

Peace Talks in Focus 2022. Report on Trends and Scenarios



Peace Talks in Focus 2022.
Report on Trends and Scenarios

Peace Talks in Focus 2022. Report on Trends and Scenarios

Authors:

Iván Navarro Milián
Josep Maria Royo Aspa
Jordi Urgell García
Pamela Urrutia Arestizábal
Ana Villellas Ariño
María Villellas Ariño

Peace Talks in Focus 2022.

Report on Trends and Scenarios

ISBN: 978-84-19200-93-8

Legal deposit: B 18441-2018

Report completed in February 2023

This report was written by:

Iván Navarro Milián, Josep Maria Royo Aspa, Jordi Urgell García, Pamela Urrutia Arestizábal, Ana Villellas Ariño and María Villellas Ariño.

Design: Lucas Wainer Mattosso

Edition: Icaria Editorial / Escola de Cultura de Pau, UAB

Translation: Dustin Langan

Printed by: Ulzama

This book is printed on chlorine-free recycled paper.

The contents of this report are full responsibility of Escola de Cultura de Pau at UAB. The contents do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the ACCD.

Citation:

Escola de Cultura de Pau. *Peace Talks in Focus 2022. Report on Trends and Scenarios.*

Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

This work is part of the series *Peace Talks in Focus. Report on Trends and Scenarios* annually published by the Escola de Cultura de Pau and is subject to a Creative Common International License



The total or partial reproduction, distribution and public communication of the work is permitted, provided that it is not for commercial purposes, and provided that the authorship of the original work is acknowledged. The creation of derivative works is not permitted.

Escola de Cultura de Pau

Edifici B13

Carrer de la Vila Puig

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

08193 Bellaterra (Spain)

Tel: +34 93 581 14 14

Email: pr.conflict.escolapau@uab.cat

Web: <http://escolapau.uab.cat>

Index

Executive summary	7
Introduction	15
1. Negotiations in 2022: global overview and main trends	17
2. Peace negotiations in Africa	35
2.1. Negotiations in 2022: regional trends	36
2.2. Case study analysis	41
Great Lakes and Central Africa	41
Horn of Africa	52
Maghreb – North Africa	56
Southern Africa	61
West Africa	61
3. Peace negotiations in America	67
3.1. Negotiations in 2022: regional trends	67
3.2. Case study analysis	69
North America, Central America and the Caribbean	69
South America	71
4. Peace negotiations in Asia	77
4.1. Negotiations in 2022: regional trends	77
4.2. Case study analysis	80
East Asia	80
South Asia	81
South-east Asia and Oceania	83
5. Peace negotiations in Europe	91
5.1. Negotiations in 2022: regional trends	91
5.2. Case study analysis	94
Eastern Europe	94
Russia and the Caucasus	99
South-east Europe	103
6. Peace negotiations in the Middle East	107
6.1. Negotiations in 2022: regional trends	107
6.2. Case study analysis	111
Mashreq	111
The Gulf	115
Annex 1. Summary of armed conflicts in 2022	121
Glossary	125
About the School for a Culture of Peace	129

List of tables, boxes, graphs and maps

Table 1.1.	Summary of peace processes and negotiations in 2022_____	17
Table 1.2.	Armed conflicts and peace processes in 2022_____	20
Map 1.1	Peace negotiations in 2022_____	21
Graph 1.1.	Regional distribution of peace negotiations_____	22
Table 1.3.	Internal and international peace processes/negotiations with and without third parties_____	23
Table 1.4.	Intergovernmental organisations in peace processes in 2022_____	26
Table 1.5.	Main agreements of 2022_____	30
Table 2.1.	Summary of peace processes and negotiations in Africa in 2022_____	35
Map 2.1.	Peace negotiations in Africa in 2022_____	37
Table 3.1.	Summary of peace processes and negotiations in America in 2022_____	67
Map 3.1.	Peace negotiations in America in 2022_____	68
Table 4.1.	Summary of peace processes and negotiations in Asia in 2022_____	77
Map 4.1.	Peace negotiations in Asia in 2022_____	78
Table 5.1.	Summary of peace processes and negotiations in Europe in 2022_____	91
Map 5.1.	Peace negotiations in Europe in 2022_____	92
Table 6.1.	Summary of peace processes and negotiations in the Middle East in 2022_____	107
Map 6.1.	Peace negotiations in the Middle East in 2022_____	108

Executive summary

Peace negotiations 2022: analysis of trends and scenarios is a yearbook that analyses the peace processes and negotiations that took place in the world during 2022. The examination of the development and dynamics of negotiations worldwide allows to provide a comprehensive overview of peace processes, identify trends and comparatively analyse the various scenarios. One of the main objectives of this report is to provide information and analysis to those who participate in peaceful conflict resolution at different levels, including parties to disputes, mediators, civil society activists and others. The yearbook also aims to grant visibility to different formulas of dialogue and negotiation aimed at reversing dynamics of violence and channelling conflicts through political means in many contexts. Thus, it seeks to highlight, enhance and promote political, diplomatic and social efforts aimed at transforming conflicts and their root causes through peaceful methods.

Methodologically, the report draws mainly on the qualitative analysis of studies and information from many sources (the United Nations, international organisations, research centres, media outlets, NGOs and others), as well as on experience gained during field research. The report also cross-cuttingly incorporates a gender perspective in the study and analysis of peace processes.

The report is divided into six chapters. The first presents a summary and map of the 39 peace processes and negotiations that took place in 2022 and provides an overview of the main global trends. The next five chapters delve into the peace processes and negotiations from a geographic perspective. Each of them addresses the main trends of peace negotiations in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, respectively, and describes the development and dynamics of each case in those regions. At the beginning of each of these five chapters, a map is included indicating the countries where peace processes and negotiations have occurred in 2022.

Peace processes and negotiations in 2022

AFRICA (15)	ASIA (10)	EUROPE (6)
Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West) Chad CAR DRC Eritrea – Ethiopia Ethiopia (Tigray) Libya Mali Morocco – Western Sahara Mozambique Senegal (Casamance) Somalia South Sudan Sudan Sudan – South Sudan	DPR Korea – Republic of Korea DPR Korea – USA India (Assam) India (Nagaland) Myanmar Pakistan Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) Philippines (MILF) Philippines (NDF) Thailand (south)	Armenia–Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) Cyprus Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) Moldova (Transdniestria) Serbia – Kosovo Ukraine
	AMERICA (4)	MIDDLE EAST (4)
	Colombia (FARC) Colombia (ELN) Haiti Venezuela	Iran (nuclear programme) Palestine Syria Yemen


Negotiations in 2022: global overview and main trends

During 2022, a total of 39 peace processes and negotiations were identified on a worldwide level. Most of the cases analyzed were concentrated in Africa, which hosted 15, equivalent to 39% of the total. Asia was the region with the second-highest number of cases, with a total of 10, representing 26% of the negotiations in 2021. The rest of the negotiations were distributed between Europe, with six (15%), the Middle East, with four (10%) and the Americas, with four (10%).

Slightly more peace processes and negotiations were analysed worldwide than in 2021, when there were 37. However, the number did not reach as high as in

previous years, since there were 40 in 2020, 50 in 2019 and 49 in 2018. The largest increase occurred in Africa, which went from 12 to 15 cases due to three new ones: Chad, Ethiopia (Tigray) and Senegal (Casamance). There were also more negotiations in the Americas, with the activation of the dialogue in Haiti. Although the same number of cases was observed in Asia in 2021, the talks in Afghanistan broke down with the rise of the Taliban regime in 2021, but a new negotiating process began in Pakistan in 2022, though it broke down by the end of the year. In Europe, Russia's invasion of Ukraine spilled over and amplified the previous conflict in eastern Ukraine and scuttled

Regional distribution of peace negotiations in 2022



the previous negotiating process. The case of Russia-Ukraine is included in the yearbook because both countries held political and military negotiations for several months in 2022. Even though the parties considered the negotiations to have reached a dead end between April and May, talks remained

There were 39 peace and negotiating processes around the world in 2022

active in other areas, such as humanitarian issues, grain exports and the protection of nuclear infrastructure. In Europe, there was one less case than in 2021, the tenth anniversary of the definitive cessation of ETA's armed activity in the Basque Country. Finally, there was one case less than the previous year in the Middle East. The negotiations between Israel and Palestine were not counted given their persistent stalemate for over a decade and the demise of the two-state formula due to Israel's persistent policies of occupation, annexation and apartheid.

There were ongoing negotiations in 19 of the 33 armed conflicts active in 2022,¹ which represented 58% of the cases, while 14 conflicts did not enjoy initiatives for rapprochement between the parties. In most regions, there were more conflicts in which there were different types of negotiations than there were conflicts in which the parties had not sought rapprochement. Thus, there were negotiations in 63% of the conflicts in Africa, in 100% of the conflicts in the Americas, in 55% of the conflicts in Asia, in 40% of the conflicts in the Middle East and in 50% of the conflicts in Europe.

Armed conflicts and peace processes in 2022

Armed conflicts with peace negotiations (19)	Armed conflicts without peace negotiations (14)
AFRICA (10)	AFRICA (6)
Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West) (2018)	Burundi (2015)
Ethiopia (Tigray) (2020)	Ethiopia (Oromia) (2022)
Libya (2011)	Mozambique (North) (2019)
Mali (2012)	Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram) (2011)
CAR (2006)	Western Sahel Region (2018)
DRC (east) (1998)	DRC (east – ADF) (2014)
Somalia (1988)	ASIA (4)
Sudan (Darfur) (2003)	Afghanistan (2001)
Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) (2011)	India (Jammu and Kashmir) (1989)
South Sudan (2009)	India (CPI-M) (1967)
AMERICA (1)	Pakistan (Balochistan) (2005)
Colombia (1964)	EUROPE (1)
ASIA (5)	Turkey (southeast) (1984)
Philippines (NPA) (1969)	MIDDLE EAST (3)
Philippines (Mindanao) (1991)	Egypt (Sinai) (2014)
Myanmar (1948)	Iraq (2003)
Pakistan (2001)	Israel – Palestine (2000)
Thailand (south) (2004)	
EUROPE (1)	
Russia – Ukraine (2022) ²	
MIDDLE EAST (2)	
Syria (2011)	
Yemen (2004)	

1. Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*. Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

2. The case of Russia-Ukraine is included in this table because Russia and Ukraine held political-military negotiations for several months in 2022. Even though the parties considered the negotiations to have reached a dead end between April and May, talks remained active in other areas, such as humanitarian issues, grain exports and the protection of nuclear infrastructure.

National governments were involved as one of the **negotiating parties** in all the peace processes and negotiations. These governments negotiated or maintained contact with various kinds of actors directly or indirectly, depending on the characteristics of the context, which in general terms included armed groups (directly or through political representatives, and in some cases through coalitions of armed groups), as was the case in most negotiations in Asia; a combination of armed groups and political and social actors, prevalent in Africa; or representatives of political/military bodies seeking secession or recognition as independent territories, which was true of most cases in Europe. To a lesser extent, cases involving opposition governments and political and social actors were also identified, such as in the Americas. Several negotiating processes that took place throughout 2022 were international negotiations that involved different governments: Eritrea-Ethiopia, Morocco-Western-Sahara, Sudan-South Sudan, North Korea-South Korea, North Korea-USA, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Serbia-Kosovo, Russia-Ukraine and Iran (nuclear programme).

Regarding the **third parties involved in the peace and negotiation processes**, although in many cases it is possible to clearly identify the actors involved in mediation, facilitation and accompaniment activities, on other occasions these tasks are carried out discreetly or not publicly. At least one third party was involved in the vast majority of the negotiating processes (35 out of 39, or 90%), in a proportion similar to that of previous years. For another year, there was third-party support for processes under different formats, both in internal (27) and international (eight) negotiations (See Table 1.2.). The vast majority of international negotiations had third-party support, which was true of 80% of all peace processes between states. At the regional level, while all negotiations that took place in Africa, the Americas, Europe and the Middle East had third-party support, only 60% of the processes in Asia involved third parties, while negotiations between the governments of North Korea and South Korea and between North Korea and the United States, as well as internal negotiations in India (in Assam and Nagaland), proceeded without third-party support. These last two cases were the only direct internal negotiations that had no external support. The only case without third-party support in another continent was the national dialogue in Chad, as part of a broader peace process in the country that did enjoy external third-party support.

In practically all the cases that had a third party (30 out of 35) there was more than one actor performing mediation or facilitation tasks. Thus, though one actor led mediation and facilitation efforts in certain contexts, the vast majority had mixed formulas, with actors playing complementary and specialised roles. In contrast, only one third party was observed in other cases, such as Norway in the process in the Philippines (NDF), the

United Nations in the process in Papua New Guinea, Malaysia in Thailand (south) and the Taliban government of Afghanistan in Pakistan. In an international context of multiplicity of mediating actors, these were of diverse types, highlighting intergovernmental organizations – such as the UN, EU, AU, OSCE, IGAD, OIC, SADC, EAC, CEEAC, ECOWAS, OIF, GCC– and state governments, religious organisations and civil society actors, including specialised centres. United Nations was the main intergovernmental organisation that participated by supporting peace processes. It was present in different formats (mainly envoys and special representatives and missions) and served various support functions (mediation, co-mediation, verification, ceasefire supervision, assistance, support, the use of good offices and others) in 21 of the 39 processes identified during the year and in 21 of the 35 that involved at least one third party (60%).

Other international and regional organisations also played a prominent role, especially regional organisations in their geographical areas of operation. Together with intergovernmental organisations, a significant number of states became involved in negotiating processes, often amidst the projection of national interests in an international dispute for hegemony between powers. In an international context of serious geographical tension marked by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow tried to maintain a leading role in various peace processes, but its involvement in different negotiating processes had a negative influence at the same time.

With regard to the **negotiating agendas**, one must consider the particular aspects of each case and bear in mind that the details of the issues under discussion did not always become known to the public. Once again, **the search for truces, ceasefires and cessations of hostilities** was one of the central subjects of discussion in various peace processes. This gained special importance in certain regions, like the Middle East. Specifically, the truce reached in Yemen in April, which remained in force for six months, was particularly significant and had a real impact on lowering violence. The first truce since 2016, it also addressed enormously important humanitarian issues. In Africa, an agreement for a permanent cessation of hostilities in the Tigray region was reached between the government of Ethiopia and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region. The issue was also important in the negotiating processes with the different armed groups active in the eastern DRC and especially with the armed group M23. The search for ceasefires was also important in Europe. This was the case in the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, and in fact both parties negotiated some humanitarian ceasefires. It was not possible to agree on any general ceasefire and as the year progressed, Ukraine demanded that Russia withdraw its troops from all its territory, including Donbas and Crimea. A ceasefire was also agreed between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In Asia,

Most armed conflicts in most regions in the world involved negotiating processes, with 58% of all conflicts worldwide involving negotiations

Internal and international peace processes/negotiations with and without third parties in 2022

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERNATIONAL	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (27)	National dialogues without third parties (1)	National dialogues with third parties (0)	Other formats (0)	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (8)
AFRICA							
Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West-South West)		x					
CAR		x					
Chad		x	x				
DRC		x					
Eritrea-Ethiopia							x
Ethiopia (Tigray)		x					
Libya		x					
Mali		x					
Morocco – Western Sahara							x
Mozambique		x					
Senegal (Casamance)		x					
Somalia		x					
South Sudan		x					
Sudan		x					
Sudan – South Sudan							x
AMERICAS							
Colombia (FARC)		x					
Colombia (ELN)		x					
Haiti		x					
Venezuela		x					
ASIA							
India (Assam)	x						
India (Nagaland)	x						
Korea, DPR – Korea, Republic of						x	
Korea, DPR – USA						x	
Myanmar		x					
Pakistan		x					
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)		x					
Philippines (MILF)		x					
Philippines (NDF)		x					
Thailand (south)		x					
EUROPE							
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)							x
Cyprus		x					
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) ⁱ							x
Moldova (Transnistria)		x					
Serbia – Kosovo ⁱⁱ							x
Russia - Ukraine							x

i. The nature of the peace processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russia's role in those conflicts and peace processes are open to interpretation. Ukraine considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, whereas Russia considers itself a third party.

ii. The peace process between Serbia and Kosovo is considered interstate because even though its international legal status is still controversial, Kosovo has been recognised as a state by over 100 countries. In 2010, the International Court of Justice issued a non-binding opinion that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERNATIONAL	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (27)	National dialogues without third parties (1)	National dialogues with third parties (0)	Other formats (0)	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (8)
MIDDLE EAST							
Iran (nuclear programme)							x
Palestine		x					
Syria ⁱⁱⁱ		x					
Yemen		x					

iii. There are two parallel negotiating processes in Syria (Astana and Geneva). Third parties are involved in both processes, though some of them directly project their interests onto the negotiations.

the Taliban armed group TTP declared a ceasefire in Pakistan during talks with the Pakistani government, but the ceasefire broke down when the talks failed. The search for a ceasefire was also enormously important to the peace talks between the Colombian government and the ELN and although President Gustavo Petro announced a six-month bilateral ceasefire agreement with various armed groups at the end of the year, including the ELN, the insurgent organisation denied that any such agreement had been reached days later.

In a year internationally marked by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, **political and military issues linked to the government's attributes, such as territorial integrity, powers related to state sovereignty and mutual recognition, as well as the status of disputed territories**, were especially important to different negotiating agendas.

Regarding the **evolution of peace processes and negotiating processes**, it is generally possible to identify a wide variety of trends. The development of many of the peace negotiations during 2022 was shaped by the global consequences of the international crisis caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February. Relations between the Russian government headed by Vladimir Putin and many other governments, especially in the West, deteriorated tremendously, which made it difficult to find common ground in different peace processes based on the different international alliances of the actors involved. The impacts of the invasion of Ukraine were especially noticeable in negotiations in Europe, but other regions, such as the Middle East, were also affected by these dynamics that opened gaps between international blocs. However, progress was made in peace processes in different regions, with important agreements, though not without obstacles, in Africa (Chad, Tigray and others). Negotiating processes were restarted in the Americas (Venezuela, Haiti and Colombia) and headway was made in various peace negotiations in Asia (Assam in India, the Philippines (MILF) and Thailand (south). Other regions also witnessed rapprochement and even agreements between actors in different countries. Several agreements were especially significant in Africa, such as those reached in Ethiopia,

Senegal (Casamance) or Chad, and the agreement on the Tigray region in Ethiopia was especially relevant. In the Middle East, some positive developments were also noted, especially in Yemen, where a nationwide truce was achieved. The negotiating processes in the Americas developed positively, despite the problems, with crucial progress in Colombia like the start of a formal peace process with the ELN and the reinstatement of key institutions to implement the 2016 peace agreements. Progress was also observed in other countries, even in

more politically fragile environments such as Haiti and Venezuela. Asia was also the scene of some positive events, such as the beginning of a negotiating process in Pakistan, though it was later cut short, the restart of negotiations in Thailand with the BRN after years of impasse and the progress made in the implementation of the agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF, especially with regard to DDR. However, many negotiating processes had to face significant obstacles and some remained deadlocked.

Finally, regarding the **gender, peace and security agenda**, the analysis of the different peace processes in 2020 confirms, like in previous years, the obstacles that women face in participating in formal processes and the difficulties in incorporating a gender perspective in negotiation. Twenty-two years after the approval of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, many challenges to its implementation remained and most peace processes continued to exclude women. **No specific mechanisms of participation were designed for women in most negotiations and gender issues and recognition of the rights of women and the LGTBQIA+ population were left out of much of the negotiating agendas. There were several processes in which women had the opportunity to participate, though with many limitations, such as the cases of Mali, CAR, Sudan, Sudan and South Sudan, Ethiopia (Tigray), Colombia, Thailand (south), Papua New Guinea and Bougainville, Cyprus, Moldova, Yemen or Syria.** Composed of 15 Syrian women of different sensibilities, the consultative body met periodically with the United Nations envoy.

Main agreements of 2022

Peace processes	Agreements
Chad	The government of Chad and 34 of the 52 political and military movements participating in the negotiations reached an agreement in Doha (Qatar) under Qatari mediation on 7 August, which enabled their participation in the subsequent National Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS), held in N'Djamena between 20 August and 8 October together with hundreds of representatives of the government and the political and social opposition.
Ethiopia (Tigray)	The Ethiopian government and the military and political authorities of the Tigray region reached a peace agreement on 2 November under the auspices of the African Union. The agreement establishes a cessation of hostilities that will be monitored, supervised and verified by the AU through a unit composed of a maximum of 10 people designated by the AU, with a representative from the regional organisation IGAD, who must report to the mediation team led by former Nigerian President Olesegun Obasanjo. On 12 November, the parties signed the Declaration of the Senior Commanders on the Modalities for the Implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Nairobi, which stipulates the delivery of heavy weapons and the demobilisation of combatants, the restoration of public services in Tigray, the reactivation of aid and the withdrawal of all armed groups and foreign forces that fought alongside the Federal Ethiopian Army.
Senegal (Casamance)	The government of Senegal and the faction of the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) led by Cesar Atoute Badiate signed a peace agreement on 4 August. The agreement, which remains confidential, describes the road map for laying down arms and reaffirms the parties' commitment to find a negotiated solution to the conflict.
South Sudan	On 16 January, the government of South Sudan and the SPLA-IO Kitgwang faction, led by General Simon Gatwech Dual, which broke off from the SPLA-IO headed by Vice President Riek Machar in August 2021, signed an agreement that integrates the Kitgwang faction into the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Signed in Khartoum under the mediation of the government of Sudan, the new agreement includes amnesty for Kitgwang fighters, a permanent ceasefire and its integration into the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF). ³
Haiti	The National Consensus Agreement for Haiti, signed with various political groups and civil society organisations and the private sector for an inclusive transition and transparent elections, lays out a 14-month transition that includes elections held before the end of 2023, the inauguration of the new government on 7 February 2024 (the date until which Ariel Henry will remain in office as prime minister) and the formation of a High Transition Council made up of a representative of civil society, a representative of political parties and representative of the private sector, as well as a Control Body for Government Action. Much of the opposition rejected the agreement.
India (Assam)	Tripartite peace agreement between the central government of India, the government of the state of Assam and eight Adivasi armed groups (All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), AANLA (FG), Birsia Commando Force (BCF), BCF (BT), Santhal Tiger Force, Adivasi Cobra Militant of Assam (ACMA), ACMA (FG) and Adivasi People's Army (APA)) involves the demobilisation of the combatants and their acceptance of current Indian legislation. The Indian government pledged to protect and preserve the social, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic identity of the Adivasi groups; to ensure the development of tea plantations in the Adivasi villages of Assam; to establish an Adivasi welfare and development council; to rehabilitate armed actors and guarantee the welfare of tea plantation workers; and to provide a special development package to improve infrastructure in Adivasi villages.
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	The Era Kone Covenant on the Finalisation of the Bougainville Referendum on Independence, signed by the prime minister of Papua New Guinea and the president of the Autonomous Bougainville Government, stipulates that the results of the 2019 referendum and the conclusions and agreements of the consultations and negotiations held since then will be submitted to the Parliament of Papua New Guinea before the end of 2023. When the Parliament has voted on the proposed political settlement for Bougainville that the two governments reach, it should be implemented no earlier than 2025 and no later than 2027. After its ratification by both governments, the agreement provides for writing the drafts of the constitutional regulations necessary to advance on the road map described therein.
Palestine	The Algerian Document for inter-Palestinian Reconciliation was signed by Fatah, Hamas and 12 other Palestinian organisations in Algiers on 13 October. The agreement recognises the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and commits to a national dialogue to ensure the involvement of all groups. It also provides for presidential and legislative elections to be held within a year, including for the Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament) and the Palestinian National Council (the PLO's legislative body in which Palestinians and Diaspora Palestinians also participate). Also known as the "Algeria Declaration", the document establishes that an Arab-Algerian team will supervise the implementation of the agreement.
Russia – Ukraine	An agreement on the export of grain and other food products, known as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, was reached in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 in the form of two identical documents, one signed by Russia and the other by Ukraine, with Turkey and the UN Secretary-General also signing, the latter as an observer. The agreement establishes a mechanism for the safe transport of grain, other food products and fertiliser from Ukrainian ports to global markets. The agreement also includes the export of Russian food and fertiliser to global markets through the Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the United Nations Secretariat. The Black Sea Grain Initiative was facilitated by Turkey and the UN. As part of the agreement, the Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) was established in Istanbul, in which representatives of Ukraine, Russia, Turkey and the UN participate, under the auspices of the UN. On 17 November, the agreement was extended for another 120 days.
Yemen	A nationwide truce agreement was signed by the internationally recognised government and the Houthis for a cessation of hostilities starting on 2 April, coinciding with the start of Ramadan. The five-point agreement included a halt to all types of military offensives inside and outside Yemen and the maintenance of existing military positions; the entrance of ships with fuel to the port of Al Hudaydah; the resumption of commercial flights to and from the capital, Sana'a, towards Jordan and Egypt; the start of talks to agree on the opening of roads in several governorates, including Ta'iz, to facilitate the movement of the civilian population; and the commitment to continue working with the UN special envoy to take steps to end the armed conflict. The agreement was signed for an initial period of two months and renewed twice, in May and August. Starting in October, the agreement formally ended, though full-scale hostilities between the parties had not resumed by the end of the year and some of the elements of the truce remained in force.

3. See: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/2397>

A gender approach, specific clauses on gender equality or the recognition of women's rights was included in various peace agreements reached during 2022, though admittedly in a very limited way. Thus, in their agreement, Sudan and South Sudan pledged to foster peaceful coexistence by making women the agents of change in ongoing peacebuilding efforts and intercommunal talks. The agreement reached for the conflict in the Ethiopian region of Tigray included issues regarding gender violence and urged the parties to the conflict to condemn any act of sexual or gender violence, any act of violence against minors, girls, women and the elderly and the recruitment of child soldiers. The agreement also encouraged the parties to promote family reunification and to consider the specific needs of what it describes as “vulnerable groups”, which include women, minors and the elderly, in providing humanitarian aid.

Regional trends

Africa

- Fifteen peace processes and negotiations were identified in Africa in 2022, accounting for nearly 40% of all peace processes worldwide.
- Various local initiatives were put forth by civil society actors in Cameroon and Canada facilitated contacts to explore the possibility of relaunching a negotiating process between political and military actors and the Cameroonian government.
- The little progress made in implementing the Mali peace agreement of 2015 prompted a coalition of northern armed groups to suspend their participation in mechanisms to implement the agreement.
- The government of Senegal and Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) faction led by Cesar Atoute Badiate signed a peace agreement.
- On 2 November, the federal government of Ethiopia and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia reached a permanent cessation of hostilities agreement facilitated by the African Union.
- The Doha peace process and the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue in Chad, boycotted by many armed groups and by the political opposition, respectively, concluded with the extension of the mandate of the Transitional Military Council through the creation of a national unity government and the continuity of the presidency of Mahamat Déby.
- The Military Junta and the opposition in Sudan reached a framework agreement to create a civilian transitional government.
- After the general elections were cancelled in Libya in late 2021, the impasse in the negotiations persisted in 2022 and the divisions materialised in the configuration of two parallel governments.

America

- In the Americas there were four negotiations during 2022, 10% of the world total.
- In Haiti, the government and part of the opposition began talks about the deep economic, humanitarian, political and institutional crisis gripping the country, but no significant agreement was reached.
- The Colombian government and the ELN began a formal negotiating process with a first round of talks in Venezuela.
- The Colombian Truth Commission presented its report, which stated that most of the victims of the armed conflict were civilians and non-combatants.
- The Venezuelan government resumed dialogue and reached an agreement with the opposition alliance Unitary Platform in Mexico, began talks with other opposition factions and sought common ground with the US government.

Asia

- During 2022 there were 10 peace negotiations in Asia, 26% of the total negotiations in the world.
- The government of Pakistan and the Taliban armed group TTP held talks for several months, which ended in November with the TTP's withdrawal from the negotiations.
- In the southern Philippines, the implementation of the 2014 peace agreement made substantial progress, both in the institutional development of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and in the demobilisation of MILF fighters.
- After almost two years of deadlock in the negotiations, the government of Thailand and the BRN resumed talks and reached some agreements in 2022.
- The governments of Papua New Guinea and the Autonomous Region of Bougainville reached an agreement in the negotiations on the future political status of Bougainville, but relations between the two parties later deteriorated and the process was interrupted.
- Negotiations continued to stall between ASEAN and the Myanmar military junta on the return of democracy to the country.

Europe

- In 2022, six of the 39 peace processes in the world (15%) took place in Europe.
- All the negotiating processes in Europe involved third parties in supporting roles.
- After Russia's invasion of Ukraine there were attempts at direct negotiations between both countries in the first few months, which failed, and the discussions were relegated to humanitarian

issues, grain exports and the protection of nuclear infrastructure.

- Russia's invasion had various impacts on the negotiating processes in Europe, such as delays in the Georgian peace process, a less favourable geopolitical context for Armenia and international calls for Kosovo and Serbia to make progress in normalising relations.
- The Cyprus peace process remained stalled, with no resumption of formal, high-level political negotiations in a pre-election year.
- Women's organisations and civil society activists from Kosovo and Georgia called for women's effective participation in the negotiating processes.

Middle East

- The Middle East was the scene of four negotiating processes in 2022 that accounted for 10% of all peace processes worldwide.
- Negotiations over the Iranian nuclear programme oscillated between progress and impasse, but full compliance with the agreement reached in 2015 had not been restored by the end of the year.
- A truce agreement in force in Yemen for six months helped to reduce violence in the country, but at the end of the year, uncertainty persisted because the truce was not renewed and there were fears of a new escalation.
- Hamas and Fatah signed a new reconciliation agreement, but there was scepticism about its implementation given the failed experiences in recent years.
- Different formal negotiating schemes continued in Syria, but in line with previous years, no significant progress was observed in the search for a political solution after over a decade of armed conflict.

Introduction

Peace Talks in Focus 2022. Report on Trends and Scenarios is a yearbook that analyses the peace processes and negotiations that took place in the world in 2022. The examination of the evolution and the dynamics of these negotiations at a global level offers a global view of the peace processes, identifying trends and facilitating a comparative analysis among the different scenarios. One of the main aims of this report is to provide information and analysis for those actors who take part in the peaceful resolution of conflicts at different levels, including those parties in dispute, mediators and civil society, among others. The yearbook also seeks to reveal the different formulas of dialogue and negotiation that are aimed at reversing the dynamics of violence and that aim to channel conflicts through political means in numerous contexts. As such, it seeks to highlight, enhance and promote political, diplomatic and social efforts that are aimed at transforming conflicts and their root causes through peaceful methods.

With regard to **methodology**, this report draws mainly from on qualitative analysis of studies and information from numerous sources –the United Nations, international organizations, research centres, the media, NGOs, and others–, in addition to experience gained in field research. The report also incorporates the gender perspective in the study and analysis of peace processes in a cross-cutting manner.

The analysis is based on a **definition** that understands **peace processes** as comprising all those political, diplomatic and social efforts aimed at resolving conflicts and transforming their root causes by means of peaceful methods, especially through peace negotiations. **Peace**

negotiations are considered as the processes of dialogue between at least two conflicting parties in a conflict, in which the parties address their differences in a concerted framework in order to end the violence and encounter a satisfactory solution to their demands. Other actors not directly involved in the conflict may also participate. Peace negotiations are usually preceded by preliminary or exploratory phases that define the format, place, conditions and guarantees, of the future negotiations, among other elements. Peace negotiations may or may not be facilitated by **third parties**. The third parties intervene in the dispute so as to contribute to the dialogue between the actors involved and to promote a negotiated solution to the conflict. Other actors not directly involved in the dispute may also participate in peace negotiations. Peace negotiations may result in comprehensive or partial **agreements**, agreements related to the procedure or process, and agreements linked to the causes or consequences of the conflict. Elements of the different type of agreements may be combined in the same agreement.

With respect to its **structure**, the publication is organized into six chapters. The first presents a summary of those processes and negotiations that took place in 2022, and offers an overview of the main trends at a global level. The following five chapters detail the analysis of peace processes and negotiations from a geographic perspective. Each addresses the main trends of peace negotiations in Africa, America, Asia, Europe and the Middle East, respectively, and describes the development and dynamics of each of the cases present in the regions, including references to the gender, peace and security agenda.

1. Negotiations in 2022: global overview and main trends

- Thirty-nine peace processes and negotiations were identified in the world in 2022. The largest number of cases was reported in Africa (15), followed by Asia (10), Europe (six), the Middle East (four) and the Americas (four).
- There were ongoing negotiations in 19 of the 33 active armed conflicts during 2022, accounting for 58% of the cases, while 14 conflicts were not accompanied by negotiating processes between the parties.
- Ninety per cent of the negotiating processes enjoyed third-party participation and the UN was involved in 60% of the processes that included at least one third party.
- The development of many peace negotiations in 2022 was affected by the global consequences of the international crisis set off by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February.
- Specific mechanisms for female participation were not designed in most peace negotiations and gender issues and the recognition of the rights of women and the LGBTBIQA+ population was left out of most of the negotiating agendas.

During 2022, a total of 39 peace processes and negotiations were identified on a worldwide level. The analysis of the different contexts reveals a wide variety of realities and dynamics, a result of the diverse nature of the armed conflicts¹ and socio-political crises² that the negotiations are linked to. Without losing sight of the need to consider the specific characteristics of each case, it is possible to draw several conclusions and offer reflections on the general panorama of peace processes and negotiations, as well as to identify some trends. Several conclusions are presented below regarding the geographical distribution of the negotiations, those actors involved in the negotiation processes, the third parties who participated, the main and recurrent issues in the negotiation agendas, the general development of the processes, inclusiveness and the gender dimension in these peace negotiations.

Table 1.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in 2022

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
AFRICA		
Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West)	Government, political-military secessionist movement formed by the opposition coalition Ambazonia Coalition Team (ACT, including IG Sako, AIPC, APLM, FSCW, MoRISC, SCARM, SCAPO, SCNC, RoA, RoAN, civil society actors and independent individuals), and Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC, including IG Sisiku)	Church, civil society organisations, Switzerland/Swiss Contact Group, Friends of the Swiss Contact Group (EU, USA, Canada, Belgium, Germany, UK), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, USIP, Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation (CDN), Vatican, Canada
CAR	Government, armed groups belonging to the former Séléka coalition, anti-balaka militias	The African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation (AU and ECCAS, with the support of the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Rep. of the Congo and Chad), Community of Sant'Egidio, ACCORD, OIC, International Support Group (UN, EU, among others), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, China, Russia, Sudan
Chad	Transitional Military Council, 52 armed groups, including the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCSMR), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) and the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR)	Qatar, AU, UN

1. The School of the Culture of Peace (Escola de Cultura de Pau, ECP) defines armed conflict as any confrontation between regular or irregular armed groups with objectives that are perceived as incompatible in which the continuous and organised use of violence a) causes a minimum of 100 battle-related deaths in a year and/or a serious impact on the territory (destruction of infrastructures or of natural resources) and human security (e.g. wounded or displaced population, sexual violence, food insecurity, impact on mental health and on the social fabric or disruption of basic services) and aims to achieve objectives that are different than those of common delinquency and are normally linked to a) demands for self-determination and self-government or identity issues; b) the opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state or the internal or international policy of the government, which in both cases leads to fighting to seize or erode power; or c) control over the resources or the territory.
2. A socio-political crisis is defined as that in which the pursuit of certain objectives or the failure to satisfy certain demands made by different actors leads to high levels of political, social or military mobilisation and/or the use of violence with a level of intensity that does not reach that of an armed conflict and that may include clashes, repression, coups d'état and bombings or attacks of other kinds, and whose escalation may degenerate into an armed conflict under certain circumstances. Socio-political crises are normally related to: a) demands for self-determination and self-government, or identity issues; b) opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state, or the internal or international policies of a government, which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; or c) control of resources or territory.

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
AFRICA		
DRC	Government of DRC, government of Rwanda, armed group M23, eastern armed groups, political opposition and civil society	Congolese Episcopal Conference (CENCO), Church of Christ in the Congo, Angola, Tanzania, Uganda, Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue on the DRC led by the AU, SADC, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), AU, EU, UN, OIF and USA
Eritrea – Ethiopia	Government of Eritrea and Government of Ethiopia	United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, USA
Ethiopia (Tigray)	Federal Government, political and military authorities of the Ethiopian region of Tigray (Tigray People's Liberation Front)	AU, USA, IGAD
Libya	Government of National Accord (GNA) / Government of National Unity (GNU), High State Council (HSC), House of Representatives (HoR), LNA/ALAF	Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU, EU), Germany, France, Italy, UK, USA, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Mali	Government, Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), MNLA, MAA and HCUA, Platform, GATIA, CMFPR, CPA, faction of the MAA	Algeria, France, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), AU, UN, EU, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Carter Center, civil society organisations, Mauritania
Morocco – Western Sahara	Morocco, Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO Front)	UN, Algeria and Mauritania, Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, USA, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia)
Mozambique	Government, RENAMO	National mediation team, Community of Sant'Egidio, Catholic Church, UN, Southern African Development Community (SADC), AU, EU, Botswana, South Africa, Switzerland, Tanzania, United Kingdom
Senegal (Casamance)	Government, factions of the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC)	ECOWAS, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde
Somalia	Federal Government, leaders of the federal and emerging states (Puntland, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Southwest), political military movement Ahlu Sunna WalJama'a, clan and sub-clan leaders, Somaliland	UN, IGAD, Turkey, among others
South Sudan	Government (SPLM), SPLM/A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), and several minor groups (SSOA, SPLM-FD, among others) and SSOMA, faction led by Paul Malong and Pagan Amum (comprising SSUF/A and Real-SPLM) and faction led by Thomas Cirillo (consisting of the SSNDA coalition, including NAS, SSNMC, NDM/PF and UDRA)	"IGAD Plus": the IGAD, which includes Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda; AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway), EU, UN, South Sudan Council of Churches, Community of Sant'Egidio
Sudan	Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, coalition comprising the armed groups of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur), Movement for Justice and Equity (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movements, SLA-MM and SLA-AW factions, Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), Malik Agar and Abdelaziz al-Hilu factions	African Union High Level Panel on Sudan (AUHIP), Troika (EEUU, United Kingdom, Norway), Germany, AU, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, IGAD, UNITAMS
Sudan – South Sudan	Government of Sudan and government of South Sudan	IGAD, African Union Border Programme (AUBP), Egypt, Libya, USA, EU
AMERICA		
Colombia (ELN)	Government, ELN	Guarantor countries (Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile) United Nations Verification Mission, Catholic Church, supporting countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain)
Colombia (FARC)	Government, Comunes	UN Verification Mission in Colombia, International Verification Component (Technical Secretariat of the Notables, University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute)
Haiti	Government, social and political opposition	Core Group (UN, OAS, EU and Germany, France, Brazil, Canada, Spain and US Governments), "Mediation Committee" (made up of three representatives of religious, academic and business organisations)
Venezuela	Government, social and political opposition	Norway, Russia, Netherlands, International Contact Group
ASIA		
Korea, DPR – Korea, Rep. of	North Korea, South Korea	--
Korea, DPR – USA	North Korea, USA	--
India (Assam)	Government, ULFA-PTF, ULFA-I; AANLA, AANLA (FG), BCF, BCF (BT), STF, ACMA, ACMA (FG) and APA	--
India (Nagaland)	Indian government, NSCN-IM, NNPG: GPRN/NSCN (Kitovi Zhimomi), NNC, FGN, NSCN(R), NPGN (Non-Accord) and NNC/GDRN/NA, ZUF	--

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
ASIA		
Myanmar	Government; armed groups that have signed the ceasefire agreement (NCA): DKBA, RCSS/SSA-South, CNF, KNU, KNLAPC, ALP, PNLO, ABSDF, NMSP and LDU; armed groups that have not signed the NCA: UWSP, NDAA, SSPP/SSA-N, KNPP, NSCN-K, KIA, AA, TNLA and MNDAA	China, ASEAN
Pakistan	Government, TTP	Afghanistan
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Government, Autonomous Bougainville Government	United Nations
Philippines (MILF)	Government, MILF, Interim Government of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in- Muslim Mindanao	Malaysia, Third Party Monitoring Team, International Monitoring Team, Independent Decommissioning Body
Philippines (NDF)	Government, NDF (umbrella organisation of various communist organisations, including the Communist Party of the Philippines, which is the political arm of the NPA)	Norway
Thailand (south)	Government, BRN	Malaysia
EUROPE		
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	Armenia, Azerbaijan	Russia, EU, USA, OSCE Minsk Group (co-chaired by Russia, France and the USA; the remaining permanent members are Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Turkey), Turkey ³
Cyprus	Republic of Cyprus, self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	UN, EU (observer at the Geneva International Conference); Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom (guarantor countries)
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	Government of Georgia, representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, government of Russia ⁴	OSCE, EU and UN; USA, Russia ⁵
Moldova (Transdniestria)	Moldova, self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniestria	OSCE, Ukraine, Russia, USA and EU
Serbia – Kosovo	Serbia, Kosovo	EU, UN, USA, Germany, France
Russia – Ukraine⁶	Russia, Ukraine	Turkey, UN, Israel, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, IAEA, OSCE, Germany, France ⁷
MIDDLE EAST		
Iran (nuclear programme)	Iran, EEUU, P4+1 (France, United Kingdom, Russia and China plus Germany)	EU, UN
Palestine	Hamas, Fatah	Algeria
Syria	Government, political and armed opposition groups	UN, EU, Russia, Turkey, Iran, in addition to Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and ICRC (observers in the Astana process)
Yemen	Government, Houthis / Ansar Allah, Saudi Arabia	UN, Oman, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

The peace negotiations in bold type are described in the chapter.
 -- There are no third parties or no public proof of their existence.

- Turkey's status as a third party may be subject to dispute. It is included in this table due to the establishment by Russia and Turkey of a peacekeeping centre for monitoring the 2020 ceasefire. The establishment of the centre was ratified in a Memorandum between Russia and Turkey.
- Russia's status in the Georgian peace process is subject to different interpretations. Georgia considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.
- Ibid.
- The case of Russia-Ukraine is included in this table because Russia and Ukraine held political-military negotiations for several months in 2022. Even though the parties considered the negotiations to have reached a dead end between April and May, talks remained active in other areas, such as humanitarian issues, grain exports and the protection of nuclear infrastructure.
- This table includes actors that have been involved as third parties in different spheres in 2022 both before the Russian invasion and in the phase following the invasion.

Regarding the geographical distribution of the peace processes and negotiations in 2022, most of the cases analyzed were concentrated in Africa, which hosted 15, equivalent to 39% of the total. Asia was the region with the second-highest number of cases, with a total of 10, representing 26% of the negotiations in 2022. The rest of the negotiations were distributed between Europe, with six (15%), the Middle East, with four (10%) and the Americas, with four (10%).

Slightly more peace processes and negotiations were analysed worldwide than in 2021, when there were 37. However, the number did not reach as high as in previous years, since there were 40 in 2020, 50 in 2019 and 49 in 2018. The largest increase occurred in Africa, which went from 12 to 15 cases due to three new ones: Chad, Ethiopia (Tigray) and Senegal (Casamance). There were also more negotiations in the Americas, with the activation of the dialogue in Haiti. Although the same number of cases was observed in Asia in 2021, the talks in Afghanistan broke down with the rise of the Taliban

Most of the negotiations in 2022 took place in Africa (39%), followed by Asia (26%), Europe (15%), the Middle East (10%) and the Americas (10%)

regime in 2021, but a new negotiating process began in Pakistan in 2022, though it broke down by the end of the year. In Europe, Russia's invasion of Ukraine spilled over and amplified the previous conflict in eastern Ukraine and scuttled the previous negotiating process. The case of Russia-Ukraine is included in the yearbook because both countries held political and military negotiations for several months in 2022. Even though the parties considered the negotiations to have reached a dead end between April and May, talks remained active in other areas, such as humanitarian issues, grain exports and the protection of nuclear infrastructure. In Europe, there was one less case than in 2021, the tenth anniversary of the definitive cessation of ETA's armed activity in the Basque Country. Finally, there was one case less than the previous year in the Middle East. The negotiations between Israel and Palestine were not counted given their persistent stalemate for over a decade and the demise of the two-state formula due to Israel's persistent policies of occupation, annexation and apartheid.

Table 1.2. Armed conflicts and peace processes in 2022

Armed conflicts with peace negotiations (19)	Armed conflicts without peace negotiations (14)
AFRICA (10)	AFRICA (6)
Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West) (2018)	Burundi (2015)
Ethiopia (Tigray) (2020)	Ethiopia (Oromia) (2022)
Libya (2011)	Mozambique (North) (2019)
Mali (2012)	Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram) (2011)
CAR (2006)	Western Sahel Region (2018)
DRC (east) (1998)	DRC (east – ADF) (2014)
Somalia (1988)	ASIA (4)
Sudan (Darfur) (2003)	Afghanistan (2001)
Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) (2011)	India (Jammu and Kashmir) (1989)
South Sudan (2009)	India (CPI-M) (1967)
AMERICA (1)	Pakistan (Balochistan) (2005)
Colombia (1964)	EUROPE (1)
ASIA (5)	Turkey (southeast) (1984)
Philippines (NPA) (1969)	MIDDLE EAST (3)
Philippines (Mindanao) (1991)	Egypt (Sinai) (2014)
Myanmar (1948)	Iraq (2003)
Pakistan (2001)	Israel – Palestine (2000)
Thailand (south) (2004)	
EUROPE (1)	
Russia – Ukraine (2022) ⁸	
MIDDLE EAST (2)	
Syria (2011)	
Yemen (2004)	

8. The case of Russia-Ukraine is included in this table because Russia and Ukraine held political-military negotiations for several months in 2022. Even though the parties considered the negotiations to have reached a dead end between April and May, talks remained active in other areas, such as humanitarian issues, grain exports and the protection of nuclear infrastructure.

There were ongoing negotiations in 19 of the 33 armed conflicts active in 2022,⁹ while 14 conflicts did not enjoy initiatives for rapprochement between the parties. In most regions, there were more conflicts in which there were different types of negotiations than there were conflicts in which the parties had not sought rapprochement. Thus, there were negotiations in 63% of the conflicts in Africa, in 100% of the conflicts in the Americas, in 55% of the conflicts in Asia, in 40% of the conflicts in the Middle East and in 50% of the conflicts in Europe.


National governments were involved as one of the negotiating parties in all the peace processes and negotiations. These governments negotiated or maintained contact with various kinds of actors directly or indirectly, depending on the characteristics of the context, which in general terms included armed groups (directly or through political representatives, and in some cases through coalitions of armed groups), as was the case in most negotiations in Asia; a combination of armed groups and political and social actors, prevalent in Africa; or representatives of political/military bodies seeking secession or recognition as independent territories, which was true of most cases in Europe. To

Most armed conflicts in most regions in the world involved negotiating processes, with 58% of all conflicts worldwide involving negotiations

a lesser extent, cases involving opposition governments and political and social actors were also identified, such as in the Americas.

Parallel or complementary negotiating channels were active in a significant number of contexts, linked to a global scenario of highly complex armed conflicts in terms of actors and disputes. Thus, for example, in the context of the armed conflict in Yemen, negotiations between the government and the Houthis were held alongside active bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, facilitated by Oman. In Syria, both the UN-backed Geneva process and the Astana process (led by Russia, Turkey and Iran) remained in force. The Syrian government participated in both formats, though with different levels of involvement in each. Examples of negotiating processes that involved a highly complex network of actors in Africa included Cameroon, Chad (with over 50 armed groups involved in the negotiations), Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. In Asia, negotiating processes in different states of India, such as Assam and Nagaland, were also multi-stakeholder, as well as in Myanmar, where the Burmese government met with different armed groups while ASEAN was trying to promote a dialogue with the Burmese government to restore democracy in the country. The negotiations in Venezuela and Haiti also

Map 1.1. Peace negotiations in 2022



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in 2022


9. Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*. Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

involved different actors in parallel and complementary negotiations.

Several negotiating processes that took place throughout 2022 were international negotiations that involved different governments: Eritrea-Ethiopia, Morocco-Western-Sahara, Sudan-South Sudan, North Korea-South Korea, North Korea-USA, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Serbia-Kosovo, Russia-Ukraine and Iran (nuclear programme). Not all reported the same level of activity during the year and some were even interrupted, as was the case with the implementation of the peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia due to the ongoing war in the Ethiopian region of Tigray and the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, which began after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and eventually failed, despite several meetings held, though talks did remain active only with respect to some humanitarian issues such as the exchange of prisoners and grain exports. The Russian invasion of Ukraine had major impacts on different peace processes, especially in Europe, where the negotiating processes between Moldova and Transnistria and the dialogue between Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were affected. In the Middle East, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the consequent rise in tension between Moscow and the West also had an impact on the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear programme and on the UN-backed negotiations over Syria in Geneva, given Moscow's alliances with the regimes in Tehran and Damascus. The negotiations between Morocco and Western Sahara were unique, since Western Sahara, a territory that the UN considers pending decolonisation whose possession by Morocco is not recognised by international law or by any United Nations resolution. At the same time, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) proclaimed by the POLISARIO Front has not been internationally recognized by the majority of states.

Regarding the **third parties involved in the peace and negotiation processes**, although in many cases it is possible to clearly identify the actors involved in mediation, facilitation and accompaniment activities, on other occasions these tasks are carried out discreetly or not publicly. At least one third party was involved in the vast majority of the negotiating processes (35 out of 39, or 90%), in a proportion similar to that of previous years. For another year, there was third-party support for processes under different formats, both in internal (27) and international (eight) negotiations (See Table 1.2.). The vast majority of international negotiations had third-party support, which was true of 80% of all peace processes between states. At the regional level, while all negotiations that took place in Africa, the Americas, Europe and the Middle East had third-party support, only 60% of the processes in Asia involved third parties, while negotiations between the governments of North Korea and South Korea and between North Korea and

Graph 1.1. Regional distribution of peace negotiations



the United States, as well as internal negotiations in India (in Assam and Nagaland), proceeded without third-party support. These last two cases were the only direct internal negotiations that had no external support. The only case without third-party support in another continent was the national dialogue in Chad, as part of a broader peace process in the country that did enjoy external third-party support.

A third party was involved in the vast majority of the negotiating processes studied in 2022 (90%), though there was no such support for 40% of the negotiating processes in Asia

In practically all the cases that had a third party (30 out of 35) there was more than one actor performing mediation or facilitation tasks. Thus, though one actor led mediation and facilitation efforts in certain contexts, the vast majority had mixed formulas, with actors playing complementary and specialised roles. In contrast, only one third party was observed in other cases, such as Norway in the process in the Philippines (NDF), the United Nations in the process in Papua New Guinea, Malaysia in Thailand (south) and the Taliban government of Afghanistan in Pakistan. In an international context of multiplicity of mediating actors, these were of diverse types, highlighting intergovernmental organizations –such as the UN, EU, AU, OSCE, IGAD, OIC, SADC, EAC, CEEAC, ECOWAS, OIF, GCC– and state governments, religious organisations and civil society actors, including specialised centres. Intergovernmental organisations played a predominant role, except in Asia, where comparatively they were hardly involved in mediation and facilitation efforts.

In line with the trend established in recent years, the United Nations was the main intergovernmental organisation that participated by supporting peace processes. It was present in different formats (mainly envoys and special representatives and missions) and served various support functions (mediation, co-mediation, verification, ceasefire supervision, assistance, support, the use of good offices and others) in 21 of the 39 processes identified during the year and in 21 of the 35 that involved at least one third party

Table 1.3. Internal and international peace processes/negotiations with and without third parties in 2022

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERNATIONAL	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (27)	National dialogues without third parties (1)	National dialogues with third parties (0)	Other formats (0)	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (8)
AFRICA							
Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West-South West)		x					
CAR		x					
Chad		x	x				
DRC		x					
Eritrea-Ethiopia							x
Ethiopia (Tigray)		x					
Libya		x					
Mali		x					
Morocco – Western Sahara							x
Mozambique		x					
Senegal (Casamance)		x					
Somalia		x					
South Sudan		x					
Sudan		x					
Sudan – South Sudan							x
AMERICAS							
Colombia (FARC)		x					
Colombia (ELN)		x					
Haiti		x					
Venezuela		x					
ASIA							
India (Assam)	x						
India (Nagaland)	x						
Korea, DPR – Korea, Republic of						x	
Korea, DPR – USA						x	
Myanmar		x					
Pakistan		x					
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)		x					
Philippines (MILF)		x					
Philippines (NDF)		x					
Thailand (south)		x					
EUROPE							
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)							x
Cyprus		x					
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) ⁱ							x
Moldova (Transnistria)		x					
Serbia – Kosovo ⁱⁱ							x
Russia - Ukraine							x

i. The nature of the peace processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russia's role in those conflicts and peace processes are open to interpretation. Ukraine considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, whereas Russia considers itself a third party.

ii. The peace process between Serbia and Kosovo is considered interstate because even though its international legal status is still controversial, Kosovo has been recognised as a state by over 100 countries. In 2010, the International Court of Justice issued a non-binding opinion that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

Peace processes	INTERNAL					INTERNATIONAL	
	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (27)	National dialogues without third parties (1)	National dialogues with third parties (0)	Other formats (0)	Direct negotiations without third parties (2)	Negotiations with third parties (8)
MIDDLE EAST							
Iran (nuclear programme)							x
Palestine		x					
Syria ⁱⁱⁱ		x					
Yemen		x					

iii. There are two parallel negotiating processes in Syria (Astana and Geneva). Third parties are involved in both processes, though some of them directly project their interests onto the negotiations.

(60%). The UN played a prominent role in Africa, where it supported 11 of the 15 negotiating processes: Chad, Libya, Mali, Morocco-Western Sahara, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan and South Sudan.

Other international and regional organisations also played a prominent role, especially regional organisations in their geographical areas of operation. The EU was the only regional organisation that supported mediation and dialogue outside its regional sphere of action. Thus, the EU carried out third-party functions in 16 processes, including six in Africa (Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC and South Sudan), two in the Americas (Haiti and Venezuela), one in Asia (Philippines MILF) and two in the Middle East (Iran and Syria), in addition to the processes in Europe. The African Union was a third party in 11 African processes (Chad, Ethiopia (Tigray), Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan), the OSCE was involved in four processes (Armenia- Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the latter prior to the start of the Russian invasion, while it lost relevance and the power to influence after the invasion) and the IGAD participated in five (Ethiopia (Tigray), Sudan, Sudan South, Sudan-South Sudan and Somalia). Other organisations such as ECOWAS, the OIC, the SADC, the EAC, ECCAS, the OIF, the Arab League and the OAS had a smaller role.

Furthermore, together with intergovernmental organisations, a significant number of states became involved in negotiating processes, often amidst the projection of national interests in an international dispute for hegemony between powers. In line with the trend seen in previous years, Middle Eastern countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman and Egypt played a significant role not only in the region itself, but also in other peace processes in Africa, which was the main stage of their diplomatic efforts beyond their immediate area of influence. Thus, Qatar participated in the negotiating process in Chad, the UAE and Saudi Arabia were involved in the dialogue between Eritrea and Ethiopia and Egypt supported the

peace process in Libya. In Asia, where the role of third parties is not as significant as in other geographical areas, Norway, Malaysia and China became involved in negotiating processes between the Philippine government and the NDF, between the Philippine government and the MILF and in Myanmar. In addition, the Taliban government of Afghanistan became involved in the dialogue between the Taliban of Pakistan and the Pakistani government. Norwegian diplomats continued to play a central role in facilitating different processes such as the peace process between the government of Colombia and the ELN and the talks between the government and the opposition in Venezuela, but they also participated in processes in other regions, such as the negotiations in Sudan and South Sudan. In the Middle East, Algeria played a prominent role in addressing the intra-Palestinian dispute and in encouraging rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas in 2022.

In an international context of serious geographical tension marked by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow tried to maintain a leading role in various peace processes, but its involvement in different negotiating processes had a negative influence at the same time. The impact was especially negative in Europe, where there were delays in the Georgian peace process and a more difficult geopolitical context for Armenia, while international calls for Kosovo and Serbia to move towards normalising their relations increased. Some negotiations in the Middle East were also affected by the spike in tension between Russia and other international actors due to the invasion of Ukraine. This was the case with the negotiations over Syria, since Russia was excluded from some of the EU's diplomatic initiatives and in turn Russia and Syria, which considers Moscow a key ally, demanded that the UN-backed Geneva process relocate after it questioned Switzerland's neutrality because of its position on the invasion of Ukraine. Russia prioritised improving relations between Syria and Turkey, the latter of which became involved as a third party in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. After several months of diplomatic negotiations over the Iranian nuclear programme, which involved the Iranian government, the USA, Russia, France, the

The UN was involved in 60% of the processes that had at least one third party

United Kingdom, China and Germany, the prospects of closing an agreement in the first quarter of the year were frustrated in part by the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Third parties – local, regional and international – got involved through various formats, including support structures. These had different forms and degrees of complexity. Among them, some included only States grouped in diverse structures, such as the formula of guarantor countries in Colombia (Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile), in Cyprus (Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, although this process remained deadlocked), of supporting countries in Colombia (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain) or the Troika in Sudan (USA, United Kingdom, Norway). Others included a mix of States and intergovernmental organizations, such as the Friends of the Swiss Contact Group in Cameroon (the EU, the USA, Canada, Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom), the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (the AU and ECCAS, with support from the UN, the ICGRL, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad), the Core Group in Haiti (UN, OAS, EU and Germany, France, Brazil, Canada, Spain and the US), the International Monitoring Team and Third Party Monitoring Team support structures in the Philippine peace process with the MILF, the OSCE Minsk Group (co-chaired by Russia, France and the US; the rest of the permanent members are Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Turkey; though this format became less important compared to other third parties) and others. In some cases, intergovernmental organisations coordinated through specific structures, such as the Quartet in Libya, made up of the UN, the Arab League, the AU and the EU, and the International Support Group in the CAR, comprised of the UN and the EU, while in other cases they coordinated on a practical level, without specific platforms, like in Venezuela, where in addition to Norway, the main facilitator, Russia and the Netherlands were also involved.

With regard to the **negotiating agendas**, one must consider the particular aspects of each case and bear in mind that the details of the issues under discussion did not always become known to the public. Once again, **the search for truces, ceasefires and cessations of hostilities** was one of the central subjects of discussion in various peace processes. This gained special importance in certain regions, like the Middle East. Specifically, the truce reached in Yemen in April, which remained in force for six months, was particularly significant and had a real impact on lowering violence. The first truce since 2016, it also addressed enormously important humanitarian issues. In Africa, an agreement for a permanent cessation of hostilities in the Tigray region was reached between the government of Ethiopia and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region. The issue was also important in the negotiating processes with the different armed groups active in the

eastern DRC and especially with the armed group M23. The search for ceasefires was also important in Europe. This was the case in the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, and in fact both parties negotiated some humanitarian ceasefires. It was not possible to agree on any general ceasefire and as the year progressed, Ukraine demanded that Russia withdraw its troops from all its territory, including Donbas and Crimea. A ceasefire was also agreed between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In Asia, the Taliban armed group TTP declared a ceasefire in Pakistan during talks with the Pakistani government, but the ceasefire broke down when the talks failed. The search for a ceasefire was also enormously important to the peace talks between the Colombian government and the ELN and although President Gustavo Petro announced a six-month bilateral ceasefire agreement with various armed groups at the end of the year, including the ELN, the insurgent organisation denied that any such agreement had been reached days later.

In a year internationally marked by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, **political and military issues linked to the government's attributes, such as territorial integrity, powers related to state sovereignty and mutual recognition, as well as the status of disputed territories**, were especially important to different negotiating agendas. Thus, before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, by which Russia militarily challenged Ukrainian sovereignty, the political and military negotiations between both countries addressed issues such as territorial integrity, security guarantees for Ukraine and Ukraine's position in NATO. Between April and May, however, these talks were considered to have reached a dead end and the parties changed their approaches to the issues in later months. Also important to many negotiating agendas were issues related to territorial cohesion and self-determination in its various forms. In Asia, self-determination, autonomy, independence or territorial cohesion and the recognition of identity were especially important factors addressed in a significant number of negotiations, such as those over the Philippines, India (in Assam and Nagaland) and Papua New Guinea (Bougainville). In Nagaland, no headway could be made on any agreement stipulating the Naga people's demands for recognition and disagreement over the constitutional framework continued. Although a territorial dispute was an issue in many of the conflicts in Europe that were addressed by negotiations, it was missing or blocked in the different levels of dialogue. However, the risk that the conflict in Ukraine could expand led to the stated desire to prioritise dialogue in certain negotiating processes, such as the one between Moldova and Transdniestria, even if no significant progress was achieved. Developments in the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the enclave of Nagorno Karabakh were consolidated when Baku proposed a negotiating framework focused on normalising bilateral relations and disconnected from the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, which it considers an internal matter. The Armenian government did not reject the Azerbaijani proposal. However, it did demand

Table 1.4. Intergovernmental organisations as third parties in peace processes in 2022

UN (22)	
AFRICA	
CAR	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic The UN is part of the International Support Group for Central Africa
Chad	Observation of the peace process facilitated by Qatar
DRC	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in the DRC
Libya	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Libya United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) The UN forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, Arab League and EU
Mali	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mali United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Morocco – Western Sahara	UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Western Sahara United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
Mozambique	UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mozambique
Somalia	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)
South Sudan	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for South Sudan United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
Sudan	United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS)
Sudan-South Sudan	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
AMERICA	
Colombia (FARC)	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia
Colombia (ELN)	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia
Haiti	BINUH UN is part of the Core Group
ASIA	
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Peacebuilding Fund Resident Coordinator's Office Mediation Support Unit UNDP
EUROPE	
Cyprus	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cyprus Mission of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General in Cyprus Office of the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Cyprus (OSASG)
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	United Nations Special Representative in the Geneva International Discussions
Russia – Ukraine	UN Secretary-General
Serbia – Kosovo	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) United Nations Special Representative for Kosovo
MIDDLE EAST	
Iran	International Atomic Energy Agency The UN Secretary-General regularly reports on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which validated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015)
Syria	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Syria
Yemen	UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Yemen United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeida Agreement (UNMHA)
EU (16)	
AFRICA	
CAR	EU is a member of the International Support Group for the CAR
DRC	EU delegation in the DRC EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region
Libya	The EU forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, UN and Arab League
Mali	EU Special Representative for the Sahel
Mozambique	EU Special Envoy for the Peace Process in Mozambique
South Sudan	The EU forms part of the IGAD Plus mediation group

AMERICA	
Haiti	EU forms part of the Core Group
Venezuela	The EU forms part of the International Contact Group
ASIA	
Philippines (MILF)	The EU forms part of the International Monitoring Team and has lent support to the Third Party Monitoring Team
EUROPE	
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia EU Monitoring Capacity to Armenia (EUMCAP). It ended on 19 December 2022.
Cyprus	High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia EU Observation Mission in Georgia (EUMM)
Moldova (Transdnistria)	EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) The EU has an observer role in the 5+2 format of the peace process
Serbia – Kosovo	High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues EU Office in Kosovo EU Rule-of-Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)
MIDDLE EAST	
Iran	The EU coordinates the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme (Viena process)
Syria	The EU organises the annual international conference on the future of Syria and the region
AU (11)	
AFRICA	
CAR	The AU leads the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR (the AU with the support of the ECCAS, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad)
Chad	Observation of the peace process facilitated by Qatar
DRC	The AU leads the Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue in the DRC
Ethiopia (Tigray)	AU mediation team led by the AU Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa
Libya	The AU forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the Arab League, UN and EU
Mali	AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel The AU participates in the Mediation Team, which supports implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali
Mozambique	The AU is a guarantor of the peace agreement
Somalia	AU High Representative for Somalia AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), ended on 31 March 2022, replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) on 1 April
South Sudan	Integrated into IGAD Plus, represented by Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria
Sudan	AU High Level Implementation Panel on Sudan (AUHIP)
Sudan – South Sudan	African Union Border Programme (AUBP)
IGAD (5)	
AFRICA	
Ethiopia (Tigray)	Participation in the monitoring and implementation committee of the peace agreement
Somalia	IGAD delegation
South Sudan	The IGAD, which consists of Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda, is part of “IGAD Plus” in South Sudan
Sudan	IGAD delegation
Sudan – South Sudan	IGAD delegation
OSCE (4)	
EUROPE	
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	Minsk Group Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the Conflict Related to the Minsk Conference of the OSCE
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the South Caucasus
Moldova (Transdnistria)	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE for the Transdnistrian Settlement Process OSCE Mission in Moldova
Ukraine	Special Representative of the Rotating Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group [Despite the dismantling of the Trilateral Contact Group in 2022, the OSCE maintained the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office in Ukraine] OSCE Special Observation Mission in Ukraine (SMM). The SMM ended its operations on the 31 March 2022. Coordinator of OSCE projects in Ukraine. Its operations ended on the 30 June 2022.

ECOWAS (2)	
AFRICA	
Mali	ECOWAS in Mali
Senegal (Casamance)	Facilitator and guarantor
OAS (2)	
AMERICA	
Colombia	OAS
Haiti	OAS is part of the Core Group
SADC (2)	
AFRICA	
DRC	SADC representation in the DRC
Mozambique	The SADC is a guarantor of the peace agreement
Arab League (1)	
AFRICA	
Libya	The Arab League forms part of the Quartet for the Libyan Political Agreement along with the AU, UN and EU
ASEAN (1)	
ASIA	
Myanmar	ASEAN envoy
CEEAC (1)	
AFRICA	
CAR	CEEAC delegation in the CAR
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (1)	
MIDDLE EAST	
Yemen	Facilitation of intra-Yemeni talks
International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) (1)	
AFRICA	
DRC	Facilitation of negotiations between DRC and Rwanda (Luanda process)
EAC (1)	
AFRICA	
DRC	Facilitation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Nairobi process)
OIC (1)	
AFRICA	
CAR	OIC delegation in the CAR
OIF (1)	
AFRICA	
RDC	OIF delegation in the DRC

guarantees of rights and freedoms for the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, arguing that the conflict was not a territorial issue, but one of rights. In Africa, aspects related to administrative decentralisation or even the independence of certain territories were also topics of discussion in various negotiations, such as in the negotiating processes in Cameroon, Ethiopia (Tigray), Mali, Senegal (Casamance), Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile), South Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan (on the dispute between both countries over the Abyei region) and Morocco-Western Sahara. Most of the negotiations around these issues faced significant obstacles, given many governments' refusal to accept formulas for decentralisation and the recognition of sovereignty. For example, in the negotiations between Morocco and the Western Sahara, the parties held fast

to their positions in the meetings with the new United Nations representative, while Rabat insisted that the negotiations should revolve exclusively around the Moroccan autonomy proposal and the POLISARIO Front repeated its commitment to hold a referendum on self-determination for the Saharawi population.

In completely different contexts in other negotiations, issues related to the governance of countries and political transitions, the distribution of power and elections were also addressed. This was especially important in the Americas, where the negotiating processes in Haiti and Venezuela revolved around the opposition's demands regarding transitional processes and democratic reform, and governance issues such as possible election schedules. Governance issues were also important in

several African negotiating processes, particularly in Chad, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Libya. In Sudan, the negotiations between the military junta and part of the Sudanese political opposition to try to end the political crisis that has gripped the country since the coup d'état in October 2021 monopolised most of the political agenda during the year, which meant that there was not much progress in implementing the 2020 Juba peace agreement or in negotiations with the armed actors that had not signed it. In Syria, one of the central issues of the Geneva process was the contents of a future Constitution for the country, even though no major headway was made. Political and electoral issues were also central to the intra-Palestinian negotiations.

As in previous years, another subject of the negotiations was the **disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants**. In Colombia, the

process to reintegrate former FARC fighters continued, as set forth in the 2016 peace agreement, though problems were faced. According to data from the Kroc Institute, 74% of the people involved in the reintegration process, approximately 9,500, were linked to a productive project. However, 42 signatories of the peace agreement (the terminology used to describe former FARC combatants) were murdered in 2022, according to the Colombian organisation Indepaz. DDR and security sector reform were also part of the negotiations in various processes in Africa, such as Chad, Ethiopia (Tigray), Mozambique, Mali, the CAR, the DRC, Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan and Libya. The reform or creation of new security forces with various types and names such as mixed units, joint forces and unified national armies were negotiated in these processes. In Mozambique, around 90% of all former RENAMO combatants included in the DDR programme demobilised during the year. In Asia, DDR continued to be fundamental in the process to implement the peace agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF in what is called the normalisation process. Crucially, the third stage of the process to demobilise the 40,000 ex-combatants of the MILF resumed in 2022. During this stage, 14,000 combatants were expected to demobilise, of which 7,200 had done so by October 2022, while another 5,500 combatants were pending demobilisation before the end of the year. However, the process was criticised for being slow. DDR processes in their various modes and names in different regions faced problems related to the slow implementation of the agreements, as well as logistical and security obstacles.

Regarding the **evolution of peace processes and negotiating processes**, it is generally possible to identify a wide variety of trends: a good development of contacts that leads to the achievement of far-reaching agreements; establishment of negotiations where there were none or reactivation of dialogue after years of paralysis;

intense efforts of an exploratory nature that arouse expectations; negotiating rounds that take place without making progress on key points, but that keep a channel of dialogue open; situations of deep blockade and lack of contact despite the efforts of third parties to facilitate a negotiation; obstacles and difficulties already in the phase of implementation of agreements; and contexts in which violence and violations of ceasefire agreements and hostilities have a profound impact on the prospects for peace processes. The analysis of the different cases in 2022 confirms this diversity of dynamics.

The development of many of the peace negotiations during 2022 was shaped by the global consequences of the international crisis caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February. Relations between the Russian government headed by Vladimir Putin

and many other governments, especially in the West, deteriorated tremendously, which made it difficult to find common ground in different peace processes based on the different international alliances of the actors involved. The impacts of the invasion of Ukraine were especially noticeable in negotiations in Europe, but other regions, such as the Middle East, were also affected by these dynamics that opened gaps between international blocs. However, progress was made in peace processes in different regions, with important agreements, though not

without obstacles, in Africa (Chad, Tigray and others). Negotiating processes were restarted in the Americas (Venezuela, Haiti and Colombia) and headway was made in various peace negotiations in Asia (Assam in India, the Philippines (MILF) and Thailand (south)).

Other regions also witnessed rapprochement and even agreements between actors in different countries. Several agreements were especially significant in Africa, such as those reached in Ethiopia, Senegal (Casamance) and Chad. The agreement on the Tigray region in Ethiopia was especially relevant, given the intensity of the conflict, with serious impacts on the civilian population. The federal government of Ethiopia and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region reached a permanent cessation of hostilities agreement facilitated by the AU, which sought to put an end to the armed conflict that began in November 2020. Though Eritrea's absence from the agreement sowed some doubts about its effective implementation and some violations of the ceasefire were reported, the TPLF handed over part of its heavy weapons, demonstrating its willingness to comply with the deal. The ECOWAS-backed peace agreement between the government of Senegal and the MFDC faction led by Cesar Atoute Badiate, from the Casamance region, was also a positive development. In Chad, a Qatari-facilitated peace agreement was reached between 34 of the 52 political and military movements, which allowed for their participation in the subsequent Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (DNIS) in

The development of many of the peace negotiations during 2022 was shaped by the global consequences of the international crisis caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February

Table 1.5. Main agreements of 2022

Peace processes	Agreements
Chad	The government of Chad and 34 of the 52 political and military movements participating in the negotiations reached an agreement in Doha (Qatar) under Qatari mediation on 7 August, which enabled their participation in the subsequent National Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS), held in N'Djamena between 20 August and 8 October together with hundreds of representatives of the government and the political and social opposition.
Ethiopia (Tigray)	The Ethiopian government and the military and political authorities of the Tigray region reached a peace agreement on 2 November under the auspices of the African Union. The agreement establishes a cessation of hostilities that will be monitored, supervised and verified by the AU through a unit composed of a maximum of 10 people designated by the AU, with a representative from the regional organisation IGAD, who must report to the mediation team led by former Nigerian President Olesegun Obasanjo. On 12 November, the parties signed the Declaration of the Senior Commanders on the Modalities for the Implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Nairobi, which stipulates the delivery of heavy weapons and the demobilisation of combatants, the restoration of public services in Tigray, the reactivation of aid and the withdrawal of all armed groups and foreign forces that fought alongside the Federal Ethiopian Army.
Senegal (Casamance)	The government of Senegal and the faction of the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) led by Cesar Atoute Badiate signed a peace agreement on 4 August. The agreement, which remains confidential, describes the road map for laying down arms and reaffirms the parties' commitment to find a negotiated solution to the conflict.
South Sudan	On 16 January, the government of South Sudan and the SPLA-IO Kitgwang faction, led by General Simon Gatwech Dual, which broke off from the SPLA-IO headed by Vice President Riek Machar in August 2021, signed an agreement that integrates the Kitgwang faction into the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Signed in Khartoum under the mediation of the government of Sudan, the new agreement includes amnesty for Kitgwang fighters, a permanent ceasefire and its integration into the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF). ³
Haiti	The National Consensus Agreement for Haiti, signed with various political groups and civil society organisations and the private sector for an inclusive transition and transparent elections, lays out a 14-month transition that includes elections held before the end of 2023, the inauguration of the new government on 7 February 2024 (the date until which Ariel Henry will remain in office as prime minister) and the formation of a High Transition Council made up of a representative of civil society, a representative of political parties and representative of the private sector, as well as a Control Body for Government Action. Much of the opposition rejected the agreement.
India (Assam)	Tripartite peace agreement between the central government of India, the government of the state of Assam and eight Adivasi armed groups (All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), AANLA (FG), Birsia Commando Force (BCF), BCF (BT), Santhal Tiger Force, Adivasi Cobra Militant of Assam (ACMA), ACMA (FG) and Adivasi People's Army (APA)) involves the demobilisation of the combatants and their acceptance of current Indian legislation. The Indian government pledged to protect and preserve the social, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic identity of the Adivasi groups; to ensure the development of tea plantations in the Adivasi villages of Assam; to establish an Adivasi welfare and development council; to rehabilitate armed actors and guarantee the welfare of tea plantation workers; and to provide a special development package to improve infrastructure in Adivasi villages.
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	The Era Kone Covenant on the Finalisation of the Bougainville Referendum on Independence, signed by the prime minister of Papua New Guinea and the president of the Autonomous Bougainville Government, stipulates that the results of the 2019 referendum and the conclusions and agreements of the consultations and negotiations held since then will be submitted to the Parliament of Papua New Guinea before the end of 2023. When the Parliament has voted on the proposed political settlement for Bougainville that the two governments reach, it should be implemented no earlier than 2025 and no later than 2027. After its ratification by both governments, the agreement provides for writing the drafts of the constitutional regulations necessary to advance on the road map described therein.
Palestine	The Algerian Document for inter-Palestinian Reconciliation was signed by Fatah, Hamas and 12 other Palestinian organisations in Algiers on 13 October. The agreement recognises the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and commits to a national dialogue to ensure the involvement of all groups. It also provides for presidential and legislative elections to be held within a year, including for the Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament) and the Palestinian National Council (the PLO's legislative body in which Palestinians and Diaspora Palestinians also participate). Also known as the "Algeria Declaration", the document establishes that an Arab-Algerian team will supervise the implementation of the agreement.
Russia – Ukraine	An agreement on the export of grain and other food products, known as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, was reached in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 in the form of two identical documents, one signed by Russia and the other by Ukraine, with Turkey and the UN Secretary-General also signing, the latter as an observer. The agreement establishes a mechanism for the safe transport of grain, other food products and fertiliser from Ukrainian ports to global markets. The agreement also includes the export of Russian food and fertiliser to global markets through the Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the United Nations Secretariat. The Black Sea Grain Initiative was facilitated by Turkey and the UN. As part of the agreement, the Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) was established in Istanbul, in which representatives of Ukraine, Russia, Turkey and the UN participate, under the auspices of the UN. On 17 November, the agreement was extended for another 120 days.
Yemen	A nationwide truce agreement was signed by the internationally recognised government and the Houthis for a cessation of hostilities starting on 2 April, coinciding with the start of Ramadan. The five-point agreement included a halt to all types of military offensives inside and outside Yemen and the maintenance of existing military positions; the entrance of ships with fuel to the port of Al Hudaydah; the resumption of commercial flights to and from the capital, Sana'a, towards Jordan and Egypt; the start of talks to agree on the opening of roads in several governorates, including Ta'iz, to facilitate the movement of the civilian population; and the commitment to continue working with the UN special envoy to take steps to end the armed conflict. The agreement was signed for an initial period of two months and renewed twice, in May and August. Starting in October, the agreement formally ended, though full-scale hostilities between the parties had not resumed by the end of the year and some of the elements of the truce remained in force.

N'Djamena, along with hundreds of representatives of the government and the political and social opposition. However, the absence of some of the main armed groups, the boycott of the DNIS by the main actors of the political opposition and the outcome of the dialogue hampered further progress in the transition. Important progress was made in the political sphere in Sudan, with the signing of a framework agreement between the military junta and much of the political opposition, with the commitment to establish a transitional civilian government.

In the Middle East, some positive developments were also noted, especially in Yemen, where a nationwide truce was achieved that allowed for a decrease in hostilities and consequently a drop in both the number of victims and people displaced by violence, as well as less food insecurity, in a conflict that has led to a very serious humanitarian crisis in recent years. However, the fragility of the agreement, which was only in force for six months, led to great concern about a possible resumption of violence during 2023. The negotiating processes in the Americas developed positively, despite the problems, with crucial progress in Colombia like the start of a formal peace process with the ELN and the reinstatement of key institutions to implement the 2016 peace agreements. Progress was also observed in other countries, even in more politically fragile environments such as Haiti and Venezuela. Thus, negotiations began between the Haitian government and the opposition and talks resumed between the opposition and the government in Venezuela. Asia was also the scene of some positive events, such as the beginning of a negotiating process in Pakistan, though it was later cut short, the restart of negotiations in Thailand with the BRN after years of impasse and the progress made in the implementation of the agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF, especially with regard to DDR.

However, many negotiating processes had to face significant obstacles and some remained deadlocked. In addition to the aforementioned dynamics, resulting from an international context marked by the invasion of Ukraine and the consolidation of international political blocs, there were local political and social problems and dynamics of mistrust between the negotiating parties that made comprehensive or partial agreements difficult. In Africa, negotiating processes in Mali, the CAR, the DRC, South Sudan and Somalia were challenged by violence. The offensive of the armed groups in the CAR that had withdrawn from the 2019 agreement and the continued armed activity of groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia and the M23 in the DRC are examples of how dynamics of conflict hindered the partial progress that had been made in all these peace processes in the absence of solid ceasefire agreements. Other processes remained at a standstill, such as the negotiations between Eritrea

and Ethiopia, where no progress was made in the implementation of the peace agreement. There were no positive developments in the negotiations in Libya in 2022 either and the political impasse in the country had negative impacts despite the significant drop in violence compared to previous years due to the current truce agreement, signed in late 2021. The negotiations between Morocco and Western Sahara also remained deadlocked, despite the expectations generated by the appointment of a new United Nations special envoy. Some negotiating processes in Asia particularly took turns for the worse. For example, the rise to power of the new president of South Korea led to a notable deterioration of the relations between the two Koreas and a growing gulf between their respective positions. In Pakistan, despite the start of talks and rapprochement between the government and the Taliban insurgency, the year ended with a breakdown in the talks and a rise in violence. In Myanmar, the situation remained stagnant amidst a rise in violence and the military junta's lack of motivation to put into practice the points agreed with ASEAN to find a solution to the country's political crisis.

Finally, regarding the gender, peace and security agenda, the analysis of the different peace processes in 2022 confirms, like in previous years, the obstacles that women face in participating in formal processes and the difficulties in incorporating a gender perspective in negotiation. Twenty-two years after the approval of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, many challenges to its implementation remained and most peace processes continued to exclude women. **No specific mechanisms of participation were designed for women in most negotiations and gender issues and recognition of the rights of women and the LGBTIQ+ population were left out of much of the negotiating agendas.** A significant example of the obstacles that women continue to face in peace processes was what happened in the negotiations between Morocco and Western Sahara, where the special envoy's decision not to visit Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara in July was partly due to the realisation that it would not be possible to meet with representatives of civil society and women's organisations due to the restrictions imposed by Rabat. This was stated in the UN Secretary-General's annual report on Western Sahara, noting that Staffan de Mistura's visit was postponed "in consistency with the principles of the United Nations and, in particular, due to the importance given to women's equal participation and full involvement in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security". However, women's activism persisted, demanding greater recognition of the proposals of women's organisations and the feminist movement and demanding spaces for participation at the negotiating table.

There were several processes in which women had the opportunity to participate, though with many limitations.

In **Mali**, 15 women joined the subcommittees of the Agreement Monitoring Committee (CSA) and the transitional president appointed 10 more women to the National Transition Council, bringing their total number to 42 (28%). The peace agreement in Mali was reached between the government and the main warring groups (excluding the jihadist groups) in 2015. There was only one female representative in the peace process for **Chad** in Doha and although women's and youth organisations participated in the DNIS, they did so with little chance of impacting its results. In addition, women constituted slightly less than 30% of the new government. Women's participation in the peace process in the **CAR** remained weak: two of the 11 members of the Republican Dialogue Follow-up Committee were women and they accounted for only 17% of the participants in the dialogue. In early September in **Sudan**, UNITAMS worked in conjunction with the UNDP to facilitate meetings with 55 Sudanese women from political parties, armed movements, civil society, academia and the Women's Rights Group (WRG). These meetings were aimed at building a common agenda of key principles and provisions from a women's rights perspective to examine the gender-related priorities of any future constitutional documents and negotiations based on those principles. This group of women also held meetings with the trilateral mechanism, an initiative promoted by UNITAMS, the AU and the regional organisation IGAD to mediate between the military junta and the civilian opposition to incorporate its agenda in the agreement reached in December.

In the dispute between **Sudan and South Sudan** for sovereignty over the Abyei region, the UN mission in the area (UNISFA) facilitated women's participation in the Joint Traditional Leaders' Peace Conference that was held in Entebbe (Uganda) in May, in which three women were involved (10% of all participants). In the negotiations between the government of **Ethiopia** and the political and military authorities of **Tigray**, former South African Vice President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka played a leading role in the AU mediation team. In the Americas, women's participation in negotiations was especially notable in **Colombia**. In the Colombian government's talks with the ELN, both delegations included many women at the table. The government panel achieved parity for the first time, prioritising equal participation over a specific mechanism for female involvement. The Women's Body for a Gender and Peace Focus continued to work on implementing the peace agreement with the FARC. In **Thailand (south)**, the government appointed Rachada Dhnadirek as its special representative, tasked with promoting the role of women in the peace negotiations. In the negotiations between the government of **Papua New Guinea and Bougainville**, women's participation was

Although women's direct participation in several peace processes was verified, they had to face many obstacles and barriers

limited to four MPs in the Parliament of Bougainville who acted as observers during the meetings of the Joint Supervisory Body, though their participation is planned in different bodies such as the Bougainville Leaders Consultation Forum, created so that civil society can present demands and proposals on post-referendum negotiations; the Independence Preparation Mission, a body to promote preparations for independence at the internal, national and international levels; and the Bougainville Constitutional Planning Commission (BCPC), created to draft the Constitution of a possible independent Bougainville. In **Cyprus**, the technical committee on gender equality, a mechanism established to include the participation of women and the gender perspective in the negotiations, adopted an action plan to promote female participation in the process, with recommendations that include a ceiling of two-thirds representation of any gender in all delegations, as well as in the members and co-chairs of the working groups and technical committees of the peace process. In **Moldova**, a new body in the negotiating process was on the verge of being approved, an Informal Advisory Council of Women aimed at issuing recommendations. For yet another year, the number of women in formal peace negotiations in **Yemen** continued to decline, as it has since 2015, and Yemeni activists pointed out that participation levels are well below the 30%

representation quota for decision-making spaces agreed on in 2014. Women's participation in different spheres was improved in the intra-Yemeni talks sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which bring together actors from the anti-Houthi camp, but women were still excluded from discussions on security and anti-terrorism and one of the five members of the government's team in the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission was a woman. Finally, the Women's Advisory Board remained active in the negotiations in **Syria**. Composed of 15 Syrian women of different sensibilities, the consultative body met periodically with the United Nations envoy.

A gender approach, specific clauses on gender equality or the recognition of women's rights was included in various peace agreements reached during 2022, though admittedly in a very limited way. Thus, in their agreement, Sudan and South Sudan pledged to foster peaceful coexistence by making women the agents of change in ongoing peacebuilding efforts and intercommunal talks. The agreement reached for the conflict in the Ethiopian region of Tigray included issues regarding gender violence and urged the parties to the conflict to condemn any act of sexual or gender violence, any act of violence against minors, girls, women and the elderly and the recruitment of child soldiers. The agreement also encouraged the parties to promote family reunification and to consider the specific needs of what it describes

as “vulnerable groups”, which include women, minors and the elderly, in providing humanitarian aid.

Civil society women’s organisations were highly active in various peace processes and demanded continuity in the negotiations, greater participation or the inclusion of proposals regarding more recognition of women’s rights or general suggestions regarding the content of the negotiations. Thus, among many others, women’s organisations in Cameroon led several different initiatives and demonstrations linked to the peace process and issued the statement Women’s Negotiations for Peace in Cameroon. Initiatives led by women in Armenia included anti-war protests in the capital and a

statement from the Feminist Peace Collective, created in 2020 in response to the war that year, to protest Azerbaijan’s military offensive in September. The statement was also critical of the male-dominated and elitist negotiations led by both government panels and appealed to unity, citizen diplomacy and peacebuilding. The Kosovo Women’s Network expressed concern to the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue about its exclusion from the peace process in Kosovo. In India, the women’s organisation Naga Mother’s Association demonstrated to demand the repeal of anti-terrorism legislation and complained of human rights violations committed against the Naga population by security forces under its cover.

2. Peace negotiations in Africa

- Fifteen peace processes and negotiations were identified in Africa in 2022, accounting for nearly 40% of all peace processes worldwide.
- Various local initiatives were put forth by civil society actors in Cameroon and Canada facilitated contacts to explore the possibility of relaunching a negotiating process between political and military actors and the Cameroonian government.
- The little progress made in implementing the Mali peace agreement of 2015 prompted a coalition of northern armed groups to suspend their participation in mechanisms to implement the agreement.
- The government of Senegal and Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) faction led by Cesar Atoute Badiate signed a peace agreement.
- On 2 November, the federal government of Ethiopia and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia reached a permanent cessation of hostilities agreement facilitated by the African Union.
- The Doha peace process and the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue in Chad, boycotted by many armed groups and by the political opposition, respectively, concluded with the extension of the mandate of the Transitional Military Council through the creation of a national unity government and the continuity of the presidency of Mahamat Déby.
- The Military Junta and the opposition in Sudan reached a framework agreement to create a civilian transitional government.
- After the general elections were cancelled in Libya in late 2021, the impasse in the negotiations persisted in 2022 and the divisions materialised in the configuration of two parallel governments.

This chapter analyses the peace processes and negotiations in Africa in 2022. First it examines the general characteristics and trends of peace processes in the region, then it delves into the evolution of each of the cases throughout the year, including references to the gender, peace and security agenda. At the beginning of the chapter, a map is included that identifies the African countries that were the scene of negotiations during 2022.

Table 2.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in Africa in 2022

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West)	Government, political-military secessionist movement formed by the opposition coalition Ambazonia Coalition Team (ACT, including IG Sako, AIPC, APLM, FSCW, MoRISC, SCARM, SCAPO, SCNC, RoA, RoAN, civil society actors and independent individuals), and Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC, including IG Sisiku)	Church, civil society organisations, Switzerland/Swiss Contact Group, Friends of the Swiss Contact Group (EU, USA, Canada, Belgium, Germany, UK), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, USIP, Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation (CDN), Vatican, Canada
CAR	Government, armed groups belonging to the former Séléka coalition, anti-balaka militias	The African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation (AU and ECCAS, with the support of the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Rep. of the Congo and Chad), Community of Sant'Egidio, ACCORD, OIC, International Support Group (UN, EU, among others), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, China, Russia, Sudan
Chad	Transitional Military Council, 52 armed groups, including the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCSMR), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) and the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR)	Qatar, AU, UN
DRC	Government of DRC, Government of Rwanda, armed group M23, eastern armed groups, political opposition and civil society	Congolese Episcopal Conference (CENCO), Church of Christ in the Congo, Angola, Tanzania, Uganda, Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue on the DRC led by the AU, SADC, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), AU, EU, UN, OIF and USA
Eritrea – Ethiopia	Government of Eritrea and Government of Ethiopia	United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, USA
Ethiopia (Tigray)	Federal Government, political and military authorities of the Ethiopian region of Tigray (Tigray People's Liberation Front)	AU, USA, IGAD

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
Libya	Government of National Accord (GNA) / Government of National Unity (GNU), High State Council (HSC), House of Representatives (HoR), LNA/ALAF	Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU, EU), Germany, France, Italy, UK, USA, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Mali	Government, Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), MNLA, MAA and HCUA, Platform, GATIA, CMFPR, CPA, faction of the MAA	Algeria, France, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), AU, UN, EU, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, The Carter Center, civil society organisations, Mauritania
Morocco – Western Sahara	Morocco, Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO Front)	UN, Algeria and Mauritania, Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, USA, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia)
Mozambique	Government, RENAMO	National mediation team, Community of Sant'Egidio, Catholic Church, UN, Southern African Development Community (SADC), AU, EU, Botswana, South Africa, Switzerland, Tanzania, United Kingdom
Senegal (Casamance)	Government, factions of the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC)	ECOWAS, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde
Somalia	Federal Government, leaders of the federal and emerging states (Puntland, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Southwest), political military movement Ahlu Sunna WalJama'a, clan and sub-clan leaders, Somaliland	UN, IGAD, Turkey, among others
South Sudan	Government (SPLM), SPLM/A-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), and several minor groups (SSOA, SPLM-FD, among others) and SSOMA, faction led by Paul Malong and Pagan Amum (comprising SSUF/A and Real-SPLM) and faction led by Thomas Cirillo (consisting of the SSNDA coalition, including NAS, SSNMC, NDM/PF and UDRA)	"IGAD Plus": the IGAD, which includes Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda; AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway), EU, UN, South Sudan Council of Churches, Community of Sant'Egidio
Sudan	Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, coalition comprising the armed groups of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur), Movement for Justice and Equity (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movements, SLA-MM and SLA-AW factions, Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), Malik Agar and Abdelaziz al-Hilu factions	African Union High Level Panel on Sudan (AUHIP), Troika (EEUU, United Kingdom, Norway), Germany, AU, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, IGAD, UNITAMS
Sudan – South Sudan	Government of Sudan and Government of South Sudan	IGAD, African Union Border Programme (AUBP), Egypt, Libya, USA, EU


The peace negotiations in bold type are described in the chapter.

2.1 Negotiations in 2022: regional trends

There were **15 peace processes and negotiations in Africa** in 2022, accounting for 39% of the 39 peace processes worldwide. This figure is higher than in previous years (12 peace processes in 2021, 13 in 2020), yet below those recorded in 2019 (18) and 2018 (22). Six negotiating processes were located in the Horn of Africa (Sudan, South Sudan, Sudan-South Sudan, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Ethiopia (Tigray) and Somalia), three in Central Africa (Chad, the CAR and the DRC), another five in North Africa and West Africa (Cameroon (Ambazonia/Northwest and Southwest), Libya, Mali, Morocco-Western Sahara and Senegal) and the rest in southern Africa (Mozambique). The increase in 2022 compared to 2021 is due to the inclusion of three new peace processes into the analysis during the year, such as the case of Chad, due to the celebration of the Doha peace process and the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue; the initiatives for dialogue and negotiation in relation to the conflict between the federal government of Ethiopia and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region; and initiatives for dialogue and negotiation between the government of Senegal and a faction of the armed group MFDC in the Casamance region.

Nine of these 15 peace processes were linked to armed conflicts: those in Cameroon (Ambazonia/Northwest and Southwest), Ethiopia (Tigray), Libya, Mali, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. The remaining six peace processes took place in contexts of socio-political crisis, which in some cases had also included episodes of warfare: Chad, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Morocco-Western Sahara, Mozambique, Senegal (Casamance) and Sudan-South Sudan. Some of the peace processes corresponded to conflicts that began in the last decade, such as Cameroon (Ambazonia/Northwest and Southwest, 2018), Libya (2011) and Mali (2012), while others date back to the previous decade, like the CAR (2006), Sudan (2003), South Sudan (2009) and Sudan-South Sudan. Still other conflicts and crisis situations date back to the 1990s, such as the cases of the DRC and Somalia, so the initiatives and peace negotiations linked to these conflicts have evolved profoundly since their origin in terms of the actors involved and the causes of the disputes. The longest-running peace process studied in Africa, which suffers from structural paralysis, is the one between Morocco and Western Sahara, which began after the 1991 ceasefire

Map 2.1. Peace negotiations in Africa in 2022



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in Africa in 2022

agreement. The last cycle of violence in Mozambique began in 2013, though it dates back to the limited application of the 1992 peace agreement that put an end to the conflict between RENAMO and FRELIMO that began in 1974. The conflict in the Senegalese region of Casamance, which began in 1982, achieved its first peace agreement in 2004. Low-intensity clashes continued afterwards, led by factions that rejected the agreement.

In relation to the actors participating in the negotiations, in 2022 **only four cases exclusively involved the governments of the respective countries and armed groups or political-military movements in the negotiations**. These were the cases of Ethiopia (between the Ethiopian federal government and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region, who met in Pretoria, South Africa, as facilitated by the African Union), Mozambique (between the Mozambican government and the opposition group RENAMO), the CAR (between the Central African government and the armed groups that did not abandon the peace process in December 2020) and Senegal (between the government and a faction of the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC)). **In the meantime, eight of the other 15 peace processes were characterised by a more complex map of actors, with governments, armed groups, and political and social opposition groups**. This was the case in Chad, where a dual negotiating track was pursued between the Chadian government and the

political and military groups in Doha, with part of these groups later participating in the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue, along with civil society actors and political parties; Cameroon (Ambazonia/Northwest and Southwest), where exploratory contacts in Canada have involved different stakeholders from the political and military secessionist spectrum; Mali, where the negotiating process has involved national authorities and many political and armed actors from the Azawad region in recent years; Libya, between political and military actors that control different parts of the country; Somalia, between the Federal Government, the leaders of the federated states and other domestic political and military actors; Sudan, between the government, the political opposition and insurgent groups from various regions of the country; South Sudan, between the government, the armed group SPLM/A-IO and other smaller political opposition and armed groups; and the DRC, where the negotiations involved the Congolese government and the Rwandan government on the one hand and the Congolese government and different armed groups in the country on other. **Other negotiating processes were conducted by the governments of neighbouring countries as part of interstate disputes**. Examples of this were the dialogue between Sudan and South Sudan and the negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Morocco-Western Sahara negotiating process, which has been at a standstill in recent years, involves the Moroccan government and the POLISARIO Front, which proclaimed the Saharawi Arab Democratic

Republic (SADR) in 1976. It is considered an international dispute because it is a territory considered pending decolonisation by the UN.

All the peace processes and negotiations in Africa studied had third-party support, whether taking the form of international organisations, regional organisations, states and religious organisations or organisations specialised in mediation and facilitation. Although there are many cases where the actors involved in mediation, facilitation and accompaniment are publicly known, in other contexts this work is carried out discreetly and away from the public eye. In all cases there was more than one actor performing mediation and facilitation tasks. Most dominant in this regard was the UN, which was involved in nine of the 15 cases in Africa: Libya, Mali, Morocco-Western Sahara, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. Another prominent actor was the AU, which participated in 10 negotiating processes in Ethiopia (Tigray), Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan. Both organisations played the role of observers in the peace talks in Chad, since the mediation was conducted by Qatar.

African regional intergovernmental organisations participated as third parties, like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Mali and in Senegal (Casamance); the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in the CAR and DRC negotiating processes; the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC) in the CAR; the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Mozambique; and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Sudan-South Sudan; and the East African Community (EAC) in the DRC. In addition to African intergovernmental organisations, other intergovernmental organisations participated as third parties in Africa, such as the EU (in Libya, Mali, Mozambique, the CAR, the DRC, South Sudan and between Sudan and South Sudan).

States also continued to play a leading role as third parties in peace processes and negotiations in Africa. All the peace processes studied had states leading or supporting initiatives of dialogue and negotiation. Local and international religious actors also played roles as third parties, especially the Community of Sant'Egidio (Vatican) in Mozambique, the CAR and South Sudan; the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in the CAR; local religious institutions in Mozambique, the DRC and South Sudan; ecumenical formats such as the Anglophone General Conference (AGC), made up of

Catholic, Protestant and Muslim leaders in Cameroon; and the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC). Organisations specialised in mediation and facilitation also played prominent roles, especially the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Cameroon, Libya, Mali, the CAR and Senegal; the Carter Center in Mali; and the Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation (CDN) in Cameroon, among others.

As part of this proliferation of mediators, **the participation of third parties in joint formats continued to be frequent, as in previous years,** such as groups of friends and support groups. This was the case with the Swiss Contact Group and the Friends of the Swiss Contact Group (EU, USA, Canada, Belgium, Germany and the UK) in the conflict in Cameroon; the Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, USA, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia) in the negotiating process between

Morocco and the POLISARIO Front; the international monitoring committee in Libya, in which the Libyan Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU and EU) participate, as well as a dozen countries; the International Support Group (which includes the UN and the EU) and the African Union Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation, which was involved in the CAR and promoted by the AU and the CEEAC, with support from the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad, and coexisted with other mediators in the CAR; the states of the Troika (the USA, United Kingdom and Norway); African Union High Level on Sudan (AUHIP) in the case of Sudan; other coordination formats included the IGAD Plus, which facilitates dialogue

in South Sudan and which consists of the IGAD, the five members of the African Union High-Level Ad Hoc Committee (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria). In Sudan, apart from the peace processes with the armed actors of Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, there was a negotiating process between the Sudanese government and the opposition to find a solution to the political crisis that was facilitated by two parallel processes: the Trilateral Mechanism (consisting of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), the AU and the IGAD) and the one known as QUAD (which includes the US, UK Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates). At the same time, competition between foreign actors continued, as exemplified in previous years in Libya and the CAR.¹

Regarding **the agendas** of the negotiations, there were **cessations of hostilities and ceasefire agreements** in different contexts, such as Ethiopia (Tigray) and the DRC, in relation to the armed groups in the east of the country and especially M23. **Security sector reform**

1. See *Peace Talks in Focus 2021. Analysis of Trends and Scenarios*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022.

was also a recurrent issue, especially the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and the reform or creation of new security forces in peace agreements with various types and names, such as mixed units, joint forces or unified national armies. These were found in most of the cases analysed, such as Chad, Ethiopia (Tigray), Mozambique, Mali, the CAR, the DRC, Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan and Libya. Issues related to **governance** were also discussed in the ongoing negotiations in various contexts, such as in Chad, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Libya. **Degrees of self-government and levels of administrative decentralisation, including independence** for some areas, were discussed in Cameroon, Ethiopia (Tigray), Mali, Senegal, South Sudan, and Morocco-Western Sahara. Unfinished border demarcations, as in the disputes between Eritrea and Ethiopia and between Sudan and South Sudan, were also discussed in negotiations in Africa.

Regarding the **gender, peace and security agenda, women were virtually absent in the negotiating processes under way in Africa**. In most contexts, however, many women's movements and organisations demanded active participation in the peace processes and various local peacebuilding initiatives were launched and led by civil society organisations and especially by women's organisations. Civil society organisations and especially women's organisations in **Cameroon** remained active in promoting peacebuilding initiatives, not just in the two English-speaking regions of Cameroon, but also in other parts of the country. After the success of the National Women's Convention for Peace that took place in Yaoundé in 2021, bringing together a thousand women, women's organisations demonstrated in various cities across the country, mainly in Yaoundé, Bamenda, Buea and Maroua, to mark the International Day for Peace (21 September), protesting their underrepresentation in peacebuilding initiatives and efforts. Various women's organisations also called for a ceasefire before the peace negotiations are formalised. In **Mali**, 15 women joined subcommittees of the Agreement Monitoring Committee (CSA) reached in 2015 between the government and the main parties to the conflict (excluding the jihadist groups), which the Carter Center, the main observer of the agreement, described as a positive step forward in the incorporation of the women, peace and security agenda. The transitional president also appointed 26 new members to the National Transition Council, 10 of which were women, bringing their total number to 42 (28%). Meanwhile, the agreement reached between the federal government of **Ethiopia** and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region included issues related to gender violence perpetrated during the conflict, which shows that all the parties to this conflict have committed atrocities that include massacres of civilians, sexual violence (especially by Eritrea) and the use of hunger as a weapon of war (mainly by Ethiopia). These violations have hardly been monitored due to

the information blackout that the federal government has imposed in the region, according to various human rights organisations. Also of note, former South African Vice President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka was active in the AU mediation team. In **Somalia**, the elections handed women 10 government positions (approximately 13% of the total), slightly more than in the previous government (11.7%), but far less than what was demanded by local activists in coordination with the international community, which had pushed for a quota of 30% female representation. They only obtained 20% of the seats in the lower house (House of the People), which was a dip compared to the 24% achieved in 2016. The number of female MPs reached 26% in the upper house (Senate), a slight increase compared to the 24% in 2016. The total number of female MPs in both chambers of Parliament fell to 67, whereas they had won 80 seats in the 2016 elections. In **Chad**, the Doha peace process only had one female representative, according to the United Nations. Likewise, women's and youth organisations participated in the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (DNIS), though their voice, as well as that of the rest of the political and social opposition, had little impact on its results, in line with the interests of the president of the Military Council, Mahamat Déby, and his new government, in which women were represented at slightly less than 30%. In the **CAR**, women's participation in the peace process remained low: two of the 11 members of the Follow-up Committee for the Republican Dialogue were women, comprising only 17% of its participants. In the **DRC**, on 26 April, the Advisory Board for Women, Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region, co-chaired by the UN Special Envoy for the DRC and the AU Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security, issued a statement calling on states to redouble their efforts to strengthen the rights of women and girls and to ensure that the gender dimension is taken into account in ongoing negotiating processes. In **Sudan**, in early September, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) teamed up with the United Nations Development Programme (UNPD) to facilitate different meetings with 55 Sudanese women involved in political parties, armed movements, civil society, academia and the Women's Rights Group (WRG). These meetings were aimed at building a shared agenda of key principles and provisions from a human rights perspective to examine the gender-related priorities of any future constitutional documents or negotiations based on those principles. This group of women also held meetings with the Trilateral Mechanism, an initiative promoted by UNITAMS, the AU and the regional organisation IGAD to mediate between the Sudanese Military Junta and the civil opposition, to incorporate its agenda into the agreement reached in December. In the dispute between **Sudan and South Sudan** over the sovereignty of the Abyei region, the UN mission in the area (UNISFA) facilitated the participation of women in the Joint Traditional Leaders' Peace Conference that

was held in Entebbe (Uganda) in May, in which three women were involved (10% of the participants). In the agreement adopted, the parties committed to promoting peaceful coexistence by making women the agents of change in ongoing peacebuilding and inter-community dialogues. Finally, in **Libya** women's and civil society organisations continued to demand a greater role in the negotiations and decision-making bodies regarding the country's political future amidst growing threats and hostility towards activists and women working in the public sphere. According to reports, in the last round of the forum for dialogue on constitutional issues in Cairo, in June, the delegations addressed this claim and both chambers agreed to support a 25% quota for women in all elections in the country, even though plans for the elections remained at a standstill. Unfortunately, in September an administrative appeals court in Tripoli upheld a decision to strike down an agreement reached in October 2021 between UN Women and the Libyan Ministry of Women to develop a national action plan for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

Developments in the peace negotiations during 2022 included various peace agreements signed in Ethiopia (Tigray), Senegal (Casamance) and Chad, as well as a transitional political agreement in Sudan, though the results were mixed. On 2 November, **the Ethiopian federal government and the political and military authorities of the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia reached a permanent cessation of hostilities agreement facilitated by the African Union**, which sought to end the armed conflict that began in November 2020. The fact that Eritrea, which is responsible for serious human rights violations in the region, did not sign the agreement raised doubts about its effective implementation, and though some violations of the cessation of hostilities were verified, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) handed over part of its heavy weapons at the start of the year, demonstrating its willingness to comply with the agreement. Another positive development was **the signing of a peace agreement between the government of Senegal and the MFDC faction led by Cesar Atoute Badiate**, from the Casamance region on 4 August, under the auspices of ECOWAS. **A peace agreement for Chad was reached in Doha** on 7 August among 34 of the 52 political and military movements thanks to Qatari facilitation, which enabled their participation in the subsequent Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (DNIS) held in N'Djamena from 20 August to 8 October, together with hundreds of representatives of the government and the political and social opposition. However, the fact that some of the main armed groups in the country did not sign the Doha agreement and that the main political opposition groups boycotted the DNIS, as well as its result, which meant the transition would be prolonged for another 24 months and the president of

Women were persistently absent from negotiating processes in Africa

the Military Council would be appointed the president of the transition, combined with the crackdown on the protests of 20 October, led to a worsening situation in the country. Finally, although there was no progress in the implementation of the 2020 Juba peace agreement in **Sudan** or in the negotiations with armed actors that had not signed the agreement, significant headway was made in the political sphere, such as the **framework agreement reached on 5 December between the Military Junta and much of the political opposition** in which the military promised to give up much of its political power and create a transitional civilian government with elections in two years. The agreement also committed the parties to security sector reforms, including the integration of former rebel groups and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into a unified Sudanese Army. However, the signatories to the framework agreement did not include the armed groups that had signed the Juba peace agreement, including those led by the two main former rebel leaders Gibril Ibrahim (now the Minister of Finance) and Minni Minawi (now the Governor of Darfur).

Various **local agreements** were also reached during the year that helped to ease inter-community tensions. Notable among them was the agreement reached in the Abyei region (Sudan-South Sudan) mediated by UNISFA, where traditional Dinka Ngok and Misseriya authorities signed a peace agreement in Uganda that sought to reduce intercommunal violence. Moreover, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue reported various processes and initiatives under way since 2018 in border areas between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger that could lead to new agreements that might help to change regional dynamics of violence and instability.

Meanwhile, there were also some **positive developments in Mozambique, Cameroon and South Sudan, as well as between Sudan and South Sudan**. In **Mozambique**, progress was made during the year in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former RENAMO combatants (DDR) provided for in the 2019 peace agreement, as 90% of the former RENAMO combatants involved in the DDR programme demobilised. In **South Sudan**, some progress was made during the year in the implementation of the 2018 South Sudan Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS), with the SPLA-IO Kitgwang faction also signing it, while peace negotiations in Rome with the groups that had not signed the peace agreement failed to move forward. The dynamics of rapprochement that began in 2019 between the governments of **Sudan and South Sudan** continued during the year, deepening and strengthening their diplomatic relations. Both governments made progress on border security agreements amidst a rise in intercommunity violence in the Abyei region. Although the mediation efforts conducted by the Swiss Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) in conjunction with

the Swiss government since 2019 were terminated in **Cameroon** and armed violence persisted in the two English-speaking provinces, there were contacts in Canada in October between representatives of the Cameroonian government and various Anglophone separatist groups as part of a new initiative to promote a peace process.

There was no progress in the rest of the peace processes, which in fact experienced many problems, standstills and crises. In **Mali**, little progress was made during the year in the implementation of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement in an atmosphere characterised by political instability in the country and the continuation of the dynamics of violence by groups that had not signed the agreement. In the **CAR**, the offensive launched by the armed groups that backed out of the 2019 agreement in December 2020 continued in 2022 and the political situation in the country worsened due to the polarisation resulting from the process to try to reform the Constitution. In addition, the Republican Dialogue did not meet the expectations raised by the absence of the political opposition and the armed actors who had abandoned the peace agreement in December 2020. As a result, the implementation of the 2019 peace agreement remained at a standstill. The Nairobi process was launched in the **DRC**, an inter-Congolese dialogue promoted by the EAC that involved around 50 armed groups from the eastern part of the country. However, the main armed group, M23, which is chiefly responsible for the escalation of violence in the region, did not participate. Added to this was the serious tension between the DRC and Rwanda, stemming from Rwandan support for M23. Legislative and presidential elections were held in **Somalia** as part of the implementation of the electoral agreement reached on 27 May 2021. The presidential election was won by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and put an end to the serious strain between parts of the government and the federated states and opposition sectors. However, the armed activities of the al-Shabaab insurgents persisted, as did the military operations of the federal government, which enjoyed international support and backing by the AU mission in the country amidst a severe drought and famine.

There were also **some processes that remained totally deadlocked throughout the year, such as the negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, in Libya and in Morocco on Western Sahara.** Three years after the historic peace agreement was signed between **Eritrea and Ethiopia**, the process to implement the agreement remained at an impasse as a result of the armed conflict between the Ethiopian government and the regional state of Tigray, in which Eritrea has supported the Ethiopian federal government. The EU noted that the implementation of the 2000 Algiers agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the 2018 peace agreement was essential to

Developments in the peace negotiations in 2022 included the signing of various peace agreements in Ethiopia (Tigray), Senegal (Casamance), Chad and Sudan, though the results were mixed

building peace and stability in the Tigray region.² Impasse persisted in the political negotiations on the political future of **Libya**, amidst deep divisions that materialised once again in the establishment of two parallel governments. The political deadlock continued to contribute to economic instability and insecurity in the country, though generally and compared with previous years, the trend of decreasing violence held up since the ceasefire agreement was signed between the main contending parties in October 2020. Finally, the conflict around the **Western Sahara** remained characterised by chronic deadlock and paralysis of the diplomatic channels, although unlike in previous years, the United Nations expended new efforts in 2022 to promote dialogue after the appointment of a new special envoy, Staffan de Mistura, in November 2021.

2.2. Case study analysis

Great Lakes and Central Africa

CAR	
Negotiating actors	Government, armed groups belonging to the former Seleka Coalition, Antibalaka militias
Third parties	The African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation (AU and ECCAS, with the support of the UN, ICGLR, Angola, Gabon, the Rep. of the Congo and Chad), Community of Sant Egidio, ACCORD, International Support Group (UN, EU, among others), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; Russia, Sudan
Relevant agreements	Republican pact for peace, national reconciliation and reconstruction in the CAR (2015), Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities (June 2017), Khartoum Political Accord for Peace and Reconciliation (Bangui, 6 February 2019)

Summary:

Since gaining independence in 1960, the situation in the Central African Republic has been characterized by ongoing political instability, leading to numerous coups d'état and military dictatorships. After the 2005 elections won by François Bozizé, which consolidated the coup d'état perpetrated previously by the latter, several insurgency groups emerged in the north of the country, which historically has been marginalized and is of Muslim majority. In December 2012 these groups forced negotiations to take place. In January 2013, in Libreville, François Bozizé's Government and the coalition of armed groups, called Séléka, agreed to a transition Government, but Séléka decided to break the agreement and took power, overthrowing Bozizé. Nevertheless, self-defence groups ("anti-balaka), sectors in the Army and supporters of Bozizé rebelled against the Séléka Government, creating a climate of chaos and generalized impunity. In December 2014 a new offensive brought an end to the Séléka Government and a transition Government led

2. Ashenafi Endale, EU reckons Algiers agreement crucial for North Ethiopia peace, *The Reporter*, 24 December 2022.

by Catherine Samba-Panza was instated. Regional leaders, headed by the Congolese Denis Sassou-Nguesso facilitated dialogue initiatives in parallel to the configuration of a national dialogue process, which was completed in May 2015. Some of the agreements reached were implemented, such as the holding of the elections to end the transition phase, but the disarmament and integration of guerrilla members into the security forces is still pending, and contributing to ongoing insecurity and violence. The various regional initiatives have come together in a single negotiating framework, the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation launched in late 2016, under the auspices of the AU and ECCAS with the support of the UN, which established the Libreville Roadmap in July 2017 and that it contributed to reaching the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation of February 2019, in the implementation phase, despite the difficulties. However, in December 2020, representatives of six of the country's most powerful armed groups, including the main groups that signed the 2019 peace agreement (the anti-balaka factions led by Mokom and Ngaïssona, the 3R, a faction of the FPRC, the MPC and the UPC), denounced its breach by the government, withdrew from the process and created the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), after which hostilities resumed throughout the country.

During 2022, the armed groups that withdrew from the 2019 peace agreement in December 2020 continued their armed attacks and the political situation in the country deteriorated due to the polarised process to try to reform the Constitution. The Republican Dialogue fell short of the expectations raised due to the absence of the political opposition and the armed groups that had abandoned the peace agreement in December 2020. As a result, the 2019 peace agreement remained unimplemented. After multiple delays, the national dialogue process known as the Republican Dialogue was held between 21 and 27 March. It had originally been announced after the coup attempt in January 2021. In February 2022, the opposition parties decided to return to the organising committee of the Republican Dialogue after they withdrew in October 2021 due to the president of the National Assembly's cancellation of the procedure to retract the immunity of three opposition leaders accused of collaborating with the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC). The CPC is a coalition formed by several armed groups that withdrew from the peace agreement in December 2020 due to the government's non-compliance. The momentum created by the Rome process in which representatives of the political and social opposition participated, facilitated by the Community of Sant'Egidio in September 2021, did not bear fruit. The rejection of the opposition parties' demands ahead of holding the Republican Dialogue, such as the inclusion of the armed groups that had not signed the 2019 agreement, equal numbers of government, civil society and opposition representatives in the organising committee and mechanisms to ensure transparency in the electoral system for the municipal elections of September 2022, culminated with the main opposition parties boycotting the Republican

Dialogue. These parties included the opposition party platform COD-2020, the Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People (MLPC, the historical party in power, led by former President Ange-Félix Patassé) and the African Party for Radical Transformation and Integration (PATRI). The Republican Dialogue brought together around 450 representatives of the government and part of the opposition and civil society. Around 600 recommendations arose from it, most of which had already been formulated at the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation in 2015, whose follow-up committee had expressed difficulties in implementing them.³ The recommendations adopted were quite general and included reviewing bilateral and multilateral agreements (with France and MINUSCA), strengthening the Central African Army, reforming electoral institutions and finding new sources of income for public finances. A monitoring body attached to the presidency was created, but no timetable was specified.⁴ In August, the president appointed the members of the Republican Dialogue follow-up committee, which was formed by representatives of the presidential majority opposition parties, including Gabriel Jean-Edouard Koyambounou as the coordinator to lead the committee, civil society organisations and religious leaders. Koyambounou was later kicked out of the opposition party MLPC. The only thing that generated controversy was withdrawn: a possible amendment to the Constitution that would lift the limits of a third term of office for President Touadéra. The Republican Dialogue recused itself and referred the issue to the presidency and to the National Assembly. Since then, the issue has dominated discussions and created serious political and social polarisation between supporters and detractors.⁵

No notable progress was made in the implementation of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic. In August, the national authorities adopted a timetable of priority activities to speed up implementation of the peace agreement through the joint road map for peace in the CAR that was adopted at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICRGL). According to the timetable, the government collaborated with representatives of armed groups that remain committed to the political agreement (the main armed groups in the country withdrew from the agreement in December 2020) so they could completely dissolve. On 4 June, the government organised a meeting in Bangui to drum up regional and international support for the peace process. The meeting was attended by the mandated mediators of the ICGLR: the Angolan foreign minister and the Rwandan foreign minister. The meeting was also attended by other national and international actors, including AU and ECCAS representatives as guarantors of the political agreement, and by international organisations and diplomatic

3. Radio Ndeke Luka, *Dialogue républicain : plus de 600 recommandations formulées par les participants*, 28 March 2022.

4. RFI, *Centrafrique: que retenir du dialogue républicain?*, 28 March 2022.

5. See in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

missions. The participants agreed to meet quarterly to monitor progress in the implementation of the joint road map and the president appointed the prime minister to coordinate its implementation. The prime minister convened coordination meetings in August and September to review the timetable of priority activities and expedite implementation of the road map. Following the meetings, which were attended by representatives of the countries of the region, regional organisations and international partners, a schedule was approved for the period between August and December 2022. In accordance with the schedule, on 14 September, the government met with representatives of 11 of the armed groups that signed the political agreement to dissolve them. On 3 October, at a fourth coordination meeting, the progress achieved in the implementation of the schedule was reviewed. According to the UN Secretary-General's report, most of the mechanisms for the local application of the political agreement were inactive during various months of the year due to a lack of government funding.

Gender, peace and security

Women continued to be mostly excluded from decision-making and from political negotiation initiatives and processes. Women's participation in the peace process remained low: two of the 11 members of the Republican Dialogue follow-up committee were women and they made up only 17% of the participants in the dialogue. The establishment of the National Parity Observatory to apply the Gender Parity Law has been pending since 2020 due to the lack of political commitment and resources for its implementation.

Chad	
Negotiating actors	Transitional Military Council, 52 armed groups, including the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCSMR), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) and the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR)
Third parties	Qatar (mediation), AU, UN, others (observers)
Relevant agreements	Doha Peace Agreement and the Participation of the Politico-Military Movements in the Chadian National, Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (2022), National, Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (2022)

Summary:

Frequently classified as one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change, Chad has faced a wide, complex and interrelated range of challenges and sources of fragility and instability in recent decades, and has also been the scene of attempts at dialogue and political negotiation. The unstable atmosphere worsened with the death of President Idriss Déby in April 2021 and the subsequent coup d'état by a military council that installed his son, Mahamat Idriss

Déby, as the new president, suspended the Constitution and replaced it with a transition charter and the promise of free elections in 18 months following the holding of a national dialogue. The Transitional Military Council (CMT) promised to promote a national dialogue in December 2021, in which the different insurgent groups active in the country were expected to participate. However, the National Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS) was postponed to facilitate a peace agreement between the CMT and the insurgent groups as a step prior to their participation in the DNIS. Between March and August 2022, peace negotiations were hosted in Doha (Qatar) under Qatari mediation and an agreement was reached on August 7 with most of the insurgent groups, which led to the DNIS being held between 20 August and October 8. The Doha peace process and the DNIS ended with the CMT's mandate being extended for another 24 months under the image of a new government, described as of one national unity, and the continued presidency of Mahamat Déby, who may run in the 2024 election, which has only prolonged the break from the Chadian Constitution that began in April 2021. The survival of Mahamat Déby's regime was rejected by the political and social opposition and the subsequent crackdown by the security forces at the end of the transition on 20 October 2022 caused dozens of deaths, which indicated the authoritarian drift of the government and the silencing of the political and social opposition.

The Doha peace process and the National Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS) ended up extending the mandate of the Transitional Military Council (CMT), creating a national unity government and keeping President Mahamat Déby in power, which has also prolonged the break from the Chadian Constitution that began in April 2021. The mandate of the CMT was extended for a new period of 24 months, after the which an election will be held in which Mahamat Déby may run. The survival of the Mahamat Déby regime was rejected by the political and social opposition. The subsequent crackdown by the security forces, which caused dozens of deaths, indicated the authoritarian drift of the government and the silencing of the political and social opposition.

The Committee for the Organisation of the National Inclusive Dialogue (CODNI) was established in June 2021 to prepare for the national dialogue, which was to start in December 2021. However, it was delayed due to disagreements over the members of the CODNI, the inclusiveness of the national dialogue, the interference of the CMT, the participation of the different insurgent groups, the agenda of the subjects for discussion and other issues. Its delay was justified by the desire to make it easier for the insurgent groups to get involved, for which a prior peace agreement between them and the CMT was sought. Formal negotiations began in March 2022 in Doha (Qatar) under Qatari mediation, and after various rounds of negotiations, a peace agreement was reached on 7 August between dozens of insurgent groups in the country and the government. This agreement was the prior step and condition to participate in the National Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS) that the government had been promoting with different civil society groups, which was held between 20 August and 8 October 2022.

Meetings between informal representatives of the CMT and insurgent groups in Togo, Egypt and France, held in 2021, continued with Qatar's offer to facilitate meetings in Doha with the insurgent groups, which the Chadian political-military opposition praised as a step forward in the process. Previously, the CMT had approved one of the insurgents' main demands, the granting of amnesty as a condition for participating in the national dialogue. In November 2021, Mahamat Déby pardoned around 300 imprisoned or exiled insurgent leaders and political opponents.⁶ This gave the CMT an image of openness. As such, the CMT had carried out a policy to win oppositional support by co-opting members of the political and social opposition, including historical opposition leader Saleh Kebzabo (appointed vice chair of the CODNI and prime minister once the DNIS had ended). After various delays, meetings finally began on 13 March 2022 between the representatives of more than 40 insurgent groups and the CMT in Doha, mediated by Qatari Special Envoy Mutlaq bin Majed Al Qahtani.⁷ Among these dozens of armed actors, only four represented a real military threat to the Mahamat Déby regime:⁸ the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCSMR), the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) and the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR). The two main political-military movements of these four were FACT, led by Mahamat Mahdi Ali, responsible for the death of Idriss Déby, and the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR), led by Mahamat Déby's cousins Timan and Tom Erdimi. Both groups are based in Libya, from where they have regularly launched offensives against the country.

The national dialogue ratified the break with the Chadian Constitution brought about in April 2021 by Mahamat Déby and his Transitional Military Council

The objective of the negotiating process (described as a pre-dialogue in the DNIS) was to get these armed groups to participate in the DNIS. Finally, after five months of negotiations, 34 of the 52 political-military groups, including the UFDD and the UFR, signed an agreement in Doha on 7 August in exchange for the release of prisoners, amnesty and an end to the hostilities between the government and these armed factions, as well as the participation in the DNIS. Sources for the number of armed groups participating in the Doha process vary, since others cite 47, five of which did not accept the agreement, which is why the United Nations' figures are taken as a reference. The signing of the agreement was attended by regional and international actors, such as the AU and the UN. The mistrust between the parties, the suspensions and the constant deadlock, among

other issues, delayed the process. Eighteen armed groups, including the FACT, rejected the agreement,⁹ which was called the Doha Peace Agreement and the Participation of the Politico-Military Movements in the Chadian National, Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue, and formed a new opposition coalition: the Cadre permanent de concertation et de réflexion (CPCR).¹⁰ The CPCR said that it rejected the agreement due to grievances about the participation quotas in the national dialogue, the failure to release prisoners of war and the transitional authorities' ineligibility to run in the post-transition elections, according to the UN Secretary-General's report in December.¹¹ The FACT said that it feared that the groups participating in the DNIS would not be treated in a similar way and demanded security guarantees, the formation of a new organising committee for the DNIS, the release of the group's prisoners and a commitment from Mahamat Déby to not run in any future presidential elections. Under the agreement, the CMT and hundreds

of representatives of the political-military opposition could participate in the DNIS, and the representatives of the rebel groups would have guarantees of access and armed protection. In May 2021, the AU had agreed to support the transition on the conditions that the authorities hold a presidential election within 18 months, that the transition should be completed by October 2022 and that members of the CMT be prohibited from running for election, demanding that the CMT amend the transition charter to include these clauses. However, the CMT did not amend the transition charter as promised, noting that any changes to it should be discussed during the DNIS.

The DNIS was scheduled to take place in December 2021 and the date was later pushed back to February 2022, but it was repeatedly postponed pending the successful completion of the Doha pre-dialogue to facilitate the participation of the armed groups. Finally, the signing of the Doha agreement on 7 August allowed the implementation of the DNIS. On 20 August, more than 1,400 representatives of political-military movements, representatives of the transitional government, representatives of political parties, civil society organisations, including women's and youth organisations, traditional leaders, diaspora figures, provincial authorities, security forces and state institutions and unions launched the DNIS in N'Djamena with regional and international actors attending. The DNIS was scheduled to last three weeks and was expected to discuss the implementation of

6. France24, Chad gives amnesty to hundreds of rebels and dissidents, meeting opposition demand, 29 November 2021.

7. AFP, Qatar takes up mediation role in Chad talks: officials, rebels, al-Monitor, 25 March 2022.

8. Toulemonde, Marie, Chad: Mapping the rebellion that killed Idriss Déby, *The Africa Report*, 29 April 2021.

9. Mills, Andrew, Chad signs peace pact with rebels, but main insurgents stay out, *Reuters*, 8 August 2022.

10. Madjissebaye Ngarindinon, Tchad : les groupes armés non signataires de l'accord de Doha mettent en place un cadre commun de lutte, Tchad Infos, 8 August 2022.

11. UN Security-Council, The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, S/2022/896 of 1 December 2022.

institutional reforms and a new Constitution, which should be submitted to a referendum. The FACT, the Wakit Tama coalition of civil society organisations, the opposition party Les Transformateurs and others boycotted the DNIS. The Episcopal Conference of Chad withdrew from the DNIS because it did not consider the dialogue process real.¹² This announcement stoked the frustration of various political and social actors who viewed the evolution of the DNIS with concern. They staged various peaceful protests against the DNIS that were harshly put down, as reported by Human Rights Watch and others.

However, on 1 October, the participants in the DNIS approved the recommendations on the path to follow for the transition, including steps to dissolve the CMT and appoint the president of the CMT to lead a 24-month “second transition”, to hold a referendum on a modified version of the 1996 Constitution and the form of the state, to double the number of seats in the National Transitional Council and to establish a second chamber of Parliament. In particular, the DNIS recommended that all Chadians who meet the legal requirements be able to run in the next elections (to be held in 2024), including members of the transitional institutions. On 10 October, the president of the CMT, Mahamat Déby, was sworn in as the president of the transition. Days later, he appointed a national unity government headed by former opposition leader and former CODNI Vice Chair Saleh Kebzabo,¹³ which included other opposition figures and members of the political-military groups that signed the Doha agreement, such as Tom Erdimi, the leader of the UFR.¹⁴ Various generals close to Déby in the CMT held strategic portfolios.

The 18-month period ended on 20 October, after which CMT President Mahamat Déby was supposed to return power to the civilian authorities. The political and social opposition called for mass protests on 20 October as a consequence of the extension of the mandate of the CMT and its president. The government banned the protests announced for 20 October.¹⁵ The violent crackdown on the protests killed at least 50 people, including at least 10 police officers, and injured around 100, according to the country’s new Prime Minister Saleh Kebzabo. A curfew was announced in N’Djamena and three other locations and several political parties were ordered to cease activity. Mahamat Déby accused foreign forces of being behind the protests. The international community

condemned the government crackdown and called for respect for human rights and dialogue with the political opposition, but no sanctions were imposed against the Chadian government. According to unconfirmed estimates, more than 100 people may have been killed and hundreds wounded. The violent crackdown on the protests also worsened relations between Qatar and Chad, as Qatar was reluctant to defend the Chadian regime on the international stage.¹⁶ As the main supporter of Mahamat Déby and the main actor in monitoring the implementation of the agreements, Qatar had tried to include the FACT in the agreement, but the events clouded relations between N’Djamena and Doha.

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which had endorsed the recommendations of the DNIS before the events of 20 October, appointed its president, Congolese national Félix Tshisekedi, to facilitate the Chadian transition. This announcement clashed with the position of the African Union, whose chair, Chadian national Moussa Faki Mahamat, presented a report highly critical of the transitional authorities, in which he demanded that the AU condemn the murder, torture, arrest and arbitrary imprisonment of hundreds of civilians, denounce the “bloody repression”, demand “the immediate release of all political prisoners”, open an investigation and take action for breaking the promises made, which would include suspending Chad from the bodies of the AU. Moussa Faki noted that such actions were a requirement consistent with the AU’s ongoing position in relation to the other four cases of unconstitutional changes of government currently under way in Africa (in Sudan, Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso).¹⁷ However, the AU Peace and Security Council, which met on 11 November to study the situation in the country, did not reach the necessary quorum to suspend Chad from the organisation.

The international community’s response to the serious situation in Chad carries a message with serious implications for other countries in the region undergoing processes similar to Chad, such as Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and even Sudan

Gender, peace and security

Regarding the participation of women and the inclusion of the gender perspective, there was only one female representative in the Doha peace process, according to the United Nations. Similarly, though women’s and youth organisations participated in the DNIS, their voice and the voice of the rest of the political and social opposition was silenced by the government’s machinery, which aligned some of the results of the DNIS with the

12. Atemanke, Jude, *Catholic Bishops Withdraw from Chad’s National Inclusive Dialogue, Cite Lack of “dialogue”*, *ACI Africa*, 4 September 2022.

13. Olivier, Mathieu, “Tchad : pourquoi Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno a nommé Saleh Kebzabo Premier ministre”, *Jeune Afrique*, 12 October 2022.

14. Olivier, Mathieu, “Nouveau gouvernement au Tchad : Mahamat Saleh Annadif aux Affaires étrangères, Tom Erdimi à l’Enseignement supérieur”, *Jeune Afrique*, 14 October 2022.

15. RFI, “Le Tchad interdit les manifestations marquant la fin initiale de la transition”, 20 October 2022.

16. Africa Intelligence, *Communications between N’Djamena and Doha break down*, 10 November 2022.

17. Le Journal de l’Afrique, *Chad: between Moussa Faki and Mahamat Idriss Déby, has war been declared?*, 11 November 2022.

interests of Mahamat Déby, perpetuating the regime that emerged from the April 2021 coup, according to analysts. Women accounted for just under 30% of the members of the new government.

DRC	
Negotiating actors	Government of the DRC, government of Rwanda, armed group M23, armed groups from the eastern part of the country, political opposition and civil society
Third parties	Episcopal Conference of the Congo (CENCO), Church of Christ in the Congo, Angola, Tanzania, Uganda, Support Group for the Facilitation of the National Dialogue in the DRC led by the AU, SADC, International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), AU, EU, UN, OIF and USA
Relevant agreements	Sun City Agreement, Pretoria Agreement and Luanda Agreement (2002); Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC (2002); Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region (2013), Comprehensive, Inclusive Peace Accord in the DRC (2016)

Summary:

The demands for democratization in the nineties led to a succession of rebellions that culminated with the coup d'état carried out by Laurent Desiré Kabila between 1996 and 1997 against Mobutu Sese Seko. Later, what is sometimes called the First African World War (1998-2003), broke out what is sometimes called the First African World War (1998-2003) broke out because of the participation of a dozen countries in the region and numerous armed groups. The signing of a ceasefire in 1999, and of several peace agreements between 2002 and 2003, led to the withdrawal of foreign troops, the setting up of a transitional government and later an elected government, in 2006. However, did not mean the end of violence in this country, due to the role played by Rwanda and the presence of factions of non-demobilised groups and of the FDLR, responsible for the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The breach of the 2009 peace accords led to the 2012 desertion of soldiers of the former armed group CNDP, forming part of the Congolese army, citing threats against and the marginalisation of their community and organised a new rebellion called the 23 March Movement (M23), promoted by Rwanda in 2012. In December 2013, the rebellion was defeated and some of its members fled to Rwanda and Uganda. Nevertheless, the violent and unstable atmosphere persisted and the M23 resumed its attacks in late 2021. In 2022, the EAC activated two processes to promote peace in the region: a negotiating process with armed groups from the eastern DRC in Nairobi and the Luanda process between the DRC and Rwanda, as well as the dispatch of a military mission against groups opposed to the Nairobi process, such as the M23. In the meantime, Joseph Kabila revalidated his hold on power (in the elections of 2006 and 2011, riddled with irregularities) and tried to extend his term in violation of the Constitution, but he bowed to domestic and international pressure and reached an agreement with the opposition in

2016 according to which elections were held in 2018 and he was defeated. The new President Félix Tshisekedi had to form a coalition government with Kabila until late 2020, when he managed to rule without Kabila's support.

Two peace processes took place in the DRC. The first initiative consisted of facilitating an inter-Congolese dialogue promoted by the East African Community (EAC) since April, known as the Nairobi process, in which around 50 armed groups, Congolese government representatives and civil society representatives participated. In the meantime, the EAC agreed to deploy a regional force in the eastern DRC to deal with the M23 due to the group's refusal to reach a ceasefire. The second initiative, known as the Luanda process by Angola's leaders, refers to the armed group 23 March Movement (M23) and the tension between the DRC and Rwanda.

During the year, the activities of the EAC-facilitated inter-Congolese dialogue continued. Known as the Nairobi process, it involved representatives of the Congolese government, dozens of armed groups from the east of the country and civil society. The participants reiterated their willingness to respect the cessation of hostilities, continue promoting the release of child soldiers and the facilitate access for humanitarian aid.¹⁸ Thus, three rounds of negotiations were held in Nairobi during the year in which the M23 did not participate (in April, May and December). In the last round, which was held between 28 November and 6 December, decisions were reached on the release of prisoners who had not committed war crimes or other atrocities and on the review of the government's Disarmament, Demobilisation, Community Recovery and Stabilisation Programme (P-DDRCS) for former combatants. It was also decided that the next round would take place in January or February 2023 in Goma or Bunia, in the eastern DRC.¹⁹

Meanwhile, the offensive launched by the armed group M23 in late 2021 worsened during the year. This military offensive may have been supported by Rwanda, according to the UN in August, and together with cross-border bombings and incursions by soldiers of the DRC in Rwanda and of Rwanda in the DRC, led to an escalation of tension between both countries and regional efforts to de-escalate the conflict and to promote meetings that could lead to peace negotiations between the DRC and the M23 and between the DRC and Rwanda.²⁰ Attempts by the countries of the region to de-escalate the dispute and promote dialogue between the parties were constant and led by Angola under the mandate of the AU. In April, the countries of the EAC, including the DRC (which joined the organisation in March) approved the deployment of a military mission in eastern DRC to combat the M23 starting in August and to support the government in putting an end to the violence resulting from the M23's

18. Africa News, *Dr Congo govt, rebels to meet In January- East Africa Bloc*, 6 December 2022.

19. East African Community Communiqué, *The Third Inter-Congolese Dialogue Under The EAC-Led Nairobi Process*, 6 December 2022.

20. Report of the Secretary-General, *Implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region*, UN Security Council, 4 October 2022.

resumption of hostilities, a decision ratified in June.²¹ Faced with the escalation of the offensive in October, the Congolese government expelled the Rwandan ambassador and public demonstrations against Rwanda broke out in the eastern part of the country, demanding that the government provide arms to fight the group and the Rwandan government.²² Due to the rising tension, on 30 October the AU called for a ceasefire and negotiations during the third round of the inter-Congolese dialogue promoted by the EAC to be held in Kenya between 4 and 13 November, which was postponed until December and in which the M23 did not participate.²³

Faced with this situation, in his position as chair of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), under the African Union's mandate, Angolan President João Lorenço promoted meetings between DRC and Rwanda. In July, a meeting was held between Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in Luanda (Angola) to create a road map to de-escalate the conflict. Later, the Congolese president and Rwandan Foreign Minister Vincent Biruta participated in a small summit on peace and security in the eastern DRC in Luanda on 23 November in which they called for the M23's immediate withdrawal from the occupied areas in North Kivu and for a ceasefire to be reached on 25 November. The M23 rejected any cessation of hostilities or withdrawal from the captured territory, noting that it had not participated in the summit. However, on 6 December the M23 changed its strategy by announcing that it agreed to a ceasefire and expressed its willingness to begin withdrawing from the occupied territories. The armed group announced its support for the regional efforts and requested a meeting with the EAC facilitator, with representatives of the organisation's military mission and with the Ad-Hoc Verification Mechanism established by the ICGLR as part of the Luanda process to discuss ways to implement the agreements. It also expressed its willingness to engage in direct talks with the Congolese government to resolve the conflict.²⁴

Gender, peace and security

On 26 April, the Advisory Board for Women, Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region, co-chaired by the UN Special Envoy for the DRC and the AU Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security, issued a statement calling on states to redouble their efforts to strengthen the rights of women and girls and to ensure that the gender dimension is considered in ongoing negotiating processes. From 12

to 15 July, a joint UN/AU/CI/ICGRL advocacy mission, led by the co-chair of the African Women's Network in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FemWise-Africa), Catherine Samba Panza, and facilitated by the Office of the Special Envoy, visited Kinshasa to support efforts to deal with the situation in the eastern DRC and to promote women's participation in the upcoming elections. The delegation included female leaders of the ICGRL Regional Forum for Women, as well as mediators trained with the support of the Office of the Special Envoy in 2021. The delegation held meetings with representatives of the Congolese authorities, who pledged to support efforts to facilitate women's involvement in the Nairobi process. A peer-to-peer capacity-building and experience-sharing workshop on women in election management bodies was held in Lusaka in July, facilitated by the Office of the Special Envoy, in collaboration with the ICGRL, the AU, UN Women and the UNDP. MONUSCO continued to promote the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda through targeted partnerships with national, provincial and local authorities and to promote greater space for women's representation and participation in the Nairobi process. The Office of the UN Special Envoy continued to work with leaders in the region to promote the inclusion of women in political processes.

The escalation of the offensive by the M23 group, supported by Rwanda, increased tension between the DRC and Rwanda and various regional initiatives attempted to achieve a negotiated solution to the conflict

South Sudan	
Negotiating actors	Revitalised Peace Agreement (2018): Government (SPLM), SPLM / A-inOpposition (SPLM/A-IO), and several minor groups (SSOA, SPLM-FD, among others) Two independent factions of the SPLM-IO: the Kitwang faction led by Simon Gatwech Dual and the faction headed by General Johnson Olony. Peace talks in Rome: Non-Signatory South Sudan Opposition Groups (NSSSOG, previously SSOMA): National Salvation Front (NAS), South Sudan United Front (SSUF), the Real SPLM, South Sudan People's Patriotic Movement (SSPPM).
Third parties	IGAD Plus: IGAD (Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda); AU (Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Chad and Algeria), China, Russia, Egypt, Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway), EU, UN, South Sudan Council of Churches, Community of Sant'Egidio
Relevant agreements	Peace Agreement (2015), Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access (2017), Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) (2018)

21. Sam Mendick and Claude Muhindo, *East African military force met with scepticism in DR Congo*, *The New Humanitarian*, 25 November 2022.
 22. See the summary on the DRC (east) in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) by Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, March 2023.
 23. Reliefweb, *Joint Communiqué of the Chair of the African Union and the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the situation in the East of DRC*, African Union, 30 October 2022.
 24. Security Council Report, *Democratic Republic of the Congo: Briefing and Consultations*, 8 December 2022.

Summary:

After years of armed conflict between the Central Government of Sudan and the south of the country, led by the SPLM/A guerrilla, South Sudan became an independent State in 2011, after holding the referendum that was planned in the 2005 peace agreement (Comprehensive Peace Agreement –CPA–) facilitated by the mediation of the IGAD. The Peace between Sudan and South Sudan and achieving independence was not achieved, however, were not enough to end the conflict and violence. South Sudan has remained immersed in a series of internal conflicts promoted by disputes to control the territory, livestock and political power, as well as by neopatrimonial practices and corruption in the Government, 42 Peace Talks in Focus 2021 all of which has impeded stability and the consolidation of peace. As part of the peace negotiations promoted in April 2013, the President offered an amnesty for six commanders of the rebel groups, but this was not successful initially. At a later date, in December 2013, tensions broke out among the factions loyal to President Salva Kiir and those loyal to the former Vice-President Riek Machar, leader of the SPLM/A-inOpposition (SPLA-IO), which gave way to a new escalation of violence in several of the country's regions. In January 2014, with the mediation of the IGAD, the Government and the SPLAIO launched peace conversations in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). Diplomatic efforts were found against many obstacles to achieve effective ceasefire agreements, after signing nine different commitments to the cessation of hostilities and transitory measures between December 2013 and August 2015, which were systematically violated and have rendered it impossible to lay the foundations for a political solution to the conflict. On 17 August 2015, after strong international pressure and threats of blockades and economic sanctions, the parties signed a peace agreement promoted by the IGAD Plus, although there is still much uncertainty surrounding its implementation, as well as other later agreements. Subsequently, new agreements were reached between the parties, such as the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access (2017) and the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R -ARCSS) (2018), which open new paths to try to end the violence. Since 2019, the government has held peace talks in Rome with the groups that did not sign the R-ARCSS.

Some progress was made during the year on the implementation of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), with the SPLA-IO Kitgwang faction signing it, while peace negotiations in Rome with the groups that did not sign the agreement failed to gain traction. The year began with the announcement of an agreement between the SPLA-IO Kitgwang faction, led by General Simon Gatwech Dual, which split from the SPLA-IO, headed by Vice President Riek Machar, in August 2021, and the South Sudanese government headed by Salva Kiir. The result of talks that began in October 2021 and resumed on 11 January 2022 in Khartoum, mediated by the government of Sudan, the agreement was signed on 16 January. Both parties agreed that the Kitgwang faction would sign the 2018 agreement, which includes

In November, the government suspended the peace talks in Rome with the armed groups that had not signed the 2018 peace agreement

amnesty for its combatants, a permanent ceasefire and integration into the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF).²⁵ The Kitgwang faction's signature prompted Vice President Machar to order his forces to cease hostilities with it and he said that the 2018 ceasefire between the SSPDF and SPLM/A-IO now applied to Kitgwang as well.

Regarding progress in the **implementation of the R-ARCSS**, the first quarter of the year was marked by heightened tension between the main parties that signed the 2018 peace agreement, the SPLM headed by President Kiir and the SPLA-IO led by Vice President Machar, which threatened the unity of the transitional government. In late March, the tension between the parties erupted in major armed clashes in the states of Upper Nile and Unity between the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO, prompting the SPLA-IO to announce that it was withdrawing from the peace monitoring mechanism. In response, Kiir's government announced on 24 March that the SPLA-IO was "officially at war" with the SSPDF. The Troika (USA, United Kingdom and Norway) expressed concern about the deterioration of the peace agreement and asked the government to safeguard it. The tension eased on 3 April, when both leaders agreed to implement a key provision of the 2018 peace agreement on implementing transitional security arrangements, consenting to the formation of unified South Sudanese Armed Forces. The agreement stipulated that Kiir's forces would get 60% of the key leadership positions in national security institutions, while Machar's SPLA-IO and South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) got the remaining 40%. Following the agreement, Machar announced he would lift the suspension of his faction's participation in the security and ceasefire mechanisms.

In terms on governance, in late July the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU), led by President Kiir and Vice President Machar, announced a controversial proposal to extend its 24-month term beyond February 2023, as stipulated in the R-ARCSS. The announcement drew criticism from civil society activists and political leaders due to a lack of deliberation and they called for a more inclusive process. It also triggered reactions from the Troika, such as Washington's announcement on 15 July that it was withdrawing funds from the peace monitoring bodies. Domestic and foreign criticism of the announcement did not prevent the transitional government from signing a road map on 4 August that extended the transition period to address the pending tasks of the peace agreement, setting the date of the elections for December 2024 and the transfer of power for February 2025. The Council of Ministers approved the road map and submitted

25. See: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/2397>

it to Parliament for approval. In response, armed groups that had not signed the agreement, opposition movements and civil society activists created a platform on 6 August to oppose the transitional government and “categorically” rejected extending the deadline. The South Sudan People’s Movement/Army (SSPM/A), led by General Stephen Buay Rolnyang, denounced the violation of the agreement, and began armed activity against the government in the state of Unity in late July. Leaders of armed groups opposed to the government, such as Thomas Cirillo, Paul Malong and Pagan Amum, also announced a broader opposition alliance. The Troika complained that the move lacked legitimacy, as it violated the agreement and did not include all parties in the deliberations on the content of the road map and on extending the transition period. The government’s announcement coincided with fresh fragmentation of the Kitgwang faction, leading to new armed clashes. The split came about as the faction’s leader, General Gatwech Dual, removed General Johnson Olony as his deputy on 9 August, sparking a further escalation of violence between the two factions in the states of Upper Nile and Jonglei and displacing around 27,000 people since 14 August, according to the UN humanitarian office in the country.²⁶

***The Revitalised
Transitional
Government of
National Unity
(R-TGoNU) of South
Sudan extended the
24-month transitional
period beyond what
was stipulated in the
peace agreement***

After the controversial extension of the transition period, on 1 September the body that oversees the peace process in South Sudan, the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), confirmed the road map to extend the transitional government until 2025. In total, 37 of the 43 members that make up the RJMEC voted in favour of the extension, thereby fulfilling Article 8.4 of the R-ARCSS, which requires that at least two thirds of the members with the right to vote consent to any amendment to it.²⁷ Meanwhile, the RJMEC urged the transitional government to redouble its efforts and fully implement the agreed road map. Some progress on implementing the clauses of the peace agreement was announced in late September. In particular, with regard to the programme to reform the security sector, it was reported that nearly 7,000 soldiers from the Bahr el Ghazal region and 1,701 soldiers from Bor, the capital of the state of Jonglei, had been integrated into the unified forces.

In early November, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix visited the country and acknowledged the positive steps taken in implementing the peace agreement, though he stressed that they are still insufficient to achieve stability. In late November, the sixth Governors’ Forum

was kicked off in Juba, the capital of the country. It was attended by the governors of the 10 states and the heads of the three administrative areas, who made calls for peace and stability. Nicholas Haysom, the head of the United Nations mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), said that the forum provided an opportunity to reflect on the country’s renewed commitment to the peace agreement and will push forward implementation of the road map.

In October, it was announced that the peace talks between the South Sudanese government and the groups that did not sign the R-ARCSS would restart after their suspension in August 2021. Mediated by the Community of Sant’Egidio, the talks began in Rome in 2019. Meanwhile, the main rebel group leaders, including the head of the National Salvation Front (NAS), Thomas Cirillo, former South Sudanese Army chief Paul Malong and the former secretary-general of the ruling SPLM, Pagan Amum, announced an alliance and the negotiating rebel coalition changed its name from the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOMA) to the Non-Signatory South Sudan Opposition Groups (NSSSOG). Within this framework, on 19 October, General Stephen Buay Rolnyang, the leader of the SSPM/A, proposed the creation of a unified front among all non-signatory opposition groups to “physically challenge the regime”. This caused the South Sudanese government to pull out of the talks again on 21 November, accusing the rebel groups of using them to “buy time to prepare for war”. Some groups that make up the rebel coalition criticised the government’s decision and urged it to reverse it. Later, on 8 December, a delegation from the Community of Sant’Egidio travelled to Juba to meet with the president of South Sudan and propose resuming the suspended peace talks.

Gender, peace and security

The various reports by the UN Secretary-General on the situation in the country highlighted significant aspects related to gender, peace and security.²⁸ Early in the year, UNMISS facilitated the creation of a network of women in the security sector to improve support for sections of the R-ARCSS that deal with security sector reform. Also in July, UNMISS and UN-Women promoted the creation of three women’s networks in the police, the army and the prison services as part of the Fund for Peace project to incorporate the gender perspective in security sector reform. In September, UNMISS and FAO organised two workshops to develop and finalise the draft national land policy, which were attended by 120 people (25 women).

26. See the summary on South Sudan in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022.

27. The Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), *RJMEC members vote to extend Transitional Period and RTGONU term*, 1 September 2022.

28. The UN Secretary-General submitted several reports to the Security Council on the situation in South Sudan during the year: S/2022/156 on 25 February; S/2022/468 on 9 June; S/2022/689 on 13 September; S/2022/918 on 7 December.

These workshops focused on issues such as women's right to inherit and register land, the elimination of discriminatory customary practices and women's representation in institutions governing land use, all of which are key reforms outlined in the R-ARCSS. Several meetings were also organised during the year in different counties to promote the adoption of action plans for inclusive governance, in line with the 35% quota reserved for women in the peace agreement. UNMISS also reported that a women's network has been launched for the Wildlife Service and the Civil Defence Service, which aims to ensure women's equal participation in the security sector and improve gender sensitivity in services provided by security sector institutions.

Sudan	
Negotiating actors	Government of Sudan, the opposition coalition "Sudan Call" formed by national opposition parties and Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF, coalition comprising the armed groups of South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur), Movement for Justice and Equity (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movements, SLA-MM and SLA-AW factions, Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Malik Agar and Abdelaziz al-Hilu factions
Third parties	African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), Troika (USA, United Kingdom, Norway), Germany, AU, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, IGAD, UNITAMS
Relevant agreements	Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) (2006), Road map Agreement (2016), the Juba Declaration for Confidence-Building Procedures and the Preparation for Negotiation (2019), Juba Peace Agreement (2020)

Summary:

Different armed conflicts (Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan) remain active in the country, as well as tensions between the government and the opposition which have led to different peace negotiations and a de-escalation of violence. In Darfur, amidst peace talks to resolve the historical dispute between the north and south of the country, which ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, various armed groups, mainly the JEM and the SLA, rebelled in 2003 around demands for greater decentralisation and development in the region. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was reached in 2006, which included only one SLA faction, led by Minni Minnawi, while the conflict persisted amidst frustrated attempts at dialogue, mainly promoted by Qatar as part of the Doha peace process, 44 Peace Talks in Focus 2021 7. UN Secretary-General, Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan, S/2021/1008, 3 December 2021. 8. See the summary on Sudan (Darfur) in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, Alert 2022! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022. in which the different parties were involved. Furthermore, in the Two Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile), the secession of South Sudan in July 2011 and the resulting national reconfiguration of Sudan aggravated tensions between those

border regions and the Sudanese government, since both regions had supported the southern SPLA insurgency during the Sudanese armed conflict. The African Union High Level Panel on Sudan (AUHIP) has mediated to seek a peaceful resolution between the parties (government and SPLM/N rebellion) that revolve around three main lines in the peace negotiations: the ceasefire model, the type of humanitarian access to the Two Areas and the characteristics and agenda of the National Dialogue. In early 2014, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir asked all armed actors and opposition groups to join the National Dialogue. From the outset, the proposal involved former South African President Thabo Mbeki and the AUHIP to promote peace negotiations and a democratic transformation. After the fall of the al-Bashir regime in April 2019, the different peace processes and scenarios between the new transitional government and the different rebel groups in the Two Areas and Darfur have merged, achieving the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020. However, several armed groups, including the SPLM-N alHilu (Two Areas) and the SLM/A-AW (Darfur), refused to sign the peace agreement, holding the talks separately.

The negotiations promoted by the Sudanese military junta and part of the political opposition to try to end the political crisis that has shaken the country since the coup d'état in October 2021 monopolised most of the political agenda during the year. This meant that not much progress was made in implementing the 2020 Juba agreement or in negotiations with armed actors that had not signed it. In May, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) launched an intra-Sudanese peace initiative known as the Trilateral Mechanism to mediate between the Military Junta and the political opposition to resolve the governance crisis in the country.²⁹ The tripartite mechanism was launched after months of separate negotiations with the parties that had signed the 2020 Juba peace agreement, civil society organisations and political groups, including factions of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) and the Committees of Resistance in the state of Khartoum. However, the country's main pro-democracy alliance, the Forces for Freedom and Change-Central Command (FFC-CC), boycotted the negotiations of the Trilateral Mechanism due to ongoing police repression. Volker Perthes, the UN special envoy for Sudan, reported that the talks were aimed at achieving a "transition programme" that included the appointment of a civilian prime minister and arrangements to draft a constitution and elections at the end of the transition. Alongside the trilateral mechanism, US and Saudi diplomats launched informal talks between the Military Junta and the FFC-CC in June in what became known as the Quad mediation (which includes the US, the UK, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). This parallel initiative drew criticism from the AU, which denounced its "external interference" in the Trilateral Mechanism, accusing the Quad countries of publicly

29. See the summary on Sudan in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

supporting the trilateral process while undermining it through their parallel negotiating process.

Significant progress was made in September when the Sudanese Bar Association's presented a draft constitution to restore democracy. Prepared by a committee made up of various groups of political parties, civil society organisations and prominent academics, the draft constitution also occasionally involved some groups that had signed the Juba peace agreement, including the Sudan Liberation Movement-Transitional Council and the Sudan Liberation Forces Alliance. However, armed movements that had not signed the agreement repeated their refusal to participate, including the Sudan Liberation Movement Abdel Wahid faction (SLM/AW) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction.

On 5 December, a framework agreement was reached in Sudan between the Military Junta and part of the opposition to create a transitional civilian government

Finally, as a result of the negotiations, **on 5 December a framework agreement was reached between the Military Junta and dozens of civilian leaders in which the military promised to relinquish much of its political power and create a civilian transitional government with elections in two years.** The agreement also committed the parties to security sector reforms, including the integration of former rebel groups and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into a unified army.

The armed groups that signed the Juba peace agreement did not sign the framework agreement, including those headed by the two main ex-rebel leaders Gibril Ibrahim (currently the finance minister) and Minni Minawi (currently the governor of Darfur). These groups rejected the agreement due to wording that suggested that part of it could be renegotiated, mainly the provisions on governance that distributed 25% of the seats in the civil administration to the signatory organisations, among other concessions. The two largest rebel groups in the country, SLM/A-AW, led by Abdulwahid al-Nur (of the Darfur region), and SPLM-N, led by Abdulaziz al-Hilu (of the South Kordofan region), had not signed the Juba peace agreement and rejected the new agreement. Their refusal (and other notable parties' refusal) to sign the new agreement made it necessary to expand the talks to bring more groups on board. These would begin in January 2023, in the second phase of the negotiations, and were planned to focus on five sensitive issues: transitional justice, security sector reform, the Juba peace agreement, the status of the committee to dismantle the former regime of Omar al-Bashir and the crisis in eastern Sudan.

Little headway was made in the implementation of the **Juba peace agreement of October 2020** during the

year. Mainly, slow progress continued to be made in implementing the security agreements for Darfur. The Permanent Ceasefire Committee continued to engage with civil society organisations and communities to develop their communication and alert networks on alleged ceasefire violations. Despite the progress made since October 2020, the UN Secretary-General's report on Sudan issued in December expressed concern about the pace of implementation, noting that the populations most affected by the conflict in Darfur and the Two Areas had still not benefitted from the 2020 agreement and required the parties to address the root causes of the conflict linked to land rights, the return of internally displaced people and issues of justice.³⁰

Finally, the **peace negotiations with the SPLM-N Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction**, which did not sign the Juba peace agreement, remained at a standstill while waiting for a civilian government to be re-established and constitutional order to be recovered. The negotiations began in Juba in 2021 with the mediation of the government of South Sudan and the facilitation of UNITAMS.

Gender, peace and security

In early September, UNITAMS and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) facilitated meetings with 55 Sudanese women involved with political parties, armed movements, civil society, academia and the Women's Rights Group (WRG). These meetings were aimed at building a shared agenda of key principles and provisions from a women's rights perspective to examine the gender-related priorities of any future constitutional documents or negotiations based on those principles. This group of women also held meetings with the Trilateral Mechanism to incorporate their agenda into the agreement.³¹

Sudan – South Sudan	
Negotiating actors	Government of Sudan, Government of South Sudan
Third parties	IGAD, African Union Border Programme (AUBP), Egypt, Libya, USA, EU, UNISFA
Relevant agreements	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (2005); Cooperation Agreement (2012), Joint Boundary Demarcation Agreement (2019)
Summary: The armed conflict between Sudan and its southern neighbour (South Sudan) lasted for more than 30 years and was marked by a growing complexity, the nature of which covered	

30. Report of the Secretary-General, *Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan*, Security Council, S/2022/898, 1 December 2022.

31. Ibid, Report of the Secretary-General, 1 December 2022.

several dimensions relating to the culture and history of both countries, affected by two civil wars (1963-1972; and 1982-2005). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 led to a referendum in the south of Sudan to ratify the independence of this region. The consultation happened in January 2011 and following a clear victory of those in favour of independence, in July 2011 South Sudan declared independence and became a new State. However, the separation of the two countries did not bring an end to the disagreements between Khartoum and Juba over the many unresolved issues. Among the main obstacles to stability there is a dispute over the oil-rich enclave of Abyei and the final demarcation of the border between both countries, as well as disagreement with regards to the exploitation of oil resources (with oil fields in South Sudan but pipelines for exportation to Sudan). Both countries accuse one another of supporting insurgency movements in the neighbour country and have contributed to further destabilizing the situation and threaten the peaceful coexistence of these two countries.

South Sudan and Sudan made progress on border security agreements during the year amidst increased inter-community violence in the Abyei region.

The most notable progress in the year occurred in February, when South Sudanese Vice President Hussein Abdelbagi Akol and Sudanese Vice President Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as “Hemeti”) met in Juba and agreed to form a high-level committee to resolve border conflicts involving both countries and promote peace and security between the communities living in these areas. The Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM), a body used by Sudan and South Sudan to discuss security issues of mutual interest, was reconvened in May. At the meeting, held in the Sudanese capital, the two countries agreed to set up a joint monitoring committee to oversee security in the disputed Abyei region and agreed to immediately open border crossings and revitalise the river transport sector.

In May, a peace agreement mediated by the UNISFA was reached between traditional Dinka Ngok and Misseriya authorities that seeks to reduce violence in the Abyei region

These agreements were reached amidst a rise in inter-community violence in the region, mainly due to heightened tension between members of the Ngok Dinka communities of South Sudan and Sudanese nomadic Misseriya herders who travel the area in search of pasture. To ease the tension between the Dinka Ngok and Misseriya communities, in May the United Nations Interim Force in Abyei (UNISFA), which has mediated between them to bring an end to the violence since 2021, organised a peace conference in Entebbe, Uganda with traditional leaders and representatives of youth and women from both communities to de-escalate the situation. Held between 17 and 19 May, the conference resulted in the signing of a peace agreement in which the parties committed to: a) promote dialogue between communities that improves the protection of women and children and girls; b) get traditional leaders to see themselves as active promoters of peace; c) support the initiatives undertaken by both governments to resolve

the issue of Abyei; d) hold periodic meetings in search of peace; and e) demand immediate publication of the investigative report on the 2013 massacres. Meanwhile, on 12 May, the UN Security Council renewed UNISFA's mandate for six months and later renewed it again for one year, until November 2023. As part of its mandate renewal, UNISFA will continue to build the capacity of the Abyei police service. The government of South Sudan urged UNISFA to stabilise the Abyei region and threatened to deploy government forces to the area if the violence was not contained. Finally, in late September, the African Union's Peace and Security Council discussed the situation in Abyei and promised to support both countries to determine the final status of Abyei. However, the government of Sudan, which is suspended from the AU and its activities due to the coup, opposed the talks on Abyei being held in its absence.

Gender, peace and security

During the year, UNISFA took several different actions to broaden female participation in decision-making processes related to peace and security, though this remains a great challenge in Abyei, according to the report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei issued in October 2022.³² UNISFA facilitated women's participation in the Joint Traditional Leaders' Peace Conference held in Entebbe in May, in which three women participated (10% of the participants). In the agreement adopted, the parties pledged to promote peaceful coexistence by making women the agents of change in ongoing peacebuilding and inter-community dialogues. The mission also worked with local leaders and communities to establish community protection committees among the Misseriya and advocated for women to participate in them, resulting in the selection of 64 women to constitute the new committees (approximately 15% of the total).

Horn of Africa

Ethiopia (Tigray)	
Negotiating actors	Federal Government, political-military authorities of the Ethiopian region of Tigray (Tigray People's Liberation Front)
Third parties	AU, USA, IGAD
Relevant agreements	Agreement for a Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (Pretoria, 2022), Executive Declaration on the Modalities of Implementation of the Agreement for a Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities (Nairobi, 2022)

32. Report of the Secretary-General, The situation in Abyei, United Nations Security Council S/2022/760, 13 October 2022.

Summary:

The region of Tigray (a state in northern Ethiopia, bordering Ethiopia and with a Tigray -majority population) has been the scene of an armed conflict and attempts at dialogue initiatives since 2020. The inauguration of Abiy Ahmed as the new prime minister of Ethiopia in early 2018 brought about important and positive changes internally and regionally in Ethiopia. However, since his rise to power, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) party and the leadership of the Tigray community, once the solid core of the ruling coalition (EPRDF), have seen their government decision-making powers evaporate. Furthermore, the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia between 1998 and 2000 had its origin in border disputes between the two countries. As a border state where decisions related to the agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia must be implemented, such as the border demarcation and status of the town of Badme, Tigray was marginalised from the peace process between both governments. Added to this was the gradual marginalisation of the TPLF from central power, contributing to growing tension that culminated in the outbreak of an armed conflict between the Ethiopian security forces and the security forces of the Tigray region. The crisis took on regional dimensions due to the involvement of Eritrea, as well as militias and security forces from the neighbouring Ethiopian region of Amhara. Since the beginning of the armed conflict in November 2020, the international community, and especially the AU, have tried to promote peace negotiations between the parties, which the Federal Government of Ethiopia rejected. Between March and August 2022, a humanitarian truce was in force, after which there was a new escalation of violence. In late October 2022, peace negotiations were formalised in Pretoria (South Africa) under the auspices of the AU, which led to the signing of a cessation of hostilities agreement in November.

On 2 November, the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the political-military authorities of the Tigray region, in northern Ethiopia, reached a permanent cessation of hostilities agreement in Pretoria (South Africa).³³

This agreement was preceded by the breaking of the humanitarian truce in force between March and August, after which there was a serious escalation of violence between the parties. Following a series of rounds launched on 25 October at the South African Foreign Minister's Office under the auspices of the AU and with South African support, the agreement was made possible by AU-led regional and international efforts, and particularly by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was appointed the AU's special envoy for the Horn of Africa and had initially been rejected by the TPLF because he was close to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed³⁴ and two other members of the mediation team, former South African Vice President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka and former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, supported by US envoy Mike Hammer. The mediation team managed to convince both parties of the need to start a negotiating process and to accept

the AU's invitation for peace talks scheduled in South Africa for 8 October, which was postponed for logistical reasons. Ethiopia and Eritrea may have used this delay to accelerate the military offensive to sit down at the negotiating table in a stronger position, according to some analysts. Pressure from the international community was intense, especially from the US on the TPLF, as highlighted by the Ethiopian representative in the negotiations, Deputy Foreign Minister and National Security Advisor Redwan Hussein.

Two years after the outbreak of an armed conflict that has caused thousands of deaths in the region, displaced more than two million people and stricken almost one million of the six million inhabitants of Tigray with famine, in late August, the fighting escalated again between the militias and security forces of the Tigray region and the Ethiopian federal troops supported by Eritrea and the security forces of the Amhara region.³⁵ The rise in violence was accompanied by an alarming increase in serious human rights violations against civilians and led to an intensification of diplomatic initiatives to convince the parties of the need to reach a ceasefire. However, from March to the end of August, a humanitarian truce had been in force that both sides traded blame for breaking, which led to more clashes and the humanitarian blockade.

The former Nigerian president indicated that the AU will assume responsibility for monitoring, supervising and verifying implementation of the agreement, which will be made up of a small group of no more than 10 people designated by the AU, with a representative of each party and a representative of the regional organisation IGAD, which must report to the mediation panel led by Obasanjo. Meanwhile, the Tigrayan authorities accused the Ethiopian federal security forces of having carried out attacks against civilians in the town of Maychew since the agreement was signed. The official name of the agreement, the "Agreement for a Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front", scored a victory for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, since it did not include the regional government of Tigray, but the Ethiopian federal government and the military political movement TPLF.³⁶ Both parties agreed to the supremacy of the federal Constitution. In addition to the cessation of hostilities, the peace agreement included important concessions by the TPLF, such as a systematic and coordinated disarmament of its security forces. The federal government agreed to remove the TPLF from its list of terrorist organisations and to start (Article 10.2) a political dialogue on the political future

33. AU, Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF), 2 November 2022.

34. Africa Confidential, Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo takes on mediating role in war as brickbats fly on both sides, 7 September 2022.

35. See chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

36. Alex de Waal, Ethiopia civil war: Tigray truce a triumph for PM Abiy Ahmed, *BBC*, 3 November 2022.

of Tigray, without the agreement defining any kind of supervision or monitoring of the dialogue. Tigrayan forces were required to cede highways and airports to federal control. The Ethiopian government and the TPLF also committed to the restoration of services, unimpeded access to humanitarian supplies and the protection of civilians, especially women and children, in Tigray. Various analysts cited the humanitarian disaster as the main issue that pushed the Tigrayan authorities to negotiate.

Various analysts and others in the Tigray community in Ethiopia and in the diaspora highlighted other issues that could be interpreted as concessions made by the TPLF.³⁷ Details included in the agreement highlight this issue and leave its effective implementation in the hands of the federal government of Ethiopia. First, Eritrea was not a party to the agreement, so it has not been forced to accept any of the provisions established by Addis Ababa. Second, the limited dimensions of the ceasefire supervision mechanism and the exclusion of the UN, the US, the EU and the IGAD from signing the agreement (they were simply observers) sow doubts about its actual implementation on the ground and demonstrates the victory of the Ethiopian strategy of not including the international community, as pointed out by the executive director of the World Peace Foundation, Alex de Waal. Third, the agreement establishes that the federal government of Ethiopia must restore authority in the region until new elections are held (Article 10.1) and that the federal government must propose a nationwide transitional justice policy without mentioning any international investigation mechanism of the serious violations of human rights committed in the region (Article 10.3), as indicated by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.³⁸ Added to this are the violations of the ceasefire by the Ethiopian and Eritrean security forces and the Amhara militias against the TPLF since the agreement was signed, which reveal the difficulties and the fragile political will to implement the agreement, according to some analysts, and which may mean that some TPLF commanders and militias will decide not to accept the very lax terms for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his wide room to manoeuvre. However, on 12 November, the parties signed the Executive Declaration on the Modalities of Implementation of the Agreement for a Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities in Nairobi, which stipulates the combatants' surrender of heavy weapons and the demobilisation, the restoration of public services in Tigray, the reactivation of humanitarian aid and the withdrawal of all armed

Various issues included in the peace agreement show broad concessions from the TPLF to the Ethiopian Federal Government to avoid a humanitarian disaster for its population

groups and foreign forces that fought alongside the Ethiopian Army.³⁹

Gender, peace and security

The agreement includes issues related to gender violence perpetrated during the conflict. Specifically, it urges the parties to condemn any act of sexual violence and gender violence and any act of violence against minors, girls, women, the elderly and the recruitment of child soldiers, while promoting family reunification (Article 4) and calling on the parties to consider the specific needs of what the agreement describes as “vulnerable groups”, which include women, minors and the elderly, in the delivery humanitarian aid (Article 5). According to human rights organisations, all parties to the conflict have committed atrocities that include massacres of civilians, sexual violence (especially by Eritrea) and the use of hunger as a weapon of war (mainly by Ethiopia), violations that have barely been able to be monitored due to the information blackout that Ethiopia has imposed on the region. There is no information available on the participation of women in the delegations of both parties, although it is possible to highlight the active presence in the AU mediation team of former South African Vice President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka.

Somalia	
Negotiating actors	Federal Government, leaders of the federal and emerging states (Puntland, HirShabelle, Galmudug, Jubaland, Southwest), political-military movement Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama'a, clan leaders and sub-clans, Somaliland
Third parties	UN, IGAD, Turkey, among others
Relevant agreements	Road map to end the transition (2011), Kampala Accord (2011), Provisional Federal Constitution (2012), Mogadishu Declaration of the National Consultative Forum (2015)

Summary:

The armed conflict and the absence of effective central authority in the country have their origins in 1988, when a coalition of opposing groups rebelled against the dictatorial power of Siad Barre and three years later managed to overthrow him. Since 1991, more than 15 peace processes with different types of proposals were attempted to establish a central authority. Of note were the Addis Ababa (1993), Arta (2000) and Mbagathi (2002-2004) processes. The

37. Rashid Abdi (@RAbdiAnalyst), *It is now clear to me TPLF capitulated. What bothers me is what Addis and Asmara will do with that victory and what happens to the people of Tigray. TPLF scripted its own downfall. It could have capitulated two years ago and saved its people and region*, (Tweet), Twitter, 6 November 2022; Alex de Waal, *Ethiopia civil war: Tigray truce a triumph for PM Abiy Ahmed*, BBC, 3 November 2022.
38. HRW, *Ethiopia: Truce Needs Robust Rights Monitoring*, 4 November 2022; Amnesty International, *Ethiopia: Peace agreement must deliver justice to victims and survivors of conflict*, 4 November 2022.
39. Addis Standard, *Declaration of the Senior Commanders on the Modalities for the implementation of the Agreement for Lasting Peace Through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities*, 12 November 2022.

centrality of the Somali state had led to a high degree of authoritarianism during Barre's rule, and the different proposals intended to establish a State that did not hold all of the power, a formula widely rejected by Somali society. However, some clans and warlords rejected the federal or decentralized model because it represented a threat to their power. The resolution of the conflict has been complicated by several issues: the power of some warlords who have turned conflict into a way of life; the issue of representation and the balance of power used to establish the future government between the different stakeholders and clans that make up the Somali social structure in conflict for years during Siad Barre's dictatorship; interference by Ethiopia and Eritrea; and the erratic stance of the international community. The rise of political Islam as a possible governing option through the Islamic courts, and the internationalization of the conflict with the arrival of foreign fighters in the armed wing of the courts, al-Shabaab, as well the Ethiopian invasion and the U.S. role in the fight against terrorism, have all contributed to making the situation more difficult. The Transitional Federal Government, which emerged from the Mbagathi peace process (2004), came to an end in 2012 and gave way to the Federal Government, which was supposed to be in charge of holding the elections in 2016. The National Consultative Forum held in 2015 laid the foundations for the different agreements to be reached on holding the elections in 2016. The elections were held in late 2016 and early 2017. Questioned for its ineffectiveness and corruption, this government managed to hold elections between 2016 and 2017, achieved progress and agreements in implementing the electoral process and the process of building the federation between the different Somali states and organised the elections between 2020 and 2021, although the end of the presidential mandate in February 2021 without the elections having been held opened up a serious crisis between the Government, the federated states and opposition sectors.

Alongside the persistence of al-Shabaab's activities and the severe drought and famine affecting the country, the legislative and presidential elections were finally held as part of the implementation of the electoral agreement reached on 27 May 2021. The presidential election was won by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, which dissolved the serious tension between parts of the government and of the federal states and opposition groups, triggering different negotiations to overcome the dispute. Meanwhile, the AU mission in Somalia ended its mandate on 31 March 2022 and was succeeded by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which was established on 1 April. The mission aims to strengthen both the military and institutional autonomy of the Somali government as it proceeds with its withdrawal from the country. The mission's mandate will end on 31 December 2024, when Somali security forces are expected to fully assume responsibility for the security of the country, guided by the Somali Transition Plan. The first ATMIS troop drawdown to facilitate the end of the peacekeeping mission took place in December 2022.

The elections concluded with the formation of the Somali Parliament and the election of Hassan Sheikh

Mohamud as the 10th president of the Republic of Somalia on 15 May. The election of MPs in the different regions, an essential step for the presidential election, was plagued by delays, conflicts and consultations to resolve the different disputes, such as in Jubaland, where two lists of MPs were chosen, each considering itself legitimate. The presidential election was indirect and voted by the MPs in three rounds in a single day held in the hangar of the Somali Air Force located in the Aden International Airport area, protected by ATMIS and enjoying the technical and operational support of the UN. Six candidates withdrew shortly before the vote began, leaving 33 candidates, including one woman.⁴⁰ Incumbent President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as "Farmajo", acknowledged his defeat and incoming President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took the oath of office immediately. The presidential election was considered transparent and was widely accepted by the country's stakeholders. **President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud assumed full presidential powers on 23 May and was inaugurated on 9 June.** After his election, the new president intensified contact with the leaders of the federal states, especially with the presidents of South West State and Galmudug State, since both had been close allies of former President "Farmajo". Thus, with the clear desire to build a good climate of relations with the federal states, according to the president, from his inauguration until the end of the year, he met three times with the leaders of the federal states to analyse and resolve the conflicts that had arisen between administrations, mainly in terms of financing. Hamza Abdi Barre, an MP from Jubaland, was unanimously confirmed as the new prime minister on 25 June. On 3 August, the formation of the government was announced, made up of 26 ministers, 24 state ministers and 25 deputy ministers and was ratified by Parliament. **Mohamud said that he intended to weaken al-Shabaab militarily, economically and ideologically.** In line with the president's determination to fight al-Shabaab with methods other than just military ones, the new government appointed al-Shabaab's former second-in-command, Mukhtar "Abu Mansour" Robow Ali, who defected from al-Shabaab in 2017, as the new Minister of Religious Affairs after weeks of negotiations. "Abu Mansour" had been threatened for being critical of the organisation and for advocating for peace negotiations with the Somali government. He was arrested in December 2018 when he was running for the presidency of South West State and imprisoned without trial until his appointment. Previously, on 15 June, and contrary to previous public statements, the second-in-command of al-Shabaab and head of its intelligence services, Mahad Karate, told the British media outlet Channel 4 that the group could consider negotiations with the government when the time was right.⁴¹ In an interview with *The Economist* published days earlier, President Mohamud stated his intention to push back al-Shabaab and then start peace talks.

40. UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia*, S/2022/665 of 31 August 2022.

41. Jamal Osman, *Inside Al Shabaab: The extremist group trying to seize Somalia*, Channel 4, 15 June 2022.

Gender, peace and security

Women held 10 government posts (approximately 13% of the total), slightly more than in the previous government (11.7%), but well below the joint demands of local activists and the international community, which had demanded compliance with a quota of 30% female representation. They only obtained 20% of the seats in the lower house (House of the People), a drop from the 24% achieved in 2016. The number of female MPs reached 26% in the upper house (Senate), slightly increased over the 24% in 2016. The total number of female MPs in both chambers fell to 67, when they had won 80 seats in the 2016 elections. A two-year joint programme on women and peace funded by the Peacebuilding Fund and the Somalia Joint Fund and implemented by UNDP, UN Women and UNSOM remained active in capacity-building efforts and in preparing to implement the National Action Plan (NAP) on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)⁴² and in September the prime minister approved the NAP for the 2022-2026 period. In an event commemorating the 22nd anniversary of the approval of the resolution held in Mogadishu, Federal Minister for Women, Human Rights and Development Khadija Mohamed Diriye stressed her ministry's wish to work together with all other federal states and civil society organisations in implementing it and in getting all stakeholders involved. Meanwhile, UN Women supported the creation of women's networks for peace in all federal member states.

UNSOM also launched a series of consultations with women who lead civil society organisations to move the women, peace and security agenda forward. The Somali Women's Study Centre (SWSC) and the Somali Women Development Centre (SWDC) have been working together with the international organisation Saferworld to promote women's participation in political and peacebuilding processes in the states of Jubaland and South West. In this vein, SWDC Chief Executive Director Mama Zahra highlighted the need to deepen awareness of women's rights agendas in communities and grassroots organisations, involve women and young people and build women's capacities as human rights activists and women's activists and the capacities of civil society organisations and link them to national mechanisms.

Maghreb – North Africa

Libya	
Negotiating actors	Government of National Accord (GNA) / Government of National Unity (GNU), High State Council (HSC), House of Representatives (HoR), LNA/ALAF
Third parties	Quartet (UN, Arab League, AU, EU), Germany, France, Italy, UK, USA, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Relevant agreements	Libyan Political Agreement or Skhirat Agreement (2015), Ceasefire agreement (2020)

Summary:

After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011, Libya has experienced a transition process characterized by multiple political, economic, social, institutional and security challenges and by the presence of numerous armed groups. Since 2014, the North African country has been the scene of increasing violence and political instability, which led to the formation of two major poles of power and authority. Given the developments in the country, mediation efforts led by the UN have tried to find a solution to the crisis. Negotiations have confronted several obstacles due to disputes of legitimacy, the diversity of actors involved, multiple interests at stake and the persistent climate of violence in the country, among other factors. In late 2015, the Libyan Political Agreement or the Skhirat Agreement was signed under the auspices of the UN amidst a climate of persistent divisions and scepticism due to the foreseeable problems in implementing it. In October 2017, the United Nations submitted a new plan to start the political transition and facilitate implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement. As part of the Berlin Process (which began in 2019 with the participation of a dozen countries, in addition to the UN, the Arab League, the EU and the AU), intra-Libyan negotiations were launched around three components in 2020: security issues (the responsibility of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission), political affairs (managed by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, or LPDF) and economic aspects. An International Monitoring Committee was also activated. In late 2020, a permanent ceasefire agreement was made official, and a roadmap was announced that provided for elections to be held in December 2021.

At the end of 2022, **the negotiations over the political future of Libya remained at an impasse amidst deep divisions that materialised once again in the establishment of two parallel governments.** The political deadlock continued to produce economic instability and insecurity in the country, though overall and compared to previous years, violence continued to ebb, consistently with the trend observed since the ceasefire agreement was signed between the main contending parties in October 2020.⁴³ The UN-sponsored negotiating process, which is supported by various countries, was partly shaped by disagreements over the deadlines for renewing the mandate of the UN mission in the North African country, UNSMIL, and over the designation of

42. UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia*, S/2022/665 of 31 August 2022.

43. See the summary on Libya in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

the special representative for Libya, who was not named until the last quarter of the year.

The suspension of the general elections scheduled for 24 December 2021 due to disagreements among the main actors in the country on how to conduct them cast tension and uncertainty over Libya at the start of 2022. The political divide became more acute in February when, given the failure to hold the elections, the House of Representatives (HoR) - a legislative chamber based in the eastern city of Tobruk, established in 2014 and aligned with the interests of General Khalifa Haftar-, decided to appoint former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha as acting prime minister. Bashagha appointed his own government, ratified in a contested vote amidst intimidation and threats against members of the HoR. This parallel Tobruk-based government coexisted throughout the year with the Tripoli-based government led by Abdul Hamid Mohamed Dbeibeh, the acting prime minister of the Government of National Unity elected in February 2021 by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), a body of 75 representatives from different political, social and geographical sectors of the country established as part of the UN-backed peace process. The Government of National Unity was scheduled to lead the country until the December 2021 elections, but as the vote did not take place, Dbeibah insisted that he would remain in office until it was held.

In this context of power struggles, the UN continued to use its good offices and do mediation work to promote political, economic, and security-related aspects of the negotiating process, with the support of international actors. Some of these efforts were exerted amidst escalating tension and violence, which in May and August led to clashes over Bashagha's attempts to enter Tripoli and install his parallel government in the Libyan capital. US diplomat and Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General for Libya Stephanie Williams (whose appointment as special representative was vetoed by Russia after the previous envoy, Jan Kubis, resigned in November 2021) met and maintained constant communication with Bashagha and Dbeibah, who announced road maps for the elections. Bashagha proposed elections within 14 months, while Dbeibah proposed them and a constitutional referendum for 24 June 2022, coinciding with the end of the transition period planned and approved by the LPDF in November 2020.

At the same time, the United Nations promoted dialogue between the House of Representatives and the High State Council, a Tripoli-based institution established by the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement to propose political measures and recommendations to reach a consensus on a constitutional framework for elections and thereby speed up the voting process. Representatives of both chambers held three rounds of meetings in Cairo in April, May and June. In late June,

the speaker of the House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh Issa, and the president of the High State Council, Khaled al-Mishri, agreed to a high-level meeting with Williams in Geneva. During the forum meetings in Cairo, agreements had reportedly been reached on several key issues, such as the role, powers and characteristics of the future president, Parliament and government of the country, as well as decentralisation mechanisms.⁴⁴ However, **deep differences persisted over eligibility to run for president, one of the thorniest issues that led to the suspension of the December 2021 elections** due to controversies over the nomination of Haftar, Dbeibah and one of Muammar Gaddafi's sons, among other candidates. Issa and al-Misri met again in Turkey and Egypt in August and in Rabat in October. A new meeting scheduled for December in the northern Libyan city of Zintan was cancelled for "logistical reasons". In his last annual report on Libya, published in December, the UN Secretary-General noted "minimal progress" in agreeing on a path for holding elections.

The power struggle and political divisions also affected the economic and security-related negotiating tracks established by the UN-sponsored process. In the economic sphere, attempts to implement reforms and unify the Central Bank remained stagnant from May until the end of the year. In the field of security, the political crisis affected the work of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, made up of five representatives of the Government of National Accord (the predecessor of the Government of National Unity) and another five representatives of General Haftar's Libyan National Army, renamed the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (known as LNA or LAAF). In April, members of the commission linked to Haftar announced that they were pulling out and even called for confidence-building measures established under the ceasefire agreement to be overturned. The move was attributed to the Government of National Unity's problems paying the salaries of LAAF members, but it was also interpreted as an attempt to pressure the handover of power from Dbeibah to Bashagha. A workshop held in Spain in May on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants, organised by the Spanish government and the Toledo International Centre for Peace with the support of UNSMIL, allowed the first contact between the members of the Commission. Meetings of the Joint Military Commission resumed at the end of October in Sirte, after the appointment of the **new UN special representative for Libya and head of UNSMIL, Abdoulaye Bathily**, and resulted in the establishment of a DDR subcommittee. UNSMIL also continued to support the commission to implement an action plan for the withdrawal of mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces from the country during the year, as stipulated in the truce agreement. Although the ceasefire was maintained, at the end of the year there were some reports of intensive recruitment by both sides.

44. UNSC, *Report of the Secretary General on United Nations Support Mission in Libya*, S/2022/632, 19 August 2022.

Another notable development was the appointment of Senegalese diplomat Abdoulaye Bathily as the UN's highest representative in Libya in September after months of debate. After his appointment, Bathily travelled to Libya in mid-October, where he met with various political and social stakeholders. Like his predecessor, the special representative held meetings with many actors with interests in the conflict and/or involved in the negotiating process in the weeks that followed and until the end of the year. After several renewals of the UNSMIL mandate for short periods, due to disagreements since late 2021 about its scope of action and mission structure, among other issues, the UN Security Council agreed to extend the mission for one more year in late October (UNSC Resolution 2656). The international monitoring committee was also active throughout 2022. Formed as part of the UN-sponsored negotiating process, it involved the Libyan Quartet (the UN, Arab League, AU and EU) and a dozen countries. The four working groups of the committee continued to meet during the year: the working group on politics, co-led by the UN, Algeria, Germany and the Arab League; the one on security, co-led by the UN, France, Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the African Union; the one on the economy, co-led by the UN, Egypt, the EU and the US; and the one on human rights and international humanitarian law, co-led by the UN, the Netherlands and Switzerland.

Gender, peace and security

Libyan women continued to demand greater involvement in the negotiations and decision-making on the country's political future amidst growing threats and hostility towards activists and women who work in the public sphere. The United Nations warned of propaganda and hate speech, which has been affecting officials of the Ministry for Women and civil society activists who demand more substantive female participation in the political process and the implementation of the international women, peace and security agenda. In meetings with senior UN officials, representatives of Libyan women's organisations emphasised the importance of reaching a 30% representation threshold in decision-making spaces. According to reports, in the last round of the forum on constitutional issues in Cairo in June, the delegations addressed this claim and both chambers agreed to support a 25% quota for women in all elections in the country. Political-electoral issues as a whole, however, remained stagnant due to disagreements about presidential candidacies. Women's participation in politics was also addressed in a meeting with Williams in March that involved delegates from political parties, including the National Charter Party, the only one headed by a woman. Bathily, meanwhile, met with some of the parliamentary candidates for the suspended elections in December 2021. As part of the efforts of

the working group on human rights and international law (on the international monitoring committee), which launched a national dialogue initiative in December 2021, Libyan women human rights defenders also presented their vision on the challenges in this area. In this area, experiences of international reconciliation and the lessons on the importance of including women were also analysed. Finally, in September, an administrative appeals court in Tripoli ratified the decision to annul an agreement reached in October 2021 between UN Women and the Libyan Ministry of Women to develop a national action plan for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.⁴⁵

Morocco – Western Sahara	
Negotiating actors	Morocco, Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO Front)
Third parties	UN, Algeria and Mauritania, Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, USA, Spain, United Kingdom and Russia)
Relevant agreements	Ceasefire agreement (1991)

Summary:

The attempts to mediate and find a negotiated solution to the Western Sahara conflict led to a cease-fire agreement in 1991. Since then, and despite the existence of a formal negotiations framework under the auspices of the UN, the Western Sahara peace process has failed. The successive proposals and the many rounds of negotiations has not lead to an agreement between the parties, all of which maintain their red lines: Morocco insists on its territorial claims and is only willing to accept a status of autonomy, whereas the POLISARIO Front claims there is a need to hold a referendum that includes the option of independence. Negotiations on Western Sahara –recognised as a territory which is yet to be decolonised- have been determined by the large asymmetry between the actors in dispute, the inability of the UN to set up a consultation on the future of this territory, and regional rivalry between Morocco and Algeria –a key support for the POLISARIO front- and by the support given to Rabat by some key international actors, such as the USA or France. This, in real terms, has meant a prevalence of the Moroccan thesis when approaching the conflict.

Attempts to seek a negotiated solution to the conflict over Western Sahara did not produce results, though unlike in previous years, the United Nations redoubled its efforts to promote dialogue in 2022 after the appointment of a new special envoy, Staffan de Mistura, in November 2021. The Swedish-Italian diplomat resumed trips to the region and meetings with various actors to restart the negotiating process, but the main contending parties held to their positions. At the same time, violence continued to be reported, though there were less hostilities compared to what was observed in 2021, after the ceasefire between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front ended in late 2020.⁴⁶ The dynamics of the conflict

45. UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations Support Mission in Libya*, S/2022/932, 9 December 2022.

46. See the summary on Morocco-Western Sahara in chapter 2 (Socio-political crises) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

continued to be affected by worsening regional tensions between Morocco and Algeria since 2021. Also relevant in 2022 was the change in Spain's official position, as it openly aligned itself with Morocco's approaches.

After two and a half years in which the post of UN special envoy for Western Sahara remained vacant, following the resignation of former German President Horst Köhler in May 2019, the new envoy toured the region twice in 2022. Staffan de Mistura's first trip lasted from 12 to 20 January, a period during which he met with Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita, in Rabat; the secretary-general of the POLISARIO Front, Brahim Ghali, in Rabouni (in the refugee camps located in southern Algeria); and the president of Mauritania and the Algerian foreign minister. De Mistura conducted a new round of meetings on the ground in the second half of the year aimed at exploring the possibilities of moving towards a political process and with the declared intent of following in the footsteps of the special envoys who preceded him in office. In July, he held meetings in Rabat and declined to visit occupied Western Sahara. Although the reasons for the cancellation of his visit to Laayoune were not initially revealed, the UN later reported that it was due to the restrictions imposed by the Moroccan authorities on any meeting with representatives of civil society and women's organisations in what would have been his first visit to the area. In early September, De Mistura went to Rabouni for new meetings with leaders of the POLISARIO Front. During his visit to the Saharawi refugee camps, the UN special envoy was in contact with women's and civil society groups, including young people, to hear about their impressions of the conflict.

In their meetings with Staffan de Mistura and throughout the year, Morocco and the POLISARIO Front repeated their stances. Rabat insisted that the starting point for the negotiations should be exclusively the Moroccan proposal of autonomy and was in favour of resuming the round table format, explored by previous Special Envoy Köhler, with the participation of Morocco, the POLISARIO Front, Algeria and Mauritania. The POLISARIO Front, reiterated its commitment to holding a referendum on self-determination for the Saharawi population. According to the UN report, various POLISARIO Front representatives hoped that the process might resume at the request of the United Nations and that confidence-building measures could have a positive impact on the ground. Algeria, the main supporter of the POLISARIO Front, was opposed to the round table format and said that it intends to present the conflict as a regional one, and not as a matter of decolonisation. Algiers stressed the need for direct negotiations without preconditions between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front and advocated revitalising the 1991 plan, which would include holding a referendum with the Saharawi people. Mauritania, meanwhile, insisted that its position is one of "positive neutrality".

The POLISARIO Front said that the reality on the ground and the lack of international attention to the issue of Western Sahara had made returning to hostilities the only option possible, which had become a reality with the abandonment in 2020 of the ceasefire agreement in force since 1991. De Mistura expressed his hope to resume the ceasefire to lower tension and to create a more conducive environment for a political process. During his visits to the region, the special envoy also said he was concerned about the intensification of regional tension between Morocco and Algeria, though both countries assured him that they had no intention of escalating militarily.

Staffan de Mistura also consulted with other international players in 2022, including countries that are members of the UN Security Council and the states that make up the Group of Friends of Western Sahara (consisting of France, Spain, Russia, the United Kingdom and the USA); senior officials from the EU, Italy, Germany and Sweden; and various international representatives at the Munich Security Conference. One notable development was the change in position of Spain, which governed Western Sahara until 1975 and is still formally the administrative power of the territory, which is considered "pending decolonisation" under international law. In 2022, the Spanish government abandoned its traditional official position of "active neutrality" to give express support to Morocco's stance. On 14 March, Spanish President Pedro Sánchez sent a letter to King Mohammed VI stating that Spain considered the autonomy initiative presented by Morocco as "the most serious, credible and realistic basis for resolving the dispute". This option excludes independence to satisfy Saharawi aspirations for self-determination. The POLISARIO Front condemned the change in Spain's position, describing it as contrary to international law and said that it invalidated Spain as a mediating actor. Algeria also rejected it and called its ambassador to Madrid for consultations in March. In July, Algiers announced the suspension of the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation signed with Spain in 2002. Some analysts said that although the change in Spain's position in 2022 is formally significant, it was implicitly aligned with Rabat's interests beforehand, and that in practice, Madrid and other international actors' lack of political will to press for a solution to the Western Sahara issue has promoted control of the territory by Morocco and its policy of *fait accompli*.⁴⁷

Spain's change in position helped to resolve a bilateral crisis that has existed between it and Morocco since 2021, when the leader of the POLISARIO Front was welcomed in Spain to be treated for COVID-19. This sparked a diplomatic crisis that prompted Morocco to recall its ambassador to Spain in May 2021. In what was interpreted as retaliation, an act of pressure and

47. Pamela Urrutia, "La política espanyola de fets consumats al Sàhara", *La Directa*, 28 March 2022.

the cynical use of migratory flows, Rabat also relaxed controls on border crossings at the time, which led to the arrival of more than 10,000 people in Ceuta in May 2021. As such, Spanish support became aligned with France's traditional support for Moroccan interests. In May 2022, the Dutch government also publicly expressed its support for the Moroccan autonomy plan. In the United States, President Donald Trump said he recognised Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara in December 2020. His successor, US President Joe Biden, has not officially overturned this recognition. In 2022, Morocco made its policy of making its relations with third countries conditional on their position on Western Sahara even more explicit. In a speech in August, King Mohammed VI called Western Sahara "the simplest and clearest benchmark by which Morocco measures the sincerity of friendship and the efficiency of association agreements". In this context, Morocco asked the Tunisian government for explanations for having invited the leader of the POLISARIO Front to a conference on development held in Tunisia. In September, new Kenyan President William Ruto made a controversial post on Twitter stating that his country would no longer recognise the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) proclaimed by the POLISARIO Front in 1976. Media outlets said that Ruto wanted to seal an agreement to purchase fertiliser from Morocco. Ruto's tweet, which marked a reversal in Kenyan politics and came a day after Ghali's participation in Ruto's inauguration, was later deleted from the president's account and the country reaffirmed its commitment to the UN-sponsored solution to the conflict.

In October, the UN Security Council renewed MINURSO's mandate for another year through UNSC Resolution 2654. The document emphasises the need to reach a "realistic, practicable, lasting and mutually acceptable" political solution to the issue of Western Sahara, "strongly encourages" Morocco, the POLISARIO Front, Algeria and Morocco to get involved in the process promoted by the special envoy in "a spirit of realism and commitment" and calls on the parties to resume negotiations "in good faith and without preconditions". As has been the case since 2017, the renewal failed to get unanimous support and though it was approved, Russia and Kenya abstained. In recent years, Moscow has said that the resolution does not make an explicit reference to the right of self-determination and has asked why the text alludes to the need to reach a "realistic" solution. Analyses of the text of the resolution approved in 2022 stressed that attempts had been made to give De Mistura more room for manoeuvre in his attempts to promote a political process and to respond to the different views on which actors should be considered

involved in the conflict. Thus, language was introduced highlighting the importance of "all concerned parties", expanding their positions to move towards a solution.⁴⁸

Gender, peace and security

Though the negotiating process remained at a standstill throughout the year, some events in 2022 did indicate that women and their participation in efforts to reach a political solution to the conflict were receiving greater attention. For example, the special envoy's decision not to visit Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara in July due to the restrictions imposed by Rabat was partly due to his realisation that it would not be possible for him to meet with representatives of civil society and women's organisations. The UN Secretary-General's annual report on Western Sahara explicitly states that De Mistura's trip was suspended in keeping with "United Nations principles, in particular the importance of women's equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security". According to the UN, the special envoy would continue efforts to arrange meetings with women's organisations and civil society groups from occupied Western Sahara on future visits to the region. During his visit to the Saharawi refugee camps in September, De Mistura met with civil society groups and women's organisations, which expressed their frustration at the lack of a political solution and expressed concern about the humanitarian situation in the camps, especially aggravated in recent years due to food insecurity.

Additionally, UNSC Resolution 2654, which approved a new extension of the MINURSO mandate, repeated the commitments made as part of the international Women, Peace and Security agenda. As part of the text drafting process, several countries asked to insert a more explicit commitment to women's participation. At the request of the government of Ireland, which was supported by other member countries of the Security Council such as Mexico, Norway and Kenya, the document was changed to call for "total, equal and meaningful" female participation, whereas it had previously urged "full, effective and meaningful" participation. The UN has also tried to embody its commitment to the Women, Peace and Security agenda through greater female participation in the MINURSO contingent. At the end of 2022, the UN mission for Western Sahara was made up of 227 people, 74 of which were women. As such, the proportion of female observers rose to 33%, the highest among field missions and above the 19% target defined in the gender parity strategy for UN missions for the 2018-2028 period.

48. Security Council Report, "Western Sahara: Vote on Resolution to Renew Mandate of MINURSO", *What's in Blue*, 26 October 2022.

Southern Africa

Mozambique	
Negotiating actors	Government, the RENAMO armed group
Third parties	AU, National mediation team, Botswana, Tanzania, South Africa, United Kingdom, EU, Community of Sant'Egidio (Vatican), Catholic Church, UN, Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Relevant agreements	Rome peace agreement (1992), Maputo Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (2019)

Summary:

The coup d'état against the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 and the guerrilla warfare carried out by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) Marxist-Leninist insurgency took Mozambique to Independence in 1975. Since then, the country has been affected by a civil war between the FRELIMO Government and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) armed group, supported by the white minorities that governed in the former Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) and South Africa during the apartheid, in the context of the Cold War. In 1992 the parties reached a peace agreement that was considered an example of reconciliation. This was mediated by the Community of Sant'Egidio and ended a 16-year long war that caused one million fatalities and five million displaced persons, and gave way to a period of political stability and economic development, albeit high levels of inequality. In parallel, growing accusations of fraud and irregularities in the electoral processes that followed, some of which were confirmed by international observers, have gone hand-in-hand with a growing authoritarianism and repression of the opposition, and FRELIMO taking over the State (and the communication media and economy). In 2013, RENAMO conditioned its continuation in political life to a series of changes, mainly the reform of the national electoral commission and an equitable distribution of the country's wealth. It threatened to remove its signature from the 1992 peace agreement, and indeed this did happen, throwing the country back into armed fighting in 2013 and the subsequent launch of a new agreed peace negotiation process in August 2014. RENAMO's declaration of a truce in 2016 and the progress made in the peace process during 2017 caused a notable drop in armed actions, achieving the signing of a new peace agreement in August 2019, though sporadic clashes persist with the dissident faction of RENAMO calling itself the RENAMO Military Junta.

Progress was made during the year in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former RENAMO combatants provided for in the 2019 peace agreement. In August, Mirko Manzoni, the UN special envoy for Mozambique and president of the International Contact Group for the Mozambique peace talks, confirmed the closure of a new RENAMO military base in the district of Montepuez, in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. Manzoni reported that with its closure, 13 of the 17 RENAMO bases had been closed and the remaining ones were expected to close by the end of the year. He also congratulated the parties on the progress made to date in the DDR process for ex-combatants and reported that 77% of the beneficiaries had been reintegrated out of the 5,221 initially expected. In October, President Filipe Nyusi and RENAMO leaders

reaffirmed their commitment to complete the DDR programme by the end of the year, announcing that another 800 former fighters began the demobilisation process on 12 October in the central province of Zambezia. However, the demobilisation process could not be completed at the end of the year since on 19 December the last group of approximately 350 ex-combatants refused to demobilise in Gorongosa district, in the province of Sofala, accusing the government of delaying the payment of pensions and the integration of eligible combatants into the security forces. About 4,700 ex-combatants, representing around 90% of the estimated total, had demobilised by the end of the year. Meanwhile, in later March, the Mozambican Defence and Security Forces (FDS) announced that the self-proclaimed RENAMO Military Junta (the RENAMO armed dissident splinter group that refused to sign the 2019 peace agreement, but which was in negotiations with the government to sign it) had chosen a new leader to succeed its founder, Mariano Nhongo, who was killed in combat in October 2021 in Sofala. However, Mozambican Defence Minister Cristóvão Chume denied the reports and said that the government had no information that the group was still operating. RENAMO also disputed the news and accused the FDS of promoting false information about the resurgence of the Military Junta to justify the persecution of RENAMO members under the pretext that they collaborate with the Military Junta.

West Africa

Cameroon (Ambazonia/North West and South West)	
Negotiating actors	Government, political-military secessionist movement formed by the opposition coalition Ambazonia Coalition Team (ACT, including IG Sako, AIPC, APLM, FSCW, MoRISC, SCARM, SCAPO, SCNC, RoA, RoAN, civil society actors and independent individuals), and Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC, including IG Sisiku)
Third parties	Church, civil society organisations, Switzerland/Swiss Contact Group, Friends of the Swiss Contact Group (EU, USA, Canada, Belgium, Germany, UK), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, USIP, Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation (CDN), Vatican, Canada
Relevant agreements	Buea Declaration (1993, AAC1), ACC2 Declaration (1994), National Dialogue (30th September-4th October, 2019)

Summary:

After Germany's defeat in the First World War, Cameroon came under the mandate of the League of Nations and was divided between French Cameroon and British Cameroon. In 1961, the two territories that made up British Cameroon held a referendum limiting their self-determination to union with the already independent Republic of Cameroon (formerly French Cameroon) or union with Nigeria. The southern part of British Cameroon (a region currently corresponding to

the provinces of North West and South West) decided to join the Republic of Cameroon, whereas the north preferred to join Nigeria. A poorly conducted re-unification in the 1960s based on centralisation and assimilation has led the English-speaking minority of what was once southern British Cameroon (20% of the country's population) to feel politically and economically marginalised by state institutions, which are controlled by the French-speaking majority. These movements demand a return to the federal model that existed between 1961 and 1972. In 1972, a referendum was held in which a new Constitution was adopted that replaced the federal state with a unitary one and granted more powers to the president, so the southern part of British Cameroon (known as Southern Cameroons) lost its autonomy and was transformed into the two current provinces of North West and South West. In 1993, representatives of the English-speaking groups held the All Anglophone Conference (AAC1) in Buea, which resulted in the Buea Declaration (which demanded constitutional amendments to restore the federation of 1961). The AAC2 was held in Bamenda in 1994, which concluded that if the federal state were not restored, Southern Cameroons would declare independence. Begun over sectoral issues in 2016, the conflict worsened in late 2017, with the declaration of independence on 1 October 2017 and the subsequent government repression to quell the secessionist movement, there was an escalation of insurgent activity. Government repression of the demands of a majority of the population of the region, which demanded a new federal political status without ruling out secession, has led to an escalation of violence and the demand for negotiated solutions to the conflict. None of the initiatives to date (the Anglophone AAC3 general conference to be held since 2018, the Swiss track with HD facilitation started in 2019 and the National Dialogue promoted by Paul Biya's government in 2019) has made substantive progress. In 2022, Cameroon certified the completion of the Swiss track.

Although the government of Cameroon terminated the mediation effort jointly conducted since 2019 by the Swiss organisation Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) and the Swiss government during the year, **in October, there were meetings in Canada between representatives of the Cameroonian government and various English-speaking separatist groups as part of a new initiative to promote a peace process.** In addition, various meetings took place between the different Anglophone political-military movements during the year to try to agree on a common position. Cameroonian civil society also took action and made appeals in favour of peace during the year, especially the demonstrations of thousands of people, most of them women, between 30 September and 4 October.

In late 2021, it emerged that the Swiss government and the Swiss organisation HD had tried to relaunch the mediation initiatives begun in 2019, though they remained at a standstill during 2022 and in September the Cameroonian government publicly revealed that it had third-party mediation to resolve the conflict

in the English-speaking regions for good.⁴⁹ After a meeting held on 13 September between the coalition of separatist groups Ambazonia Coalition Team (ACT, which includes political-military movements and civil society organisations) and Swiss special envoy Ambassador Gunther Bachler, the ACT revealed that Cameroonian President Paul Biya reportedly informed Swiss President Ignazio Cassis in September that a military solution was on the table and that Swiss mediation efforts were being rejected. In a meeting with ACT and USIP representatives in March 2022, the Swiss mediation team reportedly demanded that the government of Cameroon clarify its mandate. Yaoundé rejected the Swiss initiative and asked Switzerland to support the negotiating process promoted by Cameroon, the National Dialogue (held between 30 September and 4 October 2019), which the separatist coalition considered a farce and the Cameroonian government regarded as the only valid process. The position of the international community, led by Switzerland, is to get the Cameroonian government to commit to dialogue without preconditions to end the violence. In July, French President Emmanuel Macron visited the country, met with Paul Biya and told him that a decentralisation process and greater dialogue could resolve the conflict in the English-speaking regions. On 4 August, the Cameroonian government convened the follow-up committee of the National Dialogue in Yaoundé. However, alongside Switzerland's withdrawal from mediation, representatives of the government and various Anglophone separatist groups met in Toronto (Canada) between 10 and 14 October as part of a new initiative to relaunch peace negotiations between the parties. The Canadian federal system may have been taken as an example by the participants. They met under strict security and confidentiality to prevent possible leaks that could affect peacebuilding efforts.⁵⁰

The United Nations tried to promote meetings with the separatist movement, as highlighted in the UN Secretary-General's report in December.⁵¹ On 2 June, the UN Secretary-General's former special representative for Central Africa, François Louncény Fall, met in Yaoundé with Cameroonian President Paul Biya and updated him on the progress made in his efforts to foster dialogue between the government of Cameroon and the separatist movement in the English-speaking regions. He encouraged the government to build on the momentum to resolve the crisis peacefully and promised continued United Nations support in that regard. There were also changes in the Anglophone political leadership during the year. Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe, the historical leader of the pro-independence political Interim Government (IG), who is serving a life sentence in prison, was replaced as president by Iya Marianta Njomia on 5 March, who was in turn replaced by former IG spokesman Chris Anu in

49. David Atangana, *Anglophone Crisis: Government finally rejects Swiss mediation, hangs on military option*, *Mimi Mefo Info*, 15 September 2022.

50. Cameroon Intelligence Report, *Southern Cameroons Crisis: Talks in Canada end in key agreement*, 17 October 2022; International Crisis Group, *Crisiswatch October Cameroon*, October 2022.

51. UN Security Council, *The situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa*, S/2022/896 of 1 December 2022.

September. Following the UN Secretary-General's report in December and a communiqué from the government of Cameroon to the UN Security Council that trumpeted the results of the National Dialogue and rejected the Swiss route, the IG Sisiku (in December led by Chris Anu, hereinafter IG-Chris Anu) stressed the need to support third-party mediation, as had been the position of the international community, and regretted that the Swiss route had been ruled out by the government of Cameroon, which holds that the main agreement is the one reached through the National Dialogue of 2019, while the IG-Chris Anu described it as a smokescreen.⁵²

English-speaking military-political movements also intensified efforts to coordinate objectives. Many rounds of meetings were held between different groups. From 11 to 13 March, delegates from six groups met in Germany to discuss refugees, internal displacement and human rights violations. Other groups held meetings to promote unity within the coalition. Among these, Ayabo Cho of AGovC (armed wing: Ambazonia Defence Forces) and Ebenezer Akwanga of the African People's Liberation Movement (armed wing: South Cameroons Defence Forces, SOCADEF) met in Ireland on 11 and 12 February, where they discussed a common approach to armed activities and political negotiations. In February, the AGovC met with representatives of the African People's Liberation Movement (APLM, a member of the ACT coalition) and announced an agreement to reach a negotiated solution to the conflict and seek independence. The IG faction based in Maryland (USA), headed by Samuel Sako tried to relieve its leader in February, but he refused to resign.⁵³

Gender, peace and security

Cameroonian civil society, and especially women's civil society organisations, continued to exert effort in promoting peacebuilding initiatives, not only in the two English-speaking regions of Cameroon, but also in other parts of the country. After the success of the National Women's Convention for Peace that took place in Yaoundé in 2021 and brought together a thousand women, it should be noted that, like every year, as part of the International Day for Peace (21 September), women's organisations demonstrated in various cities of the country, mainly in Yaoundé, Bamenda, Buea and Maroua, protesting their underrepresentation in peacebuilding initiatives and efforts.⁵⁴ One of these activists was Muma Bih Yvonne, a co-founder of the Cameroon Women's Peace Movement, who noted that women accounted for less than 15% of the attendees of the government-sponsored National Dialogue. Her organisation recommended the continuation of the

dialogue to promote negotiated solutions to the conflict in the southwest of the country, where the United Nations has estimated that at least 3,500 people have died and over half a million people have been displaced since it began in 2017. Various women's organisations issued a statement known as the Women's Negotiations for Peace in Cameroon on 19 September. One of its organisers, Sonkeng Rachel, called for a ceasefire before the peace negotiations are formalised. The initiative was supported by Germany's Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Meanwhile, the organisation Women for Permanent Peace and Justice (WPPJ, a member of ACT) regretted the end of Switzerland's mediation efforts. During the four days to commemorate the third anniversary of the government-backed National Dialogue (between 30 September and 4 October 2019), thousands of women staged demonstrations throughout the country, calling for peace in the English-speaking regions.⁵⁵

Mali	
Negotiating actors	Government, Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) –MNLA, MAA and HCUA–, Platform –GATIA, CMFPR, CPA, faction of the MAA
Third parties	Algeria, France, ECOWAS, AU, UN, EU, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Carter Center, civil society organisations, Mauritania
Relevant agreements	Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (2015)

Summary:

The armed conflict affecting Mali since early 2012 resulted in an institutional crisis –which materialized in a military coup– and Tuareg and jihadist groups progressively taking control of the northern part of the country. Since the conflict started, several international actors, including ECOWAS, the AU and the UN, have promoted initiatives leading to re-establishing the constitutional order and recovering Mali's territorial integrity. In parallel with the militarist approaches to face the crisis, exploratory contacts were held with some armed groups (MNLA and Ansar Dine) to find a negotiated way out of the crisis. Despite the announcement of a commitment to the cessation of hostilities from these insurgent groups, at the start of 2013 an offensive by Ansar Dine precipitated an international military intervention led by France. In May 2014 a new negotiation process was started, led by Algeria, where the Mali Government negotiated on both sides with the two coalitions created by the armed groups: the Coordination of Azawad Movements (groups favourable to a federalist/secessionist formula), and the Platform (groups supporting the Government). In July 2015 the signing of a peace agreement was made possible between the Government, the CMA and the Platform, in Algiers. The jihadist groups were left aside in the negotiation table, which kept alive the hostilities from these groups in the new context of implementing the clauses present in the peace agreement.

52. Interim Government Official Site, *Response to LRC Letter to the UN*, Federal Republic of Ambazonia, 9 December 2022.

53. International Crisis Group, *Crisiswatch February-March Cameroon*, February and March 2022.

54. Moki Edwin Kindzeka, *Cameroonian Women Say They Are Underrepresented in Peace Talks*, VOA, 20 September 2022.

55. Moki Edwin Kindzeka, *Cameroon: Marchers Call for Peace in Cameroon, but Warring Sides At Odds On Talks*, VOA, 3 October 2022.

Little progress was made during the year in the implementation of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, as the climate in the country remained characterised by political instability and dynamics of violence perpetrated by actors that had not signed the agreement. In June, the Carter Center, an independent observer of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali resulting from the 2015 Algiers Process, published its first follow-up report of the year on the progress of its implementation.⁵⁶ Covering the period from September 2021 to June 2022, the report described unprecedented obstacles in implementing the agreement, noting that dialogue between its signatory parties (the Malian government, the Coordination of Azawad Movements and the Platform) has become increasingly difficult since October 2021 and little headway has been made. This impasse coincided with a rise in instability in the country, produced by tension between the transitional government and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the withdrawal of stabilisation support (troops and funds) by some of Mali's traditional international partners, mainly France; and a rise in violence in the centre and north of the country. The report stated that the impasse was also due to a controversy over the review of some clauses of the agreement, as well as the deterioration of relations between the irregular movements that signed it and the new transitional authorities. On a positive note, the Carter Center pointed out that the Malian parties continued to reiterate their commitment to the agreement.

The political crisis in Mali and the disagreements between the parties prevented progress in the implementation of the clauses of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement

In its second annual report, which covered the period between July and October 2022, the Carter Center analysed the progress made in the clauses of Title V of the agreement, dedicated to "Reconciliation, Justice and Humanitarian Affairs", due to the fact that the Commission for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation (CVJR) would end its mission in December 2022.⁵⁷ The Carter Center welcomed the fact that the CVJR's work on transitional justice has been relatively successful. For instance, it has taken important steps in favour of the victims and reparations, organised public hearings and developed a material and symbolic reparation policy by proposing the creation of two bodies to promote transitional justice activity: the Reparations Agency and the Centre for the Promotion of Memory, Unity and Peace. However, different critical aspects of transitional justice have not been addressed with the same attention, such as the support provided to victims filing appeals in criminal courts, nor has it been established how the CVJR's mission will be monitored

after its completion, which is worrisome in a context in which serious human rights violations persist. The report also asserted that too little attention was being paid to the provision of Title V regarding reforms of the justice system and support for humanitarian actions.

Meanwhile, progress made during the year included the Malian government's launch of the National Strategy for Reconciliation and Social Cohesion and the headway made in strengthening the status of the traditional authorities, including the promulgation of a national day for traditional authorities. Progress was also made on defence and security issues after the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) denounced the authorities' abandonment of the peace agreement in mid-July, which led Bamako to convene a meeting between 1 and 5 August with the leaders of the armed groups that had signed the agreement to move forward with its implementation. During the meeting, the parties reached an agreement on the reintegration of 26,000 former combatants under the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme, either into the security forces or civilian life over the next two years. They also agreed to launch the Commission for the Drafting of the New Constitution (CRNC), which involved the parties that signed the peace agreement so progress could be made on the issue. Earlier, on 3 July, ECOWAS had held an extraordinary summit in which it agreed to lift some sanctions on Mali after the transitional authorities presented a new transitional timetable. On 11 October, the CRNC presented a draft of the new Constitution that, if approved, will pave the way for the implementation of other provisions of the peace agreement, since it enshrines the importance of the cultural diversity of the country and the role of traditional authorities in contributing to social cohesion. The Agreement Monitoring Commission (CSA), which had been inactive since October 2021, resumed regular meetings, starting with a ministerial session on 2 September, and the meetings of the subcommittees resumed in October.

This progress was overshadowed on 22 December when a coalition of armed groups in northern Mali known as the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) announced that it was suspending its participation in the mechanisms to monitor and implement the peace agreement.⁵⁸ The coalition, in which almost all the Malian armed groups that signed the peace agreement are involved, including the CMA, complained about the little progress made in implementing the agreement due to what it described

56. The Carter Center, *Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Resulting from the Algiers Process*, June 2022.

57. The Carter Center, *Report of the Independent Observer. Observations on the Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, Resulting from the Algiers Process*, November 2022.

as the transitional military authorities' "lack of political will". They added that they would only return to the negotiating table if the talks were resumed in a neutral country and under international mediation led by Algeria. The CSP-PSD denounced the transitional authorities' "inertia" in the face of security challenges and the serious deterioration of security during the year in the Ménaka and Gao regions (north of the country) due to the violence perpetrated by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) against civilians, the Malian Armed Forces and the movements that signed the peace agreement, as well as clashes with the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM).⁵⁹

Gender, peace and security

In line with the implementation of the peace agreement, no significant progress was observed in terms of gender, peace and security. Neither of the two semi-annual reports issued by the Carter Center in 2022 included any mention of progress on the matter. Nor was gender, peace and security taken into account in the seminar organised by the Carter Center between 16 and 17 February in Bamako that brought together the key parties in the peace agreement implementation process (more than 90 people), including representatives of the parties that signed the peace agreement, the bodies of the implementation process, international mediation and the interested ministries, where observations and recommendations on the implementation of the agreement were addressed.⁶⁰ However, 15 new women were incorporated into the CFS subcommittees, which the Carter Center highlighted as a positive sign for implementation of the women, peace and security agenda. Regarding the programme for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants provided for in the peace agreement, the Malian government agreed with the World Bank to extend the deadline for financing the socioeconomic reintegration of 900 women affiliated with armed groups until 30 June 2023. In terms of governance, on 28 October, the transitional president appointed 26 new members of the National Transitional Council, 10 of which were women, bringing their total number to 42 (28%).

A coalition of armed groups in northern Mali known as the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) announced that it was suspending its participation in the monitoring and implementation mechanisms of the peace agreement

Senegal (Casamance)	
Negotiating actors	Government, factions of the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)
Third parties	ECOWAS, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde
Relevant agreements	General Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the MFDC (Ziguinchor Agreement) (2004)

Summary:

Casamance is a southern Senegalese region geographically separated from the rest of the country by the Gambia River, which is surrounded by the nation of The Gambia. The Casamance region has a distinct culture and language because it was under Portuguese administration during part of the colonial period. Since 1982, the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) has demanded its independence. Clashes between the Senegalese Armed Forces and the MFDC became most violent during the 1990s, concluding in 2004 with the signing of peace agreements by the MFDC's top leader, Diamacoune Senghor. Following Senghor's death in January 2007, the MFDC split into three main armed factions, led by Salif Sadio, César Badiate and Mamadou Niantang Diatta, respectively. Since then, low-intensity fighting has continued between the different factions that do not recognise the agreement reached with the government and are vying to increase their control over the territory. In the meantime, efforts are under way to conduct peace negotiations with these actors to put an end to the violence.

The government of Senegal and a faction of the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) signed a peace agreement. On 4 August, the government of Senegal, represented by Admiral Papa Farba Sarr, and César Atoute Badiate, the leader of a faction of the MFDC calling itself the Provisional Committee of the Political and Combatant Wings of the MFDC, signed a peace agreement in Guinea-Bissau after two days of low-key talks under the auspices of Umaro Sissoco Embaló, the president of Guinea-Bissau and current chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The agreement, which was kept confidential, described the road map for surrendering weapons and reaffirmed the parties' commitment to find a negotiated solution to the conflict. Senegalese President Macky Sall welcomed the agreement and ratified his commitment to establish a lasting peace in Casamance. Robert Sagna, a mediator and former Senegalese cabinet minister, also stressed that the agreement was an important step towards final peace and asked the other factions of the MFDC to sign it.

58. Al Jazeera, *Armed Groups in Northern Mali Pull Out of Algiers Peace Talks*, 23 December 2022.

59. See the summary on Mali in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.

60. The Carter Center, *Report on the seminar on the independent observer's observations and recommendations*, 16-17 February 2022.

The agreement came after seven negotiating meetings in Senegal, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau over the last three years facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD). As part of these negotiations, in April 2021 the parties released a joint declaration after a meeting held in Praia, Cape Verde, in which they agreed on the lines to guide the negotiations: 1) solemn proclamation of the will of the two parties (State of Senegal and Provisional Committee) to resolve the conflict in Casamance through dialogue; 2) full confidentiality in the negotiations, except for mutually agreed general communication; 3) establishment of mutual trust through respect and courtesy, without aggressive language during exchanges, negotiations and other forms of contact between the two parties; and 4) work to promote constructive conduct, avoiding any criminal activity on the ground that could create tension.⁶¹ Later, in November 2021, another declaration of intent was produced to resolve the conflict between the government of Senegal and the southern fronts of the MFDC.

The peace agreement came after a year marked by various incidents in the region. The conflict in the Casamance region had largely simmered until Senegal launched a major offensive to drive out the rebels in 2021. In January 2022, there was a clash between the MFDC and Senegalese soldiers operating as part of the ECOWAS mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG) in which four soldiers were killed and seven captured. The MFDC subsequently handed over the prisoners to officials of the Gambian government and ECOWAS. Later, on 13 March, the Senegalese Army launched a military operation aimed at dismantling the bases of Salif Sadio's MFDC faction near the border with The Gambia, which displaced 6,000 civilians towards The Gambia. On 13 June, César Atoute Badiate and two other men were sentenced to life in prison in absentia for murder and armed rebellion for a massacre that claimed 14 lives in January 2018 in a protected forest near Ziguinchor, though the MFDC denied its participation.

61. See: <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/2380>

3. Peace negotiations in America

- In the Americas there were four negotiations during 2022, 10% of the world total.
- In Haiti, the government and part of the opposition began talks about the deep economic, humanitarian, political and institutional crisis gripping the country, but no significant agreement was reached.
- The Colombian government and the ELN began a formal negotiating process with a first round of talks in Venezuela.
- The Colombian Truth Commission presented its report, which stated that most of the victims of the armed conflict were civilians and non-combatants.
- The Venezuelan government resumed dialogue and reached an agreement with the opposition alliance Unitary Platform in Mexico, began talks with other opposition factions and sought common ground with the US government.

This chapter provides an analysis of the main peace processes and negotiations in the Americas in 2022, both the general characteristics and trends of the negotiations and the development of each case on both continents throughout the year, including references to the gender, peace and security agenda. In addition, at the beginning of the chapter there is a map identifying the countries in the Americas that hosted peace negotiations during 2022.

Table 3.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in America in 2022

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
Colombia (ELN)	Government, ELN	Guarantor countries (Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile) United Nations Verification Mission, Catholic Church, supporting countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain)
Colombia (FARC)	Government, Comunes	UN Verification Mission in Colombia, International Verification Component (Technical Secretariat of the Notables, University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute)
Haiti	Government, social and political opposition	Core Group (UN, OAS, EU and Germany, France, Brazil, Canada, Spain and US Governments), "Mediation Committee" (made up of three representatives of religious, academic and business organisations)
Venezuela	Government, social and political opposition	Norway, Russia, Netherlands, International Contact Group

3.1 Negotiations in 2022: regional trends

In 2022, the Americas were the scene of four peace processes, one more than in 2021, when a negotiating process began between the Haitian government and the political opposition and was facilitated by various international actors. The negotiating processes in Colombia continued, with the start of a formal peace process between the Colombian government and the armed group ELN and the implementation of the peace agreement reached between Bogota and the FARC guerrilla group in 2016. In Venezuela, talks between the government and the opposition resumed after being interrupted for over a year and were supported by different governments and international actors.

The governments of the respective countries participated in all the different negotiations as one of the negotiating parties. The ELN was the only armed opposition group

that participated as a negotiating party in a peace process after it was reactivated with the Colombian government. Two negotiating delegations were appointed to conduct these negotiations, which formally began in November after previous exploratory meetings. The government delegation's chief negotiators were Otty Patiño and Iván Cepeda and the chief negotiator of the ELN delegation was Pablo Beltrán. Talks as part of the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrilla group took place between Caracas and the Comunes political party, which emerged from the demobilisation of the FARC-EP guerrilla group as a result of the peace agreement. Two important forums for dialogue between the parties were reactivated during the year: the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI)

Map 3.1. Peace negotiations in America in 2022



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in America in 2022

and the National Commission for Security Guarantees (CNGS). Both bodies were established by the peace agreement but had remained non-operational during the administration of President Iván Duque, who ended his term of office in 2022, giving way to President Gustavo Petro, the winner of the last presidential election. In Venezuela and Haiti, the main parties involved in the talks were the respective governments and the political and social opposition of both countries on different platforms. In Haiti, the opposition platform was called the “Montana Accord” and was made up of nearly a thousand political and social organisations with a road map for a political transition, although other opposition groups were also important, such as the Protocol for National Understanding (PEN) and the National Transition Council, resulting from the agreement between the two previous ones. The talks in Venezuela were held mainly with the opposition alliance called the Unitary Platform, although the government also met with other important opposition actors, such as the Democratic Alliance, the Lápiz Alliance and the Civic Forum.

A negotiating process began between the Haitian government and the opposition

Third parties were prominent in all the negotiations that took place in the Americas, playing different supporting, mediating and facilitating roles with the aim of bringing the parties in dispute closer together and promoting attempts at dialogue to transform the conflicts or disputes. Many of the facilitating actors were international and external to the countries that were the scenarios of the

different conflicts. Some of the facilitating actors were governments, but international and regional organisations such as the UN, OAS and EU also played a prominent role. Third parties also very frequently acted as a group or in a coordinated manner under different umbrellas and formats, such as guarantor or supporting countries, the International Contact Group and the Core Group. This coordination was necessary, given the participation of a wide variety of third parties in all negotiations. Actors that had already played a fundamental role in facilitating previous peace processes in Colombia, such as Norway, Cuba and Venezuela, were active in resuming the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the ELN, which also enjoyed the support of other countries in the region such as Mexico and Chile and four European countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain).

The parties also asked the US government to play an undefined role as a partner in the process. In addition to these governments, other supporting actors included the United Nations, specifically the Verification Mission in the country and the Catholic Church, which also played an important role in the previous attempt at dialogue with the ELN. The UN Verification Mission in Colombia and the International Verification Component (made up of the Technical Secretariat of the Notables and University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute) continued to monitor the proper implementation of the 2016 peace agreement, as provided for in the text of the agreement. There was both an international and an internal dimension in the

external support for the negotiating process in Haiti, with the former offered by the Core Group, made up of the UN, the OAS, the EU and the governments of Germany, France, Brazil, Canada, Spain and the US, and the latter provided by what is known as the “Mediation Committee”, made up of three representatives of religious, academic and business organisations. Finally, the negotiating process in Venezuela continued to enjoy the support of three countries (Norway, Russia and the Netherlands) as well as the International Contact Group, made up of European and Latin American countries.

Facilitators participated prominently in all the peace negotiations in the Americas

Each negotiating agenda reflected the circumstances and characteristics of its corresponding process, as well as the specific demands of the actors concerned. The agenda of the negotiating process between the Colombian government and the FARC is marked by the commitments outlined in the 2016 peace agreement and compliance with the same. In the negotiations with the ELN, the parties agreed to resume the agenda already agreed upon in the previous process, with some updates and adjustments, but starting from a base established beforehand. In fact, the agreement on the agenda was one of the first built at the beginning of the negotiations. The negotiations in Haiti and Venezuela revolved around issues related to the governance of both countries and the political transformations demanded by their respective oppositions, including the important issue of elections. In Haiti, the opposition presented a road map for a political transition in the country, but there was disagreement with the government over which aspects should be part of the negotiating agenda.

The negotiating processes generally made progress, especially in Colombia, where there was significant headway. The resumption of contact between the Haitian and Venezuelan governments and their respective oppositions was also a good sign, though disagreements and obstacles had to be faced. Negotiations with the ELN formally resumed and the negotiating actors and facilitators generally expressed a constructive attitude and an openness to rapprochement, reaching agreements on very important issues such as the agenda, format and location of the talks and thereby facilitating their continuity. The reactivation of the dialogue is part of a policy of the new government called “Total Peace” that is intended to promote rapprochement with the armed actors in the country. In the case of the dialogue with the Comunes party for the implementation of the peace agreement, it is worth noting the reactivation of crucial instances for this. In Venezuela, the most positive development was the resumption of direct talks between Caracas and the opposition and rapprochement between Caracas and Washington. In Haiti, the enormous gulfs between the government, considered illegitimate by the opposition, and the different opposition platforms became clear, though some important progress was achieved, including an agreement for the transition.

This agreement was not endorsed by all opposition groups, however, which questioned its ability to serve as a basis for achieving a solution to the serious social and political crisis in the country.

Regarding the implementation of the gender, peace and security agenda, **important challenges to women’s meaningful participation in the different negotiating processes persisted**, although female involvement was verified once again in the peace processes in Colombia.

The negotiating processes in Haiti and Venezuela were characterised by their exclusive nature, with no significant role for women, nor were gender issues included in the topics for discussion on the agendas. However, the peace processes in Colombia enjoyed significant female participation and development of gender agendas. Thus, bodies designed by the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC to supervise the implementation of the gender approach continued to be active, such as the Women’s Body for a Gender and Peace Focus. The gender approach was also important in the work of organisations such as the Truth Commission, which included this perspective extensively in its report, collecting Colombian women’s experiences in the conflict with recommendations for the future. Although the first exploratory contacts in the peace negotiations with the ELN took place without female participation, once the formal talks began, both delegations included a significant amount of female negotiators, which increased as they went on. Meanwhile, civil society continued to be active in promoting the preparation of a National Action Plan on UNSC Resolution 1325.

3.2 Case study analysis

North America, Central America and the Caribbean

Haiti	
Negotiating actors	Government, political and social opposition
Third parties	Core Group (UN, OAS, EU and Germany, France, Brazil, Canada, Spain and US Governments), “Mediation Committee” (made up of three representatives of religious, academic and business organisations)
Relevant agreements	--

Summary:

In recent years, especially after former President Jean Bertrand Aristide left the country in February 2004 and the subsequent deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH), there have been several attempts at consultation and dialogue between various political and social sectors to cope with the institutional fragility, political-social polarisation and economic and security crisis facing the country. Yet none of these initiatives, most of which agreements or have led to permanent or stable spaces or

mechanisms for negotiation. Though President Jovenel Moïse's mandate has been controversial since its inception after he was accused of electoral fraud in the 2015 election, his attempts to create a national dialogue in 2019 came in response to the deepening crisis in mid-2018 and the outbreak of protests and episodes of violence in 2019.

Amidst a deep economic, humanitarian, political and institutional crisis, **negotiations took place throughout the year between the acting Haitian government and various social organisation platforms and opposition political groups** that do not recognise the legitimacy or legality of Ariel Henry's government. The multilevel and multisectoral negotiations were sponsored by the US government, the Core Group (which includes representatives of the OAS, the UN, the EU and the US, France, Germany, Canada, Brazil and Spain) and certain civil society groups. The two main actors in the negotiations were the government of Ariel Henry, who has served as president and prime minister of the country since the assassination of the previous president, Jovenel Moïse, in July 2021, and a platform called the "Montana Accord", a pact signed on 30 August 2021 by nearly one thousand political and social organisations that proposed a road map for ensuring the political transition and for grappling with the growing insecurity and humanitarian crisis in the country. Promoted by the civic platform Commission to Search for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis, the Montana Accord laid out a two-year transition plan until the next presidential election is held in February 2024, the formation of a 52-member National Transition Council (appointed by political parties, political groups and civil society organisations), the creation of a five-member presidential college and the appointment of a prime minister and a ministerial cabinet.

In mid-January, the Unity Summit was held in Louisiana (USA) between representatives of the Montana Accord and the Protocol for National Understanding (PEN), the other great opposition platform made up of hundreds of social and political organisations, to reconcile their respective proposals for the political transition. As a consequence of this consensus between both platforms, on 30 January the National Transition Council elected former prime minister and former Central Bank Governor Fritz Jean as interim president and former Senator Steven Benoit as interim prime minister. The acting president and prime minister, Ariel Henry, supported in turn by the Musseau Accord (signed on 11 September 2021 by around 600 political and social organisations), did not recognise the vote of the National Transition Council, rejected the road map proposed by the Montana Accord and the PEN and argued that the only way to solve the country's political and institutional impasse was via general elections and a constitutional referendum. The legislative elections should have originally been held in October 2019, but they were postponed first until November 2021 and indefinitely thereafter. Similarly,

the referendum on the amendment of the 1987 Constitution, proposed by former President Jovenel Moïse, should have been held in June 2021, but it was also postponed and no date has been scheduled for it. As such, a significant part of the Haitian political class considered it illegal for Ariel Henry to remain president and prime minister of the country beyond 7 February 2022, since this was the date when former President Jovenel Moïse's term would have ended.

Although Ariel Henry met behind closed doors with representatives of the Montana Accord Monitoring Office on 11 February, the organisation indicated that negotiations would not continue until certain conditions were met, such as the suspension of the new Provisional Election Council and Henry's cooperation in the investigation of the murder of former President Moïse, as he is suspected of being involved. Faced with this deadlock, the US and the president of the Senate of Haiti launched several initiatives to seek common ground between the parties, but they were not successful. Along the same lines, a "Mediation Committee" was created in late March that was made up of representatives of the Conference of Rectors, Presidents and Heads of Haitian Universities (CORPUHA), the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Haiti (CCIH) and the local organisation Religions for Peace Haiti. Sponsored by the government and supported by the Core Group, the Mediation Committee publicly declared in the middle of the year that it had held talks with around 40 political parties of various inclinations, five political groups, several signatories of four political agreements, the president of the country and members of the Senate. However, the main opposition coalitions, such as the Montana Accord and the PEN, did not recognise the Mediation Committee's legitimacy, describing it a unilateral initiative of the de facto government.

Ariel Henry met twice in May with one of the representatives of the Montana Accord, former Minister Magali Comeau-Denis, who proposed the objectives of the political negotiations, the place and duration of the discussions, the negotiating agenda, the composition of the delegations and other issues. However, in late May the de facto government made a counterproposal that disregarded the terms set out in the Montana Accord and focused the talks on insecurity and corruption, the amendment of the Constitution, the formation of the Provisional Electoral Council to organise the elections and social protection programmes. In early June, the Montana Accord publicly revealed its negotiating delegation (made up of seven people), while the provisional government issued a letter in late June to announce the formation of a delegation of six people representing the government and the political groups supporting it (also known as the Musseau or 9/11 Accord). However, after no progress was made on substantive or procedural matters in the negotiations in July, the Montana Accord Monitoring Office interrupted

the talks in early August, accusing Henry and his allied political groups of lacking the political desire to move forward in the negotiations, discuss institutional governance alternatives or agree on conditions and dates for the elections. Even though the US Secretary of State travelled to Haiti in September to encourage the resumption of negotiations and the Mediation Committee continued to hold many meetings, there no new meetings between the government and the main opposition platforms in the country throughout the rest of the year and many of the opposition parties encouraged massive anti-government protests in its final months. Amidst a substantial rise in violence in the country (which even prompted the United Nations and several countries to consider deploying a military force to deal with the instability), the government declared that it would begin organising the postponed elections at the end of the year, though it did not specify a date. On 21 December, the government announced that an agreement called the Haitian Consensus had been signed with various political groups and civil society and private organisations to ensure an inclusive transition and transparent elections. The agreement provides for a 14-month transition that includes elections before the end of 2023, the inauguration of the new government on 7 February 2024 (the date until which Ariel Henry will remain in office as prime minister) and the formation of a High Transition Council, made up of a representative of civil society, a representative of the political parties and a representative of the private sector, as well as a Control Body for Government Action. Although Henry called the agreement historic and over 600 organisations had shown their support for it by the end of the year, both the Montana Accord and some of the country's main opposition parties rejected the pact since it was signed by the same organisations that had shown their support for the government thus far and argued that it only sought to keep Ariel Henry in power and did not provide a solution to the country's structural problems.

South America

Colombia (ELN)	
Negotiating actors	Government, ELN
Third parties	Guarantor countries (Cuba, Venezuela, Norway, Mexico and Chile) United Nations Verification Mission, Catholic Church, supporting countries (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain)
Relevant agreements	"Heaven's Door" Agreement (1988)
Summary:	
Since the ELN emerged in 1964, various negotiating processes have tried to bring peace to the country. The first negotiations between the Colombian government and the ELN date from 1991 (Caracas and Tlaxcala). In 1998, both parties signed a peace agreement in Madrid that envisaged holding a national convention. That same year, the "Puerta del Cielo" agreement between the ELN and civil society activists was signed in Mainz, Germany, focused on	

humanitarian aspects. In 1999, the Colombian government and the ELN resumed meetings in Cuba, which ended in June 2000. The government of Álvaro Uribe resumed peace negotiations with the ELN in Cuba between 2005 and 2007, though no results were achieved. At the end of 2012, the ELN showed its willingness to open new negotiations with President Juan Manuel Santos, appointing a negotiating commission, and exploratory meetings were held. Formal peace negotiations began in 2017, which broke off in 2019 after a serious attack by the ELN in Bogotá.

Major progress was made in the **peace negotiations between the government of Colombia and the ELN in 2022**. After the inauguration of President Gustavo Petro, who won the presidential election in June, a delegation of the Colombian government and representatives of the ELN held their first meeting in Havana after the peace process had remained at a standstill for years. The government delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva and supported by High Commissioner for Peace Danilo Rueda and Historic Pact Senator Iván Cepeda, who is very close to Gustavo Petro. The delegation was also accompanied by the special representative of the UN Secretary-General and head of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, Carlos Ruiz Massieu, the Norwegian special envoy for peace, John Otto, and the Cuban ambassador to Colombia, Javier Caamaño. After this first meeting, the government announced that it would take the necessary legal steps to facilitate the talks, in reference to the reactivation of the protocols that had already been agreed on with the ELN during the past negotiations and that were later deactivated by the government of Iván Duque. Shortly thereafter, the ELN indicated that it expected the peace negotiations to begin shortly and the Venezuelan government confirmed its willingness to act as a guarantor in response to Colombian President Gustavo Petro's request and the resumption of diplomatic relations between both countries. In October, it was officially confirmed that the negotiations would begin in November in an announcement made in Venezuela by High Commissioner for Peace Danilo Rueda, Senator Iván Cepeda, Monsignor Héctor Fabio Henao and ELN commanders Pablo Beltrán and Antonio García. It was also announced that the process would initially be supported by guarantor countries Cuba, Venezuela and Norway, later to be joined by Mexico and Chile, while Brazil's response to the invitation was still pending. Supporting special guests were to include the UN Verification Mission (with Carlos Ruiz Massieu, head of the mission as a representative in the negotiations) and the Catholic Church (with Monsignor Héctor Fabio Henao as a representative). The USA, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Spain were also invited to support the process. The negotiations with the ELN are framed within the new Colombian government's "Total Peace" policy, which seeks to hold talks simultaneously with all armed actors in the country, including the ELN and the FARC dissidents, and to put an end to the activity of criminal armed actors linked to narco-paramilitarism. To this end, the Chamber of

Representatives approved a draft bill in late October to give legal coverage to the “Total Peace” policy. Formulas to give these armed actors access to justice would also be laid out. It also includes the possibility of negotiating with FARC dissidents who abandoned the reincorporation process after the 2016 agreement was signed. The draft bill establishes that peace must be state policy and involve all government departments.

Peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the armed group ELN were formally restarted in November and the first round of talks took place.

The negotiations had been frozen in 2019 after an attack by the ELN. This will be the seventh time that the Colombian government and the ELN have launched a peace process. The start of the new talks took place in Caracas, Venezuela. The government negotiating delegation was initially headed by chief negotiators Otty Patiño, who was a negotiator with the government in 1990 as a member of the M-19, and Iván Cepeda, and also included María José Pizarro, Horacio Guerrero, Olga Lilia Silva, Danilo Rueda, José Félix Lafaurie (the executive president of the Cattlemen’s Federation, who is a supporter of Uribe’s political ideology), Carlos Rosero, Orlando Romero, Alvaro Matallana, Rosmery Quintero and Dayana Paola Urzola. It was later expanded. The ELN’s negotiating team was led by chief negotiator Pablo Beltrán and also included Aureliano Carbonell, Bernardo Téllez, Gustavo Martínez, Silvana Guerrero, María Consuelo Tapias, Nicolás “Gabino” Rodríguez, Isabel Torres, Viviana Henao and Óscar Serrano.

At the end of the round of negotiations, the parties announced that they had reached four agreements. The first agreement was on the negotiating agenda, which would resume what Santos’ government and the ELN had agreed on in 2016, though some adjustments are expected to be made. This agenda was made up of six points: the participation of society in peacebuilding, democracy for peace, transformations for peace, victims, the end of the armed conflict and implementation. The second agreement was on the institutionalisation of the Peace Talks Table regarding the basic principles and procedures for its operation. The third agreement was on humanitarian actions and dynamics and included a related partial agreement in the regions of Bajo Calima in the Valle del Cauca Department and Medio San Juan in the Chocó Department. The parties also agreed to provide humanitarian emergency care to ELN prisoners and the armed group claimed to have released 20 people (civilians and members of the security forces) as a sign of its commitment to peace. However, shortly after the announcement of the humanitarian agreement, the ELN’s Western War Front, which is active in the area included in the agreement, announced an indefinite so-called “armed strike” alluding to the presence of the Gulf Clan (ACG). The fourth agreement was on education and communication to facilitate the participation of Colombian society and the international community in

Peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the armed group ELN were formally restarted

the negotiations. On 19 December, the ELN announced a ceasefire between 24 December and 2 January, though it noted that it reserved the right to defend itself. It also called on the government to dissolve the paramilitary groups. At the end of the first round, it was announced that the negotiations would resume in January 2023 in Mexico. On 31 December, President Gustavo Petro announced a bilateral ceasefire agreement with the ELN, the Second Marquetalia, Estado Mayor Central, the AGC and the Self-Defence Forces of the Sierra Nevada from 1 January to 30 June 2023, which could be extended depending on the progress made in the negotiations. Two days later, however, the ELN denied that a bilateral agreement had been reached.

Gender, peace and security

The Government had eight women on its negotiating delegation with the ELN, after having added four more women to the four initially appointed because it had come under fire for having formed a delegation with so few women. Culture Minister Patricia Ariza was similarly critical and demanded parity in the government’s negotiating delegation. The appointments were made on the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women. Thus, the initial four female members (Senator María José Pizarro, human rights activist Olga Lilia Silva, the head of an organisation of small and medium-sized companies, Rosmery Quintero, and indigenous rights activist Dayana Paola Urzola) were joined by journalists Mabel Lara and María Jimena Duzán, lawyer Nigieria Rentería and theologian Adelaida Jiménez. The ELN had six women on its delegation: Consuelo Tapias, Silvana Guerrero, Isabel Torres, Vivian Henao, Cataleya Jiménez and Manuela Márquez. Alongside the negotiations, civil society organisations promoted discussion and advocacy to prepare for a National Action Plan to implement the women, peace and security agenda.

Colombia (FARC)	
Negotiating actors	Government, Comunes
Third parties	UN Verification Mission in Colombia, International Verification Component (Technical Secretariat of the Notables, University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute)
Relevant agreements	The Havana peace agreement (2016)
Summary: Since the founding of the first guerrilla groups in 1964 there have been several negotiation attempts. In the early 1990s several small groups were demobilized, but not the FARC and the ELN, which are the two most important. In 1998, President Pastrana authorized the demilitarization of a large region of Colombia, around the area of San Vicente del Caguán, in order to conduct negotiations with the FARC,	

which lasted until 2002 and were unsuccessful. In 2012, and after several months of secret negotiations in Cuba, new talks began with the FARC in Cuba based on a specific agenda and including citizen participation mechanisms. After four years of negotiations, a historic peace agreement for the Colombian people was signed in late 2016.

The implementation of the peace agreement reached in 2016 between the Colombia government and the former FARC guerrilla group continued. **The new government headed by President Gustavo Petro, who took office in August, reaffirmed its commitment to the full implementation of the peace agreement as part of its “Total Peace” policy.** One of the most noteworthy events of the year was the Truth Commission’s publication of its final report after four years of work, with a mandate established under the peace agreement signed between the government of Colombia and the FARC in 2016. Entitled *Hay futuro si hay verdad* (“There is a future if there is truth”),¹ the report states that 456,666 people lost their lives as a consequence of the violence between 1986 and 2016, that 50,770 people were kidnapped and that over eight million people were forcibly displaced. The Truth Commission concluded that most of the victims of the conflict were civilians and non-combatants. Forty-five per cent of the victims were afflicted between 1995 and 2004 and 45% of the homicides in the conflict between 1985 and 2018 were committed by paramilitary forces, 21% by the FARC and 12% by members of government forces. The report also includes other impacts of the conflict such as torture, forced disappearance, sexual violence, violations of the right to liberty, the recruitment of boys and girls, forced labor and more. In its recommendations, the Truth Commission emphasised the importance of fully implementing the peace agreement and restarting the dialogue with the ELN and proposed the establishment of a Ministry for Peace and Reconciliation. The report also recommends establishing a culture of peace in the country; reforming in the security sector, mainly in the police and the armed forces; committing to establishing a memory policy; taking action to end impunity; and striving to promote an international discussion on banning drugs. President Petro publicly reconfirmed his commitment to comply with the Truth Commission’s recommendations.

Meanwhile, **two key institutions for the implementation of the agreement were relaunched: the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CSIVI) and the National Commission for Security Guarantees (CNGS).** The UN Verification Mission, the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process and representatives of countries that support the peace process, as well as representatives of the extinct FARC and the government also resumed their

work. The work of the CSIVI and the CNGS had slowed down and even came to a standstill while the previous government was in power, which had led to significant obstacles in implementing the peace agreement. In fact, in its latest verification report on the implementation of the peace agreement, the Kroc Institute stated that as of November 2021, only 30% of the provisions had been fully implemented, 19% were in an intermediate state of implementation, 37% had reached only a minimal state of implementation and 15% had not begun to be implemented.² By the end of 2022, 13,539 people had submitted to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), 72.7% of which belonged to the FARC and 26% of which were members of government forces.

Gender, peace and security

The Special Forum on Gender continued to work on the implementation of the gender focus of the peace agreement. In July, the JEP announced that it would open a macro case on sexual violence and other crimes motivated by the victims’ gender, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity. Various human rights organisations had submitted reports on this subject to the JEP and the Ombudsman’s Office had requested the same.

Venezuela	
Negotiating actors	Government, political and social opposition
Third parties	Norway, Russia, The Netherlands, International Contact Group
Relevant agreements	--

Summary:

Faced with the worsening political and social crisis that Venezuela experienced after the death in 2013 of President Hugo Chávez, the leader of the so-called Bolivarian Revolution, his successor Nicolás Maduro’s narrow victory in the presidential election of April 2013 and the protests staged in the early months of 2014, which caused the death of around 40 people, in March 2014 the government said it was willing to accept talks with the opposition facilitated by UNASUR or the Vatican, but categorically rejected any mediation by the OAS. Shortly after Pope Francis called for dialogue and a group of UNASUR foreign ministers visited Venezuela and held many meetings, preliminary talks began between Caracas and the opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) in April 2014, to which the Secretary of State of the Vatican, the former Apostolic Nuncio to Venezuela, as well as the foreign ministers of Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador, were invited as witnesses in good faith. Although the talks were interrupted in May 2014 due to developments in the political situation, both UNASUR and the Vatican continued to facilitate through Apostolic Nuncio Aldo Giordano. In May 2016, shortly after a visit to Venezuela by the former leaders of Spain (Jose

1. Truth Commission, final report. *Hay futuro si hay verdad*, June 2022.

2. Echavarría Álvarez, Josefina, et al. *Cinco años después de la firma del Acuerdo Final: Reflexiones desde el monitoreo a la implementación*. Notre Dame, IN: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies/ Keough School of Global Affairs, 2022.

Luis Rodríguez Zapatero), Panama (Martín Torrijos) and the Dominican Republic (Leonel Fernández) at the request of UNASUR, the Venezuelan government and opposition met in the Dominican Republic with the three aforementioned ex-leaders and UNASUR representatives. After a meeting between Maduro and Pope Francis in October, both parties met again in Venezuela under the auspices of the Pope's new special envoy, Emil Paul Tscherrig. In late 2017, both sides decided to resume the talks in the Dominican Republic starting in December, accompanied by several countries chosen by both parties (Chile, Mexico and Paraguay by the opposition and Nicaragua, Bolivia and San Vicente and the Grenadines by the government). Although some agreements were reached during the several rounds of negotiations that took place between December 2017 and February 2018, Maduro's unilateral call for a presidential election for 2018 brought them to a standstill and caused the withdrawal of several of the accompanying countries designated by the opposition to facilitate them.

After an interruption of over a year, the Venezuelan government resumed talks and reached an agreement with the opposition alliance Unitary Platform in Mexico, while also beginning talks with other opposition factions and seeking common ground with the US government at the same time. Since the start of the year, both the International Contact Group (made up of several EU and Latin American countries) and Washington repeatedly urged the Venezuelan government and the Unitary Platform to resume the negotiations, which had begun in Mexico in August 2021 with Norway facilitating, but which were interrupted in mid-October 2021 after three rounds had been held. However, it was not until May 2022 that the heads of both delegations, Jorge Rodríguez (government) and Gerardo Blyde (opposition) met privately to explore whether the conditions were in place to resume the negotiations. The opposition asserted that any agreement reached would have to allow for a free and fair presidential election to be held, but it also called for the restoration of institutions in the country and restitution of the citizens' fundamental rights. The Venezuelan government once again demanded the release of Alex Saab, a Colombian businessman close to Caracas whose extradition to the US from Cape Verde in October 2021 caused a breakdown in the negotiations. The Venezuelan government also called for Saab to participate in the negotiations. Despite this meeting between the government and the opposition, the official negotiations did not resume until late November, again in Mexico City, facilitated by Norway and supported by the Netherlands and Russia. On 26 November, both delegations signed the Second Partial Agreement for the Social Protection of the People, whereby both parties agree to take all nationwide and international steps aimed at gradually recovering around three billion USD of Venezuelan state assets frozen abroad to fund social programmes for health, education, food and electrical infrastructure. The agreement formalises the creation of the Fund for the Social Care of the Venezuelan People, a trust fund administered and supervised by the United Nations that will be supplied with Venezuelan assets

frozen in the international financial system, as well as the establishment of three working groups (the National Board for Social Care, the Overcompliance Group and Monitoring Commission), which are complementary to and not intended to replace the negotiating table. The facilitator of the negotiations, Dag Nylander, reported that both parties also promised to continue the talks in December to address the political issues on the agenda established in the Memorandum of Understanding signed in August 2021, though he did not specify the date and place of the following meetings. Immediately after the agreement was signed, Washington announced that it had authorised the oil company Chevron to resume its oil extraction operations in Venezuela for export to the US, and Caracas announced the signing of several agreements between the national oil company PVDSA and Chevron. UN Secretary-General António Guterres publicly expressed his satisfaction with the agreement and urged both parties to remain fully committed to the negotiations, while a joint statement from the EU and the governments of the US, Canada and the United Kingdom urged both parties to show good faith and the political commitment to achieve a comprehensive agreement leading to free and fair elections in 2024, while also expressing their willingness to review political sanctions if significant progress is made in the negotiations.

Even though both parties expressed their satisfaction that the agreement had been signed, in early December the Unitary Platform demanded that the Venezuelan government set a date for continuing the negotiations on political issues, such as the conditions for the next elections, the release of people that the opposition considers political prisoners and the return of exiled people. The opposition also accused Maduro of lying about the scope of the signed agreement, of wanting to impose new conditions not provided for in the previous agreements to promote his political agenda in the negotiations and of promoting, making visible and legitimising other opposition factions outside of the Unitary Platform and simulating negotiations with them for his own benefit. Thus, in early December, a few days after the agreement was signed in Mexico, Maduro welcomed to the Presidential Palace representatives of the Democratic Alliance (made up of by 18 political organisations) and the Lápiz Alliance, neither of which is involved in the Unitary Platform, and announced the commitment to issue a document with proposals and agreements on economic, social, political and electoral matters within 30 days. After these meetings, both parties stressed the importance of promoting a nationwide dialogue in Venezuela that includes other voices and sectors in the negotiations. Along these same lines, in March the government announced its intention to promote an inclusive national dialogue with political, business and union groups, in line with a section of the Memorandum of Understanding that calls for bringing other political and social actors in the country on board.

Previously, in February, Caracas had begun talks with political and social opposition groups and accepted the appointment of 10 civil society representatives in the parliamentary committee that chose the Supreme Court judges, although in the end the vast majority were considered close to the government. Subsequently, in April, the government met with representatives of the Democratic Alliance and the Civic Forum, which brings together around 690 organisations and 194 civil society actors. In late December, a US judge rejected Alex Saab's request for diplomatic immunity to avoid trial for money laundering. Nicolás Maduro had requested his release on several occasions.

Finally, the governments of the US and Venezuela attempted to find common ground throughout the year. In early March, senior US government officials met with Maduro in Caracas to discuss the release of Americans imprisoned in Venezuela, although Washington acknowledged that the negotiations also revolved around issues of energy security and its need to secure alternative sources of energy due to its ban on the import of oil from Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. In May, the US government authorised US oil company Chevron to negotiate a license with Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA, but not to drill or export oil of Venezuelan origin. It also removed Carlos Erik Malpica

Flores, a high-ranking PDVSA executive and nephew of the first lady of Venezuela, Cilia Flores, from the Office of Foreign Assets Control's list of sanctioned persons. Washington declared that both decisions were made at the request of the interim government led by Juan Guaidó and by the Unitary Platform to facilitate the resumption of talks between the two parties, which had been interrupted since October 2021. Later, in early October, both governments agreed to an exchange of prisoners, which some media outlets considered the most important agreement between both countries since President Biden took office. The exchange, which took place in a third country, included two nephews of Maduro's wife who had been detained by the DEA in Haiti in 2015 and were serving an 18-year sentence in the US and seven US citizens imprisoned in Venezuela, including five former high-ranking US employees of Citgo, a PDVSA subsidiary in the US, who had been arrested by the Venezuelan authorities in 2017. At the end of the year, Maduro declared that his government was fully ready to normalise diplomatic relations with the US a few days after the 2015 National Assembly, considered the only legitimate democratic institution in the country according to the opposition, but outlawed by the government, decreed an end to the interim government and presidency of Juan Guaidó.

4. Peace negotiations in Asia

- During 2022 there were 10 peace negotiations in Asia, 26% of the total negotiations in the world.
- The government of Pakistan and the Taliban armed group TTP held talks for several months, which ended in November with the TTP's withdrawal from the negotiations.
- In the southern Philippines, the implementation of the 2014 peace agreement made substantial progress, both in the institutional development of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and in the demobilisation of MILF fighters.
- After almost two years of deadlock in the negotiations, the government of Thailand and the BRN resumed talks and reached some agreements in 2022.
- The governments of Papua New Guinea and the Autonomous Region of Bougainville reached an agreement in the negotiations on the future political status of Bougainville, but relations between the two parties later deteriorated and the process was interrupted.
- Negotiations continued to stall between ASEAN and the Myanmar military junta on the return of democracy to the country.

This chapter provides an analysis of the main peace processes and negotiations in Asia in 2021, both the general characteristics and trends of the negotiations and the development of each case on the continent throughout the year, including references to the gender, peace and security agenda. In addition, at the beginning of the chapter there is a map identifying the countries in Asia that hosted peace negotiations during 2021.

Table 4.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in Asia in 2022

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
Korea, DPR – Korea, Rep. of	North Korea, South Korea	--
Korea, DPR – USA	North Korea, USA	--
India (Assam)	Government, ULFA-PTF, ULFA-I; AANLA, AANLA (FG), BCF, BCF (BT), STF, ACMA, ACMA (FG) and APA	--
India (Nagaland)	Indian government, NSCN-IM, NNPG: GPRN/NSCN (Kitovi Zhimomi), NNC, FGN, NSCN(R), NPGN (Non-Accord) and NNC/GDRN/NA, ZUF	--
Myanmar	Government; armed groups that have signed the ceasefire agreement (NCA): DKBA, RCSS/SSA-South, CNF, KNU, KNLAPC, ALP, PNLO, ABSDF, NMSP and LDU; armed groups that have not signed the NCA: UWSP, NDAA, SSPP/SSA-N, KNPP, NSCN-K, KIA, AA, TNLA and MNDAA	China, ASEAN
Pakistan	Government, TTP	Afghanistan
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Government, Autonomous Bougainville Government	United Nations
Philippines (MILF)	Government, MILF, Interim Government of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in- Muslim Mindanao	Malaysia, Third Party Monitoring Team, International Monitoring Team, Independent Decommissioning Body
Philippines (NDF)	Government, NDF (umbrella organisation of various communist organisations, including the Communist Party of the Philippines, which is the political arm of the NPA)	Norway
Thailand (south)	Government, BRN	Malaysia

The peace negotiations in bold type are described in the chapter.


-- There are no third parties or no public proof of their existence.

4.1 Negotiations in 2022: regional trends

There were **10 peace negotiations** in Asia in 2022, the same number as the previous year. This number did not change, as even though the negotiations in Afghanistan

ended after the withdrawal of international troops from the country and the fall of the Afghan government, a new negotiating process began between the Pakistani

Map 4.1. Peace negotiations in Asia in 2022



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in Asia in 2022

government and the Taliban armed group TTP, though it was discontinued at the end of the year due to the TTP's withdrawal. Four of the negotiations took place in Southeast Asia, notably in the Philippines (MILF and NDF), Myanmar and Thailand (south). Three were conducted in South Asia: in India (Assam and Nagaland) and Pakistan. Two were held in East Asia (DPR Korea-Rep of Korea and DPR Korea-USA) and the tenth negotiating process took place in the Pacific region, between Papua New Guinea and Bougainville. As in previous years, half the negotiations aimed to resolve active armed conflicts, though with different degrees of violence and clashes between the parties, such as in the Philippines (MILF and NDF), Myanmar, Pakistan and Thailand (south), while the other half dealt with domestic and interstate socio-political crises, as was the case of DPR Korea-Republic of Korea and DPR Korea-USA, India (Assam and Nagaland) and Papua New Guinea (Bougainville).

The respective governments were **active in all the different negotiating processes** and armed opposition groups participated in all those that involved armed conflicts. Thus, the governments of Pakistan, the Philippines, Myanmar and Thailand held talks in different formats with armed groups of different kinds. Although some of the negotiations took place directly between the insurgent groups and the governments involved in each conflict, as was the case between the Pakistani government and the TTP, the Indian government and the NSCN-IM and the Thai government and the BRN, in other scenarios the talks took place

through political organisations linked to and acting on behalf of the insurgents, as in the Philippines, where Manila was negotiating with the National Democratic Front (NDF) representing the Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed wing, the NPA.

In other contexts, the negotiations were conducted solely by governments, as occurred in the inter-state negotiations that took place between the governments of North Korea and South Korea, as well as between North Korea and the US. In other contexts, the negotiations took place between central and regional governments, like those between the government of the Philippines and the regional Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and those between the government of Papua New Guinea and the Autonomous Bougainville Government. Although Nagaland was not a negotiating actor, the state government was involved in promoting the process and different political and parliamentary actors also played an important role in promoting a negotiated solution to the conflict. Thus, decentralised government actors played an important role in several of the negotiating processes in Asia, in line with the characteristics of the conflicts to resolve. Issues related to autonomy, self-determination, independence, land use and recognition of the identity of different national minorities were some of the central lines of dispute in many conflicts in the region, such as in India (Assam and Nagaland), the Philippines (MILF), Myanmar, Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) and Thailand (south), hence the importance of the participation of political actors from different administrative levels.

Third parties played a smaller role in peace processes in Asia than in other regions and 40% of the negotiations did not receive support from external actors. This was the case in the Indian states of Assam and Nagaland, where dialogue took place directly between armed groups and the government, and in interstate negotiations between the two Koreas and between North Korea and the US. In addition, the negotiations that did receive external support were also characterised by a smaller presence of third parties in different roles, since in most cases there were only one or two actors facilitating the dialogue. This was the case in the negotiations between the Philippines and the NDF, which were supported by Norway; between the Pakistani government and the TTP, facilitated by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; between the government of Papua New Guinea and the Autonomous Bougainville Government, supported by the United Nations; and between the Thai government and the armed opposition group BRN, facilitated by Malaysia. This was also the case in Myanmar, where China tried to promote negotiations between the government and different ethnic armed groups and ASEAN maintained contact with the military junta to resolve the political crisis affecting the country since the 2021 coup. The only case in which third-party support consisted of a network of different actors and facilitators was in the implementation of the peace agreement signed between the Philippine government and the armed group MILF. In this case, the actors involved in the current phase of implementing the agreement were organised through different teams for coordinating supervision and support, such as the Third Party Monitoring Team, in charge of overseeing the implementation of the agreements signed between the MILF and the Philippine government; the International Decommissioning Body, made up of Turkey, Norway, Brunei and local staff from the Philippines to supervise the demobilisation of 40,000 former MILF combatants; and, finally, though with a less prominent role in the implementation phase of the peace agreement, the International Contact Group, made up of Japan, the United Kingdom, Turkey and Saudi Arabia and four international NGOs (Muhammadiyah, the Asia Foundation, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and Conciliation Resources).

International and regional organisations played a smaller role in facilitating peace processes in Asia than in other regions, where organisations such as the United Nations played a fundamental facilitating role. In Asia, ASEAN played a prominent role in finding a solution to the political crisis in Myanmar after the 2021 coup, though unsuccessfully for now. The United Nations also played a role in facilitating the dialogue between the government of Papua New Guinea and the Autonomous Bougainville Government. It also supported different initiatives related to the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda, such as in the implementation of the peace agreement in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, with a reintegration

programme for female MILF fighters. The end of the peace process in Afghanistan shrank the role of international organisations in promoting peacebuilding in the region, since Afghanistan had been the focus of many international efforts and interventions in the area due to the foreign military presence and the prominent role played by the United Nations and the EU.

Though several of the peace processes in Asia that had been stagnant in previous years were reactivated during the year, others deteriorated, leading to deadlock or interruption of the talks between the negotiating actors. This was true of the negotiations between the Taliban armed group TTP and the Pakistani government, where the dialogue facilitated by the Taliban government of Afghanistan ended with the TTP's withdrawal and an escalation of violence. In Papua New Guinea, the deterioration in relations between the negotiators led to the postponement of the process, though important progress had been made early in the year, such as an agreement regarding the completion of the referendum and the implementation of constitutional amendments. The reactivation of the negotiations in Nagaland did not yield any significant progress, and for yet another year they were subject to impasse and a lack of agreement

Third parties played a smaller role in peace processes in Asia than in other regions

between the parties on crucial and more complex issues. Relations between the two Koreas deteriorated significantly after the change of government in South Korea, which prevented any kind of headway in the dialogue. No progress was even made on the reunions of families separated by the 1950 Korean War, which had been a point of rapprochement at earlier times in the process. In Myanmar, no significant progress was made in the negotiations between the Burmese government and some insurgent groups or in ASEAN's contact with the military junta, and the implementation of the five-point agreement to resolve the crisis remained at a standstill. One positive development was the agreement signed between the Indian government and eight Adivasi armed groups from the state of Assam requiring their demobilisation, with political trade-offs and recognition of the rights of the Adivasi population. Significant progress was also made in the peace process in Thailand, despite the ongoing violence.

Little significant headway was made in the application of the **gender, peace and security agenda** and in women's participation in peace processes, as women continued to be excluded from most peace negotiations. This was the case of the negotiations in Assam and Nagaland in India, in Pakistan, between the two Koreas, between the NDF and the Philippine government, in Myanmar and in Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), where female involvement was only found in some negotiation-related areas. The gender, peace and security agenda continued to be considered a key issue in most peace negotiations, despite women's organisations' mobilisation and advocacy efforts in different parts of Asia. However, some significant progress was made in some of the cases

analysed. This was the case in the peace negotiations in Thailand (south), where the government appointed a woman as special representative in the negotiations with the BRN, with a mandate to promote the role of women in the process. In the negotiations to implement the peace agreement reached between the government of the Philippines and the MILF, considered one of the processes where the gender perspective has been included the most, there were higher levels of female participation in different areas, such as in Parliament, though shortcomings persisted, as seen in the low number of female candidates in the May elections. Thus, Asia remained the scene of major challenges in implementing the gender, peace and security agenda as part of peace negotiations.

4.2. Case study analysis

East Asia

DPR Korea – Republic of Korea	
Negotiating actors	North Korea, South Korea
Third parties	--
Relevant agreements	Panmunjom Declaration (April 2018)

Summary:

Although the high points of the negotiations between North Korea and South Korea were the presidential summits held in the 21st century (2000, 2007 and 2018), there have been attempts at rapprochement to move forward on the path of reunification and cooperation since the 1970s. Thus, in 1972, both countries signed the North-South Korea Joint Statement, outlining some measures for reunification and reducing the arms race, among other issues. In late 1991, both countries signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation; a few weeks later, they signed the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. The former, which was achieved after five rounds of negotiations begun in September 1990 between the prime ministers of both countries, was considered a historic agreement and a turning point in the relationship between both countries by much of the international community, as it included commitments to mutual non-aggression, respect for the political and economic systems of each country, peaceful conflict resolution, economic cooperation and the promotion of measures for the reunification of both countries. However, the measures included in the agreement were not fully implemented, partly because of the tensions generated by the North Korean weapons programme. In 1994, former US President Jimmy Carter exercised his good offices between the leaders of both countries to contain the crisis generated by the progress made in the programme and Pyongyang's decision not to allow inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and to abandon the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the 21st century, under a policy of rapprochement with North Korea (called the Sun Policy) promoted by Kim Dae-jun and continued by his successor, Roh Moon-hyun, in 2000 and 2007 Pyongyang hosted the first two presidential summits since the end of the Korean War, in which both countries again pledged to boost cooperation to move towards greater stability and the eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula.

Amidst increased military tensions on the Korean peninsula, not only were there no meetings or negotiations between the governments of North and South Korea in 2022, but relations between them deteriorated notably after new South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol took office in May. In the first half of the year, South Korean President Moon Jae-in called for a resumption of the negotiations between both countries and in late April, shortly before leaving office, he exchanged personal letters with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in which he urged him to establish peaceful and cooperative relations with the next South Korean administration. In August, Yoon Suk-yeol made his policy towards North Korea public, noting that North Korea's denuclearisation is a prerequisite for advancing on the path to peace and prosperity in the region and proposing a large-scale economic aid plan if Pyongyang takes determined and verifiable steps towards its denuclearisation. Yoon Suk-yeol also announced his intention to strengthen the country's military capabilities, reserving the possibility of even carrying out pre-emptive strikes in the face of the threats and risks posed by North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programme. Shortly after he made these statements, Kim Yo-jong, a senior government official and sister of Kim Jong-un, categorically rejected Yoon Suk-yeol's inter-Korean cooperation plans, describing them as a copy of those that had already been carried out by the administrations of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye between 2008 and 2013 and saying that economic aid packages cannot be used as barter for her country's arms programme. Kim Yo-jong added that her government did not intend to meet in person with the new South Korean president during his term. Previously, in July, South Korean Unification Minister Kwon Young-se had announced his intention to promote inter-Korean relations based on respect for all the agreements that both countries have signed in recent decades and declared that any possible dialogue or summit between them should include the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, since this was important enough for building trust between the two countries to be included in the bilateral dialogue and not to be left solely to the international community. Shortly after these statements were made on the 50th anniversary of the first official agreement signed between the two countries, the South-North Joint Communiqué of 1972, North Korean government-owned media outlets said that one of the reasons for the political and military tension between both countries is South Korea's lack of compliance with and implementation of it. In the South-North Joint Communiqué, which establishes the guiding principles of the Korean reunification process, both parties agree to promote reunification without interference from foreign powers, without resorting to the use of force and building national unity as one people that transcends ideologies and systems.

Despite the impasse in the dialogue, in early September the South Korean government officially proposed the start of talks to hold new gatherings of families separated by the Korean War (1950-53). Since 1988, more than

133,000 people have registered to participate in these reunions, but currently only about 44,000 of them are alive and 67% of these are over 80 years of age. Since the end of the war, 21 meetings have been held, the last of which was in 2018, amidst rapprochement between the two countries and a sustained dialogue between the governments of North Korea and the US. Although these family gatherings had normally been facilitated by the Red Cross, on this last occasion, the South Korean Ministry for Unification proposed them directly to the North Korean government and channelled them through the joint liaison office, which some media outlets interpreted it as a political gesture by Seoul aimed at starting direct bilateral talks between both countries. The North Korean government did not respond to the proposal. In late September, Yoon Suk-yeol spoke at the UN General Assembly. It was the first time that a South Korean president's speech made no mention of North Korea.

Not only were there no meetings or negotiations between the governments of North and South Korea in 2022, but relations between them deteriorated notably after new South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol took office

South Asia

India (Assam)	
Negotiating actors	Government, ULFA-PTF, ULFA-I; AANLA, AANLA (FG), BCF, BCF (BT), STF, ACMA, ACMA (FG) and APA
Third parties	--
Relevant agreements	--
Summary: The Indian state of Assam has been the focal point of several conflicts and socio-political crises between the Indian government and different armed groups that have demanded Assamese independence or greater recognition for the political and cultural rights of different ethnic minorities. The demographic transformations in the state after the partition of the Indian subcontinent, with the arrival of two million people from Bangladesh, are at the origin of the demands of the population of Assamese ethnic origin for recognition of their cultural, civil and social rights and the creation of an independent state. Violence escalated several times during the 1980s and 1990s and there were failed attempts at negotiations. In 2005, a peace process began with the armed group United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), which was interrupted in 2006, giving rise to a new escalation of the conflict. Since 2011, there has been a significant decrease in violence in the state and many armed groups have handed over their weapons or started talks with the government, including the main insurgent organisation in the state, ULFA, which split as a result of the negotiations since one faction was against them.	

In September, the Indian government signed a peace agreement with eight Adivasi armed groups operating in the state of Assam, in the northeastern region of the country. The groups that signed it were the All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA), AANLA (FG), Birs Commando Force (BCF), BCF (BT), Santhal Tiger Force, Adivasi Cobra Militant of Assam (ACMA), ACMA

(FG) and Adivasi People's Army (APA), with which a ceasefire agreement had been in force since 2016. It was a tripartite peace agreement between the central government of India, the government of the state of Assam and the armed groups, and the signing ceremony was attended by Interior Minister Amit Shah and Assam's Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma. The eight armed groups had a total of 1,182 insurgents. The agreement involves the demobilisation of the combatants and their acceptance of current Indian legislation. The Indian government pledged to protect and preserve the social, cultural, linguistic and ethnic identity of the Adivasi groups; to ensure the development of tea plantations in the Adivasi villages of Assam; to establish an Adivasi welfare and development council; to rehabilitate armed combatants and guarantee the welfare of tea plantation workers; and to provide a special development package worth one billion rupees to improve infrastructure in Adivasi villages. The Minister of the Interior framed the agreement as a government plan to ensure that no group that the government considered extremist would remain active by 2025 and to resolve all territorial disputes between the different states of northeast India by 2024. The insurgents have lived in "designated camps" (cantonment centres) since the ceasefire was signed. In December, around 1,200 members of the Bru tribal armed groups Bru Revolutionary Army of Union (BRAU) and United Democratic Liberation Front of Barak Valley (UDLF-BV) also handed in their weapons. Having started their negotiations in 2017, the Bru armed groups presented their demands for the creation of an autonomous economic council, seeking full Scheduled Tribe (Plain) status in the state and a land deal for the Bru community of Assam.

India (Nagaland)	
Negotiating actors	Government, NSCN-IM, NNPG: GPRN/ NSCN (Kitovi Zhimomi), NNC, FGN, NSCN(R), NPGN (Non-Accord) and NNC/ GDRN/NA, ZUF
Third parties	--
Relevant agreements	Framework agreement (2015)
Summary: The Indian state of Nagaland has suffered armed conflict and a socio-political crisis since the 1950s as a result of much of the Naga population's unfulfilled aspiration to win independence and create a sovereign state. There have been different attempts at negotiation since the 1960s, but it was not until 1997 that a ceasefire agreement was reached with the NSCN-IM group, one of the main actors in the conflict. Although the agreement has remained in force to date, the negotiations have not made significant progress on the central issues. In 2012, however, the peace process received a boost from greater involvement from the Naga government and state MPs. Alongside the negotiations	

with the NSCN-IM, in 2001 the government reached another ceasefire agreement with the NSCN-K insurgent organisation. However, these negotiations have also failed to make significant progress. In 2015, the Government and the NSCN-IM reached a framework pre-agreement, considered a preamble to the final resolution of the conflict. However, that same year, the ceasefire agreement with the NSCN-K was broken, and violent clashes began again.

The peace negotiations between the NSCN-IM and the Indian government resumed in April after several months on pause, following the episode of violence that took place in Nagaland in late 2021 that shut down the talks.¹ However, at the end of the year, not enough progress had been made in achieving a signed definitive agreement. The lead negotiator for the Indian central government, A. K. Mishra, travelled to Nagaland and met with representatives of the armed group for the first time, including NSCN-IM Secretary General Thuingaleng Muivah at his headquarters in Camp Hebron. This location was chosen for the meeting due to Muivah's health. An octogenarian, he had been hospitalised in the weeks running up to the meeting. Mishra also met with the state government's central committee for the Naga political issue, headed by Nagaland Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio and representatives of Naga civil society. During his visit to the state, Mishra and three armed groups (NSCN-NK, NSCN-R and NSCN-KK) also agreed to extend the ceasefire agreement for three months. In May, a delegation of 10 NSCN-IM representatives travelled to New Delhi to continue the negotiations and held several meetings with the central government, which reportedly repeated the urgency of reaching a solution and reaffirmed its position that it would not accept a Naga flag or a Naga Constitution. Also in May, the Indian government held meetings with other Naga stakeholders, such as representatives of the NNPG group and the government of Nagaland. Various sources indicated that after the meetings and government's proposals, the NSCN-IM could have ended its participation in the negotiations. In July, the Naga government, made up of all parties with parliamentary representation, asked the Indian government to invite the NSCN-IM back to New Delhi to continue discussions on the government's proposal. The Nagaland chief minister stressed the entire Naga legislature's commitment to the peace process. In August, after several months of uncertainty, the NSCN-IM said it had decided to continue validating the framework agreement reached in 2015, while standing firm in its demand for a Naga flag and a Naga Constitution. Different meetings were held in the following months, but they failed to resolve the situation completely and the discussions around the issue of the Naga flag and Constitution, the main obstacles to signing a final agreement, did not lead to any agreement between the parties. However, the NSCN-IM and the NNPG reached an agreement to

form the "Council of Naga Relations and Cooperation", thereby overcoming divisions between the different Naga insurgencies. Though different analysts pointed out that this rapprochement did increase the chances of an agreement, by the end of the year no significant results had been achieved in this regard.

Gender, peace and security

Women remained excluded from the peace process despite the outstanding peacebuilding work that civil society organisations have done in Nagaland. The organisation Naga Mother Association, which has played a role of rapprochement between the parties in conflict at different times during the negotiations, repeated its call on the Indian government to revoke the anti-terrorist Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), denouncing the human rights violations that have been committed against the Naga population by the security forces under the protection of this legislation.

Pakistan	
Negotiating actors	Government, TTP
Third parties	Afghanistan
Relevant agreements	--

Summary:

In recent years, the Pakistani government and the Taliban armed opposition group Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have made several attempts to negotiate an end to the armed conflict between them since 2007, stemming from the armed conflict in Afghanistan between the Taliban and the US-led international coalition. In 2013 and 2014, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif began a process of rapprochement with the Pakistani Taliban insurgency, but an attack on a school in Peshawar, which killed 145 people, put an end to the negotiations. After the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, the new Afghan regime promoted fresh rapprochement between the Pakistani government and the TTP, leading to a temporary ceasefire in 2021 and the start of negotiations in 2022.

The Pakistani government and the Taliban armed group TTP held talks for several months, but the TTP withdrew from them in late November. Following the month-long ceasefire that the Pakistani Taliban announced in 2021, which ultimately failed without negotiations, the Taliban armed group announced another new ceasefire in May. Initially it was a 10-day truce to mark the Eid religious festival that was extended until 30 May. However, the armed group ended up announcing an indefinite ceasefire. Also in May, the Taliban government of Afghanistan declared through its spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, that it was mediating in talks in Kabul between the Pakistani Taliban insurgency and Pakistani political

1. See the summary on Nagaland in Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Peace Talks in Focus 2021: Report on Trends and Scenarios*, Barcelona: Icaria, 2022.

and military representatives. After the announcement of the indefinite nature of the ceasefire, the Pakistani government officially recognised its participation in the negotiations with the Taliban through statements by Information Minister Marriyum Aurangzeb, who indicated that they had begun in 2021. After the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, there had been an uptick in Taliban violence in Pakistan, which had further strained relations between Kabul and Islamabad. The ceasefire announcement was reportedly the result of several weeks of secret talks in Kabul between the TTP and representatives of the Pakistan Armed Forces, which were later followed by further public talks between the TTP and Pakistani tribal leaders. The release of dozens of TTP members imprisoned in Pakistan was also announced, including commanders Muslim Khan and Mehmood Khan. The Pakistani military negotiators were led by Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, the former head of the Pakistani secret services (ISI). The TTP presented several demands for the negotiating agenda: a substantial reduction of the military presence in the former tribal areas of the country and a reversal of the merger of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas with the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which had been enacted via a constitutional amendment in 2018. Faiz Hameed would have offered the Taliban a safe return to Pakistan in exchange for a long-term ceasefire that could lead to the dismantling of the armed group and its political integration. The Pakistani government considered the demand for the FATA to regain their administrative status prior to the 2018 merger inadmissible, so on 26 July a delegation of religious leaders met with TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud in Kabul, but they were unable to convince him to give up the demand. Finally, on 28 November, the TTP announced that it was abandoning the ceasefire and urged its members to carry out attacks in Pakistan. The TTP said it was breaking the ceasefire due to the rise in military operations by the Pakistani Armed Forces against the insurgent group in the northwestern tribal areas and elsewhere in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. On 30 November, an attack took place against the police who were protecting a polio vaccination health team in Balochistan. The announcement that the ceasefire agreement was broken came one day before Asim Munir took over as the new head of the Pakistani Armed Forces.

Gender, peace and security

While the negotiations between the Pakistani government and the TTP remained active, women did not play an active role in any of the negotiating delegations and no issues related to the rights of women or the LGBTQIA+ population had been included in the negotiating agenda. However, after the Afghan-facilitated process broke down, Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar travelled to Kabul to meet her Afghan counterpart in a gesture that was seen as a

The government of Pakistan and the Taliban armed group TTP began a negotiating process that fell apart in November

challenge issued by the Pakistani government against the Afghan Taliban.

South-east Asia and Oceania

Philippines (MILF)	
Negotiating actors	Government, MILF, Interim Government of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
Third parties	Malaysia, Third-Party Monitoring Team, International Monitoring Team, Independent Decommissioning Body
Relevant agreements	Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities (1997), Agreement on Peace between the Government and the MILF (2001), Mutual Cessation of Hostilities (2003), Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2012), Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2014), Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (2018)

Summary:

Peace negotiations between the Government and the MILF, an MNLF splinter group, started in 1997, just months after Fidel Ramos's Administration had signed a peace agreement with the MNLF. Since then, the negotiating process has been interrupted three times (in 2000, 2003 and 2008) by outbreaks of high intensity violence. Despite this, in the over 30 rounds of talks that have taken place since the late 1990s some agreements on security and development have been reached, as well as a ceasefire agreement that has been upheld, for the most part. In October 2012 both parties signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro and in March 2014 the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which plans to replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with a new public body (called Bangsamoro) with a larger territorial scope and broader self-government competences. Since 2014, the peace process has been focused on the drafting and congressional approval of the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which incorporates the main contents of the two aforementioned peace agreements and was approved by Congress in 2018. Following its ratification in a plebiscite in early 2019, the peace process has hinged on the implementation of the peace agreements, the institutional development of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (governed temporarily by the leader of the MILF) and the disarmament of the MILF.

Even though there was a major confrontation between the Philippine Armed Forces and a MILF battalion at the end of 2022, both parties held regular and periodic meetings throughout the year and significant progress was made in implementing the 2014 peace agreement. In fact, in December the government declared that the successful development of the peace process in Mindanao is the main asset that Manila

intends to show to the international community in order to secure a seat on the UN Security Council in 2027. These statements regarding the implementation of the 2014 peace agreement and the subsequent Bangsamoro

Organic Law that institutionalised the main commitments of the agreement are in line with the latest report issued by the Third-Party Monitoring Team (TPMT), the body in charge of evaluating and advising on the progress of the peace process between the Philippine government and the MILF. Issued in March, the report covers the period between November 2020 and January 2022. It confirms constant and positive progress in the peace process in the region throughout the period and especially stresses the validity of the ceasefire and the functioning of the mechanisms supervising it, the institutional development of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) through the activity of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), the approval of legislation essential to its operation, regular and effective interaction between the Philippine government and the Bangsamoro government through the Intergovernmental Relations Body (IGRB), the start of the third phase of the demobilisation of MILF combatants in November 2021, progress in granting amnesty to MILF members and the set-up of the Bangsamoro Normalisation Trust Fund. However, the TPMT pointed out that the implementation of the peace process was slowed down by the COVID-19 pandemic and the discussion on extending the transition period beyond the originally scheduled date of June 2022. The TPMT's input largely coincides with the assessments of the Peace Implementing Panels of the government and the MILF, which issued a joint statement in the middle of the year praising the development of the peace process and announcing several agreements, as well as the opinion of the Intergovernmental Relations Body (IGRB), the main bilateral negotiating mechanism between Manila and the BARMM government, which has met regularly after since its establishment in 2019. In June, the IGRB submitted its second monitoring report on the negotiations between both administrations (covering the period between December 2019 and December 2021), noting that both governments' cooperation is very effective for establishing peace in Mindanao.

During 2022, the process to implement the peace agreement made substantial progress both politically and institutionally, as well as in terms of normalisation, which includes the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former MILF combatants, the transformation of the six MILF camps into peaceful and productive areas, amnesty for MILF combatants, the withdrawal and redeployment of the Philippine Armed Forces in the region, the dismantling of armed groups and private militias and other issues. Regarding the section of the 2014 peace agreement on normalisation, in January the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives approved three concurrent resolutions regulating amnesty for former MILF and MNLF combatants, by which they can be pardoned only for punishable crimes committed for political reasons and beliefs. However, at the end of the year, both the MILF and the TPMT

The meeting held in early September between Nur Misuari and Ebrahim Murad was of great historical significance, as it was the first meeting in more than two decades between the leaders of the MNLF and the MILF

regretted that the National Amnesty Commission had not yet been set up, which is tasked with processing amnesty requests from former Moro and Communist rebels and determining whether the applicants have a right to amnesty by virtue of Proclamations 1090, 1091, 1092 and 1093, issued by President Duterte in February 2021. In October, the MILF Peace Implementing Panel submitted 524 amnesty requests for former MILF combatants and MILF leader Mohagher Iqbal urged Manila to speed up its processing of them, since they are essential to the reconciliation process in the areas affected by the armed conflict. The second key aspect of normalisation was the resumption of the third phase of the demobilisation of 40,000 former MILF combatants. From the start of the process in 2015 until the resumption of its third phase in October 2022, 19,345 MILF combatants had demobilised. The third phase of the process began in November 2021, but its continuation was hampered by the spread of COVID-19. According to the peace agreement,

14,000 combatants were supposed to demobilise during the third phase, of which 7,200 had done so by October 2022, with another 5,500 combatants pending demobilisation before the end of the year. This process is supervised by the International Decommissioning Body, made up of the governments of Turkey, Norway and Brunei Darussalam and by local staff appointed by Manila and the MILF. Although the Philippine government indicates that the implementation schedule for the agreement is following the expected pace, the MILF had repeatedly criticised the slowness and paralysis of

the process throughout 2022. Finally, in June the EU, the UNDP and the Office of the Presidential Advisor on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity (OPAPRU) launched a two-year project to transform the six MILF camps into peaceful and productive communities by boosting local capacities and developing sustainable livelihoods through support for agricultural companies, alternative professional training programmes and microcredit to diversify productive activity.

The most important political event of the year related to the peace agreement was undoubtedly the inauguration in August of the 80 people that make up the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), whose original mandate (2019-2022) was extended for another three years (until 2025) in late 2021 by President Duterte, since the spread of COVID-19 had slowed down the BTA's institutional development, legislative activity and government action. Since its establishment, the BTA has been headed by MILF leader Ebrahim Mura. According to the peace agreement, the MILF has the power to designate 41 of the 80 members of the BTA, while the central government is responsible for appointing the remaining 39 people. After Manila names its appointees, the BARMM Parliament will have 55 of its 80 representatives appointed by the historical insurgent

groups in Mindanao: 41 from the MILF (41) and 14 from the two main factions of the MNLF: one led by the founder of the group, Nur Misuari (7) and one led by Muslimin Sema and Yusoph Jikiri. Although the Sema and Jikiri factions had already directly participated in the peace process between the government and the MILF (by joining the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, for example), the participation of Misuari's MNLF faction in the Parliamentary Assembly of the BARMM (where two of his sons will have a seat) implies the de facto reconciliation or convergence of the two negotiating processes that the government maintained with the MILF and the MNLF. Thus far, Nur Misuari had decided to hold direct and parallel negotiations with the government on the full implementation of the peace agreement that Manila and the MNLF signed in 1996, refusing to participate in any forum or decision-making mechanism stemming from the 2014 peace agreement between Manila and the MILF and even rejecting its legitimacy. Thus, the meeting held in early September between Nur Misuari and Ebrahim Murad was of great historical significance, as it was the first meeting in more than two decades between the leaders of the MNLF and the MILF. The unity between the MILF and the MNLF also became official in the formation of the new BARMM government, which is led by Ebrahim Murad and made up of prominent historical figures from the MNLF, such as Muslimin Sema and the son of Yusoph Jikiri. During the inaugural session of the BTA legislature, new Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos pledged to continue supporting the peace process and urged the Bangsamoro Parliament to pass the necessary legislation for the BARMM to function properly, noting that there will be further extensions of the BTA transitional period beyond May 2025, the date when the first regional elections in the BARMM should take place.

Gender, peace and security

The legislature of the new BTA Parliament was inaugurated in September. It included 80 members, 41 appointed by the MILF and 39 by the central government. In this term (2022-2025), 16 of the 80 MPs are women, a higher number than in the previous Parliament (2019-2022). However, in the elections held in May, women accounted for only 20% of the candidates running for executive or legislative office in Mindanao's 27 provinces and 33 cities. In addition, most of these women are the wives, daughters or sisters of public office holders, or of those who are finishing their third and last term. In the previous term (2019-2022) women held 15% of Mindanao's 27 governorates and 15% of its district seats and accounted for 33% of its mayors. According to the World Economic Forum's *Global Gender Gap Report 2021*, the Philippines remains the best-performing country in Asia in terms of gender equality, ranking 17th out of 156 countries. In December, the United Nations announced the completion of a civil reintegration training and empowerment programme for 2,000 ex-combatants of

the MILF's Bangsamoro Islamic Women Auxiliary Brigade (BIWAB). The programme, which was implemented over the course of two years by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UN Women, with the support of the United Nations Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund, also promoted the establishment of the Peace, Security and Reconciliation Office under the Office of the Chief Minister of the BARMM to strengthen security and conflict mediation during the transition, strengthen the capacities of regional and local institutions to deal with potential conflicts during the BARMM transition period and work together with the Bangsamoro Women Commission to implement the Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.

Philippines (NDF)	
Negotiating actors	Government, NDF (umbrella organisation of various communist organisations, including the Communist Party of the Philippines, which is the political wing of the NPA)
Third parties	Norway
Relevant agreements	The Hague Joint Declaration (1992), Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (1995), Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (1998)

Summary:

Negotiations between the Government and the NDF began in 1986, after the fall of Ferdinand Marcos' dictatorship. Since then, many rounds of negotiations have taken place, but agreement has only been reached on one of the four items listed in the substantive negotiation agenda of The Hague Joint Declaration of 1992, namely human rights and international humanitarian law (an agreement was signed in 1998). No agreement has been reached on the other three items: socio-economic reforms; political and constitutional reforms; and cessation of hostilities and disposition of armed forces. Since 2004, the Government of Norway has been acting as a facilitator between the Government and the NDF, the political organisation that represents the Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed wing (the NPA) in the peace talks. In addition to the significant differences that exist between the Government and the NDF with regard to which socio-economic and political model is best for the Philippines, one of the issues that has generated the greatest controversy between the parties in recent years is that of the security and immunity guarantees for the NDF members involved in the peace negotiations.

As in previous years, there were no formal talks between the Philippine government and the National Democratic Front (NDF) in 2022, though both the outgoing administration of Rodrigo Duterte and the incoming administration of Ferdinand Marcos continued to conduct direct local negotiations with units of the armed group known as the New People's Army (NPA). The first half of the year was marked by the Duterte government's categorical refusal to establish any type of contact with the NDF and by the presidential election in May, in which none of the candidates openly called for resuming the negotiating process with the NDF, which in recent

decades has negotiated on behalf of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the NPA. In February, the founder of the CPP and the NPA, Jose Maria Sison, had indicated that negotiations could resume after the election if certain conditions were met, such as the repeal of the Anti-Terrorism Law (enacted in 2020), the dissolution of the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) and the removal of the NPA, the CPP and the NDF from Manila's list of terrorist organisations. In this regard, in late February the Anti-Terrorism Council designated 16 organisations that supposedly form part of the CPP and the NDF as terrorist organisations. After Ferdinand Marcos won the presidential election, he did not mention resuming talks with the NDF in his inaugural speech.

Along the same lines, after the first meeting of the NTF-ELCAC under the new government in July, both National Security Advisor Clarita Carlos and Presidential Advisor on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity Carlito G. Gálvez said that the NTF-ELCAC had advised Ferdinand Marcos not to resume negotiations with the NDF, though they made it clear that the final decision on this issue depends on the new president. They also indicated that the government's intention is to continue with the approach of local or localised peace negotiations, since it is working and enabling the pacification of the country. To corroborate this statement, the NTF-ELCAC cited data from the Department of National Defence according to which at least 26,414 NPA combatants (which the government officially calls the Communist Terrorist Group) had surrendered or turned themselves in since May. According to official data, the number of NPA fighters is currently slightly over 2,000 and 75% of the group's 89 fronts have been neutralised. The NTF-ELCAC also recommended that the government grant amnesty to NPA combatants (but not to fighters of other Communist armed groups). According to Gálvez, this could benefit between 8,000 and 10,000 NPA combatants, although it would depend on the Senate's guidelines if it came to pass. In early 2022, Karapatan, one of the most important human rights networks in the country, declared that since the NTF-ELCAC was created, 3,908 civilians have been forced to surrender, while nearly another 4,000 people have been detained on politically motivated charges, many of them publicly labelled Communist sympathisers, NPA members, terrorists or all of the above.

Both the NDF and the CPP firmly opposed the localised peace negotiations, considering them a counter-insurgency strategy aimed at dividing the revolutionary movement, promoting psychological warfare, obtaining intelligence information and exercising greater control over people, relatives or communities with ties to the insurgent group. The CPP also claimed that this approach is a smoke screen to divert attention away from large-scale combat operations and promotes corruption among

the military, public administrations and municipalities participating in such programmes. Similarly, the NDF and CPP criticised the proposed amnesty and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes as a way to demobilise and co-opt NPA fighters. Despite their complaints, Jose Maria Sison once again declared that he was open to resuming negotiations in late June if the government would simply ratify the agreements signed by both parties since 1992, when the Hague Declaration was adopted as the negotiating framework. Throughout the year, civil society organisations staged demonstrations and actions to raise social awareness and political advocacy in support of resuming formal negotiations between the government and the NDF, arguing that it is the only format that can address the

social and political issues that originally gave rise to the NPA. The Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform (PEPP), a network of five religious federations, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), the National Council of Churches of the Philippines (NCCP), the Philippine Council of Evangelical Churches (PCEC), the Conference of Major Superiors of the Philippines, and the Ecumenical Bishops' Forum (EBF) played a special role in these demonstrations. Jose Maria Sison died in mid-December at the age of 83, in Utrecht. Sison lived in exile in Europe after being released after the fall of Ferdinand Marcos' dictatorship in the mid-1980s, and in recent years he had worked as a consultant for the NDF, although both the media and the government thought that he was still having a decisive impact on formulating the political, military and negotiating strategy of the Communist movement.

In mid-December, the founder of the CPP and the NPA, Jose Maria Sison, died at the age of 83. He had lived in exile in Europe following his release after the fall of Ferdinand Marcos' dictatorship in the mid-1980s

Myanmar	
Negotiating actors	Government, armed signatory groups of the cease fire agreement (NCA): DKBA, RCSS/SSA-South, CNF, KNU,KNLAPC, ALP, PNLO, ABSDF, NMSP and LDU; armed groups not part of the: UWSP, NDAA, SSPP/SSA-N, KNPP, NSCN-K, KIA, AA, TNLA, MNDAA
Third parties	China, ASEAN
Relevant agreements	Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (October 2015)
Summary: Since the armed conflict between the Armed Forces of Myanmar and ethnic-based insurgent groups began in 1948, several negotiations have take place in an attempt to end the violence. Beginning in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, many armed groups have reached ceasefire agreements with the Burmese Government. Although definitive peace agreements were never reached, violence did decrease significantly as a result of these pacts. In 2011 there was a change in the Administration as a result of the 2010 elections and the new Government made several overtures to the armed insurgency that brought about the start of peace negotiations and the signing of agreements	

with most of the armed groups operating in different parts of the country. By mid-2012 the Government had signed a ceasefire agreement with 12 insurgent organizations. In 2013, talks began with different insurgent groups aimed at reaching a nationwide ceasefire agreement and promoting political talks. In 2015, the government and eight armed opposition groups signed a ceasefire agreement (NCA), taking the first steps towards political dialogue. In 2016, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi convened the Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong, which brought the government together with the armed opposition groups, beginning a new phase in the peace process. The conference has been convened several times in subsequent years.

The military regime summoned armed insurgent organisations to talks that began in May. Seven of the groups that had signed the 2015 ceasefire agreement participated in these talks: the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army (RCSS/SSA), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the KNU/KNLA Peace Council, New Mon State Party (NMSP), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Pa-Oh National Liberation Organisation (PNLO) and Lahu Democratic Union (LDU). Three armed groups that had not signed the ceasefire agreement also participated in the talks: the United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA-Mongla) and Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP). The talks took the form of bilateral meetings between the top leader of the military junta, Min Aung Hlaing, and representatives of the armed groups. They were criticised by civil society organisations and other armed groups, which claimed that they only helped to legitimise the military regime, but not to solve the armed conflict rocking the country. The armed groups insisted on their demands for self-government and the Burmese government offered to let them join the official security forces. In December, seven armed groups that signed the ceasefire agreement demanded to hold a new meeting with the chairman of the government's National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC), Lieutenant General Yar Pyae, but the government rejected any possibility of holding this meeting, arguing that the crises in the country prevented it. The armed groups hoped to hold a low-profile meeting in Chiang Mai (Thailand) involving representatives of both parties, followed by a round of meetings in the Shan or Mon states. The groups that had requested the meeting were the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), New Mon State Party, Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council (KPC), Arakan Liberation Party, Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, Pa-O National Liberation Organisation (PNLO) and Lahu Democratic Union. Some analysts described most of these groups as irrelevant (with the exception of the RCSS) and said that the armed organisations' call for this meeting could be an attempt at survival. Other groups that signed the agreement, such as the KNU, indicated that they had no intention of meeting with the regime and that they would continue to battle with it.

Meanwhile, the diplomatic efforts exerted by the regional organisation ASEAN to seek a political solution to the

country's crisis continued, but no progress was made in implementing the 2021 five-point agreement to resolve the crisis: the immediate cessation of the violence in the country, dialogue between all parties, the appointment of a special envoy, ASEAN humanitarian assistance and a visit by the special envoy to Myanmar to meet with all parties. In November, ASEAN reaffirmed the five-point agreement and tasked foreign ministers with developing a concrete implementation plan while upholding a ban on members of Myanmar's military government from participating in ASEAN summits. In December, Thailand held a meeting bringing together foreign ministers from ASEAN member states Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, as well as government representatives from Myanmar. However, representatives of the member states that are most critical of the Burmese military government, notably Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore, did not attend. No concrete progress was made at the meeting, which addressed implementation of the five-point agreement and the country's humanitarian situation.

Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)

Negotiating actors	Government of Papua New Guinea, government of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville
Third parties	United Nations
Relevant agreements	Bougainville Peace Agreement (2001)

Summary:

The armed conflict between the government of Papua New Guinea and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (1988-1998), which some sources consider to have been the deadliest in Oceania since the Second World War, ended with a cessation of hostilities in 1998 and the signing of a peace agreement in 2001 in Arawa (the largest city in Bougainville). Among other matters, the agreement provided for the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (ARB), the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants and the holding of a non-binding independence referendum within a maximum period of 15 years after the election of the first ARB government, which finally took place in 2005. After several years of negotiations between the national and regional governments, in 2018 the Agreement's Joint Supervisory Body created the Post-Referendum Planning Working Group and former Irish President Bertie Ahern was elected chair of the Bougainville Referendum Commission, making him responsible for preparing the census and other logistical preparations for the referendum. After several delays, the referendum was finally held between 23 November and 7 December 2019, with a binary question in which voters could choose between greater autonomy or independence for the region.

In April, the government of Papua New Guinea and the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) reached an important agreement in the negotiations on the future political status of Bougainville, but relations between the two parties deteriorated during the second half of the year and the talks were even postponed. In early April, Papua New Guinean Prime Minister James Marape and ABG President Ishmael Toroama signed

the Era Kone Covenant on the Finalisation of the Bougainville Referendum, which stipulates that the results of the 2019 referendum and the conclusions and agreements of the consultations and negotiations that the two parties have held since then must be presented to the Parliament of Papua New Guinea before the end of 2023. Moreover, once the Parliament has voted on both governments' proposed political agreement for Bougainville, it should be implemented no earlier than 2025 and no later than 2027. Following its ratification by both governments, the agreement also stipulates that technical teams from both governments would draft the constitutional regulations necessary to move forward on the road map described in the agreement. During the signing of the agreement, Toroama thanked James Marape and the government of Papua New Guinea as a whole for their commitment to the negotiating process. Marape guaranteed that the Era Kone Covenant and the continuation of the negotiating process would be binding on both the Parliament and the government of Papua New Guinea, regardless of who won the upcoming general elections in July. In February, the Autonomous Bougainville Government announced the creation of the Bougainville Constitutional Planning Commission (BCPC), made up of 40 people from various parts of the region and representatives from different social groups, such as women, young people, veterans and members of religious denominations. The BCPC has a mandate to draw up a draft constitution for a possible independent Bougainville, which should foreseeably be ready by the first quarter of 2025. In April, the government transferred its political road map and guiding principles and international standards on constitutional design to the BCPC and called for consultative and participatory processes to begin throughout the Bougainville region to ensure that the new constitution was truly inclusive and democratic.

Despite the signing of the Era Kone Covenant, relations between the two governments deteriorated in the second half of the year to the point that the ABG called for the deferral of the meeting of the Joint Supervisory Body, the main mechanism and negotiating forum between both parties. In August, following his repeat victory in elections marred by violence and accusations of fraud, James Marape declared that the determination of Bougainville's political status affected issues of great political importance such as national sovereignty and the country's borders, so citizens of the entire country should have a say in it. After pointing out that the country's national unity was defined in the 1975 Constitution and that only a constitutional amendment could modify such unity, Marape said that until mid-2023, the government would consult with the public throughout the country on the constitutional implications of the political agreement on Bougainville, which would have to be ratified by the national

Parliament of Papua New Guinea. A few months later, a government representative declared that no political agreement could usurp the power and authority of the Constitution, and that the government's obligation was to protect the Constitution while submitting to it. He also added that a decision as important as the secession of a part of the territory should be voted on and approved by all citizens. Shortly after making these remarks, the Australian defence minister met with James Marape and said that his government would defend and support any decision the government of Papua New Guinea made on Bougainville. He also announced his intention to sign an ambitious security treaty with Papua New Guinea. The Autonomous Bougainville Government and its president, Ishmael Toroama, said that both the 2019 referendum and the implementation of one of its options (the independence of Bougainville) were constitutionally guaranteed and that there is no legal basis whatsoever for the citizens of the entire country to be consulted, since the 2001 peace agreement makes it clear that the governments of Papua New Guinea and Bougainville are the only two parties that must discuss and agree on a proposal on the political status of Bougainville based on the results of the referendum, and that this proposal must be approved by the Parliament of Papua New Guinea. Toroama also criticised Australia's position supporting the national government and regretted that in recent times the Australian government had ignored all demands for cooperation and assistance in all activities promoted by the Bougainville government to prepare for the country's possible independence. Toroama also said that Australia wields its power and influence in the region and the announcement of a security treaty with Papua New Guinea was meant to intimidate the population of Bougainville and shape the decisions of its government. Given these circumstances, in late October the Autonomous Bougainville Government called for the postponement of the meeting of the Joint Supervisory Body, arguing that the government of Papua New Guinea was not showing the political resolve to implement the 2001 peace agreement and was moving away from the spirit and letter of the Era Kone Covenant signed in April.

Gender, peace and security

In April, the Australian National University published an article² on women's participation in the negotiating process between the government of Papua New Guinea and the Autonomous Bougainville Government since the 2019 referendum that verified that the delegations of both parties in the intergovernmental talks and within the Joint Supervisory Body are made up entirely of men. The article points out that the four female MPs in the Bougainville Parliament participate as "observers" in the JSB meetings, together with other diplomats and

2. Kabuni, Michael and Hansen, Ancuta, *Women's Inclusion in the Post-Referendum Consultation Process between Papua New Guinea and Bougainville*, 2022, Canberra, ACT: Dept. of Pacific Affairs, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University.

officials from both governments, and states that there are no female MPs in the Parliament of Papua New Guinea. The Australian National University highlights the importance of involving women more in the negotiations between both governments, yet also mentions that the Autonomous Bougainville Government has provided for and encouraged the participation of women in various forums, such as the Bougainville Leaders Consultation Forum, created to encourage certain civil society groups to present their demands and proposals to the government regarding the post-referendum negotiations; the Independence-Ready Mission Programme, a body to promote preparations for independence at internally, nationally and internationally; and the Bougainville Constitution Planning Commission (BCPC), created to draw up the constitution of a potential independent Bougainville.

Thailand (south)	
Negotiating actors	Government, BRN
Third parties	Malaysia
Relevant agreements	--
Summary: Since 2004, the year when the armed conflict in the south of Thailand reignited, several discreet and exploratory informal conversations have taken place between the Thai government and the insurgent group. Some of these dialogue initiatives have been led by non-government organizations, by the Indonesian government or by former senior officials of the Thai State. After around one year of exploratory contacts between the Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and some insurgent groups, at the start of 2013, formal and public conversations started between the Government and the armed group BRN, facilitated by the Government of Malaysia. These negotiations were interrupted by the coup d'état in March 2014, but the military government in power since then resumed its contacts with several insurgent groups towards the second half of the year. In 2015 negotiations between the Government and MARA Patani –an organization grouping the main insurgent groups in the south of the country– were made public. Although the insurgency wanted to discuss measures that might resolve the central points of the conflict (such as recognizing the distinct identity of the Patani people or granting some level of self-government to the provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat), the main point discussed during the initial stages of the process was the establishment of several security areas to reduce the level of violence and thus determine the level of representativeness of MARA Patani and the commitment of insurgent groups (especially the BRN) with the process of dialogue.	

Although significant levels of violence continued to be reported in the southern part of the country, formal face-to-face negotiations between the government and the armed opposition group BRN resumed during the year and important progress was even made, such as an agreement on the substantive issues of the negotiating agenda, the formation of working groups and a commitment to reduce violence during Ramadan. After almost two years in which the COVID-19 pandemic

restricted dialogue to informal, exploratory and online contacts between the parties, the third meeting of the negotiating process (formally called the Joint Working Group-Peace Dialogue Process) was held in Kuala Lumpur on 11 and 12 January in southern Thailand. The first two meetings had taken place in January and March 2020. In this third meeting, both parties discussed the three substantive issues on the negotiating agenda: resolving the conflict through political agreements; reducing violence in the three southern provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat; and including and involving civil society in the peace process through various consultation mechanisms. The negotiating framework had been discussed throughout 2021 through informal channels and agreed during a confidential and informal meeting between both parties held in Turkey in November 2021. During the January 2022 meeting, the parties agreed to establish mixed committees for each of the three substantive aspects of the negotiations to produce more flexible and continuous workspaces between the parties. They also agreed to define the terms of reference and the procedures to implement each of the three aforementioned topics. In response to the BRN's repeated demands to have some kind of international observation of the process, both parties agreed to the appointment of five experts to observe and accompany it, though only two of them were present in Kuala Lumpur.

Though there were many clashes between the parties in January, February and March, the fourth official meeting of the negotiating process was held on 31 March and 1 April in Kuala Lumpur and was facilitated by the government of Malaysia. A member of the BRN's military wing, Deng Awaeji, participated in the meeting for the first time, which some media outlets interpreted as an attempt to publicly convey an image of internal unity and to show Bangkok a firmer commitment to the negotiating process. Both parties formalised the substantive points of the negotiating agenda during the meeting, which was made official as the General Principles of the Peace Dialogue Process. In addition to reducing the levels of violence and promoting public consultations in the south of the country on the content of the peace process, both parties pledged to seek political solutions in accordance with the wishes of the Pattani community under the unitary state of Thailand in accordance with the Thai Constitution. Previously, the Malaysian facilitator of the negotiations, Abdul Rahim Noor, had indicated that the creation of an autonomous region in the south of the country (Patani Darussalam) had been discussed, while the chief negotiator of the BRN, Anas Abdulrahman (also known as Hipni Mareh) had declared that both parties agreed to focus the talks on issues of governance, education, the economic system and recognition of Patani Malay identity. In the fourth round of negotiations, the Thai government and the BRN also agreed on the Ramadan Peace Initiative, aimed at reducing violence between 3 April and 14 May. Both

parties also agreed that BRN members in prison could spend the Muslim Eid holiday at home and that BRN members operating in hiding could return to their homes during Ramadan without being arrested (as long as they did not carry weapons or carry out attacks). To this end, the Thai government and the BRN formed a working group to oversee the decrease in violence during that period. In general terms, the terms of the agreement to reduce violence were respected, though there were still some episodes of violence. In mid-April, Kasturi Mahkota, the leader of the PULO (one of the armed groups operating in the region in recent decades, though it has not carried out any significant armed actions since 2016), claimed responsibility for a double attack in Pattani province launched to remind the Thai government that peace negotiations in southern Thailand should include the main armed groups active in the region, and not just the BRN. Along the same lines, in late June, Makhota said that the PULO was likely to join the negotiations between the government and the BRN. In 2015, peace negotiations began between the Thai government and MARA Patani, an umbrella organisation that included the main southern insurgent groups, including the BRN. However, the negotiations ended in 2019 without any significant agreements shortly before an exclusive new negotiating process began between Bangkok and the BRN.

On 1 and 2 August, the fifth round of negotiations was held in Kuala Lumpur, in which the terms of reference of the joint working groups created in January were addressed, such as the ones on public consultation

After almost two years in which the COVID-19 pandemic restricted the negotiations to informal and remote contacts between the government and the BRN, significant progress was made during the year

and the reducing acts of violence. During this round, Bangkok also proposed a second initiative to reduce violence from 15 August to 30 November, though the BRN rejected it on the grounds that there was not enough time to conclude the agreement. However, on 30 October, the BRN issued a statement via Twitter repeating its commitment to the peace process and to the General Principles of the Peace Dialogue Process. The International Crisis Group research centre later noted that both negotiating panels had met in Berlin in early December and that their technical teams met in Malaysia a few days later. The BRN issued a statement explaining that both parties were working on a road map that included security issues and reducing violence, legal immunity for BRN representatives who conducted consultations with civilians and the BRN's proposal for a democratic governance system in the southern part of the country.

Gender, peace and security

In January, the government appointed Rachada Dhnadirek as its special representative in the peace negotiations with the BRN. According to Bangkok, one of her duties will be to promote the role of women in the peace negotiations. Rachada Dhnadirek was a government spokesperson and had served as vice chair of the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats, an executive of the International Liberal Human Rights Committee and member of the International Panel of Parliamentarians for Freedom of Religion or Belief (IPPFoRB).

5. Peace negotiations in Europe

- In 2022, six of the 39 peace processes in the world (15%) took place in Europe.
- All the negotiating processes in Europe involved third parties in supporting roles.
- After Russia's invasion of Ukraine there were attempts at direct negotiations between both countries in the first few months, which failed, and the discussions were relegated to humanitarian issues, grain exports and the protection of nuclear infrastructure.
- Russia's invasion had various impacts on the negotiating processes in Europe, such as delays in the Georgian peace process, a less favourable geopolitical context for Armenia and international calls for Kosovo and Serbia to make progress in normalising relations.
- The Cyprus peace process remained stalled, with no resumption of formal, high-level political negotiations in a pre-election year.
- Women's organisations and civil society activists from Kosovo and Georgia called for women's effective participation in the negotiating processes.

This chapter provides an analysis of the main peace processes and negotiations in Europe in 2022. Firstly, the main characteristics and general trends on the dialogue processes in the region are presented, followed by the analysis on the evolution of each specific context during the year, including in relation to the gender, peace and security agenda. In addition, at the beginning of the chapter there is a map identifying the countries in Europe that hosted peace negotiations during 2022.

Table 5.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in Europe in 2022

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	Armenia, Azerbaijan	Russia, EU, USA, OSCE Minsk Group (co-chaired by Russia, France and the USA; the remaining permanent members are Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Turkey), Turkey ¹
Cyprus	Republic of Cyprus, self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	UN, EU (observer at the Geneva International Conference); Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom (guarantor countries)
Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	Government of Georgia, representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, government of Russia ²	OSCE, EU and UN; USA, Russia ³
Moldova (Transnistria)	Moldova, self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria	OSCE, Ukraine, Russia, USA and EU
Serbia – Kosovo	Serbia, Kosovo	EU, UN, USA, Germany, France
Russia – Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	Turkey, UN, Israel, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, IAEA, OSCE, Germany, France ⁴

5.1. Negotiations in 2022: regional trends

Six peace processes were identified in Europe in 2022. They accounted for 15% of the total peace processes in the world in 2022 (39 processes worldwide). Russia's invasion of Ukraine created a serious humanitarian

crisis and dismantled the previous negotiating process. Although it was accompanied by political and military negotiations for a few months, they broke down and only discussions on humanitarian and other issues

1. Turkey's status as a third party may be subject to dispute. It is included in this table due to the establishment by Russia and Turkey of a peacekeeping centre for monitoring the 2020 ceasefire. The establishment of the centre was ratified in a Memorandum between Russia and Turkey.

2. Russia's status in the Georgian peace process is subject to different interpretations. Georgia considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.

3. Ibid.

4. This table includes actors that have been involved as third parties in different spheres in 2022 both before the Russian invasion and in the phase following the invasion.

remained active. The other armed conflict in Europe, which has pitted Turkey against the PKK since 1984, continued without a negotiating process. This absence of dialogue was especially alarming amidst escalating regional tension between Turkey and the main Kurdish movement in Syria, as well as internal challenges. Four other processes covered socio-political crises of varying intensity (Armenia and Azerbaijan, regarding Nagorno-Karabakh as well the relations between both countries; Georgia, in relation to Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russia; Moldova, over Transdniestria; Cyprus; and Serbia and Kosovo). The peacebuilding process in the Basque Country was no longer analysed in this edition of the yearbook due to its consolidation, which in 2021 commemorated the 10th anniversary of the definitive end of ETA's armed activity. Even if it is no longer analysed in this yearbook, local actors continued to take steps and work on areas such as coexistence and memory.


Regarding the **actors**, Russia's invasion of Ukraine set off an interstate conflict that went beyond the previous phases of the conflict (the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and the war in eastern Ukraine since 2014, with protracted negotiations). In this new scenario, Ukraine and Russia negotiated directly for some months, with external facilitation. This transformed the previous situation during the Donbas war, in which Russia presented itself as a third party while it was considered by Ukraine as a party to the conflict due to its participation in support of the Donbas militias. Thus,

in 2022, two of the six processes involved interstate negotiations (Russia-Ukraine and Armenia-Azerbaijan).

In the negotiations around Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the format of the Geneva International Discussions (GID) brought together Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia with an ad hoc formula regarding the status of the participants. In all other negotiations, at least one of the negotiating actors was a state. One distinctive feature of Europe was the relatively high proportion of actors representing self-proclaimed states (Transdniestria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) participating in various formats under the decisive influence of countries exercising political, economic and military influence over them.

Europe continued to stand out for the proportion of third parties involved in the negotiations. All the peace processes involved external parties performing mediation and facilitation tasks. In relation to third parties, 2022 was a year in which the OSCE became less relevant as a third party, both in the process between Armenia and Azerbaijan and in the new scenario in Ukraine after the Russian invasion. Even so, the OSCE continued to be a prominent third party as a co-mediator in the peace process between Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia and in the negotiating process between Moldova and Transdniestria. The EU raised its profile as a third party in the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a scenario where, in addition to being one of the facilitating actors, it

Map 5.1. Peace negotiations in Europe in 2022



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in Europe in 2022.

also deployed a new civilian observation mission in Armenia in 2022. The EU continued to be the main facilitating actor in the Kosovo-Serbia peace process, as well as an observer in the Moldovan negotiating process and an “interested party” in the stalled Cyprus process. The UN Secretary-General became involved in meetings with Ukraine and Russia to promote solutions to the conflict. The UN was also a co-facilitator with Turkey in talks between Kyiv and Moscow regarding the export of grain and fertilisers. As part of this, the UN participated in the Joint Coordination Centre (JCC), a mechanism created to coordinate and guarantee the implementation of the agreement on the export of grain, other food products and fertilisers, in which Turkey, Ukraine and Russia also participated. The UN also continued to be the mediating actor in the Cyprus negotiating process, as well as a co-mediator in the Georgian peace process, and provided support to the EU-facilitated talks between Serbia and Kosovo through various functions. In 2022, the IAEA joined as a third-party actor in Ukraine. Its director general engaged in talks with both parties to facilitate and promote agreements to protect nuclear infrastructure and particularly to establish a demilitarised zone around the Zaporizhzhia power plant. The IAEA also sent a technical mission and established a permanent presence at the plant.

In 2022, the role of different **states** grew in supporting negotiations, interventions influenced in part by the international and regional geopolitical context and their own agendas. This was the case with Turkey in the political, military and humanitarian talks between Ukraine and Russia. The US, Germany and France also stepped up their diplomatic activity regarding the peace process between Serbia and Kosovo to support the EU’s facilitation, a scenario in which a Franco-German proposal to normalise relations was presented and in which these Western actors urged the parties to move forward, appealing to the need to resolve bilateral and regional disputes in view of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia continued to facilitate the process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, although its influence faded because of its weaker position caused by the war in Ukraine, a certain level of Armenian discontent and pullback from Russia, as well as Azerbaijan’s military and economic predominance. Russia’s peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh continued to be active in 2022 but faced further criticism and pressure.

The issues on the negotiating agendas were diverse and the details on the various elements and status of discussions of each round were not always public. **In 2022, political-military issues and those related to the state’s own attributes predominated, such as territorial integrity, powers related to state sovereignty and mutual recognition.** In face of **Russia’s** invasion of **Ukraine**,

which militarily questioned Ukraine’s sovereignty, the political and military negotiations between the two countries addressed issues such as territorial integrity, security guarantees for Ukraine and Ukraine’s position regarding NATO. In late March, media outlets reported that Ukraine accepted and offered permanent neutrality, not joining blocs or hosting foreign military bases and abstaining from developing nuclear weapons in exchange for legally binding international security guarantees and a proposed 15-year period to resolve the question of Crimea through diplomatic channels. However, the negotiations broke down in April and were not revived for the rest of the year. Ukraine stated its intention to recover its territorial integrity, among other aspects, as a requirement for resuming the negotiations, while Russia demanded recognition of its annexation of four regions. In the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, border demarcation, mutual recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty and other related issues were addressed during the year. Despite focusing part of the year on managing the crisis surrounding their dispute over vehicle license plates, Serbia and Kosovo were urged by Western actors to make headway in negotiations to normalise relations.

Other items on the agendas included **ceasefires and troop withdrawals**. Ukraine and Russia negotiated humanitarian ceasefires, though they encountered many obstacles and were repeatedly broken by Russia. Ukraine also aspired to a withdrawal of troops by Russia, while Moscow persisted in its invasion. While they were still active, the negotiations laid out scenarios for the withdrawal of Russian troops to the positions prior to 24 February, though in later months Ukraine aimed at militarily recovering all territory within its internationally recognised borders and Russia demanded recognition of its annexation of four regions in Ukraine. For their part, Armenia and Azerbaijan reached a ceasefire agreement in September, following the most serious escalation since the 2020 war.

On the other hand, the issue of the status of the various disputed territories, root cause of many conflicts in Europe, continued to be absent or blocked in the negotiating processes. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine expanded the previous conflict in the Donbas. In September, Russia formally annexed four regions (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, in addition to Crimea, which had been annexed in 2014) and demanded recognition of the annexation as a new reality to be taken into account if negotiations were resumed. Ukraine declared its intent to regain control of all its territory, including Donbas and Crimea, departing from previous positions it had held in the March negotiations regarding the possible compartmentalisation of the issue. In the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Baku warned that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was internal and that

*Peace processes
in Europe in 2022
accounted for 15% of
all cases worldwide*

it would not negotiate with the Armenian government over it under any circumstances. Thus, for another year since the 2020 war, the previous negotiating framework appeared to have been dismantled. The previous process aimed at resolving the enclave's status through the balance of principles of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. Other negotiating processes regarding conflicts over the status of territories remained stalled, such as in Moldova (Transdniestria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Cyprus. As a whole, they also faced greater difficulties due to pressures in the local, regional and international contexts.

Regarding the **evolution** of the peace negotiations, 2022 was a year of serious obstacles and greater difficulties, including Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its effects on the peace processes in Europe, with greater uncertainty, geopolitical changes and the prioritisation of strategic objectives over negotiated solutions. Russia's invasion of Ukraine created a serious humanitarian crisis, questioned Ukraine's sovereignty, dismantled the previous failed negotiating process and revealed the lack of a shared security architecture in Europe. This had echoes in the negotiating process between Moldova and Transdniestria, where uncertainty and risks of the conflict expanding increased, although the parties did commit to a peaceful and negotiated solution to the conflict. The invasion also resonated in the South Caucasus. The international co-mediators delayed the Geneva International Discussions (GID) between Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia until October to "protect" it against any possible negative effects from the war in Ukraine. The process remained stalled under greater continental tension. Some progress was made in normalising relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, such as with the establishment of border commissions, but the volatility of the situation prevailed, as evidenced by the escalation of violence in September (the worst since the 2020 war), the blockade of the Lachin corridor and Iran's warnings against any change to the borders. Moreover, the possibility of a negotiated solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue deteriorated and was practically nullified amidst the imbalance of power between the two countries, with Azerbaijan ascendant militarily and economically, supported by Turkey and strengthened by its position as a gas exporter, including with gas agreements with the EU, as well as a decline in Russia's ability to influence the region. In this geopolitical context, Baku imposed its view of Nagorno-Karabakh as an internal issue not subject to negotiation. The negotiating process in Cyprus remained deadlocked, with no resumption of formal negotiations and a growing gap between the parties' positions. The negotiating process also continued to be affected by the regional tension in the eastern Mediterranean between Turkey and Cyprus and by the clear risks of greater militarisation on the island and in the surrounding area. Although agreements were reached on the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo

regarding license plate fees, the situation remained volatile. Both parties agreed to focus on negotiating a proposal to normalise relations, although the situation was affected by uncertainty in Europe, evident signs of the gulf between Pristina and Belgrade and the limits of encouragement of future entry in the EU.

Regarding the gender perspective, the peace processes in Europe continued to be characterised mainly by low levels of women's participation in the negotiating teams, as well as by the lack of gender mechanisms or gender architecture. The political and military negotiations between Ukraine and Russia revealed this exclusion, though whether formally or informally organised, women's activists, women's organisations and the civilian population as a whole were fully involved in the civilian response to the crisis triggered by the invasion through many different humanitarian and community support initiatives. Some progress was made in formal negotiating processes, such as in Cyprus, where the technical committee for gender equality adopted an action plan to promote the participation of women in the peace process in response to the UN Secretary-General's call and as the result of decades of activity by women's organisations on the island. However, the plan was structured around recommendations, so its impact will depend on the degree of implementation. The deadlock in the negotiations partly limited their potential, though many of the recommendations did not depend on the resumption of negotiations at a high level. Another positive development in 2022 was the imminent launch of the informal Women's Advisory Board in the Transdniestrian negotiating process with the support of UN Women. This new body aims to issue recommendations for the resolution process. Moreover, women's organisations and activists in Kosovo and Georgia continued to demand women's participation in the negotiating processes.

5.2. Case study analysis

Eastern Europe

Moldova (Transdniestria)	
Negotiating actors	Moldovan government, self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniestria
Third parties	OSCE (mediator), Ukraine and Russia (guarantor countries), USA and EU (observers) in the 5+2 format
Relevant agreements	Agreement on the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Dniester Region of the Republic of Moldova (1992), Memorandum on the Bases for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria (The Moscow Agreement) (1997)

Summary:

Transdniestria is a 4,000 km² enclave with half a million inhabitants that are mostly Russian-speaking. Legally under Moldovan sovereignty, but with de facto independence, since the 1990s it has been the stage for an unresolved dispute regarding its status. The conflict surfaced during the final stages of the breakup of the USSR, when fears increased in Transdniestria over a possible unification between the independent Moldova and Romania, which have both historical and cultural links. Transdniestria rejected Moldovan sovereignty and declared itself independent. This sparked an escalation in the number of incidents, which eventually became an armed conflict in 1992. A ceasefire agreement that same year brought the war to an end and gave way to a peace process under international mediation. One of the main issues is the status of the territory. Moldova defends its territorial integrity, but is willing to accept a special status for the entity, while Transdniestria has fluctuated between proposals for a confederalist model that would give the area broad powers and demands full independence. Other points of friction in the negotiations include cultural and socio-economic issues and Russian military presence in Transdniestria. Since the beginning of the dispute there have been several proposals, partial agreements, commitments and confidence-building measures in the framework of the peace process, as well as important obstacles and periods of stagnation. Geostrategic international disputes also hover over this unresolved conflict, which has deteriorated due to the war in Ukraine.

The negotiating process between Moldova and Transdniestria faced the risks of greater instability and expansion of the conflict in Ukraine due to the Russian invasion, although both parties affirmed their willingness to resolve the Transdniestrian conflict peacefully and through dialogue. The political, social and economic context in which the process took place deteriorated due to the crisis in the neighbouring country. The Moldovan Parliament approved the introduction of a state of emergency in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which remained in force at the end of the year. In April, Russian General and Deputy Commander of the Central Military District Rustam Minnekayev declared that Russia aimed to seize control of eastern and southern Ukraine in the second phase of the war, including the city of Odessa, and reaching as far as Transdniestria. In April, the Transdniestrian regime blamed several explosions and security incidents in Transdniestria on Ukraine. The Moldovan government considered this a provocation and in October it alleged that Russian missiles had invaded its airspace. However, the Moldovan authorities ruled out the immediate risk of spill over from the conflict and both parties to the conflict made statements ruling out the spread of armed violence and war and calling for a peaceful solution to the Transdniestrian conflict. Since Ukraine maintained control of Odessa, analysts also said there was a low risk of the conflict expanding to Transdniestria. Another factor reducing the likelihood of spill over is the high degree of Transdniestria's commercial integration with Europe. In addition, the European Union granted Moldova and Ukraine EU candidate country status in

In a year of uncertainty due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, both Moldova and Transdniestria called for a peaceful and negotiated solution to the Transdniestrian conflict

June. Uncertainty increased in the final months of the year alongside opposition demonstrations in September and October demanding an end to the sanctions against Russia and the resignation of the president and the pro-EU government. This came amidst a hike in gas prices and the Russian gas company Gazprom's threats to cut off supplies to the country.

Amidst the challenges caused by the war, diplomatic activity intensified between the government of Moldova and international actors such as European governments (including Ukraine), the EU, (including the High Representative), as well as with the Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE mission in the country and the special representative of the OSCE chairperson-in-office for the Transdniestria settlement process, United Nations agencies and the UN resident coordinator in the country. Various meetings took place during the year between senior political representatives of Moldova and Transdniestria, involving Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Reintegration Oleg Serebrian and Transdniestrian chief negotiator Vitaly Ignatiev, as well as representatives of the 5+2 negotiating format. **No significant agreements were reached in the process, but it was possible to maintain a fluid dialogue in a year of great uncertainty due to the war in Ukraine.** Also prominent was the parties' explicit commitment to prevent the conflict from expanding, including after the April incidents.

Some analysts said that Moldova tried to calm Ukrainian representatives' belligerent tone in relation to Transdniestria. One of the main topics of discussion in the format of Moldovan and Transdniestrian political representatives was the energy crisis. Throughout the year, there were also joint working groups meetings, including on social affairs and humanitarian aid, civil status and documentation, education, health, environmental issues, car transport and infrastructure development, customs issues and others. In late November, Moldova participated in a NATO meeting in Bucharest. The Moldovan foreign minister said that the country did not aim to join NATO and that neutrality is enshrined in the Moldovan Constitution, though he also said that Moldova needed to intensify relations with the Atlantic organisation.

Gender, peace and security

As part the negotiating process between Moldova and Transdniestria, the women participating in the joint expert working groups continued to enhance their mediation capacities. A positive development in 2022 was the imminent launch of the informal Women's Advisory Board in the Transdniestrian negotiating process with the support of UN Women to issue recommendations for the resolution process. On the other hand, in November, 16 women participated

in joint face-to-face training organised by the OSCE mission and the mediation support team of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, giving continuity to the 2021 training sessions. Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Reintegration Oleg Serebrian, who is also the country's chief negotiator, met at least twice with UN Women, including the organisation's representative in the country, Dominika Stojanoska, and its executive director, Sima Bahous, in April. A consultative seminar held in October was aimed at preparing the second national action plan on women, peace and security for the period 2023-2027 (after the completion of the first in 2021) and brought together institutional representatives, civil society organisations, international representatives and others. In this context, the UN Women representative in the country warned of the decline in women's rights and representation in recent years, as well as the possible rollback of gender equality due to the war in Ukraine. The representative pointed to risks of greater militarisation, increased financing for military equipment and a decrease in funds for social needs.

Russia – Ukraine	
Negotiating actors	Russia, Ukraine
Third parties	Turkey, UN, Israel, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, IAEA, OSCE, Germany, France ⁵
Relevant agreements	Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports (22th July 2022)

Summary:

Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, resulting in the military occupation of southern and eastern parts of the country and affecting other areas with bombings and attacks that had serious impacts on human security, such as mass forced displacement, extrajudicial executions, disappearances, sexual violence, food and energy insecurity and other crises. The invasion was preceded by previous cycles of conflict, including Russia's 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea, the war in eastern Ukraine between Russian-backed local militias and Ukrainian security forces, and deadlocked negotiations, all following the change of government in Ukraine after the Maidan uprising between late 2013 and 2014. In contravention of international law, Russia's invasion and war targeted Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The antagonism between the US, the EU and NATO on one side and Russia on the other, as well as a failed security architecture in Europe, also influenced the context of the conflict and the prospects for resolution. Shortly after the invasion began, Ukraine and Russia began peace talks in various formats, addressing different topics. Facilitated by Turkey, the political and military negotiations reached a certain degree of rapprochement around a possible permanent neutrality agreement with respect to NATO, security guarantees and postponement of the Crimean issue, to be resolved through diplomatic channels in 15 years. However, the negotiations broke down in April.

Russia annexed four regions in September 2022, despite not controlling them in their entirety, and stated that any negotiations should recognise this new situation. Ukraine stated that it wished to regain control of the entire territory, including Crimea and Donbas. The talks on humanitarian issues, nuclear safety and grain exports continued.

Russia's military invasion of Ukraine triggered a high-intensity armed conflict and a serious humanitarian crisis, while scrapping the previous negotiating process over eastern Ukraine. Attempts at direct negotiations in the opening months of the invasion failed and dialogue was relegated to humanitarian issues, including prisoner exchanges, grain exports and the protection of nuclear infrastructure. The military invasion was preceded by years of impasse in the negotiating process over Donbas, with substantive disagreements between the parties regarding the Minsk agreements, their scope and sequence. This was made worse in 2021, which saw a massive build-up of Russian military forces in April 2021 and again in the closing months of the year. Diplomatic activity intensified between December 2021 and February 2022, among different actors and in various arenas, including between the US and Russia, between NATO and Russia, within the framework of the OSCE, in the Normandy format and efforts by the German and French foreign ministries. Various actors engaged in consultations with Ukraine. The EU also engaged in dialogue with various actors. In December 2021, Russia presented two treaties to the US and NATO for them to sign that demanded that NATO cease enlargement, withdraw to its 1997 borders and guarantee not to deploy offensive weapons along its borders, among other points. The US and NATO responded with proposals to continue the dialogue on European indivisibility and on European security with respect to the right to choose foreign policy, though they ruled out the non-enlargement of NATO, as well as with proposals on some issues of arms control, risk reduction and transparency. Russian President Vladimir Putin considered them unsatisfactory. On 21 February, Russia recognised the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk and ordered troops to those territories, accompanied by a presidential speech in which Putin questioned the historical legitimacy of Ukraine as an independent country. On 24 February, Russia began its invasion with Putin's announcement of a "special operation" in pursuit of "demilitarisation" and "denazification". The invasion gave way to war and military occupation, which was still active at the end of the year and caused human, material and territorial devastation. In mid-December, according to OCHA data, 17.7 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance, 5.59 million people were internally displaced and 7.83 million people were refugees. In response to the invasion, the US and the EU imposed coordinated sanctions, backed by other actors. Russia responded by imposing sanctions and measures of its own.

5. This table includes actors that have been involved as third parties in different spheres in 2022 both before the Russian invasion and in the phase following the invasion.

Over the course of the invasion, direct negotiations took place between Ukraine and Russia. The political and military dialogue was held between late February and April, and in May both parties considered it to be at a standstill. In contrast, discussions on humanitarian issues were on going at the end of the year, despite the difficulties encountered. In the political and military dialogue, the parties held face-to-face meetings in Belarus and Turkey and fundamentally by videoconference between negotiating delegations and working groups. Turkey acted as a facilitator, while there were also contacts and offers from other actors, such as Israel and the UN Secretary-General. Throughout the year, other actors offered their good offices, such as Switzerland (which Russia rejected) or prepared proposals, such as Mexico (which proposed a High-Level Caucus for Dialogue and Peace), which Ukraine rejected as being pro-Russian. As for the negotiating agenda and positions, in late March it was reported in the media that Ukraine accepted and offered permanent neutrality and that it would not join any blocs or host foreign military bases and abstain from developing nuclear weapons in exchange for legally binding international security guarantees and the right to take military action such as the closure airspace, the supply of weapons and the use of armed forces, if necessary, in case of future aggression. Ukraine offered to exclude Crimea and parts of Donbas from these guarantees, with the parties having to define the borders of those regions or agree to disagree, according to media reports. The Ukrainian position, later known as the Istanbul Communiqué, also proposed a 15-year period to resolve the Crimean issue through diplomatic channels, with the parties abstaining from using military action. The Istanbul Communiqué also proposed continuing the dialogue and consultations with guarantor states to prepare and agree on a security guarantee treaty, which would enter into force after a referendum in Ukraine on its neutral status, constitutional amendments and ratification of the treaty by the Ukrainian Parliaments and those of the guarantor countries. The proposal also considered continuing to negotiate types of ceasefires, withdrawing troops and other paramilitary forces and tackling humanitarian issues.

There was no agreement between the parties then or in subsequent months due to fundamental disagreements and because of how the development of the war influenced the parties' positions. In the meetings on 1 and 2 April, Russia maintained its position that Crimea was an integral part of its territory and defended the independence of the Donbas republics. In line with this position, in a face-to-face meeting on 11 April between

In contravention of international law, Russia's invasion of Ukraine created a serious humanitarian crisis and was rejected by a large majority in the UN General Assembly, which called for the troops to withdraw

Ukraine and Russia negotiated from the start of the invasion, including some rapprochement around an offer by Ukraine to remain neutral with respect to NATO and international security guarantees, but the talks broke down in April

the Austrian chancellor and the Russian president, the first with a European leader since the start of the invasion, Vladimir Putin said that resolving the conflict in Donbas on terms favourable to Moscow was more important for Russia than the impact of international sanctions. On 17 April, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed that Ukraine would not give up Donbas to end the war.

On 20 April, Russia said that it had already responded to Ukraine's proposal from the last round of talks in Istanbul and that was waiting for a response from Ukraine. The Ukrainian and Russian chief negotiators, David Arakhamia and Vladimir Medinsky, held talks on 22 April, though no details were revealed. In late April, Russia reported that both countries' delegations maintained daily discussions via videoconference. However, there were clear disagreements and military means ended up prevailing. On 10 May, Ukrainian negotiator Rustem Umerov noted that Russian attacks on the Azovstal steel plant had slowed down the negotiations, and on the same day the Ukrainian foreign minister indicated that Ukraine's military objectives had changed and that they aspired to win the battle for Donbas. On 12 May, Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Hanna Mairal announced that a new phase of the war was beginning that involved mobilising and arming the Ukrainian forces. On 17 May, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko said that the political negotiating process was totally deadlocked. In late May, Podoliak confirmed the impasse in the negotiations, noting that no agreement was possible without the full withdrawal of Russian troops, and repeated Ukraine's position that it would not compromise its territorial integrity, describing it as a red line. At around the same time, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia's primary objective was to control the entire Donbas and accused Ukraine of changing its position from what it had been in Istanbul, while Ukraine blamed Russia for the failure of the negotiations.

Despite the deadlock in negotiations with Russia, Ukraine continued to negotiate with potential guarantor countries regarding security guarantees. It established an international working group chaired by former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, which issued a report with recommendations called the "Kyiv Security Compact" in September. The report indicated that Ukraine's military defence capability was the main security guarantee. Based on that militaristic approach, it identified Ukraine's need for a highly prepared military force, massive military training, joint exercises, sea and land-based anti-missile systems, Ukraine's access to EU funding for the defence industry, and military capabilities and service for the entire civilian population over 18 years

of age. The report called for legal and political guarantees so that the guarantor countries can commit to Ukraine's military capabilities with financial support, direct investment and reconstruction funds, arms exports, technology transfer, intelligence cooperation and other areas spanning over decades. It also called for legal guarantees for expanded commitments of military and non-military support in the event of renewed aggression within its internationally recognised borders. The report made Ukraine's aspiration to join NATO explicit, and stating that the guarantees should not be established in exchange for neutral status or otherwise, nor with any obligations or restrictions imposed on Ukraine, including any limit on the size or capabilities of its armed forces. Russian negotiator Leonid Slutski said that Russia would never accept a list of guarantees such as those contained in the report of recommendations and complained that they implied expansion of Western countries' military infrastructure to Russia's borders, the entrenchment of sanctions against Russia and other actions.

The prospects for restarting the negotiating process were complicated in September. Russia formally annexed the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions on 30 September, in contravention to international law, after independence referenda were held in late September in parts of those provinces under Russian military occupation. The Russian president issued new nuclear threats, claiming that he would use all forces and means at his disposal to "protect" those territories. In early August, the Ukrainian president had warned that holding referenda closed the doors to negotiations. Also on 30 September, Ukraine signed its application to join NATO by urgent procedure. Ukraine rejected international calls to negotiate on terms it considered unfair. Military means to resolve the conflict remained dominant and Ukraine regained control of the areas of Kherson to the west of the Dnieper River in a counteroffensive in November after recapturing the northeastern city of Kharkov in September. In November, Ukrainian chief negotiator David Arakhamia laid out the terms under which it would be possible to negotiate with Russia, which had been stated in previous months: the recovery of Ukraine's territorial integrity, compensation for damages, the prosecution of war criminals and effective guarantees so that no new aggressions take place in the future. **In November, the Ukrainian president unveiled what he called a 10-point Formula for Peace at the G20 summit.** These points refer to areas that need to be addressed for a lasting solution, including: nuclear and radiation safety; food safety; energy security; the release of prisoners of war and deportees; the implementation of the UN charter and restoration of territorial integrity; the withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of

The continuation of the invasion and its serious impacts, Russia's annexation of four regions of Ukraine and Russian threats to use all means at its disposal to maintain those territories made it hard to reach a solution

Despite the impasse in the political and military negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, both countries continued to discuss the exchange of prisoners, the export of grain and the protection of nuclear power plants

hostilities; justice and a special court for prosecuting war crimes; action against ecocide and environmental protection, including demining; security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic space, including security guarantees for Ukraine, with an international conference on security architecture and the signing of the "Kyiv Security Compact"; and confirmation of the end of the war. **In the final months of the year, Ukraine sent its proposal to international actors such as the US, France and India. Russia rejected the proposal as a basis for negotiations and continued its offensive against Ukraine,** with an increase in massive air attacks against civilian infrastructure, including the power network, in the closing months of the year.

Meanwhile, discussions on humanitarian issues remained active. Partial ceasefire agreements were negotiated at various times to conduct humanitarian evacuations and deliver humanitarian assistance, but they were not honoured and obstructed by Russia. Evacuations of Mariupol, the Azovstal steel plant and other locations were negotiated. Starting in April, the UN became more widely involved in supporting these humanitarian discussions. After months of efforts and negotiations, and with Turkey and the UN participating, Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement on 22 July to resume the export of Ukrainian grain, other food and fertiliser from three Ukrainian ports (Odessa, Chornomorsk and Pivdenne) and through a humanitarian shipping corridor on the Black Sea. Exports had been blocked by Russia since the start of the invasion and their resumption led to some drop in global prices, which had specifically impacted countries in the global South dependent on grain imports from Ukraine and Russia. The agreement also included the export of Russian food and fertiliser to global markets as an exception to the sanctions imposed on Russia. In mid-November, Turkey announced a 120-day extension to the agreement. There were also exchanges of prisoners of war and of remains of the deceased throughout the year.

Another topic of discussion was the protection of nuclear infrastructure. Hostilities near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the largest in Europe and militarily occupied by Russia at the beginning of the invasion, caused damage and serious security risks. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sent a technical mission to Ukraine in late August and established a permanent presence at the plant. The IAEA issued a report in early September that analysed the damage produced and described the situation as unsustainable. **The IAEA urged Russia and Ukraine to agree on a buffer zone under the aegis of the UN. The UN Secretary-General demanded that Russia withdraw its troops and that Ukraine refrain from seizing the plant militarily. The IAEA director general held separate talks with Russia and Ukraine aimed at**

reaching an agreement to create a demilitarised buffer zone, although at the end of the year there was still no agreement. Attacks on the power grid temporarily disconnected the plant, requiring the use of generators. The IAEA also became involved in the independent verification of Russia's allegations in October that Ukraine was preparing a "dirty bomb" attack and raised concerns in Ukraine and internationally about the risks of a Russian false flag attack involving the use of radioactive weapons. IAEA inspections at three locations found no evidence of undeclared nuclear material or activities.

Diplomatic initiatives and activity related to international justice began from the start of the invasion. The UN General Assembly passed several resolutions by using the mechanism of emergency special sessions. One was a resolution in March (141 votes in favour, five against and 35 abstentions) condemning the invasion and demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops (Resolution A/ES-11/L.1). Another in November urged Russia to pay war reparations to Ukraine (94 votes in favour, 14 against and 73 abstentions). In another April resolution, the General Assembly suspended Russia's membership in the Human Rights Council (93 votes in favour, 24 against and 58 abstentions). Separately, in March, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court began collecting evidence for an investigation into past and present alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity and genocide in Ukraine since 2013. The Human Rights Council also established a commission to investigate violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Ukraine. Ukrainian civil society organisations and the self-organised Ukrainian population became involved in the humanitarian response to the crisis and dealt with other aggravated problems, such as gender-based violence in the family, while also supporting nonviolent civil resistance and other peacebuilding activities.

Gender, peace and security

Women and the civilian population of Ukraine as a whole devised many different civil strategies to respond to the invasion by supporting evacuations, the distribution of basic goods, support for alternative accommodations, the search for missing persons, the documentation of war crimes and crimes against humanity and many other areas. Women's rights activists and organisations were also active in many different civil responses to the invasion, including by denouncing the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war against women and men by Russian forces in areas under occupation and in psychosocial, sexual and reproductive health and humanitarian assistance in the face of this and other forms of violence. Women's and women's rights

organisations continued to warn of gender violence at home, a problem that was aggravated by the context of the armed conflict and worked to support related initiatives.

Until they fell apart in April, the political and military negotiations between Ukraine and Russia took place without women participating in the negotiating delegations of both countries. Negotiations in the humanitarian sphere did involve women, including Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories Irina Vereshchuk, who led the negotiations on humanitarian corridors and prisoner exchanges. Ukrainian Ombudsman for Human Rights Lyudmila Denisova also oversaw prisoner exchanges until May, when she was ousted and replaced by Dmytro Lubinets. In a joint open letter, activists and journalists from Ukraine had urged Denisova to refrain from sensationalism and victimisation when reporting on sexual violence and instead provide only verified information, avoid excessive detail, use the term "survivor" rather than "victim", consider survivors' privacy and safety and remind the population about networks offering legal support, human rights advocacy and psychosocial care.⁶

Russia and the Caucasus

Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	
Negotiating actors	Government of Armenia, Government of Azerbaijan
Third parties	Russia, EU, USA, OSCE Minsk Group (Co-chaired by Russia, France and USA; other permanent members are Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Turkey), Turkey ⁷
Relevant agreements	Bishkek Protocol (1994), Ceasefire agreement (1994), Statement by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian Federation (2020)

Summary:

The armed conflict going from 1992 to 1994 between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh – an enclave of Armenian majority belonging to Azerbaijan that declared independence in 1992 – ended with a cease-fire agreement in 1994, after causing more than 20,000 dead and one million displaced people as well as the military occupation by Armenia of several districts around Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then negotiations have been in place between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with several failed attempts to reach peace plans during the first years and a renewed impulse through the Prague Process, which started in 2004 and since 2005 has focused on negotiating some basic principles to base the discussions on a future agreement (withdrawal of Armenia from the occupied

6. IMI, "Female media workers call on Lyudmila Denisova to abstain from detailed descriptions when informing the public about rape", IMI, 25th May 2022.

7. Turkey's status as a third party may be subject to dispute. It is included in this table due to the establishment by Russia and Turkey of a peacekeeping centre for monitoring the 2020 ceasefire. The establishment of the centre was ratified in a Memorandum between Russia and Turkey.

territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, granting provisional status to Nagorno-Karabakh, the right for displaced persons to return, an eventual decision on the final status of the territory through a binding expression of will, international security safeguards). The deadlock of negotiations since 2010 and the fragile cease-fire increased the alert warning in a context of an arms race a bellicose rhetoric and a regional scenario of geostrategic tensions. War broke out again in September 2020 and in November the parties reached an agreement that entailed a complete change of the status quo (control by Azerbaijan of the districts adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh and a part of Nagorno-Karabakh, along with the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces), but left the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh unresolved.

The governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan maintained contacts and dialogue around a new framework to normalise bilateral relations, while the peace process's approach prior to the 2020 war, which had addressed the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and had focused on the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination, was dismantled. This turnaround took place amidst an imbalance of power and Azerbaijan's military, political and economic dominance, as well as a geopolitical context influenced by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which made the imbalance larger.

In March, it emerged that **Azerbaijan had presented Armenia with a five-point plan to normalise relations between both countries, which included their mutual recognition of territorial integrity and state sovereignty, the relinquishment of future territorial claims, border limitation and demarcation, diplomatic relations and the opening of regional transport routes.** It contained no direct reference to Nagorno-Karabakh. By submitting its plan, Baku proposed a negotiating framework focused on normalising bilateral relations and disconnected from the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, which it considered an internal matter and not debatable with any international actor. The Armenian government did not reject the Azerbaijani five-point proposal, but it did demand guarantees of rights and freedoms for the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the Armenian foreign minister in March, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was not a territorial issue but one of rights. In a speech given to the Armenian Parliament on 13 April, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that if the basis for negotiations in the past had been the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, from which guarantees of security and rights were to be derived, the basis now consisted of guarantees of security and rights and its status would stem from them. In November, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev warned that in no case would Baku accept a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan that included references to Nagorno-Karabakh and demanded a completely clear position on the matter from Armenia. Aliyev also confirmed that Azerbaijan was willing to speak with the population of Nagorno-Karabakh and that this process had already begun, but

ruled out doing so with Ruben Vardanyan, a Russian millionaire businessman of Armenian origin who took over as state minister of the self-proclaimed republic in November, nor with the government of Armenia. The leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh expressed their willingness to speak with Azerbaijan, but ruled out direct talks, calling for a format with international mediation.

Meetings between Armenia and Azerbaijan were focused on the normalising relations.

Meetings took place in different formats throughout the year (conversations at the leadership level, contacts between the foreign ministers and between border commissions, among others) and with the support of various actors as third parties, including the EU, the US and Russia. In the first half of the year, some steps were taken to bring the parties closer together. On 6 April, during a meeting in Brussels hosted by EU Council President Charles Michel, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev agreed to assign their foreign ministers to work on preparations for a peace agreement and expressed the desire to move quickly towards an agreement. They also announced in April that they would convene a bilateral border commission charged with defining the interstate border and guaranteeing security in the area. The parties established their respective border commissions in May and delegations from both bodies met for the first time on 24 May at the interstate border. That first meeting was preceded by a new meeting in Brussels on 22 May between the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders, facilitated by Charles Michel. According to the EU statement, in addition to agreeing on the first meeting of the border commissions, both leaders agreed on the need to restore transport connections in the

region and reached agreements on principles for border restoration and management techniques, customs, fees and security issues. They also agreed to move towards a peace treaty, maintain close contact and hold a new trilateral meeting in the summer. Various meetings took place in July, including one between the foreign ministers in Georgia, separate meetings between the US Secretary of State with both leaders and visits to the two countries by EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Toivo Klaar. On 31 August, the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders met again in Brussels, facilitated by the EU. According to the International Crisis Group, at that meeting they agreed that the foreign ministers would meet again within a month to work on the drafts of a possible peace agreement.

Despite these efforts, the dialogue and meetings were accompanied by difficulties, mistrust and security incidents in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the interstate border, as well as Azerbaijani military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Armenia. Armenia denounced Baku's military seizure of some territory in the region and inside Armenia's borders. The Azerbaijani Army's

air offensive in September against parts of Armenia on the central and southern border resulted in the deadliest interstate escalation since the 2020 war, with 207 Armenian soldiers and 80 other Azerbaijanis killed, several civilian fatalities, dozens of civilians wounded and over 2,700 Armenian civilians displaced, among other impacts. Armenia and Azerbaijan announced a ceasefire on 14 September following an earlier failed truce promoted by Russia and international calls for a ceasefire and the resumption of negotiations. Pashinyan had expressed his willingness to reach an agreement with Azerbaijan if Baku recognised Armenia's territorial integrity, including 50 km² of Armenia taken by Baku in 2021 and 2022, adding that Armenia in turn would recognise the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. After his announcement, a few thousand people (according to some media outlets) protested against Pashinyan in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, as well as in the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, Stepanakert, and in Gyumri, against what they perceived as concessions.

The military escalation and truce in September were followed by new diplomatic moves and international calls for dialogue. Among other US efforts, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with the foreign ministers of both countries on 19 September at the same time as the UN General Assembly. During a meeting held alongside the Prague Summit of European countries on 6 October, the Azerbaijani president, the Armenian prime minister, the French president and the president of the EU Council agreed to deploy an EU civil observation mission on the Armenian side of the international border. The meeting's attendees also committed to mutual recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty, based on the United Nations Charter and the 1991 Alma-Ata Protocol. It was deployed on 20 October and ended in December, with a mandate to help to build trust between the parties by monitoring compliance with the ceasefire and issuing reports to the EU for its work in support of the border commissions. At another trilateral meeting of the two leaders with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 31 October in Sochi, Russia, the parties agreed to refrain from using force and to negotiate problematic issues exclusively on the basis of recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. On 30 October, thousands of people (40,000 according to local authorities) demonstrated in Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, rejecting the possibility of the region coming under Azerbaijani control. On that same day, the Nagorno-Karabakh Parliament, which organised the protest, issued a declaration in defence of the region's sovereignty and its right to self-determination and against any document or proposal that might question it.

The issue of the Lachin corridor, the only road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, was a source of tension and a topic of discussion during the year. In August, Baku announced that it had completed its section of the

new route that will replace the Lachin corridor according to the 2020 ceasefire agreement and accused Yerevan of delaying its section. In addition to the incidents in August and the evacuation of the population from towns around the corridor, at the end of the year tensions rose due to the blockade of the corridor in December by Azerbaijani protesters opposed to mining activity in the region. The blockade hindered access to basic goods and generated the risk of a humanitarian emergency. International actors such as the US, the EU and the UN Secretary-General called for it to reopen. Armenia postponed a planned trilateral meeting with Azerbaijan and Russia in December, stating that its priority was the reopening of the corridor.

Gender, peace and security

The new negotiating framework for diplomatic contacts in various formats took place without the participation of women from civil society or the inclusion of the gender dimension, which marked continuity with their exclusion prior to the 2020 war. There were some peacebuilding initiatives by women or that involved female activists, such as anti-war protests in the Armenian capital in January and a statement from the Feminist Peace Collective (created in 2020 in response to the war that year) in protest against Azerbaijan's offensive in September, which was also critical of the male-dominated and elitist negotiations of both governments and appealed for unity, citizen diplomacy and peacebuilding.

Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia)	
Negotiating actors	Government of Georgia, representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, government of Russia ⁸
Third parties	OSCE, EU and UN; USA, Russia ⁹
Relevant agreements	Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian–Ossetian Conflict (Sochi Agreement) (1992), Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces (1994) [agreement dealing with conflict on Abkhazia], Protocol of agreement (2008), Implementation of the Plan of 12 August 2008 (2008)

Summary:

The war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, which began in South Ossetia and spread to Abkhazia and territory not disputed by Georgia, ended in a six-point peace agreement mediated by the EU. The peace plan included the start of international talks on security and stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two small territories in the northwest and north-central Georgia bordering Russia that are internationally recognised as regions of Georgia, though de facto independent since the end of the wars between Abkhaz and Georgian forces (1992–1994) and between Ossetian and Georgian forces (1991–1992) regarding their

8. Russia's status in the Georgian peace process is subject to different interpretations. Georgia considers Russia a party to the conflict and a negotiating party, while Russia considers itself a third party.
9. Ibid.

status. The 2008 agreement gave way to the start of talks known as the Geneva International Discussions (GID), which bring together representatives of Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Russia under international mediation (the OSCE, EU and UN, with the US as an observer). According to the agreement, the talks were supposed to focus on provisions to guarantee security and stability in the region, the issue of the refugees and displaced populations and any other issue agreed by the parties, so the disputed status of the territories was not explicitly addressed. Thus, after the 2008 war, Russia formally recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and established agreements and a permanent military presence there despite Georgian opposition. The post-2008 phase involved the dismantling of previous dialogue and observation mechanisms, including the OSCE and the UN missions, and replaced the previous separate talks with a single format covering both disputed regions. An EU observation mission was also authorised, though it was given no access to the disputed territories. The GID have two working groups (on security and humanitarian issues) and under its aegis one Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism was created for each region in 2009, facilitated by the EU and OSCE. Amidst a context of geopolitical rivalry between Russia and Western political, economic and military players (the US, EU and NATO) and chronic antagonism between the disputed regions and Georgia, the negotiating process faces many obstacles.

The negotiating process involving Georgia, the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russia was influenced by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The new conflict in Ukraine and global instability prompted the co-mediators to delay the Geneva International Discussions (GID) in order to “protect” the process and avoid any negative effect from the international context and the war in Ukraine on the planned round and the GID as a whole. However, Russia criticised the decision, accused the US, the EU and the OSCE of trying to freeze the negotiations and demanded that the GID be transferred to another location. Abkhazia and South Ossetia seconded Russia’s demands. Preceded by two trips to the region by the co-facilitators, the 56th round of the GID finally took place in October in Geneva, the first since December 2021. Despite the delay, the co-facilitators stressed that the paths for communication with the GID participants (Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia) had remained operational. The round addressed persistent issues in the process that had not yet been resolved. Among other issues, Georgia claimed that the internally displaced population and refugees had the right to return. Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia demanded bilateral agreements on the non-use of force between Georgia and each of the two de facto independent regions. Georgia, which already issued a unilateral commitment not to use force in 2010, maintained its position that such an agreement should be bilateral between Russia and Georgia, as it considers Russia the main party to the conflict. In the statement ending the round, the EU expressed concern about Russia’s continued military presence and its actions in the internationally

recognised territory of Georgia, its attempts to integrate the two disputed regions into its security and regulatory space, the gradual expansion of the territory under its control and the restrictions on freedom of movement. Despite disagreements and antagonism, the parties pledged to continue with the GID format. The co-mediators took another trip to the region in November.

The Ergneti Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) remained active during the year, with meetings in September and November. It deals with South Ossetia and is co-facilitated by the EU and the OSCE. Moreover, South Ossetia reopened two of the five border crossings with Georgia, though only partially. The Gali IPRM remained non-operational, as it has been since 2018. However, the parties expressed their willingness to resume it in the last round of the GID in 2021 and in the October 2022 round, the parties repeated their interest in restarting it, though it was not reactivated.

The negotiating process took place in an unfavourable context, both due to the situation in Europe caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the political polarisation between the Georgian government and the opposition and social tension. Some opposition groups called on Georgia to regain control of the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by military means. Among other developments during the year, in June former Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, who was president between 2004 and 2013, was arrested in 2021 after eight years outside the country and sentenced to prison for abuse of power, spoke on a social network in favour of offering the creation of a Georgian-Abkhaz federation to Abkhazia.

Gender, peace and security

The international gap continued between states’ commitments to the women, peace and security agenda and the limits of implementation, as denounced by Georgian female civil society activists. During a meeting between the co-facilitators of the GID and various Georgian women from civil society held in November, almost a month after the 56th round of the GID, ICCN director and GPPAC representative Nina Tsikhistavi-Khutsishvili warned of the lack of implementation of the women, peace and security agenda in Georgia.⁹ She said that the women from the civil society had not received any information that the round of the GID on 5 October would take place or anything about the agenda and added that the participation and duration of the subsequent consultation meeting was limited. Beyond that round and subsequent consultation, Tsikhistavi-Khutsishvili warned of the many limitations of the negotiating process in Georgia in relation to the four pillars of the women, peace and security agenda (participation, protection,

9. International Center on Conflict and Negotiation, “Statement to Georgia’s Peace Process Stakeholders”, ICCN, 13 November 2022; Tsikhistavi-Khutsishvili, Nina, “Implementing Women, Peace and Security in Georgia: Where do we stand?”, GPPAC, 23 November 2022.

prevention and assistance and recovery). She emphasised the underrepresentation of women in negotiation, mediation, monitoring and humanitarian roles, the lack of steps taken to ensure that their participation is substantive and able to influence the process and insufficient support for women's peace initiatives.

In contrast to the limitations identified by civil society groups, the co-mediator and UN representative to the GID, Ayşe Cihan Sultanoğlu, highlighted the co-mediators' commitment to implementing the women, peace and security agenda during the open symposium on women, peace and security in November. In September, a new meeting took place in Gori between representatives of the Georgian government participating in the IPRM and women's organisations and women affected by the conflict and displacement, with the support of UN Women. During the meeting and at other forums throughout the year, local organisations and directly affected population raised various issues, including but not limited to restrictions on movement, difficulties in accessing health care and other services, the poor condition of the buildings used as collective centres for the displaced population and the need for alternative accommodation and the road infrastructure situation.

South-east Europe

Cyprus	
Negotiating actors	Republic of Cyprus, self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
Third parties	UN, EU (observer at the Geneva International Conference); Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom (guarantor countries)
Relevant agreements	13 February agreement (2004)

Summary:

Inhabited by a Greek majority, a Turkish population and other minorities, the island of Cyprus faces a situation of long-lasting unresolved conflict. Preceded by the violence of the 1950s, followed by independence in 1960, Cyprus was affected by a crisis in which the Turkish Cypriot population was displaced from power, calling into question the distribution of power stipulated in the Constitution and triggering new violent incidents, which led to the deployment of the UNFICYP peacekeeping mission in 1964. There was an underlying confrontation between the aspirations of enosis (union with Greece) of the Greek Cypriot population and taksim (partition) by Turkish Cypriot population. A coup in 1974 with the aim of promoting unification with Greece triggered a military invasion of the island by Turkey. The crisis led to population displacement and the division of the island between the northern third under Turkish Cypriot control and two-thirds in the south under Greek Cypriot control, separated by a demilitarised zone known as the buffer zone or "Green Line", supervised by the UN. Since the division of the island there have been efforts to find a solution, such as high-level dialogues in the 70s and initiatives in the following decades promoted by successive UN Secretaries-General. The Annan Plan for a bizonal bicomunal federation was approved in referendum in 2004 by the Turkish Cypriots and rejected by the Greek Cypriots. After the failure of the Christofias-Talat dialogue (2008-2012), a new phase of negotiations began in 2014, which has generated high expectations.

The peace process remained at an impasse, with no resumption of formal negotiations at a high political level. The UN Secretary-General's special representative, Colin Stewart, held separate meetings with Greek Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot President Ersin Tatar and their respective representatives, as well as with many local and international actors as part of the UN mission of good offices. Moreover, the UN Secretary-General's Advisor for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas, Miroslav Jenca, held separate meetings in November with both leaders. There were no joint meetings, although both leaders met twice during the year: in April for the launch of the action plan to promote the participation of women in the peace process and in December at a reception organised by the UN at the end of the year. There was an exchange of letters between both leaders. In his letter in June, Anastasiades called to resume the negotiations on the same basis as the previous negotiations. In his reply, Tatar said that the negotiations based on a federation solution had run their course and demanded confirmation of equal sovereignty and equal status for a restart of the negotiating process. During the year, Anastasiades confirmed a solution based on a bizonal and bicomunal federation (the framework in which the negotiating process has been conducted), while Tatar demanded a solution of equal sovereignty and two states. As in recent years, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan defended a two-state solution and ruled out reunification. At the end of the year, the conditions for restarting the negotiations were still not in place. The predictions for the presidential elections in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in 2023 suggested that the difficulties in restarting the process would continue in the short term. In any case, at the reception at the year's end, Stewart said that the parties had made headway in proposals for cooperation and trust-building during the year.

Despite the disagreements between the parties regarding the conflict's underlying issues, there was some progress and cooperation in the discussions between the joint technical committees, including in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The UN Secretary-General and the Deputy to the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Cyprus hailed these developments, favoured by the framework of permanent dialogue and the weekly trilateral meetings between the Special Adviser and the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Menelaos Menelaou and Ergun Olgun, respectively. Stewart also highlighted the boost in trade between both communities on the island at the end of the year. However, as a whole, the prospects for resolving the conflict continued to be affected by regional tension, including disputes over the exploitation of oil in the Mediterranean and the multidimensional crisis between Greece and Turkey, which confronts both countries along various lines, including the divided island of Cyprus, which escalated in intensity at certain times of the year. Furthermore, Washington's decision to lift restrictions on arms sales to the Greek Cypriot

administration and the Greek Cypriot announcement to increase its defence budget prompted Turkish and Turkish Cypriot criticism, warnings of reciprocity and an announcement by Ankara to increase its military presence in the island. Furthermore, the UN Security Council renewed the mission of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in July. According to the media, the Turkish Cypriot authorities presented a draft agreement to the UN in September to formalise the presence of the UN mission. Until then, the mission personnel operated in the northern part of the island with the approval of the Greek Cypriot administration. In October, they again demanded a direct agreement with the Turkish Cypriot authorities, with warnings that the mission would have to leave the northern part of the island without it.

Gender, peace and security

The Cyprus peace process' technical committee on gender equality adopted a series of recommendations in the form of an action plan to promote women's participation in the process, addressed to the political leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities of the island. This was agreed in response to previous calls from the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary-General amidst women's chronic underrepresentation in the peace process. The committee's recommendations include a ceiling of two-thirds representation of either gender in all delegations as well as members and co-chairs of the working groups and technical committees of the peace process. Another pillar includes recommendations that the technical committee for gender equality should engage regularly with civil society, women's and youth organisations and collect their opinions on various issues of the process in coordination with the process' negotiators, including through seminars. They also recommend that the main delegations include a gender expert and that enough financial and human resources be earmarked to implement the plan. The UN Security Council endorsed the plan in UNSC Resolution S/RES/2618 (2022) of January 2022.

Serbia – Kosovo	
Negotiating actors	Serbia, Kosovo
Third parties	EU, UN, USA, Germany, France
Relevant agreements	Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia (1999), First agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations between the republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia (Brussels Agreement) (2013)

Summary:

Since the end of the 1998-1999 war between Serbia and the Kosovar Albanian armed group KLA, with the participation of NATO, the status of Kosovo has remained in dispute. This Albanian-majority land has historically been part of the Ottoman Empire, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and more recently the Republic of Serbia in Yugoslavia (as an autonomous region and autonomous province, successively). Following an interim international administration for Kosovo with a mandate from the UN Security Council (Resolution 1244, of 1999), a process to discuss its status began in 2006 under the aegis of the United Nations. Kosovo supported the proposal made by the UN Secretary-General's special envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, entailing internationally supervised independence for Kosovo and decentralisation for its Serbian minority, though Serbia rejected it. This was followed by fresh attempts at dialogue facilitated by a troika (USA, EU, Russia) that also failed. In 2008 Kosovo unilaterally proclaimed its independence and pledged to implement the Ahtisaari plan. The start of a new process of dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo in 2011 under facilitation of the EU (Brussels Process) opened the doors to rapprochement on technical and political issues. Since its inception there has been significant progress, including the agreement to dismantle parallel political, judicial and security structures of the Serb-inhabited areas of Kosovo; as well as to create an association/community of Serb municipalities in Kosovo. However, there are still outstanding pending challenges, especially in the field of implementation of the agreements, reconciliation and the final resolution of the political status.

The negotiating process between Serbia and Kosovo faced obstacles and was affected by the spike in tension between the parties amidst instability and war in Ukraine, while international actors called for intensified effort to reach an agreement to normalise relations.

One of the main challenges facing the process during the year was the dispute around reciprocity measures on vehicle registrations and identity cards. The 2021 provisional agreement on license plates expired in April 2022. In late June, the Kosovar government announced that it would require Kosovar license plates starting on 30 September, as well as temporary identity documents issued by Pristina to people with Serbian identification to enter Kosovo starting in August. The announcement received harsh criticism from Serbia and Kosovar Serb representatives and was followed by barricades and violent incidents that lasted several days. The Kosovar government blamed the Serbian government for the blockades and protests. Amidst international calls, Pristina postponed the implementation of the identification documents to 1 September. A meeting held on 18 August at the highest political level (between the Serbian president and the Kosovar prime minister, facilitated by the EU's High Representative for Foreign Policy) and described by the EU as a crisis management meeting, did not lead to an agreement and was followed by new consultations that involved the special envoys of the EU and the US. **On 27 August, the Serbian and Kosovar leaders reached a freedom of movement agreement whereby Serbia agreed to abolish its entry and exit documents for people with Kosovar**

identification and Kosovo agreed not to incorporate the reciprocal requirement. The Serbian government made it explicit that the agreement was due to practical issues, related to facilitating freedom of movement based on the 2011 agreement, but added that it was in no way a recognition of Kosovo.

On 1 September, the Kosovar prime minister announced a two-month deadline for the replacement of Serbian license plates with Kosovar ones on vehicles entering Kosovo, until 31 October. Amidst a climate of escalating tension, with new incidents of violence and international calls to delay the deadline, in October Kosovo postponed the notice period for drivers until 21 November, while delaying the entry of the full reciprocal requirement. The situation was further aggravated by the mass resignation in early November of hundreds of Kosovo Serb civil servants and officials, including police officers, mayors, judges and prosecutors from northern Kosovo, customs officials and Serb MPs to the Kosovar Parliament to protest the suspension of a regional director of the northern Kosovo police service for deciding not to issue tickets to vehicles with Serbian license plates. **The parties reached an agreement in extremis on 23 November in a meeting between the chief negotiators facilitated by the EU, preceded by an unsuccessful round on 21 November between the Serbian president and the Kosovar prime minister. The deal provided for Serbia to stop issuing license plates with the names of Kosovar towns and for Kosovo to cease all actions requiring vehicle registration. According to the EU, the parties also agreed to focus on negotiating a proposal to normalise relations presented by the EU facilitator and supported by France and Germany in September.** In addition, according to what the EU stated after the meeting, the parties to the conflict understood that all the agreements reached throughout the process should be implemented. Despite the freedom of movement agreement, tension continued in northern Kosovo, with some violent incidents against electoral facilities and the erection of barricades, which led Pristina to postpone until April 2023 the local elections scheduled in northern Kosovo for 18 December after mayors and public officials resigned en masse. The main party of the Kosovo Serb population, Serb List, which backs the positions of the Serbian government, rejected the elections and some civil society organisations and international governments (including the “Quintet” of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and USA) had called for a delay in the elections. The prolongation of the barricades led the EU special envoy to hold new meetings with the Kosovar and Serbian leaders in their respective capitals on 13 and 14 December, with the US special envoy participating. At the end of the month, the Serbian president announced that the barricades

Kosovo and Serbia reached an agreement on the dispute over vehicle license plates in a year of escalating tension and international actors urged them to move forward in normalising relations through a Franco-German proposal

would be removed, noting that a response had been given to Kosovar Serb demands. Kosovo had denied the existence of lists of Kosovar Serb citizens to be arrested or prosecuted for the protests and the Kosovar Serb police officer whose arrest triggered part of the protests was placed under house arrest.

Alongside the negotiated management of the license plate crisis, one of the most prominent developments of the year was the reinvigoration of international support for a final agreement to normalise relations through a Franco-German proposal, part of whose content circulated in the media in September. Previously, in May, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz had held separate meetings in Berlin with the Kosovar prime minister and the Serbian president in which he called for an agreement between the parties and pledged Germany’s support for the process. That same day, the EU special envoy met the two leaders in the German capital. In early September, the French president and the German chancellor sent joint letters to the Serbian and Kosovar leaders urging them both to step up their dialogue in a context they described as critical for security in Europe and stability in the Western Balkans region, as bilateral and regional disputes had to be resolved in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The letters also announced that their advisors Emanuel Bono and Jens Pletner would give direct support to EU special envoy Miroslav Lajcak in the negotiating process. Bono, Pletner and Lajcak travelled together to Pristina and Belgrade a few days later. In mid-September, the *Albanian Post* reported

that there was a proposal for an agreement that laid out a first phase in 2023 that included Serbia’s acceptance of Kosovo as an independent state and a subsequent 10-year scenario in which the EU would be willing to integrate the Western Balkans and in which the parties would accept mutual recognition, a prerequisite for entry. The plan also included aspects such as Kosovo’s entry into international organisations, such as the UN and the EU, through various phases. The Kosovar and Serbian leaders declined to comment on the information published in the media, stating that the proposal was not public, although Vucic said that Serbia would not accept Kosovo’s entry into international organisations. Kurti said that there was no final proposal, but there were various ideas under discussion, including a Franco-German initiative to strengthen EU facilitation and US support for the negotiating process. The US special envoy for the Western Balkans, Gabriel Escobar, said in October that Serbia would probably recognise Kosovo at some point, but that along the way Kosovo had to focus its efforts on achieving recognition from the five EU countries that have not yet recognised it and on the process of integrating into international structures. He also said that a prominent part of the agreement to

normalise relations should be the association of Kosovo Serb municipalities, which was already signed in the past but has not yet been implemented by the Kosovo government. In November, as part of Germany and France's renewed support for the negotiating process between Kosovo and Serbia and amidst lingering tensions in northern Kosovo, the French president met in Paris with the Serbian president and with the Kosovar prime minister and president at the same time as the Paris Peace Forum. The High Representative of the EU also met jointly with the parties in the same forum. As part of the dialogue facilitated by the EU, Kosovo and Serbia agreed on a roadmap for the implementation of the 2013 and 2015 energy agreements, which remained pending full implementation. In December, Kosovo applied to join the EU.

Gender, peace and security

Kosovar female civil society activists continued to demand participation in the negotiating process, as well

as in the consultations that the EU is conducting with actors in the country. Specifically, the Kosovar Women's Network (KWN, a platform that brings together more than 150 women's civil society organisations in Kosovo, including women from ethnic minorities in the region) sent a letter in February to EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Miroslav Lajcak expressing concern that neither the KWN nor any other women's rights organisation had been invited to the meetings held by Lajcak that month with civil society representatives, nor did they receive any information about the schedule. The KWN's letter criticised the lack of female participation and the lack of attention to the gender dimension in the EU-facilitated negotiating process and reminded the special representative of the commitments made and obligations assumed by the EU in relation to women's participation in the peace processes. The platform was again willing to provide names of women who could participate in the process, as well as to support consultations.

6. Peace negotiations in the Middle East

- The Middle East was the scene of four negotiating processes in 2022 that accounted for 10% of all peace processes worldwide.
- Negotiations over the Iranian nuclear programme oscillated between progress and impasse, but full compliance with the agreement reached in 2015 had not been restored by the end of the year.
- A truce agreement in force in Yemen for six months helped to reduce violence in the country, but at the end of the year, uncertainty persisted because the truce was not renewed and there were fears of a new escalation.
- Hamas and Fatah signed a new reconciliation agreement, but there was scepticism about its implementation given the failed experiences in recent years.
- Different formal negotiating schemes continued in Syria, but in line with previous years, no significant progress was observed in the search for a political solution after over a decade of armed conflict.

This chapter analyses the main peace processes and negotiations in the Middle East throughout 2022. First, it presents the main characteristics and general trends of the negotiating processes in the region. Second, it studies the evolution of contexts during the year, including references to the gender perspective and implementation of the international agenda on women, peace and security. At the beginning of this chapter, a map is also presented identifying the countries of the Middle East that were the scene of negotiations in 2022.

Table 6.1. Summary of peace processes and negotiations in the Middle East in 2022

Peace processes and negotiations	Negotiating actors	Third parties
Iran (nuclear programme)	Iran, EEUU, P4+1 (France, United Kingdom, Russia and China plus Germany)	EU, UN
Palestine	Hamas, Fatah	Algeria
Syria	Government, political and armed opposition groups	UN, EU, Russia, Turkey, Iran, in addition to Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and ICRC (observers in the Astana process)
Yemen	Government, Houthis / Ansar Allah, Saudi Arabia	UN, Oman, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

6.1. Peace negotiations in 2022: Regional trends


This chapter analyses four negotiating processes that took place in 2022 in the Middle East and account for 10% of the peace processes worldwide that year. Two of these processes are linked to armed conflicts (in Yemen and Syria) and the other two are connected to socio-political crises (one between the Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah and the other associated with the Iranian nuclear programme). With the exception of Palestine, which is internal in nature, the rest of the contexts were internationalised (Yemen and Syria) or international (tension over the Iranian nuclear programme). In geographical terms, two of the cases were located in the Gulf (Yemen and Iran) and the other two were in the Mashreq area (Palestine and Syria). The number of negotiations in the Middle East fell compared

to previous years, in which the case of Palestine-Israel was also included. This case is not analysed as a peace process due to the chronic impasse in the negotiations, suspended since 2014, and the gradual exhaustion of the two-state formula and Israel's persistent occupation, annexation and apartheid policies.¹

As for the **actors participating in the negotiations**, the respective governments were involved in all cases in the Middle East, both in direct and indirect meetings with other actors. **Government actors participated in negotiations with various kinds of actors, mainly other states and armed and unarmed opposition organisations in mostly formal negotiating schemes.** Thus, for example, in 2022, diplomatic contact continued

1. For further information, see the previous edition of this yearbook and "Violence, apartheid, dispossession: the price of ignoring the occupation of Palestine" in *Alert 2022! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*. Icaria: Barcelona: 2022.

Map 6.1. Peace negotiations in the Middle East in 2022



■ Countries with peace processes and negotiations in the Middle East in 2022.

between Iran and other countries that signed the 2015 nuclear agreement (France, the United Kingdom, Russia and China, plus Germany, known as the P4+1 group), in addition to the United States, which formally pulled out of the agreement in 2018 during the Trump administration. Iran continues to adhere to the agreement formally, but it has distanced itself from complying with its provisions in practice. US President Joe Biden promised to return to the nuclear agreement during the electoral campaign, but by the end of 2022, Washington had still not rejoined the agreement due to disagreements with Tehran over the conditions to restore it. In Yemen, the internationally recognised government supported by Saudi Arabia also remained involved in negotiations with the armed group known as the Houthis (formally Ansar Allah). Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who had headed the government since before the escalation of violence in the country in 2015, resigned from his office in 2022 and gave way to a presidential council that declared the objective of negotiating with the Houthis to reach a permanent ceasefire and a political solution for Yemen. In Syria, the government of Bashar Assad also remained formally involved both in the negotiating format sponsored by the United Nations, the Geneva process, and in the Astana process, which is promoted by its main supporter, Russia, along with Iran and Turkey. However, the Damascus regime was singled out for its lack of genuine political will to engage in the Geneva process, which involves Syrian political and social actors. The negotiations in the intra-Palestinian

dispute mainly involved Hamas, which has controlled the Gaza Strip since the political split, and Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA), which has maintained dominance over the West Bank. The possibility of setting up a national unity government was discussed during the negotiations in 2022, but in the end no consensus was reached in this regard.

The significant influence of regional and international actors on the dynamics of the dispute and on the prospects for negotiation became evident in some processes in the Middle East. This influence is based on their direct or indirect participation in some of the armed conflicts that are subject to negotiation, on their ability to influence the positions of some of the local actors involved in the respective conflicts and/or on their power and leverage on the international scene at a more general level and in some of the dialogue and negotiating mechanisms put in place. One context where this became more evident in 2022 was Yemen, where Saudi Arabia's growing interest in distancing itself from the war may have influenced the Yemeni government (supported by Riyadh) to agree to the nationwide truce agreement in April. After the failure to renew the cessation of hostilities agreement in October, Saudi Arabia held direct talks with the Houthis and this bilateral channel had emerged as the main space for negotiations by the end of the year. In Syria, signs of rapprochement in 2022 between the Assad regime and the government of Turkey (still one of the main sources

of support for the Syrian opposition) prompted various interpretations about its possible influence both on the dynamics of the conflict and on the talks. According to reports, the normalisation of relations between Syria and Turkey is a priority for Russia, which is one of the main backers of the Assad regime and wields great influence over Damascus. **Rising tension between Moscow and Western countries after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 also had repercussions on the negotiating processes in the Middle East.** Thus, for example, the EU decided not to invite Russia (as it traditionally did before) to the annual meeting on Syria held in Brussels in May. Weeks later, the Geneva process to address the conflict in Syria was blocked after Russia and Damascus demanded a change in the venue for the talks, considering that Switzerland was no longer an impartial actor due to its position on the war in Ukraine. Progress made on the talks on the Iranian nuclear programme in the first quarter as a result of intense diplomatic exchanges was also affected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which ended up undermining the dynamics of the dialogue and did not allow for the establishment of a consensus text. Towards the end of the year, Western countries involved in the negotiations with Iran over the nuclear programme also indicated Tehran's responsibility for the transfer of weapons (drones) to Russia, in violation of United Nations Resolution 2331, which endorsed the nuclear deal in 2015.

***Rising tension
between Moscow and
Western countries
after the invasion
of Ukraine had
repercussions on the
negotiating processes
in the Middle East***

Third parties were involved in all the negotiating processes in the Middle East. This role was played by international organisations, regional bodies and/or states that did mediation and facilitation work. **As in many other cases around the world, the United Nations played a prominent role in the processes in the region and was an active mediator in three of the four cases.** In Syria and Yemen, the United Nations led negotiating processes through "special envoys" (Geir Pedersen for Syria and Hans Grundberg for Yemen). In the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear programme, the UN's role was mainly channelled through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its supervision and facilitation of compliance with the provisions of the 2015 nuclear agreement. Regarding the role of regional organisations, the EU coordinated the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear programme in terms of contact between the parties that adhered to the agreement and by facilitating exchanges between Tehran and Washington. In Yemen, the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which played a role in the past in attempts to facilitate a political transition in the country after the overthrow of Ali Abdullah Saleh (2011), facilitated the formation of the new presidential leadership in 2022, conceived as a structure representing different forces in the country to resolve disagreements within the anti-Houthi faction. Regarding states involved in mediation and facilitation tasks, Algeria played a decisive role in the

rapprochement between Hamas and Fatah that led to the signing of an agreement between the parties and 12 other Palestinian organisations in October. Oman also played an important role in facilitating bilateral contacts between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis regarding the conflict in Yemen.

The **negotiating agendas** included various topics due to the unique and specific nature of each context. However, one significant issue was the attempt to establish ceasefire agreements. This subject has become prominent in recent years in Syria and Yemen and was especially important in Yemen in 2022. The nationwide truce reached in April, coinciding with the start of Ramadan, was the first since 2016 and had a significant impact on reducing violence in the country while it was in force (until October). Other aspects of the truce agreement in Yemen included humanitarian issues (access to fuel through the country's ports, the resumption of commercial flights from the capital, Sana'a, and the reopening of roads in various governorates). The UN special envoy sought a more far-reaching truce, but the negotiations failed mainly due to the Houthis' additional demands. Regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, the main issues of disagreement that prevented a return to effective compliance with the 2015 agreement were related to three issues. Firstly, the sanctions imposed on Iran (particularly the listing of the Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist organisation by the US); secondly, the guarantees on how long the agreement would last and, thirdly, the deadline to end the inspection of Iranian nuclear facilities. In Syria, the sanctions against Damascus were also a topic of interest in the Astana process, while in the Geneva process the debates continued to focus on the contents of a future Constitution for Syria. Given the deadlock of the process and the little progress observed in recent years, the UN special envoy tried to explore whether different actors involved in the Syrian conflict were willing to make concessions in exchange for reciprocal measures on issues such as kidnapped, detained and disappeared persons, humanitarian assistance and conditions for the dignified and safe return of refugees. The release of prisoners was also present in the Astana process and was one of the topics that the UN special envoy in Yemen wanted to include as part of the failed renewed truce agreement in October. As has happened on other occasions in the past, the agreement between the parties in Palestine focused on political and electoral issues. The agreement once again included a commitment to hold presidential and legislative elections within a year and recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

In terms of **implementing the international agenda on women, peace and security in the region**, many different challenges for women's equal and substantive

participation continued to be observed, despite the demands made by women in this area.. Thus, for example, the Algerian-backed agreement between the Palestinian organisations was signed with no Palestinian women present. There were none among the people signing the agreement at the ceremony held in Algiers. Palestinian feminist organisations have denounced the exclusion of women in discussions to address Palestinian reconciliation in recent years, warning of their marginal involvement in delegations. Throughout 2022, Yemeni activists repeated that female participation in power and decision-making were well below the 30% threshold agreed at the National Dialogue Conference in 2014. At the end of the year, the UN special envoy for Yemen also said that a decline had been observed in the already limited number of women involved in the various formal negotiating processes active in the country since 2015. In the new Presidential Leadership Council established in April, not one of the eight representatives of the different forces of the anti-Houthi faction were women. Consultative structures allowing regular communication between the respective special envoys and women's advisory groups continued to operate in both Syria and Yemen. As part of their dialogue and advocacy activities with other actors, feminist organisations and activists from the region expressed concern over various issues, including humanitarian needs in armed conflicts (Syria, Yemen), frustration over the impasse in the political process (Syria) and concern over the harassment and persecution of human rights activists and defenders, limitations on freedom of expression and restrictions on mobility due to the requirement of male guardians (Yemen).

Agreements were signed in both Palestine and Yemen in 2022, but the prospects at the end of the year were still uncertain

Finally, the **evolution of the negotiations in the Middle East in 2022** was uneven, but in general terms it illustrates the problems and obstacles besetting the processes in the region. **Agreements were signed in both Palestine and Yemen in 2022, but the prospects at the end of the year were still uncertain.** In Palestine, this was because of the scepticism with which the announcement of a new agreement was received, considering that similar pacts in the past have not materialised or led to effective intra-Palestinian reconciliation. Thus, sectors of the Palestinian population perceive that neither Hamas nor Fatah are genuinely committed to change because they benefit from the status quo. In Yemen, the nationwide truce clearly had positive effects on reducing hostilities, the number of victims of the armed conflict, the number of displaced people and levels of food insecurity. Although large-scale fighting had not resumed between the warring parties by the end of the year, the fact that the truce could not be extended after October raised concerns about the possibility of fresh violence in 2023. Progress and setbacks were observed in the Iranian nuclear programme in 2022, but the intense diplomatic activity did not lead to a consensus and by the end of the year the prospects for negotiations

remained murky. The US issued a series of demands to Tehran to return to the 2015 agreement, while Iran persisted in policies that progressively distanced it from complying with the provisions of the agreement, including on the production of enriched uranium. The different negotiating schemes in Syria to address the armed conflict remained under way, but no significant progress was observed in the search for a political solution and relief from the serious economic and humanitarian conditions faced by civilians.

In addition to the negotiating processes analysed in this chapter, there were other political dialogue initiatives in the region. In Iraq, after the October 2021 elections, escalating tension between different actors due to the inability to form a government and the occupation of Parliament by followers of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, acting Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi promoted political talks in the middle of the year to try to overcome the persistent political impasse. The talks

were attended by the president, the speaker of Parliament and leaders of different political parties, but it was boycotted by al-Sadr, whose group had won the largest number of seats in the elections. In line with her mandate to offer good offices and given the situation of political crisis, the UN special representative in Iraq and head of the mission in the country (UNAMI), Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, participated in the talks promoted by al-

Kadhimi and maintained contact with various actors in the country, including al-Sadr. The diplomat did not offer details about her efforts, but she assured that she had held various meetings in which potential road maps were discussed and that she had conducted shuttle diplomacy to foster communication between the parties. The persistent deadlock and al-Sadr's decision to withdraw from politics and shut down political bodies associated with his movement led to an escalation of violence in August. Finally, a year after the elections, a new government was set up in Iraq. The head of UNAMI, a mission whose priorities include supporting inclusive dialogue and national reconciliation in Iraq, was openly critical of Iraqi leaders from across the political spectrum for their lack of political will to put national interest first and for engaging in power struggles that prolonged the impasse. The UN representative insisted on the need to establish a stable, institutionalised and predictable mechanism to comprehensively and lastingly address the problems facing Iraq and stressed the importance of ensuring substantive female participation in the political process. The UN underlined its willingness to support efforts in this regard.

At the same time, other actors are trying to promote spaces for dialogue to address the main challenges in Iraq. The Iraq Dialogue Initiative, promoted since September 2021 by The Shaikh Group, has sought to bring together various actors from the Iraqi political spectrum to address the root causes of the conflicts in

the country, facilitating conversations between elites on the one hand and between elites and citizens on the other. Informal talks have been held in Basra, Baghdad, Mosul and the Kurdish region for this purpose. In 2022, regional and international actors also held talks on the challenges facing Iraq as part of the second round of the Baghdad conference. Held in Jordan in December in coordination with France and Iraq, the event was attended by representatives of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE, as well as the EU, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The first of these meetings had been held in Baghdad a year and a half earlier, in August 2021. **During the meeting in Jordan, it emerged that Saudi Arabia and Iran had reached an agreement to resume dialogue with a view to re-establishing bilateral relations.** Direct contact between Riyadh and Tehran began in April 2021 under the mediation of Iraq. The two countries have great influence over the conflicts in the region and their usually tense relations deteriorated since 2016.. From April 2021 until the end of 2022, five rounds of dialogue were held in Baghdad under the auspices of the Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who left office in October 2021. Finally, in October 2022, Israel and Lebanon reached an agreement on the demarcation of their maritime border after several years of intermittent mediation by the United States.

6.2 Case study analysis

Mashreq

Palestine	
Negotiating actors	Hamas, Fatah
Third parties	Algeria
Relevant agreements	Mecca Agreement (2007), Cairo agreement (2011), Doha agreement (2012), Beach Refugee Camp agreement (2014)

Summary:

Since the start of the confrontation between Hamas and Fatah, which materialized as of 2007 with a de facto separation between Gaza and the West Bank, several mediation initiatives have been launched in an attempt to reduce tensions and promote an approximation between these two Palestinian formations. It was not until May 2011 that the confluence of several factors –including the deadlock in negotiations between the PA and Israel, changes in the region as a result of the Arab revolts and the pressure exerted by the Palestinian public opinion– facilitated the signing of a reconciliation agreement between the parties. The diverging opinions between Hamas and Fatah on key issues have hampered the implementation of this agreement, which aims at establishing a unity government, the celebration of legislative and presidential elections, and reforming the security forces. Successive agreements have been announced between both parties since, but they have not been implemented.

As part of the negotiating process mediated by Algeria, **Hamas and Fatah signed a new reconciliation agreement in 2022.** The deal was presented as a new possibility for the main Palestinian factions to overcome a split that had only widened since 2006, after Hamas' electoral victory, which was not recognised internationally. This led to armed clashes between Hamas and Fatah in 2007 and worsened the territorial fragmentation of Palestine beyond that the Israeli occupation imposes. The reconciliation agreement reached in October 2022, similar to others signed in the last decade at the request of other mediating actors (primarily Qatar and Egypt), was received with scepticism by the Palestinian population and local analysts.

Algeria expressed its willingness to mediate in the conflict between the Palestinian factions in late 2021, when tensions had risen again due to the decision of the president of the Palestinian Authority and leader of Fatah, Mahmoud Abbas, to suspend (in April) what would have been the first Palestinian presidential and legislative elections in 15 years. The Algerian proposal was for the parties to address their differences and the organisation of conference on intra-Palestinian reconciliation before the Arab League summit, scheduled for November 2022. In January 2022, Hamas confirmed that a delegation headed by its leader, Ismail Haniyeh, would travel to Algeria for “talks on Palestinian unity” after receiving an invitation from the Algerian ambassador in Qatar, the country where the Islamist leader resides. Months later, in early July, a meeting took place in Algiers between Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, **Abbas and Haniyeh. It was the first direct meeting between the two Palestinian representatives since October 2016.**

Despite the photographs of the two leaders shaking hands and the fact that some described the meeting between Abbas and Haniyeh with the president of Algeria as “historic”, other observers considered it a matter of protocol and political courtesy towards the host for the 60th anniversary of Algerian independence (6 July), rather than as a sign of progress in the rapprochement of positions between the Palestinian factions. According to reports, there was no bilateral meeting between the leaders of Fatah and Hamas during the trip to Algiers. Media outlets and analysts highlighted the interest of both Palestinian factions in maintaining good relations with Algeria, one of the countries that has offered the strongest political and economic support to the Palestinian cause² and a staunch opponent of the normalisation of relations between the Arab countries and Israel as part of the Abraham Accords, which has viewed the rapprochement between Israel and Morocco, its main regional adversary, with suspicion and concern. In a context of declining support from other Arab countries, Algeria has maintained significant support for the Palestinian Authority (100 million dollars per year). The Islamist group Hamas is interested in the support of a country like Algeria, given the deterioration of its ties with other Arab

2. Daoud Kuttab, *Palestinian reconciliation must be championed post-Arab League summit*, *Arab News*, 19 October 2022.

countries amidst the revolts that have shaken the region. Throughout the year, Hamas and Fatah leaders continued to trade accusations for blocking reconciliation efforts. Nevertheless, Algerian efforts persisted and meetings were held with teams from the rival Palestinian factions. Thus, on 11 October, representatives of Hamas, Fatah and a dozen other Palestinian groups arrived in Algeria to participate in two days of talks aimed at discussing a proposal for reconciliation and national unity. The draft had been prepared by Algiers after its diplomats held separate talks with representatives of Hamas and Fatah. **The signing of the Algerian Declaration by Hamas, Fatah and the other 12 Palestinian organisations attending was announced on 13 October.** The text, officially titled “Algerian document for Palestinian reconciliation”, **recognises the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) headed by Abbas as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and supports the adoption of a national dialogue to ensure the involvement of all groups in this space. The declaration also includes a commitment to hold presidential and legislative elections within one year in Gaza, the West Bank, including Jerusalem.** The elections include a vote for the Palestinian Legislative Council, which operates as a parliament in the occupied Palestinian territory, and one for the Palestinian National Council, the PLO’s legislative body in which Palestinians and diaspora Palestinians also participate. Algeria offered to host the sessions of the Palestinian National Council after its election. The agreement also specifies that an Arab-Algerian team would be responsible for supervising the implementation of the agreement. **According to reports, there were talks regarding the formation of a unity government, but in the end no mention was made of this issue in the final document.** The declaration was signed by Haniyeh on behalf of Hamas and by the head of the Fatah delegation, Azzam al-Hamed. Others who signed the document were the secretary-general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Tala Naji; senior PLO official Ahmed Majdalani; the secretary-general of the Palestinian National Initiative, Mustafa Barghouti; and the secretary-general of the Palestinian People’s Party, Bassam al-Salhi. President Abbas was not present at the ceremony in which the agreement was made official. The signing of the declaration took place in the Palace of Nations in Algiers, a symbolic setting, as Algerian President Tebboune recalled, since it was the same place where Yasser Arafat declared the independence of the Palestinian state in 1988.

The Algerian declaration was welcomed by the UN Secretary-General, who urged the parties to fulfil the commitments made, especially with regard to holding elections. However, the announcement was met with

The Palestinian population was reticent and pessimistic about the prospects of the agreement between Hamas and Fatah, since similar announcements in the past have not materialised in effective reconciliation

scepticism in Palestine. After dozens of meetings, rounds of contacts and over six previous agreements between the parties, including for the formation of a unity government, **the Palestinian population was pessimistic about the prospects of the agreement, partly due to similar announcements in the past that have failed to materialise.** A perception exists that the main Palestinian factions are not truly committed to the change because they benefit from the status quo. According to opinion polls released in the last quarter of 2022, two thirds of the Palestinian population does not believe that reconciliation efforts will lead to substantive changes on the ground. At the end of the year, a new round of talks between Palestinian factions in Algeria was announced, but no further details were revealed about the meetings or about the implementation of the Palestinian reconciliation agreement reached in Algiers.

At the Arab League summit in November, in which Algeria aimed to reaffirm a position of regional power, the Palestinian issue was once again present and was pointed out as one of the priorities for discussion. However, the first face-to-face meeting of the Arab League after the COVID-19 pandemic was held with several heads of state absent, including those of Morocco, Bahrain and the UAE, all of which signed the Abraham Accords, as well as the head of Saudi Arabia, which is expected to sign the agreements to normalise relations with Israel. The Arab League summit closed with a communiqué reiterating support for the Palestinian cause and commitment to some positions adopted in the past by Arab countries, in line with what is known as the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Nevertheless, **analysts and observers noted that the summit repeated known commitments and avoided controversial issues, including addressing and positioning itself on the Abraham Accords.** Critics said that regarding the Palestinian issue, the final declaration of the Arab League summit in Algeria is nothing more than rhetoric, since the normalisation agreements with Israel are not criticised even though they contravene principles established in the charter of the organisation.³

Gender, peace and security

The signing of the Algerian document for Palestinian reconciliation once again demonstrated the marginalisation of Palestinian women from the highest decision-making spaces, including in the field of peace and reconciliation. **No women signed the 13 October agreement in Algiers.** This exclusion persists despite the formal commitments made by the Palestinian Authority to international frameworks such as the Women, Peace and Security Agenda or the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),

3. Mustafá Fetouri, *Arab leaders claim to promote Palestine, but actually do the opposite*, *Middle East Monitor*, 10 November 2022.

which was signed by the PA in 2014, but has not yet been published in the official Palestinian gazette. Palestinian women's organisations and analysts have stressed that there have been virtually no women in the delegations to address Palestinian reconciliation except for the meeting that led to the 2017 agreement, in which four women from three political parties participated. Nor has there been a significant female presence in the technical committees established to implement the reconciliation agreements signed in the past.

Syria	
Negotiating actors	Government, political and armed opposition groups
Third parties	UN, EU, Russia, Turkey, Iran, in addition to Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and ICRC (observers in the Astana process)
Relevant agreements	Geneva Communiqué from the Action Group for Syria (2012); UNSC Resolution 2254 in support of the International Syria Support Group Roadmap for a Peace Process (Vienna Statements (2015))

Summary:

Given the serious consequences of the armed conflict in Syria and amidst concern about the regional repercussions of the crisis, various regional and international actors have tried to facilitate a negotiated solution and commit the parties to a cessation of hostilities. However, regional actors' and international powers' different approaches to the conflict, together with an inability to reach consensus in the UN Security Council, have hindered the possibilities of opening the way to a political solution. After a brief and failed attempt by the Arab League, the UN took the lead in the mediation efforts, led by special envoys Kofi Annan (2012), Lakhdar Brahimi (2012-2014), Staffan de Mistura (2014-2018) and Geir Pedersen (since 2018). Other initiatives have come from the EU, United States, Russia and leaders of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG). In 2015, the ISSG peace talks in Vienna -led by Washington and Moscow and in which twenty countries and international organizations participated- resulted in a peace plan for Syria that was endorsed by Security Council resolution 2254 the ONU. As of 2017, in parallel to the UN-led Geneva process - which has included intra-Syrian talks promoted by De Mistura- a new channel began: the Russian-backed Astana process, which also involve Turkey and Iran. The various rounds of negotiations held since the beginning of the armed conflict have shown the deep differences between the parties and have not been able to halt the high levels of violence in the country.

In line with the situation observed in recent years, **formal negotiating schemes to address the armed conflict in Syria remained active in 2022, though no significant progress was made in the search for a political solution** after more than a decade of hostilities. Although the levels of lethality of the conflict have been decreasing in recent years, the country continues to be the scene of continuous acts of violence involving local, regional and international actors and the humanitarian crisis is at its

worst level since the start of the war.⁴ Given the significant role played by Russia in the Syrian armed conflict and in the ongoing negotiating schemes, they were indirectly affected by the war in Ukraine and its consequences, particularly by the significant deterioration in Moscow's relations with other international actors.

The UN-backed negotiating process for Syria continued to be promoted by the organisation's special envoy, Geir Pedersen. In this context, **two rounds of meetings were held with the Constitutional Committee throughout 2022, the seventh and eighth of this process initiated in September 2019**. The first meeting of the year (seventh round) took place in Geneva between 21 and 25 March. In four days of sessions, issues related to governance, state identity, symbols of the state and structure and functions of the public administrations were addressed. At the end of the four days, however, the Syrian opposition said that no significant changes had taken place and repeated its criticism of the government for its lack of effective involvement in the process. In this context, a new EU-backed meeting on Syria was held in Brussels in May, with the participation of around 50 countries, international organisations and UN agencies. The conference "Supporting the future of Syria and the region", the sixth annual meeting of its kind, aimed to support the United Nations' efforts to promote a political solution and raise funds for the Syrian refugee population and the countries hosting them. The EU decided not to invite Russia to this meeting and its high representative for foreign affairs and security justified the move by saying that, given its aggression against Ukraine, Moscow had shown that it had no interest in contributing to peace in the world.

The next (eighth) round of the Constitutional Committee was held between 30 May and 3 June. Four topics were discussed, one per day: using unilateral coercive measures from a constitutional perspective, preserving and strengthening state institutions, upholding the supremacy of the Constitution and the hierarchy of international agreements and pursuing transitional justice. On the fifth day, the parties presented and discussed their observations on the different issues. Although the UN special envoy said that some areas for potential rapprochement had been identified, significant disagreements persisted in others. Pedersen lamented the slow pace of the process and the inability to specify issues that could form part of an interim agreement. A ninth round of the Constitutional Committee was then scheduled for 25 to 29 July, but it did not take place. The Syrian government refused to participate and demanded a change in the venue for the negotiations, in line with the demands of its ally, Russia. Moscow proposed changing the meetings from Geneva, where they have been held since 2019, to a city like Muscat, Abu Dhabi, Algiers or Astana, since it no longer considered Switzerland an impartial actor.

4. See the summary on Syria in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in *Alert 2023! Report on armed conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Icaria: Barcelona, 2023.

Faced with this situation, Pedersen asked all the actors involved to protect the political process in Syria from the disagreements they may have in other parts of the world. The UN special envoy tried to reactivate the negotiations in the following months and in meetings with members of the UN Security Council, he expressed concern about Damascus' lack of political will to become involved in the Constitutional Committee's work. **At the end of the year, Pedersen openly acknowledged that no serious efforts were being made to resolve the conflict politically. Nevertheless, the diplomat announced that he would persist in his political efforts, concentrating on his "step-by-step, step-for-step" approach,** which he pursued throughout the year. With this goal in mind, Pedersen held meetings in 2022 with multiple actors (the Syrian government and opposition, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, the Arab League, Egypt, Qatar, Russia, Turkey, the US and the UK) to explore actions that could impact the dynamics of the conflict and build trust. Through these meetings, he sought to identify the concessions that different actors could make in exchange for reciprocal actions from others on various issues, including the situation of kidnapped, detained, and disappeared persons; humanitarian assistance; conditions for the dignified, safe and voluntary return of refugees; socio-economic conditions and diplomatic affairs. Under this rationale, in December Pedersen met with representatives of the Syrian government and with the president of the Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC) that represents the Syrian opposition.

At the end of the year, UN Special Envoy for Syria acknowledged that no serious efforts were being made to resolve the armed conflict politically

Meanwhile, **two new rounds of meetings were held in 2022 as part of the "Astana" process**, which has been active since January 2017 and promoted by Russia, Iran and Turkey, three of the international actors most involved militarily in the armed conflict in Syria. The 18th round of this format took place in the capital of Kazakhstan, Nur-Sultan (formerly Astana), between 15 and 16 June, and the 19th round was held there between 22 and 23 November. According to official notes released after these meetings, the commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria and to UNSC Resolution 2254, which calls for a political solution to the conflict, were reaffirmed during the talks. Demonstrating the sensitivities and interests of the international actors that dominate the process, the participants also stressed their willingness to continue collaborating in the fight against terrorist actors and those with separatist agendas, while the use of unilateral sanctions was condemned. The working group on kidnapped, detained and disappeared persons created as part of the Astana process may have achieved the release of some prisoners. Representatives from Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross (CICR) continued to

participate as observers in the meetings of the Astana process. A new round of meetings was expected for the first quarter of 2023. Russia, Turkey and Iran also discussed the situation in Syria elsewhere, such as in a meeting in Tehran in July.

One of the most significant events observed during the year due to its potential impact on the dynamics of the conflict and the negotiations were the signs of rapprochement between Turkey and Syria. The government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a key supporter of Syrian opposition groups, showed signals of being willing to normalise relations with Bashar Assad's regime. In late December, the defence ministers and intelligence chiefs of Turkey and Syria met in Moscow in the first public meeting of its kind since the armed conflict started over a decade ago. The parties reportedly discussed immigration and the Kurdish issue. A week later, Erdogan assured that he was willing to meet with Assad "to promote peace and stability in Syria" and announced that the trilateral talks between Russia, Turkey and Syria that began in Moscow would continue. This would have been unthinkable just a few years ago, when both leaders traded harsh accusations. The possible thaw in Turkish-Syrian relations was received with particular concern by Syrian opposition groups and by the Syrian Kurdish group YPG. These meetings took place while Turkey was threatening a new incursion into northeastern Syria after blaming Kurdish groups for an attack in Istanbul in November.⁵

The change in Ankara's stance is attributed to various factors. Analysts point out that Turkey wants to take advantage of its stronger position on the international stage to press for its interests in Syria. A member of NATO, Turkey has tried to position itself as a mediator between Russia and the West and offers a safe space for Russian businesses and citizens in a context of increasing international sanctions against Moscow. Erdogan would like to force the withdrawal of Kurdish forces and prevent the establishment of autonomy in Syria. Ankara would also like for Damascus to consider the YPG a terrorist group and insists on creating a 30-kilometre buffer zone along the Turkish-Syrian border. Meanwhile, the Assad regime's preconditions for normalising relations with Ankara included the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Syria and the end of its support for rebel groups. However, Damascus may be forced to talk with Turkey because, as analysts suggest, the normalisation of Turkish-Syrian relations may have become one of Russia's key objectives. As observers have noted, Erdogan's electoral calculations are also a factor, as he is facing general elections in June 2023. Polls indicate that 60% of the Turkish population approves of negotiations with the Assad regime with the expectation that a re-establishment of relations could lead to the return of the Syrian refugee population (3.7

5. See the summary on Turkey (southeast) in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in *Alert 2023! Report on armed conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Icaria: Barcelona, 2023.

million people in Turkey).⁶ Turkey is also interested in being involved in reconstruction projects in Syria. Finally, during 2022 the normalisation of relations intensified between the Syrian regime and the UAE, a country that also supported parts of the Syrian opposition in the past. After calling for Syria's reinstatement in the Arab League in 2021, the UAE became the first country to host Syrian President Assad in his first visit to an Arab country since the outbreak of the war.

Gender, peace and security

Syrian women have been demanding greater and more substantive participation in political discussions on the future of Syria since the negotiations began. As a result of these efforts, in 2019 they achieved 30% representation in the Constitutional Committee established as part of the UN-sponsored intra-Syrian talks. Throughout the year, the Women's Advisory Board (WAB) also remained active. Established in 2016 and made up of 15 Syrian women of different sensibilities, the WAB is the first consultative structure of its kind created by a UN special envoy. The WAB held regular discussions with Pedersen and his team to address issues related to the conflict and its resolution and the political process, offering its insight into the daily situation of Syrian women, men and boys. WAB meetings were mostly held in Geneva, Switzerland, although there was also a meeting in Oslo, Norway earlier in the year. The members of the WAB also continued to participate in other forums, such as the annual conference on Syria in Brussels promoted by the EU. During meetings with Pedersen and other senior UN officials, the WAB and other civil society actors expressed their concern and frustration at the deadlock in the political process and the enormous humanitarian needs facing the Syrian population.

The Gulf

Iran (nuclear programme)	
Negotiating actors	Iran, EEUU, P4+1 (France, United Kingdom, Russia and China plus Germany)
Third parties	EU, UN
Relevant agreements	Joint Plan of Action (provisional agreement, 2013), Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015)
Summary:	
Under scrutiny by the international community since 2002, the Iranian nuclear programme has become one of the main sources of tension between Iran and the West, particularly affecting Iran's relationship with the United States and Israel. After more than a decade of negotiations, and despite the fact that various proposals were made to resolve the conflict, the parties failed to reach an agreement and remained almost unchanged in their positions. The US,	

Israel and several European countries remained distrustful of Tehran and convinced of the military objectives of its atomic programme, whilst Iran continued to insist that its nuclear activities were strictly for civilian purposes and in conformance with international regulations. In this context, the Iranian atomic programme continued to develop whilst the UN Security Council, US and EU imposed sanctions on Iran and threats of military action were made, mainly by Israel. Iran's change of government in 2013 favoured substantive talks on nuclear issues, facilitated new rounds of negotiations and led to the signing of agreements aimed at halting the Iranian atomic programme in exchange for lifting the sanctions. Negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme have been met with resistance by Israel, certain countries such as Saudi Arabia and groups in the United States in a context marked by historical distrust, questions of sovereignty and national pride, disparate geopolitical and strategic interests, regional struggles and more.

The negotiations over the Iranian nuclear programme experienced many ups and downs during the year, but at the end of 2022 the general trend was one of blocked efforts to restore the agreement reached in 2015 (Joiny Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Beyond the issues under discussion in these talks, the overall process was affected by various factors. These included the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its consequent repercussions in rising tensions between various actors on the global scene; the international condemnation of Tehran for the intensification of its crackdown on the massive internal protests following the death in police custody of a young woman for not properly wearing the veil; and the US midterm elections in November, which also shaped Washington's calculations and position on the Iranian nuclear programme. The last negotiating process to restore the nuclear agreement was reactivated three years after the Trump administration decided to pull out of the nuclear agreement in 2018 and intensify sanctions against Iran. US presidential candidate Joe Biden promised that the US would return to the agreement during the election campaign in exchange for Iran's strict compliance with the commitments made. Tehran has formally maintained its adherence to the JCPOA, but in practice it has taken actions that contravene its provisions, especially regarding the limits for uranium enrichment.

Between April and June 2021, six rounds of negotiations were held in Vienna, which were suspended after the presidential election won by Ebrahim Raisi. The process resumed in October 2021 and the eighth round that began in December 2021 continued in the first few months of 2022. **In March 2022, after weeks of intense diplomatic activity, it seemed that an agreement had been very close and that the parties were close to a final text that addressed almost all the substantive issues they had raised.** However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the rise in international tension ended up affecting the dynamics of collaboration and the disagreements between Tehran and Washington on key

6. Fehim Tastekin, "Fledgling Turkish-Syrian dialogue faces bumpy road ahead", *Al-Monitor*, 14 January 2023.

issues once again blocked the process. The EU, which coordinated the talks, tried to reactivate the process in the following months. European External Action Service Deputy Secretary-General Enrique Mora travelled to Tehran in March to meet senior Iranian officials and address some of the most divisive issues. There were exchanges of proposals between the US and Iran and a round of indirect meetings in Qatar at the end of June, but no progress was made. In July, the head of European diplomacy, Josep Borrell, assured that “the best possible deal” had been submitted for the parties’ consideration. In August, the negotiations between the parties were resumed in Vienna and headway was made on some issues. Iran and the US exchanged a series of counterproposals, but they did not lead to an agreement. The last meetings between the negotiators took place in September, shortly before tension in Iran escalated due to anti-government protests.

The disagreements between the parties focus on three issues. The first has to do with Washington’s listing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation in 2019. This was an unprecedented decision, since it affects a state body from a third country, in this case a military body operating under the direct control of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, independently of the rest of the Iranian Armed Forces, which projects its influence in various countries in the region. Tehran wants Washington to remove the IRGC from its list of terrorist organisations during negotiations over the nuclear programme. The US government has insisted that it will only remove the IRGC from the list if certain conditions are met. In March, it was suggested that both Iran and the US refrain from attacking retired or active officers of the other country, in a context in which Tehran is still seeking reprisals for the assassination of senior General Qassem Soleimani by the Trump administration in January 2020. Later, Washington reportedly proposed removing the IRGC from the list in exchange for a broader and stricter nuclear agreement that goes beyond 2030 (the expiration date of the JCPOA) and includes new issues, such as Iran’s support for militias in the region.

A second point of contention has to do with the sanctions against Iran: Tehran insists that it will not reduce its enriched uranium reserves until Washington overturns the sanctions, while Washington assures that it will not lift the sanctions until these reserves decrease. Neither country can agree on which sanctions should be withdrawn or on the duration of a new agreement. **Tehran wants guarantees that the agreement will last and will not be struck down by a new US government.** According to analysts, some in Tehran even doubt whether Biden will be willing to keep it during his

term of office. Meanwhile, the US government says that it cannot satisfy Iran’s requirement because it cannot bind future administrations in the way that Tehran wishes. Another divisive issue revolves around the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) investigation into Iran’s past activities related to nuclear material and three undeclared sites. Tehran stressed in September that the end of this investigation is a precondition for its full compliance with the nuclear deal. However, as analysts point out, the US and other European countries involved in the negotiations do not wish to nor can they limit the mandate of a United Nations agency whose mission is to monitor nuclear activity.

Regarding this last issue, France, Germany and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement denouncing that Tehran was reopening issues related to its international obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and stated that its demands cast serious doubts on its intentions and commitment to the JCPOA. Meetings in Vienna on this issue between the director of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi, and the head of the Iranian nuclear agency, Mohammad Eslami, produced no positive results. Thus, the **IAEA Governing Council passed a no-confidence resolution in late November (with China and Russia voting against it)**

condemning Iran and urging it to comply with the IAEA investigation. In response, the Iranian government announced days later that it had begun to enrich uranium to 60%, at the Fordow facility, a level just below what is needed to produce nuclear weapons. This percentage is also well above the 3.67% limit established in the nuclear agreement. Previously, the IAEA had warned that Iran had already accumulated 62.3 kilos of 60% uranium produced at Natanz, its main nuclear facility. The agency also warned that its verification and monitoring work had been severely affected by Tehran’s decision to dismantle the devices installed for the surveillance and supervision of the JCPOA. In December, an IAEA delegation returned to Tehran to try to move towards an agreement. In this context, **the UN Secretary-General called on Iran to reverse the steps it had taken to distance itself from implementing the agreement since July 2019.** Previously, the head of the United Nations had warned that the delays and lack of diplomatic progress to re-establish the JCPOA undermined confidence that the agreement would help Iran to maintain a peaceful nuclear programme. During the last quarter of the year, Western countries said that Iran was responsible for transferring weapons, specifically drones, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2331, which was approved to support the JCPOA in 2015. Russia may have used these weapons in Ukraine.

In March, a deal on the nuclear agreement seemed close, but the dynamics of the negotiations were affected by the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Yemen	
Negotiating actors	Government, Houthis / Ansar Allah, Saudi Arabia
Third parties	UN, Oman, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Relevant agreements	Stockholm Agreement (2018), Riyadh Agreement (2019)

Summary:

forced Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down as president after more than 30 years in office. The eventful aftermath led to a rebellion by Houthi forces and former President Saleh against the transitional government presided over by Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who was forced to flee in early 2015. In March 2015, an international coalition led by Saudi Arabia decided to intervene militarily in the country in support of the deposed government. Since then, levels of violence in the conflict have escalated. Given this turn of events, the United Nations, which has been involved in the country since the beginning of the transition, has tried to promote a political solution to the conflict, joined by some regional and international actors. Despite these initiatives, the meetings were unsuccessful, and the talks have been at an impasse since mid-2016. It was not until late 2018 that meetings between the parties resumed and led to the signature of the Stockholm Agreement at the end of that year, arousing cautious expectations about the possibilities of a political solution to the conflict. The hostilities have significantly worsened the security and humanitarian situation in the country. In 2019, under the mediation of Saudi Arabia, various actors signed the Riyadh Agreement to try to resolve the struggles and differences within the anti-Houthis faction.

The year 2022 was one of change and oscillation in Yemen, including an escalation of the armed conflict at the start of the year, a ceasefire agreement between April and October and a climate of uncertainty and the prospect of a possible intensification of the fighting in the last quarter because the truce was not renewed.

As in previous years, the negotiations were promoted primarily by the United Nations, although Oman also played an important role in the bilateral meetings between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis throughout the year. Disagreements between the anti-Houthi actors continued, despite the accord mediated by Riyadh in the past and some important institutional developments.

The year began with a rise in violence that had previously been observed in 2021 as part of the Houthis' campaign to take control of the central city of Maarib that was repelled by armed groups supported by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Houthis' attacks against the UAE and Saudi Arabia and the reprisals from both countries set off alarms of the possible regional expansion of the conflict and made January 2022 the month with the highest number of civilian casualties in Yemen in the last three years.⁷ In February, the UN Security Council approved the resolution renewing the sanctions against Yemeni actors, including the Houthis as an actor subject to a weapons embargo (UNSC Resolution 2624). In this

context, UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg continued with his activities. In early March, the diplomat held consultations with different Yemeni actors (political party and civil society representatives and experts) in Amman, Jordan to identify principles and priorities for a future political process in Yemen. In mid-March, Grundberg met in Muscat (Oman) with the Houthis' chief negotiator, Mohamed Abdulsalam, who welcomed the proposal for a truce during Ramadan, a holy month for the Muslim population. In late March, the Houthis announced a three-day truce and said they were willing to release prisoners.

The 1 April the UN formally announced that, for the first time since 2016, the parties to the conflict had agreed to a nationwide truce for an initial period of two months with the possibility of an extension. The truce began on 2 April, coinciding with the beginning of Ramadan. The UN insisted that the purpose of the truce was to create a favourable environment for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and that the parties should not take advantage of it to regroup to resume armed operations later. The truce consisted of five points, including military and humanitarian aspects. First, it established a halt to all types of military offensives (land, air and sea) inside and outside Yemen and the maintenance of existing military positions on the ground to date. Second, the agreement provided for the entry of ships with fuel (18 in two months, as specified) to the port of Al Hudaydah. Third, it allowed the resumption of commercial flights (two per week) to and from Sana'a, the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital, with two specific destinations: Jordan and Egypt. Fourth, the truce stipulated that talks would begin to agree on opening motorways in various governorates of the country to facilitate the movement of civilians, including Ta'iz, which has been besieged by the Houthis for years. Finally, the agreement committed the parties to continue working with the UN special envoy to take steps to end the war.⁸ Analyses of the different actors' motivations to sign the truce included the wear and tear of two years of intense campaigning in Maarib, the Houthis' limited access to fuel, the serious military problems and internal struggles faced by the government of Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi and Riyadh's growing interest in distancing itself from the war.⁹

A few days after the truce was announced, major changes took place in the internationally recognised government of Yemen. **On 7 April, Hadi resigned from his position and transferred all his powers to the Presidential Leadership Council, made up of eight members, all of them men.** This decision was preceded by intra-Yemeni talks that brought together different anti-Houthi actors in Riyadh in late March at the request of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

7. For further information, see the summary on Yemen in chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) in Escola de Cultura de Pau, (Armed conflicts) in *Alert 2023! Report on armed conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*, Icaria: Barcelona, 2023.
8. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen, *United Nations Initiative For A Two-Month Truce*, OSESGY, 1 April 2022.
9. International Crisis Group, *How Houthi-Saudi Negotiations Will Make or Break Yemen*, Crisis Group Middle East Briefing no. 89, 29 December 2022.

According to reports, Riyadh pressured Hadi to resign and both Saudi Arabia and the UAE played a decisive role in selecting the members of the Presidential Leadership Council, which then came to be led by Rashad al-Alimi.¹⁰ The presidential declaration that announced the creation of this council recognised that its tasks include negotiating with the Houthis to reach a permanent ceasefire and a political solution that can take Yemen from a state of war to one of peace.¹¹ The Consultation and Reconciliation Commission was also created, made up of 50 members and a legal and economic team to advise the Presidential Leadership Council.¹² However, the establishment of the Presidential Leadership Council did not resolve the differences and struggles between the anti-Houthi forces, which continued to lead to disagreements throughout the year.

In the months that followed, the UN continued with its diplomatic efforts, which took shape in direct negotiations between the parties in Amman and “shuttle diplomacy” conducted by the special envoy. Grundberg visited Sana’a for the first time since he took office, met with the head of the Presidential Leadership Council and travelled to Riyadh, Muscat and Tehran (with the Houthis’ support) to explore a possible extension of the truce. The UN also promoted the creation of a military coordination committee made up of representatives of the government, the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis. Despite some violations, the suspension of hostilities established by the truce was generally fulfilled. At the same time, commercial flights were restored from Sana’a in May (the first in almost six years) and the arrival of oil through the port of Al Hudaydah partially alleviated the fuel crisis in the country, which was also affected by the repercussions of the war in Ukraine. The United Nations mission (UNMHA) also continued its work in Al Hudaydah, where it supports the implementation of the agreement on this port and on those of Salif and Ras Issa as part of the 2018 Stockholm Agreement. Furthermore, the mandate of the mission was approved for one more year in July 2022. There was no progress on reopening the roads in Ta’iz and other governorates, despite the meetings held between the parties. The Houthis’ refusal to accede to the government’s demands supported the feeling within the Presidential Leadership Council that the implementation of the truce agreement was benefiting their adversaries.

Despite these obstacles, **the ceasefire agreement was renewed twice, in June and in August, but not in October.**

The truce agreement in Yemen had positive effects on decreasing the number of victims of the armed conflict, the number of displaced people and levels of food insecurity

The UN special envoy had proposed an extension of the truce from two to six months along with another set of measures: the payment of salaries and pensions to civil servants, the opening of specific routes in Ta’iz and other governorates, additional destinations for flights from Sana’a, unrestricted entry of fuel through the port of Al Hudaydah, a commitment to release detainees and a strengthening of de-escalation mechanisms through the military coordination committee. According to him, the Yemeni government was willing to renew the truce despite its reluctance due to the persistent blockade of Ta’iz. The Houthis were held responsible for the failure to uphold the agreement by including additional demands, particularly their intention that the military forces under their control be included in the payment of salaries to public officials. According to reports, the group demanded that the funds be transferred to an account controlled by the Houthis and that the money come from government oil and gas exports. Amidst growing uncertainty due to the possibility of a resumption of violence, **the UN special envoy persisted in his diplomatic activities in the last quarter in order to re-establish the truce and highlighted its positive effects. According to estimates, the victims of the conflict fell by 60%, forced displacements dropped by half and the number of people affected by food insecurity was also partially reduced.** Until late 2022, large-scale hostilities had not resumed and some aspects of the UN-sponsored agreement remained in place, such as the reopening of the Sana’a airport to civilian flights and oil imports through Al Hudaydah. Nevertheless, some called attention to indications that the parties were taking advantage of the de facto pause in hostilities to prepare for a new phase of violence and that they had stepped up their economic warfare.

In this context, **the bilateral dialogue between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis remained active, with Oman facilitating.** These talks, which already had precedents (2019), were resumed virtually in June 2022 and became the main negotiating track during the last quarter. Although the parties struck a more conciliatory tone, by the end of the year there were no related agreements and the parties offered different versions of the terms of the talks. Sources close to the talks reported that the Houthis wanted a written commitment from Riyadh that would satisfy their demands to end the armed conflict, including lifting all kinds of restrictions on the Sana’a airport and the port of Al Hudaydah, the payment of salaries, including for their security forces, the withdrawal of Saudi Arabia

10. The Presidential Leadership Council is made up of representatives of various anti-Houthi groups. In addition to Rashad al-Alimi, who was the interior minister in the early 2000s, the Council consists of Maarib Governor Sultan al-Arada, National Resistance Forces leader Tareq Saleh, Giants Brigades Commander Abdulrahman Abu Zara’a, Chief of Staff of the Presidential Office Abdullah al-Alimi Bawaseer, Member of Parliament Othman al-Majali, Southern Transitional Council President Aiderous al-Zubaidi and Hadramawt Governor Faraj al-Bahsani.

11. Security Council Report, *May 2022 Monthly Forecast: Yemen*, 29 April 2022.

12. Saba, *Presidential declaration on the transfer of power and the formation of a Presidential Leadership Council*, Saba (Yemeni News Agency), 7 April 2022.

from the war, the end of Riyadh's support for the Presidential Leadership Council and payment to the Houthis for reconstruction. Some analysts pointed to the risks stemming from the exclusion of other Yemeni actors from the negotiations between Riyadh and the Houthis and underlined the importance of restoring the multilateral format that the UN was trying to promote. Finally, various international actors were involved in the Yemeni negotiating process throughout the year. For example, the US continued to be involved through its special envoy for Yemen, Timothy Lenderking, who continued to work in coordination with the UN special envoy. The armed conflict in Yemen was also high on US President Biden's agenda in his meetings with the Saudi leadership during his visit to the region in July. The self-styled "Quintet", made up of Oman, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the US and the UK, also held meetings on Yemen during 2022.

Gender, peace and security

Despite their prominent role in peace and security activities, Yemeni women remained excluded from power and decision-making relevant to a political resolution of the conflict. During the Feminist Summit that brought together Yemeni political and civil society actors with the UN special envoy in December, Grundberg noted that there had been a persistent decline in the already limited number of women involved in formal peace negotiations since 2015. During 2022, Yemeni activists repeated that participation levels were well below the 30% representation threshold in decision-making agreed in 2014 during the conclusions of the National Dialogue Conference. There were no women in the committees

established after the adoption of the Stockholm agreement in 2018 (on prisoner exchange, military security and Ta'iz). In the intra-Yemeni talks sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which bring together anti-Houthi actors, female participation in different spheres has improved, but women remained excluded from discussions on security and anti-terrorism. The new Presidential Leadership Council created after Hadi's resignation in April that tried to represent the different anti-Houthi forces was formed without any women present. In the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission, the executive team included a woman among its five members.

Throughout the year, the UN special envoy held various meetings with Yemeni actors who are not among the parties to the dispute represented in the negotiations, including women activists, experts and civil society representatives. As part of his attempts to promote a multilevel peace process, Grundberg held such a meeting in Amman in May to discuss the implementation of the truce and priorities for a future political process. The office of the special envoy organised another meeting in November to address the challenges of including a gender perspective in Track II activities. Yemeni groups also organised their own discussions and took advantage of platforms such as UN Security Council briefings to articulate their demands, including defence of the 30% threshold for decision-making, the urgent need to address the economic recovery of the country and a halt to arms transfers that perpetuate the cycle of violence. Various Yemenis also denounced the harassment of human rights activists defenders and demanded an end to the growing restrictions on women's freedom of expression and mobility, especially criticising the Houthis' mandatory impositions of male guardians (*mahram*).

Annex 1. Summary of armed conflicts in 2022¹

Conflict ² -beginning-	Type ³	Main parties ⁴	Intensity ⁵
			Trend ⁶
AFRICA			
Burundi -2015-	Internationalised internal	Government, Imbonerakure Youth branch, political party CNDD-FDD, political party CNL, armed groups RED-TABARA, FPB (previously FOREBU), FNL	1
	Government		=
Cameroon (Ambazonia/ North West and South West) -2018-	Internationalised internal	Government of Cameroon, Government of Nigeria, political-military secessionist movement including the opposition Ambazonia Coalition Team (ACT, including IG Sako, to which belong the armed groups Lebialem Red Dragons and SOCADEF) and the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC, including IG Sisiku, whose armed wing is the Ambazonia Defence Forces, ADF), multiple militias and smaller armed groups	3
	Self-government, Identity		=
CAR -2006-	Internationalised internal	Government, armed groups that are members of the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC, made up of anti-balaka factions led by Mokom and Ngaïssona, 3R, FPRC, MPC and UPC), other local and foreign armed groups, France, MINUSCA, Rwanda, Russia, Wagner Group	2
	Government, Resources		↓
DRC (east) -1998-	Internationalised internal	Government, FDLR, factions of the FDLR, Mai-Mai militias, Nyatura, APCLS, NDC-R, Ituri armed groups, Burundian armed opposition group FNL, Government of Rwanda, MONUSCO	3
	Government, Identity, Resources		↑
DRC (east – ADF) -2014-	Internationalised internal	Government of DRC, Government of Uganda, Mai-Mai militias, armed opposition group ADF, MONUSCO	3
	System, Resources		=
Ethiopia (Oromia) -2022-	Internationalised internal	Government of Ethiopia, Government of Oromia Regional State, Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) armed group, Fano pro-government Amharic militia	3
	Government, Identity, Resources		↑
Ethiopia (Tigray)-2020-	Internationalised internal	Government of Ethiopia, Government of Eritrea, Government of Tigray Regional State, security forces and militias of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), security forces of the Amhara and Afar regions, Fano pro-government Amharic militia	3
	Government, Self-government, Identity		↓

1. Table from Escola de Cultura de Pau, *Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*. Barcelona: Icaria, 2023.
2. This column includes the states in which armed conflicts are taking place, specifying in brackets the region within each state to which the crisis is confined or the name of the armed group involved in the conflict.
3. This report classifies and analyses armed conflicts using two criteria: on the one hand, the causes or clashes of interests and, on the other hand, the convergence between the scenario of conflict and the actors involved. The following main causes can be distinguished: demands for self-determination and self-government (Self-government) or identity aspirations (Identity); opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a state (System) or the internal or international policies of a government (Government), which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; or the struggle for the control of resources (Resources) or territory (Territory). In respect of the second type, the armed conflicts may be of an internal, Internationalised internal or international nature. An internal armed conflict is defined as a conflict involving armed actors from the same state who operate exclusively within the territory of this state. Secondly, an internationalised internal armed conflict is defined as that in which at least one of the parties involved is foreign and/or in which the tension spills over into the territory of neighbouring countries. Another factor taken into account in order to consider an armed conflict as internationalised internal is the existence of military bases of armed groups in neighbouring countries (in connivance with these countries) from which attacks are launched. Finally, an international conflict is one in which state and non-state parties from two or more countries confront each other. It should also be taken into account that most current armed conflicts have a significant regional or international dimension and influence due, among other factors, to flows of refugees, the arms trade, economic or political interests (such as legal or illegal exploitation of resources) that the neighbouring countries have in the conflict, the participation of foreign combatants or the logistical and military support provided by other states.
4. This column shows the actors that intervene directly in the hostilities. The main actors who participate directly in the conflicts are made up of a mixture of regular or irregular armed parties. The conflicts usually involve the government, or its armed forces, fighting against one or several armed opposition groups, but can also involve other irregular groups such as clans, guerrillas, warlords, armed groups in opposition to each other or militias from ethnic or religious communities. Although they most frequently use conventional weapons, and more specifically small arms (which cause most deaths in conflicts), in many cases other methods are employed, such as suicide attacks, bombings and sexual violence and even hunger as a weapon of war. There are also other actors who do not directly participate in the armed activities but who nevertheless have a significant influence on the conflict.
5. The intensity of an armed conflict (high, medium or low) and its trend (escalation of violence, reduction of violence, unchanged) are evaluated mainly on the basis of how deadly it is (number of fatalities) and according to its impact on the population and the territory. Moreover, there are other aspects worthy of consideration, such as the systematisation and frequency of the violence or the complexity of the military struggle (complexity is normally related to the number and fragmentation of the actors involved, to the level of institutionalisation and capacity of the state, and to the degree of internationalisation of the conflict, as well as to the flexibility of objectives and to the political will of the parties to reach agreements). As such, high-intensity armed conflicts are usually defined as those that cause over 1,000 fatalities per year, as well as affecting a significant proportion of the territory and population, and involving several actors (who forge alliances, confront each other or establish a tactical coexistence). Medium and low intensity conflicts, with over 100 fatalities per year, have the aforementioned characteristics but with a more limited presence and scope. An armed conflict is considered ended when a significant and sustained reduction in armed hostilities occurs, whether due to a military victory, an agreement between the actors in conflict, demobilisation by one of the parties, or because one of the parties abandons or significantly scales down the armed struggle as a strategy to achieve certain objectives. None of these options necessarily mean that the underlying causes of the armed conflict have been overcome. Nor do they exclude the possibility of new outbreaks of violence. The temporary cessation of hostilities, whether formal or tacit, does not necessarily imply the end of the armed conflict.
6. This column compares the trend of the events of 2022 with those that of 2021. The escalation of violence symbol (↑) indicates that the general situation in 2022 has been more serious than in the previous year; the reduction of violence symbol (↓) indicates an improvement in the situation; and the unchanged (=) symbol indicates that no significant changes have taken place.

Conflict -beginning-	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
AFRICA			
Lake Chad Region (Boko Haram) - 2011-	Internationalised internal	Government, Civilian Joint Task Force pro-government milita, Boko Haram factions (ISWAP, JAS-Abubakar Shekau, Ansaru, Bakura), civilian militias, Multinational Joint Task Force MNJTF (Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger)	3
	System		=
Libya -2011-	Internationalised internal	Unity Government with headquarters in Tripoli, government with headquarters in Tobruk, numerous armed groups including the Libyan National Army (LNA, also called Arab Libyan Armed Forces, ALAF), ISIS, mercenaries, Wagner Group; Turkey	1
	Government, Resources, System		=
Mali -2012-	Internationalised internal	Government, CMA (MNLA, MAA faction, CPA, HCUA), Platform (GATIA, CMPFPR, MAA faction), MSA, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, AQIM, MRRA, al-Mourabitoun, JNIM/GSIM, Islamic State in the West Africa Province (ISWAP) –also known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)-, Katiba Macina, MINUSMA, France (Operation Barkhane), G5-Sahel Joint Force (Mauritania, Chad, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso), USA, Takouba Task Force (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Mali, Holland, Niger, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom), Russia, Wagner Group	3
	System, Self-government, Identity		↑
Mozambique (North) -2019-	Internationalised internal	Government, Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) -formerly Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama (ASWJ)-, al-Qaeda, South African private security company DAG (Dyck Advisory Group), Tanzania, Rwanda, South Africa, Mission in Mozambique of the Southern African Development Community (SAMIM), “Naparama” militias	3
	System, Identity		↓
Somalia -1988-	Internationalised internal	Federal Government of Somalia, pro-government regional forces, Somaliland, Puntland, clan militias and warlords, Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a, USA, France, Ethiopia, Turkey, AMISOM/ATMIS, EUNAVFOR Somalia, Operation Ocean Shield, al-Shabaab, ISIS	3
	Government, System		↑
South Sudan -2009-	Internationalised internal	Government (SPLM/A), SPLM/A-in Opposition armed group (faction of former vice president, Riek Machar), dissident factions of the SPLA-IO led by Peter Gatdet and Gathoth Gatkuoth, SPLM-FD, SSLA, SSDM/A, SSDM-CF, SSNLM, REMNASA, NAS, SSUF (Paul Malong), SSDA, communal militias (SSPPF, TFN, White Army, Shilluk Agwelek), Sudan Revolutionary Front armed coalition (SRF, composed of JEM, SLA-AW, SLA-MM and SPLM-N), South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) – which includes the rebel organizations NAS, SSUF/A, Real-SPLM, NDM-PF, UDRM/A, NDM-PF, SSNMC), Sudan, Uganda, UNMISS	3
	Government, Resources, Identity		=
Sudan (Darfur) -2003-	Internationalised internal	Government, PDF pro-government militias, RSF paramilitary unit, pro-government militias <i>janjaweed</i> , Sudan Revolutionary Front armed coalition (SRF, composed of JEM, SLA-AW, SLA-MM and SPLM-N), several SLA factions, other groups, UNITAMS	3
	Self-government, Resources, Identity		=
Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) -2011-	Internationalised internal	Government, armed group SPLM-N, Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) armed coalition, PDF pro-government militias, Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary unit, South Sudan	2
	Self-government, Resources, Identity		↑
Western Sahel Region -2018-	International	Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Ivory Coast, G5-Sahel Joint Force (Mauritania, Chad, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso), Joint Task Force for the Liptako-Gourma Region (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso), MINUSMA, France (Operation Barkhane), USA, Takouba Task Force (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Mali, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom), Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM or GSIM), Islamic State in the Province of West Africa (ISWAP) - also known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)-, Macina Liberation Front (FML), Ansaroul Islam, other jihadist groups and community militias, Russia, Wagner Group	3
	System, Resources, Identity		↑
AMERICA			
Colombia -1964-	Internationalised internal	Government, ELN, groups that emerged from the FARC, paramilitary groups	2
	System		↓
ASIA			
Afghanistan -2001-	Internationalised internal	Taliban Government, ISIS (ISIS-K), National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF)	2
	System		↓
India (CPI-M) -1967-	Internal	Government, CPI-M (Naxalites)	1
	System		↓

Conflict -beginning-	Type	Main parties	Intensity
			Trend
ASIA			
India (Jammu and Kashmir) -1989-	Internationalised internal	Government, Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, United Jihad Council, The Resistance Front (TRF)	1
	Self-government, Identity		=
Myanmar -1948-	Internationalised internal	Government, armed groups (Ceasefire signatories: ABSDF, ALP, CNF, DKBA, KNU, KNU/KNLA-PC, PNLO, RCSS, NMSP, LDU; Non-signatories: KIA, NDAA, MNDAA, SSPP/SSA, TNLA, AA, UWSA, ARSA, KNPP) PDF	3
	Self-government, Identity		↑
Pakistan -2001-	Internationalised internal	Government, Armed Forces, intelligence services, Taliban militias, foreign militias, USA	2
	System		↑
Pakistan (Balochistan) -2005-	Internal	Government, Armed Forces, intelligence services, BLA, BRP, BRA, BLF and BLT, civil society, LeJ, TTP, Afghan Taliban (Quetta Shura) , ISIS	2
	Self-government, Identity, Resources		↑
Philippines (Mindanao) -1991-	Internationalised internal	Government, Abu Sayyaf, BIFF, Islamic State of Lanao/ Dawlay Islamiyah/Maute Group, Ansarul Khilafah Mindanao, Toraife group, factions of MILF and MNLF	1
	Self-government, System, Identity		↓
Philippines (NPA) -1969--	Internal	Government, NPA	1
	System		=
Thailand (south) -2004-	Internal	Government, BRN and other separatist armed opposition groups	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
EUROPE			
Turkey (southeast) -1984-	Internationalised internal	Government, PKK, TAK, ISIS	2
	Self-government, Identity		=
Russia - Ukraine -2022-	International	Russia, Wagner Group, Donbas militias, Ukraine	3
	Government, Territory		↑
MIDDLE EAST			
Egypt (Sinai) -2014-	Internationalised internal	Government, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM) or Sinai Province (branch of ISIS), pro-government militia Union of Sinai Tribes (UST)	1
	System		=
Iraq -2003-	Internationalised internal	Government, Iraqi and Kurdish (peshmerga) military and security forces, Shia militias (Popular Mobilization Units, PMU), Sunni armed groups, Islamic State (ISIS), international anti-ISIS coalition led by USA, USA, Iran, Turkey	3
	System, Government, Identity, Resources		=
Israel-Palestine -2000-	International	Israeli government, settler militias, PA, Fatah (Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), Hamas (Ezzedin al-Qassam Brigades), Islamic Jihad, FPLP, FDLP, Popular Resistance Committees, Salafists groups, brigades of Jenin, Nablus and Tubas, Lion's Den	1
	Self-government, Identity, Territory		=
Syria -2011-	Internationalised internal	Government, pro-government militias, Free Syrian Army (FSA), Ahrar al-Sham, Syrian Democratic Forces (coalition that includes the YPG/YPJ militias of the PYD), Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly al-Nusra Front), Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), ISIS, international anti-ISIS coalition led by USA, Turkey, Hezbollah, Iran, Russia, Israel	3
	System, Government, Self-government, Identity		=
Yemen -2004-	Internationalised internal	Armed forces loyal to the internationally recognised Government, followers of the cleric al-Houthi (al-Shabaab al-Mumen/Ansar Allah), tribal militias, Salafist militias (including Happy Yemen Brigades), armed groups linked to the Islamist Islah party, separatist groups under the umbrella of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), Joint Forces (including the Giants Brigades), AQAP, ISIS, international coalition led by Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE)	3
	System, Government, Identity		↓

1: low intensity; 2: medium intensity; 3: high intensity;

↑: escalation of violence; ↓: decrease of violence ; = : unchanged; End: no longer considered an armed conflict

Glossary

AA: Arakan Army	ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States
ABSDF: All Burma Students' Democratic Front	ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
ABM: Ansar Beit al-Maqdis	EDA: Eritrean Democratic Alliance
ACCORD: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes	EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone
ADF: Allied Democratic Forces	EFDM: Eritrean Federal Democratic Movement
AKP: Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)	EH Bildu: Euskal Herria Bildu
ALP: Arakan Liberation Party	EIC: Eritrean Islamic Congress
AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia	EIPJD: Eritrean Islamic Party for Justice and Development
APCLS: Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo	ELF: Eritrean Liberation Front
AQIM: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb	ELN: National Liberation Army
AQAP: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula	ENSF: Eritrean National Salvation Front
ARSA: Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army	EPC: Eritrean People's Congress
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations	EPL: Popular Liberation Army
ASWJ: Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a	EPDF: Eritrean People's Democratic Front
AU: African Union	EPPK: Collective of Basque Political Prisoners
AUBP: African Union Border Program	EPRDF: Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
BDB: Benghazi Defense Brigades	ETA: Basque Country and Freedom
BIFF: Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	ETIM: East Turkestan Islamic Movement
BINUH: United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti	ETLO: East Turkestan Liberation Organization
BLA: Baluch Liberation Army	EU: European Union
BLF: Baluch Liberation Front	EUFOR: European Union Force
BLT: Baluch Liberation Tigers	EULEX: European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
BOL: Bangsamoro Organic Law	EUNAVFOR Somalia: European Union Naval Force - Somalia, Operation Atalanta
BRA: Balochistan Republican Army	FARC-EP: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army
BRN: Barisan Revolusi Nasional	FDLR: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
BRP: Baluch Republican Party	FGN: Federal Government of Nagaland
CAR: Central African Republic	FLEC-FAC: Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
CENCO: Congolese Episcopal Conference	FLM: Macina Liberation Front
CENTCOM: United States Central Command	FNL: National Liberation Forces
CMA: Coordination of Movements of Azawad	FPB: Popular Forces of Burundi
CMFPR: Coordination of Movements and Patriotic Front of Resistance	FPR: Popular Front for Recovery
CNARED: National Council for the Respect of the Peace Agreement and the Reconciliation of Burundi and the Restoration of the Rule of Law	FPRC: Patriotic Front for the Renaissance of the Central African Republic
CNDD-FDD: National Congress for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy	GATIA: Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies
CNDP: National Congress for the Defense of the People	GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council
CNF: Chin National Front	GID: Geneva International Discussions
CNL: National Congress for Freedom	GNA: Government of National Accord
CNR: National Council of the Republicans	GNWP: Global Network of Women Peacebuilders
CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement	GPRN/NSCN: Government of the People's Republic of Nagaland / National Socialist Council of Nagaland
CPE: Center for Peace Education	GSIM: Support Group for Islam and Muslims
CPI-M: Communist Party of India-Maoist	GSPC: Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration	HCUA: High Council for the Unity of Azawad
DFLP: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine	HTS: Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham
DKBA: Democratic Karen Buddhist Army	IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
DMLEK: Democratic Movement for the Liberation of the Eritrean Kunama	ICC: International Criminal Court
DPA: Darfur Peace Agreement	ICG: International Crisis Group
DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo	ICGLR: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
EAC: East African Community	ICRC: International Committee for the Red Cross
	IFLO: Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHL: International Humanitarian Law
INSTEX: Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges
IOM: International Organization for Migration
IPRM: Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism
IRGC: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
ISGS: Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
ISIS: Islamic State
ISWAP: Islamic State in the Province of West Africa
IU: United Left
IWF: Iduwini Volunteers Force
JCPOA: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement
JKLF: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
JMB: Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Assembly)
JNIM: Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (Support Group for Islam and Muslims)
KANU: Kenya African National Union
KCP: Kangleipak Communist Party
KDP: Kurdistan Democratic Party
KDPI: Kurdistan Democratic Party - Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan
KFOR: Kosovo Force
KIA: Kachin Independence Army
KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army
KNA: Kuki Liberation Army
KNF: Kuki National Front
KNLAPC: Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council
KNPP: Karenni National Progressive Party
KNU: Kayin National Union
KNU/KNLA: Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army
KPLT: Karbi People's Liberation Tigers
KRG: Kurdistan Regional Government
KWN: Kosovo Women's Network
KYKL: Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (Organization for the Salvation of the Revolutionary Movement in Manipur)
LDU: Lahu Democratic Union
LeJ: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Jhangvi Army)
LeT: Lashkar-e-Toiba (Jhangvi Army)
LGBTI: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex
LNA: Libyan National Army
LRA: Lord's Resistance Army
M23: March 23 Movement
MAA: Arab Movement of Azawad
MASSOB: Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MEND: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MFDC: Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance
MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MINUSCA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MLCJ: Movement of Central African Liberators for Justice
MNDAA: Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
MNJTF: Multinational Joint Task Force
MNLA: National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MNLF: Moro National Liberation Front

MONUSCO: United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOSOP: Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
MPC: Patriotic Movement for Central Africa
MRC: Mombasa Republican Council
MUD: Democratic Unity Roundtable
MUYAO: United Movement for Jihad in West Africa
MWMN: Mediterranean Women Mediators' Network
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA: Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
NCP: National Congress Party
NDA: Niger Delta Avengers
NDAA: National Democratic Alliance Army
NDF: National Democratic Front
NDFB: National Democratic Front of Boroland
NDFB-P: National Democratic Front of Boroland - Progressive
NDFB-RD: Ranjan Daimary faction of The National Democratic Front of Boroland
NDGJM: Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate
NDPVF: Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
NDV: Niger Delta Vigilante
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
NIDCA: Niger Delta Consultative Assembly
NMSP: New Mon State Party
NNC: Naga National Council
NNC/GDRN/NA: Naga National Council/ Government Democratic Republic of Nagaland/ Non-Accord
NNPG: National Naga Political Groups
NOREF: Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
NPA: New People's Army
NPGN: National People's Government of Nagaland
NPT: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSCN (K-K): National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Kole-Kitovi)
NSCN-IM: National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah
NSCN-K: National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
NSCN-R: National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Reformation
NSLA: National Santhal Liberation Army
NTJ: National Towheed Jamaat
OAS: Organization of American States
OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDM: Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement
OIC: Organization for Islamic Cooperation
OIF: International Organization of La Francophonie
OLF: Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPC: Oromo People's Congress
OPM: Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Organization of Free Papua)
OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PA: Palestinian Authority
PANDEF: Pan-Niger Delta Forum
PDKI: Kurdish Democratic Party

PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PJAK: Party for the Free Life in Kurdistan
PKK: Kurdistan Workers' Party
PNA: Palestinian National Authority
PNDPC: Pan Niger Delta Peoples' Congress
PNLO: Pa-Oh National Liberation Organization
PNV: Basque Nationalist Party
POLISARIO: Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro
PP: Spain's Popular Party
PREPAK: People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak
PREPAK (Pro): People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak / Progressive
PS: Province of Sinai
PSE-EE: Socialist Party of the Basque Country-Euskadiko Ezkerra
PSOE: Spanish Socialist Worker's Party)
PYD: Democratic Union Party of Kurds in Syria
R-ARCSS: Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
RABMM: Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
RAMM: Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
RCSS/SSA- South: Restoration Council of Shan State / Shan State Army – South
RECOM: Regional Commission Tasked with Establishing the Facts about All Victims of War Crimes and Other Serious Human Rights Violations Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
RED-Tabara: Resistance for the Rule of Law in Burundi
RENAMO: Mozambican National Resistance
REWL: Red Egbesu Water Lions
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front
RPF: Revolutionary People's Front
RSADO: Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization
RSF: Rapid Support Forces
SADC: Southern Africa Development Community
SADR: Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
SCACUF: Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front
SDC: Syrian Democratic Council
SCDF: Southern Cameroons Restoration Forces
SDF: Social Democratic Front of Cameroon
SDF: Syrian Democratic Forces
SIGI: Social Institutions and Gender Index
SLA: Sudan Liberation Army
SLA-AW: Sudan Liberation Army - Abdul Wahid
SLA-MM: Sudan Liberation Army - Minni Minnawi
SLDF: Sabaot Land Defence Forces
SLM-MM: Sudan Liberation Movement - Minni Minnawi
SOCADDEF: Southern Cameroons Defence Forces
SPLA: Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLA-IO: SPLA in Opposition
SPLM: Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-IO: Sudan People's Liberation Movement – in Opposition
SPLM-N: Sudan People's Liberation Army - North
SRF: Sudan Revolutionary Forces
SSA: Shan State Army
SSA-N: Shan State Army - North
SSDM/A: South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army
SSLA: South Sudan Liberation Army
SSOMA: South Sudan Opposition Movement Alliance
SSPP: Shan State Progress Party
SSPP/SSA-N: Shan State Progress Party / Shan State Army – North
SSUF: South Sudan United Front
START: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
STC: Southern Transitional Council
TAK: The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons
TCG: Trilateral Contact Group
TFG: Transitional Federal Government
TMC: Transitional Military Council
TNLA: Ta-ang National Liberation Army
TPLF: Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
TTP: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UAE: United Arab Emirates
UDPS: Union for Democracy and Social Progress
UFDD: Union of the Forces for Democracy and Development)
UFR: Union of Resistance Forces
ULFA: United Liberation Front of Assam
ULFA-I: United Liberation Front of Assam - Independent
ULFA-PTF: Pro-Talks faction of United Liberation Front of Asom
UN: United Nations
UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMI: United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNAMID: United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNISFA: United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNLF: United National Liberation Front
UNMIK: United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMHA: United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement
UNMISS: United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOCA: United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa
UNOCI: United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSMIL: United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UPC: Union for Peace in Central Africa
UPLA: United People's Liberation Army
UPR: Universal Periodic Review
UPyD: Union for Progress and Democracy
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USA: United States of America
UWSA: United Wa State Army
UWSP: United Wa State Party
WILPF: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
YPG: People's Protection Unit
YPJ: Women's Protection Units
YWPL: Young Women for Peace and Leadership
ZUF: Zeliangrong United Front

About the School for a Culture of Peace

The Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace, hereinafter ECP) is an academic peace research institution located at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. The School for a Culture of Peace was created in 1999 with the aim of promoting the culture of peace through research, Track II diplomacy, training and awareness generating activities.

The main fields of action of the Escola de Cultura de Pau are:

- Research. Its main areas of research include armed conflicts and socio-political crises, peace processes, human rights and transitional justice, the gender dimension in conflict and peacebuilding, and peace education.
- Teaching and training. ECP staff gives lectures in postgraduate and graduate courses in several universities, including its own Graduate Diploma on Culture of Peace at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. It also provides training sessions on specific issues, including conflict sensitivity and peace education.
- Track II diplomacy. The ECP promotes dialogue and conflict-transformation through Track II initiatives, including facilitation tasks with different actors and on various themes.
- Consultancy services. The ECP carries out a variety of consultancy services for national and international institutions.
- Advocacy and awareness-raising. Initiatives include activities addressed to the Spanish and Catalan society, including contributions to the media.

Escola de Cultura de Pau

Edifici B13, Carrer de la Vila Puig, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 08193 Bellaterra (Spain)

Tel: +34 93 581 14 14

Email: pr.conflict.escolapau@uab.cat / Web: <http://escolapau.uab.cat>



Peace Talks in Focus 2022. Report on Trends and Scenarios is a yearbook that analyses peace processes and negotiations that took place in the world during 2022. The examination of the development and dynamics of negotiations worldwide allows to provide a comprehensive overview of peace processes, identify trends and comparatively analyse the various scenarios. *Peace Talks in Focus 2022. Report on Trends and Scenarios* also analyses the evolution of peace processes from a gender perspective. One of the main objectives of this report is to provide information and analysis to those who participate in peaceful conflict resolution at different levels, including parties to disputes, mediators, civil society activists and others. The yearbook also aims to grant visibility to different formulas of dialogue and negotiation aimed at reversing dynamics of violence and channelling conflicts through political means in many contexts. Thus, it seeks to highlight, enhance and promote political, diplomatic and social efforts aimed at transforming conflicts and their root causes through peaceful methods.

Peace Talks in Focus: Report on Trends and Scenarios presents a comprehensive and focused analysis of ongoing peace processes while also discussing the main global trends in national dialogues, and negotiation and mediation efforts. The annual reports provide an invaluable resource for peace scholars, peace activists, and students of international relations. Treating conflict parties as diverse, it attracts attention to different ways to address their needs and interests and offer possible scenarios as outcomes of the peace processes. As such, it is one of the few resources to understand the root causes of conflicts, and dynamics, trends, and outcomes of peace processes by providing qualitative analyses of cases and gender perspective to understand them.

Prof. Dr. Ayşe Betül Çelik,
Faculty Member at Sabanci University (Turkey) and
member of the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network

Once again, *Peace Talks in Focus: Report on Trends and Scenarios* provides peace advocates, scholars, policymakers and even conflict actors a veritable trove of information and analysis that will help them in their respective work, and to also potentially collectively untangle the knots of conflict that continue to bedevil our world. The report is almost an indispensable source that bestows us with a powerful tool in peacebuilding, with a gender perspective that is essential in conflict transformation. The reader-friendly text, matrixes, tables and layout will furnish practitioners with a delightful perusal and discernment of the report's contents.

Gus Miclat,
Executive Director of the Initiatives for International
Dialogue (Philippines)

Peace Talks in Focus. Report on Trends and Scenarios is an indispensable resource for anyone engaged in the search for peace. It is particularly relevant for mediators facilitating political negotiations, often expected by conflict parties to be knowledgeable about recent developments in peace processes beyond their own, and who will find in this publication a well-crafted and succinct compendium on peacemaking worldwide. Negotiating parties seeking to understand how other processes have evolved will also benefit from its valuable and detailed insights. So too will civil society representatives, officials in countries that support peacemaking financially and politically, as well as academic researchers and students of conflict resolution.

The publication sheds light on specific developments in dozens of individual peace processes, striking the right balance between brevity and depth, which is no easy feat. It also offers a bird's eye view of the state of peacemaking globally, cogently analyzing trends at the regional and international scale and also by thematic area, paying particular attention throughout to gender and the Women, Peace and Security agenda. It is well worth keeping close at hand.

Juan Jeannet Arce,
Political Affairs Officer in the Mediation Support Unit of
the United Nations Department of Peacebuilding and
Political Affairs

In collaboration with:

