Note to correspondents - Statement by Virginia Gamba, Head of Joint Investigative Mechanism, on the occasion of the briefing to the Security Council on the Mechanism’s third report

Good afternoon, I just briefed the Security Council on the third report by the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism. The Mechanism conducted an independent, impartial and objective investigation as a sub-organ of the Security Council, led by a 3-member Leadership Panel, which I head. In its task, the mechanism was supported by the OPCW and the UN. In view of the Mechanism’s reporting requirements to the Security Council, let me now turn to the report:  The Mechanism’s third report provides the findings, assessments and conclusions of the Leadership Panel on the nine cases under the Mechanism’s investigation. The Leadership Panel concluded that it had sufficient information to reach a conclusion on the actors involved in three cases: In the cases of Talmenes (21 April 2014) and Sarmin (16 March 2015), the Panel concluded that Syrian Arab armed forces, in particular the air force, were responsible for the attack which released toxic substances. In the case of Marea (21 August 2015), the Panel concluded that there is sufficient information to conclude that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was the only entity with the ability, capability, motive and the means to use sulfur mustard in this attack which released toxic substances. In further three cases the Leadership Panel determined that it had close to sufficient information to reach a conclusion on the actors involved. These cases are: Kafr Zita (18 April 2014), Qmenas (16 March 2015) and Binnish (24 March 2015). In these three cases, the investigation continues with information and analysis forthcoming from forensic institutes and laboratories. The Leadership Panel will provide an update on these three cases in our fourth report due before the end of the Mechanism’s mandate. Finally, the Leadership Panel found insufficient evidence to identify to the greatest extent feasible those involved in the use of chemicals as weapons in another three cases. They are: Kafr Zita (11 April 2014), Al Tamanah (29-30 April 2014) and Al Tamanah (25-26 May 2014). The Panel recommends no further investigation in these cases. To conclude, I wish to note that the Leadership Panel is acutely aware of the ongoing use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. We also note with great concern that there is a diversification of both the type of chemicals used and the actors involved. We cannot allow chemical weapons to become the norm of the already unspeakable conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic or anywhere else.

The perpetrators must be identified and held accountable to deter such actions in the future. It is the Panel’s hope that the results of the Mechanism’s investigation will contribute to this process.