms for AAP, although it is understood that all UNRWA schools have parent teacher associations and health centres have friendship committees. The protection mainstreaming toolkit indicates that programmes should ensure accountability and participation but fails to provide any detailed guidance in this regard. The protection audit/alignment review methodology, however, includes checklists for each protection principle, including accountability, and staff interviewed were aware of these requirements. As noted, the most recent available protection audits found generally low levels of alignment with accountability and participation standards across all field offices and programmes.

#### **Element 5**

Existing approval mechanisms do not include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for AAP are integrated into programming or projects. As noted in the previous MOPAN assessment of UNRWA, the terms of reference for the Project Review Committees do not include the requirement to assess the extent to which procedures for accountability to beneficiaries will be addressed by interventions. Reviewed planning instructions for PB preparation and the relevant programmatic technical norms and standards reviewed also make no references to AAP. UNRWA's 2021 Protection Strategic Framework clearly indicates that the Agency's protection standards, including accountability, should guide all programming and service delivery, and should be understood by all staff. It also specifies that all of UNRWA's programmes and interventions, irrespective of their technical specialism and formal responsibilities, should have protection at the core. Protection alignment reviews periodically assess the extent to which protection standards, including accountability, have been integrated into programming, but these cannot be considered an approval mechanism. Moreover, as indicated in the 2021 Annual Operational Report, there is inconsistent implementation of recommendations stemming from internal protection audits.

**Figure 17: Percentage of protection mainstreaming recommendations from internal protection audits implemented**



Source: 2021 Annual Operational Report

**MI 6.7 Evidence confidence**

**Medium**

**MI 6.8: Participation with national and other partners in mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments**

**Score**

**Overall MI rating**

**Overall MI score**

Element 1: Participation in joint performance reviews of interventions e.g. joint assessments

NA

Element 2: Participation in multi-stakeholder dialogue around joint sectoral or normative commitments

NA

Element 3: Use of surveys or other methods to understand how partners are experiencing working together on implementing mutually agreed commitments.

NA

**MI 6.8 Analysis**

**Evidence documents**

Removed from framework, in light of UNRWA's specific mandate to deliver services to eligible persons directly. Therefore, not assessed.

NA

**MI 6.8 Evidence confidence**

**MI 6.9: Use of knowledge base to support policy dialogue and/or advocacy**

**Score**

**Overall MI rating**

**Satisfactory**

**Overall MI score**

**3.50**

Element 1: Statement in corporate documentation explicitly recognises the organisation's role in knowledge production

4

Element 2: Knowledge products produced and utilised by partners to inform action – NOT RELEVANT

NA

Element 3: Knowledge products generated and applied to inform advocacy, where relevant, at country, regional, or global level

3

Element 4: Knowledge products generated are timely/perceived as timely by partners – NOT RELEVANT

NA

Element 5: Knowledge products are perceived as high quality by partners – NOT RELEVANT

NA

Element 6: Knowledge products are produced in a format that supports their utility to partners – NOT RELEVANT

NA

**MI 6.9 Analysis**

**Evidence documents**

**Element 1**

Knowledge production is not a component of the Agency's mandate. Most of the elements under this Micro Indicator are therefore considered to be not relevant to the assessment. However, UNRWA is acknowledged to contribute to knowledge production through international protection monitoring. This involves monitoring, reporting, and advocating for the rights of Palestine refugees to be respected and protected in accordance with international law. Interviews confirmed that international protection monitoring is an important responsibility of protection teams across all field offices.

10-13, 100, 145, 315

Protection monitoring involves efforts to gather objective information on possible rights violations, threats, and vulnerabilities. This information is then used to inform advocacy targeting duty bearers, but also facilitates other aspects of UNRWA's humanitarian response, including protection mainstreaming. Specific knowledge products produced through international protection monitoring include:

- Rapid protection assessments, which seek to gather immediate information during protection crises such as escalations in hostilities.
- Protection trends monitoring, which gathers information about threats, vulnerabilities, and capacities from a variety of sources, and is used to inform protection mainstreaming.
- Incident-based reporting, which is focused monitoring to gather information about and document specific alleged violations of international law.


Interviews also indicated that UNRWA provides inputs to a number of other knowledge products produced by the UN system, including vulnerability assessments, crisis monitoring surveys, UN common country analyses, and multi-sectoral needs assessments.

### Element 3:

The evidence indicates that UNRWA's international protection monitoring is regularly used to inform advocacy work at the national and international level. UNRWA's formal engagement with international human rights mechanisms is led by its Department of Legal Affairs, with the majority of the substance collected and produced by protection staff in the fields and at HQ".

The Agency's CMM includes an indicator to track the number of advocacy interventions it undertakes annually, and this is reported in Annual Operational Reports. The 2021 Annual Operational Report provides an overview of the Agency-wide trend for this indicator between 2016 and 2021. As illustrated by the graph below, the number of advocacy interventions by the Agency has increased substantially over this period.

**Figure 18: Number of protection (advocacy) interventions, including formal letters, concerning protection issues undertaken by UNRWA targeting external actors and duty bearers**



Source: UNRWA statistics bulletin

Note that draft results for 2-22 indicate a total of 822 interventions in 2022.

UNRWA also tracks the percentage of these interventions that prompt a positive response from the relevant authorities. However, it only tracks this indicator for the Jordan and West Bank field offices.

### MI 6.9 Evidence confidence

High

## Results management

*Systems geared to managing and accounting for development and humanitarian results and the use of performance information, including evaluation and lesson-learning*

KPI 7: Strong and transparent results focus, explicitly geared towards function	KPI score
Satisfactory	2.81
<p><b>UNRWA measures its progress against the strategic objectives identified in the 2016-2022 through 178 output and outcome indicators housed within a Common Monitoring Matrix (CMM).</b> Annual Operational Reports and the online Statistics Bulletin report values for a subset of these indicators on an annual basis. The Statistical Bulletin also reports values against a variety of additional indicators that are outside of the CMM. The subset of CMM indicators against which the Agency reports are determined through consultations between UNRWA's management and the Harmonised Results Working Group, which is attached to the sub-committee of the Agency's Advisory Commission. Donors have indicated satisfaction with the level and focus of UNRWA's results reporting, and in general feel that it aligns with their needs. One exception is in the protection programming area, where UNRWA has not been able to report consistently on relevant indicators included in the CMM.</p> <p><b>The results of interventions funded through Emergency Appeals and project-funding are monitored separately.</b> Emergency Appeals contain their own results frameworks with indicators that are reported against in Annual Operational Reports. Projects have their own results frameworks and monitoring mechanisms which correspond to the relevant donor requirements. UNRWA's RBM system tracks the extent to which projects are ahead of plan, on track, or behind plan. UNRWA's revised Project Procedures manual indicates an ambition to improve the integration of monitoring by developing the Agency's RBM system further in a way that will allow it to monitor the implementation of all resources for core operations, projects, and emergencies through one system.</p> <p><b>Targets are reviewed annually following Annual Results Reviews, but the absence of published reporting of results versus targets over time hinders assessment of the extent to which expected results have been achieved.</b> The Common Monitoring Matrix in the 2016-2022 MTS identifies targets for most output and outcome indicators. Information on annual targets is included in Annual Operational Reports. A recent evaluation of the UNRWA's monitoring and reporting mechanisms also highlighted the need for greater clarity and guidance with respect to the setting of results targets. Although UNRWA's corporate results reporting was recently modified to include information on results achieved over time, this information is not displayed alongside annual targets, and the extent to which specific, anticipated results have been achieved over time is therefore challenging to assess.</p> <p><b>While UNRWA produces a large quantity of results data that meets the reporting expectations of donors, the full potential for this performance data to inform planning and decision making is not currently being realised.</b> Budgeting, planning, and programmatic adjustments are driven first and foremost by resource availability. Formal processes are in place for reviewing results on a quarterly and annual basis, and these are viewed by staff as useful opportunities for reflection. However, documents and interviews indicate that the links between these results reviews and planning and decision making are not sufficient. Annual Operational Plans do not contain overviews of past performance or summaries of relevant lessons from prior evaluations, and there are no documented linkages between the departmental priorities that they articulate and past performance. The recent evaluation of UNRWA's monitoring and reporting systems emphasised the Agency's limited ability to act on performance data owing to resource shortages, noting that follow up and additional analysis is reliant on programmes being able to reallocate existing resources, or independently secure additional resources.</p>	
<b>MI 7.1: Leadership ensures application of an organisation wide RBM approach</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.00</b>
Element 1: Corporate commitment to a result culture is made clear in strategic planning documents	4
Element 2: Clear requirements/incentives in place for the use of an RBM approach in planning and programming	3
Element 3: Guidance for setting results targets and developing indicators is clear and accessible to all staff	3
Element 4: Tools and methods for measuring and managing results are available	3
Element 5: Adequate resources are allocated to the RBM system	3
Element 6: All relevant staff are trained in RBM approaches and method	2
<b>MI 7.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
<b>Element 1</b>	3, 10-14, 16- 18,
UNRWA's strategic planning and other organisational documents clearly indicate a strong corporate	20-30, 32, 33,

commitment to a results culture.

The 2016-2022 Medium-Term Strategy includes a detailed Common Monitoring Matrix (CMM) with outcome and output indicators, baseline figures, and targets to track progress against strategic objectives. Annual Emergency Appeals also contain dedicated results frameworks to track the progress of supported interventions. UNRWA's project procedures manual requires projects to include dedicated results frameworks for tracking progress.

As established by Organisational Directive 21, internal quarterly, mid-year, and annual results reviews are held which provide opportunities for management staff across the Agency to reflect on performance. Agency-wide results reviews are convened on a biannual basis. Interviews with staff across the Agency confirmed that these reviews are held at the stipulated intervals and are generally perceived to be of good value insofar as they generate discussions relating to programming experiences and facilitate the identification of factors underpinning both positive and negative performance. That said, the recent evaluation of UNRWA's monitoring and reporting systems revealed a perception among management staff that these reviews were geared more towards accountability than learning, and that they were not sufficiently utilised to inform planning and budgeting.

Agency-wide results are collected on a quarterly basis reported through periodic updates to indicators in the CMM, published in Annual Operational Reports and UNRWA's online statistics bulletin. Proposed programme budgets, which are presented annually to the UN General Assembly, also contain succinct overviews of key results for previous years realised under each programmatic area.

## Element 2

There are clear requirements in place for results monitoring, and these appear to be largely implemented. As discussed in the analysis for M.I. 7.5, however, there is scope for improvement in the extent to which UNRWA uses results data to inform budgeting and planning.

Organisational Directive 02 assigns central responsibility for monitoring and reporting across the Agency's three funding streams through to the Department of Planning. The directive also clearly indicates that responsibility for ensuring accurate and timely monitoring and reporting against CMM indicators lies with individual programme departments. Compact letters between UNRWA's CG and field and programme directors also clearly establish their responsibility for monitoring implementation and analysing results.

As noted, Organisational Directive 21 establishes RBM as a key component of UNRWA's approach to programme and project cycle management. The directive requires annual operational plans for each field office and headquarters department to "detail the results that will be achieved in accordance with the Agency's monitoring framework" and to "set out the activities that will be conducted to achieve the aforementioned results". The directive also requires annual reviews to be held, chaired by the Deputy CG, to take stock of "results achieved, challenges faced, and lessons learned during the year of implementation". As stated above, interviews with staff across the Agency indicated that these reviews are held as required and are generally perceived to be useful opportunities for reflection.

A review of annual operational plans between 2019 and 2022, however, indicates Annual Operational Plan documents establish departmental priorities, which are tracked through quarterly reviews. Targets against indicators in the CMM are set following annual results reviews. Annual Results Review information packages reviewed for the assessment report against progress against all output and outcome indicators in the CMM vis-à-vis annual targets. An evaluation of the Agency's monitoring and reporting made a similar observation, noting that several staff "identified a need for more consistent and systematic target setting processes within programmes and across fields", and expressed concerns relating to the "adequacy of the guidance on target setting, and insufficient transparency on how targets have been set".

In other respects, there appears to be a relatively high level of compliance across the agency with respect to collecting and monitoring results data. Annual Results Review information packages provide reporting against all the output and outcome indicators in the CMM, though it is understood that these are not public documents. Public Annual Operational Reports also report against progress against a subset of the output and outcome indicators contained within the CMM. An evaluation of UNRWA's monitoring and reporting systems also noted that Annual Operational Reports and accompanying materials provide updates on many, though not all, of the output and outcome indicators contained within the CMM. Specifically, the Annual Operational Reports provide updates for up to 45 of the 178 indicators in the CMM, and the online statistics bulletin provides information on

136, 173, 174,  
190, 194, 208,  
223, 240, 294,  
417



97 indicators. The subset of CMM indicators included in Annual Operational Reports is agreed with members of the Harmonised Results Working Group, which is attached to the sub-Committee of the Advisory Commission.

### **Element 3**

The Department of Planning is responsible for providing guidance, technical support, and training to staff on all aspects of the RBM approach, including the development of indicators and targets. Comprehensive guidance on all indicators in the CMM has been developed by the Department of Planning and made available to all relevant staff. Other guidance includes the 2018 guide to the RBM IT system and a guide on calculating targets. Interviews with relevant staff suggested that this guidance was applied and valued, and Annual Results Review documentation indicates that the required monitoring information is routinely collected. However, as noted above, an evaluation of the Agency's MTS reporting did find that staff felt that there was insufficient guidance on target setting.

### **Element 4**

Several tools are available for measuring and managing results, and the consistency of results reporting through Annual Operational Reports, annual results review documentation, and the statistics bulletin indicates that these are widely utilised. UNRWA's Handbook of Common Monitoring Matrix Indicators provides comprehensive guidance on the measurement methodologies underpinning CMM indicators, provides an explanation of the traffic-light assessment approach used to track progress, as well as detailed breakdowns of the Agency's reporting cycle timelines, roles, and responsibilities. The Department of Planning has also issued a tool for calculating targets, though staff have expressed concerns about its adequacy and clarity. The RBM Enterprise Business Intelligence system includes a series of dashboards that provide information to managers on the status of CMM indicators, which permits a real time review of programmatic performance as well as the visualisation of trends and progress over time. Within UNRWA's health programming, the eHealth platform serves as a tool for storing patient, consultation, and treatment data which informs reporting against several indicators in the CMM. Similarly, UNRWA's education programming benefits from an Education Management Information System which facilitates reporting against relevant indicators in the CMM.

### **Element 5**

Despite UNRWA's chronic funding constraints, the RBM system appears in general to be adequately resourced. An evaluation of the Agency's reporting systems found that "a range of resources are in place to support the management and coordination of MTS monitoring and reporting activities", including dedicated staff within the Department of Planning, a network of staff across the Agency who serve as RBM focal points, reporting focal points, verifiers, and recipients, who are convened regularly in the Monitoring and Reporting working group.

The Department of Planning currently includes six international posts and five area staff. This level of staffing is perceived to be sufficient insofar as it has enabled the department to discharge its core functions with respect to the management and maintenance of the Agency's RBM system. That said, interviews revealed a perception that the department lacks the capacity to conduct activities that could potentially contribute to improved performance of both the RBM system and service delivery, including spot checks to verify monitoring data, socioeconomic assessments of programmes, and cost-efficiency analyses.

The evaluation of UNRWA's MTS monitoring and reporting also identified a lack of resources for managers to follow up and analyse data. Specifically, it found that "where problems or discrepancies are identified through data collection, any kind of analysis, research or follow-up is reliant on programmes being able to reallocate existing resources, or independently secure temporary resources". While this does not reflect inadequate resourcing of the RBM system per se, it is nevertheless an important finding that is illustrative of the barriers to fully implementing an RBM approach in a highly resource constrained environment.

### **Element 6**

Interviews with staff have strongly indicated that UNRWA's chronic funding crisis has resulted in highly limited resources for staff training across the board. The training of relevant staff on RBM comes as no exception. Interviews conducted for this assessment pointed to a general lack of resources for training in UNRWA's RBM systems, though training sessions were conducted following the rollout of the Agency's new RBM approach in 2017. Trainings in RBM were also carried out between April and July 2023 for programme chiefs, their deputies, and reporting focal points in all field offices with the exception of the Gaza Strip. The evaluation of UNRWA's MTS monitoring and reporting also highlighted training in RBM as a weak area and found that increased training would enable staff to make more efficient use of the highly technical RBM tools and guidance provided by the Department of Planning.

Note that training sessions were provided in 2023 on the following days:	
West Bank Field Office (Programme Chiefs / Deputies / Reporting Focal Points): 12 April, 20-21 September	
Syria Field Office (Programme Chiefs / Deputies / Reporting Focal Points): 3-6 July	
Lebanon Field Office (Programme Chiefs / Deputies / Reporting Focal Points): 10-12 July	
Jordan Field Office (Programme Chiefs / Deputies / Reporting Focal Points): 16-17 July	
Education Department (HQ staff, Field Programme Chiefs and Field Programme Deputy Chiefs): 25-26 July	
<b>MI 7.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High</b>

<b>MI 7.2: Corporate strategies, including country strategies, based on a sound RBM focus and logic</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>3.20</b>
Element 1: Organisation-wide plans and strategies include results frameworks	3
Element 2: Clear linkages exist between the different layers of the results framework, from project to country and corporate level	3
Element 3: An annual report on performance is discussed with the governing bodies	4
Element 4: Corporate strategies are updated regularly	3
Element 5: The annual corporate reports show progress over time and notes areas of strong performance as well as deviations between planned and actual results	3
<b>MI 7.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
<p><b>Element 1</b></p> <p>UNRWA's 2016-2022 MTS is accompanied by a Common Monitoring Matrix, populated by output and outcome indicators for measuring progress against the strategy's five outcome areas, as well as a set of indicators to relating to management and operational effectiveness. Progress against all of the indicators contained in the CMM is reported in Annual Operational Reports, UNRWA's statistical bulletin, and Annual Results Review information packages.</p> <p>Each of the Emergency Appeals reviewed for the 2018-2022 period include results frameworks with indicators to track intended results. Progress is reported in dedicated Emergency Appeal progress reports as well as in Annual Operational Reports.</p> <p>Annual Operational Plans, however, are not clearly aligned with the Agency wide CMM that accompanies the 2016-2022 MTS. The plans reviewed for this assessment make no reference to the indicators contained within the CMM, and instead outline departmental and programmatic priorities.</p> <p>UNRWA's five field offices are not required to produce individual strategies for their respective areas of operation.</p> <p><b>Element 2</b></p> <p>UNRWA's Common Monitoring Matrix only captures the results of interventions funded through the <b>Programme Budget</b>. There are separate monitoring and reporting mechanisms in place for interventions supported through Emergency Appeals and project funding. UNRWA's primarily standardised approach to Programme Budget-funded service delivery implies that all field offices are expected to contribute to indicators in the CMM. Reporting against CMM indicators in Annual Operational Reports and UNRWA's statistics bulletin is disaggregated by field office. It is therefore possible to track the contribution of each field office to Agency-wide results.</p> <p>To clarify, UNT+RWA issues mid-year emergency appeal progress reports and final emergency annual reports. It is the latter that forms separate chapters in AORs.</p> <p>Results frameworks for UNRWA's <b>Emergency Appeals</b> are area-specific and are not integrated into the Agency's Common Monitoring Matrix, which monitors the results of Programme-Budget funded services only. UNRWA issues mid-year emergency appeal progress reports and final emergency annual reports. The final reports inform separate chapters in AORs. Emergency Appeal-supported interventions clearly align with the strategic priorities</p>	8, 10-14, 20-33, 52, 101, 108, 107, 136, 223, 417

set out in the 2016-2022 MTS, and the Agency is known to occasionally draw on Emergency Appeal funding to cover gaps in Programme Budget-funded service delivery. At the very least, this implies the presence of complementarities between Emergency Appeal and Programme-Budget-funded interventions. However, due to the separation of results reporting for these two distinct funding streams, such complementarities are not systematically captured and reported.

There is no unified framework for aggregate reporting of **project results**. Instead, each project is required to have its own results framework, which must align with the strategic objectives identified in the 2016-2022 MTS. Monitoring and reporting is therefore done on a project-by-project basis, and there is no mechanism in place for systematically capturing how projects contribute to the Agency's wider strategic outcome areas. At present, Project Managers are only required to use the Agency-wide RBM system to record the extent to which projects are ahead of plan, on track, or behind plan. UNRWA's Project Procedures Manual, which was in the process of being revised in 2022, indicates an intention to develop UNRWA's RBM system to "allow UNRWA to visibly plan, monitor, and evaluate the implementation of all resources for core operations, projects and emergencies – all in one system".

### Element 3

Unlike most UN Agencies, UNRWA does not have its own governing body. UNRWA's CG instead reports directly to the UN General Assembly. An Advisory Commission, comprised of 29 donor and host government representatives, is tasked with advising the CG on carrying out the Agency's mandate. UNRWA produces Annual Operational Reports on its performance that are discussed during meetings of the Advisory Commission, and the Commissioner General provides annual reports on the Agency's performance to the UN General Assembly. An evaluation of the Agency's monitoring systems found that the content of Annual Operational Reports strongly aligned with the demands and expectations of donors. The recent evaluation of the Agency's 2016-2022 MTS also found that donors expressed satisfaction with UNRWA's Annual Operational Reports.

### Element 4

UNRWA updates corporate strategies relatively regularly. Organisational Directive 21 requires UNRWA to develop Medium Term Strategies for unspecified "multi year periods". The MTS and Strategic Plan both cover six-year periods. During interviews, some internal stakeholders pointed to the discrepancy between six-year strategies and UNRWA's mandate, which is typically renewed on a three-year basis. It was also reported by several interviewees that the utility of six-year, Agency-wide strategies was generally diminished by the highly unpredictable nature of the UNRWA's funding, which was perceived to constitute a major barrier to effective medium or long-term planning. An independent evaluation of the 2016-2022 MTS was carried out in 2021. The Strategic Plan 2023-2028 appears to have addressed certain shortcomings identified in previous Agency-wide assessments. For instance, high-level results on gender equality and environmental sustainability have been incorporated into the CMM that accompanies the Strategic Plan 2023-2028.

Organisational Directive 21 also calls for the development of a Resource Mobilisation Strategy, a Human Resources Strategy, strategies to inform protection and other cross cutting issues, and specific programme strategies. At the time of writing, UNRWA's Resource Mobilisation Strategy was being updated. The Agency's HR strategy was issued in 2015 and has not been updated (see MI 3.4.). UNRWA's Gender Equality Strategy was most recently updated in 2016, and aligns with the 2016-2022 MTS. A new Gender Equality Strategy has been promised for the Strategic Plan 2023-2028 and was still under development at the time of writing. UNRWA's Protection Policy was developed in 2012, and in 2021 a review of UNRWA's Protection Strategic Framework was conducted, resulting in several recommendations.

It is understood that Field Offices are no longer required to produce area-specific strategies. It was not considered a priority at the time in light of other developments, and given their more conceptual focus, Field Office Strategic Plans were of less relevance / value than Annual Operational Plans. In this regard, Field Offices found that the limited utilization of Strategic Plans did not justify the considerable investment required to develop them.

### Element 5

UNRWA's results reporting improved markedly during the assessment period in terms of its ability to track performance over time. Annual Operational Reports dating from earlier in the assessment period (i.e. 2018, 2019) presented results in data tables only, with reporting limited to the current and preceding year. This was an area of criticism highlighted in the recent evaluation of UNRWA's monitoring and reporting systems. The management response to the evaluation welcomed this observation and noted that the accompanying recommendation endorsed enhancements that the Department of Planning was making to the RBM system.

These enhancements are evident in subsequent Agency-wide reporting. From 2020 onwards, Annual Operational Reports have presented results from several programme areas over time through the use of line graphs. The agency-wide trend graphs included in the Annual Operational Report, however, do not include information relating to annual targets, rendering it challenging to obtain a view of actual versus planned performance over time. Annual targets are presented on internal dashboards for all CMM results. UNRWA's online statistics bulletin also displays results over time, disaggregated by field office, for numerous indicators across all programme areas, but also does not present information relating to annual targets.

Results reporting for UNRWA's Emergency Appeals in annual operational reports is limited to data tables displaying results and targets for the current year. However, UNRWA's online statistics bulletin does report results over time for selected EA interventions, including the total annual monetary value of cash and food assistance per beneficiary, the value of food vouchers, and the total number of beneficiaries served through EA cash and food assistance. However, as with Programme Budget reporting, these results are not displayed vis-à-vis the relevant annual targets. As such, it is not possible to identify discrepancies between planned and actual results.

#### MI 7.2 Evidence confidence

High

MI 7.3: Results targets set on a foundation of sound evidence base and logic	Score
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.60</b>
Element 1: Targets and indicators are adequate to capture causal pathways between interventions and the outcomes that contribute to higher order objectives	3
Element 2: Indicators are relevant to expected results to enable the measurement of the degree of goal achievement	3
Element 3: Development of baselines are mandatory for new Interventions	4
Element 4: Results targets are regularly reviewed and adjusted when needed	3
Element 5: Results targets are set through a process that includes consultation with beneficiaries	0
MI 7.3 Analysis	Evidence documents
<p><b>Element 1</b></p> <p>Programme Budget and Emergency Appeal funded interventions are comprised of direct service delivery across several programmatic areas and are not underpinned by either organisation-wide or programme-specific theories of change. The presumed causal pathways linking the Agency's service delivery to higher order strategic objectives are therefore largely unspecified. Nevertheless, in most cases the logical linkages between output and outcome indicators included in UNRWA's CMM are relatively straightforward and can therefore be considered adequate to capture the implicitly assumed causal pathways linking the Agency's interventions to higher order strategic objectives. For instance, in the health programme area, the CMM contains an output indicator to track the percentage of women with live births who received at least 4 ante-natal care visits. This indicator has a clear logical link to the outcome indicator that tracks the maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births. The logical links between output and outcome indicators are also evident across other programmatic areas. Emergency Appeals reporting is almost exclusively focused on the output level. There are no mechanisms in place to track the extent to which interventions supported by Emergency Appeals contribute to the Agency's higher order objectives.</p> <p><b>Element 2</b></p> <p>For the most part, the indicators contained within the CCM can be considered relevant to expected results. A recent evaluation of the Agency's monitoring and reporting systems found that the indicators in the CMM align strongly with donor requirements. The same evaluation also found that indicators for UNRWA's health and education programmes, which are derived from global frameworks and benefit from well-developed information management systems, are broadly relevant. There was less confidence, however, regarding indicators for other programmatic areas. Concerns raised by the evaluation included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Indicators for protection did not consistently reflect the portfolio work of protection teams across the various field offices, and there is a need for more indicators at the outcome level to illustrate the broader impact of the Agency's work in this area.</li> <li>The evaluation found that there was a perception of insufficient indicators to track results in the relief</li> </ul>	10-14, 16, 17, 21, 22, 27-31, 134, 136, 417

and social services programme area and that current indicators do not help UNRWA track and report on service eligible populations for assistance and distributed benefits. That said, UNRWA's online statistical bulletin does now report on several indicators of relevance to the relief and social services programme, including indicators relating to the average number of beneficiaries assisted through the social safety net programme, and indicators to track Emergency Appeal-funded food and cash assistance.

- The evaluation found that important aspects of ICIP work, including maintenance and environmental health activities, are not measured. However, the online statistic bulletin does now include indicators relating to both of these areas. In the area of environmental health, there is consistent reporting against indicators to track both the percentage of shelters connected to the water network and the percentage of shelters connected to the sewage network. In the area of maintenance, there is consistent reporting against an indicator to monitor the number of shelters rehabilitated.
- Indicators on the performance of support services, including procurement, logistics and human resources were perceived to be insufficiently reflective of the work done in these areas. This concern appears to be fully justified with respect to human resources. Currently, UNRWA's statistic bulletin only reports on staff numbers. For procurement, however, the bulletin reports consistently on nine relevant indicators.

### Element 3

UNRWA's CMM contains baseline figures for almost all output and outcome indicators across all outcome areas. The exception is for 'new' indicators where there is no baseline data available. It is important to highlight, however, that 'new' indicators do not pertain to new interventions. Rather, they refer to new indicators designed to capture additional information about existing interventions.

Emergency Appeals do not contain baselines for supported interventions. When results are presented over time, as they are for selected Emergency Appeals indicators on UNRWA's online statistics bulletin, the preceding year(s) serves as a functional baseline for assessing trends over time.

### Element 4

The MTS 2016-2022 strategy document identifies targets for most indicators. Annual Operational Reports, contain information on annual targets for selected indicators, but do not display performance over time vis-à-vis annual targets. For the new indicators, targets could not be set as there was no baseline data. Where there is no baseline data, results achieved (against the new indicator) during the first year form the baseline for the next year, against which targets were set. UNRWA's public statistics bulletin also does not display performance against targets over time. However, the Agency's internal results system does display information on results against targets over time through power-BI dashboards.

On an annual basis, performance against results targets is reviewed. The degree of flexibility available for adjusting targets is understood to vary across programmes. In the health programmatic area, for instance, several indicators and targets are derived from WHO global standards and can therefore not be adjusted. However, in other programmatic areas, such as microfinance, there is a much greater level of flexibility for adjusting targets in accordance with critical contextual developments. Several staff consulted for this assessment indicated that in cases where targets were not met, this was attributable primarily to funding shortfalls.

It is important to reiterate here that the recent evaluation of the Agency's monitoring and reporting found that there was a demand among staff for clearer guidance and training on target setting, and a need for more consistent, transparent, and systematic target setting processes within programmes and across fields. The evaluation also found a lack of agreement among staff about the best approach to setting targets:

"Some staff felt that targets need to reflect available resources, while others expressed the opposite, and that targets should be resource-blind and reflect the Agency's mandate and actual needs. This would almost certainly result in a higher volume of behind target performance but would serve to emphasise resource gaps and the inability of a programme area to achieve targets through the current resource base".

It is worth noting that targets for Emergency Appeals appear to have adopted the latter approach. Emergency Appeal reporting for 2018-2022 reveal a considerable number of consistently behind target performance indicators, which are nevertheless retained as targets year on year.

UNRWA's project procedures manual permits a certain degree of flexibility during implementation. The manual

indicates that project managers may request changes to projects, including to milestones and targets, at any point during implementation. Such changes require approval from the Project Review Committee, as well as the project donor if the change is deemed sufficiently significant to necessitate an amendment to the original grant agreement.

#### Element 5

UNRWA processes for setting targets do not involve consultation with beneficiaries. In fact, beneficiaries are not systematically involved in the Agency's RBM systems at all. An important finding from the recent evaluation of the Agency's monitoring systems noted that despite the MTS commitment to strengthening AAP, there is no framework for refugee participation within the RBM cycle. Though UNRWA's management agreed with this finding and the resulting recommendation to develop mechanisms for including refugee participation in RBM, the management response did not commit to establishing such mechanisms, but instead pointed to planned protection audits that would examine the strengths and weaknesses of the agency's APP framework.

#### MI 7.3 Evidence confidence

High

#### MI 7.4: Monitoring systems generate high-quality, useful performance data in response to strategic priorities

Score

#### Overall MI rating

Satisfactory

#### Overall MI score

3.00

Element 1: The corporate monitoring system is adequately resourced

3

Element 2: Monitoring systems generate data at output and outcome levels of the results chain

3

Element 3: Reporting processes ensure data is available for key corporate reporting and planning, including for internal change processes

3

Element 4: A system for ensuring data quality exists

3

#### MI 7.4 Analysis

Evidence documents

#### Element 1

See M.I. 7.1, element 5 – the wording of this element is identical. The corresponding analysis and score are therefore the same. The text from M.I. 7.1, element 5 has been repeated below for ease of reference:

Despite UNRWA's chronic funding constraints, the RBM system appears in general to be adequately resourced. An evaluation of the Agency's reporting systems found that "a range of resources are in place to support the management and coordination of MTS monitoring and reporting activities", including dedicated staff within the Department of Planning, a network of staff across the Agency who serve as RBM focal points, reporting focal points, verifiers, and recipients, who are convened regularly in an RBM working group.

The Department of Planning currently includes six international posts and five area staff. This level of staffing is perceived to be sufficient insofar as it has enabled the department to discharge its core functions with respect to the management and maintenance of the Agency's RBM system. That said, interviews revealed a perception that the department lacks the capacity to conduct activities that could potentially contribute to improved performance of both the RBM system and service delivery, including spot checks to verify monitoring data, socioeconomic assessments of programmes, and cost-efficiency analyses.

10-14, 136, 223, 417

The evaluation of UNRWA's MTS monitoring and reporting also identified a lack of resources for managers to follow up and analyse data. Specifically, it found that "where problems or discrepancies are identified through data collection, any kind of analysis, research or follow-up is reliant on programmes being able to reallocate existing resources, or independently secure temporary resources". While this does not reflect inadequate resourcing of the RBM system per se, it is nevertheless an important finding that is illustrative of the barriers to fully implementing an RBM approach in a highly resource constrained environment.

#### Element 2

UNRWA's CMM, which tracks the results of interventions delivered through the regular Programme Budget, includes indicators at both the output and the outcome levels of the results chain. A recent evaluation of the Agency's monitoring system found that the indicators in the CMM are strongly aligned to donor requests. Though the evaluation highlighted perceptions among some staff that the CMM would benefit from additional outcome indicators, the view of management is that the current ratio of one outcome indicator for every three output



indicators is adequate. Discussions with external stakeholders conducted for this assessment revealed no concerns in relation to indicators in UNRWA's CMM. Results frameworks to track the results of UNRWA's Emergency Appeals are focused almost exclusively on the output level or fail to distinguish between output and outcome indicators.

### Element 3

UNRWA's monitoring systems clearly generate sufficient high-quality data to enable the valued review processes identified in Organisational Directive 21. These include quarterly results reviews at the field level, and mid-year and annual results reviews at an Agency wide level. Staff interviewed for this assessment were generally positive about these exercises, noting that they provided good opportunities for taking stock of performance. The Annual Results Review information package for 2021 indicated that 95 per cent of indicators in the Agency's results framework were reported within the agreed timeframe.

The Agency's monitoring systems also clearly generate sufficient data to accommodate regular, detailed external results reporting. As noted above, UNRWA's Annual Operational Reports and statistics bulletin publish results against most, though not all, of the indicators included in the CMM. The results of Emergency Appeals funded interventions are also included in Annual Operational Reports.

With respect to the monitoring of internal processes, the CMM includes 29 indicators to track various dimensions of management and operational effectiveness. Though updates to these indicators are provided in Annual Results Review documents, there is limited reporting through either Annual Operational Reports or the online statistics bulletin. The statistics, bulletin, for instance, only provides information relating to two of these indicators. Annual Operational Reports only report on six of these indicators. During the Management Initiative period (2020-2021), documentation and interviews with staff indicate that implementation progress was regularly communicated to managers and AdCom members. That said, donors consulted during the assessment indicated that reporting against some dimensions of the management initiative was lacking in detail.

### Element 4

Data gathered during interviews conducted for this assessment indicate that UNRWA's results data go through several rounds of quality assurance before publication. As data are generated, they are interrogated at different levels within the organisation, firstly at the area level, then by programme staff in field offices, and then by the Department of Planning at headquarters. Formal quarterly reviews at the field level and Agency-wide mid-year and annual results reviews provide an additional opportunity for scrutinising the quality of data and addressing any identified discrepancies before publication.

The recent evaluation of UNRWA's monitoring and reporting systems included a similar finding, noting that:

"Quality assurance is mostly achieved inherently, and largely as a result of 'many eyes' brought to bear on the data. The introduction of RBM roles (RFOs, Verifiers and Recipients) was developed to help strengthen quality assurance, and the mid-year and annual results review meetings represent another important quality assurance point. A degree of quality assurance is also achieved – albeit informally – through other roles having sight of the data, for example Area Officers, information system focal points, and PSO staff".

Interviews held during the course of this assessment, however, indicated that the Department of Planning lacked the resources needed to conduct systematic spot checks to ground truth the quality of results data.

## MI 7.4 Evidence confidence

High

## MI 7.5: Performance data transparently applied in planning and decision-making

Score

### Overall MI rating

Unsatisfactory

### Overall MI score

2.25

Element 1: Planning documents are clearly based on performance data

1

Element 2: Proposed adjustments to interventions are clearly informed by performance data

2

Element 3: At corporate level, management regularly reviews corporate performance data and makes adjustments as appropriate

2

Element 4: Performance data support dialogue in partnerships at global, regional and country levels

4

MI 7.5 Analysis	Evidence documents
<p><b>Element 1</b></p> <p>Organisational Directive 21 indicates that UNRWA’s annual operational plans must take into account lessons learned from relevant audits and evaluations and must set out the results that will be achieved in accordance with the Agency’s monitoring framework. Interviews held and documentation reviewed for this assessment clearly establish that UNRWA does hold regular formal reviews of results at both the field and Agency-wide level, which could potentially serve as a basis for informing subsequent planning cycles. The annual operational plans reviewed for this assessment, however, contain neither an overview of past performance nor a summary of relevant lessons from evaluations. Published evaluation recommendations are annexed to the corresponding AOP. The anticipated results that they detail for forthcoming years are articulated as departmental priorities, rather than the programmatic indicators contained within the Agency’s CMM. There are no clear, documented links between the articulated priorities and past performance data. Emergency Appeal documents also do not contain analyses of past performance, though they do detail anticipated programmatic results and associated targets.</p> <p>During interviews conducted for this assessment, numerous staff from all levels within the organisation indicated that planning and budgeting processes are informed primarily by the need to address financial constraints alongside adherence to programme-specific technical norms and standards that do not vary across fields, rather than past performance. This is echoed by a recent evaluation of the Agency’s monitoring and reporting, which also found that there was a broad consensus among departmental and field leadership that planning and budgeting is not sufficiently linked to needs or results review discussions.</p> <p>In light of the above, it is not possible to conclude that planning documents are clearly based on performance data, despite the formal requirement established by Organisational Directive 21.</p> <p><b>Element 2</b></p> <p>As noted, UNRWA regularly holds field-level and Agency-wide results reviews which provide opportunities for managers to take stock of performance, and potentially make adjustments that are deemed necessary. However, interviews held with staff for this assessment indicated that the scope for significant adjustments to programming is relatively constrained. Evidence based programming adjustments presuppose the existence of mechanisms that permit flexibility in programming modalities, as well as sufficient resources to address issues and concerns identified through the review of performance data. Neither requirement can be considered fully present within UNRWA. As described above, there is a strongly held perception, particularly among field-based staff, that modalities for the Agency’s core programme delivery are largely inflexible, due to centralised planning, budgeting and programme design processes. This places considerable limits on the ability of field offices to use performance data to adapt programme delivery. Adding to this, severe resource constraints also restrict the scope for follow up on lessons learned from monitoring and evaluation data. The recent evaluation of UNRWA’s monitoring and reporting systems made a similar observation in its finding that the full potential of the large quantity of data generated by the Agency’s RBM system is not being realised, because there are limited resources available for acting on data. Follow up is largely dependent on the ability of programme departments to reallocate existing resources. Given the lack of flexibility accorded to field-level managers for reallocating programme resources, the scope for data-driven adjustments to interventions is limited.</p> <p><b>Element 3</b></p> <p>Agency-wide Annual Results Reviews are the primary instrument through which UNRWA’s management reviews corporate management data. Documentation resulting from these reviews identify action points to be undertaken by departments, derived from the discussions. Only in some cases however do these action points involve substantive changes to programme delivery, and where changes are proposed, these appear to be driven more by financial constraints and external exigencies than by performance data. For instance, the main substantive adjustments relating to programme delivery reflected in the 2020 Annual Results Review involved the suspension of non-essential health services and the closure of schools, and the introduction of telemedicine and e-learning in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Most of the action points in the review pertained to issues concerning indicator and monitoring methodologies, resource mobilisation, and relationship management.</p> <p>As described above, interviewees reported that UNRWA’s planning and programme adjustments were driven more by financial considerations and the Agency’s primarily standardised approach to core service delivery across the five fields of operation than by performance data. This perception was also highlighted in the recent evaluation of UNRWA’s monitoring systems, which found that “managers view the linkages between results</p>	<p>16-22, 27-31, 136, 134, 233, 417</p>

review discussions, and planning and budgeting processes as inadequate". The evaluation also highlighted a general perception that annual results reviews were geared more towards accountability than towards learning, and that the lack of involvement by area and installation level staff limited possibilities for fully exploring the underlying causes of positive and negative performance. It is important to note that the Department of Planning did not fully agree with this evaluation finding, and noted in its management response that the performance data which is reviewed during results review meetings informs strategic discussions held in multiple fora, including Senior Management Team meetings, routine dialogue between headquarters departments and field offices, and sessions of the Sub-Committee and the Advisory Commission. Several internal and external stakeholders consulted during this assessment however were of the view that there was significant scope for an increased focus on strategic concerns during meetings of the senior management team, as well as Advisory Commission sessions, but that this was complicated by the urgent need for sustained resource mobilisation to address the Agency's chronic funding crisis, and significant political sensitivities relating to any perceived efforts to adjust its mandate.

#### Element 4

The evidence reviewed suggests that UNRWA's performance data is generally useful for supporting dialogue with UNRWA's key development partners. The Agency's Annual Operational Reports are valued by donors, align with their requirements, and are discussed by the Harmonised Results Working Group, which includes both donor and host government representatives. Interviews also indicated that results information was perceived to have been useful in supporting dialogue with existing and potential private partners.

Interviews with external stakeholders, however, also highlighted concerns relating to insufficient reporting on progress relating to UNRWA's internal Management Initiative. There was also a perception among external stakeholders that there was further scope for using results data at AdCom meetings to better communicate the impact of UNRWA's core service delivery.

#### MI 7.5 Evidence confidence

High

#### KPI 8: Evidence-based planning and programming applied

KPI score

Satisfactory

2.73

**UNRWA's application of evidence-based planning and programming is rated as satisfactory.** Improvements since the last MOPAN assessment (2017/18) have been seen in the areas of evaluation coverage and evaluation quality. However, the evaluation function does not enjoy full independence. Moreover, funding shortfalls and specifically a lack of funding allocated to evaluation has left UNRWA dependent on ad-hoc donor funding and unable to fulfil its ambition to generate evaluative evidence and implement evidence-based programming and strategies. Embedding learning into design and implementation of UNRWA's activities is weak and the ability of UNRWA to showcase its achievements or be fully accountable is not being optimised.


Within UNRWA, evaluations aim to systematically and impartially determine the relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of ongoing and completed activities, projects, programmes, strategies, policies, topics, themes, operational areas and institutional performance by examining expected and achieved accomplishments, theory of change, processes, contextual factors and causality. The Evaluation Division is supported by core funds (programme budget) and earmarked donor contributions of some 477,000 USD in 2021, representing 0.06 per cent of UNRWA programme expenditure or 0.04 per cent of total expenditure. The Evaluation Strategy 2020-22 has appropriate objectives and areas of action to address weaknesses identified in the 2018 MOPAN assessment and the OIOS 2017 evaluation. The evaluation policy which has recently been updated in 2022 (superseding the 2016 policy) comprehensively guides the planning, implementation, and use of evaluations. However, despite the improvement in the system and policies the potential of evaluation is not being optimised due to underfunding at the central and decentralised levels of the organisation. Respondents to the MOPAN assessment survey agreed or strongly agreed that UNRWA is committed to independent evaluation of its performance (61 per cent) however only 50 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that UNRWA was adequately undertaking evaluation of its performance (with 26 per cent stating they did not know).

**UNRWA does well at tracking poorly performing programmes with a performance management system that provides timely and accurate information for staff to analyse programme performance.** Regular results review sessions provide the opportunity to interrogate performance and identify risks to results achievements. However, the results-based management system is weaker in the areas of learning feedback loops and an ability to use evidence, performance data, and lessons to inform strategic decisions.

MI 8.1: A corporate independent evaluation function exists	Score
Overall MI rating	Unsatisfactory
Overall MI score	2.33
Element 1: The evaluation function is independent from other management functions (operational and financial independence)	4
Element 2: The head of evaluation reports directly to the governing body of the organisation (structural independence)	0
Element 3: The evaluation office has full discretion in deciding the evaluation programme	1
Element 4: The central evaluation programme is fully funded by core funds	1
Element 5: Evaluations are submitted directly for consideration at the appropriate level of decision-making for the subject of evaluation	4
Element 6: Evaluators are able to conduct their work during the evaluation without undue interference by those involved in implementing the unit of analysis being evaluated (behavioural independence)	4
MI 8.1 Analysis	Evidence documents
<p><b>Element 1</b></p> <p>The UNRWA evaluation function consists of a centralised evaluation function located in the Department of Internal Oversight Services (DIOS), and a decentralised evaluation function located in field offices and headquarters' departments. The Evaluation Division assumes functional leadership and oversight over the UNRWA evaluation system and is responsible for evaluations as prescribed in the Organisation Directive-14 (OD-14). DIOS fulfils an internal oversight role through independent and objective internal audit, evaluation and inspection. The UNRWA Evaluation Policy developed in 2016 (and updated in 2022) affirms the independence of DIOS and the evaluation function; including unrestricted access to all functions, records, property, premises, and personnel to enable DIOS to fulfil its responsibilities, and the necessary resources in terms of budget and staff in DIOS to adequately maintain its independence and objectivity.</p> <p><b>Element 2</b></p> <p>The Evaluation Division does not stand as a wholly separate entity. It sits alongside Internal Audit and Investigation embedded within DIOS and as such the Chief of the Evaluation Division reports to the Director of DIOS. The Director of DIOS reports and is accountable to the Commissioner-General and the Advisory Committee on Internal Oversight (ACIO). OD 14 stipulates that the Director of DIOS holds responsibility for selecting DIOS staff; however, it does not specifically mention whether this extends to the appointment of the Chief of Evaluation and/or to the restrictions on the term of office. DIOS activities and results are reported quarterly to ACIO and management and since quarter three of 2019. DIOS has been producing an Annual Report which is shared with ACIO and to the AdCom for consideration since 2015.</p> <p><b>Element 3</b></p> <p>The Director of DIOS is responsible for the work of DIOS and is required to submit an oversight strategy and annual work plans, including a risk-based and flexible annual audit plan and evaluation plan through the ACIO (for review and advice) to the Commissioner-General for information. OD 14 stipulates that the Director of DIOS shall have the authority to allocate resources, set frequencies, select subjects, determine scopes of work, and apply the techniques required to accomplish audit, inspection, evaluation, or investigation objectives. A multi-year evaluation plan for strategic centralised evaluations is prepared to align with and accompany the Agency's strategic plan 2023-2028. The six-year evaluation plan aspires to ensure coverage of all key strategic areas, while allowing for flexibility to address urgent, emergent needs. The Evaluation Policy commits to the production of an annual evaluation plan which is directly informed by the six-year evaluation plan. The costed annual evaluation plan is prepared by the Evaluation Division who propose, prioritise and finalize topics through consultations with fields and headquarters departments/divisions and through the consideration of current and emerging organisational issues; the annual plan includes decentralised evaluations as well as those of the Evaluation Division. Of the six central evaluations completed since 2019 three were conducted using staff resources, donor contributions funded two and Programme Budget resources funded one. The evaluation function is somewhat dependent on additional donor funding to deliver on its mandate to conduct central evaluations and independent assessments. Given the central evaluation programme is not fully funded by core funds this element was judged to be only approaching conditions/partially implemented.</p> <p><b>Element 4</b></p> <p>The organisational directive which guarantees the independence of DIOS and the Evaluation function (OD 14)</p>	<p>10, 121, 122, 125, 128-130, 134, 171, 187, 277, 287, 387, 419, 438</p>

states that it ensures the necessary resources in terms of budget and staff in DIOS to adequately maintain its independence and objectivity. Further, the Evaluation Policy (2022) stipulates that the Commissioner-General should aim to allocate adequate resources to the central evaluation function, with a target of 0.5 per cent of organisational expenditure, which is at the minimum end of the 0.5 per cent to 3 per cent range recommended by the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit to implement the evaluation workplan. Fields and headquarter departments are encouraged to reserve adequate resources to commission and supervise decentralised evaluations and allocate 0.5 per cent to 3 per cent of the overall project budget for evaluation purposes, as part of the direct cost of the project. In reality, these funding targets have not been met. The central evaluation function is supported by the Regular Programme Budget and earmarked donor contributions (USD 477,000 in 2021) representing 0.06 per cent of UNRWA programme expenditure or 0.04 per cent of total UNRWA expenditure. In 2021, the regular budget income was supplemented by donor contributions and despite the Evaluation Policy stating that the UNRWA annual programme budget should serve as the primary source of funding for the centralised evaluation function in fact in 2021 earmarked donor funds represented 70 per cent of the total evaluation budget. Whilst the overall budget allocation to the Evaluation Division has increased since 2018, the proportion arising from core programme budget has declined by 61 per cent (in 2018 USD 360,782 budget allocation (non-staff) fell to USD 141,553 in 2021). For 2022 only USD 163,000 has been approved for consultancy and travel for planned evaluations (DIOS workplan 2022).

**Figure 19: Evaluation Operational Budget (Non-staff)**



Source: Chart created with data from DIOS Annual Report 2021.

The staffing of the Evaluation Division is not proportionate to the size of the agency's overall budget expenditure profile with only three staff (1 P5, 1 P3, 1 G17). The OIOS Triennial review of recommendations from the programme evaluation of UNRWA 2020 found that "... slower progress had been made in strengthening the independent evaluation function...". The view was that the financial crisis had had a negative impact on the Agency's capacity to conduct independent corporate or central evaluations.

#### Element 5

An annual report of DIOS activities is prepared and submitted – including significant findings highlighted by evaluations and measures taken by management to implement DIOS's recommendations. A draft is shared with ACIO for review and advice. Subsequently, DIOS submits the annual report to the Commissioner-General, and for information purposes to the Advisory Commission. UNRWA publishes its evaluation reports on the website and has an enhanced policy of disclosure of internal reports to members states.

#### Element 6

OD 14 guarantees the independence of DIOS and the evaluation division in its conduct, specifically it ensures: unrestricted access to all functions, records, property, premises and personnel, fulfil its responsibilities free from interference in determining scope of work, performing its work and communicating results. The DIOS Annual Reports set out whether the Department has been able to operate in an independent manner, for each of the three annual reports reviewed each reported that there had been no undue influences or impairment to its operational independence. Operational independence was not raised as an issue in either the interviews conducted for this assessment nor in the evaluation reports reviewed (i.e. none of the evaluators reported that they were not able to conduct their work without undue interference).


<b>MI 8.1 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>High</b>
<b>MI 8.2: Consistent, independent evaluation of results (coverage)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>Overall MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>Overall MI score</b>	<b>2.60</b>
Element 1: An evaluation policy describes the principles to ensure the coverage, quality and use of findings, including in decentralised evaluations	3
Element 2: The policy/an evaluation manual guides the implementation of the different categories of evaluations, such as strategic, thematic, corporate level evaluations, as well as decentralised evaluations	2
Element 3: A prioritised and funded evaluation plan covering the organisation's planning and budgeting cycle is available	2
Element 4: The annual evaluation plan presents a systematic and periodic coverage of the MO's interventions, reflecting key priorities	3
Element 5: Evidence demonstrates that the evaluation policy is being implemented at country-level	3
<b>MI 8.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
<p><b>Element 1</b></p> <p>UNRWA recently revised its 2016 evaluation policy (2022). The policy defines the overall framework for the evaluation function of UNRWA and provides a guide for UNRWA staff and partners on the Agency's requirements for evaluation planning, conduct, quality assurance and use. The Evaluation Policy outlines the criteria to be used to identify what should be evaluated. Centralised evaluations are conducted or commissioned by the Department of Internal Oversight Services, decentralised evaluations are commissioned by the decentralised evaluation function, the Evaluation Division provides professional and technical support in the quality assurance of decentralised evaluations but the responsibility lies with the commissioning unit or evaluation manager. Evaluation reference groups have been established to support stakeholder involvement through the full life cycle of evaluations, these groups have included key staff representatives, donor and host representatives, as well as subject matter experts from relevant UN sister agencies or regional research organisations. The terms of reference for the evaluation reference group mechanism sets out the advisory role in the design of evaluations, as a forum for sharing findings and discussions on data accuracy, contextualization, conclusions, recommendations and on the adequacy of management responses. The evaluation policy sets out the criteria by which to guide the selection of evaluation subjects including strategic relevance; risk, significance of investment, knowledge gap; innovation, formal commitments; feasibility to implement but does not stipulate coverage targets or expectations. The Policy sets out how evaluation results should be communicated and used: with full final reports of centralised and decentralised evaluations and the management responses to be on the UNRWA website, with a requirement to produce summary communication products and briefings with staff and subcommittees of the Agency's Advisory Commission.</p> <p><b>Element 2</b></p> <p>The primary vehicle for providing guidance on the implementation of different categories of evaluations such as strategic thematic, corporate as well as decentralised evaluations is currently the Evaluation Policy. This is complemented by a 2016 quality assurance manual and toolkit and an evaluation manual is due to be completed in 2023. The evaluation policy provides definitions, principles, norms and standards, and outlines roles and responsibilities. It guides UNRWA staff and partners on the Agency's requirements for evaluation planning, conduct, quality assurance and use. The Evaluation Policy provides limited guidance on evaluation conduct and methodology stipulating a participatory approach should be adopted, with methods and tools tailored to the individual evaluation; it does not provide advice tailored to the category of evaluation. The policy provides some guidance on the purpose of the centralised evaluations stipulating that the evaluation plan should set the framework for ensuring coverage across the Agency's strategic plan. Guidance is also provided as to the timing of evaluations advising that they align to management decision making processes. Useful guidance is also provided on enhancing the credibility of the evaluation findings, and importance of transparency recommending the use of evaluation reference groups to engage key stakeholders in the evaluation process. The policy does not specify the frequency with which each type of evaluation should be conducted and does not address the use of evaluability assessments, meta-evaluations, portfolio evaluations, thematic evaluations, or country programme evaluations. No specific guidance on planning and conducting evaluation was issued during or following the outbreak of COVID-19; the Agency has since incorporated evaluation questions regarding the response and impact of COVID-19 on Palestine refugees needs in subsequent evaluations.</p>	10, 121, 122, 125, 134, 171, 187, 202, 277, 284, 287, 387, 417



### Element 3

A six-year evaluation plan for strategic centralised evaluations is prepared to align with and accompany the Agency's multi-year strategic plan (see Fig. 24). The Evaluation Division proposes, prioritises and finalizes topics for its work plan through consultations with fields and headquarters departments/divisions and through the consideration of current and emerging organisational issues. A total of 28 evaluations or review products were completed or commenced in period 2018-2022/3, seven of which were central and twelve decentralised, further six planned for 2023. According to the Evaluation Policy, UNRWA directors are required to notify the Chief of the Evaluation Division of plans for decentralised evaluations. Annual DIOS workplans include evaluation plans, with an overall budget envelope stated (rather than individually costed evaluations). This element is not fully achieved because the evaluation function/plan is not fully resourced and is dependent on additional donor contributions (see KPI 8.1).

Figure 20: UNRWA Evaluation Plan 2015-2022



Source: UNRWA Website


### Element 4

The six-year evaluation plan aspires to ensure coverage of all key strategic areas, while allowing for flexibility to address urgent, emergent needs. In terms of actual evaluations or reviews conducted, there was a good range covering the Strategic Objectives of MTS 2016-22, reflecting the balance of activities and effort – i.e., focus on basic needs (SO5) and Health (SO2). A total of 28 evaluation/review products were completed/commenced in period 2018-2022/3, 7 of which were central and 12 decentralised, a further 6 were planned for 2023. 8 Emergency appeals evaluations/reviews were completed or due to be completed by 2023, 3 SO1, 1 SO2, 3 SO3, 1 SO4, 5 SO5, 1 SO6, 1 WASH (water and sanitation), 1 relief and social security, 1 Medium Term Strategy, 1 Infrastructure and camp improvement (ICIP). For the new Strategic Plan commencing 2023 – the ambition is slightly reduced, with 15 evaluations to be completed during the period 2023-28 compared to 20 during the previous strategic period. Given the budgetary constraints this modest plan seems the most appropriate.

### Element 5

The decentralised evaluation activities over the reporting period have remained fairly consistent, with around 4 evaluations commenced/concluded each year (see figure 25 below). Evaluation Working Group meetings provide a forum for monitoring and evaluation focal points from field offices and HQ departments to share lessons learnt. In 2021 three Evaluation Working Group meetings were hosted by the central Evaluation Division. Tools and guides have been issued to field staff including one on ethical standards for beneficiary engagement in research. No evidence was supplied on the number of monitoring and evaluation focal points across the Agency. A further indication of the application of the evaluation policy at country level is the quality of decentralised evaluations: the DIOS AR 2021 states that significant improvement has been made in the quality of evaluations with the three central evaluations achieving 75 per cent or above – however for the decentralised evaluations a score of 55 per cent meant that they did not reach UNEG standards set.

Figure 21: Decentralised Evaluation Activity 2016-2021

**MI 8.2 Evidence confidence****High****MI 8.3: Systems applied to ensure the quality of evaluations****Score****Overall MI rating****Satisfactory****Overall MI score****3.20**

Element 1: Evaluations are based on design, planning and implementation processes that are inherently quality oriented

3

Element 2: Evaluations use appropriate methodologies for data collection, analysis and interpretation

3

Element 3: Evaluation reports present the evidence, findings, conclusions, and where relevant, recommendations in a complete and balanced way

3

Element 4: The methodology presented includes the methodological limitations and concerns

4

Element 5: A process exists to ensure the quality of all evaluations, including decentralised evaluations

3

**MI 8.3 Analysis****Evidence documents**

UNRWA is a member of UNEG and has adopted its Norms and Standards for Evaluation. The quality assurance of decentralised evaluation activities is the responsibility of the decentralised evaluation managers in UNRWA field offices and headquarter units, with the Evaluation Division providing guidance and training to support their capacity to do so. According to the Evaluation Policy (2022) evaluations should be properly supervised and carried out in conformity with UNEG norms and standards, the Evaluation Policy, and the Agency's guidelines for quality assurance in evaluation. The Agency supplied 14 evaluations for this MOPAN assessment, consisting of: 5 decentralised evaluations and 9 centralised evaluations (of which 3 were real-time evaluations of the agency's COVID-19 response).

**Element 1**

UNRWA has specific guidance on quality assurance in evaluation developed in 2016, which outlines the full evaluation cycle and where quality assurance is necessary at each stage, as well as describing the roles and responsibilities for each of these stages. The document provides quality assurance templates against which evaluations can be assessed. The evaluation division in DIOS backstops decentralised evaluations aiming to ensure both independence as well as quality. A Quality Assurance assessment tool is used which measures report quality against eight criteria and 34 indicators – guided by the UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports. Evaluations are guided by the Evaluation Policy which emphasises quality and utility and stipulates that independent quality assurance peer reviews of evaluation reports should be undertaken to reinforce credibility.

10, 121, 122, 125, 131-142, 171, 186, 187, 277-283, 287, 288, 387

**Element 2**

The Evaluation Policy stipulates a participatory approach should be adopted, with methods and tools tailored to the individual evaluation. Of the 14 evaluations reviewed as part of this MOPAN assessment the majority used similar designs and methods with a reliance on theory-based designs, use of field qualitative data collection and evidence which necessitated adaption during COVID-19. No quasi-experimental or experimental evaluation designs were used which seems appropriate given the nature of the evaluation questions, resource constraints and contextual factors. A balance between the desire to generate insights and learning rather than a pure focus on donor accountability is appropriate and relevant to the agency's needs. All of the evaluations reviewed state the methodology utilised and adhere to UNEG guidelines.

**Element 3**

An analysis of the centralised and decentralised evaluations provided for the MOPAN assessment finds that all evaluations present the evidence, findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The internal quality assurance assessments note some weakness in the recommendations provided in evaluations which was also revealed in the DIOS October 2021 satisfaction survey of staff. In 2020 UNRWA newly met the requirements for Evaluation – UN SWAP 2.0 Performance, but not all evaluations were strong on the gender indicators set out in the quality assurance assessment.

**Element 4**

An analysis of 14 of the centralised and decentralised evaluations provided for the MOPAN assessment finds that all evaluations adequately present the methodology including the limitations and concerns.

**Element 5**

As per the 2022 Evaluation policy, the quality assurance of centralised evaluations is the responsibility of the Evaluation Division. The quality assurance of decentralised evaluation activities is the responsibility of the decentralised evaluation managers in UNRWA field offices and headquarter units, with the Evaluation Division providing guidance and training to support their capacity to do so. The Evaluation Division reviews both central and decentralised evaluation reports applying a quality assurance assessment tool guided by the UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports, measuring quality across eight criteria and 34 indicators. According to the DIOS workplan 2022, the standards and procedures for Quality Assurance in Evaluation (2016) were due to be updated in 2022 to align with the new Evaluation Policy and revisions to the OECD/DAC Criteria. No process or requirement exists for evaluations to be independently quality assured through the use of external panels; however, evaluation reference groups are established for central and decentralised evaluations. The agency will utilize an external company to undertake a post-hoc assessment of evaluation quality during 2023.

**MI 8.3 Evidence confidence****Medium**

Small sample of evaluations meant that it was not possible to robustly assess the quality.

**MI 8.4: Mandatory demonstration of the evidence base to design new interventions****Score****Overall MI rating****Highly Unsatisfactory****Overall MI score****1.50**

Element 1: A formal requirement exists to demonstrate how lessons from past interventions have been taken into account in the design of new interventions

2

Element 2: Clear feedback loops exist to feed lessons into the design of new interventions

2

Element 3: Lessons from past interventions inform new interventions

2

Element 4: Incentives exist to apply lessons learned to new interventions

NA

Element 5: The number/share of new operations designs that draw on lessons from evaluative approaches is made public

0

**MI 8.4 Analysis****Evidence documents**

The previous 2017/18 MOPAN assessment identified some challenges in ensuring the mandatory demonstration of the evidence base to design new interventions, with a lack of specific mechanisms to ensure that evaluation findings and lessons learned were incorporated into decision making processes and no evidence of incentives to apply lessons learnt to new interventions; opportunities for improvement remain.

**Element 1**

The Evaluation Policy (2022) stipulates that field and headquarter departments and divisions are required to take relevant evidence from the evaluation into account when developing strategic response plans and annual work plans. The Policy also states it is the role and responsibility of the Department of Planning to (a) ensure that results from evaluations are used during the planning process (annual and strategic); (b) ensure that the Strategic Plan 2023-2028 and emergency appeals are evaluable; (c) ensure that evaluation is adequately covered in the planning guidelines; and (d) maintain the recommendations in the RBM system. Project proposals are required to state whether relevant lessons learnt from other projects have been identified and incorporated. The uptake or reflection on lessons from evaluations or previous interventions is not formally monitored. The DIOS AOR tracks the implementation rate of agreed actions in evaluation management responses but does not track how lessons from past interventions are used in programme design. The assessment team was unable to

10, 14, 21, 24, 52, 125, 134, 171, 186, 187, 277, 278, 287, 315, 387.

find evidence that there is systematic capture of lessons learnt in project proposals. There are no clear, documented links between the articulated priorities and past performance data. Emergency Appeal documents do not contain analyses of past performance, though they do detail anticipated programmatic results and associated targets.

#### Element 2

The closure phase of projects requires a lessons learned exercise undertaken by the project manager and team members. The Department of Planning is tasked with keeping track of all lessons learned, take/initiate any required action, and provide an analysis of all lessons learned to the Project Review Committee every 6 months. Membership of the PRC include: DCG (Chair), Director of Finance, Director of ERCD, Director of HRD, and two additional members from the Management Committee to serve for a one-year term on the PRC, with the Department of Planning acting as the Secretariat. The Evaluation Division's current strategy states that an indicator regarding examples of evaluation use for decision making will be utilised but this is not yet reported in the DIOS Annual Report or the Annual Results Review.

#### Element 3

Staff interviewed for the OIOS Triennial review of recommendations from the programme evaluation of UNRWA reported that "the improvement in the results-based framework and monitoring system and the institutionalization of regular reflection sessions had positively influenced stronger evaluative thinking across the Agency". During the assessment interviews conducted with UNRWA staff the Gaza After Action Review stood out as a key learning opportunity, and in the first half of 2022, UNRWA HQ Emergency Management protocols were updated to reflect the recommendations of the 2021 After Action Review (AAR). The activation of emergency procedures, including emergency communications, and the functioning of the HQ-led Emergency Task Force were reviewed and further clarified to incorporate lessons learned. The midterm evaluation of MADAD III found that "Overall, the design of the MADAD III project reflects a strong commitment from UNRWA to use learning to improve performance and respond to challenges experienced during MADAD I and MADAD II."(pp7-8). Only minor evidence was found that demonstrates the incorporation of evaluation findings and lessons learned into new interventions: the Proposed Programme Budget for the General Assembly 2023 states that the findings from three evaluations informed the Programme Plan and subprogrammes also present general lessons learnt.

#### Element 4

No evidence was provided to the assessment team on how UNRWA directly incentivises staff to apply lessons learned. DIOS Annual satisfaction survey 2021 noted that the Evaluation Division could boost activities to ensure greater visibility of evaluation results. The 2021 Evaluation of MTS found some staff felt that there was a lack of mechanisms for ongoing communication and information sharing between peer groups in field offices, which they felt would enable them to share experiences on a more regular basis and to learn from each other. The same evaluation found that resource constraints restrict the scope for follow up on lessons learned from monitoring and evaluation where the action would require a financial commitment.

#### Element 5

This element assesses whether the number or share of new operations design that draw on lessons from evaluations is publicly reported. There is a lack of explicit reference to evaluation findings and lessons in programme design documents and no corporate tracking indicator exists that measures the application of evidence into programmatic or strategic plans. Since there is no publicly available information on the number or share of new operations designs that draw on lessons from evaluative approaches this element scores a zero.

#### MI 8.4 Evidence confidence

Medium

MI 8.5: Poorly performing interventions proactively identified, tracked and addressed	Score
Overall MI rating	Satisfactory
Overall MI score	3.00
Element 1: A system exists to identify poorly performing interventions	4
Element 2: Regular reporting tracks the status and evolution of poorly performing interventions	2
Element 3: A process for addressing poor performance exists, with evidence of its use	2
Element 4: The process clearly delineates the responsibility to take action	4

MI 8.5 Analysis	Evidence documents
<p><b>Element 1</b></p> <p>Monitoring and reporting are set out in Organisational Directive 21, which requires UNRWA to annually plan, monitor and report to appropriate internal and external stakeholders (including the Advisory Commission and the UN General Assembly) progress in achieving its strategic objectives. For the MTS 2016-22, the Common Monitoring Matrix listed 178 indicators for the five Strategic Objectives/Outcomes, the new strategy 2023-28 contains 141 indicators to track performance. Results reporting is derived from the UNRWA results-based monitoring (RBM) system which enables data collection and analysis against strategic objectives and outcomes. The system also hosts monitoring structures for Emergency Appeals (EAs), projects, and other results frameworks used by the Agency. Data is reviewed and analysed on a quarterly basis at the field level, and on a bi-annual and annual basis through UNRWA-wide results reviews. Staff interviewed for this assessment were generally positive about these exercises, noting that they provided good opportunities for taking stock of performance. The Annual Results Review information package for 2021 indicated that 95 per cent of indicators in the Agency's results framework were reported within the agreed time frame. Both the evaluation of the MTS Monitoring and Reporting activities and the Evaluation of the MTS confirm that the monitoring and reporting activities are generally relevant, delivering actionable data that supports internal stakeholders' management and decision-making processes, providing important opportunities for strategic reflection and learning. Evaluations provide another way to identify poorly performing interventions – especially when conducted in real time such as the Real-Time Evaluations (RTEs) in response to the COVID-19 emergency.</p> <p><b>Element 2</b></p> <p>Results reporting is derived from the UNRWA results-based monitoring (RBM) system which enables data collection and analysis against MTS strategic outcomes, EAs, projects and other results frameworks used by the Agency. The RBM system was designed within the Department of Planning to provide the ability to regularly assess all operational and project activities against set indicators, forecasts, and plans (including the Agency's Unified Strategic Framework, Medium Term Strategy, and respective project plans). The main areas of assessment focus are Operations, Finance, Risk and Reporting timelines. Data is collected and analysed on a quarterly basis and on a semi-annual basis through UNRWA wide results reviews.</p> <p>At the programme/project level, project managers record in the RBM System the extent to which their projects are ahead of plan, on track or behind plan. If a project is behind plan, the project manager is required to record and classify the risk(s) associated with this status. Project managers report monthly on expenditures and achievement of milestones, risks, progress. Grants progress reports as stipulated in the grant agreement and incorporate operational and financial indicators and risk updates are also produced. Monthly programme management meetings take place alongside quarterly management reviews. The Project Assessment Committee (PAC) meets on a quarterly basis to: (i) review the quarterly project / grants tracker report and monthly assessments developed by Project Managers/Officers, paying particular attention to the implementation status of projects that are within 3 months of their project completion date and any projects that have been assessed by Project Managers/Officers as behind plan.</p> <p>An evaluation of UNRWA's monitoring and reporting activities found that these were well managed, with many UNRWA staff valuing the Department of Planning's coordination support and mechanisms for internal reflection on progress and challenges. However, a lack of resources for analysing and acting on data was a significant challenge with following up on problems identified (Evaluation of UNRWA Monitoring and Reporting Activities on the Medium-Term Strategy 2016-2022). The evaluation went on to recommend that a tracking process should be developed to ensure systematic follow-up of action items and suggestions made during review meetings. In response, the Department of Planning agreed that a tracking process will be developed to ensure the systematic follow-up of results review action points.</p> <p><b>Element 3</b></p> <p>Documentation resulting from the results reviews identify action points to be undertaken by departments, derived from the discussions. Only in some cases however do these action points involve substantive changes to programme delivery, and where changes are proposed, these appear to be driven more by financial constraints and external exigencies than by performance data. The Evaluation of the Monitoring and Reporting activities on the medium term strategy 2016-21 (pp4) found that the Agency is constrained in its ability to address poor performance by limited funding: where problems or discrepancies are identified through data collection, any kind of analysis, research or follow-up is reliant on fields and programmes being able to reallocate existing resources, or independently secure new resources to undertake research and – where appropriate – act to resolve difficulties. In response to a recommendation made in the Evaluation of the MTS monitoring and</p>	<p>10, 52, 125, 134, 136, 171, 223, 277, 278, 287, 387</p>

reporting, the Department of Planning agreed that a tracking process will be developed to ensure the systematic follow-up of results review action points. Interviews held with staff for this assessment indicated that the scope for significant adjustments to programming is relatively constrained. There is a strongly held perception, particularly among field-based staff, that modalities for the Agency's core programme delivery are largely inflexible, due to centralised planning, budgeting, and programme design processes. This places considerable limits on the ability of field offices to use performance data to adapt programme delivery. Respondents to the MOPAN survey were not confident that UNRWA is able to identify and address poorly performing programmes with only 33 per cent agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement, however 30 per cent stated that they did not know.

#### Element 4

The Agency has clearly delineated roles and procedures in place to act on poorly performing interventions. The HQ Project Review Committee (PRC) is responsible for taking action and decisions where project implementation is not on-track or where risk tolerance thresholds have been exceeded (based on the report provided by the Project Assessment Committee). Furthermore, the evaluation of the MTS found UNRWA's use of 'management compacts' between the Commissioner-General and responsible directors for the delivery of annual operational plans established accountability.

#### MI 8.5 Evidence confidence

High

#### MI 8.6: Clear accountability system ensures responses and follow-up to and use of evaluation recommendations

Score

#### Overall MI rating

Highly satisfactory

#### Overall MI score

4.00

Element 1: Evaluation reports include a management response (or has one attached or associated with it)

4

Element 2: Management responses include an action plan and/ or agreement clearly stating responsibilities and accountabilities

4

Element 3: A timeline for implementation of key recommendations is proposed

4

Element 4: An annual report on the status of use and implementation of evaluation recommendations is made public

4

#### MI 8.6 Analysis

Evidence documents

#### Element 1

UNRWA's Evaluation Policy stipulates the production of a timely management response to recommendations, outlining the decisions concerning each evaluation recommendation and specifically whether they accept, partially accept, or reject each recommendation. The review of 14 evaluations undertaken for this assessment confirms that all evaluations included a management response with the exception of the real-time evaluations of COVID-19 response which were intended to be rapid learning products.

#### Element 2

The Evaluation Policy stipulates for each recommendation that managers are required to formulate action(s) specifying how the recommendation will be implemented, by who and the implementation timeline (Evaluation Action Plan). For rejected or partially accepted recommendations, managers are required to articulate the factors influencing acceptance. All management responses are publicly available as part of the evaluation reports published on the UNRWA website. All the evaluations reviewed for this assessment, with the exception of the real-time evaluations of COVID-19 response, included a management response and action plan which clearly stated responsibilities and accountabilities.

10, 11, 12, 52, 125, 131-142, 177, 186, 277-279, 281, 287, 288, 387

#### Element 3

All the evaluations reviewed for this assessment, with the exception of the real-time evaluations of COVID-19 response, included a management response with a timeline for implementation of actions.

#### Element 4

The Evaluation Policy stipulates that DIOS will report on the progress of implementation for centralised and decentralised evaluation recommendations twice annually to the Executive Office and ACIO, as well as reporting on progress through the DIOS Annual Report and UNRWA Annual Operational Report. For decentralised evaluations, the commissioning office is responsible for verifying, tracking, and reporting on recommendations



and actions points to DIOS. The DIOS Annual Report is made public and contains updates on the implementation of evaluation recommendations but not the use of evaluation recommendations. For the 2021 reporting period 71 per cent of all recommendations issued in 2018 and 2019 were implemented.

#### MI 8.6 Evidence confidence

Medium

#### MI 8.7: Uptake of lessons learned and best practices from evaluations

Score

##### Overall MI rating

Unsatisfactory

##### Overall MI score

2.50

Element 1: A complete and current repository of evaluations and their recommendations is available for use

3

Element 2: A mechanism for distilling and disseminating lessons learned internally exists

2

Element 3: A dissemination mechanism to partners, peers and other stakeholders is available and employed

3

Element 4: Evidence is available that lessons learned and best practices are being applied

2

#### MI 8.7 Analysis

Evidence documents

##### Element 1

UNRWA staff have access to copies of all evaluation reports as the UNRWA website contains centralised and decentralised evaluation reports, including the management response to recommendations. In terms of ensuring ease of access to evaluation reports and their recommendations, the Evaluation Policy states it is the role and responsibility of the Department of Planning to maintain the recommendations in the RBM system. According to the (draft) Revised Project Procedures manual v07, where an evaluation takes place the recommendations from the evaluation will be shared with the Department of Planning and followed up in the RBM system, evaluation lessons learned will be incorporated into the registry of lessons learned, however, the assessment team received no evidence to demonstrate this is taking place. Access to a system that allowed staff to search content would promote the use of evaluation findings, lessons, and recommendations, enabling the Agency to achieve a higher rating. This has been recognised as an area to improve and the Evaluation Division has begun the process of developing a searchable database and repository of evaluation findings, recommendations, and lessons.

##### Element 2

Evaluation briefings are produced to share evaluation results with the Management Committee, AdCom, Harmonized Results Working Group (3 meetings with the Harmonized Results Working Group and 3 with the Evaluation Working Group during 2021). Virtual Briefings with staff also take place and respondents interviewed for this MOPAN assessment particularly noted learning opportunities arising from the Review of the UNRWA management of the emergency response to the 2021 Gaza-Israel conflict.

In a recent DIOS annual satisfaction survey (2021) staff noted that the Evaluation Division could boost activities to ensure greater visibility of evaluation results. This was echoed in the evaluation of the MTS (2021) which found that "More regular communication between programme staff across field offices could help with information exchange and lesson-learning on specific technical issues, good practice, findings from programme evaluations, and addressing common challenges (as was the case during COVID-19)" (pp 50). According to the (draft) Revised Project Procedures manual v07, the Department of Planning will maintain a registry of lessons learned in order that lessons can be shared with project sponsors/officers/managers of similar/other projects in the future. The Department of Planning reported to the assessment team that this initiative has, to date, not been undertaken, the Project Procedures Manual and improvements to the RBM system have not been finalized primarily due to a lack of staff in the Department.

##### Element 3

The evaluation policy demonstrates a commitment to share evaluation reports with internal stakeholders and further requires field offices and HQ departments to ensure that evaluation results are shared with Agency stakeholders. The primary dissemination mechanism to partners, peers and other stakeholders is the use of Evaluation Reference Groups; these are established for central and decentralised evaluations as a key mechanism to engage stakeholders including representatives of host governments and donors. Briefing and dissemination activities for central evaluations are reported in the DIOS AOR. UNRWA staff confirmed during the assessment interviews that briefings of two recent evaluations had taken place to external stakeholders. Dissemination of decentralised evaluations seems to be more ad-hoc and less systematic.

10-12, 52, 125, 131- 142,171, 186, 277-279, 272, 287, 288, 387.  
UNRWA website

**Element 4**

Organisational Directive 21 commits UNRWA's annual operational planning to consider lessons learned from relevant audits and evaluations. Despite this, the programme approvals process does not include a requirement to state what evaluation lessons or learning have been drawn on in the design of the intervention. The Project Outline template (the first conceptual description of the project) does not include a section on applying evidence from evaluations, however the Draft Revised Project Procedures Manual does have a project proposal development checklist asking whether "relevant lessons learned from other projects [have] been identified and incorporated?". A review of the annual operational plans (2018, 2019, 2021, 2022) reveal that they do not contain an overview of past performance nor a summary of relevant lessons from evaluations. The Annual Proposed Programme Budget for 2023 does state lessons learned and planned changes reflecting on the performance and experience of the previous year.

There is no Agency-wide indicator that measures the percentage of projects or strategies that incorporate evaluation findings and lessons learned. Nor was there evidence of formal reporting of use of evaluation evidence, although the Evaluation Division made a commitment in its strategy (2020-2022) to report on an indicator capturing "examples of use of evaluations for decision making, senior management and donor feedback on the value of evaluation", this unfortunately has not yet been implemented. The Evaluation Division is able to track perceptions on evaluation coverage, relevance, and utility of evaluation products through the DIOS annual survey to Agency directors, and examples of use and influence of evaluation findings are collated and reported to the senior management team and ACIO. The 2022 DIOS survey harnessed positive responses from Directors on the utility of evaluations and their ability to influence positive change and learning, examples cited included the MTS 2016-22 evaluation, the Protection Audit evaluation, and the Gaza After Action Review.

There was evidence of utilisation of evaluation lessons found in two evaluations only: first, the Emergency response to Gaza crisis 2021 found that following the 2014 hostilities in the Gaza Strip, the Agency and GFO have made serious efforts to ensure that lessons learned are used to inform emergency preparedness and response readiness. Second, the mid-term evaluation for MADAD III identified that the design of MADAD III responds to the recommendations of the previous MADAD II project, reincorporating protection as a focus of programming in LFO. LFO has taken onboard feedback from previous MADAD projects to strengthen its partnership approach, the evaluation confirmed that UNRWA has attempted to incorporate learning from MADAD II and strengthen its work with national partners, and local civil society organisations. Staff interviewed as part of the MADAD evaluation showed a clear willingness to learn and adapt and were able to provide updates on the extent to which they had implemented responses to identified challenges and recommendations. However, evaluations for MADAD show that opportunities have been missed to capitalise on MADAD's regional programming profile, with a lack of knowledge sharing between offices, the relatively short nature of the programme has made embedding lessons challenging.

According to the evaluation of the MTS reporting and monitoring activities (2022), the Agency's potential – including the capacity to act on data – is also affected by weaknesses in the learning and evaluation culture within the Agency, where there is sometimes a lack of openness around gaps and problems. The evaluation found there was a common view across the staff base that the tone and focus of meetings has been skewed towards accountability rather than learning, which has served to aggravate weaknesses with the Agency's learning culture.

Of the respondents to the MOPAN survey 45 per cent (strongly) agreed that UNRWA is able to learn lessons and apply best practice to its programming, 25 per cent somewhat agreed, 13 percent did not agree, while 17 per cent did not know/had no opinion. Survey respondents cited factors that impeded lesson learning such as the agency's lack of funding, lack of staff and resources, cases where evaluations were slow to be completed (inferring lost learning opportunities), and no clear link of how lessons feed back into programming. Whilst there was recognition of the agency's willingness to learn, with some proactive initiatives to learn from failure and success, there was an impression that uptake of lessons is not systematic and instead reliant on field office and department initiatives.

Given the partial achievement rather than the application of evaluation lessons in the majority of cases a score of 2 is awarded.

**MI 8.7 Evidence confidence****Medium**

## Results

*Achievement of relevant, inclusive and sustainable contributions to humanitarian and development results are achieved in an efficient manner.*

KPI 9: Development and humanitarian objectives are achieved and results contribute to normative and cross-cutting goals	KPI score
Satisfactory	2.84

The analysis of evaluations conducted by the assessment team reviewed a total of 14 evaluations, consisting of: 5 decentralised evaluations and 9 centralised evaluations including 3 centralised real-time evaluations of the agency's COVID-19 response. UNRWA's corporate reports and information were also assessed.

UNRWA's strategic priorities are to protect Palestine refugees through the realization of their rights under international law; ensure they can lead healthy lives and complete quality, inclusive and equitable education; give them access to livelihood opportunities; alleviate poverty amongst the most vulnerable; and ensure they are able to meet their basic human needs of shelter, water, and sanitation. According to UNRWA's 2023-2028 Strategic Plan the agency is expected to serve 6.58 million women, men, and children, a number that is likely to grow as time progresses.

**Noting the scope and scale of UNRWA's programmatic interventions in the five diverse highly volatile contexts achievement of results was constrained by factors including contextual challenges and funding limitations.**

The complex contexts (the socioeconomic collapse in Lebanon, blockade of the Gaza Strip, Syrian conflict and 2023 earthquake, occupation, violence and instability in the West Bank, and an increasingly difficult economic situation in Jordan) in which UNRWA operates inevitably impacts on the organisation's ability to deliver services, this is further compounded by the unpredictable funding availability. During the assessment period COVID-19 also impacted on the ability to deliver core mandated services.

**The independent evaluation of the Medium-Term Strategy 2016-2022 confirmed that the agency largely delivered against the indicators set to measure delivery of its Strategic Outcomes.** The evaluation recognises this as a significant achievement given the external challenges the Agency has faced such as COVID-19, funding shortfalls, and the economic, political and security volatility in each context it operates. Furthermore, the evaluation also states that the Agency's programmes (provision of services and employment opportunities to Palestine refugees) contribute to regional stability and conditions for 'peace', combining humanitarian and development activities effectively.

**Evaluative evidence demonstrates strong programmatic performance in education, health, livelihoods, and emergency response.** These achievements are reflected in UNRWA's corporate results reporting: according to UNRWA's most recent strategic plan 2023-28, UNRWA was able to achieve – and in many cases exceed – performance targets for its education and health programmes throughout much of the previous strategic period (2016–22). However, COVID-19 diminished the educational progress made during the first four years of the MTS with evidence of severe learning loss amongst Palestine refugee pupils in 2020 and 2021. MTS objectives targets were not wholly met in protection, livelihoods and relief assistance; according to the agency this is attributed in large part to the Agency's financial situation (funding shortfalls) and rising costs of living.

**SDGs:** In terms of contributing to SDG indicators, UNRWA's strategic outcome areas align to and contribute towards the achievement of all 17 goals, but directly contribute to: Goal 1 (no poverty); Goal 2 (zero hunger); Goal 3 (good health and wellbeing); Goal 4 (quality education); Goal 5 (gender equality); Goal 6 (clean water and sanitation); Goal 7 (affordable and clean energy); Goal 8 (decent work and economic growth); Goal 10 (reduced inequalities); Goal 11 (sustainable cities and communities); Goal 13 (climate action); Goal 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions); and Goal 17 (partnerships for the goals). UNRWA did not provide the assessment team with a report of results achieved against the SDG indicators.

**Gender:** The evaluations and UNRWA's corporate information highlight both the achievements and shortcomings of the organisation in achieving results on gender equality and women's empowerment in different areas, such as health, education, protection, and emergency response. The organisation has adopted various policies and strategies to enable the achievement of gender equality and has made progress in increasing the number of women in management positions and addressing gender-based violence (GBV). Specifically, UNRWA has provided assistance to survivors of gender-based violence, and mainstreamed gender, GBV, and child protection interventions in its emergency response. In relation to gender-based violence, UNRWA implements a

multisectoral approach to responding to and preventing GBV, ensuring survivors are referred to the Agency's assistance programmes, including food and cash assistance, education, health, legal counselling, and psychosocial support. When UNRWA is unable to provide the required assistance in legal counselling and psychosocial support, it refers the case to an external service provider. UNRWA takes steps to mainstream gender, GBV and child protection interventions in its emergency response, both at the programmatic and operational levels. According to UNRWA's corporate results reporting, in 2021, the Agency assisted 3,999 identified survivors of GBV (3,563 female; 436 male), including 22 persons with disabilities, through the extension of medical, including psychosocial counselling, legal, food and cash assistance. For 2022 only 2,752 survivors of GBV were reported in the AOR 2022 as receiving assistance with counselling support all of whom were in the Gaza Strip, with 0 reported as receiving legal advice /social intervention.

However, corporate reporting, evaluations, and interviews conducted point to a lack of dedicated gender mainstreaming staff, insufficient resources, and inconsistent implementation of gender-sensitive services all of which limit the ability to achieve results in this area. Of the fourteen evaluations reviewed, only 5 specifically reported gender results, and these evaluations found that in order to strengthen its development and humanitarian objectives related to women and girls, an improvement is needed in the conduct of gender and vulnerability analyses, bolstered staff capacity on gender and GBV, and consistent implementation of gender mainstreaming policies and programmes across all areas of operation.

**Environmental sustainability:** The agency has undertaken some initiatives with respect to environmental sustainability and tackling climate change, including energy saving initiatives in camps and its premises (installation of energy efficient lights, solar panels, solar powered water purification), reduction of waste and water usage, promotion of environmental awareness in schools. However, there is significant room for improvement in UNRWA's interventions to include planned activities and project design criteria to achieve environmental sustainability and contribute to tackle the effects of climate change. There was very little evaluative evidence or corporate results of the agency's performance in this area; out of the 14 evaluations reviewed only one explicitly reports on UNRWA's work on environmental programming. Environmental sustainability has been under-resourced in the agency but there are, however, indications of an upward trajectory including the development of an environmental sustainability policy, draft implementation plan and a number of projects that support environmental sustainability.

**Human rights and LNOB:** Protection, based on the enjoyment of human rights, is part of the UNRWA's core mandate. UNRWA provides basic needs and essential services to 6.5 million Palestine refugees across 5 fields of operation all of which deliver development objectives that uphold the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): rights to education (702 schools providing education for 544,710 pupils), right to health (140 health care facilities serving 1.9 million people), decent standard of living (cash and food assistance supplied to more than two million Palestine refugees, 68 camps with 4000 homes rehabilitated), and work (job creation, vocational and teacher training, and microfinance initiatives which issued over 200,000 loans (2016-2021). UNRWA provides education that emphasizes a human rights culture, inclusive policies for marginalized and excluded children, and primary healthcare to Palestine refugees across five fields of operation. The organisation engages with duty bearers and external actors to promote compliance with international law and advocates for the rights of Palestine refugees under international law. During 2022, 882 advocacy interventions were undertaken by UNRWA on behalf of Palestine refugees. UNRWA has also adopted a new Protection Strategic Framework and engages in protection monitoring to inform advocacy targeting duty bearers. According to the respondents to the MOPAN survey 79 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that UNRWA's programmes and services promote the protection of Palestine refugee rights and most respondents (76 per cent) also agreed or strongly agreed that UNRWA was reaching Palestine refugees in the greatest need.

However, despite these efforts, there has been a decrease in spending on protection in recent years, project funding for protection did resume during the assessment period, and some additional posts were secured on the regular budget for this area, but the sustainability of funding for protection remains precarious. The lack of secure funding has constricted the organisation's protection activities and particularly its ability to mainstream protection across its work.

<b>MI 9.1: Interventions assessed as having achieved their objectives, and results (analysing differential results across target groups, and changes in national development policies and programs or system reforms)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>4. Highly satisfactory:</b> The organisation achieves all or almost all intended significant development, normative and/or humanitarian objectives at the output and outcome level. Results are differentiated across target groups.	

<b>3. Satisfactory:</b> The organisation either achieves at least a majority of stated output and outcome objectives (more than 50 per cent if stated) or the most important of stated output and outcome objectives is achieved	
<b>2. Unsatisfactory:</b> Half or less than half of stated output and outcome level objectives is achieved	
<b>1. Highly unsatisfactory:</b> Less than half of stated output and outcome objectives has been achieved, including one or more very important output and/or outcome level objectives	
MI 9.1 Analysis	Evidence documents
<p>Evidence from UNRWA's management reporting and supported by evaluations, the MOPAN survey and interviews conducted for the assessment confirm that UNRWA has achieved extensive reach in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank. Over the period 2016-2021, there has been an increase of 8.5 per cent in registered refugees and a 42.5 per cent increase in other registered persons, totalling over 6.5 million by 2021 (UNRWA Statistics Bulletin). The Evaluation of the MTS 2016-21 (2021) confirmed UNRWA's reach across 5 contexts and particularly delivering services to 1.1 million registered Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip representing nearly three quarters of the population there.</p> <p>Based on all the evidence reviewed, the assessment team conclude that UNRWA has been effective in providing critical assistance in areas such as education, health, protection, and emergency cash assistance. UNRWA provides essential cash assistance, including to persons with disabilities, female-headed or older refugees, and emergency cash assistance. UNRWA provides education to over half a million students, with outcomes higher than those in public schools (Jordan) at a lower unit cost. Evidence from the Agency's management reporting and independent evaluations indicate that COVID-19 negatively impacted some targets, but UNRWA quickly adapted to the pandemic's restrictions, particularly in the areas of telemedicine, online education, and GBV case management services.</p> <p><i>* "Other registered persons" refer to those who, at the time of original registration, did not satisfy all of UNRWA's Palestine Refugee criteria, but who were determined to have suffered significant loss and/or hardship for reasons related to the 1948 conflict in Palestine; they also include persons who belong to the families of other registered persons.</i></p> <p><b>Evidence of results achievements drawn from UNRWA's corporate reporting</b></p> <p>The MTS Common Monitoring Matrix (CMM) was established to monitor and assess the Agency's performance across its strategic outcomes and includes key performance indicators (KPIs) at the outcome, output, and activity levels, however it is not possible to assess whether the MTS objectives have been achieved as the targets set in the original CMM have been amended annually or not reported on in their entirety. To piece together an assessment of objectives and results achievements the latest corporate results data are taken from the Annual Operational Report 2022 (which features information on up to 45 of the CMM indicators) and data extracted from the annual results review information package (2021) and the UNRWA on-line statistics bulletin (data on 97 CMM indicators).</p> <p>For 2021 despite setting a target of 70 per cent, UNRWA reported that 66 per cent of planned indicators had been achieved for the annual reporting period, in 2020 UNRWA reported that all assessed indicators exceeded targets. Any targets not met were reportedly due to (i) COVID -19- related movement restrictions; and (ii) the reprioritization of resources to respond to the pandemic (2021 Annual Results Review Information Package, p. 220).</p> <p><b>Key highlights of strategic results</b> (compiled from UNRWA's statistics bulletin, 2023-28 Strategy, AOR 2022):</p> <p><b>SO 1</b> Palestine refugees are protected through the realization of their rights under international law</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In 2022, social workers provided PSS and case management services to 4,291 refugee clients (2,599 female and 1,692 males, including 457 persons with disabilities).</li> <li>• In 2022, issuance of 882 targeted protection advocacy interventions and engaging with host governments, civil society, and other UN entities on these issues to secure preventative and remedial action.</li> <li>• Improved staff capacity development on key protection issues, including the PSEA, GBV, child protection, the systematic identification of disability, addressing violence against children, and safe identification and referral (training 4,762 frontline staff on protection)</li> <li>• Establishment of on-line registration platform</li> </ul> <p>Challenges to results achievement include: shrinking humanitarian space restricted access and limited the available sphere of engagement in contexts such as Occupied Palestinian Territories and Syria; high reliance on project funding that impacted staff retention and the continuity of advocacy efforts; and insufficient resources</p>	<p>10-14, 132-135, 137-142, 171, 174 186, 277-279, 282, 288, 294, 315, 386, 417, 418</p>



to recruit specialized staff and to implement capacity building efforts.

**SO 2: Palestine refugees lead healthy lives**

- 140 health care facilities serving 1.9m persons.
- In 2021, seven million medical consultations were provided.
- Improvements in efficiency and quality, with the average number of daily medical consultations per doctor decreasing from 85 in 2016 to 66.3 in 2021
- 12 per cent of all consultations are now via telemedicine.

Challenges to results achievement: staff face an extremely high workload, with almost all cadres understaffed.

**SO 3 Palestine refugees complete inclusive and equitable quality basic education**

- 702 schools providing education for 544,710 pupils (545,000 in 2022)
- UNRWA strives to ensure class sizes of between 25 – 40 pupils; however, as of the 2021–22 school year, 53 per cent of classes in UNRWA schools accommodated more than 40 pupils.

Challenges to results achievement: COVID-19 forced schools to close resulting in significant learning loss in all fields of operation, consistent with global patterns. Learning loss was felt almost equally by both boys and girls, with an average loss of 30 percentage points across grades, subject matter, and gender.

**SO 4 Palestine refugees have improved livelihood opportunities**

- TVET: The Agency runs eight TVET centres with around 8,000 students enrolled on an annual basis.
- Two teacher training faculties – in Jordan and the West Bank – which provide degree level training for Palestine refugee students, with over 2,000 students currently enrolled.
- Job Creation Programme in the Gaza Strip
- Camp improvement interventions created an estimated 2,500 full-time equivalent jobs each year under the 2016–22 strategic period.
- Microfinance: Between 2016 and 2021, the programme issued over 200,000 loans valued at more than USD 187 million.

Challenges to results achievement: The Agency identified that it was unable to make the necessary investments in its TVET programming or expand partnerships sufficiently to address rising unemployment, particularly amongst Palestine refugee youth. The performance of UNRWA's microfinance programme was also impacted by COVID-19 related shocks, which led to the downward revision of many targets.

**SO 5 The most vulnerable Palestine refugees have access to effective social assistance**

- Between 2020–22, UNRWA provided food and cash assistance to more than two million Palestine refugees, or over a third of all those registered with the Agency.

Challenges to results achievement: The Agency reported that persistent resource constraints have prevented it from expanding its support under the SSNP. The aspiration of the SSNP to cover a visibly large number of persons in need has meant that limited resources have been stretched to be able to show coverage. This has come at the detriment of the transfer value, which is limited to between USD 80 and USD 130 annually per person and thus remained insufficient to address poverty or food insecurity.

**SO 6 Palestine refugees are able to meet their basic human needs of shelter, water and sanitation**

- Between 2016–21, a total of 4,000 homes were rehabilitated with project funds; a further 18,000 homes damaged or destroyed in conflicts – primarily in the Gaza Strip and Nahr El-Bared, Lebanon, were also reconstructed or rehabilitated.
- Rehabilitated 1049 shelters in 2021

Challenges to results achievement: The Agency reports that progress has remained slow and challenging -due to the limited availability of project funds and the unavailability of or lack of access to construction materials linked to COVID-19 restrictions, as well as lengthy host authority procedures in some fields.

**Evidence of results achievements drawn from independent external evaluations:**

SO2: The evaluations reviewed by the assessment team confirm UNRWA's delivery of strategic objective 2 (health), whilst there have been improvements in UNRWA's health services (especially since reforms in the Family Health Team) staff shortages and the inability for UNRWA to cover specialised treatments and diagnostics (requiring hospital treatment as UNRWA is unable to cover the full cost) limit UNRWA in achieving all its outcome and output targets set.

SO3: Evaluations confirm the achievement of strategic objective 3 (education) – with the MTS Evaluation (2021) noting that UNRWA provides more than half a million students with an education that enshrines a human rights



culture, seeking to embed tolerance in social and political contexts where children are exposed to conflict and violence. A World Bank and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees report, published in January 2021, highlighted that in the West Bank, and Jordan, UNRWA school children scored an average of a quarter of a standard deviation higher in international assessments than their counterparts in public schools. The report concludes that “UNRWA schools provide a model example and strong foundational lessons for effective emergency responsiveness in refugee education”.

SO4: The MTS evaluation (2021) confirmed that UNRWA provides employment directly for around 29,000 Palestine refugees in its five fields of operation. UNRWA contributes to ensuring that Palestine refugees have the support of a secure income in a region where there are few viable alternative employment opportunities.

SO5: Evaluation evidence states how UNRWA cash assistance is an essential lifeline and for some a main source of income especially for persons with disabilities, female headed or older refugees. Emergency cash assistance was especially important for the ability of Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) to cope with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Evaluation of the Transition to E-Card found that recipient dignity, choice, and accountability, has improved with the change in modality. However, the social protection potential of the Social Safety Net Programme is limited by the relatively low amount of the cash transfer, lack of integration with other UNRWA services and limited time for social workers for casework and referrals. Overall, the SSNP prevents people from slipping further into poverty but can only partially succeed in helping people meet their basic needs.

The independent evaluations of the EU funded MADAD projects assessed the humanitarian aid in response to the Syria crisis. Overall, the evaluations found that UNRWA's interventions have been effective in providing critical assistance in areas including education, health, and emergency cash assistance but also the wider contribution to mitigating the effects of the crisis and helping to maintain the dignity, resilience, and stability of Palestine refugees.

**COVID-19 response:** There were 3.6 million cases of coronavirus in UNRWA's fields of operation with 33,414 deaths (UNRWA Strategic plan 23-28). Only five evaluations of the fourteen reviewed offered insights into whether and how COVID -19 impacted the ability of UNRWA to deliver its objectives: the MTS evaluation (2021), MADAD III mid-term evaluation, and UNRWA's three internal real-time evaluations of the COVID-19 response. The evaluations found that some achievements of results targets were negatively impacted by COVID -19, but UNRWA was seen to adapt very quickly to COVID -19 restrictions across its programmes with its swift ability to switch to telemedicine and online education provision particularly applauded. The mid-term evaluations of MADAD III reported that health programme switched to telemedicine to reduce the number of people visiting its health centres, it set up hotlines within days, trained staff and established Standard Operating Procedures for telemedicine. Further, GBV case management services were adapted to the COVID -19 operational context, to enable remote GBV case management including operating hotlines to receive GBV cases and disseminating information through social media, text messages, and public TV channel. Emergency Social Workers conducting outreach activities including awareness sessions to children and parents on protection issues shifted their activities to online platforms (e.g., WhatsApp, Facebook) and phone calls, in addition to sending messages over social media and SMS. Psychosocial support (PSS) sessions were carried out using hotlines and social media. The MTS evaluation reported that when schools closed in March 2020, school counsellors worked with teachers and principals to set up virtual support groups for students and provide individual counselling. UNRWA was able to provide individual counselling to almost 16,000 students in 2020, compared with around 11,000 in 2019. The evaluation went on to report that in Lebanon, given the level of over-crowding in camps, UNRWA partnered with an NGO to turn vocational training centres into isolation centres for asymptomatic COVID-19 patients. The real-time evaluation of the COVID-19 response in Jordan praised the Jordan Field Office for scaling up aggressively and working in partnerships to contribute to delivery of results.

#### **Challenges identified in evaluations of UNRWA meeting objectives / delivering results.**

In summary, the main challenges for UNRWA in delivering results, as identified in the evaluations reviewed, are as follows:

- **Funding Constraints:** The lack of funding to invest in operations reported in evaluations is hampering the agency severely in several areas, including environmental sustainability, maintaining facilities (schools, health centres, office premises), and the quantity of assistance that UNRWA can provide, particularly to the poorest and most vulnerable.
- **Staff Reductions:** UNRWA has cut almost a thousand frontline staff between 2016 and 2020, which has implications for the quality of assistance that they can provide.
- **Service Quality:** Issues regarding the number of toilets within schools and the drop-out rates amongst PRS students remain a concern, and service quality proxy indicators such as the proportion of classes exceeding the threshold of 40 children or more show a persistent trend.

- **Coordination Challenges:** Enhanced coordination between UNRWA and other humanitarian actors is needed, along with ensuring access to services for hard to reach and vulnerable populations and promoting longer-term sustainability and self-reliance for Palestine refugees.
- **Emergency Response:** Year-on-year austerity measures have led to significant reductions in resources available to ensure readiness and support to Palestine refugee needs, resulting in inadequate stocking of emergency supplies and non-food items.

**SO1:** The evaluation of the MTS (2021) found that Palestine refugees identified a reduction in service quality and the lack of funding to invest in operations is hampering the Agency severely in several areas, including environmental sustainability and maintaining facilities (schools, health centres, office premises). The evaluation of the Protection Audit Mechanism (2021) identified a persistent issue regarding the number of toilets within schools and UNRWA's low standards compared to international standards: in 2021, UNRWA design standards required a ratio of 1 toilet unit per class section, and class sizes can be up to 50 students, whilst WHO standards are a ratio of 1 toilet to 25 students.

**SO2:** The MTS Evaluation reported that the Agency cut almost a thousand frontline staff between 2016 and 2020. In Gaza, UNRWA only has one doctor per 10,000 refugees so they have to triage patients to prioritise the most critical cases. The MTS set a target for each doctor to spend five minutes with each patient, but this has been reduced during the strategy implementation period. The current target for the end of the MTS period is 3.5 minutes, which has implications for the quality of care that they can provide.

**SO3:** MADAD evaluations show that drop-out rates amongst PRS students remain a concern and have been impacted by COVID despite various enrolment efforts from UNRWA. High transport costs, unemployment of family members, and onward movement were all cited as drivers of drop-out rates, which can enhance students' protection risks. Across all five fields of operations: service quality proxy indicators such as the proportion of classes exceeding the threshold of 40 children or more show a persistent trend in 2022 more than 44 per cent of classes exceeded the threshold (an increase from 38.8 per cent in 2016).

**SO5:** The evaluation of the MTS (2021) found that the chronic funding shortfalls are having an impact on the quantity of assistance that UNRWA can provide, particularly to the poorest and most vulnerable, with long waiting lists for UNRWA assistance and even those able to receive cash assistance have found this insufficient to meet their needs. MADAD evaluations found that the cash assistance beneficiaries receive is not sufficient to meet all their basic needs or reduce economic vulnerability. However, emergency cash and winterization assistance are both helpful in bridging gaps in cash assistance. Differences exist in the sufficiency of cash for households with one eligible beneficiary versus those with several. In Lebanon specifically, with the devaluation of the Lebanese Pound against the US dollar, interviewees were very dissatisfied and argued that food assistance would be more valuable than cash. The evaluation of the transition to the E-Card suggested that debates should be had on the trade-off between quantity and quality – whether more meaningful assistance to fewer people or less meaningful assistance to the same or more people.

The MADAD evaluations identified several challenges such as the need for enhanced coordination between UNRWA and other humanitarian actors, the need to ensure access to services for hard to reach and vulnerable populations and the need to promote longer term sustainability and self-reliance for Palestine refugees. Reducing the vulnerability of PRS was not always achieved due to constraints on access to employment, high cost of living and worsening socio-economic conditions.

#### **Emergency response**

The 2021 evaluation of the emergency response to the Gaza Israel crisis found that year-on-year austerity measures led to significant reductions in resources available to ensure readiness and support to IDP needs, the GFO had to eliminate all school guard positions, repair and maintenance activities of facilities were deferred, as well as the maintenance of emergency stocks of NFIs. As a result, the field's Designated Emergency Shelter (DES) and non-food item (NFI) stores were not adequately stocked and ready to meet the needs of IDPs as envisaged in the field's emergency response plans.

#### **MI 9.1 Evidence confidence**

**Medium**

The evaluative evidence provided a credible complement to UNRWA's corporate results but did not provide complete coverage of the entirety of UNRWA's objectives and planned results (only 14 evaluations were provided to the team). As such, an assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of development results (KPIs 9-11) based on a relatively small sample of evaluations will always be incomplete. Assessment of the delivery of CMM protection indicators is constrained by issues with reporting indicators, including the suspension of key indicators of the CMM.

MI 9.2: Interventions assessed as having helped improve gender equality and women's empowerment	Score
MI rating	Satisfactory
MI score	3
<b>4. Highly satisfactory:</b> Interventions achieve all or nearly all of their stated gender equality objectives	
<b>3. Satisfactory:</b> Interventions achieve a majority (more than 50 per cent) of their stated gender objectives	
<b>2. Unsatisfactory:</b> Interventions either lack gender equality objectives or achieve less than half of their stated gender equality objectives. (Note: where a programme or activity is clearly gender-focused (maternal health programming for example) achievement of more than half its stated objectives warrants a rating of satisfactory)	
<b>1. Highly unsatisfactory:</b> Interventions are unlikely to contribute to gender equality or may in fact lead to increases in gender inequalities	
MI 9.2 Analysis	Evidence documents
<p>UNRWA has made efforts to promote gender equality and women's empowerment through its policies and programs. To underpin UNRWA's objectives of gender equality and women's empowerment both in its organisational operations and the interventions it delivers, it has adopted a Gender Equality Policy and Strategy, implemented a mandatory gender awareness e-learning course, and committed to increasing the number of women in management positions. In terms of helping improve gender equality for women Palestine refugees, the organisation has provided assistance to survivors of gender-based violence (referred cases to external service providers when necessary), and mainstreamed gender, GBV, and child protection interventions in its emergency response.</p> <p><b>Evidence of achievements in gender equality and women's empowerment drawn from UNRWA's corporate reporting</b></p> <p>The Agency's commitment to SDG 5 on the promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment is enshrined in its Gender Equality Policy (2007) and Gender Equality Strategy 2016-22 that continue to be implemented in tandem with the MTS 2016-22, and Strategy 2023-28. In UNRWA's self-report for the Grand Bargain 2022, the Agency's advancement on the implementation of the Gender Equality Strategy continued to be limited due to a scarcity of resources and staff vacancies. The Agency did report progress on the strategy's implementation through individual field office gender action plans and field-level activities, including capacity building, including trainings, for frontline workers; increased participation and engagement in Inter-Agency working groups; strengthening of internal and external referral mechanisms; and targeted outreach and awareness-raising.</p> <p>While UNRWA's 2016-2022 Gender Equality Strategy includes a results matrix with indicators to track progress, annual updates to the strategy do not report on these indicators. Moreover, a gender marker that was established to track the extent to which Programme Budget resources contribute to gender equality has not been applied between 2018 and 2022, and the 2016-2021 MTS Common Monitoring Matrix lacks a specific high-level result relating to gender equality. The Strategic Plan 2023-2028 has a high level result on gender and this demonstrates organizational progress.</p> <p>The Agency reports that it implements gender-sensitive programming, including the incorporation of a gender perspective in regard to the rehabilitation of shelters, schools and health centres, the involvement of men in pre-conception care and family planning, addressing the dropout of girls and boys from basic education and the promotion of female economic participation through the extension of microfinance loans for women and the introduction of new TVET courses on subjects more attractive to female participants. During the reporting period of the 2022 AOR, UNRWA also provided temporary cash-for-work (CfW) opportunities to 15,453 Palestine refugees, including 5,006 women.</p> <p><b>In relation to gender-based violence, UNRWA continues to implement the multisectoral approach to responding to and preventing GBV,</b> ensuring survivors are referred to the Agency's assistance programmes, including food and cash assistance, education, health, legal counselling, and psychosocial support. When UNRWA is unable to provide the required assistance in legal counselling and psychosocial support, it refers the case to an external service provider while ensuring follow up. According to UNRWA's corporate results reporting, in 2021, the Agency assisted 3,999 identified survivors of GBV (3,563 female; 436 male), including 22 persons with disabilities, through the extension of medical, including psychosocial counselling, legal, food and cash assistance. For 2022 only 2,752 survivors of GBV were reported in the AOR 2022 as receiving assistance with counselling support all of whom were in the Gaza Strip, with 0 reported as receiving legal advice /social intervention.</p>	10-14, 107, 110, 132-135, 137-142, 171, 174, 186, 277-279, 282, 286, 288, 294, 315, 386, 420.

Participation in 16 Days of Activism included over 80 field-level activities including awareness-raising sessions delivered across Agency installations, activities aimed to shift the narrative and stigma facing GBV survivors, activities to engage community members, and targeted sessions for vulnerable women at high risk of GBV including:

(i) information sessions on GBV for teachers and students in UNRWA schools; (ii) psychological support for women in the community; (iii) social media campaigns; (iv) video screenings and performances followed by group discussions; (v) awareness-raising sessions; (vi) initiatives to equip youth groups to lead community advocacy campaigns; and (vii) information on preventing and combating domestic violence

In 2021, UNRWA launched a one-year cross-departmental GBV project consisting of three main components: (i) GBV training, focused on transforming attitudes and norms; (ii) strengthening programmes through referral mapping and training; and (iii) research concerning the perceptions of GBV across Palestine refugee communities.

Protection Alignment Reviews (PAR) undertaken by UNRWA explore gender mainstreaming gaps, including safety concerns for girls and boys, gender-related access barriers, and the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse. The physical accessibility of schools has improved and enhanced safety measures have been introduced, including specific gender-related requirements, including the separation of lower grades from upper grades and the construction of internal toilets. The percentage of UNRWA schools meeting protection design standards increased from 23 per cent in 2016 to 49.32 per cent by the end of 2021, against a 2021 target of 49.54. UNRWA design standards currently require a ratio of 1 toilet unit per class section, and class sizes can be up to 50 students, whilst WHO standards are a ratio of 1 toilet to 25 students (Evaluation of the Protection Audit Mechanism - 2021, p. 36).

UNRWA reports that the mandatory gender awareness e-learning course, launched in 2020, was completed by over a third of staff Agency-wide, of which 40 per cent are male and 60 per cent female. The institutional arrangements as measured by the UN SWAP 2.0 performance framework indicate that the foundational drivers for the achievement of gender and empowerment objectives appear to be lacking in UNRWA, according to its UN SWAP submission (2021), **only 8 performance indicators out of 16 applicable** were met (or exceeded).

#### **Evidence of gender and women's empowerment results achievements drawn from independent external evaluations**

Fourteen evaluations were supplied to the assessment team and reviewed (5 decentralised evaluations, 9 centralised evaluations including 3 centralised RTEs on COVID-19 response), of these only 5 of the evaluations reported specifically on gender results. **There are areas where UNRWA needs to improve its efforts to promote gender equality, according to the evaluations reviewed.** The MTS evaluation found that while UNRWA had performed well against UN indicators on gender equality and had mainstreamed gender into its programs, it lacked dedicated gender mainstreaming staff in most field offices. Additionally, some programs lacked a broader consideration of gender issues facing PRS, and the MADAD III project was not based on any gender analyses. The Evaluation of the Family Health Team Reform found that while there had been a focus on gender in the health program, the family health team approach had not been provided with sufficient resources to implement services consistently, and the approach needed stronger gender and vulnerability analysis.

**The MTS evaluation focused on three specific cross-cutting issues: gender, youth, and the inclusion of persons with disabilities.** It found that UNRWA has performed well against UN indicators on gender equality, it has adopted an action plan on gender parity in its workforce and committed to increasing the number of women in management positions. However, the evaluation reported a lack of dedicated gender mainstreaming staff with only the Gaza Strip and Jordan field offices have gender mainstreaming officers. The main coordination mechanism for gender mainstreaming is the Gender Task Force, comprising 70 Gender Focal Points from various field offices and programmes. The evaluation found that UNRWA has mainstreamed gender into its programmes and strengthened staff capacity on gender and GBV, with certain programmes, such as the SSNP, ICIP and microfinance, prioritizing assistance to women and women-headed households. The evaluation reported that in 2019, 16,052 women accessed loans through the microfinance programme in four areas of operations (Gaza, West Bank, Jordan, and Syria) which represented 83 per cent of the target. UNRWA has also promoted gender-sensitive health services and one priority has been to include men in pre-conception care and family planning. In education, UNRWA has focused on the gender dimensions of school dropouts, noting that male students have higher drop-out rates.

**The MADAD evaluations** found that the cross-cutting issues of protection, disability, and gender in terms of GBV were well integrated into programme design, although the programme design lacks a broader consideration of gender issues facing PRS. Under MADAD 1 "Maintaining the Resilience of Palestine Refugees from Syria in Jordan

and Lebanon”, the evaluation found the interventions were strong in community engagement and women in the camps highlighted their increased capacity to identify and address protection risks (including identification of children not attending school due to early marriage). The midterm evaluation of MADAD III found that the project was not based on any gender analyses but relied solely on UNRWA’s gender mainstreaming policies and commitment to equitable service provision. Additionally, there are no gender-specific results in the MADAD III results framework. Gender was primarily addressed in relation to GBV and through the lens of protection. In both fields, RSS social workers and Protection Units had a strong focus on support to GBV survivors. Furthermore, under the cash assistance component, priority for emergency cash assistance requests was given to female-headed households.

**The Evaluation of the Family Health Team Reform (2021)** found that whilst there has been a concerted focus on gender (the health programme has focused on priority issues including maternal and child health care, family planning, increasing breast screenings, improving men’s participation in pre-conception care, school health, disability inclusion), the family health team approach has not been provided with sufficient resources to implement these services consistently and the approach needs to be underpinned by stronger gender and vulnerability analysis to fully meet the needs of groups accessing these services.

**The Evaluation of the Protection Audit Mechanism 2021** set out how for a woman to register for prenatal services at UNRWA clinics, she currently must be married and state the name of her husband (on the e-health system). This has meant that unmarried pregnant women have not been able to access vital prenatal and neonatal health services. Interviews conducted as part of this assessment confirm that this policy position has changed but is not widely understood by all UNRWA staff or partners. In a similar vein, UNRWA registration is conducted by household rather than individual. For a woman, registration is generally linked to her father until she is married and then it is linked to the husband’s registration. If they divorce, she goes back under the registration of the father and there is no category for a woman living alone. If a female beneficiary lives apart from the registered household, it can be more difficult for her to access UNRWA services.

**The responses to the MOPAN survey were favourable** with 64 per cent agreeing or strongly agreeing that UNRWA’s programmes and services promote gender equality. Overall, while UNRWA has made some efforts to promote gender equality through its work, there is still room for improvement in meeting the objectives set in the Gender Strategy.

#### MI 9.2 Evidence confidence

Medium

UNRWA does not incorporate gender into the high-level results level of its MTS 2016-22. However, for the new strategy 23-28, of the 135 key performance indicators 11 indicators are women specific.

#### MI 9.3: Interventions assessed as having helped improve environmental sustainability/tackle the effects of climate change

Score

##### MI rating

Unsatisfactory

##### MI score

2

**4. Highly satisfactory:** Interventions include substantial planned activities and project design criteria to achieve environmental sustainability and contribute to tackle the effects of climate change. These plans are implemented successfully and the results are environmentally sustainable and contribute to tackling the effects of climate change

**3. Satisfactory:** Interventions include some planned activities and project design criteria to ensure environmental sustainability and help tackle climate change. Activities are implemented successfully and the results are environmentally sustainable and contribute to tackling the effects of climate change

**2. Unsatisfactory:** EITHER Interventions do not include planned activities or project design criteria intended to promote environmental sustainability and help tackle the effects of climate change. There is, however, no direct indication that project or programme results are not environmentally sustainable. AND/OR The intervention includes planned activities or project

**1. Highly unsatisfactory:** Interventions do not include planned activities or project design criteria intended to promote environmental sustainability and help tackle climate change. In addition changes resulting from interventions are not environmentally sustainable/do not contribute to tackling climate change.

#### MI 9.3 Analysis

Evidence documents

**Despite a commitment in the MTS 2016-22:** “In light of the increasing global concern over climate change, UNRWA will assist and coordinate with others who undertake work on climate change and its impact on refugee

10-14, 57, 130, 132-135, 134, 134, 137-142,



populations. The Agency is committed to achieving tangible and measurable results in these areas in the strategic period”, **this has not been delivered primarily due to a lack of funding.** The agency has undertaken some initiatives with respect to environmental sustainability and tackling climate change, including energy saving initiatives in camps and its premises, reduction of waste and water usage, and promotion of environmental awareness in schools. However, there is significant room for improvement in UNRWA’s interventions to include planned activities and project design criteria to achieve environmental sustainability and tackle the effects of climate change. There was very little evaluative evidence or corporate results of the agency’s performance in this area, out of the 14 evaluations reviewed (consisting of 5 decentralised evaluations and 9 centralised evaluations and 3 centralised real-time evaluations of the agency’s COVID-19 response), only one explicitly reports on UNRWA’s work on environmental programming.

171, 174, 186,  
277-279, 282,  
287, 288, 294,  
315, 386, 417,  
419

#### **Evidence from UNRWA’s corporate reporting**

According to UNRWA’s own 2022 corporate results reporting some results have been delivered that promote environmental sustainability:

- The Agency took a series of practical steps to reduce its carbon footprint. All field offices continued to replace fluorescent lighting with light emitting diode fittings, which lowered electricity consumption by 54,957 kilowatt hours (kWh) and reduced carbon dioxide emissions by 35 tonnes. Through project funding, installations were also renovated to incorporate energy saving measures. Solar panels were installed onto 11 health centres in Jordan and Syria, ten schools in Jordan, Syria and the West Bank, several Agency installations in two camps in the Gaza Strip and one camp, Lebanon, to ensure the continued operation of water pumps. UNRWA also signed MoUs with two partners to generate solar electricity for five schools in the West Bank. Three of these schools will also be equipped with solar powered water purification systems.
- In 2022, the Agency took proactive measures to reduce waste generated by its operations. Paper waste was reduced in all fields, with 5,797 kg of paper recycled in Jordan and 16,200 kg of paper and 1,800 kg of plastic waste recycled in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, an agreement was signed with a local company to begin paper recycling from UNRWA installations in East Jerusalem. In addition, medical waste from all Agency health centres continued to be collected and disposed of in accordance with host country and WHO guidance.
- In 2022, the Agency sought to minimize water usage by: (i) incorporating grey water harvesting systems into renovated schools in the Gaza Strip, Jordan, and Lebanon; and (ii) upgrading water networks to reduce water loss caused by leakages.
- Utilizing its extensive presence in all 58 official refugee camps, UNRWA promoted environmental awareness and sustainability measures among Palestine refugee communities. In 2022, in Syria, gardening and tree planting activities were implemented in schools in three camps, whilst cleaning and recycling campaigns were also conducted in Agency schools in Damascus and rural Damascus. In Jordan, Earth Day was celebrated through a drawing competition in 80 UNRWA schools, with 859 students participating.

#### **Evidence from independent evaluations:**

**The MTS Evaluation 2021 found that a lack of adequate funding had left UNRWA unable to invest in environmentally friendly technology** such as solar panels or green vehicles to transport area staff (although the Jordan field office has secured funding for a photovoltaic plant). Out of the 14 evaluations reviewed this was the only one explicitly reporting on UNRWA’s work on environmental programming. This weak coverage of environmental sustainability in evaluations, reflects a lack of systematic assessments of how UNRWA’s interventions contribute to environmental sustainability. The 2016 Evaluation Policy did not place a necessity to assess environmental sustainability in evaluations conducted, however, the new 2022 evaluation policy does require the evaluation function to assess environmental sustainability in evaluation activities and assess alignment with the principles of UNRWA’s Environmental Sustainability Policy.

In response to the MOPAN survey only 37 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that UNRWA’s programmes and services consider environmental sustainability (noting that 25 per cent stated they did not know).

UNRWA’s environmental sustainability policy (2022) reflects the commitments, principles, implementation accountabilities and structures for environmental sustainability that will allow the Agency to achieve tangible and measurable results during the 2023-28 strategic period. There is no evidence to suggest that changes resulting from interventions are **not** environmentally sustainable/do **not** contribute to tackling climate change. Therefore, the assessment scores this indicator as unsatisfactory rather than highly unsatisfactory.



<b>MI 9.3 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Low</b>
ESCC is not well covered by the evaluative evidence. Therefore, this MI relies substantially on internal management results reporting which, in general, tend to be more positive than independent external evaluations.	
<b>MI 9.4: Interventions assessed as having helped improve human rights, including the protection of vulnerable people (those at risk of being left behind)</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>4. Highly satisfactory:</b> Interventions include substantial planned activities and project design criteria to promote or ensure human rights and reach those most at risk of being left behind. These plans are implemented successfully and the results have helped promote or ensure human rights demonstrating results for the most vulnerable groups.	
<b>3. Satisfactory:</b> Interventions include some planned activities and project design criteria to promote or ensure human rights. These activities are implemented successfully and the results have promoted or ensured human rights.	
<b>2. Unsatisfactory:</b> EITHER Interventions do not include planned activities or project design criteria intended to promote or ensure human rights or demonstrate their reach to vulnerable groups. There is, however, no direct indication that project or programme results will not promote or ensure human rights, AND/OR The intervention includes planned activities or project design criteria intended to promote or ensure human rights but these have not been implemented and/or have not been successful	
<b>1. Highly unsatisfactory:</b> Interventions do not include planned activities or project design criteria intended to promote or ensure human rights. In addition, changes resulting from interventions do not promote or ensure human rights. Interventions do not focus on reaching vulnerable groups.	
<b>MI 9.4 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
<p><b>Evidence from UNRWA's corporate reporting:</b></p> <p><b>Economic, social, and cultural human rights and Leave no one behind</b></p> <p>Protection, based on the enjoyment of human rights, is part of the UNRWA's core mandate. UNRWA provides basic needs and essential services to 6.5 million Palestine refugees across 5 fields of operation all of which deliver development objectives that uphold the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): rights to education (702 schools providing education for 544,710 pupils), right to health (140 health care facilities serving 1.9 million people), decent standard of living (cash and food assistance supplied to more than two million Palestine refugees, 68 camps with 4000 homes rehabilitated), and work (job creation, vocational and teacher training, and microfinance initiatives which issued over 200,000 loans (2016-2021).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNRWA provides universal primary healthcare and education to Palestine refugees across its five fields of operation but also tries to support the poorest and most vulnerable groups thus delivering results and upholding rights set in the UDHR Article 26 (right to education) and Article 25 (right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services).</li> <li>• UNRWA has an inclusive education policy based on a human rights-based approach to education and on appreciating the diversity of learners. The inclusive education strategy outlines its approach to providing additional support to children vulnerable to marginalization and exclusion and also to developing systems to respond to children with extensive needs.</li> <li>• UNRWA provides students with an education that enshrines a human rights culture, seeking to embed tolerance in social and political contexts where children are exposed to conflict and violence. UNRWA schools integrate human rights into the teaching of Arabic, Islamic studies, and social science as part of the Agency's effort to promote non-violence, healthy communication skills and conflict resolution.</li> <li>• The health programme supports the most vulnerable refugees to access secondary and tertiary care through contracts with hospitals or by covering a high proportion of the cost of care at public, non-governmental and private healthcare facilities (Article 25).</li> <li>• UNRWA's SSNP provides cash assistance to the abject poor (using a proxy-means testing formula to identify these) and the most vulnerable (as well as in-kind food assistance in the Gaza Strip through both the SSNP and the emergency programme), (Article 22).</li> <li>• UNRWA's strategic outcome to increase livelihood opportunities helps to uphold Article 23: the right to work. This is primarily delivered through provision of inclusive financial services, training, and camp</li> </ul>	

8, 10-15, 23,  
102, 132-135,  
137-142, 171,  
174, 186, 277-  
279, 282, 288,  
294, 315, 386


improvement works. According to UNRWA's Annual Operational Report (2022), between 2016 and 2022, UNRWA provided inclusive financial services that helped create and sustain jobs, decrease unemployment, and reduce poverty for Palestine refugees and other proximate poor and marginal groups. During this period, the Agency disbursed USD 218,956,122 in microfinance loans to a total of 234,482 clients. Over the 2016-22 MTS period, 32,144 young Palestine refugees graduated from UNRWA's eight VTCs, FESA and ESF, with the knowledge and skills to secure employment. 2022 Employment rates of graduates from VTC, FESA and ESF vary from 72 per cent to 91 per cent with improvements only seen for FESA female graduates over the period 2016-21.

### Civil and political rights

UNRWA reports that it has implemented the following activities to protect and promote civil and political rights in the following ways:

- Advocacy for the rights of Palestine refugees under international law, during the assessment period key concerns around protection and compliance with international law were raised through targeted interventions with duty bearers and other external stakeholders and active engagement with UN international human rights mechanisms.
- Monitoring which involves efforts to gather objective information on possible rights violations, threats, and vulnerabilities. This information is then used to inform advocacy targeting duty bearers, but also facilitates other aspects of UNRWA's humanitarian response, including protection mainstreaming.
- The Agency's CMM includes an indicator to track the number of advocacy interventions it undertakes engaging with host governments, civil society and other UN entities on these issues to secure preventative and remedial action, and this is reported in Annual Operational Reports, the number of advocacy interventions by the Agency has increased over the assessment period from 480 in 2018, 809 interventions in 2021 and 642 in 2020, culminating in 882 in 2022.
- The agency has established an indicator of its success in its advocacy effort for the West Bank and Jordan: percentage of UNRWA interventions on protection issues that prompt a positive response from authorities, and as can be seen in the chart below taken from UNRWA's on-line statistics bulletin there has been an upward trend over the assessment period rising from 24 per cent in 2018 to 63 per cent in 2021.
- On SDG 17, UNRWA engaged with host governments, other UN entities and civil society to promote compliance with international law.

**Figure 14: Percentage of UNRWA interventions prompting positive response from authorities**



Source: UNRWA Statistics bulletin

### Evidence from independent evaluations:

Evaluations confirm that projects have successfully delivered on protection outcomes, despite (as reported by the Evaluation of the MTS 2016-2022) total spending on protection and human rights declining from USD 30 million in 2016 to USD 8 million in 2020 (a decrease of 74 per cent).

**MADAD project evaluations:** MADAD projects have been the primary donor funded programme to address protection concerns (in addition to basic services in education, health, cash assistance) of Palestine Refugees from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon and Jordan. The evaluations conducted to date of MADAD confirm that in Jordan and Lebanon UNRWA has provided protection services to all PRS – encompassing GBV and child protection, and

that capacity to deal with protection cases increased under MADAD. Protection activities implemented via the MADAD projects included outreach activities, awareness sessions for parents on protection issues including early marriage, GBV, and legal issues as well as addressing concerns regarding civil registration and de-nationalisation. MADAD evaluations found that the protection emergency cash, albeit small scale, was most valued by beneficiaries. Emergency cash assistance was provided to families who had experienced major shock or calamity that significantly affects their economic situation at USD 200 per family (it can be more depending on the needs of beneficiaries and the challenges they face, such as arrest or deportation). Emergency cash assistance increased from 500 to 700 families in 2020 to support beneficiaries against the ramifications of the COVID-19 crisis. The agility of the emergency protection cash assistance was recognised as the intervention continued to run smoothly despite significant changes in the Lebanese context which have increased the needs of both the PRS and PRL population. The Protection Unit has been able to adapt the amounts of cash, identify and respond to new shocks and work closely with other UNRWA departments to ensure that needs are met.

The provision of legal support to PRS under MADAD III in JFO is highly relevant as PRS in Jordan who do not have Jordanian nationality are at risk of arrest, detention and/or forced return due to their irregular legal status. However, protection cases involving PRS without legal residency status are more complex and render the Agency more constrained in its capacity to assist, additionally COVID-19 further limited progress of the legal aid provision.

**Evaluation of Child and Family Protection Services:** Another key project addressing protection has been the child and family protection project which was evaluated as positively influencing the social workers' approach to their work and provided children, women, and persons with disabilities with broadened access to protection sensitive social services. The project's logic of intervention was embedded in a protection approach which prioritised case management among other possible child protection strategies in which the protection needs of children are addressed in their respective family environment.

**Evaluation of Agency MTS 2016-2022:** As the above-mentioned evaluations found, protection remains highly dependent on project funding and the MTS Evaluation identified that the lack of funding impacted UNRWA's activities, relying on project funding and secondments from donors and other organisations to undertake protection work because of a lack of RB funding for protection staff. The evaluation reported that it has also been challenging to mainstream protection when the protection division is separate to the programme departments, providing advice on mainstreaming protection, but not able to hold programme staff accountable for contributing to Strategic Outcome 1.

According to the respondents to the MOPAN survey 79 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that UNRWA's programmes and services promote the protection of Palestine refugee rights. The majority of respondents (76 per cent) also agreed or strongly agreed that UNRWA was reaching Palestine refugees in the greatest need.

### **Persons with disabilities**

**UNRWA addresses disability inclusion from a rights-based perspective, focused on the four principles of accessibility, participation, awareness, and non-discrimination.** To this end, the Agency pursues a twin-track approach to disability inclusion consisting of targeting and mainstreaming. UNRWA put in place a policy on promoting the rights of persons with disabilities in 2010 (updated in 2022), followed by a strategy in 2011, in 2017, it issued guidelines on disability inclusion. However, in response to the MOPAN survey only 45 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that UNRWA's programmes and services are inclusive of persons with disabilities.

### **Evidence from UNRWA's corporate reporting:**

According to UNRWA's corporate results reporting, the rights of Palestine refugees with disabilities and their access to and inclusion in UNRWA service provision is promoted, including through the provision of assistive devices and the renovation of UNRWA installations to ensure compliance with accessibility standards. During 2022, UNRWA reached 7,439 Palestine refugees with disabilities (3,926 female and 3,513 male) either through direct service provision or indirectly, in partnership with community-based rehabilitation centres and NGOs. Through these partnerships, those in need benefitted from rehabilitation services, such as education, speech and physical therapy to children with specific impairments (sensory, intellectual, and cerebral palsy), and awareness-raising sessions to reduce stigma and improve social inclusion of adults and children with disabilities at the community and household levels. Within the Agency's education programme, 56 per cent of students identified as having a disability received support during the 2021/22 academic year, representing a total of 7,964 students with disabilities (4,038 girls and 3,926 boys).

According to UNRWA's 2022 results reporting, the Agency designed and implemented a new system of quarterly integrated assessments of UNRWA installations, the assessments determined that only 30 per cent of Agency installations were fully accessible to persons with disabilities, 81 per cent had sufficiently wide doorways and corridors and 81 per cent had accessible toilets.

In 2022, UNRWA completed its third cycle of reporting against 15 UNDIS indicators, meeting the requirement of one indicator on accessibility. The Agency reported that it was 'approaching requirement' in relation to 11 indicators, an increase from ten in 2021. Two indicators were reported as 'missing requirement', these relate to consultation with persons with disabilities and procurement; this was an improvement from four 'missing requirement' indicators in the previous year.

#### Independent evaluation evidence:

**Evaluation evidence on meeting the needs of persons with disabilities has been mixed but with a common theme of UNRWA needing to improve accessibility to its services.**

**According to the Evaluation of the MTS 2016-21 a lack of funding has hampered the Agency's efforts to ensure that all its facilities are accessible**. UNRWA has a framework in place and addresses the needs of persons with disabilities in a variety of ways but is constrained by a lack of funding. The MTS evaluation commended UNRWA in its 2019 performance against 15 indicators in the UN Disability Inclusion Strategy for its ability to address the needs of persons with disabilities, particularly compared to other agencies providing humanitarian assistance.

**The Evaluation of the Protection Audit Mechanism (2021)** found that meaningful access received a score of 36 per cent with concerns about access to installations for persons with disabilities, although positive efforts were made for new constructions and the development of Technical Instructions. The evaluation also stated that toilets in UNRWA schools should better reflect global safety and dignity standards (i.e. location and number of toilets, with the MTS Evaluation recommending that if it is adequately resourced, UNRWA should invest in ensuring its facilities are accessible to persons with disabilities.

**The MADAD evaluations** found that accessibility of health services has been an issue, with beneficiaries with disabilities finding it harder to access sufficient care, and transport costs making access to healthcare services challenging for some beneficiaries. Despite UNRWA's efforts to include 'hard-to-reach' populations, children with disabilities and those without the means to secure the needed infrastructure were not able to benefit from the remote learning opportunities.

**An evaluation of an UNRWA project to support training of teachers and teaching of French in UNRWA schools (2022)** found that respondents did not consider teaching techniques adequate to meet needs of children with special educational needs. In the Gaza Strip, UNRWA had to cut teaching assistant posts even though they supported students with disabilities (Evaluation MTS 2021). COVID-19-related restrictions not only affected Palestine refugees with disabilities disproportionately but also posed operational challenges for UNRWA.

#### Youth

**Despite the 2016–22 MTS's recognition of the importance of meeting the specific needs of Palestine youth, the evaluation of the MTS 2016-2022 found that UNRWA had limited activities for doing this**, only the TVET programme to support employment opportunities for youth across its fields of operation and, to a small extent, the microfinance programme. The evaluation suggests that UNRWA needs a vision for how to engage with youth as agents for change. UNRWA's recent consultations with Youth Parliaments could provide the basis for a way forward. In response to the MOPAN survey only 58 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that UNRWA's programmes and services address the needs of youth.

#### MI 9.4 Evidence confidence

Medium

#### MI 9.5: Interventions assessed as having helped improve any other cross-cutting issue

Score

#### MI rating

NA

#### MI score

NA

**4. Highly satisfactory:** Interventions include substantial planned activities and project design criteria to promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue. These plans are implemented successfully and the results have helped promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue.

**3. Satisfactory:** Interventions include some planned activities and project design criteria to promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue. These activities are implemented successfully and the results have promoted or

ensured any other cross-cutting issue.	
<b>2. Unsatisfactory:</b> EITHER Interventions do not include planned activities or project design criteria intended to promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue. There is, however, no direct indication that project or programme results will not promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue, AND/OR Intervention include planned activities or project design criteria intended to promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue but these have not been implemented and/or been successful	
<b>1. Highly unsatisfactory:</b> Interventions do not include planned activities or project design criteria intended to promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue. In addition changes resulting from interventions do not promote or ensure any other cross-cutting issue.	
<b>MI 9.5 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
This assessment considered MI 9.5 with KPI 9.4 due to the synergies between these two areas of UNRWA's activities.	
<b>MI 9.5 Evidence confidence</b>	
<b>KPI 10: Interventions are relevant to the needs and priorities of partner countries and beneficiaries, as the organisation works towards results in areas within its mandate</b>	<b>KPI score</b>
<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>3</b>
<p>The analysis of evaluations conducted by the assessment team reviewed a total of 14 evaluations, consisting of: 5 decentralised evaluations and 9 centralised evaluations including 3 centralised real-time evaluations of the agency's COVID-19 response. UNRWA's corporate reports and information were also assessed.</p> <p><b>Overall, UNRWA's interventions have been externally evaluated as relevant and as responding to the needs of Palestine refugees.</b> Evaluations found that UNRWA was very effective in adjusting its approaches during COVID-19 in order to respond to beneficiaries' needs under these changed conditions. Strategic Outcomes are framed sufficiently broadly that the remain applicable across the very different and changing contexts in UNRWA's fields of operation. However, the ability to respond fully to needs is limited by funding constraints: particularly as needs have increased as a result of population growth, higher poverty levels in the Gaza Strip, the economic crisis in Lebanon and the impact of COVID-19. The evidence on the use of systematic needs assessments and consultation has been variable. While UNRWA has made efforts to respond to the needs of beneficiaries, there is still room for improvement, especially in promoting participatory programme planning to ensure that assistance responds to refugee needs and that refugees have a say in the decisions that affect their lives.</p>	
<b>MI 10.1: Intervention objectives and design assessed as responding to beneficiaries', global, country, and partner/institution needs, policies, and priorities (inclusiveness, equality and Leave No One Behind), and continuing to do so where circumstances change</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>4. Highly satisfactory:</b> Systematic methods are applied in intervention design (including needs assessment for humanitarian relief operations) to identify target group needs and priorities, including consultation with target groups, and intervention design explicitly responds to the identified needs and priorities	
<b>3. Satisfactory:</b> Interventions are designed to take into account the needs of the target group as identified through a situation or problem analysis (including needs assessment for relief operations) and the resulting activities are designed to meet the needs of the target group	
<b>2. Unsatisfactory:</b> No systematic analysis of target group needs and priorities took place during intervention design or some evident mismatch exists between the intervention's activities and outputs and the needs and priorities of the target groups	
<b>1. Highly unsatisfactory:</b> Substantial elements of the intervention's activities and outputs were unsuited to the needs and priorities of the target group	
<b>MI 10.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
UNRWA adopts a primarily standardised approach to core service delivery across operating contexts, which	10-13, 16, 52, 69, 132-142,

provides limited scope for programmatic prioritisation and adaptation in different fields of operation. In the most part UNRWA's activities are responsive to needs and priorities, 64% of the MOPAN survey respondents agreed somewhat or strongly that UNRWA involves Palestine refugees in the design and delivery of its programmes and services. Of MOPAN Survey respondents, 59 per cent (strongly) agreed or somewhat agreed that UNRWA had effective procedures for complaints and feedback from Palestine refugees, 15 percent did not, whereas 26 per cent did not know/had no opinion.

Meanwhile, evaluation evidence was more critical on the use of systematic needs assessments and felt that the Agency could undertake more meaningful and comprehensive forms of engagement with refugees. There is room for improvement especially in promoting participatory programme planning to ensure that assistance responds to refugee needs and that refugees have a say in the decisions that affect their lives.

**At the strategic level:** A formal system sets out the requirements to consider the needs of beneficiaries from agency wide strategy cascading down to individual project plans. Organisational Directive 21 requires the routine development of medium-term strategies which are based on an analysis of the humanitarian, humanitarian development and protection threats and vulnerabilities of Palestine refugees. The MTS 2016-2022 includes a detailed analysis of needs, as does the subsequent strategy 2023-28. UNRWA's annual operational plans include a summary analysis of major contextual characteristics in each field of operation, phrased as "planning assumptions". The sections of the annual operational reports which cover activities and regular programmes delivered under the Programme Budget also contain detailed context analyses.

**At the project level:** Project procedure manuals require all project concept/development notes to include a section on the background to the project which contains an analysis of context drawing on both primary and secondary data. This is used to inform a subsequent section on the rationale for the given project. Project proposals require an explanation problem analysis, whether affected refugees have been involved in project formulation, requirement to address cross cutting issues included persons with disability and youth. Activities supported through Emergency Appeals, which constituted approximately 30 per cent of UNRWA's overall expenditure in 2022, are underpinned by detailed contextual analyses. **All of the emergency appeals reviewed for this assessment (those for the oPt and the Syria Regional Crisis in 2019, 2020, 2021) were found to contain detailed sections** summarising the major contextual features of each field of operation, an analysis of the key emergency needs of Palestine refugees in each area and identification of how the Agency intends to respond to these.

Camp improvement plans (CIPs) involve participation of the refugee community and the UNRWA Environmental and Social Management Framework sets out requirements and guidance for undertaking stakeholder and community engagement and consultation during such projects, additionally through the CIP process UNRWA further develops its understanding of community needs. ICIP Guidelines no.13 "Participatory design guidelines of UNRWA premises" were in development at the time of the MOPAN assessment, once complete they will be key to ensuring that the design is developed in a participatory manner and that the views of end-users are considered and incorporated into the design of these premises according to feasibility and availability of funding.

UNRWA has a short AAP framework that outlines five guiding principles: information sharing, participatory information gathering, consultation, ensuring the participation of vulnerable groups, and complaints and feedback mechanisms (see KPI 6.7). According to UNRWA's self-reporting (AOR 2022) all fields of UNRWA operations integrate systematic feedback and accountability mechanisms across the programme management cycle via:

- communication campaigns, appeals and complaints mechanisms related to UNRWA SSNP, emergency food and cash distributions,
- the participation of Palestine refugees in the camp improvement processes, points of assistance for refugees supported with shelter rehabilitation: UNRWA staff held 1,173 meetings with camp service committees, 164 women's committees and youth committees to gauge community needs.
- engagement with the UNRWA workforce of just under 28,000 staff, the vast majority of whom are engaged in the direct delivery of assistance and are drawn from the Palestine refugee communities they serve.
- an extensive network to enable feedback and consultation including area offices, camp services offices, schools (including school parliaments and parent-teacher associations), health centres and other installations.
- In 2022, 145,639 individual pieces of feedback and 19,400 complaints were received from beneficiaries pertaining to the delivery of services. The majority of complaints related to the eligibility for, the value of and quality of cash and food assistance.

171, 181, 186,  
190, 277-279,  
282, 288, 315,  
365, 386, 420



### Independent evaluation evidence:

**Evaluation evidence and the views of MOPAN survey respondents were more critical than UNRWA's own reporting on the use of systematic needs assessments and felt that the Agency could undertake more meaningful and comprehensive forms of engagement with refugees.** Only 40 per cent of survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed that UNRWA involves Palestine refugees in the design and delivery of its programmes and services. Further, only 42 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that UNRWA has effective procedures for obtaining complaints or other feedback from Palestine refugees (27 per cent did not know).

**The Evaluation of the MTS** confirmed that for the development of the MTS 2016-2022 UNRWA analysed Palestine refugee needs in a variety of ways (e.g., analysis of data from a human development study on Palestine refugees, graphical visualization of refugee needs) and further that UNRWA also assesses needs for specific programmes on an ongoing basis. The evaluation found that whilst UNRWA staff have a deep understanding of the operational context, it is hard to judge the extent to which conflict or political economy analysis informs key decisions, as there are few explicit references to either. The MTS evaluation goes on to recommend that to better implement its commitment to accountability to affected populations, UNRWA should improve its engagement with Palestine refugees and reflect their voices better by promoting participatory planning to ensure that assistance responds to refugee needs and that refugees have a say in the decisions that affect their lives. This could build on good practice examples such as the development of camp improvement plans. The evaluation reported that needs of refugees are ever growing and a chronic funding crisis during the assessment period has also limited UNRWA's ability to respond to all needs. The MTS evaluation confirmed that the MTS Strategic Outcomes were framed sufficiently broadly that they remained applicable across the very different and changing contexts in UNRWA's fields of operation. However, the ability to respond fully to needs and implementation of the 'Leave No One Behind' agenda is limited by the chronic funding crisis: particularly as needs have increased as a result of population growth, higher poverty levels in the Gaza Strip, the economic crisis in Lebanon and the impact of COVID-19.

**Since UNRWA aims to provide universal health and education services to Palestine refugees, it does not need to conduct humanitarian-style needs assessments. However, it does conduct needs assessments for other programmes,** particularly relief and social services, to help target its assistance to the poorest and those most in need. The MTS evaluation confirmed that as part of the SSNP, UNRWA conducts surveys and assessments to identify those most in need. UNRWA's SSNP provides cash assistance to the abject poor (using a proxy-means testing formula to identify these) and the most vulnerable (as well as in-kind food assistance in the Gaza Strip through both the SSNP and the emergency programme).

**The evaluation of the Family Health Team Reform (2021)** states that the FHT has consistently been relevant to and coherent with UNRWA's strategic goals on health, including addressing the growing burden of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) among the Palestine refugee population. However, the evaluation found that the Agency's engagement with the refugee community in the results-based management cycle is less developed. This same concern was reflected in the evaluation for the **MTS Monitoring and Reporting evaluation (2020)**: despite an MTS commitment to strengthen the framework for accountability to affected populations (AAP), a unified framework for refugee participation within the RBM cycle is not yet elaborated or well-integrated with results monitoring activities. Although fields and programmes are working to advance their approaches to AAP, it is being done quite independently with little collaboration or sharing of experience and learnings.

The **MADAD III mid-term evaluation** confirmed that the project design has remained relevant to the needs of PRS in both Jordan and Lebanon, enabling UNRWA to provide core services to PRS which are highly appropriate and indeed essential for many. However, the evaluation was critical of the implementation and use of needs assessments to inform programme design and targeting which were delayed meaning that UNRWA has been unable to obtain crucial insights on how to tailor its services to the changing needs of the population. The evaluation recommended that UNRWA should ensure that future PRS programming is informed by up-to-date vulnerability assessments and that the targeting mechanisms for the provision of services take these into account, as well as considering what is feasible with the level of funding available. UNRWA should ensure that vulnerability assessments include detailed analysis of needs with regards to disability and a thorough gender analysis, and that these needs, and analysis are then reflected in programme design.

The decentralised **Evaluation of UNRWA Child and Family Protection Services** was positive in its appraisal, finding that the intervention objectives remained relevant even when the context changed with UNRWA remaining flexible and adapted design and delivery model to respond to changing context.

### COVID-19

**According to the Evaluation of the MTS (2021), UNRWA adapted very quickly to COVID-19 restrictions across its programmes.** The health programme switched to telemedicine to reduce the number of people visiting its

health centres. It set up hotlines within days, trained staff and established Standard Operating Procedures for telemedicine. In Lebanon, given the level of over-crowding in camps, UNRWA partnered with an NGO to turn vocational training centres into isolation centres for asymptomatic COVID patients. The education programme quickly switched students to remote education, organising children into classes, revising curricula, and addressing technological issues. Additional learning materials were provided along with physical health services, the development of appropriate guides, as well as the involvement of parents. UNRWA was able to report a slight improvement in its education retention level in 2020, which is an achievement. It continued to provide MHPSS remotely through the education and health programmes, using qualified counsellors and dedicated helplines.

**One challenge with the switch to remote education was that many students lacked access to devices or the internet.** A lack of funding meant that UNRWA was unable to provide devices to the poorest or to assist students with getting internet access. In these cases, it provided students with self-learning materials. Remote education was also a challenge for students with disabilities, including those with learning difficulties. UNRWA supported these students with mentors. Education recovery plans have been developed based on insights generated from Annual Learning tests (ALO) to tackle significant learning loss due to COVID-19.

**The MADAD evaluation found that access to services has been severely affected by the pandemic** and MADAD was significantly behind on achieving its healthcare objectives under MADAD III, with a larger drop in attendance of PRS than PRL at health centres. The only objectives achieved were for provision of PPE and hygiene equipment. However, it is important to note that many of these changes were intentional.

The Grand Bargain Annual Report 2022 -based on self-reporting by UNRWA -highlights the Agency's ability to respond to beneficiary feedback, noting the formalisation of a project in the Gaza Strip which was originally set up during the pandemic to enable telephone access for refugees to health professionals (when face-to-face appointments were not possible due to COVID-19 restrictions). This decision was in direct response to feedback from beneficiaries, particularly women, who found the service more convenient and efficient than traditional face-to-face appointments.

#### MI 10.1 Evidence confidence

High

#### KPI 11: Results are delivered efficiently

KPI score

Satisfactory

3

The analysis of evaluations conducted by the assessment team reviewed a total of 14 evaluations, consisting of: 5 decentralised evaluations and 9 centralised evaluations including 3 centralised real-time evaluations of the agency's COVID-19 response. UNRWA's corporate reports and information were also assessed.

**On the whole, services are delivered broadly in a cost-efficient manner, although austerity measures have negatively impacted on efficiency and effectiveness of operations.**

UNRWA has a reputation for consistent delivery of results (in this case service delivery) despite the contextual challenges and volatile funding it faces. The organisation spent USD 1,206.7 million in 2021, and staff costs represent 61 per cent of total expenses. UNRWA spends 90 per cent of its total expenses on education, health, relief, and social services, and the average 2021 expense per refugee ranges from USD 80 in Jordan to USD 241 in the Syrian Arab Republic.

UNRWA corporate reporting indicates that the organisation has taken measures to achieve value for money throughout its operations, such as regularly reviewing and monitoring its cost base, harnessing UN shared services, and enhancing the delivery of outputs against available resources. Evaluations suggest that UNRWA has achieved some efficiencies, but cost savings have had negative consequences on the quality of its services. External audits point to external causes for delays, such as funding gaps, cash flow challenges, and externally imposed restrictions on access and movement.

UNRWA records the timeliness of project delivery only (rather than all services / activities), and according to corporate reporting, has been achieving **project results** on time, with an average of 88 per cent of projects completing within agreed time and budget over the period 2016-21, culminating in 94.3 per cent in 2021. For projects, there have been some challenges to timeliness, including insufficient or inadequate human resources, COVID-19, unpredictable funds, and context-specific challenges. Despite these challenges, the organisation's response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been commended in independent evaluations, and it has successfully mobilized to support emergency responses and recovery phases.

#### MI 11.1: Interventions/activities assessed as resource-/cost-efficient

Score

<b>MI rating</b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>
<b>MI score</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>4. Highly satisfactory:</b> Interventions are designed to include activities and inputs that produce outputs in the most cost/resource efficient manner available at the time	
<b>3. Satisfactory:</b> Results delivered when compared to the cost of activities and inputs are appropriate even when the programme design process did not directly consider alternative delivery methods and associated costs	
<b>2. Unsatisfactory:</b> Interventions have no credible, reliable information on the costs of activities and inputs and therefore no data is available on cost/resource efficiency	
<b>1. Highly unsatisfactory:</b> Credible information is provided which indicates that interventions are not cost/resource efficient	
<b>MI 11.1 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
<p>According to the UNBOA Financial Report and Audited Financial Statement (2021), the Agency spent a total of USD 1,206.7 million in 2021 with staff costs representing 61 per cent of total expenses (USD 741.9 million). Around 90 per cent of expenditure is on the provision of education, health and relief and social services, the basic services envisaged in the MTS to implement the UNRWA mandate. The average 2021 expense per refugee as per the UNRWA Financial Statement across its fields of operation range from USD 80 in Jordan, West Bank (USD 181), the Gaza Strip (USD 344), Lebanon (USD 349) and to the highest of USD 241 in the Syrian Arab Republic. The high numbers of children educated, patients seen, and families supported indicates that UNRWA is efficiently delivering on its mandate (see KPI 9).</p> <p>The measures taken to save costs and reduce expenditure have been noted in both evaluations and interviews conducted for the assessment as having a detrimental impact. In addition, evaluations and reviews have identified areas of service delivery and project implementation that could be more cost or resource efficient.</p> <p>UNRWA's budget and expenditure data are presented by strategic objective, programming area/type and by field office, meaning cost/resource efficiency conclusions are difficult to assess. According to the 2022 AOR, the Agency is proactively trying to achieve value for money throughout its operations in the following ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regularly reviewing and monitoring the Agency's cost base to ensure that goods and services at the required quality are procured for the lowest available price. This includes the development, consolidation, and revision of long-term agreements (LTAs) which provide greater price predictability and value while reducing administrative costs. As of 31 December 2022, 19 per cent of UNRWA procurement by value was conducted through LTAs.</li> <li>Harnessing UN shared services. In 2019, UNRWA signed the Mutual Recognition Statement which aims for consolidation of shared services across the UN. This enabled UNRWA to contract the UN Global Service Centre and the UN International Computing Centre for the hosting and maintenance of UNRWA information and communication technology systems and OneHR for recruitment services. The Agency also continued to utilize UNICEF e-learning resources. At the field level, UNRWA remained an active participant in UN Operations Management Teams in all fields. During the reporting period, the Agency also continued or signed new agreements on shared services in relation to: (i) security, with UNDSS in the Gaza Strip, Syria, and Lebanon; (ii) fuel storage and disbursement with 18 other UN entities in Lebanon; and (iii) office premises, with OCHA and UNDSS in the Gaza Strip.</li> <li>Enhancing the delivery of outputs against available resources. For example, through reforms undertaken in the health programme, UNRWA's expenditure in this area has decreased from USD 31 per person per year at the start of the MTS in 2016 to USD 24 in 2022. Within the education programme, the cost per pupil increased only 9.7 per cent, from USD 802 in the 2016/17 academic year to USD 880 in 2021/22.</li> <li>Ensuring delivered outputs lead to outcomes that positively impact the lives of Palestine refugees; and</li> <li>Making sure that UNRWA's services benefit those most in need.</li> </ul> <p><b>Independent evaluation evidence:</b></p> <p>The evaluations assessed present evidence that UNRWA has achieved some efficiencies, but cost savings have had negative consequences.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Efficiency gains achieved through change of assistance modality:</b> The evaluation of the MTS found some reforms to RSS programmes in the MTS implementation period contributed to efficiency gains, for example, moving from food distribution to cash assistance in three fields of operation. However, the evaluation of the Transition to the e-card modality (2018) found that the overall changes in the SSNP programme costs have resulted in a shifting of costs to recipients and other budget lines within UNRWA rather than efficiency</li> </ul>	10-13, 132, 135-142, 171, 186, 276-279, 282, 288, 315, 386, 418, 419

gains.

- A World Bank and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees report, published in January 2021, highlighted that in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jordan, UNRWA school children scored an average of a quarter of a standard deviation higher in international assessments than their counterparts in public schools, implying an advantage of almost a year of learning, the report noted that this outcome was achieved at lower unit costs than public education systems in these fields of operation. In 2019, the annual cost per UNRWA elementary student was USD841.50 and in Jordan the cost per student in UNRWA schools in 2009 was 20 percent lower than that in Jordanian public schools.
- **Mixed evidence on efficiencies in services:** The evaluation of the Child and Family Protection Service (2019) found that the project was implemented efficiently, although there were issues connected to delays in the financial transfer and execution of funds, the timely recruitment of skilled staff, the re-allocation of funds to unplanned outputs, and increases in social worker caseload resulting from changes in roles and responsibilities of staff. The evaluation of the UNRWA Family Health Team (FHT) Reform (2021) found there have not been sufficient resources in place to efficiently implement the FHT Reform; there are some indications that efficiency savings have been made, however these are challenged by ongoing difficulties in fully implementing the FHT Approach. The FHT Approach has created more efficient health services, enabled the redistribution of tasks from medical officers to other staff members including midwives and nurses, making better use of staff's skillsets, and allowing better share of workloads. The integration of MHPSS, disability services, and to a lesser extent GBV services, under HC management is an efficiency gain.
- **Austerity measures impacting on effectiveness:** The review of UNRWA's Management of the Emergency Response to the 2021 Gaza-Israel conflict concluded that serious financial shortfalls and year-on-year austerity measures had led to significant reductions in resources available to ensure readiness and support to IDP needs. In 2018, after a significant loss of funding to its Emergency Appeal, the GFO had to eliminate all school guard positions. Moreover, given funding constraints, repair and maintenance activities of facilities were deferred, as well as the maintenance of emergency stocks of non-food items (NFI). As a result, the field's Designated Emergency Shelter and NFI stores were not adequately stocked and ready to meet the needs of IDPs as envisaged in the field's emergency response plans.
- **Short term fixes impacting on future cost effectiveness:** the Evaluation of the MTS was critical of UNRWA's strategy of delaying payments to vendors as a way of managing cash flows as this affects UNRWA's reputation for reliability and is likely to result in higher costs in the future.
- **Expenditure cuts leading to staff stresses:** The evaluation of the MTS found that UNRWA had responded to its chronic funding crisis by cutting expenditure. The variety of measures taken include increasing vacancy rates (in some cases twice as high as the corporate vacancy rate target of 7 per cent), reducing the number of frontline staff providing services, hiring staff on cheaper daily wage contracts even for long-term positions, and cutting Programme Budget investment in information technology and in maintaining vehicles and premises. In addition, UNRWA reduced its travel and training budget for field offices by 50 per cent in 2020. The level of area staff vacancy rates has implications for the delivery of UNRWA services. Altogether, this has meant that the Agency has achieved results at the expense of staff well-being to some extent.
- **Efficiency constrained by inadequate IT systems:** The real-time evaluation of COVID-19 in Jordan found that issues with beneficiary data slowed response and limited the field's ability to leverage volunteer resources. Limited interoperability between the Agency's MI systems – eHealth, EMIS (education) and RRIS (relief). Infrastructure and resource constraints – older desktop computers, lack of mobile phones also reduced efficiency in response. The Evaluation of the MTS Monitoring and Reporting (2020) also found performance issues with the eHealth system which affected efficiency and data quality.

The UNBOA financial report for 2021 highlighted efficiency problems with the following activities:

- Micro finance programme loan officer productivity continued to decrease from 2019 to 2021. The Board recommended that UNRWA establish a specific investment strategy for excessive cash of the Microfinance Department to enhance the efficiency of fund utilization.
- Food stock disposal and losses require enhancement to improve the efficiency of food use.
- The inventory of vaccines and other medicines require unified management in the REACH system to facilitate closer and more efficient tracking of actual medicine consumption.

#### MI 11.1 Evidence confidence


Medium

#### MI 11.2: Implementation and results assessed as having been achieved on time (given the context, in the case of humanitarian programming)

Score

#### MI rating

Satisfactory

<b>MI score</b>	<b>3</b>
<p><b>4. Highly satisfactory:</b> All or nearly all the objectives of interventions are achieved on time or, in the case of humanitarian programming, a legitimate explanation exists for delays in achieving some outputs/outcomes</p> <p><b>3. Satisfactory:</b> More than half of the intended objectives of interventions are achieved on time, and this level is appropriate to the context that existed during implementation, particularly for humanitarian interventions.</p> <p><b>2. Unsatisfactory:</b> Less than half of the intended objectives are achieved on time but interventions have been adjusted to take account of the difficulties encountered and can be expected to improve the pace of achievement in the future. In the case of humanitarian programming, a legitimate explanation exists for delays</p> <p><b>1. Highly unsatisfactory:</b> Less than half of stated objectives of interventions are achieved on time, and no credible plan or legitimate explanation is identified that would suggest significant improvement in achieving objectives on time</p>	
<b>MI 11.2 Analysis</b>	<b>Evidence documents</b>
<p>UNRWA collects monitoring data on project implementation timeliness and level of efficiency in completing projects within agreed time and budget, data compiled from the UNRWA statistics bulletin show that across all field operations there has been a general upward trend on this indicator, averaging 88 per cent over the period 2016-21, culminating in 94.3 per cent of projects completing within agreed time and budget for 2021 (10. 2021 Annual Operational Report, p. 212). However, UNRWA's Annual Results Review Information Package 2021 states that project completion on time/to budget was behind plan across the agency due to: COVID-19 restrictions affecting construction and education projects; the May 2021 hostilities in the Gaza Strip; and the financial crisis in Lebanon.</p> <p><b>Figure 15: Level of efficiency in completing projects within agreed time and budget (%)</b></p>  <p>Source: Data compiled from UNRWA Statistic Bulletin 27.4.2022.</p> <p><b>The sample of evaluations and reviews offers very little evidence of timely/untimely implementation and achievement of results.</b> Response to the COVID-19 pandemic was positive and swift:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Management of the Emergency Response to the 2021 Gaza-Israel conflict identified that the Gaza Strip Field Office quickly geared up to ensure that civilians sheltering in UNRWA schools were safe. Further, it rapidly mobilized to support the release of an Agency Flash Appeal which raised USD 57 million within days of its release.... The outreach efforts resulted in swift international support to the Agency's work for Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip, and valuable financial resources for the emergency response and recovery phases.</li> <li>The evaluation of training and professional development of teachers and the teaching of French for quality education in UNRWA schools commended the project for replanning, redesigning, and coordinating successfully given the challenges posed by COVID-19.</li> </ul> <p>Causes of lack of timeliness identified by evaluations and audit reports include: (i) insufficient or inadequate human resources; (ii) COVID -19; (iii) unpredictable funds; iv) context-specific challenges:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MADAD III mid-term evaluation found that contract negotiations with the EU were lengthy and as a result MADAD III project funds were delayed by six months; this was in part because the contract was revised to include additional funds to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. To mitigate the delay to funding, the first six months of MADAD III were funded by advance funding from UNRWA HQ. While this enabled ongoing provision for services such as cash assistance, it posed a challenge in areas where UNRWA was required to procure staff and equipment for the project. In Lebanon, delayed funds meant that the Health Programme</li> </ul>	

14, 16, 132-141,  
171, 186, 276-  
279, 282, 286,  
288, 315, 386,  
418

<p>was unable to appoint long-term staff to the MADAD-funded Family Health Teams and instead relied on daily paid staff. This affected continuity of services for patients supported by these FHTs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The UNBOA Financial Report and Audited Financial statement 2021 set out reasons for delays to camp improvement projects in the Gaza Strip: reconstruction work continues despite Israeli restrictions on cement imports, machinery, steel, water pumps and elevators, which slowed progress. In addition, operations continued to be burdened by the direct costs of the ongoing blockade, such as additional staffing, transit, and logistical costs as a result of Israeli requirements regarding access and the monitoring of the materials the Agency imports into the Gaza Strip. Lack of funding also remains a cause of slow progress on various reconstruction projects.</li> </ul>	
<b>MI 11.2 Evidence confidence</b>	<b>Medium</b>
Absence of systematic monitoring and reporting of timeliness in programme budget or emergency appeals activities	



## Annex B: Evidence list

Evidence Number	Reference
1.	TOR Executive Advisory Group
2.	Summary Record July 2020 AdCom Meeting
3.	Template UNRWA Compact Letter
4.	Template UNRWA Compact Letter Resource Management
5.	International Conference on UNRWA Key Messages 2021
6.	International Conference on UNRWA Q&A 2021
7.	Strategic Plan Outline 2021
8.	Draft Strategic Plan Programmatic Response 26 June 2022
9.	Draft Strategic Plan Logframes with Indicators 29 June 2020
10.	2021 Annual Operational Report
11.	2020 Annual Operational Report
12.	2019 Annual Operational Report
13.	2020 Annual Results Review Report
14.	2021 Annual Results Review Information Package
15.	2020 Midyear Results Review Report
16.	2022 Annual Operational Plan
17.	2021 Annual Operational Plan
18.	2021 Fourth Quarter Update Annual Operational Plan – February 21
19.	Draft UNRWA and the SDGs 2022
20.	2022 Syria, Lebanon and Jordan Emergency Appeal
21.	2021 Syria Regional Crisis Emergency Appeal
22.	2020 Syria Regional Crisis Emergency Appeal
23.	2019 Syria Regional Crisis Emergency Appeal Progress Report
24.	2021 Syria Regional Crisis Emergency Appeal Progress Report
25.	2020 Syria Regional Crisis Emergency Appeal Progress Report
26.	2019 Syria Regional Crisis Emergency Appeal
27.	2022 oPt Emergency Appeal
28.	2021 oPt Emergency Appeal
29.	2020 oPt Emergency Appeal
30.	2019 oPt Emergency Appeal
31.	2019 oPt Emergency Appeal
32.	2019 Midyear Results Review Report
33.	2020 oPt Emergency Appeal Progress Report
34.	2019 oPt Emergency Appeal Progress Report
35.	2021 Updated Humanitarian and Early Recovery Appeal Gaza
36.	COVID-19 Response Appeal (Aug Dec 2020)
37.	COVID-19 Response Report (Mar July 2020)
38.	COVID-19 Response Appeal (Mar July 2020)
39.	2022 Syria Emergency Appeal Humanitarian Operational Plan
40.	2022 Syria Emergency Appeal Humanitarian Operational Plan

41.	2022 oPt Emergency Appeal Humanitarian Operational Plan
42.	2022 oPt Emergency Appeal Funding Gap Spreadsheet
43.	2022 Syria Emergency Appeal Funding Gap Spreadsheet
44.	Business Continuity Plan HQ Amman 2020
45.	Business Continuity Plan Department of Planning 2021
46.	2021 Results Based Monitoring System Step by Step Guidance
47.	2022 Priority Projects List
48.	2021 Priority Projects List
49.	2020 Priority Projects List
50.	2019 Priority Projects List
51.	2020 Project Outline Template
52.	2022 Draft Revised Project Procedures Manual v07
53.	2022 Draft Summary Risk Maturity Assessment
54.	2022 Draft Risk Maturity Assessment Report
55.	Survey on Biweekly Operational Meetings – 2022
56.	Budget Guide 2022 Planning and Budget Preparation Instructions
57.	Environmental Sustainability Policy 2022
58.	2022 Grand Bargain Self report UNRWA
59.	UN Partnerships Stocktake 26 May 2022
60.	Annual Health Report 2021
61.	TI School Health Programme 2020
62.	TIs Mental Health and Psychosocial Support 2018
63.	COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan 2020
64.	Health Response to COVID-19 First 100 Days and Beyond
65.	Strategy on Information and Communication Technology for Education
66.	Education in Emergencies Factsheet 2021
67.	Updated Education in Emergencies Indicators 2021
68.	Education in Emergencies Final Project Report 2019
69.	Education in Emergencies Project Proposal 2021
70.	Self-learning Materials Guide 2022
71.	UNRWA Guide to Quality Education in the context of COVID-19
72.	Checklists Quality Education in the Context of COVID-19
73.	Education Cannot Wait COVID-19 Project Final Report
74.	Draft COVID-19 Student Survey Report 2021
75.	UNRWA British Council Letter of Intent 2022
76.	UNRWA NRC MoU 2020
77.	UNRWA UNESCO MoU 2019
78.	RSS Guide To Social Work
79.	SOPs for Social Workers and their Supervisors
80.	RSS Reform FAQ 2021 ENGLISH Beneficiaries
81.	RSS Reform FAQ 2021 ENGLISH Staff
82.	Registration and Eligibility Modernization Strategy 2022
83.	2022 Microfinance Department Business Plan
84.	2021 Microfinance Department Annual Report
85.	2020 Microfinance Department Annual Report
86.	2019 Microfinance Department Annual Report 2019

87.	Environmental and Social Management Framework 2022
88.	Overview Clean Energy Wheeling Station 2020
89.	Off Grid Solar System in 6 Health Centres in Jordan
90.	Solid Waste Management Framework 2016
91.	Protection Mainstreaming Toolkit 2020
92.	Protection Alignment Review Method and Tools 2022
93.	Protection Alignment Review Method and Tools 2022
94.	Summary Report Protection Audits 2017-18
95.	Protection Audit Report – Jordan Field Office 2019
96.	Protection Audit Report – Lebanon Field Office 2019
97.	Protection Audit Report – West Bank Field Office 2019
98.	Protection Audit Report – The Gaza Strip Field Office 2019
99.	Protection Audit Report – Syria Field Office 2019
100.	International Protection Framework
101.	Protection Strategic Framework 2021
102.	UNRWA Disability Policy 2022
103.	Disability Inclusion Guidelines 2017
104.	UNDIS Entity Report 2022
105.	Disability Inclusion Annual Report 2021
106.	AVAC Strategic Framework 2019
107.	GES – Gender Equality Strategy Annual Implementation Rep
108.	UNRWA Gender Equality Strategy 2016-2022
109.	Endline Study Violence Prevention Framework 2019
110.	UN SWAP Report 2021
111.	Resource Mobilization Strategy 2019
112.	External Relations Department Workplan for 2021
113.	Donor Relations Division 2020 Action Plan
114.	Multilateral Engagement Report – 2021
115.	Multilateral Engagement Report – 2020
116.	Multilateral Engagement Report – 2019
117.	Revised Area Staff Selection Policy 2022
118.	Revised International Staff Selection Policy 2021
119.	Administration of Temporary Appointments 2022
120.	Teleworking Rev 2022
121.	DIOS Work Plan 2022
122.	DIOS Work Plan 2021
123.	DIOS Work Plan 2020
124.	DIOS Work Plan 2019
125.	DIOS Annual Report 2021
126.	DIOS Annual Report 2020
127.	DIOS Annual Report 2019
128.	Revised OD 14 DIOS Charter 2020
129.	Revised OD 24 ACIO ToR 2020
130.	UNRWA Evaluation Policy 2016
131.	Standards and Procedures for Quality Assurance in Evaluation
132.	Review of the UNRWA management of the emergency response to the 2021 Gaza-Israel conflict

133.	Evaluation of the Protection Audit Mechanism 2021
134.	Evaluation of the Agency Medium Term Strategy 2021
135.	Evaluation of the UNRWA Family Health Team Reform 2021
136.	Evaluation of Monitoring and Reporting Activities on the Medium Term Strategy 2016-2022
137.	Real Time Evaluation Report One Jordan Field response to COVID-19 emergency
138.	Real Time Evaluation Report two West Bank Field response to COVID-19 emergency
139.	Real Time Evaluation Report three the Gaza Strip Field response to COVID-19 emergency
140.	Evaluation of UNRWA's transition to the e-card modality in the Jordan, Lebanon and West Bank fields
141.	Decentralised Evaluation Maintaining the resilience of Palestine refugees from Syria in Jordan and Lebanon
142.	Decentralised Evaluation of UNRWA Child and Family protection services
143.	Decentralised Evaluation Maintaining PRS Resilience in Lebanon
144.	UNRWA Data Protection and Disclosure Policy
145.	Effective UNRWA Engagement with International Human Rights
146.	Revised Detained Staff Policy and Technical Instruction
147.	Draft Code of Ethics – 2022
148.	Draft Affirmation of UNRWAs Code of Conduct 2022
149.	GSC No 07 2010 SEA Complaints Procedure
150.	GSC No 06 2010 Prohibition of Discrimination and Harass
151.	UNRWA SEA Flowchart – Management of Allegations
152.	Footnotes Draft UNRWA SEA Flowchart – Management of Alle
153.	Screenshots Internal Ethics Sexual Misconduct Sharepoint
154.	Circular Template Designation Ethics and PSEA Focal Point
155.	Designation Letter PSEA Focal Points 2020
156.	Designation Letter Ethics Focal Points 2022
157.	Ethics Network and Ethics Focal Point ToRs 2022
158.	We Say No to Sexual Misconduct 2022
159.	TI Medical Examination Requiring Chaperone 2019
160.	Medical Chaperone Information Roll up – 2022
161.	Medical Chaperone Information Poster – 2022
162.	GSC No03 2020 Mandatory Learning Courses Including P
163.	GSC No 04 2020 e-Per System Enhancement on Mandatory Tr
164.	Information Security Policy 2022
165.	Cybersecurity Strategy 2022 2026
166.	Cloud Strategy 2020 24 0
167.	ToR Architecture Review Board 2020
168.	TI No 1 Application Development and Change Procedures
169.	TI No 4 ICT Security Incident Management Procedure 2006
170.	TI No 5 Access Control Policy 2021
171.	Report of the UNRWA Commissioner General to the GA 2020
172.	Report of the UNRWA Commissioner General to the GA 2019
173.	Proposed Programme Budget for 2023 Palestine Refugees
174.	Proposed Programme Budget for 2022 Palestine Refugees
175.	UNRWA Framework of Accountability
176.	Procurement Manual 2021
177.	Syria Field Office Programme and Operation Cluster Priorities

178.	Syria Field Office Programme and Operation Cluster Priorities
179.	Syria Crisis Monitoring Survey May 2021 0
180.	Syria Post Distribution Monitoring Report in 2021
181.	Project Proposal Rehabilitation of UNRWA facilities
182.	Palestine Refugees from Syria Socio economic Survey
183.	Lebanon Crisis Monitoring Report July 2021
184.	Lebanon Crisis Monitoring Report March 2022
185.	Real time Evaluation Report – JFO Response to COVID-19
186.	Mid Term Evaluation MADAD III
187.	Evaluation Division Strategy 2020-2022
188.	UNRWA Budget Planning Processes
189.	Lessons COVID adapted data collection
190.	2022 Annual Operational Plan May 2022
191.	Annex 2 Oversight Recommendations by Department and Field
192.	Annex 4 2022 UNRWA Priority Projects List
193.	Draft 2022 Annual Operational Plan
194.	2018 Annual Operational Plan
195.	ACABQ Approved Posts for 2022
196.	2019 Annual Operational Plan
197.	GB 2019 Self report template narrative summary UNRWA
198.	ACABQ Recommended Posts for 2023 Restricted
199.	GB 2020 Self Report narrative part UNRWA
200.	GB 2021 Self report narrative part UNRWA
201.	Outline of the UNRWA Strategic Plan 2023
202.	Final Draft UNRWA Strategic Plan 2023-2028
203.	2018 Planning and Budget Preparation Instructions
204.	2019 Planning and Budget Preparation Instructions
205.	2020 Planning and Budget Preparation Instructions
206.	2021 Planning and Budget Preparation Instructions
207.	OD 01
208.	OD 02
209.	OD 03
210.	OD 04
211.	OD 05
212.	OD 06
213.	OD 07
214.	OD 10
215.	OD 12
216.	OD 13
217.	OD 14
218.	OD 15
219.	OD 17
220.	OD 18
221.	OD 19
222.	OD 20
223.	OD 21

224.	OD 24
225.	OD 25
226.	OD 26
227.	OD 27
228.	OD 28
229.	OD 30
230.	OD 33
231.	OD 34 Executive Advisory Group
232.	Strengthening UNRWA Risk Management Systems
233.	UNRWA Reform Overview
234.	Partnerships A Strategic Framework
235.	UNRWA overall org chart
236.	Executive Office org chart
237.	Field GFO org chart
238.	Field WBFO org chart
239.	Field LFO org chart
240.	Field SFO org chart
241.	Field JFO org chart
242.	Programme Protection org chart
243.	Programme HD org chart
244.	Programme ED org chart
245.	Programme ICID Org Chart
246.	Programme MD org chart
247.	Programme RSSD org chart
248.	Support PD org chart
249.	Support DLA Org Chart
250.	Support FD org chart
251.	Support ERCD org chart
252.	Support HRD org chart
253.	Support CSSD org chart
254.	Support DIOS org chart
255.	Support IMTD org chart
256.	Support SRMD org chart
257.	UNRWA Dispute Tribunal org chart
258.	Ethics & Integrity English
259.	Ethics & Integrity Arabic
260.	Ethics & Integrity Course Assessment
261.	PSEA English
262.	PSEA Arabic
263.	PSEA Course Assessment
264.	United to Respect English
265.	United to Respect Arabic
266.	United to Respect Course Assessment
267.	Mandatory Training Dashboard
268.	Compliance With Mandatory Training
269.	Ethics Refresher Training English



270.	Ethics Refresher Training Arabic
271.	Evaluation Questionnaire Ethics Refresher
272.	Ethics Refresher Record 2022
273.	2018 UNBOA Financial Report and Audited Financial Statement
274.	2019 UNBOA Financial Report and Audited Financial Statement
275.	2020 UNBOA Financial Report and Audited Financial Statement
276.	2021 UNBOA Financial Report and Audited Financial Statement
277.	Central evaluation, Agency Medium Term Strategy 2016 2022
278.	QA MTS Final Report 7 February 2022
279.	Central evaluation, UNRWA Family Health Team Reform
280.	QA FHT Final Report February 2022
281.	QA FSPI Final Report June 2022
282.	Final evaluation of EUTF funded project in Lebanon and Jordan MADAD II: strengthening the resilience of Palestine refugees from Syria in Jordan and Lebanon
283.	QA Decentral MADAD II 2020
284.	Evaluation Work Plans 2018
285.	LPDC STRATEGY 2022
286.	LPDC Presentation September SubCom
287.	UNRWA evaluation policy 2022
288.	Final evaluation of the project of 'support to the training and professional development of teachers and the teaching of French for quality education in UNRWA schools, year 1 and year 2'
289.	Private Fundraising Business Model
290.	DIOS Strategic Plan 2020-2022
291.	Internal Quality Assessment Report Results 2022
292.	Management Reforms at UNRWA 2020
293.	UNRWA Management Reform Report 2022
294.	Strategic Plan 2023-2028 Common Monitoring Matric and Indicator Methodology Handbook
295.	Budget Guide – 2023 Planning and Budget Preparation Instructions
296.	EAG Decision on 2023 Final Programme Budget Allocations
297.	OD 31 Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation 2012
	UNRWA Flash Appeal – Earthquake Response 2023
299.	TI n.7 Budget Technical Instructions (Quarterly Expenditure Reviews)
300.	UNRWA Investigation Policy 2021
301.	GSC N.03/2022 Protection Against Retaliation for Reporting Misconduct
302.	Protection Against Retaliation What You Need to Know
303.	UNRWA Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Policy
304.	UNRWA Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Course
305.	UNRWA Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Course Assessment
306.	Ethics Office Annual Reports 2018-2021
307.	Poster on Reporting Misconduct
308.	Pocket Cards on Reporting to Misconduct in English and Arabic
309.	Area Personnel Directive No. PD/A/23 on Performance Management
310.	UNRWA Communications Division Workplan 2023
311.	Ad Com Agenda June 2022
312.	Ad Com Agenda November 2022
313.	Ad Com Summary June 2022
314.	Ad Com Summary November 2022

315.	Annual Operational Report 2022
316.	Business Case for Senior Strategic HR Specialist
317.	Post description Senior Strategic HR Specialist 2023
318.	Completion Rates of Mandatory Courses
319.	GSC No.02/2022 Mandatory Learning Courses
320.	GSC No.03/2020 Mandatory Learning Courses
321.	SOPs on Mandatory Trainings 2021
322.	Letter to New Appointed Staff and Complementary Personnel Arabic and English
323.	HR Communication on Completing the Mandatory Learning Courses
324.	UNRWA PSEA/H Action Plans 2018-2023
325.	UNRWA Code of Ethics 2022
326.	Area Staff Personnel Directive No.A/4/Rev.8 Appointment of Area Staff
327.	UNRWA End-of-Year Management Letter on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Reporting of SEA Allegation – Annual Certification Letter From GC to SG 2019-2022
328.	Guidance on New Integrated Assessments
329.	Coordinator for UNRWA’s Sexual Misconduct Task Force Vacancy Announcement
330.	UNRWA’s Sexual Misconduct Task Force TOR 2018
331.	UNRWA PSEA Focal Point Network TOR 2020
332.	UNRWA PSEA Focal Point Designation Letters, Field Level Circular Template and Email to Field Directors 2022
333.	UNRWA PSEA and Ethics Focal Point Workshop
334.	Ethics Office Facebook Live Transcript 2022
335.	Poster Zero Tolerance for Sexual Misconduct by UNRWA Personnel
336.	Poster and Screen Saver Together We Say No to Sexual Misconduct
337.	Poster Know the Rules SEA
338.	Message from GC – We Say No to Sexual Misconduct March 2023
339.	TI No.HD/MC/1/2015 Medical Examination Requiring Chaperone in UNRWA Health Centres
340.	Revised Template for Canteen Services at UNRWA Educational Institution
341.	UNRWA Supplier Code of Conduct 2017
342.	UNRWA Invitation to Bid Template 2021
343.	General Conditions of Contract for Procurement of Goods and Services
344.	UNRWA Key Findings for the OSC SEA and CEB SH Survey Results
345.	PSEA Practitioners Brown Bag – Electronic Incident Reporting Form 2022
346.	UNRWA Findings 2022 Annual Survey on Facts and Perceptions of UN Personnel Related to the prohibitions of SEA
347.	Implementation of Clear Check Interoffice Memorandum
348.	UN SEA-I Report Tracker UNRWA 2023
349.	Guidance on the referral of allegation of serious misconduct to DIOS 2021
350.	Field PSEA Mapping 2021
351.	SEA Incident Reporting Form Arabic and English
352.	Code of Ethics at UN Events 2019
353.	Resources Available for Individual Affected by Sexual Harassment
354.	Guide for Managers Prevention of and Response to Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
355.	Class Formation Instructions – Norms and Standards (2020-2021)
356.	Class Formation Instructions – Norms and Standards (2021-2022)
357.	Class Formation Instructions – Norms and Standards (2022-2023)
358.	Draft School Counsellor Norms (2022)

359.	Promoting Gender Equity within UNRWA Schools
360.	MCHC in Gaza (Shouka Health Center)
361.	Health Medical Officer Norms (2020)
362.	Health Clerk Norms (2020)
363.	ECW Multiyear Resilience Programme for Palestine Agreement Amendments 1 to 5
364.	Emergency Cash Assistance for PRS and Vulnerable Palestine Refugees from Lebanon in Lebanon Agreement Amendment
365.	Project Proposal for the Regional Programme for the Improvement of Living Conditions of Palestine Refugee Camps (REPAC XI)
366.	BTI 4 – Budget Standards – Food Commodities and Cash Subsidies
367.	Humanitarian Principles at UNRWA
368.	UNRWA 2021/22 Management Initiatives Priorities and Support to UNRWA Resource Mobilization and Communication
369.	UNRWA Programme, Sub-Programme and Sub-Sub Programme Structure against Cost Centres
370.	EU Contribution Agreement to Strengthening the Resilience of Palestine Refugee Communities in Syria – Phase II
371.	Senior Management Compact Letter Template 2023
372.	Post Description Director of UNRWA Affairs
373.	Draft Microfinance Programme Strategy 2023-28
374.	Draft Livelihoods Strategic Framework (20218)
375.	Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) SubCom Presentation (March 2023)
376.	Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) - Background note for Strategies Dialogues 2023
377.	Standard Implementation Procedures (SIP) UNRWA and WFP Joint Emergency Food Assistance in the Gaza Strip 2022
378.	Completion Rates of Mandatory Courses (not dated)
379.	Grant list 2018-22
380.	Human Resource Department Achievements on Digitalization and Modernization
381.	Status of Implementation of previous audit recommendations up to March 2023
382.	UNRWA Finance Regulatory Framework Review
383.	UNRWA Leadership Dialogue 2023 – Leader’s Guide
384.	UNRWA Leadership Dialogue 2023 – Participant’s Guide
385.	UNRWA Leadership Dialogue 2023 – PowerPoint Presentation
386.	UNRWA Statistics Bulletin 2021-2022
387.	Analysis of the Evaluation Function in the UN system JIU/REP/2014/6 2014
388.	MoU UNRWA-UNICEF
389.	MoU UNRWA-UNESCO 2020
390.	MoU UNRWA-UNESCO 2022
391.	MoU UNRWA-UNFPA 2013
392.	Draft MoU UNRWA (SFO) – UNFPA
393.	Contribution Agreement UNRWA (LFO) – UNDP 2020
394.	Amendment 1 - Contribution Agreement UNRWA (LFO) – UNDP 2021
395.	Amendment 2 - Contribution Agreement UNRWA (LFO) – UNDP 2021
396.	UNRWA (LFO) – WFP Agreement 2018
397.	UNRWA (LFO) – WFP Agreement Extension 2018
398.	UNRWA (LFO) – WFP Agreement 2020
399.	MoU UNRWA (JFO) – WFP 2022
400.	Basic Agreement UNRWA (JFO) – ILO 1953
401.	Amendment to Basic Agreement UNRWA (JFO) – ILO 1953

402.	Draft UNRWA (JFO) – ILO Supplementary Agreement 2023
403.	MoU UNRWA (GFO) – UNDP 2016
404.	Amendment 1 MoU UNRWA (GFO) – UNDP 2017
405.	Amendment 2 MoU UNRWA (GFO) – UNDP 2018
406.	Amendment 3 MoU UNRWA (GFO) – UNDP 2018
407.	Amendment 4 MoU UNRWA (GFO) – UNDP 2020
408.	Amendment 5 MoU UNRWA (GFO) – UNDP 2021
409.	MoU UNRWA (GFO) – FAO 2021
410.	MoU UNRWA (GFO) – FAO 2022
411.	MoU UNRWA (GFO) – UNFPA 2021
412.	Amendment 1 MoU UNRWA (GFO) – UNFPA 2021
413.	MoU UNRWA (GFO) – UNFPA 2023
414.	MoU UNRWA (GFO) – WFP 2022
415.	SIP UNRWA (GFO) – WFP 2022
416.	Agreement UNRWA GFO-WFP 2023
417.	UNRWA Medium-Term Strategy 2016-2022
418.	Case study on the education of Palestinian refugees in UNRWA schools (Annex 7), The global cost of Inclusive Refugee Education - World Bank. (2021)
419.	Strategic Plan 23-28
420.	Grand Bargain in 2022: Annual Self Report
421.	Evaluation of French training
422.	Annual Operational Report 2018
423.	Q1 2022 Quarterly Expenditure Review – Meeting the Gaza Strip
424.	Q1 2022 Quarterly Expenditure Review – Meeting West Bank
425.	Q1 2022 Quarterly Expenditure Review – Meeting Syria
426.	Q1 2022 Quarterly Expenditure Review – Meeting Lebanon
427.	Q1 2022 Quarterly Expenditure Review – Meeting Jordan
428.	Management Initiative Strategic Implementation Plan – Initiatives linked to DIOS
429.	Q1 2020 Update – UNRWA Management Initiatives Strategic Implementation plan April 2020
430.	UNRWA Management Initiative Final Implementation Plan
431.	Confidential Document – Management Initiatives (Final)
432.	Workforce Planning Process
433.	Training materials – Saying No To Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 2013
434.	UNRWA Operational Report 2018 Section on PSEA
435.	JIU UN enterprise risk management; approaches and uses in UN system organisations
436.	Update to the Management Initiative 2022
437.	UNRWA Accountability to Affected Populations Framework
438.	OIOS 2020, Triennial review of recommendations from the programme evaluation of the UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

## Annex C: Results of the MOPAN external partner survey

**Table 22. Key Information on the Partner Survey**

Geographic sample	Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and West Bank including East Jerusalem
Effective sample size	453
Survey responses (response rate)	163 (36%)
Survey time frame	14 March – 11 April 2023

Note: The online survey was administered by MOPAN and was conducted over a period of 4 weeks, starting on mid-March 2023 and closing on mid-April 2023. The effective sample for this survey was of 453 people and total of 163 partners responded.

**Figure 16. Respondents' profile**




Figure 17. Respondents' geographical coverage




Figure note: Other\* includes respondents selecting more than one country or countries not included in the sample.

Note: Results displayed only reflect responses to questions that are relevant to specific partner categories. Where partner categories have not been asked a particular question, their category is not included and may change "n" (total number of respondents) per partner category.

## Strategy, finances, planning and resources allocation

Figure 18. Strategy, finances, planning and resources allocation overview






Figure 19. UNRWA has a clear strategy that identifies its role and intended results (Q1.1)







**Figure 20. UNRWA's financial framework supports the effective implementation of the strategy (Q1.2)**




**Figure 21. UNRWA is able to raise the funds that it needs to deliver on its strategy (Q.1.3)**




**Figure 22. UNRWA allocates its resources transparently and efficiently across headquarters and field offices (Q1.4)**




**Figure 23. UNRWA's organisational structure supports effective planning and resource use (Q1.5)**



**Figure 24. UNRWA's planning processes ensure coherence between its programme budget, emergency appeals and projects (Q1.6)**




**Figure 25. UNRWA's administrative and finance procedures are easy to understand and effective (Q1.7)**




## Needs and rights protection of refugees


**Figure 26. Needs and rights protection of refugees overview**




**Figure 27. UNRWA's programmes and services reach Palestine refugees in the greatest need (Q2.1)**




**Figure 28. UNRWA's programmes and services promote the protection of Palestine refugee rights (Q2.2)**




**Figure 29. UNRWA uses its knowledge to effectively advocate for the protection of Palestine refugee rights (Q2.3)**




**Figure 30. UNRWA's programmes and services promote gender equality (Q2.4)**




**Figure 31. UNRWA's programmes and services consider environmental sustainability (Q2.5)**




**Figure 32. UNRWA's programmes and services are inclusive of persons with disabilities (Q2.6)**




**Figure 33. UNRWA's programmes and services address the needs of youth (Q2.7)**



**Figure 34. UNRWA has taken appropriate measures to enhance management performance in accordance with the proposals identified in the management initiatives (Q2.8)**





## Systems and ways of working

Figure 35. Systems and ways of working overview




Figure 36. UNRWA involves Palestine refugees in the design and delivery of its programmes and services (Q3.1)








Figure 37. UNRWA has effective procedures for obtaining complaints or other feedback from Palestine refugees (Q3.2)





**Figure 38. UNRWA brings clear added value to its partnerships with other organisations (Q3.3)**



**Figure 39. UNRWA actively shares relevant information with its partners (Q3.4)**



**Figure 40. UNRWA participates constructively in humanitarian response and coordination structures and processes (Q3.5)**





## Results, evaluation and learning activities

Figure 41. Results, evaluation and learning activities overview




Figure 42. UNRWA communicates its results transparently and effectively (Q4.1)




Figure 43. UNRWA is able to identify and address poorly performing programmes (Q4.2)





Figure 44. UNRWA is able to learn lessons and apply best practices to its programming (Q4.3)




Figure 45. UNWRA is committed to independent evaluation of its performance to ensure accountability and learning (Q4.4)




Figure 46. UNRWA adequately undertakes independent evaluation of its performance to ensure accountability and learning (Q4.5)

