

# UNRWA

## emergency appeal

# 2005



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## PREFACE

UNRWA has been providing services to the Palestine refugee population for a long time - some five decades - and there may be a tendency to assume that it will continue to manage somehow, whatever the circumstances. I wish to dispel any impression that things are business-as-usual in the oPt. This is the eighth emergency appeal issued by UNRWA since the oPt was plunged into a severe humanitarian crisis in September 2000. Each appeal has been a little more pressing, each citing the latest statistics of destruction and poverty.

This appeal, like previous appeals, details the needs of the refugees, and describes the emergency measures UNRWA is taking. Even a brief perusal will confirm the remarkable level of services being offered over and above UNRWA's regular programme activities. There is no doubt that UNRWA is confronting the enormous hurdles brought on by economic suffocation and relentless violence to the best of its ability. I am grateful to a committed staff, who continue to work tirelessly, often at great personal risk. Eleven staff members have been killed since the beginning of the *intifada*. Although the reputation of UNRWA staff has suffered in the eyes of some due to strike action initiated by the West Bank staff union, I do not see these actions as representative of the staff at large. I look forward to seeing West Bank staff return to work and resume their tireless efforts on behalf of the refugee community as has continued uninterrupted in Gaza.

Since the latest military incursions, I have again visited several camps in the Gaza Strip. In Jabalia, for example, I spoke to the residents of a whole neighbourhood that had been flattened by Israeli forces. I continue to be impressed by the resilience of the refugees, their civility towards outsiders and their confidence in a better future.

The constraints to this better future are largely political and beyond the scope of this report. However, the responsibility of meeting the urgent needs of the refugees is ours and yours. UNRWA has been struggling to make do with a seriously under-funded emergency budget for almost four years. It is no longer working. The 2004 emergency budget was not even half funded. The deficit of need has become too great. Closures, curfews and the wall/fence increasingly disrupt services and prevent economic activity; violent military incursions destroy lives, property and livelihoods. Despite an overwhelming desire to be economically productive and self-sufficient, the refugee population cannot, under current conditions, support itself, or rebuild its communities.

In 2005 we are requesting a total of US\$ 185,814,882 which is a reduction on the sum appealed for in 2004. This is not due to any improvement in the situation, but because we have moved a number of activities in health, education and psycho-social support into UNRWA's General Fund. This is in recognition of the long term nature of these activities, and in part, as a response to the under-funding of previous appeals.

This document shows why we need further emergency funding and exactly how we intend to use it. You will find that we do our utmost to work around the hurdles and to provide meaningful assistance: mobile clinics service those unable to reach regular health facilities, job creation programmes in addition to emergency hand-outs, supplementary food aid for those families who would otherwise go hungry. The coming months will be crucial in determining the future of the oPt. By meeting the emergency needs of the refugee population, the donor community can replace some of the uncertainty with a modicum of stability, going a long way to allow families, workers, professionals, youth and children to contribute positively to their communities and ultimately to peace.

**Peter Hansen**  
19th November 2004



## BACKGROUND

The ongoing crisis in the oPt is a result of the combination of the effects of a prolonged regime of military occupation that has severely limited options for employment, education, and economic productivity, and a more recent security crisis in which Israeli forces have employed drastic measures intended to eliminate the threat of suicide bombs and home-made "Qassam" rockets.

It has been widely observed that the loss of life and destruction of property and livelihoods in the oPt include violations of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War<sup>(1)</sup>, and of international human rights law. A particularly compelling and relevant component of human rights law is the safety and well-being of children - international legal protection of children is extremely strong, yet they are under increasing threat in the oPt. Both charter- and treaty-based UN bodies continue to call on Israel to meet its obligations, as do the concerned Special Rapporteurs. Ensuring respect specifically for the Fourth Geneva Convention, however, clearly requires increased commitment from all the State Parties to the Conventions.

UNRWA's role is to provide humanitarian and human development services to the Palestine refugee population, but this task becomes considerably more difficult when the basic principles of the laws of armed conflict, proportionality of attack, and discrimination between civilian and military targets, go unheeded; the security of staff and facilities cannot be guaranteed, and the spiralling costs of the continued destruction fall squarely on the Palestine refugee population and on UNRWA.

UNRWA is particularly concerned about the near-term prospects for the Gaza Strip. While a well-coordinated Israeli disengagement involving the Palestinian Authority and guided by the Quartet's "Road Map" has real potential to improve humanitarian conditions and political stability, a withdrawal that is not accompanied by a radical easing of movement restrictions for both people and goods, will only exacerbate economic stagnation, and increase the volatility of the Gaza Strip.

This past year has seen a continuation of violence, loss of life and by far the worst levels destruction since the outbreak of the intifada. UNRWA statistics do little to convey the real amount of suffering.



Jabalia camp November 2004.

1. The Fourth Geneva Convention, adopted in August 1949, Israel states that it does not recognize de jure the applicability of the Convention, claiming that sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip remain disputed.



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### Loss of life and injury

The most extreme result of the conflict has been the loss of life on both sides. The latest figures available from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) report that 3,452 Palestinians living in the oPt were killed from September 2000 to October 2004 with 1,723 dead in the West Bank and 1,729 in the Gaza Strip. One particularly tragic aspect of these statistics has been the number of children<sup>2</sup> killed during this period; 305 and 378 respectively in the two territories. Out of the 27,811 Palestinians injured, 3,581 cases were reported in the period January - September 2004. Since September 2000, Israeli losses have totaled 1,001 dead and 6,979 injured.

### Destruction of property and infrastructure

The focus of home demolition as a result of military activity has been in the Gaza Strip where 1,304 homes have been destroyed from 1st January to 1st November 2004 with 13,350 persons affected. The cumulative number of homes destroyed since September 2000 has reached 2,389, making 22,963 persons homeless in total.

In Rafah, southern Gaza, the Israeli army has continued operations to clear the border line with Egypt of housing, ostensibly with the objective of destroying tunnels. Whilst these operations reached their peak in May 2004, demolitions have continued since then: this has resulted in an inexorable rise in levels of destruction. The rate of home demolitions increased from 15 homes per month in 2002, to 77 homes per month in the first nine months of 2004 in Rafah alone. Finding temporary accommodation for the victims, and later house reconstruction, has been a priority for UNRWA. However, funding shortfalls in 2004 meant that the Agency was only able to cover rental assistance, and the pace of reconstruction has lagged far behind that of demolition. With rates of demolition so high in southern Gaza, even available accommodation for rent is becoming increasingly scarce.



Demolished zone, Rafah camp, Gaza, November 2004.

Nor is this level of destruction confined to Rafah. During the Israeli army's "Operation Days of Penitence" incursion into northern Gaza in October 2004, 675 Palestinians were made homeless during the operation: 91 homes, for 143

2. Defined by UNICEF as those under 18 years.



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families, were destroyed. Over 90 percent of those affected were refugees. The total cost of rebuilding these homes is estimated at around US\$ 2.5 million. A further 101 homes (housing 833 persons) sustained damage. The majority of homes destroyed were on the eastern edge of the Jabalia refugee camp, close to Block 4. This was the single most intense house demolition operation in northern Gaza since the start of the second *intifada*<sup>(3)</sup>.

Israeli army incursions have also seriously damaged water, sewage and power networks. For example initial estimates suggest that damage to the road network in Beit Hanoun alone amounts to more than US\$ 2 million. In Rafah, the cost of repairs of water pipes and installations destroyed during Israeli military activities amounts to approximately US\$ 250,000 every six months<sup>(4)</sup>.

The wholesale destruction of orchards has contributed to food insecurity in Gaza. Over 50 percent of Beit Hanoun's agricultural land, mainly comprising citrus and olive trees, has been destroyed in the last four years on the basis that trees provide cover for the launching of Qassam rockets at settlements and into southern Israeli towns. Levelling has also taken place around Israeli settlements in Gaza, to create 'security' areas. Particularly affected are the Moghaga area to the south-east of Nezarim settlement, the area around Morag settlement and around Abu Houli junction, where Israeli settlers cross the major north-south road to enter the Gush Qatif settlement block.

The West Bank has been affected to a lesser degree but nonetheless, 382 refugee shelters have been destroyed from the start of the *intifada* to the end of September 2004 and 298 suffered major damage.

### Closure measures

In addition to the overt violence that affects the Palestinian refugees in the oPt, movement is increasingly difficult, which drastically affects people's ability to support themselves, and access educational and health facilities, as well as food sources. The net effect of these measures has been to put normal life on hold in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip with hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, predominantly young males, effectively condemned to town arrest. Most Gazans studying at West Bank academic institutions have not seen their families for over four years, despite the fact that they live less than two hours' drive away. The constantly changing nature of the permit systems make even routine journeys arduous and unpredictable, with Palestinians regularly abused and humiliated at checkpoints and kept waiting for long periods.

The oPt is controlled by a dense network of fixed and flying checkpoints, road blocks, earth mounds and other measures used to monitor and restrict Palestinian movement. Over 700 closure measures currently restrict movement of Palestinian goods and people inside the West Bank, while the Gaza Strip is often divided into three sections by checkpoints. The residents of the small enclaves of al-Mawasi and Sifa in Gaza live under one of the tightest localised closure regimes. Residents of these areas have effectively been trapped inside since April 2004. Severe restrictions are in place on entry and exit of residents, food commodities and building materials as well as the passage of children to schools outside.

Internal closure in the West Bank is often reinforced by curfews. During the twenty months from June 2002 - February 2004, Hebron was under curfew 40 percent of the time, Nablus 32 percent, Tulkarem 31 percent, Jenin 26 percent, Bethlehem 18 percent, Ramallah 17 percent and Qalqilya 15 percent<sup>(5)</sup>.



Kalandia checkpoint, West Bank.

3. For further details see UNRWA Gaza Field Office, Preliminary Assessment of IDF Operation Days of Penitence, October 2004
4. For further details see UNRWA/OCHA Rafah Humanitarian Needs Assessment, June 2004.
5. [www.palestinercs.org](http://www.palestinercs.org)



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Israel has imposed heavy restrictions on the road networks, preventing Palestinians from travelling on major highways between urban centres in the West Bank. According to the Israeli human rights organisation B'Tselem, Israel restricts Palestinian travel on forty-one roads and sections of roads throughout the West Bank, totalling more than 700 kilometres (km) of roadway<sup>(6)</sup>. Palestinian travel is also regulated through a complex system of permits, regularly subject to change without notice, by which Israel allows some Palestinians access to Jerusalem and to the 'seam area' between the wall/fence and the 1967 "Green Line."



Shepherds by the Jerusalem wall, Abu Dis, West Bank.

Since 2000, Israel has also tightened "external closure" on both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Permits that Palestinians require in order to travel into Israel or cross other borders have, in many cases, been cancelled. Borders are frequently sealed by Israel, particularly following security incidents or on the occasion of Jewish religious holidays. External closure on Gaza is reinforced by an electric fence, which seals the borders with Israel and Egypt. The Rafah terminal into Egypt was closed for all Palestinians, preventing movement in both directions between 18 July and 6 August 2004. More than 3,000 Palestinians, including many sick patients, were stranded on the Egyptian side, without adequate food and sanitary facilities.

The wall/fence currently being constructed inside the West Bank is compounding movement restrictions, cutting Palestinians off from their land, work and trade opportunities in Israel. Israel began the construction of the wall/fence in June 2002 as a security measure to protect its citizens from suicide attacks. It comprises a system of fences, ditches, razor wire, groomed trace sands, an electronic monitoring system, patrol roads, and a "no-go" buffer zone. Over 185km of this system has already been constructed, and a further 70km is under construction. In many places, the wall/fence veers east of the 1948 armistice line and into the West Bank, isolating Palestinian families from their land, communities and services. A complex, at times Kafka-esque, permit regime is enforced, comprising 13 different permits governing access to areas beyond the wall-fence, including one allowing residents to live in their own homes for a period of just three months!

### Economic deterioration

The results of Israel's security and closure measures described above can be seen most clearly in basic economic indicators<sup>(7)</sup>. One example: in January 2004, the ratio of imports to exports from Israel to Gaza was 3:1. By June of this year, the figure had changed dramatically to 12:1 - representing a significant net transfer of income out of Gaza<sup>(8)</sup>.

The main feature of this marked decline in economic fortunes is unemployment. Historically, the economy of the oPt has been highly dependent on job opportunities in the Israeli labour market and the tightening of the closure regime along the borders with the West Bank and Gaza has had a severe impact on the incomes of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. Gaza has been hit particularly hard. In 1999, 29,865 workers from the Gaza Strip crossed into Israel to work each day. This year an average of 1,946 workers crossed into Israel daily<sup>(9)</sup> although during incursions and holiday closures, this flow of ground to an entire halt. According to research undertaken by UNRWA's Gaza Field Office, the accumulated income from workers crossing in to Israel decreased from US\$7.4 million in January 2004 to US\$1 million in July 2004<sup>(10)</sup>.


The Palestinian economy has been unable to absorb such large numbers of unemployed persons. Private sector growth has been crippled by the restrictions on movement of goods and the poor investment climate; and, although public

6. "The Forbidden Road Regime in the West Bank", B'Tselem, August 2004
7. World Bank, Disengagement, the Palestinian Economy and the Settlements, June 2004
8. Gaza on the Edge, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), October 2004
9. Gaza on the Edge, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), October 2004
10. Monitoring Report on Freedom of Movement of People and Goods in the Gaza Strip, UNRWA, July 2004.



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
sector employment in the Palestinian Authority has increased markedly during the past four years, it has not been sufficient to stem the spiralling rise in unemployment. According to the latest figures available from the PCBS, unemployment in Gaza rose from 15.5 percent in the 3rd quarter of 2000 to 36.8 percent in the 3rd quarter of 2004. Unemployment in the West Bank rose from 7.5 to 22.3 percent in the same period<sup>(11)</sup>.



As job opportunities in Israel have all but dried up, a growth in the informal sector of the economy can be seen.

The impact of this trend can be seen in average incomes over same period. In the West Bank the median household income has decreased by 33 percent and in Gaza by 20 percent<sup>(12)</sup>.

Inevitably, this has led to a sharp increase in poverty. PCBS statistics show that in the latter half of 2004, 62.5 percent of all households in oPt are living below the poverty line<sup>(13)</sup>. In real terms this means that over 2.2 million people are attempting to subsist on less than US\$2 per person per day which puts them below the World Bank's globally defined poverty line.



11. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 29 July 2004. (Note that PCBS uses standard ILO definitions of unemployment, counting those who are not working but actively seeking work)
12. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, August 2004
13. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, August 2004
14. Palestinian Public Perceptions On Their Living Conditions VII, IUED, 2004 (Draft)

Work undertaken by the University of Geneva's Graduate Institute of Development Studies (IUED) on Palestinian Public Perceptions of their Living Conditions shows that, in spite of the social safety net provided by UNRWA, refugee communities remain more vulnerable to these trends than non-refugee populations. According to the most recent report in a time series from the IUED, 36 percent of refugees live under the poverty line against 31 percent of non-refugees<sup>(14)</sup>. Refugees are particularly hard hit as they have traditionally been more dependent on wage labour in Israel, have fewer assets that they can sell and have been hit by repeated Israeli army incursions into camps, leading to a further depletion of their resources.



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### Food insecurity

According to the UN's World Food Programme (WFP), as of mid-2004, approximately 1.3 million people in the occupied Palestinian territory, or 38 percent of the population, were food insecure. A further 26 percent of the population, or 586,000 people, were at risk of becoming food insecure<sup>(15)</sup>. Again, refugees were more at risk; 39 percent of refugees were estimated to be food insecure against 36 percent of non-refugees<sup>(16)</sup>. According to research undertaken by the FAO, the food insecure are either the "chronic poor" (which is equivalent to UNRWA's Special Hardship Case definition), or the "new poor". This latter group consists of people who have lost assets due to the emergency (farmers, home and land owners), farmers who have lost access to markets, and workers who have lost jobs<sup>(17)</sup>.

In the West Bank, food insecurity levels bear a close correlation to the path of the wall/fence, while this area in the past, with high levels of agricultural activity, used to be more food-secure than others<sup>(18)</sup>. In the Gaza Strip, the food insecure are characterized by female-headed households, fishing households, farmers, households "locked" into enclaves by security zones (such as Siafa and al-Mawasi), and the unemployed<sup>(19)</sup>.

In the West Bank as well there are pockets of high food-insecurity. In the Hebron district, 61 percent of the population is food-insecure; in the Salfit district the figure is 79 percent, and in the Tubas district 90 percent. In the Gaza Strip, the highest food-insecurity can be seen in Jabalia Camp where 83 percent of the population is deemed vulnerable. In the Gaza district, 62 percent is food-insecure, in Deir al Balah 66 percent, and in Rafah 62 percent<sup>(20)</sup>. Moreover, due to worse levels of poverty, overcrowding and limited access to fresh foodstuffs, in general, the quality of food intake is worse in Gaza than the West Bank<sup>(21)</sup>.

As incomes have declined and savings been exhausted, Palestinian households have resorted to purchasing food through credit with shopkeepers and neighbours, forgoing payment of utilities, and selling assets. Real food consumption per capita has fallen by 25-30 percent since the intifada began, as Palestinians have reduced the number of meals consumed. Many have substituted their normal diets with cheaper staples to counter the rise in consumer prices of fresh foods as well as basic food commodities. Others struggle to get by through assistance from relatives.

Previous research shows that children are particularly vulnerable to deficiencies in their levels of food and micro-nutrient intake<sup>(22)</sup>. Likewise, women are disproportionately affected by food insecurity, as in times of scarcity they tend to feed men and children with protein, while substituting protein with additional carbohydrates in their own diets.



UNRWA food distribution centre, Khan Younis, Gaza.

15. Emergency Food Security Needs Assessment report", WFP oPt, June 2004.
16. UN OCHA, Consolidated Appeals Process document, November 2004.
17. Report of the Food Security Assessment, West Bank and Gaza Strip, FAO, 2004 (Data collected February through July 2003).
18. Report of the Food Security Assessment, West Bank and Gaza Strip, FAO, 2004 (Data collected February through July 2003).
19. Report of the Food Security Assessment, West Bank and Gaza Strip, FAO, 2004 (Data collected February through July 2003).
20. Report of the Food Security Assessment, West Bank and Gaza Strip, FAO, 2004 (Data collected February through July 2003).
21. Nutritional Assessment of West Bank and Gaza Strip 2003, CARE, 2004, quoted in UN OCHA Consolidated Appeals Process document, November 2004.
22. For example, see CARE and Save the Children, Humanitarian Update on West Bank and Gaza, April 2003





## THE PHYSICAL TOLL ON PEOPLE AND PROPERTY

### Humanitarian Access

UNRWA is mandated by the UN General Assembly to provide education, health, relief and social services to Palestine refugees. In spite of this clear expression of will from the international community, the Agency continues to face significant obstacles placed in its path in the fulfilment of this mandate in the oPt.



UNRWA relief convoy, Rafah, May 2004.

In the Gaza Strip, 2004 has been the worst year by far since the start of the intifada for the movement of both personnel and commodities.

Heightened security measures at the Karni commercial checkpoint, in the wake of an attack by Palestinian militants on the port of Ashdod, impacted on UNRWA's service delivery in 2004 and forced the Agency to suspend its emergency food distribution programme on two occasions. The most recent round of emergency distributions, due to begin on 10 June 2004, did not start until the beginning of October, affecting around 600,000 persons - almost two-thirds of the refugee population. Delays at Karni and Ashdod port are estimated to have cost UNRWA around US\$ 4.5 million since September 2000.

Hundreds of thousands of working hours have been lost as a result of internal closures in the Gaza Strip since Sept 2000. These are estimated to have cost the Agency around USD 6.2 million.

Restrictions on the movement of UNRWA international staff into, and around, Gaza in 2004 have led to considerable disruptions to Agency operations. The Erez crossing between Gaza and Israel - the sole crossing point civilians are permitted to use - has been closed to non-diplomats, who constitute the majority of UNRWA's international work force, on 20 percent of all days in 2004. Even when the crossing is officially open, staff often spend several hours waiting to cross. In view of the heightened UN security phase in Gaza<sup>(23)</sup> and the relocation of most of the international staff from UNRWA's Gaza Headquarters for their own protection and wellbeing in July 2004, the movement of staff in and out has become even more crucial.

In the West Bank, incidents of denied and delayed access continue to affect Agency operations. In September 2004 alone, 1,228 duty hours were lost due to access problems. A particular difficulty concerns the West Bank Field Office, located in East Jerusalem. Staff with West Bank identity cards are required to have a special permit to enter the city. At present, 90 staff members (i.e. 20 percent of the Field Office staff complement) have been denied permits to access their place of work on unspecified "security" grounds. Again, this situation in the West Bank was compounded by the staff strike in the autumn of 2004.

23. Level Four, the next to, highest security level, was imposed on 21 July 2004



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Delivery of humanitarian assistance has been particularly affected in the 'seam' zone which lies between the Green Line and the wall/fence, as the Israeli army routinely require permits from UNRWA staff. Several cases have been recorded where access of distribution and medical teams has been prevented altogether. UNRWA's West Bank operation is preparing for a worst case scenario of increased closures and full construction of the wall/fence, including the identification and costing of measures that may need to be adopted in order to counter increased restrictions on access for staff. According to this early assessment, a total of 195 employees will have their access to Jerusalem made either difficult or impossible by the projected future route of the wall/fence.

Such obstacles placed in the path of effective delivery of services to Palestine refugees are wholly in contravention, both of the spirit and the letter, of agreements reached with the Israeli authorities during the mission of the UN Secretary-General's Personal Humanitarian Envoy, Catherine Bertini, in August 2002.



Gate in the West Bank wall/fence, Qalqilya, West Bank.



## UNRWA'S RESPONSE

In response to the deepening humanitarian crisis in the oPt, UNRWA has developed a refined package of measures to mitigate the worst effects of the conflict on refugee communities. This comprises:

**Employment Programmes** consisting of both direct and indirect hire to address the impact of closure measures on job opportunities in Israel and the local market with the subsequent reduction in household income;

**Cash and In-kind Assistance** aimed at the poorest refugee families to supplement income and provide an immediate response to the loss of basic home contents resulting from home demolitions;

**Food Assistance** where UNRWA distributes a basic basket of food commodities to those refugee households assessed as being in greatest need

**Reconstruction and repair of conflict damaged infrastructure** which seeks to address the toll of destruction of refugee homes, focussed on northern and southern areas of the Gaza Strip

**Health Programming** consisting of support to mobile health teams in the West Bank where operations seek to maintain access to basic healthcare provision and combat the restrictions placed on access by refugees' to their usual healthcare providers;

**Operations Support Officer Programme** which assists the Field-based programme staff in continuing to deliver services as well as supporting both the monitoring of social conditions and continued neutrality of the Agency's premises; and

**Support for the Agency's operations**, to cover the additional costs of a range of measures undertaken as a result of the crisis to ensure continuity of service provision.

The 2005 Emergency Appeal differs from previous Appeals. In response to the Agency's concern that emergency programming should be focussed as tightly as possible around meeting the immediate needs of Palestine refugees, a number of key changes have been made to the programme in 2005 as follows:

UNRWA has transferred a number of activities from its emergency budget to its General Fund in recognition of the long-term nature of the problems which they address, and in recognition of the under-funding of previous appeals. Note that this does not mean that UNRWA is discontinuing such activities; it is merely changing the structure through which they are funded. Programmes and sub-programmes affected are:

Under the Health Programme, the provision of medical supplies, assistance with hospitalisation costs, physiotherapy and environmental health programming;

Under the Psycho-social Support Programme, counselling and other forms of support delivered under both the Education and Health Programmes; and

Under the Education Programme, remedial and distance learning activities, extra-curricular activities for schoolchildren as well as vocational training.



## Emergency employment

## UNRWA'S RESPONSE

**Objective:** Contain and mitigate the socio-economic crisis facing the refugee population through temporary job creation using both direct hire (where UNRWA both funds and directs the programme of work) and indirect hire (where UNRWA funds and supervises activities implemented through community organisations). Note that the maintenance of UNRWA's service levels and infrastructure is a secondary objective of the temporary job creation programme

**UNRWA's job creation programme has made a significant contribution to maintaining minimum levels of income for Palestine refugees during the emergency. Since the Direct Hire programmes began, over 4 million job days have been provided in the Gaza Strip and over 1 million job days in the West Bank. Likewise, Indirect Hire programmes have created over 100,000 job days in Gaza and over 260,000 job days in the West Bank.**

### Direct Hire Sub-Programme

Under the Direct Hire component of this programme, UNRWA plans to provide over 2.6 million job days in 2005. In Gaza, the 1,900,000 workdays proposed will benefit over 200,000 refugees (jobholders plus dependents) and employ up to 6,800 persons each month and a total of 27,200 over the year. In the West Bank, 787,800 job days will be created to the benefit of 8,619 individuals and their dependents in 2005. Both Fields rotate job opportunities on a three monthly basis for most posts to ensure that benefits are spread as widely as possible whilst maintaining effectiveness.



Emergency job creation programme, Gaza Strip.

By targeting very poor and unemployed persons with large families, jobs created under the Direct Hire programme will provide income support for an average of six dependents per person employed, at a wage of US\$10 to US\$12 per working day. This will provide income support of approximately US\$2 per day for each dependent. This daily rate is set below the general market rate (ensuring an element of self-targeting among those in greatest need) while encouraging workers to seek regular employment as soon as the economy improves.

The majority of those hired under the programme, including medical personnel, administrative staff, labourers and guards will serve for a maximum period of three months. However, certain professional categories such as engineers, health workers, social workers, teachers, sanitation and food distribution supervisors,



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serve for the length of a specific project or operation. In Gaza, the programme will also include qualified professionals and labourers hired on behalf of institutions outside UNRWA, including local municipalities and community rehabilitation centres. The Agency will be responsible for hiring and paying these people directly and a close monitoring mechanism will ensure proper implementation of the programme.

### Indirect Hire Sub-Programme

To increase the efficiency of use of funds, UNRWA has changed the emphasis of this sub-programme. Whereas in previous Appeals, larger infrastructural works were used as employment creation mechanisms, experience has shown that these are often subject to disruption due to closures and, in the West Bank, difficulties with planning permission from the Israeli authorities. The Agency has also concluded that the ratio of labour to material costs was low in such projects. As such, a refocusing on the objectives was required.

In 2005, this sub-programme will consist of a larger number of smaller-scale projects that can be executed in a short timeframe whilst generating the highest possible number of work opportunities. In addition to the income generated, camp residents will benefit from a cleaner environment and safer water.

Through its 2005 Appeal, UNRWA in Gaza is planning to create approximately 34,000 job days through the pavement of dirt roads and alleys in camps, and 21,000 job days in maintenance and renovation works at UNRWA installations

In the West Bank, a total number of 76,689 job-days will be created, providing employment for 5,777 labourers on a fortnightly and monthly rotation basis (depending on the task), and benefiting 30,000 dependents (11 percent of the camp population).

The main components of the programme consist of the laying, repair or maintenance of pathways, sewers and drains; building of retaining/boundary walls; rehabilitation of cisterns; maintenance of agricultural roads and drains; cleaning and the removal of solid waste.

Camp Popular Committees will implement many of the programme activities in the West Bank inside refugee camps, while agriculture-related tasks will be managed through the partnership with the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees. UNRWA will maintain an active monitoring role through its specialised and technical staff.

Emergency Employment					
Description	West Bank		Gaza Strip		Total US\$
	No. Job Days	Cost US\$	No. Job Days	Cost US\$	
Direct Hire	787,800	11,264,462	1,900,000	21,354,419	32,618,881
Indirect Hire	76,689	1,795,766	34,000	2,461,276	4,257,042
Sub-total	864,489	13,060,228	1,934,000	23,815,695	36,875,923
PSC @ 11%		1,436,625		2,619,726	4,056,352
<b>Total</b>		<b>14,496,853</b>		<b>26,435,421</b>	<b>40,932,275</b>



## Food assistance

## UNRWA'S RESPONSE

**Objective:** To combat malnutrition and micro-nutrient deficiencies and counteract the problems of physical and economic access to food by providing food security nets comprising a basket of six basic commodities that are not produced or are not available locally at an affordable cost. An indirect benefit of the Programme also is that it frees up scarce household funds for other essential needs.

**UNRWA's Emergency Food Assistance Programme has delivered almost four million food parcels in the West Bank and Gaza since the start of the intifada. Food aid has been targeted at refugee households that have lost their income altogether and those whose incomes have been severely disrupted. The Agency will continue to coordinate activities with the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Social Affairs and WFP in order to avoid duplication. Families in areas under curfew or closure and those facing crises, resulting for example from evacuation have also been assisted. In such cases, the Agency assists both refugees and non-refugees indiscriminately.**

Prior to the *intifada*, UNRWA distributed food only to those families that met the criteria for its Special Hardship Case programme, providing 60 percent of their calorific requirements. Since 2001, UNRWA has capitalized on its extensive logistical network and expanded food distribution to families affected by the conflict. Lists of beneficiaries are regularly reviewed by the Agency's social workers working under the Relief and Social Services Department in coordination with the Ministry of Social Affairs and WFP to identify families most in need of food assistance. They have an in-depth knowledge of the area and community they work in and can easily verify conditions of beneficiaries, so as to ensure that criteria of eligibility are met. Commodities procured by UNRWA are distributed by the Agency's own emergency distribution teams.

Under each round in 2005, every family should receive a single parcel, the composition of which depends on the family size. Established research calls for additional sources of protein to meet the nutritional needs of refugees in the oPt to directly address the threat of malnutrition. For this reason, in addition to the standard food basket budgeted for in 2005 (containing flour, rice, sugar, oil, whole milk powder and lentils), UNRWA will continue to request from donors in-kind donations of additional commodities providing animal protein, for example in the form of canned fish, corned beef and other similar products acceptable to the population. These items would be provided as a supplement to families on an ad hoc basis, depending on the provision of these goods.



UNRWA food distribution, West Bank.



## Food assistance

## UNRWA'S RESPONSE

In 2005, the Agency aims to provide staple commodities to 132,000 families throughout the Gaza Strip. Here, high unemployment and levels of poverty have led to an increase in the number of families in need of food aid and other types of emergency assistance. Accordingly, the target number of families benefiting from the Agency's emergency food aid operation has been increased modestly from 128,000 families in 2004. This figure includes a small number of non-refugee families residing in areas under strict siege or those who have had their homes demolished during Israeli military operations.

In the West Bank, UNRWA should provide the same level of food assistance to 94,294 households (including a small number of societies), amounting to 450,000 individuals. UNRWA will distribute a standard food package on a quarterly basis.

Note that this Appeal makes provision for six rounds of emergency food distribution in Gaza in 2005 instead of the usual eight. Due to closures and intense military activity in both the north and south of the Gaza Strip during 2004 which prevented the Agency from carrying out some of its planned food aid, funds provided this year have been carried forward for an additional two rounds of distribution. This will ensure that emergency food assistance continues to meet the Agency norm of providing 60 percent of calorific nutritional requirements to those most in need.

Food Security					
Description	West Bank		Gaza Strip		Total US\$
	Target Households	Cost US\$	Target Households	Cost US\$	
Food commodities (flour, rice, sugar, oil, whole milk powder, lentils) and related transport/storage and distribution costs	94,294	21,437,645	132,000	27,026,463	48,464,108
PSC @ 11%		2,358,141		2,972,911	5,331,052
<b>Total</b>		<b>23,795,786</b>		<b>29,999,374</b>	<b>53,795,160</b>



## UNRWA'S RESPONSE

### Cash and In-kind Assistance

**Objective:** To enable the most vulnerable families most affected by the crisis to meet urgent needs

Since launching its Flash Appeal in October 2000, UNRWA has distributed over US\$12.5 million in cash assistance grants in Gaza and over US\$9 million in the West Bank. In-kind assistance, in the form of tents, blankets, mattresses and kitchen kits, is provided mainly to those whose homes have been demolished through Israeli military activity. Over 110,000 items have been distributed in the Gaza Strip and over 30,000 in the West Bank since the uprising began.

In the Gaza Strip, UNRWA seeks to continue extending cash assistance to families facing severe economic hardship to help them meet their most urgent basic needs. In the majority of cases, amounts will be disbursed to the families who have lost their main source of income either due to unemployment, imprisonment or the death of the main breadwinner. In the main, funds are used to cover the cost of essential items such as food, clothing and schooling supplies and to pay utility bills. Specific grants are made available to cover hospital fees and funeral expenses.



Homeless refugee, Rafah camp, Gaza May 2004.

The other main category of beneficiaries will be those whose homes have been demolished; in these cases relocation fees will be provided to enable them to secure alternative accommodation until replacement housing is made available. Emergency supplies (tents, blankets, mattresses) will also be provided.

The size of the cash grant is determined by UNRWA's social workers after a thorough assessment of the household's financial situation, taking into consideration income prior to the start of the current crisis and assistance from other sources which might be available. In Gaza, grants made available under this programme include: relocation fees, \$1,200 (on average covering rental costs, renewable); loss of income, \$270 (one time payment); and post injury social care, \$270 (one time payment). UNRWA in Gaza will also assist a small number of community-based service providers who offer relief and social services to the population. In the West Bank, the average cash grant totals \$300 per family.

In 2005, 31,300 refugee families will benefit from this programme in the Gaza Strip and 20,000 families in the West Bank.

Cash and in-kind assistance					
Description	West Bank		Gaza Strip		Total US\$
	Target Households	Cost US\$	Target Households	Cost US\$	
Cash Assistance	18,000	4,616,276	30,200	10,885,000	15,501,276
In-kind	2,000	600,000	1,100	540,000	1,140,000
Financial support provided via local NGOs				85,000	85,000
Sub-total		5,216,276		11,510,000	16,726,276
PSC @ 11%		573,090		1,266,100	1,839,890
<b>Total</b>		<b>5,790,066</b>		<b>12,776,100</b>	<b>18,566,166</b>





## Reconstruction and repair of conflict-damaged infrastructure

## UNRWA'S RESPONSE

**Objective:** Meeting the housing needs of families made homeless, and repairing damages caused to shelters, community infrastructure and UNRWA installations

Since the *intifada* began in September 2000, UNRWA's rehousing programme has struggled to keep pace with the rate of destruction brought to bear. The Agency has so far been able to re-house only 505 families in 477 dwelling units and repair 1,043 damaged shelters in Gaza, due to a shortage of funds. An additional 190 dwelling units to accommodate 210 families are currently under construction. In the West Bank, the Agency has been able to rebuild a total of 339 shelters and rehabilitate 277 cases of major damage.

During the first four years of the *intifada*, to September 2004, over 23,000 persons have been made homeless in the Gaza Strip by Israeli military operations. More than 2,500 homes were destroyed and about 3,000 damaged. Refugees account for over 80 percent of those affected. The rate of demolition has more than doubled from one year to another, from 32 shelters per month in 2002 to 65 per month in 2003 to 120 per month during the first eight months of 2004. Around two thirds of all demolitions have taken place in Rafah, particularly along the border line with Egypt. Between September 2000 and August 2004, over 16,000 persons - or 10 percent of the population of Rafah - had their homes destroyed. A further 10 percent had their homes damaged. The Agency can only register its alarm at these statistics.



UNRWA's assessments show that around 2,800 of the refugee families whose homes had, by 31 August 2004, been destroyed in Gaza are eligible for re-housing. In order to re-house the 2,400 remaining families, plus the additional rehousing requirements due to projected demolitions up to the end of December 2004 (on the assumption that the present rate of 120 demolitions per month continues), the Agency will require over US\$56 million. An additional US\$1 million will be required to repair shelters damaged during Israeli military operations. Note that no provision has been made in this Appeal for anticipated home demolitions in 2005, due to the considerable uncertainty surrounding the political situation, but the Agency may be compelled to launch a supplementary appeal later in the year, if circumstances require such action.

Due to repeated incursions by the Israeli army into refugee camps and surrounding areas, community infrastructure and UNRWA installations are regularly damaged.



## Reconstruction and repair of conflict-damaged infrastructure

## UNRWA'S RESPONSE

The services most affected are water, sewerage, storm water drainage, roads and electricity. If hostilities continue in 2005, as is widely anticipated, there will be further damages which will require urgent intervention. UNRWA in Gaza has therefore made a projected provision of approximately US\$2 million to enable it to repair infrastructural damage expected to occur in 2005.

The West Bank has suffered to a lesser degree in this respect. However, since 2000, a total of 12,521 shelters sustained varying degrees of damage as a direct or indirect result of operations conducted in the West Bank. Out of these, 382 were completely destroyed and 298 suffered major damages, rendering them hazardous for their inhabitants. UNRWA in 2005 plans to rebuild 70 shelters and undertake structural repairs on a further 60, in all benefiting 750 refugees.

Reconstruction and repair of conflict damaged infrastructure			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	
Description	Cost US\$	Cost US\$	US\$
Shelter reconstruction	1,180,000	56,171,672	57,351,672
Shelter repair	390,428	1,000,000	1,390,428
Repair of damaged infrastructure	226,361	2,090,090	2,316,451
Sub-total	1,796,789	59,261,762	61,058,551
PSC @ 11%	197,647	6,518,794	6,716,441
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,994,436</b>	<b>65,780,556</b>	<b>67,774,992</b>



## Emergency Health Programme

## UNRWA'S RESPONSE

**Objective:** Meet the additional burden on the healthcare system owing to the newly emerging needs and challenges and facilitate access to health services in locations affected by closures and the wall/fence in the West Bank. This programme does not run in the Gaza Strip due to its smaller geographical size and the concentration of camp-based refugees who are able to access services locally.

Composed of a medical officer, practical nurse, laboratory technician, pharmacist and lab technician/driver, mobile health units visit villages on a weekly or bi-weekly schedule. The teams will offer a full range of essential medical services including maternal and child health services, immunisation, control of communicable and non-communicable diseases, as well as provide first aid of treatment for conflict-related injuries. A total of 61,315 patients were seen and 699 visits carried out in the first half of 2004.

There are currently five mobile teams in the West Bank, each serving an average of 100 patients during each visit. In addition to maintaining the running costs of the five teams, during 2005, the Agency is seeking to create two new mobile units in the Nablus and Hebron areas. These additions will bring the total number of teams to seven, and enable 14,000 patients to receive essential health care every month.

Emergency Health Programme		
	West Bank	
Description	Cost US\$	Total US\$
Mobile Health Teams	627,462	627,462
Sub-total	627,462	627,462
PSC @ 11%	69,021	69,021
<b>Total</b>	<b>696,483</b>	<b>696,483</b>



Mobile medical team, West Bank.



## Operations Support Officer Programme

## UNRWA'S RESPONSE

**Objective:** Mitigate restrictions on freedom of movement, prevent disruptions in the Agency's humanitarian services and ensure its continued neutrality.

Since the start of the intifada, restrictions on movement imposed by the Israeli authorities have posed the largest problem for UNRWA's operations in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Checkpoints and blocked roads have made travel in the West Bank arduous and often dangerous. On any given day, hundreds of the Agency's employees are unable to reach their workplace; this continues to cause major organisational difficulties.

Through the Operations Support Officer Programme, UNRWA seeks to address restrictions on freedom of movement and prevent, to the maximum possible, disruptions in its humanitarian services. The Programme also enables the Agency to develop a complementary role in monitoring the needs of refugees in changing circumstances and safeguard the integrity of its installations through thorough inspections carried out on a regular basis. It helps the Agency respond to challenges while providing visible reassurance to the refugees that UNRWA remains a source of strength and stability.

For the purposes of this Appeal, it is assumed that there will be a continuing requirement for the OSO Programme in the oPt after current funding arrangements expire<sup>(24)</sup>.

Operations Support Officer Programme			
	West Bank	Gaza	
Description	Cost US\$	Cost US\$	Total US\$
OSO Programme	607,308	218,000	825,308
PSC @ 11%	66,804	23,980	90,784
<b>Total</b>	<b>674,112</b>	<b>241,980</b>	<b>916,092</b>



Operations Support Officers escorting a relief convoy, Rafah, May 2004.

24. An earmarked donor contribution covers the OSO programme's activities until 31 August 2005.



## Emergency-imposed Operational Requirements



West Bank checkpoint.

## UNRWA'S RESPONSE

Over the past four years, the Agency's ability to deliver its regular activities as well as its emergency aid has been severely affected as a result of the numerous mobility and access restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities.

Internal checkpoints, especially the one erected at the Abu Houli-Gush Qatif junction in the Gaza Strip (which when closed bisects the territory into two separate areas) are closed and reopened at the will of Israeli soldiers without prior notice. Consequently, Agency staff members are often prevented from reaching their duty stations at all or arrive late. Agency cars and buses carrying local staff are often prevented from crossing or are delayed at checkpoints. In addition to the major disruptions these measures cause to the Agency's operations, the resultant stress negatively impacts on the morale of the staff members.

In its previous emergency appeals, the Agency made special provisions for requirements to enhance its operational and logistical capacities and cover other emergency related expenses. Additional vehicles and communications and other types of equipment have been procured, additional staff have been recruited under the emergency employment generation programme, essential staff have been compensated for working additional hours and hotel accommodation expenses plus meal allowances have been covered for some key staff members from the middle and the south of Gaza. These additional pressures on the Agency's budget remain and so are included as part of this Appeal. There is also the need to extend the position of the Emergency Programme Implementation Officer (EPIO) for a further twelve months which provides a key monitoring role for the Agency's emergency programming.

Likewise in the West Bank, due to the sharp increase in the level of Agency activities as a response to the emergency, UNRWA has had to strengthen its own support structures. At field level, this has led to the need to hire new staff in the Finance and Administration Departments to deal with an increased number of transactions and increased number of permits and ID-related paperwork.

### Emergency related operational requirements

	West Bank	Gaza	
Description	Cost US\$	Cost US\$	Total US\$
Hotel accommodation		576,000	576,000
Over time and casual staff		483,600	483,600
Additional office equipment, stationary, utility expenses		116,900	116,900
Other emergency operations support expenses	1,439,835	340,000	1,779,835
Sub-total	1,439,835	1,516,500	2,956,335
PSC @ 6% <sup>(25)</sup>	86,390	90,990	177,380
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,526,225</b>	<b>1,607,490</b>	<b>3,133,715</b>

25. A lower rate of PSC (overhead costs) is charged for this activity, due to the smaller amount of administration required.



## MONITORING AND EVALUATION

In order to allow the Agency to assess the performance of its emergency programming, costs have been included within programmes to allow for the monitoring of progress. Under its standard reporting system for emergency activities, UNRWA will continue to issue reports on a quarterly basis.

At a more strategic level, UNRWA's programme of cooperation with the University of Geneva's Graduate Institute of Development Studies (IUED) on data collection will also bring benefits during 2005 for the targeting of emergency programmes and strengthen the needs-based approach already adopted.

The situation in oPt is under constant review by UNRWA. The Agency will be prepared to act quickly in response to developments on the ground such as disengagement. To account for the fluid nature of the situation, UNRWA will undertake a mid-term review of its emergency provision during 2005. As was the case during 2004 in response to events in Rafah, UNRWA may require to develop supplementary appeals during the course of the year.

## Summary Financial Requirements

Summary Table			
Programme	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Total
Employment	14,496,853	26,435,421	40,932,275
Food	23,795,786	29,999,374	53,795,160
Cash and in-kind	5,790,066	12,776,100	18,566,166
Reconstruction	1,994,436	65,780,556	67,774,992
Health	696,483		696,483
Operational Support Officers	674,112	241,980	916,092
Emergency related costs	1,526,225	1,607,490	3,133,715
<b>Total</b>	<b>48,973,961</b>	<b>136,840,921</b>	<b>185,814,882</b>

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