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SECRET.

THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE.

THE course of events opens a prospect of a change, at the end of the war, in the status of Palestine. Already there is a stirring among the twelve million Jews strattered throughout the countries of the world. A feeling is squeading with great rapidity that now, at last, some advance may be made, in some way, towards the fulfilment of the hope and desire, held with unshable tenneity for eighteen hundred years, for the restoration of the Jews to the land to which they are attached by ties almost an ancient as history itself.

Yet it is felt that the time is not ripe for the stablishment there of an independent, autonomous Jewish State. Such increase of population as there has been in Palestine in recent years has been composed, indeed, mostly of Jewish immigrants; the new Jewish agricultural colonies already number about 15,000 souls; in Jerusalem itself twe-thirds of the inhabitants are Jews; but in the country, as a whole, they still probably do not number more than about one-sixth of the population.

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population.

If the attempt were scade to place the 400,000 or 500,000 Mahonomedans of Arab race under a Government which rested upon the support of 90,000 or 100,000 Javish inhabitants, there can be no assurance that such a Government, even if established by the authority of the Powers, would be able to command obedience. The dream of a Jewish State, prosperous, progressive, and the home of a brilliant civilisation, night vanish in a series of squalid conflicts with the Arab population. And even if a State so constituted did succeed in avoiding or repressing internal disorder, it is doubtful whether it would be strong cough to protect itself from external aversession.

so constituted did successi in avoiding or repressing internal disorder, it is doubtful whether it would be atrong enough to protect itself from external aggression from the turbulent elements around it. To attempt to realise the aspiration of a Jewish State one century too noon might threw back its actual realisation for many centuries more.

I am assured that the solution of the problem of Pulestine which would be sough the most welcome to the leaders and supporters of the Zionist movement throughout the world would be the annexation of the country to the British Empire. I believe that that solution would be carlially welcome also to the greater number of Jews who have not hitherto been interceted in the Zionist movement. It is hoped that under British rale facilities would be given to Jewish organisations to purchase land, to found colonies, to establish adventional and religious institutions, and to speed usefully the funds that would be freely contributed for promoting the economic development of the country. It is hoped also that Jewish imm gration, carefully regulated, would be given preference [198] [198]

so that in course of time the Jewish people, grown into a respectly and settled in the land, may be conceded such degree of self-government as the conditions of that

such degree of self-government as the conditions of that day may justify.

It would no doubt, be necessary to establish an extra-teratorial régime for the Christian accred sites, and to vest their possession and control in an international commission, in which France, on behalf of the Catholic Church, and Russia, on behalf of the Greek Church, would have leading voices. It would be desirable also that the Mahoramedan accred sites should be declared inviolable, and probably that the Governor's council should include one or more Mahoramedas, whose presence would be a guarantee that Mahoramedan interests would be safe-gharded.

From the standpoint of British interests there are several arguments for this policy, if wider considerations should allow it to be pursued:—

several argaments for this policy, if wider considerations should allow it to be pursued:—

1. It would enable England to fulfil in yet another apiece her historic part of civiliser of the backward countries. Under the Turk, Palestine has been blighted. For hundreds of years she has produced neither men nor things useful to the world. Her native population is sunk in squalor. Roads, harbours, irrigation, sanitation, are neglected. Almost the only signs of agricultural or industrial vitality are to be found in the Jewish and, on a smaller sode, in the German colonies. Corruption is universal in the administration and in the judiciary. The Governors, who follow one another in rapid succession, are concerned only with the amount of money they can squases out of the country to send to Constantinople. Under British administration all this will be quickly changed. The country will be redeemed. What has been done in Egypt will be redeemed. What has been done in Egypt will be redeemed to the howeledge of this would make many of the present inhabitants not merely acquiece, but rejuice, in the change. The British Agent in Egypt recently reported (on the 7th January) that the information of the Intelligence Department there indicated that a large proportion of the population would welcome a British occuration. There have been many previous indications of the same feeling. The Turkish officials are foreigners in the country. Of Turkish population there is none. England should assume control, because by that means she can forward the purpose for which, at bottom, her Empire in the tropics and sub-tropics exists.

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2. The British Empire, with its present vastness and presperity, has little addition to its greatness left to win. But Palestins, small as it is in area, bulks so large in the world's imagination, that no Empire is so great but its prestige would be raised by its possession. The inclusion of Palestine within the British Empire would add a lastre even to the British Crown. It would make a most powerful appeal to the people of the United Kingdom and the Dominions, perticularly if it were avowedly a means of aiding the Jews to receipty the country. Widespread and deep-rooted in the Protestant world is a sympathy with the idea of restoring the Hebrew people to true land which was to be their inheritance, an intense interest in the fulfilment of the peoplecies which have loved id it. The redumption also of the Christian Holy

Places from the vulgarisation to which they are new subject, and the opening of the Holy Land, more easily than hitherto, to the visits of Christian travellers, would add to the appeal which this policy would make to the British popples. There is probably no outcome of the war which would give greater antisfaction to powerful ecctions of British opinion.

3. The importance that would be nitached to this annexation by British opinion would help to facilitate a wise settlement of another of the problems which will result from the war. Although Great British did not enter the conflict with any purpose of territorial expansion, being in it and having made immense encrifices, there would be profound disappointment in the country if the outcome were to be the accurring of great advantages by our allies, and none by ourselves. But to strip Germany of her colonies for the benefit of England would leave a permanent feeling of such intense bitterness among the German people as to render such a course impedition. We have to live in the same world with 74,900,000 Germans, and we should take care to give as little justification as we can for the latching, ten twenty, or thirty years hence, of a German war of revenge. Certain of the German colonies must no doubt be retained for strategic reasons. But if Great Britain can obtain the compensations, which public opinion will demand, in Mesopotamia and Palestine, and in German East Africa and West Africa, there is more likelihord of a lasting peace.

4. The belt of desert to the cost of the Suez Canal is an admirable strategic frontier for Egypt. But it would be an inadequate defence if a great Ruropean Power were established on the further ede. A military expedition organised from Southern Palestine, and including the hying of a railway from E Arish to the Canal, would be fermidable. Palestine in British hands would itself no doubt be open to attack, and would being with it extended military responsibilities. But the mountainous character of the country would make its occupatio

value. [198]

What are the alternatives?

What are the alternatives !

(a.) Annexation by France.—French interests, which in Northern Syrin are considerable, in Palestine are small. A French company owns the railway of 54 miles from Jaffa to Jerusalem, but that interest could doubtless be bought out for no large sum. Beyond that there is little. There are Franch monastic establishments, but few French residents claswhere. The Egyptian Intelligence Department report, which has been already quoted, is to the effect that a Franch annexation would be unwelcome to the first that a Franch annexation would be unwelcome to the Jews. If, as the outcome of the war, France recovers Alsace and Lorraine, and obtains the greater part of Syria, including Beirout and Damascus, she ought not to grudge to Great Britain Missopotamia and Palestine. Her ancient protestorate of Catholic interests in the East would be continued by her leadership in the International Commission which would control the Holy Piaces.

this in the International Commission which would control the Holy Pinces.

(b.) Internationalisation.—To establish a Government composed of representatives of all the Powers would be to lay the country under a dead hand. Continuous disappearents would be inevitable, and would result in nothing being done for the development of the land and in the progress of the people. Besides, a status which was in form international would give an opportunity for the gradual permeation of the country by German influence. Already Germany has been very active in Palestine. She has spont considerable some of money there with a view to increasing her influence. She has founded a bank, agricultural colonies, schools, beepitals. After the war, that out, to a great extent, from the Far East and other parts of the globs, she may well concentrate a part of her energies on Palestine. In twenty years time Egypt's neighbour, estousibly internationalised, may have become so permested by German influence as to furnish a strong case for German control, whenever the cumbrous form of government shall have patently brokes to down, and whenever another revision of the map of Western Asia takes place. An international régims has invariably been a transition stage to something does the will be a dangerous to France in Northern Syrio on to a German protectorate. Such an eventuality would be as dangerous to France in Northern Syrio on to England in Egypt.

(c.) Annexation to Egypt.—Incorporation within the Prints Empire by this indirect method may be found incodes a consultation in India and Egypt.—The constitution of a Greater Egypt would predably be very acceptable to Saltan Hussein and his Mahammedan subjects. But this policy would introduce complications in the administration of the country, without, it would seen, advantages rufficient to counterbulence them. Nor is it certain that the urrangement would be preferred by the Araba. In the over of the Jewn, it would define a much less strong appeal than would the possibility of the growth of a Je the Holy Piaces.
(b.) Internationalisation.—To establish a Government

(d.) To leave the country to Turkey, but with some

goarantees for improved government and greater facilities for Jewish coloniaation.—To davise such guarantees and to make them effective would be a matter of extrems difficulty, as the whole of the modern history of the Turkish Empire has shown. It is probable that the adoption of such a policy would leave the situation substantially unimproved. Whether it would in any case be practicable would depoin upon the disposition, after the war, of the territories to the north and east.

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war, of the territories to the north and east.

The gradual growth of a considerable Jawish community, under British suzeraisty, in Palestine will not solve the Jewish question in Europe. A country the size of Wales, much of it barren mountain and part of it waterless, cannot hold 9,000,000 people. But it could probably hold in time 3,000,000 or 4,000,000, and some relief would be given to the pressure in Russia and elsewhere. Far more important would be the effect upon the character of the larger part of the Jawish zace who must still remain interminged with other peoples, to be a strength or to be a weakness to the countries in which they live. Let a Jewish centre be established in Palestine; let it achieve, as I believe it would achieve, a spiriteal and intellectual greatness; and insemibly, but inevitably, the character of the individual Jew, wherever he might be, would be ennebled. The sordid associations which have attached to the Jewish name would be aloughed off, and the value of the Jews as an element in the divillastion of the European peoples would be enhanced.

The Jewish brain in a physiological product not to be despesed. For fifteen centuries the race produced in Palestine a constant succession of great men—statesmen and prophets, judges and eddiers. If a hody be again given in which its soul cas ledge, it may again gurish the world. Till full scope is granted, as Macaulay said in the House of Commons, "let us not presume to say that there is no genius among the descundants of the Macabee."

H. S.

January 1915.