Nuclear naval propulsion

Working paper submitted by Indonesia

1. The issue of nuclear naval propulsion program presents a unique case that deserved serious attention, be it from the perspective of disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and safeguards measures.

2. This issue prompts some concerns, such as:
   a. The uranium enriched to fuel naval propulsion reactors is above levels used in civilian power reactors, near-weapons-grade levels, and even weapons-grade, which poses a growing risk to achieving the non-proliferation goals of the NPT;
   b. The exclusion of the production, use, and disposition of Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) for nuclear naval propulsion from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, could be exploited to provide a shield for diversion of that material to nuclear weapons program;
   c. The use and sharing of nuclear technologies and materials in the military purposes could run counter to the spirit and objectives of the NPT, as it could potentially set precedence for other similar arrangements, and complicate safeguards mechanism needed to prevent risks arising from such arrangements including, but not limited to, the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destructions (WMDs), derived from the combination of nuclear materials and conventional weapons;
   d. The application of nuclear materials for nuclear naval propulsion possesses safety risks, considering the possibility of accidents and exposure, which may occur during transportation, maintenance, and use. Such accidents and exposure may cause humanitarian and environmental consequences.

3. Against that backdrop, there is a driving urgency for the NPT Review Conference and beyond to address such a raising challenge that would impact global effort on progressing disarmament, non-proliferation, and safeguards agenda under the NPT.

4. Indonesia reaffirms the importance of Article I and Article II of the NPT in the context of not to transfer, not to receive the transfer from and to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

5. Indonesia views that any cooperation involving the transfer of nuclear materials and technology for military purposes from Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) to any Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) increases the associated risks and the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences, as well
as navigation risks posed by potential proliferation and conversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons, particularly HEU in the operational status of nuclear naval propulsion.

6. Indonesia recognizes that the IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verification of the fulfillment of safeguards obligations assumed by States Parties under the NPT, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

7. Indonesia emphasizes the significance of Article IV of the NPT on the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Article I and Article II of the Treaty. The realization of such article constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty.

8. Indonesia underscores that economic and technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes should be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of the NPT.

9. Indonesia reaffirms that in conformity with Article VI of the NPT, nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority and the continued lack of progress in the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations by the NWS could undermine the objective and purpose of the NPT and the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

10. Against this backdrop, Indonesia notes with concern the potential consequences of nuclear-powered submarine capability sharing to the global non-proliferation regime.

11. Indonesia calls for strict observance of Article III of the Treaty and reaffirms that under the NPT, all parties must accept the IAEA strict observance by concluding and adhering to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) and applicable additional measures related to the safeguards, such as the Additional Protocol (AP).

12. Indonesia calls upon all States Parties to the NPT to garner political will and create opportunities for IAEA Member States to develop constructive approach on verification and monitoring arrangement of nuclear naval propulsion program, with a view among others to enhance safeguards agreements that tighten monitoring measures for uranium designated for naval propulsion reactors in NNWS to prevent diversion of that material for use in a nuclear weapons program.

13. Indonesia urges all States Parties to the NPT to fully implement their commitment as faithful partners in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons by addressing the three pillars of the NPT in a balanced manner.

14. Indonesia also urges all States Parties to the NPT to refrain from actions that create an environment that is not conducive to nuclear disarmament and that would increase the risk of nuclear conflict, including by avoiding the dual-use of nuclear and conventional military installation and weapon platforms that can be armed with nuclear and conventional weapons.