Excellencies, distinguished guests,

I would like to thank Ambassador Delattre of France and the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security for organizing this event. France has been a steadfast champion of my mandate and a leading voice on these issues in the Security Council, including its Sanctions Committees. I would also like to thank Ambassador Melanne Verveer and Ms. Sophie Huve for spearheading new strategic research on ways to more effectively use sanctions regimes to address the scourge of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.

My mandate, as SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict, was established in 2009, through the adoption of Security Council resolution 1888 during a debate presided over by Secretary Hillary Clinton of the United States. During that debate, Secretary Clinton stated: “In too many countries, and in too many cases, the perpetrators of sexual violence go unpunished, and this impunity encourages further attacks”. Accordingly, the resolution called for efforts to strengthen justice and the Rule of Law, and required the UN to consider the imposition of sanctions to help raise the cost of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.

Resolution 1888 built on the foundations laid by resolution 1820, adopted exactly one decade ago, in 2008, which elevated the issue of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence onto its agenda as a threat to security and an impediment to peace. It also recognized that sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, and/or a constitutive act with respect to genocide.

Since then, the issue has been systematically included in the mandates of peacekeeping missions; addressed in peace and ceasefire agreements; and excluded from amnesty provisions in the wake of war. Importantly, ithas also been reflected in the designation criteria of several sanctions regimes.

Just yesterday I briefed the 1533 Sanctions Committee on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and made concrete recommendations for either adding new names to the sanctions list, or including sexual violence in the narrative citation of individuals and entities that are already subject to sanctions on other grounds. I was able to do this as our monitoring and reporting arrangements have significantly improved in recent years, providing a deep evidence-base for targeted advocacy and action.

In recent years, the Security Council has also considered the imposition of sanctions and targeted measures against terrorist groups and networks involved in sexual violence, sexual slavery, and trafficking of persons for the purpose of sexual exploitation in connection with armed conflict. This reflects the newfound recognition of sexual violence as not only a tactic of war, but also a tactic of terrorism, and one that directly intersects with the recruitment and resourcing strategy of armed and violent extremist groups – most notoriously, ISIL and Boko Haram.

Against this backdrop, I fully endorse the key recommendations of the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) report, namely: enhancing cooperation between Groups and Panels of Experts and my Office; increasing and regularizing the number of briefings I deliver to relevant Sanctions Committees; and ensuring that such committees more consistently act on my recommendations. The report also recommends that my mandate play a role in evaluating the impact of sanctions on listed individuals in terms of deterrence and behavioral change.

I would like to draw your attention to the list annexed to the annual Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, which “names and shames” parties to the conflict that are credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in situations on the Security Council agenda.  These listed parties, particularly “persistent perpetrators” that remain on the list for several years, are eligible for sanctions. In our engagements with such parties, it is critical to leverage the credible threat of sanctions to achieve compliance with international norms.

A total of 47 parties to conflict were listed this year, including 12 State parties. Among the newly listed entities are non-State parties in DRC, such as Twa militias in Tanganiyka province; and Bana Mura and Kamuina Nsapu militias in Kasai province. The Armed Forces of Myanmar, (or Tatmadaw), were also listed for the first time this year on the basis of widespread and systematic sexual violence employed as a tool of “ethnic cleansing” in the context of military clearance operations in Northern Rakhine state, against the backdrop of sexual violence targeting ethnic minorities in the Kachin and Shan States over many years.

My predecessors, Margot Wallstrom and Zainab Hawa Bangura, both briefed Sanctions Committees in the past, namely those on the Central African Republic (CAR), the DRC, South Sudan and Sudan, repeatedly calling for sexual violence to be a separate criterion for listing, and recommend in that certain individuals and entities be targeted for sanctions. They also shared detailed information of parties listed in the Annex to the Secretary-General’s annual Report on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, so that sanctions committees could take necessary action.

This year’s Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence urged the Security Council to take three concrete steps in relation to sanctions, namely to:

1) include sexual violence as part of the designation criteria for sanctions;

2) ensure that dedicated expertise on gender and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence informs the work of sanctions committees and monitoring entities; and

3) continue to invite the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict to share information with sanctions committees.

These recommendations seem particularly pertinent in light of the finding of the GIWPS report that: “designation criteria are typically either late, inconsistently applied, and/or sexual violence is ignored.”

I also agree with the report’s conclusion that sanctions tools offer significant – and, as yet, largely unexploited – potential to advance women’s protection from sexual violence in conflict. The threat of sanctions sends a powerful political signal that can change the behavior of belligerents. For those operating beyond the reach of the rule of law, who may harbor no fear of judicial accountability, sanctions can remove their means of doing harm, divest them of resources, and limit their freedom of manoeuver, through arms embargoes, travel bans and asset freezes.

It is very encouraging that Member States, including France, supported these recommendations from the Secretary-General’s report during the Security Council Open Debate on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence that took place on 16 April.

To conclude, I would like to share five observations.

  • First, threatening parties with sanctions for sexual violence can itself prevent and deter perpetrators from committing such crimes and send a strong message that sexual violence will not be tolerated. This political pressure reinforces the gravity of the crime, as a threat to security and an impediment to the restoration of peace, and can generate political commitments from the relevant authorities to address the issue and engage with my Office. This will work most effectively if sexual violence is explicitly included in the designation criteria. For instance, the inclusion of sexual violence as part of the designation criteria of the DRC sanctions regime has sent a clear message that there will be costs and consequences for committing, commanding or condoning sexual violence. My mandate has been able to leverage this in our engagements with the political and military leadership of the DRC.
  • Second, in addressing engagement with the national authorities, emphasis has not only been placed on sanctions and punitive measures, but also on the support that the United Nations can provide to aid national efforts to deal with the problem. In the DRC, my Office — through the Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the UN country team — has worked to provide the requisite support to the Government to implement the Joint Communique on preventing and addressing sexual violence that was signed in March 2013. Though significant challenges remain, the political and military authorities have adopted significant measures such as zero tolerance policies for sexual violence and codes of conduct for the national armed and security forces. In other words, it is important not only to “name and shame”, but also to “raise and praise” cases of positive progress. Similar agreements have been signed with countries including the Central African Republic, Somalia and South Sudan, where sanctions regimes exist.
  • Third, to convert cultures of impunity for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence into cultures of deterrence, we must invest in justice and accountability. Sanctions and judicial accountability measures must work in tandem. In that respect, I would note that the recipe for transformation requires both sanctions for perpetrators and reparations for victims.
  • Since I took up office in June last year, I have met with many victims of sexual violence crimes committed by Da’esh and Boko Haram. I have spoken with women and girls in IDP camps in the DRC and Sudan, as well as with Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazaar, Bangladesh. Though circumstances may vary across different situations, these survivors all expressed a thirst for justice, as urgent and acute as their need for medical services and humanitarian aid.
  • While sexual violence is a self-standing criterion for sanctions in the case of the Central African Republic, my Office continues to support its justice sector reform process to ensure accountability. The Team of Experts is providing technical assistance to the Special Criminal Court and the joint rapid response unit within the gendarmerie and the police to improve the response to sexual violence cases.
  • Fourth, cooperation from neighboring countries and regional bodies is necessary to ensure the effective implementation of sanctions. Even though sanctions may be imposed on individuals and entities for sexual violence, if some countries, which see the sanctions as contrary to their own national interests, refuse or fail to enforce them, this tool will prove ineffective.
  • Fifth, we also need to consider the effectiveness of bilateral sanctions imposed by individual countries. For instance, the United States and Canada both decided to impose sanctions against a Major General of the Tatmadaw (the Armed Forces of Myanmar), in light of his alleged responsibility for widespread abuses against Rohingya civilians, including sexual violence.

Ultimately, targeted sanctions have great potential to address sexual violence. But once designation criteria have been adopted, they must be activated. For my part, I remain committed to enhancing the cooperation between my mandate and all relevant Sanctions Committees while, at the same time, continuing to advocate for national ownership and responsibility through the consistent application of justice and accountability. Impunity for wartime rape remains the rule and accountability the rare exception. To break the vicious cycle of violence and impunity, we must use all the diplomatic and enforcement tools at our disposal, and we must make them work equally for women’s security and rights.

Thank you, and I look forward to continuing this important discussion.

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