The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council and its supplements are published by the United Nations Secretariat as a guide to the proceedings of the Security Council from its first meeting in 1946 onwards. The Repertoire is designed to assist government officials, practitioners of international law, academics and all those interested in the work of the United Nations to follow the evolving practice of the Council and gain a better understanding of the framework within which it operates. The publication presents, as comprehensively as possible, new trends in the Council's application of the Charter of the United Nations and its own provisional rules of procedure. The Repertoire is the only such official record and is based solely on the deliberations of the Council, its decisions and other official documentation before the Council. The current Supplement, twenty-first in the series of Supplements to the Repertoire, covers the year 2018. This is the first Supplement in the history of the publication that covers a one-year period aiming at making available to the United Nations membership the most recent information on the work of the Council.

As further detailed in this Supplement, the application of the Charter by the Council and its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security further evolved during the year 2018. Amidst fraying consensus, the Council continued to concentrate most of its work on existing conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. In connection with the conflict in Yemen, the Council authorized the Secretary-General to establish and deploy an advance team to monitor and support the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement. The use of chemical weapons beyond the Syrian Arab Republic, in Salisbury (United Kingdom), was brought to the attention of the Council. Initiatives to enhance accountability for the use of these weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic were proposed—albeit unsuccessfully. In 2018, the United Nations Mission in Liberia completed its mandate after more than 14 years of operations and the Council terminated the sanctions measures concerning Eritrea, further to the signature of the peace agreement with Ethiopia.
United Nations

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council

Supplement 2018
Note

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
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Introduction

The present publication constitutes the twenty-first supplement to the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 1946–1951, which was issued in 1954. It covers the proceedings of the Security Council from the 8152nd meeting, held on 5 January 2018, to the 8439th meeting, held on 21 December 2018. The original Repertoire and previous supplements may be consulted online on the Council website.

The Repertoire was mandated by the General Assembly in its resolution 686 (VII) of 5 December 1952, entitled “Ways and means for making the evidence of customary international law more readily available”. It is a guide to the proceedings of the Council and sets forth in a readily accessible form the practices and procedures to which the Council has had recourse. The Repertoire is not intended as a substitute for the records of the Council, which constitute the only comprehensive and authoritative account of its deliberations.

The categories employed to arrange the material are not intended to suggest the existence of procedures or practices that have not been clearly or demonstrably established by the Council itself. The Council is at all times, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, its own provisional rules of procedure and practice established through notes by the President of the Council, master of its own procedure. For ease of reference, this introduction contains a table indicating the membership of the Council during the period under review.

In recording the Council’s practice, the headings under which the practices and procedures of the Council were presented in the original volume issued in 1954 have been largely retained. Where necessary, adjustments have been made to better reflect the Council’s practice. For example, the studies contained in part I of the present publication are organized according to region or thematic issue.

The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council covers four primary areas, namely, the application of the provisional rules of procedure, the application of Articles of the Charter of the United Nations, the subsidiary organs of the Council, including peacekeeping operations and special political missions as well as sanctions committees and the associated panels and groups of experts, and an overview of Council activities for each item on its agenda. From 1946 to 2007, each Supplement to the Repertoire, generally covering a period of two to four years, comprised 12 chapters. Since 2008, each Supplement to the Repertoire, covering a period of two years, has been organized in 10 parts. Since 2018, each Supplement to the Repertoire has covered a period of one year; it continues to be organized in 10 parts.

From 1946 to 2007, the 12 chapters of each Supplement covered the following topics:

Chapter II   Agenda (rules 6–12 of the rules of procedure)
Chapter III  Participation in the proceedings of the Security Council (Articles 31, 32, 35 (1); rules 37–39 of the rules of procedure)
Chapter IV   Voting (Article 27; rule 40 of the rules of procedure)
Chapter V    Subsidiary organs of the Security Council
Chapter VI  Relations with other United Nations organs
Chapter VII  Practice relative to recommendations to the General Assembly regarding membership in the United Nations
Chapter VIII  Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security (overview by agenda item)
Chapter IX  Decisions taken by the Security Council in the exercise of its other functions and powers
Chapter X  Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter
Chapter XI  Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter
Chapter XII  Consideration of the provisions of other Articles (Articles 1 (2), 2 (4), 2 (5), 2 (6), 2 (7), 24, 25, 52–54, 102, 103)

From 2008 onwards, the 10 parts of each Supplement covered the following topics:

Part I  Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security
Part II  Provisional rules of procedure and related procedural developments
Part III  Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations
Part IV  Relations with other United Nations organs
Part V  Functions and powers of the Security Council (Chapter V of the Charter)
Part VI  Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter
Part VII  Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression (Chapter VII of the Charter)
Part VIII  Regional arrangements (Chapter VIII of the Charter)
Part IX  Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: committees, tribunals and other bodies
Part X  Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and special political missions

The Repertoire is based on published documents of the Council. Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of letters combined with figures. Council documents are indicated by a symbol that includes the year and a sequential number (for example, S/2018/1151). References to the verbatim records of meetings of the Council are given in the form S/PV.8434, meetings being numbered consecutively, starting with the first meeting in 1946. As in previous recent supplements, reference is made in this Supplement only to the provisional verbatim records of Council meetings, as the practice of publishing the meeting records in the Official Records has been discontinued.

The resolutions and other decisions adopted by the Council, including statements and notes issued by the President of the Council and relevant exchanges of letters between the President and the Secretary-General, are published in the yearly volumes of Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council. Resolutions
are identified by a number followed by the year of adoption in parentheses, for example, resolution 2451 (2018). Since 1994, references to the statements by the President on behalf of the Council have been given in the form S/PRST/2018/1, for example. Prior to that date, presidential statements, like other Council documents, were circulated under a symbol in the sequential series (for example, S/25929).

Readers who wish to consult the full record of a meeting or the text of a Council document referred to in the Repertoire may do so on the official United Nations documentation website, www.un.org/en/documents/. Council documents can be accessed on the website by selecting “Official Document System (ODS)” or one of the direct links to specific categories of documents. The volumes of Resolutions and Decisions may be accessed by symbol (S/INF/73 for 2018).
Membership of the Security Council, 2018

Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
China
Côte d’Ivoire
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
France
Kazakhstan
Kuwait
Netherlands
Peru
Poland
Russian Federation
Sweden
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
Part I

Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security
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Introductory note

Part I of the present Supplement to the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council provides an overview of the proceedings of the Security Council in respect of the items on its agenda that relate to its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Part I gives the immediate political context in which consideration by the Council of these items evolved during the year 2018.\(^1\) It also constitutes a framework within which the deliberations of the Council expressly related to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its provisional rules of procedures can be considered. Part I also examines the substantive aspects of the Council’s practice that are not covered in other parts of the Repertoire.

For ease of reference, the items are grouped by region, with an additional category of thematic issues. Within each region, items are listed in the order in which they were first included in the list of matters of which the Council is seized.

Individual studies highlight significant developments in the Council’s consideration of an item that are considered important for contextualizing the decisions taken by the Council.

Each section is followed by a table comprising all procedural information relating to the item, including meetings, sub-items, documents referred to, and speakers, listed in chronological order. To illustrate the mainstreaming of thematic issues in items specific to a country or region, some sections are followed by an additional table setting out the relevant provisions of decisions of the Council.

\(^1\) The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council covers formal meetings and documents of the Council. Some of the questions considered in part I were also discussed in informal consultations among the members of the Council.
Africa

1. The situation concerning Western Sahara

During 2018, the Security Council held two meetings and adopted two resolutions on the situation concerning Western Sahara. The two meetings under this item were convened to adopt the two resolutions.\(^2\) The Council also met twice with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).\(^3\) More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

On 27 April, the Council adopted resolution 2414 (2018), extending the mandate of MINURSO for six months, until 31 October 2018, with 12 votes in favour and three abstentions. In the resolution, the Council emphasized the need to make progress towards a realistic, practicable and enduring political solution to the question of Western Sahara based on compromise and the importance of aligning the strategic focus of MINURSO and orienting the resources of the United Nations to that end.\(^4\)

As the pen holder of the resolution, the representative of the United States explained that her country had taken a different approach to the extension of the mandate of MINURSO with the goal of sending two messages: that there could be no more “business as usual” with MINURSO and Western Sahara and that it was the time for the Council to lend its full support to the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara. She also explained that the change in the extension of the mandate from one year to six months was due to her country’s desire to see progress in the political process to resolve the conflict.\(^5\) Council members who had abstained in the voting expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of the negotiations and with the failure to achieve consensus on the text.\(^6\) The representative of the Russian Federation cautioned that attempts to accelerate the political process could backfire and added that a review of Mission’s mandate was unacceptable. Furthermore, he opposed efforts to include human rights monitoring in the mandate.\(^7\) Other Council members commented on the conduct of the negotiations and the lack of balance in the text of the resolution.\(^8\)

On 31 October 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2440 (2018), extending the mandate of MINURSO for six months, until 30 April 2019. While not all members cast the same vote, the result was identical to that of resolution 2414 (2018), with 12 votes in favour and three abstentions. In resolution 2440 (2018), the Council expressed its full support for the intention of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to relaunch negotiations before the end of 2018. In that regard, the Council noted the invitations to an initial round-table meeting in Geneva on 5 and 6 December 2018 and welcomed the positive responses from Morocco, the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), Algeria and Mauritania.\(^9\)

As the pen holder of the resolution, the representative of the United States again repeated the explanations in favour of the resolution and indicated that his country was encouraged by the progress made in the previous six months.\(^10\) While acknowledging that some of the members of the Council would have preferred a 12-month mandate,\(^11\) he argued that the political process required the Council’s close attention and support and that a shorter mandate signalled the Council’s determination to accelerate the political process and move beyond the status quo.\(^12\) The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the Council’s efforts should be based on parameters previously agreed upon, which identified the parties to the conflict in Western Sahara, were based on the principle of a mutually acceptable definitive solution and stipulated the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the framework of procedures consistent with the Charter. In that regard, he regretted that resolution 2440 (2018) amplified the ambiguity of

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2 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
3 Held on 5 April and 9 October 2018 under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B”; see S/PV.8222 and S/PV.8367.
4 Resolution 2414 (2018), para. 2.
5 S/PV.8246, p. 2.
6 Ibid., p. 3 (Ethiopia), pp. 3–4 (Russian Federation) and p. 6 (China).
7 Ibid., p. 4.
8 Ibid., p. 5 (Sweden) and p. 8 (Plurinational State of Bolivia).
9 Resolution 2440 (2018), para. 3.
10 S/PV.8387, p. 2.
11 In his report on the situation concerning Western Sahara, the Secretary-General recommended that the Council extend the mandate of MINURSO for one year (S/2018/889, para. 86).
12 S/PV.8387, p. 3.
those parameters. He further noted that the process had been once again “neither transparent nor consultative”. The other members of the Council who had abstained explained that fundamental principles for finding a political solution raised during the negotiations had not been taken into consideration and that the issue of the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara was not sufficiently reflected in the final text.

In both resolutions, the Council requested the Secretary-General to brief the Council on a regular basis and at any time he deemed appropriate. In addition, in resolution 2440 (2018), the Council requested the Secretary-General to brief the Council within three months from the most recent mandate renewal and again prior to its expiration.

Meetings: the situation concerning Western Sahara

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For Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States; against: none; abstaining: China, Ethiopia, Russian Federation.

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.

For China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States; against: none; abstaining: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Ethiopia, Russian Federation.

During the period under review, the Security Council held one meeting in connection with the situation in Liberia and issued one presidential statement. The meeting took the form of a briefing. More information on the meeting, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

On 19 April 2018, the Council heard briefings by the Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Sweden, on behalf of the Chair of the Liberia configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, and the Chief Executive Officer of the company Liberty and Justice. Against the backdrop of the final report of the Secretary-General and the drawdown and closure of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions focused on the political situation and economic prospects in Liberia, as well as on the impact and legacy of the Mission in the country. On behalf of the Chair of the Liberia configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Sweden focused on the future of the country and the need to address the remaining root causes of the conflict and the key structural reforms set out in the peacebuilding plan. The Chief Executive Officer of Liberty and Justice briefed the Council on the role of civil society groups in achieving peace in Liberia and

2. The situation in Liberia

For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
emphasized the need to strengthen the private sector and encourage investment in the country.\textsuperscript{19}

At the meeting, the Council also heard a statement by the representative of Liberia, invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure. In his statement, the representative expressed gratitude to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, the European Union and all organs of the United Nations, as well as the Peacebuilding Commission. He assured that the challenges still looming would remain “front and centre” for the Government. He also remarked that Liberia, once a beneficiary of a peacekeeping mission, had become a contributing nation to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.\textsuperscript{20}

At the meeting, Council members commended the work performed by UNMIL during its presence in Liberia and noted the need for continued engagement by the United Nations and the international community after its closure. Council members noted the difficulties faced by the Government of Liberia in addressing the remaining root causes of conflict, praised its efforts in establishing State institutions aimed at implementing the peacebuilding plan following the closure of UNMIL and expressed their appreciation for the efforts of the Liberian authorities in prioritizing the Sustainable Development Goals in the country’s national development plan.

At the meeting, the Council issued a presidential statement, in which the Council commended the remarkable achievements and notable progress made by the people and Government of Liberia to consolidate lasting peace and stability since 2003 and their continued commitment to respect and develop democratic processes and institutions. The Council also commended the Government for its preparation and execution of the 2017 legislative and presidential elections and expressed its appreciation to ECOWAS, the African Union and all international, regional and domestic election observation missions for their contributions to the electoral process.\textsuperscript{21} The Council also expressed its appreciation for the important contribution of UNMIL throughout its more than 14 years of operation in Liberia and requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study on the role of UNMIL in the resolution of conflicts and challenges in Liberia that allowed for the successful completion of the UNMIL mandate and the transition to the United Nations country team.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19} S/PV.8239, pp. 2–7.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., pp. 21–22.
\textsuperscript{21} S/PRST/2018/8, first and second paragraphs.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., third and fourth paragraphs.

\section*{Meeting: the situation in Liberia}

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
Meeting record \& date & Sub-item & Other documents & Rule 37 invitations & Rule 39 and other invitations & Speakers & Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining) \\
\hline
S/PV.8239 19 April 2018 & Final progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (S/2018/344) & Liberia & Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Chief Executive Officer of Liberty and Justice & All Council members,\textsuperscript{a} all invitees & S/PRST/2018/8 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{a} The Deputy Permanent Representative of Sweden spoke on behalf of the Chair of the Liberia configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission.

\section*{3. The situation in Somalia}

In 2018, the Security Council held 10 meetings, adopted five resolutions, four of which were under Chapter VII of the Charter, and issued one presidential statement on the situation in Somalia. Six meetings under the item were convened to adopt a decision; all others took the form of briefings.\textsuperscript{23} More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

\textsuperscript{23} For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
During the period under review, the Council was regularly briefed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).\(^{24}\) In his three briefings, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General emphasized the structural challenges facing Somalia, including abuse and deprivation of human rights, disputes over borders, a weak rule of law and systemic corruption. He also cautioned against a series of risks affecting the country relating to the threat of Al-Shabaab, the political differences and power distribution in the country, the fragmentation of the international community and the risk of a humanitarian catastrophe. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission focused in his three briefings on the political developments in the country and the support by AMISOM to the Federal Government in connection with the transition plan and its fight against Al-Shabaab. The Council also heard one briefing by the Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), who focused on the progress made in and the barriers to the achievement of gender equality in Somalia and affirmed that the country would not have long-lasting peace and deep reconciliation without the far-reaching contribution, involvement and recognition of women.\(^{25}\)

During 2018, the Council focused its discussions on the country’s security transition plan, national reconciliation efforts and the commitment of the newly elected Federal Government to implement political and socioeconomic reforms. Council members also addressed the continued need for humanitarian assistance in response to the persistent threats posed by Al-Shabaab and the ongoing risks of severe famine and drought. Some Council members also noted the significance of economic recovery and of the meaningful participation of women in all efforts towards the maintenance and promotion of sustainable peace and in the political settlement process.\(^{26}\)

As in previous years, Council members continued to deliberate on the role of UNSOM, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and AMISOM and their respective mandates.\(^{27}\) During the deliberations, speakers underlined the importance of the support provided by UNSOM and UNSOS to the Federal Government on the electoral process, conflict resolution and the implementation of the national security architecture, as well as the need to maintain the deployment of AMISOM and build the capacity of the Somali security forces, given the protracted instability in the country. In that regard, speakers condemned the increasing terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab against civilians and military targets, including AMISOM personnel and bases, underscoring the need for unity among Somalis, the African Union, troop-contributing countries and principal security partners.\(^{28}\)

In addition, further to the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship signed between Eritrea and Ethiopia on 9 July, discussions at the Council also focused on the adjustment of the sanctions measures concerning Eritrea. In that regard, on 30 July, the Council heard a briefing by the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, specifically on his visit to the region in May 2018.\(^ {29}\) With respect to Somalia, he noted that, in the view of the Committee, the arms embargo should not be completely lifted until Somalia underwent political and security reforms and created strong institutions capable of securing an adequate level of weapons and ammunition management.\(^ {30}\)

During 2018, the decisions of the Council focused on the same issues dealt with in the context of its discussions. Insofar as the political situation was concerned, on 7 June 2018, the Council issued a presidential statement, welcoming the resumption of high-level dialogue between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states to make further progress on key priorities, including power-sharing and resource sharing, the constitutional review, fiscal federalism, preparations for one-person-one-vote elections in 2020 and 2021, support for regional security forces and finalizing the justice and corrections federal model.\(^ {31}\) The Council also welcomed the progress achieved in developing a conditions-based transition plan for the progressive transfer of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security

\(^{24}\) S/PV.8165, S/PV.8259 and S/PV.8352.

\(^{25}\) S/PV.8352, pp. 7–8.

\(^{26}\) See, for example, ibid., p. 9 (United Kingdom), p. 14 (Peru), p. 16 (Sweden), p. 17 (France), p. 18 (Netherlands), p. 19 (Kazakhstan), p. 22 (Poland) and p. 23 (Russian Federation).

\(^{27}\) For more information on UNSOM, see part X, sect. II.

\(^{28}\) See, for example, S/PV.8259, p. 7 (Equatorial Guinea), p. 8 (Plurinational State of Bolivia), p. 9 (Peru), p. 10 (Côte d’Ivoire) and p. 11 (Kazakhstan).

\(^{29}\) For more information on the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, see part IX, sect. I.B.

\(^{30}\) S/PV.8322, p. 3.

\(^{31}\) S/PRST/2018/13, third paragraph.
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institutions and noted the critical role of AMISOM in enabling the transition to Somali-led security.\(^3^2\)

Concerning UNSOM, on 27 March 2018, by its resolution 2408 (2018), the Council extended the mandate of UNSOM until 31 March 2019, as set out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2158 (2014).\(^3^3\) In the resolution, the Council recognized the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of Somalia and emphasized the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by Governments and the United Nations relating to those factors.\(^3^4\) Moreover, the Council underscored the importance of the support provided by UNSOM to the Federal Government of Somalia on preparations for the delivery of an inclusive, credible and transparent one-person-one-vote elections in 2020 and 2021, and encouraged UNSOM to help to ensure that the views of civil society were incorporated into the various Somali-led, inclusive political processes.\(^3^5\)

Regarding AMISOM, the Council adopted two successive resolutions, under Chapter VII of the Charter, extending the authorization for the States members of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM. On 15 May, by its resolution 2415 (2018), the Council proceeded to undertake a technical rollover of the authorization for AMISOM, extending it until 31 July 2018, awaiting the report of the joint assessment of the Mission by 15 June 2018.\(^3^6\) Thereafter, on 30 July, further to the letter dated 5 July 2018 from the Secretary-General,\(^3^7\) the Council adopted resolution 2431 (2018), extending the authorization until 31 May 2019. Against the backdrop of the discussions in the Council concerning the composition of AMISOM, in resolution 2431 (2018), the Council reduced the level of uniformed personnel to a maximum level of 20,626 by 28 February 2019, delayed from the scheduled date of 30 October 2018 as envisaged in paragraph 5 of resolution 2372 (2017) and paragraph 1 of resolution 2415 (2018), and stressed that there should be no further delay in the reduction beyond that date. The Council also set out the strategic objectives of AMISOM to enable the gradual handover of security responsibilities to Somali security forces by December 2021.\(^3^8\)

On 6 November 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2442 (2018), under Chapter VII of the Charter, renewing, for a further period of 13 months, the authorizations set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 2383 (2017) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, including the use of all necessary means to repress such acts.\(^3^9\)

Concerning the sanctions measures, on 14 November, the Council adopted resolution 2444 (2018), under Chapter VII of the Charter, in which it recognized that, during the course of the mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, no conclusive evidence had been found that Eritrea supported Al-Shabaab. Moreover, the Council welcomed the meeting between the representative of the Government of Eritrea and the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea and the meeting between the Presidents of Djibouti and Eritrea and lifted the arms embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes and other targeted sanctions imposed on Eritrea and terminated the mandate of the Monitoring Group with effect from 16 December 2018.\(^4^0\) Furthermore, the Council adjusted the mandate of the Security Council Committee and established the Panel of Experts on Somalia. It also reaffirmed the arms embargo on Somalia and reiterated the exemption on the delivery of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces.\(^4^1\)

\(^3^2\) Ibid., sixth and eighth paragraphs.
\(^3^3\) Resolution 2408 (2018), para. 1.
\(^3^4\) Ibid., eighteenth preambular paragraph.
\(^3^5\) Ibid., paras. 4 and 5.
\(^3^6\) Resolution 2415 (2018), second preambular paragraph and para. 1.
\(^3^7\) S/2018/674.
# Meetings: the situation in Somalia

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<td>S/PV.8165 24 January 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/1109)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Two Council members (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Peru), all invitees&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8259 15 May 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2018/411)</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Five Council members (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan, Peru), all invitees&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>S/PV.8280 7 June 2018</td>
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<td>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8322 30 July 2018</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia</td>
<td>Two Council members (Kazakhstan, Ethiopia), all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8352 13 September 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2018/800)</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women)</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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4. **The situation in Burundi**

During the period under review, the Security Council held five meetings in connection with the situation in Burundi and issued one presidential statement. One meeting was convened under this item to adopt a decision; all others were briefings.\(^{42}\) More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

\(^{42}\) For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
In 2018, the briefings under this item were delivered by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi and the Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, both invited under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. The briefers focused on three main aspects, namely, the political, security and humanitarian situation in the country. Invitations to those meetings under rule 37 were extended to Burundi.43

With regard to the political situation, the deliberations in the Council were focused on the impact of the decision of the Government of Burundi to conduct a referendum on 17 May in order to amend the Constitution and, in particular, on the effects of that decision on the inter-Burundian dialogue process and the implementation of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi. During his briefing in August, the Special Envoy informed the Council of the promulgation by the President of Burundi of the new Constitution on 7 June, adopted by more than 73 per cent of the Burundian people, as well as the official announcement by the President of the end of his mandate in 2020 and his commitment to give full support to the new President to be elected.44 The Council’s discussions thereafter centred on the activities of the Office of the Special Envoy in support of the fifth round of the inter-Burundian dialogue, despite the lack of participation by the Government, and the obstacles posed by the decision of the Government to temporarily suspend the work of international non-governmental organizations. Council members also focused on the new political environment and the road map for the 2020 elections and discussed the role of the United Nations in the context of the referendum on the constitutional amendment.45

In his briefings, the Special Envoy informed the Council that the security situation in the country had remained relatively calm. Nonetheless, he indicated that violations of human rights and other abuses, such as arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, hate speech against opposition actors and other acts of intimidation, continued.

Concerning the humanitarian situation, the Council heard three briefings by the Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, including on his two visits to Burundi and on the activities of the Burundi configuration.46 He briefed the Council on the country’s socioeconomic challenges and on humanitarian issues relating to the return of refugees from the United Republic of Tanzania and the influx of refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as on the newly launched national development plan for the period 2018–2027. At the meetings, speakers affirmed that the humanitarian situation was a cause of concern, in particular in view of the deterioration of the country’s socioeconomic situation and the threat of food insecurity.

In addition, Council members continued to discuss the standing issues of the status-of-mission agreement for the Office of the Special Envoy and the memorandum of understanding between the Burundian authorities and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The issues outlined above were also addressed by the Council in its decision during the reporting period. In a presidential statement issued on 5 April 2018, the Council expressed deep concern over the slow progress of the inter-Burundian dialogue led by the East African Community and the lack of engagement by the Government in that regard and underscored its deep concern regarding the continued worsening of the humanitarian situation.48 The Council welcomed and supported the renewed commitment of the African Union and the East African Community to a peaceful resolution of the political situation in Burundi through an inclusive dialogue on the basis of the Arusha Agreement and urged the guarantors of the Agreement to meet their obligations and ensure that the entirety of the Agreement was adhered to.49 The Council called upon the Government of Burundi and the Secretary-General to expeditiously finalize and implement the status-of-mission agreement for the Office of the Special Envoy, with a view to supporting the inter-Burundian dialogue and, in the areas of security and rule of law, to engaging with all stakeholders to the crisis to improve the human rights and security situation and foster an environment conducive to political dialogue.50

43 For more information on participation in meetings of the Council, see part II, sect. VII.
44 S/PV.8325, p. 2
45 For more information on the constitutional discussions of the Council members related to the role of the United Nations and Article 2 (7) of the Charter, see part III, sect. IV.B.
46 S/PV.8189, S/PV.8268 and S/PV.8408.
47 S/PRST/2018/7, first paragraph.
48 Ibid., eighth paragraph.
49 Ibid., second and third paragraphs.
50 Ibid., sixteenth paragraph.
Meetings: the situation in Burundi

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<td>S/PV.8189 26 February 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi (S/2018/89)</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi, Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission</td>
<td>Six Council members(^a), all invitees</td>
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<td>S/PV.8223 5 April 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8268 24 May 2018</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi, Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8325 9 August 2018</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8408 21 November 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi (S/2018/1028)</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi, Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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\(^a\) Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan and Peru.

5. The situation in the Great Lakes region

During the period under review, the Security Council held one meeting in connection with the situation in the Great Lakes region, which took the form of a briefing.\(^{51}\) The Council did not adopt any decision on this item in 2018. More information about the meeting, including invitees and speakers, is given in the table below.

On 10 April 2018, further to the most recent report of the Secretary-General,\(^{52}\) the Council heard a

\(^{51}\) For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

\(^{52}\) S/2018/209.
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briefing by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region on the activities of his office in support of the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region. The Special Envoy indicated that his office had focused on several critical areas, namely, inter alia, addressing the activities of armed groups in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supporting the peaceful dialogue and electoral processes in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, tackling the root causes of conflict, including the continued illicit exploitation and trade in natural resources from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the human rights violations, and the humanitarian situation in the region. The Special Envoy also informed the Council about the efforts to dispel mistrust among the countries of the region and to find sustainable and regional solutions to the ongoing humanitarian crisis.53

The representative of the Republic of the Congo also briefed the Council on behalf of the Chair of the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework on the conclusions of the most recent summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and high-level meeting of the Regional Oversight Mechanism, held in Brazzaville on 19 October 2017. In that regard, he informed the Council on the priorities identified. He emphasized the need to help to stabilize the Democratic Republic of the Congo so that it could serve as a vector for peace in the region and called upon the international community to mobilize around the efforts of the countries of the region – for the implementation of the Framework – with strengthened and coordinated cooperation.54

During the discussion that ensued, Council members reflected on the status of the implementation of the Framework on the fifth anniversary of its signing and emphasized its importance for peace and stability in the region. Council members also discussed the upcoming elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the lack of progress in the inter-Burundian dialogue and the constitutional reform process in Burundi, the challenges posed by armed groups, in particular in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the humanitarian situation in the region and the illicit trafficking in natural resources.

53 S/PV.8227, pp. 2–4.

54 Ibid., pp. 4–7.

Meeting: the situation in the Great Lakes region

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8227 10 April 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region (S/2018/209)</td>
<td>Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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6. The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

During the period under review, the Security Council held nine meetings and adopted two resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter in relation to the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Two meetings were convened to adopt the decisions of the Council; all others were briefings.55 The Council also met once with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of

55 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
the Congo (MONUSCO), pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001). More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. The Council also conducted a mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 5 to 7 October.57

The Council was regularly briefed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Head of MONUSCO. Other briefers included the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, representatives of the Episcopal Conference of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and representatives of civil society organizations. The Council was also briefed by the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

During its briefings and deliberations in 2018, the Council focused mainly on the electoral process and the implementation of the Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement of 31 December 2016, the continued occurrence of human rights violations in the context of a deteriorating security situation and the humanitarian situation in the country.

Regarding the electoral process and the implementation of the Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement, Council members discussed and followed closely the preparations leading up to the presidential and national and provincial legislative elections scheduled for 23 December and subsequently postponed to 30 December 2018, including the issuance of the electoral calendar and the voter and candidate registration processes and the provision of election security in areas of the country where armed groups were active. The readiness of MONUSCO to provide logistical support to the elections was also discussed.

During 2018, the Council also considered the overall deteriorating security situation, in particular the situation in Kasai Province and in the eastern side of the country, due to intercommunal violence and the activities of armed groups, including the attack on 7 December 2017 by the Allied Democratic Forces in Semuliki against civilians, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO, to which the Secretary-General responded with the appointment, on 5 January 2018, of a former Assistant Secretary-General to lead a special investigation into the incident. The Council discussed the incidence of violence and human rights violations in those areas of the country where armed groups were active, including incidents of sexual and gender-based violence and other violent attacks against civilians. The deliberations in the Council also concerned human rights violations relating to political rights, namely, the continued restrictions on the political space, the suppression of peaceful demonstrations and arbitrary arrests, and the slow progress in the implementation of the confidence-building measures envisaged in the 31 December 2016 political agreement.

Regarding the humanitarian crisis affecting the country, Council members specifically addressed the issue of the 4.5 million internally displaced persons in need of humanitarian assistance and the more than 7.7 million people suffering from severe food insecurity. On 19 March, the Council held a meeting dedicated to the humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including an “epidemic” of sexual violence in the country and the security and humanitarian situation of women. At the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the coordinator of the organization Encadrement des femmes indigènes et des ménages vulnérables and the Secretary-General of the Episcopal Conference of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.60 During 2018, Council members also discussed the two Ebola outbreaks that were declared in May and August in different parts of the country and their impact on the elections, the security situation in relation to the activities of armed groups in affected areas and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The effects of the Ebola outbreak on the humanitarian situation in the country were also considered by the Council under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”.61

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56 Held on 6 March 2018 under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B”; see S/PV.8196.
57 For more information on the Council’s mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see part I, sect. 33.
58 On 22 December 2018, the Council issued a statement to the press in which Council members took note of the decision by the Independent National Electoral Commission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to delay the elections.
59 S/PV.8153, p. 4.
60 S/PV.8207.
61 For more information, see part I, sect. 12.
Moreover, Council members discussed the adjustment of the configuration of MONUSCO and its activities in line with the Mission’s priority mandates of protecting civilians and supporting the implementation of the 31 December 2016 political agreement and the electoral process, and discussed its mandate to protect United Nations personnel. At the meetings, reference was made to the Mission’s “protection through projection” strategy for carrying out its protection mandates in accordance with the Secretary-General’s strategic review of MONUSCO of 2017. In that regard, by its resolution 2409 (2018), the Council extended the mandate of MONUSCO for a period of one year, until 31 March 2019, and authorized MONUSCO to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate.

In addition, during 2018, the Council focused on the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004). On 20 May 2018, the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo submitted, for the Council’s attention, its final report, in which it concluded that the security situation had not improved and raised two major factors of concern, namely, that peacekeepers were facing serious attacks and that armed actors were continuously using the delay in the electoral process to promote acts of violence. In that connection, by its resolution 2424 (2018), the Council renewed the sanctions measures and extended the mandate of the Group of Experts. At a meeting in July, the Chair of the Committee gave a briefing on its activities during the first six months of 2018, including the addition of four individuals to its sanctions list. Further to the renewal of its mandate, on 18 December 2018, the Group of Experts transmitted to the Council its midterm report pursuant to resolution 2424 (2018), in which it focused on the four territories in the North and South Kivu Provinces, where it had documented findings relevant to its mandate, while also confirming that the overall security situation in the country remained volatile.

Meetings: the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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63 Resolution 2409 (2018), paras. 29 and 35. For more information on the mandate of MONUSCO, see part X, sect. I. For more information concerning the decisions of the Council related to measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter during the period under review, see part VII, sect. IV.A.
64 S/2018/531.
65 Resolution 2424 (2018), paras. 1 and 3. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see part VII, sect. III. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) and the mandate of the Group of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.
66 S/PV.8318, p. 4.
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8318 26 July 2018</td>
<td>Letter dated 1 June 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/528)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General, President of the Board of Directors of Synergy of Women for Victims of Sexual Violence</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
<td>S/PV.8318 26 July 2018</td>
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<td>Letter dated 18 July 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/727)</td>
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<td>Art. 8(b)</td>
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<td>S/PV.8331 27 August 2018</td>
<td>Letter dated 7 August 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/762)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General, President of the Episcopal Conference of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, spokesperson for Rien sans les femmes</td>
<td>13 Council members, all invitees</td>
<td>S/PV.8331 27 August 2018</td>
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7. The situation in the Central African Republic

During the period under review, the Security Council held seven meetings, adopted three resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter and issued one presidential statement in connection with the situation in the Central African Republic. Except for three meetings convened to adopt a decision of the Council, all meetings held in 2018 took the form of briefings. The Council also held one meeting with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001). More information on meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

During 2018, the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary General

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68 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

69 Held on 17 October 2018 under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B”; see S/PV.8374.
for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA, consistent with the four-month reporting schedule established under resolution 2387 (2017). The Council also heard a briefing by the Special Representative of the African Union to the Central African Republic, the Force Commander of the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic and the Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service.

The briefings were focused on the security situation in the country and the extension and consolidation of State authority beyond Bangui, the priorities for MINUSCA, including enhanced protection of civilians, and the training and deployment of the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic by the European Union Military Training Mission in cooperation with MINUSCA. The briefings were also focused on the political situation and the progress of the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, as well as on the strengthening of national judicial institutions and the preparations for the establishment of the Special Criminal Court. The Council was also briefed on the persistently dire humanitarian situation in the country, including the population displacement and the continued attacks on peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. In addition, the Council heard briefings by the Chair of the Central African Republic configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission on its work and initiatives in support of the Government of the Central African Republic, including the assistance provided to the establishment of the Special Criminal Court, and the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, who reported on the implementation of the sanctions measures and his visit to the country from 2 to 5 October 2018.

These issues were also addressed by the Council in its decisions during the reporting period. By its resolution 2399 (2018), adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended until 31 January 2019 the arms embargo, the asset freeze and the travel ban imposed against individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013). The Council further introduced, for the first time, incitement and support to incitement to violence, especially if based on religious or ethnic grounds, as criteria for the designation of individuals or entities by the Committee. The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic until 28 February 2019.

In a presidential statement issued on 13 July 2018, the Council expressed concern regarding the persistent violence against civilians, United Nations peacekeepers and humanitarian workers and condemned the rise of incitement to violence and hostility towards MINUSCA. The Council also reaffirmed its support to the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and its road map, and stressed the need to operationalize the Special Criminal Court, establish the Commission on Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation and bolster national accountability mechanisms. The Council welcomed the ongoing good collaboration between Central African Republic authorities and international partners, including MINUSCA and the European Union Military Training Mission, for the progressive and sustainable redeployment of the armed forces of the Central African Republic trained by the European Union Military Training Mission and expressed its deep concern for the humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic, including the situation of internally displaced persons and refugees, while noting the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance. The Council also encouraged Member States to scale up funding to respond to the humanitarian needs identified in the humanitarian response plan for 2018.

During the period under review, the Council renewed the mandate of MINUSCA twice. On 15 November 2018, by its resolution 2446 (2018), the Council extended the mandate of the Mission for one month, until 15 December 2018, in the context of mandate renewal negotiations. On 13 December 2018, the Council adopted – albeit not unanimously – resolution 2448 (2018), by which it extended the mandate of MINUSCA until 15 November 2019. The Council decided that the Mission's mandate would include four main priority tasks, namely, the protection of civilians, the provision of good offices and support to the peace process, the facilitation of the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the operationalization of the Special Criminal Court and the establishment of the Commission on Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation.

70 S/PV.8187, pp. 6–8.
71 S/PV.8187, pp. 8–10; and S/PV.8378, pp. 7–9.
72 Resolution 2399 (2018), paras. 1, 9 and 16.
73 Resolution 2399 (2018), para. 22. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning the Central African Republic, see part VII, sect. III.
74 Resolution 2399 (2018), para. 31. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.
75 S/PRST/2018/14, first paragraph.
76 Ibid., third, fourth, tenth and eleventh paragraphs.
77 Resolution 2446 (2018), para. 1.
assistance, and the protection of United Nations personnel, installations, equipment and goods. In the resolution, the Council also reaffirmed its support to the Government of the Central African Republic and the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, and commended the concrete steps taken towards the full operationalization of the Special Criminal Court. The Council further welcomed the intent to appoint a United Nations-African Union joint special envoy to support the peace process and called for the reactivation of joint bilateral commissions between the countries of the region to tackle cross-border issues while encouraging continued coordination with the Peacebuilding Commission and other partners in support of long-term peacebuilding needs.

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78 Resolution 2448 (2018), paras. 34 and 39. For more information on the mandate of MINUSCA, see part X, sect. I.
79 Ibid., paras. 1, 2 and 20.
80 Ibid., paras. 4, 6 and 25.
81 S/PV.8422, pp. 4–6 (Russian Federation) and p. 6 (China).

### Meetings: the situation in the Central African Republic

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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8378 23 October 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic (S/2018/922)</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Special Representative of the African Union to the Central African Republic, Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service</td>
<td>All Council members,&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt; all invitees&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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8. The situation in Guinea-Bissau

During the period under review, the Security Council held five meetings and adopted one resolution in connection with the situation in Guinea-Bissau. Except for one meeting convened for the adoption of the decision, all other meetings took the form of briefings. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

During 2018, the Council heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau and Head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs on the evolving political situation in Guinea-Bissau and the steps taken to implement the Conakry Agreement on the Implementation of the Economic Community of West African States Road Map for the Resolution of the Political Crisis in Guinea-Bissau. The briefings were also focused on the preparations for legislative elections scheduled for November 2018 and later postponed until March 2019.

Under this item, the Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission also briefed the Council. He focused on his visit to Bissau and Portugal from 24 to 27 July 2018 and on the Peacebuilding Commission’s continued engagement in Guinea-Bissau, including the support provided to the justice sector and national reconciliation efforts, the implementation of the Peacebuilding Commission’s portfolio for Guinea-Bissau, the engagement with regional and international partners to assist in overcoming the political impasse in the country, and the preparations for legislative and presidential elections.

The Council also heard a briefing by the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau on his visit to Bissau and Conakry from 25 to 29 June 2018. The Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) briefed the Council on the work conducted to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime in Guinea-Bissau. The spokesperson for the Network on Peace and Security for Women in the Economic

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82 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

83 S/PV.8337, pp. 4–5.

84 S/PV.8261, p. 4.
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Region focused during her briefing on the engagement of civil society, especially women, in the political and peace processes in Guinea-Bissau.85

The issues outlined above were also addressed by the Council in its decision on the situation in Guinea-Bissau in 2018. On 28 February 2018, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2404 (2018), extending the mandate of UNIOGBIS for 12 months, until 28 February 2019.86 In the resolution, the Council called for the implementation of the recommendations of the strategic review mission regarding the need of UNIOGBIS to refocus its existing efforts towards political capacities in support of the Special Representative’s good offices and to streamline its management structure, and encouraged UNIOGBIS to operate in a more effective and efficient manner.87 In that regard, the Council requested UNIOGBIS to focus in particular on a series of priorities, including to support the implementation of the Conakry Agreement and the ECOWAS road map, and to support, through good offices, the electoral process to ensure free and credible elections. The Council also included, as a priority, to provide support to national authorities in expediting and completing the review of the Constitution of Guinea-Bissau.88 The Council affirmed that, in addition to those priorities, UNIOGBIS and the Special Representative would continue to assist, coordinate and lead international efforts to ensure lasting peace and stability in a broad range of other issues, including strengthening democratic institutions and enhancing the capacity of State organs.89

In its decision, the Council also supported the efforts of ECOWAS to ensure a swift resolution of the crisis and took note of the ECOWAS decision to impose sanctions against those obstructing the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, while calling upon the stakeholders of Guinea-Bissau to strictly respect and comply with the Agreement and the ECOWAS road map.90 The Council also welcomed the joint efforts undertaken by international partners to enhance cooperation in support of the Government of Guinea-Bissau, in accordance with the priority structural reforms established by the Government, and recognized the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in enhancing those efforts with a view to supporting the long-term peacebuilding priorities of Guinea-Bissau.91

In the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide an oral update within three months on the political and security situation in the country, to submit regular reports every six months on the implementation of the resolution and to submit his assessment of UNIOGBIS within nine months, including options for a possible reconfiguration of the United Nations presence in the country and reprioritization of tasks.92

On 6 December 2018, the Secretary-General submitted a special report on the strategic assessment of UNIOGBIS in which he outlined a three-phased approach to the exit of the Mission by no later than 31 December 2020, including the establishment of a streamlined good offices special political mission in Bissau led by a special representative and focused on facilitating the political process.93

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85 S/PV.8337, pp. 8–10.
86 Resolution 2404 (2018), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNIOGBIS, see part X, sect. II.
87 Resolution 2404 (2018), para. 2.
88 Ibid., para. 3.
89 Ibid., para. 4.
90 Ibid., paras. 5 and 6.
91 Ibid., para. 16.
92 Ibid., para. 28.

**Meetings: the situation in Guinea-Bissau**

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<td>14 February 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (S/2018/110)</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau, Togo</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau and Head of the United Nations Integrated</td>
<td>All Council members, all inviteesa</td>
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Guinea-Bissau

Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission

All Council members, all invitees

Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, spokesperson for the Network on Peace and Security for

All Council members, all invitees
Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

9. Central African region

During the period under review, the Security Council held three meetings and issued one presidential statement under the item entitled “Central African region”. Except for one meeting convened for the adoption of a decision of the Council, all other meetings took the form of briefings. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

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<td>Women in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Region</td>
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<td>Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission</td>
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<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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a The representative of Togo spoke on behalf of ECOWAS. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference from Bissau.

b The Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime participated in the meeting via videoconference from Vienna.

c The representative of Equatorial Guinea spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau.

d Guinea-Bissau was represented by its Prime Minister. The spokesperson for the Network on Peace and Security for Women in the ECOWAS Region participated in the meeting via videoconference from Bissau.

94 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
for Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea.\(^95\) The Director of the Operations and Advocacy Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations also briefed the Council in 2018, noting the intensification of the humanitarian crises in the Central African region and highlighting issues with the funding of the humanitarian response plans in the region and the increase of the number of persons that would be in need of humanitarian assistance by 2019.\(^96\)

These issues were also addressed by the Council in its only decision under this item for 2018. In a presidential statement issued on 10 August 2018, the Council expressed deep concern at the grave security situation in parts of Central Africa, the persistent violence perpetrated by armed groups in the Central African Republic, the ongoing violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the increase in violence in the north-west and south-west regions of Cameroon. The Council also expressed its continuing concern regarding maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, the illegal wildlife trade and transnational organized crime, including the threat of mercenary activities.\(^97\)

In addition, the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review of the scope of the mandate and activities of UNOCA by 1 August 2019.\(^98\) With respect to the mandate of UNOCA, the Council noted that the priorities of the Office would include, inter alia, to perform good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General, to assist in consolidating peace and resolving tensions from the various elections held in the period 2015–2018, to work with ECCAS and its member States on the structural prevention of election-related violence and to enhance the capacity of ECCAS in conflict prevention, early warning and other areas.\(^99\) The Council also encouraged UNOCA to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue in its activities and to take into consideration information relating to the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters on the stability of the Central African region.\(^100\)

The Council also remained concerned at the security and humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin region, noting in particular the continued use by Boko Haram of women and girls as suicide bombers. The Council welcomed the support provided by UNOCA and UNOWAS for the development of a joint regional strategy to address the root causes of the crisis through regular contact with regional leaders and encouraged partners to increase their security assistance to States members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, as well as humanitarian and development support to the region.\(^101\) The Council also took note of the elections planned throughout the region between 2018 and 2021 and emphasized the need for the facilitation of timely, peaceful, transparent and credible elections.\(^102\)

During the reporting period, by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 24 and 28 August 2018,\(^103\) the Council extended the mandate of UNOCA for three years, until 31 August 2021.

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\(^95\) S/PV.8284, pp. 4–6.
\(^96\) S/PV.8421, pp. 4–6.
\(^97\) S/PRST/2018/17, fourth paragraph.
\(^98\) Ibid., fifth paragraph.
\(^99\) Ibid., sixth paragraph. For more information regarding the mandate of UNOCA, see part X, sect. II.
\(^100\) Ibid., eighth and ninth paragraphs.
\(^101\) Ibid., twelfth and thirteenth paragraphs.
\(^102\) Ibid., fifteenth paragraph.

### Meetings: Central African region

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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8284 13 June 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (S/2018/521)</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, Secretary-General of the</td>
<td>10 Council members,(^a) all invitees(^b)</td>
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### 10. Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

During the period under review, the Security Council held 30 meetings, adopted 11 resolutions, including 8 under Chapter VII of the Charter, and issued two presidential statements under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”. Except for the meetings convened to adopt a decision of the Council, most meetings under this item took the form of briefings.\(^{104}\) In addition, the Council held two closed meetings with countries contributing troops and police to the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001).\(^{105}\) Council members also continued to hold, on a regular basis, informal consultations of the whole on the situation in South Sudan and the Sudan. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the tables below.

Consistent with prior practice, in the context of these meetings, the Council considered several distinct topics, principally the situation in Darfur and the mandate of UNAMID; the relations between South Sudan and the Sudan, the situation in the Abyei Area and the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA); and the situation in South Sudan and the mandate of UNMISS.\(^{106}\) The Council also considered the work of the Panels of Experts on South Sudan and on the Sudan,\(^ {107}\) as well as the implementation of resolution 1593 (2005), by which the Council referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

Concerning the situation in Darfur, the Council heard briefings by the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur and Head of UNAMID at 60-day intervals on the progress made in

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\(^{104}\) For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.  
\(^{105}\) Held under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B”. For UNMISS, see S/PV.8197 (6 March 2018); for UNAMID, see S/PV.8279 (6 June 2018).  
\(^{106}\) For more information on the mandates and compositions of UNAMID, UNISFA and UNMISS, see part X, sect. I.  
\(^{107}\) For more information on the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan and their respective Panels of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.
the implementation of the mission’s reconfiguration and drawdown, on the absence of significant impact on the security and protection situation in areas from which UNAMID had withdrawn, and on the proposed benchmarked exit strategy for the mission. The Joint Special Representative highlighted the absence of major fighting between the Government of the Sudan and the non-signatory armed movements, except for limited and sporadic clashes with the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid in Jebel Marra, decreased levels of intercommunal violence and persistent insecurity and land occupation issues faced by displaced persons, preventing their sustainable return. He noted some limited progress in the peace process, referring to the agreement by the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi to accept the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as the basis for further negotiations with the Government in June 2018 and the signing of a pre-negotiation framework in December 2018. The Council also heard briefings on two occasions by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on the findings and recommendations of the joint African Union-United Nations assessment conducted in 2017 and the strategic review conducted in 2018, both of which served as the basis for the further reconfiguration of UNAMID.

By its resolutions 2425 (2018) of 29 June 2018 and 2429 (2018) of 13 July 2018, the Council extended the mandate of UNAMID twice, for a period of two weeks and for a period of one year, respectively, the latter being until 30 June 2019. In resolution 2429 (2018), further to the outcome of the joint African Union-United Nations strategic review of UNAMID, the Council modified the priorities and mandate of UNAMID and decreased the authorized troop ceiling.

In a presidential statement issued on 31 January 2018, the Council welcomed the improvements in the security situation. The Council reiterated its concern about the considerable challenges that remained, particularly that of ensuring sustainable solutions for the 2.7 million internally displaced persons in Darfur, and stressed that funding for the consolidation of peacebuilding efforts should be treated by Member States as a political issue of high priority to avoid a relapse into conflict. The Council commended the conclusion of the first phase of the reconfiguration of UNAMID and noted the findings of the assessment that the closure of team sites had created a gap in the mission’s early warning systems, affected the mission’s capacity-building work and limited its human rights investigation capacity. Subsequently, in a presidential statement issued on 11 December 2018, the Council again welcomed the continued improvements in the security situation outside of Jebel Marra, aided by the arms collection campaign of the Government, and the joint efforts by the Government and UNAMID to address intercommunal disputes.

Taking note of the benchmarks proposed by the Secretary-General, the Council acknowledged that progress towards achieving the benchmarks and indicators would contribute towards the successful transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur.

The Council also heard three briefings by the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan. The Chair highlighted the recommendations of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan in its final report of 28 December 2017, including for the Committee to continue to monitor the activities of Darfurian armed groups in Libya and South Sudan and to cooperate with relevant committees for this purpose. The Chair also made reference to the findings of the Panel in its interim report discussed with the Committee on 17 August 2018 and to the work of the Committee, including its meeting with the Sudan and States in the region on 2 February 2018 and her visit to the Sudan in April 2018 to obtain information on the state of implementation of the sanctions measures. The Council renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts for a period of one year, until 12 March 2019.

Pursuant to resolution 1593 (2005) and consistent with established practice, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court briefed the Council twice in 2018. The Prosecutor reiterated her call to the Council to take concrete action in response to the non-compliance with the resolution by the Sudan and other Member States in the execution of arrest warrants issued by the Court. She noted some progress in the situation in Darfur, while also expressing concern about reports of continued violence against civilians.

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111 Ibid., second and sixth paragraphs.
112 Ibid., fifth paragraph.
113 S/PRST/2018/19, second paragraph.
114 Ibid., sixth paragraph. See also S/2018/912.
115 S/2017/1125.
116 Resolution 2400 (2018), para. 2.
updated the Council on the status of her office’s investigations into the situation in Darfur and requested its support, including through the provision of United Nations funding.

With respect to the Abyei Area and the border between South Sudan and the Sudan, on 20 September 2018, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on the status of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and on the recommendations of the Secretary-General for the reconfiguration of UNISFA. During 2018, by its resolution 2411 (2018) of 13 April 2018, the Council authorized a technical rollover of the border security agreement mandate for a period of 10 days.\(^{117}\) Subsequently, in accordance with its practice since 2017, the Council separately extended the mandates of UNISFA in support of the Mechanism and with respect to the Abyei Area twice each, for periods of six months each, the second time until 15 April and 15 May 2019, respectively.\(^{118}\) With respect to the Abyei Area, the Council also renewed its decision, acting under Chapter VII, to extend the protection and security tasks of UNISFA set out in paragraph 3 of resolution 1990 (2011).\(^{119}\) While not modifying the mandate of UNISFA during the period under review, the Council twice reduced the mission’s authorized troop ceiling and increased the level of police personnel.\(^{120}\)

Regarding the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, in its resolution 2412 (2018) of 23 April 2018, the Council determined that the parties should demonstrate measurable progress on several conditions, including maintaining standing clearance for the air and ground patrols of UNISFA, operationalizing Border Mechanism team sites, convening the Joint Political and Security Mechanism and withdrawing the forces of both parties from the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, opening additional border crossings, and resuming border demarcation discussions including negotiations on the disputed areas.\(^{121}\) On 11 October 2018, in its resolution 2438 (2018), the Council updated these conditions to include the establishment by the Government of South Sudan of a high-level team to undertake community sensitization and enable ground movement by UNISFA from Gok Machar into the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and to have both parties develop a timeline for verifying the functioning of the border crossings and to have them establish customs and migration offices.\(^{122}\)

Regarding the Abyei Area, in its resolution 2416 (2018) of 15 May 2018, the Council expressed disappointment that the parties had taken few steps to implement the agreement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area and to achieve a political resolution to the status of the territory, and requested them to update the Council, through the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, on steps taken, inter alia: to resolve the final status of Abyei by considering the 2012 proposal of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, to implement the decisions and ensure the functioning of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee and to promote reconciliation and engagement of the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities.\(^{123}\) The Council also urged continued progress towards the establishment of the Abyei Area interim institutions.\(^{124}\) In its resolution 2445 (2018) of 15 November 2018, the Council also requested an update on the steps the African Union Commission had taken to submit to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union the findings and recommendations of the Abyei Area Joint Investigation and Inquiry Committee.\(^{125}\) The Council encouraged UNISFA to coordinate with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa on reconciliation, community sensitization and political peace processes, and invited the mission to coordinate with the Juba-appointed administration in Abyei and the Misseriya administration in Muglad.\(^{126}\)

Concerning South Sudan, the Council was briefed at 90-day intervals, as well as on three additional occasions, by the Under-Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on the implementation of the mandate of UNMISS, including the deployment of the regional protection force, the Mission’s efforts to extend its protection-of-civilians activities to different parts of the country and the possible future reconfiguration of the Mission to support the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South

\(^{117}\) Resolution 2411 (2018), para. 1.
\(^{118}\) Resolutions 2412 (2018), para. 1; and 2438 (2018), para. 1 (extending the mandate in support of the border security agreement); and resolutions 2416 (2018), para. 1; and 2445 (2018), para. 1 (extending the mandate with respect to the Abyei Area).
\(^{119}\) Resolutions 2416 (2018), para. 1; and 2445 (2018), para. 1. For more information on the authorization of the use of force, see part VII, sect. IV.
\(^{120}\) Resolutions 2416 (2018), para. 3; and 2445 (2018), paras. 3 and 4.
\(^{121}\) Resolution 2412 (2018), para. 3.
\(^{122}\) Resolution 2438 (2018), para. 3.
\(^{123}\) Resolution 2416 (2018), para. 6.
\(^{124}\) Ibid., para. 7.
\(^{125}\) Resolution 2445 (2018), para. 7.
\(^{126}\) Ibid., paras. 9 and 16.
Sudan, signed by several of the parties in Addis Ababa on 12 September 2018. The Council also heard briefings by representatives of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations as well as the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan, the Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Special Envoy for South Sudan on the continued fighting and violations of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access of 21 December 2017. They noted the progress made in the efforts led by IGAD to ensure a permanent ceasefire and to revitalize the peace process with the signing on 27 June 2018 of the Khartoum Declaration of Agreement between Parties of the Conflict of South Sudan.

The Under-Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, together with the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, also briefed the Council on the difficult humanitarian conditions in South Sudan, highlighting approximately 4 million displaced persons, 6 million persons in need of life-saving aid and protection and more than 5 million persons estimated to be food insecure, as well as highly complex and unpredictable levels of humanitarian access. They also highlighted the high rates of human rights violations and abuses and conflict-related sexual violence. In this context, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict briefed the Council once on the alarming increase in sexual violence in 2018, the highest in the previous three years, including the reports of mass rapes of women and girls in Bentiu in November 2018. The Special Representative urged the Government to ensure accountability for these acts and the Council to consistently apply sanctions in that regard as a critical aspect of deterrence and prevention.

On 16 November 2018, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union and the Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) updated the Council on the joint United Nations-African Union visit to South Sudan in October 2018 to strengthen the partnership between the two organizations to achieve inclusive and gender-responsive peace and security. During 2018, the Council also heard briefings from two representatives of South Sudanese civil society organizations regarding the impact of the conflict on civilians, including women and children. They emphasized the need for, inter alia, a gender-sensitive approach to the implementation of the ceasefire and for governance reform and transitional justice, called upon the Council to pressure the parties to uphold the ceasefire and ensure the meaningful participation of women in the peace process and urged the Council to support and engage with women’s and civil society organizations.127

By its resolution 2406 (2018) of 15 March 2018, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of UNMISS for a period of one year, until 15 March 2019, introducing some modifications to its mandate while maintaining its overall composition.128 The Council demanded that all parties immediately end the fighting and implement the ceasefire declared in the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan of 2015 and the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities of 2017.129 On 13 July 2018, in its resolution 2428 (2018), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council expressed deep concern at the failures of the leaders of South Sudan to bring an end to the hostilities and demanded that they fully and immediately adhere to their ceasefire agreements and allow full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access.130

The Council heard two briefings by the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan on the recommendations of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan in its final report of 12 April 2018 and interim report of 26 November 2018 regarding the implementation of the sanctions on South Sudan.131 The Chair also updated the Council on the work of the Committee, including a briefing to the Committee by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict on 11 April 2018, and the visit of the Chair to South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya in June 2018 in order to strengthen and

127 S/PV.8249, pp. 5–6; and S/PV.8356, pp. 7–8.
128 Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 5.
129 Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 1.
130 Resolution 2428 (2018), paras. 1 and 2.
131 In its final report submitted to the Council pursuant to resolution 2353 (2017) (S/2018/292), the Panel reiterated its recommendations to the Council to, inter alia, designate additional persons responsible for actions that threatened the peace, security and stability of South Sudan and to impose an arms embargo. See also the interim report of the Panel submitted to the Council pursuant to resolution 2428 (2018) (S/2018/1049).
engaged with the States concerned on the implementation of the sanctions measures.  

In its resolution 2406 (2018), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council expressed its intention to consider all measures, including an arms embargo, as appropriate, to deprive the parties of the means to continue fighting and to prevent the violations of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities of 2017.  

During 2018, the Council adopted two additional resolutions concerning the sanctions in South Sudan, namely, resolutions 2418 (2018) of 31 May 2018 and 2428 (2018) of 13 July 2018, by which it renewed the travel ban and asset freeze in South Sudan and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts twice, for periods of two and a half months and eleven and a half months, respectively.  

In addition, in resolution 2428 (2018) and further to paragraph 3 of resolution 2418 (2018), the Council imposed an arms embargo on South Sudan until 31 May 2019, broadened the sanctions listing criteria to include persons and entities involved in planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence and added two individuals to its sanctions list.  

Both resolutions 2418 (2018) and 2428 (2018) were adopted with nine votes in favour and six abstentions. In both instances, abstaining Council members questioned the timing and utility of the arms embargo and the listing of additional individuals at a critical juncture for the South Sudanese peace process and the lack of coordination by the Council with IGAD and the African Union. Those members supporting the adoption of the resolutions emphasized the continued violations by the parties of both the 2015 and 2017 agreements and the need for concrete action to ensure accountability and increasing pressure on the parties to achieve a political solution.  

For the purposes of facilitating the coverage of this item, the meetings are set out below under three separate headings, concerning Darfur, the relations between South Sudan and the Sudan and the situation in Abyei, and South Sudan.

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132 For more information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) and the mandate of its Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.
133 Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 3.
134 Resolutions 2418 (2018), paras. 1 and 2; and 2428 (2018), paras. 12 and 19.
135 Resolution 2428 (2018), paras. 4–6, 12–14 and 17. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning South Sudan, see part VII, sect. III.

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Meetings: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – Darfur

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<td>S/PV.8155 10 January 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2017/1113)</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>Seven Council members; all invitees</td>
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<td>Meeting record and date</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8283 11 June 2018</td>
<td>Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>Seven Council members, all invitees</td>
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<td>S/PV.8287 14 June 2018</td>
<td>review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2018/530)</td>
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<td>One Council member (Poland)(^c)</td>
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<td>S/PV.8290 20 June 2018</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<td>S/PV.8366 3 October 2018</td>
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<td>One Council member (Poland)(^c)</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8377 22 October 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2018/912)</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Joint Special Representative for Darfur and Head of UNAMID</td>
<td>Seven Council members, all invitees(^a)</td>
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### Meetings: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan, South Sudan and Abyei

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<td>13 April 2018</td>
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<td>23 April 2018</td>
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<td>15 May 2018</td>
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<td>S/PV.8357</td>
<td>Letter dated 20 August 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/778)</td>
<td>South Sudan, Sudan</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<td>Resolution 2438 (2018) 15-0-0</td>
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<td>S/PV.8371</td>
<td>Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2018/909)</td>
<td>South Sudan, Sudan</td>
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<td>All invitees</td>
<td>Resolution 2438 (2018) 15-0-0</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 October 2018</td>
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- Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait and Peru.
- Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan, Peru and Poland.
- The representative of Poland spoke in her capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan.
- The Joint Special Representative participated in the meeting via videoconference from El Fasher.
- The Joint Special Representative participated in the meeting via videoconference from Johannesburg, South Africa.
### Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

#### Meetings: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – South Sudan

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<td>South Sudan, Sudan</td>
<td>All invitees</td>
<td>Resolution 2445 (2018) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)</td>
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<td>S/PV.8166 24 January 2018</td>
<td>Special report of the Secretary-General on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (S/2018/143)</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
<td>Resolution 2406 (2018) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)</td>
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<td>S/PV.8192 27 February 2018</td>
<td>Special report of the Secretary-General on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (S/2018/143)</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Special Envoy for South Sudan</td>
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<td>Resolution 2406 (2018) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)</td>
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<td>16 February 2018 (S/2018/163)</td>
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<td>Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan, representative of the Centre for Inclusive Governance, Peace and Justice</td>
<td>Four Council members (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Poland), all invitees*</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8299 28 June 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 17 February to 3 June 2018) (S/2018/609)</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>Six Council members, all invitees</td>
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<td>S/PV.8356 18 September 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 4 June to 1 September 2018) (S/2018/831)</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan, IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan, Governance and Peace Manager for the Community</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<td>Decision and vote (for against-abstaining)</td>
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<td><strong>S/PV.8403</strong> 16 November 2018</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>Empowerment for Progress Organization</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<td><strong>S/PV.8431</strong> 18 December 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 2 September to 30 November 2018) (S/2018/1103)</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women)</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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*a* The Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission participated in the meeting via videoconference from Juba.

*b* The representative of Poland briefed the Council in her capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan.

*c* The IGAD Special Envoy and the representative of the Centre for Inclusive Governance, Peace and Justice participated in the meeting via videoconference from Addis Ababa and Juba, respectively.

*d* Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.

*e* For: Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States; against: none; abstaining: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation.

*f* Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan and Peru.

*g* Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.

*h* For: Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States; against: none; abstaining: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation.

*i* The IGAD Special Envoy and the Governance and Peace Manager participated in the meeting via videoconference from Addis Ababa and Kampala, respectively.

*j* The Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union participated in the meeting via videoconference from Addis Ababa.

*k* The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict participated in the meeting via videoconference from London.
11. Peace consolidation in West Africa

During the period under review, the Security Council held four meetings and issued two presidential statements under the item “Peace consolidation in West Africa”. Two of the meetings took the form of briefings and the other two were convened for the adoption of decisions of the Council. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

During its meetings under this item, the Council heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS). During his briefings, he presented the succeeding reports of the Secretary-General on the activities of UNOWAS. He focused on the multifaceted security challenges affecting West Africa and the Sahel, including the increase and complexity of terrorist attacks and the expansion of extremist activities, such as those undertaken by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. He also referred to the violence between farmers and herders as “increasingly a major security threat in the region”, which risked morphing into the terrorist attacks that had defined the security landscape, as well as to the threat posed by maritime piracy and transnational organized crime.

While observing an upsurge in popular discontent in the region, manifested through demonstrations calling for political and economic reform, he reported on the “positive trajectory” of the democratic elections in the region, namely in the Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. In his briefings, he emphasized the importance of the respect for human rights and the rule of law for advancing peace, security and development as well as democracy and good governance in the region. He also briefed the Council on the work by the United Nations on sustaining peace in Burkina Faso and the Gambia, cautioning that attention needed to be paid to the challenges facing the two countries in the areas of security-sector reform, national reconciliation and the justice sector.

In his briefings, the Special Representative also reported on the challenges faced regarding the demarcation of the border between Cameroon and Nigeria and the pillar construction process, as well as on the efforts to reinvigorate the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. The Council was also briefed on the progress of the operationalization of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the efforts of the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin.

During the deliberations, Council members focused on the political, socioeconomic, security and humanitarian trends in the region over the reporting period. Council members centred their discussions around the progress on democratic transitions and governance in the region, highlighting the political progress achieved in Burkina Faso, the Gambia and Liberia, and the gains achieved in sustaining inclusive economic development in the region. Discussions were also focused on the security situation in West Africa and the Sahel, with Council members expressing concern over the persistence of multifaceted and complex challenges across the region, such as transnational organized crime, the proliferation of cross-border armed groups and the insecurity caused by terrorist groups such as Boko Haram. Council members also discussed the efforts to combat security challenges, such as the deployment of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the work of the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram, and the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. Council members also expressed concern about the dire humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin region.

Most of these issues were also addressed by the Council in its decisions under this item in 2018. In its presidential statement of 30 January 2018, the Council expressed full support to the Special Representative and looked forward to ongoing activities undertaken by UNOWAS in the areas of conflict prevention, mediation and good offices. The Council further welcomed the efforts to give renewed impetus to the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. In the presidential statement, the Council emphasized the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, in peacebuilding and in post-conflict situations and emphasized the need for national stakeholders to work towards the increased participation of women, including with a view to increasing the number of women appointed to senior government positions.

The Council also welcomed the peaceful general elections held in Liberia, while expressing various levels of concern with regard to the situation in

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139 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
140 S/PV.8313, pp. 2–3.
141 Ibid., p. 3.
142 S/PV.8156, p. 3.
144 Ibid., fifth and sixth paragraphs.
Guinea-Bissau, Togo and, more broadly, West Africa and the Sahel.143 The Council expressed concern over the threats of terrorism and about the attacks on civilians and welcomed the leadership demonstrated by countries in the region in spearheading initiatives to address security challenges, commending the efforts of regional stakeholders to address the impact of terrorism and transnational organized crime, including through the Multinational Joint Task Force and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel.144

In the same presidential statement, the Council also recognized the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes, among other factors, on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel and emphasized the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by Governments and the United Nations relating to these factors. The Council expressed concern over the overall humanitarian situation in the region, characterized by the impact of armed conflict and terrorism, extreme poverty, food insecurity, forced displacement and the adverse effects of climate change and epidemics.146 Moreover, the Council expressed its intention to periodically monitor progress made and reiterated its call for an assessment of the implementation of resolution 2349 (2017) to be integrated into the regular reporting by UNOWAS.147

The Council also issued a presidential statement on 10 August 2018, in which it reiterated its recognition of the role of UNOWAS in contributing to the continuous strategic and integrated analysis of the opportunities, risks and challenges in support of efforts by national and local actors to sustain peace.148 In the statement, the Council also reiterated its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of all countries in West Africa and the Sahel, welcoming regional and international efforts in Togo and the Gambia and calling upon all political stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau to uphold the provisions of the Conakry accord.149 The Council again emphasized the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, in peacebuilding and in post-conflict situations and welcomed efforts by UNOWAS and the Economic Community of West African States to work towards the systematic involvement of women in initiatives to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism.150 The Council reiterated its concern over the challenging security situation in the region and expressed concern for the increased tensions between pastoralists and farmers driven by competition for natural resources and, inter alia, pressures related to climate and ecological factors.151 The Council again recognized the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel and continued to stress the need for long-term strategies by Governments and the United Nations, based on risk assessments, to support stabilization and build resilience.152

In the same presidential statement, the Council stressed the need for strengthening collective engagement across the Sahel region, taking note of the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to reactivate the Nouakchott Process and the review of the African Union strategy for the Sahel.153 The Council also underlined the need for a more integrated, cross-pillar approach across the development, humanitarian and peace and security nexus and welcomed the collective efforts of the United Nations towards recalibrating the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. The Council also welcomed the appointment of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for the Sahel and encouraged efforts to foster greater coherence and coordination within the United Nations system and with regional partners through the efficient implementation of the United Nations Support Plan for the Sahel.154 The Council also reiterated its call for an assessment of the implementation of its resolution 2349 (2017) to be integrated into the regular reporting by UNOWAS.155

143 Ibid., seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth paragraphs.
144 Ibid., eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth paragraphs.
145 Ibid., eighteenth and twenty-first paragraphs.
146 Ibid., twenty-fifth paragraph.
147 S/PRST/2018/16, fourth paragraph.
148 Ibid., fifth, seventh, eighth and ninth paragraphs.
149 Ibid., seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth paragraphs.
150 Ibid., thirteenth and fifteenth paragraphs.
151 Ibid., nineteenth paragraph.
152 Ibid., twentieth paragraph.
153 Ibid., twenty-first paragraph. The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for the Sahel was appointed on 21 March 2018, see the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (S/2018/649, para. 65).
## Meetings: Peace consolidation in West Africa

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<td>S/PV.8170 30 January 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office for West Africa and the Sahel (S/2017/1104)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Special</td>
<td>Seven Council members, b</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8313 17 July 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office for West Africa and the Sahel (S/2018/649)</td>
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<td>Special</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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a Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Peru and Sweden.
b Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Netherlands and Peru.

### 12. Peace and security in Africa

During the period under review, the Security Council held eight meetings and adopted one resolution under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”. Of the eight meetings held, one was convened to adopt a resolution, one was an open debate and the remaining six were briefings. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In 2018, the Council held five meetings focusing on the Sahel, including the Lake Chad Basin region, and the activities of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. The remaining three meetings were held to address other issues, namely, the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, peacekeeping operations in Africa and drug trafficking in West Africa.

The Council held three meetings concerning the Lake Chad Basin region. On 22 March 2018, one year after the Council’s mission to the Lake Chad Basin region, the Council held a meeting focused on that region, further to the concept note circulated by the Netherlands. At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Deputy Secretary-General, a representative of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and a senior conflict adviser working with Adelphi (an independent think tank). The Deputy Secretary-General briefed the Council via videoconference from Monrovia. She noted that, while considerable progress...
had been made over the previous six months in the fight against Boko Haram, raids, abductions, sexual and gender-based violence and suicide bombings continued. Violations of human rights continued to fuel insecurity, and increasingly Boko Haram was using children, women and girls to carry out suicide attacks. The humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin remained complex and dire, with 10.7 million people in need of life-saving assistance and 2.3 million people forcibly displaced from their homes. The representative of the Lake Chad Basin Commission briefed the Council on climate variability and its impact on the vulnerability of the Lake Chad Basin, as well as on the potential role for the United Nations, specifically the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, in that context. The senior conflict adviser with Adelphi briefed the Council on the conflict dynamics in the region and the possible pathways to peace. During the discussion, Council members highlighted the importance of regional efforts, such as the work of the Multinational Joint Task Force, in addressing the challenges posed by Boko Haram.

On 10 July 2018, the Council held a meeting focused on women and peace and security issues in the Sahel region, further to the joint United Nations-African Union mission to Chad, the Niger and South Sudan. At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Deputy Secretary-General and the Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on Women, Peace and Security on their mission to the region, which was also joined, among others, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was presiding the meeting, also spoke at the meeting, about the overall challenges faced by the region, the interrelated nature of those challenges and the fact that all aspects raised through the mission were not solely a women’s issue but a peace and security issue. During the discussion, several Council members referred to the importance of the participation of women in peace processes and to the linkage between the empowerment of women and gender equality, and peace, stability and security.

On 20 December 2018, further to a concept note circulated by Côte d’Ivoire, the Council held a meeting under the sub-item entitled “United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, an integrated response to peacebuilding and sustaining peace”. At the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for the Sahel, who underscored that the region was one of the least developed regions in the world and was facing simultaneous challenges of extreme poverty, climate change, food crises, rapid population growth, fragile governance and terrorist-linked security threats. While the humanitarian situation had only slightly improved in 2018, he emphasized that an exclusively security-based approach alone would not be enough to stabilize the Sahel. At the meeting, the Council also heard a briefing by the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, who stated that the Commission had convened a series of meetings on the situation in the region and had focused primarily on deepening partnerships and ensuring the cooperation, coordination and coherence of the United Nations and the international community in support of the Sahel. The Vice-President of the World Bank for Africa, who also briefed the Council, reiterated the need to address the economic and social drivers of conflict in the Sahel. The representative of the Sahel Alliance also briefed the Council, specifically on the activities of the Sahel Alliance, which was launched on 13 July 2017 to contribute to the development of the Sahel and to reduce the region’s social, economic, environmental and institutional vulnerability. During the discussion, Council members stressed the need for a holistic approach in the Sahel that would bring together the political, security and development dimensions.

160 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
161 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
162 Ibid., pp. 5–7.
163 S/PV.8306.
166 The concept note was not issued as a Security Council document.
167 S/PV.8435.
168 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
169 Ibid., p. 4.
170 Ibid., p. 5.
171 Ibid., p. 6.
The operationalization of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel was addressed by the Council twice, in the context of two briefings in 2018, following the issuance of the respective reports of the Secretary-General. In both of these meetings, held on 23 May and 15 November 2018, respectively, the Assistant Secretary-General and the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations stressed that the security situation in the Sahel remained dire and that delays were preventing the Joint Force from attaining full operational capability. They both called upon the Group of Five for the Sahel to pursue efforts to deploy the remaining troops and clarify the Joint Force’s concept of operations. The Permanent Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel underlined in both briefings that the Joint Force continued to face major equipment shortfalls, capability gaps, insufficient infrastructure and shortcomings at the logistical and financial levels. During both meetings, several speakers discussed the need for a mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter for the Joint Force.

Against the backdrop of the Ebola outbreak in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council held a meeting on 30 October 2018 at which it unanimously adopted resolution 2439 (2018), sponsored by all Council members as a presidential text. In the resolution, the Council expressed serious concern regarding the security situation in the areas affected by the Ebola outbreak, also condemning all attacks by armed groups, including those posing serious security risks for responders and jeopardizing the response to the Ebola outbreak. The Council also noted the important positive role of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in supporting the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the World Health Organization and other actors to bring the Ebola outbreak successfully under control and in ensuring, within its area of operations, effective protection of civilians. Finally, the Council emphasized the importance of maintaining international support and engagement — financially, technically and in-kind — to bring the Ebola outbreak successfully under control.

On 20 November 2018, the Council held an open debate on strengthening peacekeeping operations in Africa, following the concept note circulated by China. Among the questions that were addressed during the meeting, briefers and invitees discussed how the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union and African countries could be improved in terms of safeguarding peace and security in Africa in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, while respecting the continent’s leading role in resolving its own security issues. The Secretary-General touched upon the challenges to peacekeeping in Africa and stated that United Nations missions were carrying out complex operations with multidimensional mandates in extremely dangerous environments. He announced that he would be signing a joint communiqué with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to guide the work of the Secretariat and the African Union Commission in strengthening United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa, paving the way for more adequately supported African-led peace operations. In that connection, he emphasized the need for strong mandates and predictable, sustainable and flexible financing, including through United Nations assessed contributions, where appropriate. At the meeting, the Council also heard a briefing by the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, who updated the Council on the areas of cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union. During the meeting, several speakers made reference to the negotiations on a draft resolution for the financing of African Union peace operations, which would enable access by the African Union to the United Nations assessed contributions for operations authorized by the United Nations.

On 19 December 2018, the Council held a meeting under the sub-item entitled “Drug trafficking

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173 S/PV.8266, pp. 2–4; and S/PV.8402, pp. 2–4.
174 S/PV.8266, pp. 4–5; and S/PV.8402, p. 4.
175 S/PV.8266, p. 7 (Permanent Observer of the African Union) and p. 18 (United States). S/PV.8402, p. 3 (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations), p. 5 (Permanent Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel), p. 6 (High Representative of the African Union for Mali and the Sahel), p. 15 (Ethiopia), p. 17 (United States) and p. 24 (Plurinational State of Bolivia). For more information concerning decisions and discussions of the Council relating to Chapter VII of the Charter, see part VII.
176 For more information on presidential texts, see part II, sect. VIII.
177 Resolution 2439 (2018), paras. 4 and 5.
178 Ibid., para. 7.
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in West Africa as a threat to stability”. At the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). He illustrated some of the findings of the World Drug Report 2018 and stated that UNODC was observing new, alarming trends in drug trafficking in West and Central Africa, with disruptive and destabilizing effects on governance, security, economic growth and public health. He noted that West and Central Africa, together with the countries of North Africa, accounted for 87 per cent of the pharmaceutical opioids seized globally and added that, along with Asia, Africa had seen the largest rises worldwide in cocaine seizures as well. In that regard, he underscored the linkages among terrorism, illicit drugs and other forms of crime and explained that, within the upcoming phase of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, UNODC would be supporting the police component of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel to strengthen its capacity to tackle terrorism and organized crime, including drug trafficking. Following the briefing, Council members focused on the links between drug trafficking, regional stability and security, and sustainable development.

185 S/PV.8433. In its capacity as President of the Security Council for December 2018, Côte d’Ivoire provided a summary of the meeting in a letter dated 20 May 2019 from the representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the Secretary-General (S/2019/419).

186 S/PV.8433, p. 2.

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<td>S/PV.8212 22 March 2018</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>Representative of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, senior conflict adviser with Adelphi</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General, all Council members, all invitees</td>
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<td>S/PV.8306 10 July 2018</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on Women, Peace and Security</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary-General, all Council members, all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8407 20 November 2018</td>
<td>Strengthening peacekeeping operations in Africa Letter dated 9 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/1004)</td>
<td>40 Member States' Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union, Permanent Observer and Head of Delegation of the International Committee of</td>
<td>Secretary-General, all Council members, 38 invitees under rule 37, all other invitees</td>
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<td>S/PV.8433 19 December 2018</td>
<td>Drug trafficking in West Africa as a threat to stability</td>
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<td>the Red Cross to the United Nations, Permanent Observer of the observer State of the Holy See to the United Nations</td>
<td>All Council members, invitee&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8435 20 December 2018</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, an integrated response to peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the Sahel</td>
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<td>Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)</td>
<td>All Council members, invitees&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<sup>a</sup> The Deputy Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference from Monrovia.

<sup>b</sup> The senior conflict adviser with Adelphi participated in the meeting via videoconference from Abuja. The representative of Nigeria spoke also on behalf of Cameroon, Chad and the Niger.

<sup>c</sup> Sweden was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>d</sup> The High Representative of the African Union for Mali and the Sahel and the Deputy Secretary-General for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response at the European External Action Service participated in the meeting via videoconference from Bamako and Brussels, respectively.

<sup>e</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Djibouti, Egypt, Estonia, Fiji, Germany, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

<sup>f</sup> The representative of Côte d’Ivoire spoke also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia.

<sup>g</sup> Although invited under rule 37, the representatives of Fiji and Uganda did not make statements. The representative of Norway spoke on behalf of the five Nordic countries. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

<sup>h</sup> The Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union participated in the meeting via videoconference from Addis Ababa.

<sup>i</sup> The Executive Director of UNODC participated in the meeting via videoconference from Vienna.

<sup>j</sup> The Vice-President of the World Bank for Africa and the representative of the Sahel Alliance participated in the meeting via videoconference from Washington, D.C., and Paris, respectively.
13. The situation in Libya

During the period under review, the Security Council held 12 meetings, adopted three resolutions, including two under Chapter VII of the Charter, and issued one presidential statement in relation to the situation in Libya. Except for those meetings convened to adopt a decision of the Council, all the meetings held under this item took the form of briefings. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In 2018, the Council was regularly briefed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). In his six briefings, the Special Representative reported on the ongoing political, security, humanitarian, economic and institutional challenges in Libya and how the progressive expansion of UNSMIL was supporting the country’s political and democratization process, in accordance with the United Nations Action Plan for Libya. With regard to the political and democratization process, the briefings were focused on the status of holding a referendum on the draft constitution and presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as the development of a national conference as a platform for the Libyan people to crystallize their vision for a political transition and to foster institutional progress. He also reported on the visit of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs to Libya from 9 to 12 January 2018 and spoke about the deteriorating security situation in Tripoli and other parts of the country, including the brokering by UNSMIL of a ceasefire between the major parties to the conflict in September. Other briefings included the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The Council was also addressed by the co-founder of Together We Build It, a Libyan civil society organization. Invitations under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure were extended to Libya.

The Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) briefed the Council four times on the activities of the Committee and its Panel of Experts. His briefings were focused on the violations of the sanctions regime, including the arms embargo, the violations in the context of human trafficking and migrant smuggling, the illicit exports of crude oil and refined petroleum products from Libya and the implementation of the asset freeze. The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court briefed the Council twice to report on the progress and challenges relating to the investigations in Libya and the status of the Court’s efforts to arrest Saif Al-Islam Qadhafi following the issuance of an arrest warrant in June 2011 by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court. She also called upon the Council and all States to effect and lend support to the arrest and surrender of fugitives of the Court in Libya and elsewhere.

During their deliberations in 2018, Council members expressed full support for the United Nations Action Plan for Libya and underscored the importance of the role of the United Nations in facilitating a Libyan-led political solution to the challenges facing the country. The need for the institution of a universally recognized and respected Government at the national level was also discussed, including the need to establish a unified and strengthened Libyan police and security institutions. Speakers also focused on the country’s underlying economic problems and financial corruption, threatening the unity and stability of the country. Council members expressed concern over the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Libya, as well as over the ongoing fight against terrorism and the continuing threat of terrorist groups in Libya.

The above issues were also addressed by the Council in its decisions during the reporting period. On 6 June 2018, the Council issued a presidential statement in which it reaffirmed its endorsement and full support for the United Nations Action Plan for Libya. In the statement, the Council welcomed all efforts to strengthen an inclusive political dialogue among all Libyans within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement, while bearing in mind that the political and security situation was not sustainable. The Council welcomed the success of the first phase of the national conference and the organization, in a peaceful and organized process, of the first municipal elections in the city of Zawiya, and encouraged all Member States to fully support the efforts of the

188 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
189 S/PV.8159, pp. 2–4; S/PV.8211, p. 4; S/PV.8263, pp. 4–5; and S/PV.8312, pp. 2–3.
190 S/PV.8159, p. 3; S/PV.8263, pp. 3–4; S/PV.8312, pp. 2–3; S/PV.8341, p. 4; and S/PV.8394, p. 4.
191 S/PV.8159, p. 4.
192 S/PV.8341, p. 2; and S/PV.8394, p. 2.
193 S/PV.8159, pp. 4–5; S/PV.8263, pp. 5–6; S/PV.8312, pp. 5–6; and S/PV.8341, pp. 4–5.
194 S/PV.8250, pp. 2–5; and S/PV.8388, pp. 2–4.
196 Ibid., second and fourth paragraphs.
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Special Representative. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report, as necessary, on the support provided by UNSMIL for the subsequent phases leading to national elections.

Shortly thereafter, on 11 June, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2420 (2018). In the resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended for 12 months the authorizations set out in resolution 2357 (2017) for Member States to inspect vessels in strict implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya and to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections.

On 13 September 2018, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2434 (2018), in which it welcomed the United Nations-brokered ceasefire in Tripoli and expressed its strong support for the ongoing efforts of UNSMIL and the Special Representative. By virtue of the resolution, the Council extended until 15 September 2019 the mandate of UNSMIL as an integrated special political mission under the leadership of the Special Representative.

On 5 November 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2441 (2018), in which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it extended the sanctions measures related to petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, and the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 15 February 2020. Resolution 2441 (2018) was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions. Further to the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation explained that his country was unable to support the resolution, drafted by the United Kingdom, as the authors had incorporated into the resolution a provision specifying sexual and gender-based violence as a separate criterion for sanctions even though such actions were fully covered in the existing listing criteria. He added that the issue of sexual and gender-based violence was considered by specialized bodies and the proper division of labour had to be adhered to.

Developments in Libya were also considered elsewhere under the items entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts” and “Maintenance of international peace and security”.

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<td>17 January 2018</td>
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197 Ibid., seventh, eighth and fourteenth paragraphs.
198 Ibid., sixteenth paragraph.
199 Resolution 2420 (2018), para. 1. See also resolutions 2357 (2017), para. 1 and 2292 (2016), paras. 3 and 4. For further details on authorizations granted under Chapter VII, see part VII, sect. IV.A.
200 Resolution 2434 (2018), fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs.
201 Ibid., para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNSMIL see part X, sect. II.
202 Resolution 2441 (2018), paras. 2 and 14.
203 S/PV.8389, p. 3. For more information on the sanctions regime concerning Libya, see part VII, sect. III.
204 For further details, see part I, sects. 31 and 37, respectively.
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<td>S/PV.8211 21 March 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (S/2018/140)</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
<td>Six Council members, all invitees&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>S/PV.8250 9 May 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8263 21 May 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (S/2018/429)</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8312 16 July 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
<td>Three Council members (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Kazakhstan, Sweden), all invitees&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8341 5 September 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (S/2018/780)</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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</table>
14. The situation in Mali

During the period under review, the Security Council held six meetings and adopted two resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter in connection with the situation in Mali. Except for two meetings convened to adopt the decisions of the Council, all other meetings under this item took the form of briefings. The Council also met once with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

The Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and Head of MINUSMA, both invited under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. In 2018, the discussions in the Council were focused on the delays in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015, the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in the country, the operationalization of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the additional support required, and the presidential elections, which were held in July and August 2018.

On 23 January 2018, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, who reported on the timeline for the implementation of urgent measures within the framework of the peace agreement. He emphasized the importance for the Government and the signatory movements to make every effort to respect the new timetable. He also reported on the increasing insecurity in the northern and central parts of the country and noted the worsening human rights and humanitarian situation. He welcomed the progress made in the operationalization of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel during 2018 and informed the Council that, in spite of the capability gaps of

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205 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
206 Held on 7 June 2018 under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B”; see S/PV.8281.
MINUSMA, the Mission was pursuing its efforts to project a robust posture and undertaking all necessary measures to implement the recommendations outlined in the review on peacekeeping fatalities conducted by Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz. He also made reference to the mission-wide prioritization and transition plans in the context of a strategic review of the Mission.\(^{207}\)

On 11 April 2018, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General briefed the Council further to the most recent report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali.\(^{208}\) He focused on the implementation of the peace agreement and described the role of MINUSMA in strengthening the capacities of the regional authorities in the north and centre of the country, providing electoral assistance and providing support to the Specialized Judicial Unit to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime. The Special Representative also informed the Council about the support provided by MINUSMA to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel further to the tripartite technical arrangement signed on 23 February 2018. He also referred to the establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry on Mali and to the work of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission as mechanisms that complemented the monitoring architecture of the peace agreement.\(^{209}\) At the meeting, the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali also briefed the Council on the activities of the Committee and the Panel of Experts on Mali and on the visit to Bamako on 26 and 27 March 2018.\(^{210}\)

On 14 June 2018, further to the report of the Secretary-General,\(^{211}\) the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations reported that, while progress in the peace process had been achieved since the adoption of resolution 2364 (2017), the security environment remained volatile, with a total of 101 blue helmets having lost their lives since the deployment of MINUSMA.\(^{212}\) He also reported on the political tensions fuelled by the presidential election and clarified that, while the Special Representative’s good offices had helped to ease tensions, the United Nations was not in a position to certify the election results since that activity was not part of the mandate of MINUSMA. He also referred to the recommendations of the independent strategic review and, in that regard, noted that the United Nations country team would take the lead in humanitarian, recovery, development and peacebuilding efforts and enhance its presence in the north and centre of the country and that MINUSMA would adjust its role with the goal of underscoring the primacy of politics, which would involve a shift in focus to maximize its role in support of the peace agreement.\(^{213}\)

On 19 October 2018, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations briefed the Council again to report on the successful holding of presidential elections. He noted that the holding of the elections should have been underpinned by further progress in the implementation of key institutional reforms. He also informed the Council of the signing on 15 October by the Government and the United Nations of the Pact for Peace, as requested by the Council in its resolution 2423 (2018), and said that it was an essential tool to spur the implementation of the peace agreement and give new impetus to the peace process. The Under-Secretary-General expressed his extreme concern about the security situation, especially in the centre of the country, and informed the Council that MINUSMA and the United Nations country team had begun developing a comprehensive strategic framework in support of the Government’s security plan for the central regions.\(^{214}\)

These issues were also addressed by the Council in its decisions during the reporting period. On 28 June 2018, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2423 (2018), in which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it extended the mandate of MINUSMA for one year, until 30 June 2019, and renewed the authorization for MINUSMA to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate with a proactive and robust posture.\(^{215}\) The Council decided that the Mission’s strategic priority remained to support the implementation of the peace agreement and requested it to reprioritize its resources and efforts to focus on political tasks.\(^{216}\) In the resolution, the Council welcomed the recent positive

\(^{207}\) S/PV.8163, pp. 2–4.


\(^{209}\) S/PV.8229, pp. 2–5.

\(^{210}\) Ibid., p. 5. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.

\(^{211}\) S/2018/541.

\(^{212}\) S/PV.8288, pp. 2–3.

\(^{213}\) Ibid., pp. 3–4.

\(^{214}\) S/PV.8376, pp. 2–3.

\(^{215}\) Resolution 2423 (2018), paras. 24, 32 and 33. For more information concerning the decisions of the Council related to measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter during the period under review, see part VII, sect. IV.A. For more information on the mandate of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I.

\(^{216}\) Resolution 2423 (2018), para. 26. See also paras. 27, 38 and 39.
steps achieved in the implementation of the peace agreement and expressed its deep frustration that parties had too long stalled its implementation, in spite of significant international support and assistance. The Council also urged the Government of Mali, the Plateforme coalition of armed groups and the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad coalition of armed groups to take immediate and concrete action to implement key provisions of the peace agreement referenced in the road map adopted on 22 March 2018. In that regard, the Council expressed its intention to respond with measures pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) should the parties not implement the commitments agreed upon in the road map within the announced time frame. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council six months after the presidential inauguration on progress achieved in the implementation of the measures and the benchmarks developed in the framework of the Pact for Peace and, in the absence of progress in the implementation of the measures and benchmarks, to provide options for the potential significant adaptation of the mandate of MINUSMA. The Council also welcomed the signing on 23 February 2018 of the technical agreement between the United Nations, the European Union and the Group of Five for the Sahel with a view to providing specified operational and logistical support through MINUSMA to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and requested the Secretary-General to enhance the exchange of information between MINUSMA and the States members of the Group of Five for the Sahel through the provision of relevant intelligence. The Council also noted the importance for the Government of Mali and the United Nations to take into consideration, as appropriate, the security implications of the adverse effects of climate change and other ecological changes and natural disasters in their activities, programmes and strategies. Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report every three months on the implementation of the resolution and to include every six months in his regular reports an update on the development and implementation of the integrated strategic framework setting the United Nations overall vision, joint priorities and internal division of labour to sustain peace in Mali. Following the vote, the representative of France stressed that the resolution made it clear that maintaining the configuration of a mission as important and exposed as MINUSMA had to be accompanied by substantial progress in the peace process. The representative of the United States noted that, without significant progress, it would be necessary to consider options to overhaul the Mission. He added that, through the resolution, the Council had streamlined the mandate of MINUSMA, emphasized the primacy of the Mission’s political engagement and stressed the importance of outreach and engagement for the protection of civilians. While the Russian Federation supported the resolution, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed his country’s opposition to the term “intelligence” in relation to the mandate of peacekeepers. Furthermore, with regard to the provisions on climate and ecological changes, he underlined that those issues fell under the purview of the relevant bodies of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.

On 30 August, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2432 (2018), in which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it renewed until 31 August 2019 the sanctions measures imposed under resolution 2374 (2017). The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 30 September 2019 and expressed its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action no later than 31 August 2019. Following the adoption of the resolution, the representative of France took the floor to restate that imposing sanctions on those who obstructed the implementation of the peace process in Mali was embedded in the very content of the peace agreement and that the sanctions regime established by the Council in 2017 had proven to be a useful addition to the range of tools available to the international community to promote a solution to the crisis in Mali.

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217 Ibid., paras. 1 and 2.
218 Ibid., sixth preambular paragraph and paras. 3 and 4.
220 Ibid., paras. 49 and 50.
221 Ibid., para. 68.
222 Ibid., paras. 29, 70 and 71.
223 S/PV.8298, p. 3.
224 Ibid., p. 4.
225 Ibid., p. 5.
226 Resolution 2432 (2018), para. 1. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning Mali, see part VII, sect. III.
227 Resolution 2432 (2018), para. 3.
228 S/PV.8336, p. 2.
Meetings: the situation in Mali

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<td>S/PV.8163 23 January 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2017/1105)</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>S/PV.8229 11 April 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2018/273)</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
<td>All Council members&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;, all invitees&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8288 14 June 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2018/541)</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8376 19 October 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2018/866)</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<sup>a</sup> Mali was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

<sup>b</sup> The representative of Sweden spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali.

**Americas**

**15. The question concerning Haiti**

During the period under review, the Security Council held four meetings and adopted one resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter on the question concerning Haiti. Two of the meetings took the form of debates, one meeting was a briefing and one was convened for the adoption of the decision. Through the adoption of resolution 2410 (2018), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for Justice

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229 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In 2018, the Council heard one briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, prior to the expiration of the initial mandate of MINUJUSTH, and heard briefings by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of MINUJUSTH at 90-day intervals starting from 1 June 2018, further to resolution 2410 (2018). After the establishment of the Mission in October 2017, the briefings in 2018 were focused on its role in supporting the Government of Haiti to consolidate stability and security and facilitate the country’s path to longer-term development with a stronger rule of law and a focus on the enjoyment of human rights. As part of their remarks, the briefers presented and reported on the implementation of the two-year benchmarked exit strategy for the transition to a non-peacekeeping United Nations presence in Haiti, as requested by the Council in resolution 2350 (2017). The 11 benchmarks and corresponding 46 indicators were initially presented to the Council by the Secretary-General in his reports of 20 March and 1 June 2018.

During the Council deliberations, discussions were focused on the importance for the MINUJUSTH mandate to ensure a successful transition to a non-peacekeeping United Nations presence in Haiti, including the implementation of the benchmarked exit strategy and the indicators. Council members highlighted the stabilization of political and security conditions in Haiti, in particular with the conclusion of the electoral process in 2017 and the appointment of a new Government in 2018. They also noted progress on the professionalization of the Haitian National Police through the implementation of the development plan for the period 2017–2021 and on the Government’s definition of a broad reform and legislative agenda, the need for further progress in the strengthening of rule of law institutions, improving respect for human rights and addressing the difficult socioeconomic conditions and the lack of accountability and corruption that resulted in several protests in different parts of Haiti in July, October and November 2018. Discussions also touched upon the need for international support for the reform of the security sector in Haiti, for the full implementation of the humanitarian response plan and for the efforts of the Government to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to eradicate the cholera epidemic, and the continued progress by MINUJUSTH to report and investigate instances of sexual exploitation and abuse in accordance with the zero-tolerance policy of the Secretary-General.

On 10 April 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2410 (2018), with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions. In the resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of MINUJUSTH for a period of one year, until 15 April 2019, and provided for a downward adjustment of the Mission’s police component. In addition to specific reporting requirements concerning the exit strategy for the Mission, the Council also requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic assessment mission to Haiti by 1 February 2019 and, on that basis, to present to the Council recommendations on the future United Nations role in Haiti, including any recommendations for drawdown and exit, in the fourth 90-day report no later than 1 March 2019. The Council also affirmed its intention, on the basis of a review of the security conditions on the ground and the country’s overall capacity to ensure stability, to consider the withdrawal of the Mission and transition to a non-peacekeeping United Nations presence beginning no sooner than 15 October 2019.

Explaining the decision to abstain in the vote on the resolution, the representative of the Russian Federation maintained that the situation in Haiti did not constitute a threat to international peace and security and that the invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter should be contemplated by the Council only as a last resort for issues related to physical safety. The representative of China stated that the mandate of MINUJUSTH should clearly focus on helping Haiti to address peace and security challenges, rather than focusing too much on human rights, and called for more patient consultations during negotiations on draft resolutions. By contrast, the United Kingdom stated that MINUJUSTH required all the tools necessary to ensure that the transition in Haiti was a success and that that included the authorization under Chapter VII of the Charter to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate.

By the same resolution, the Council recognized that, over the past year, Haiti had made considerable strides towards stability and democracy, improvements in strengthening the security and humanitarian

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230 For more information on the mandate and composition of MINUJUSTH, see part X, sect. I.
situation and a consolidation of its democratic institutions through a peaceful transfer of power.\textsuperscript{239} The Council further encouraged the Government, working with MINUJUSTH, to carry out work towards implementing the benchmarks, including adopting a new criminal legislation, strengthening judicial and correctional systems, increasing oversight and accountability mechanisms in the justice, corrections and police sectors, establishing a Permanent Electoral Council, adopting the Legal Assistance Law, addressing the issue of prolonged pretrial detention and implementing community violence reduction efforts.\textsuperscript{240}

In a letter dated 31 July 2018, the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint his new Special Representative for Haiti and Head of MINUJUSTH.\textsuperscript{241}

\textsuperscript{239} Resolution 2410 (2018), second preambular paragraph.

\textsuperscript{240} Ibid., para. 7.

\textsuperscript{241} S/2018/754.

### Meetings: the question concerning Haiti

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\textsuperscript{a} Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia and Haiti.

\textsuperscript{b} The Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and Ukraine. The representative of Canada spoke on behalf of the Friends of Haiti, comprising Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Guatemala, Peru, the United States and Uruguay.

\textsuperscript{c} Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

\textsuperscript{d} For: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States; against: none; abstaining: China, Russian Federation.

\textsuperscript{e} The Netherlands was represented by the Prime Minister of Sint Maarten.

\textsuperscript{f} The Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union, as well as Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine.
16. Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)

During the period under review, the Security Council held five meetings and adopted one resolution under the agenda item entitled “Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)”. Four of the meetings took the form of briefings and one was convened for the adoption of the decision. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In his quarterly briefings to the Council, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia highlighted the progress made by the parties in the implementation of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace. He also focused on the overall political process in Colombia, namely the successful and peaceful conduct of presidential and legislative elections in March and May 2018, respectively, with the participation of the People’s Alternative Revolutionary Force (Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común) for the first time, the establishment of transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms and the steps taken by the new Government of Colombia in the implementation of the Agreement. In terms of challenges, he briefed the Council on an upsurge in attacks on social leaders and human rights defenders and emphasized the need for full political, legal and socioeconomic reintegration of former members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP).

Deliberations in the Council under this item during 2018 focused similarly on the status of the implementation of subsequent phases of the Agreement and the reintegration of the FARC-EP elements into political, economic and social life, as well as the status of ceasefire talks between the Government and the National Liberation Army.

On 13 September 2018, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2435 (2018), in which it welcomed the progress made towards peace since the adoption of the Agreement and urged the parties to work together to renew the momentum behind the implementation of the Agreement. Acknowledging the request of the Government of Colombia to extend the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, the Council also extended the mandate for a period of one year, until 25 September 2019.

Furthermore, in a letter dated 5 December 2018 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General indicated his intention to appoint a new Special Representative for Colombia and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission.

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242 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
243 In his letter dated 21 May 2018 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/498), the Secretary-General requested an extension for the submission of his third progress report from 26 June to 20 July 2018, in order to align its time frame with the concluding period of the current administration in Colombia. See also S/2018/499.
244 S/PV.8238, pp. 3–4; S/PV.8319, pp. 2–3; and S/PV.8368, pp. 3–4.
## Meetings: Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)

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<td>S/PV.8154 10 January 2018</td>
<td>Letter dated 8 December 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/1037) Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (S/2017/1117)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8238 19 April 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (S/2018/279)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8319 26 July 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (S/2018/723)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</td>
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<td>S/PV.8368 10 October 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (S/2018/874)</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<sup>a</sup> Colombia was represented by its Vice-President.<br>
<sup>b</sup> Colombia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

### Asia

#### 17. The situation in Afghanistan

During the period under review, the Security Council held five meetings, adopted one resolution and issued one presidential statement on the situation in Afghanistan. Four of the meetings took the form of debates and one was convened for the adoption of a resolution.<sup>250</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the

<sup>250</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
During 2018, as in previous periods, the Council was briefed quarterly by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) further to the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan. The Council was also briefed once by the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011). The Council was also briefed twice by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and once by the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011). The Council was also briefed once by the Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism of the United Nations as well as by representatives of the High Peace Council of Afghanistan and the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution. Finally, the Council was briefed by two civil society representatives, in two separate meetings.

In his briefings, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General highlighted the new momentum in the peace process following the offer by the President of Afghanistan, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, to hold unconditional peace talks with the Taliban, which was endorsed at the second meeting of the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation, held on 28 February 2018. He described the security and human rights situation, with more than 8,000 civilian casualties from January to September and high levels of child casualties, despite a short ceasefire from both sides in June 2018. The Special Representative kept the Council informed of the preparations and outcome of the parliamentary elections held on 20 October 2018 and the joint United Nations-Government of Afghanistan ministerial conference held in Geneva on 27 and 28 November 2018. While noting modest progress in the status of women, in particular on the legislative agenda, the Special Representative underlined the importance of ensuring the equal participation and full involvement of women in all efforts for the promotion, establishment and maintenance of peace and security. He also drew attention to the impact of the insecurity on journalists and aid workers in Afghanistan and the significant humanitarian challenges facing the population, in particular in light of the worst drought in years.

The Executive Director of UNODC noted that, despite a decline since 2017 due to drought, the area of opium cultivation in Afghanistan was the second-highest recorded since 1994. He stressed the need for a strong Afghan lead and international support in counter-narcotics action as well as comprehensive and balanced approaches targeting the nexus between drugs, crime and terrorism. The Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) provided an overview of the latest trends in the security situation, as reported by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, including the actions undertaken by the Taliban, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh) and Al-Qaida, and called upon Member States to play a more active role in providing information to assist the Committee in the implementation of its mandate.

The Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism also informed the Council about the continued deadly violence across Afghanistan, including terrorist attacks against civilians, and provided an overview of the activities of the Office with respect to the provision of technical assistance to Afghanistan on, inter alia, law enforcement, border security, countering terrorist financing and assistance and support to victims.

During their discussions, Council members expressed support for the Kabul Process and called for an inclusive, Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation process. They also urged the Taliban to accept the President’s offer for direct talks, and the international community, including regional actors, to support the process. Speakers condemned the high rates of violence against civilians, including terrorist attacks by ISIL (Da’esh) and the Taliban. With respect to the conference in Geneva, speakers welcomed the renewed partnership between the Government and the international community and urged donors and stakeholders to support Afghanistan, including through regional economic and development cooperation. During 2018, the discussions in the Council also addressed the status of women in Afghanistan. Speakers condemned and called for an end to the violence against women and girls and called upon the Government to increase efforts to ensure greater representation of women in the peace process and to implement the measures necessary to ensure their safe participation in the parliamentary and

251 For more information on the Council’s mission to Afghanistan, see part I, sect. 33.
253 S/PV.8294, p. 2.
254 S/PV.8426, p. 4.
255 S/PV.8199, p. 3; S/PV.8294, p. 3; S/PV.8354, pp. 2–3; and S/PV.8426, pp. 2–3.
256 S/PV.8199, p. 3; and S/PV.8354, p. 3.

257 S/PV.8294, p. 4; S/PV.8354, p. 3; and S/PV.8426, p. 4.
258 S/PV.8426, p. 4.
259 S/PV.8294, p. 5.
260 S/PV.8426, pp. 5–6. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), see part IX, sect. I.B.
261 S/PV.8294, pp. 5–7.
presidential elections, as well as safe access to education and health care.

On 8 March 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2405 (2018), extending the mandate of UNAMA for one year, until 17 March 2019. In the resolution, the Council welcomed the findings of the strategic review of the Mission and called for the implementation of the recommendations of the Secretary-General, including with a view to aligning the Mission’s substantive functions in support of peace efforts and an intra-Afghan dialogue.262 While reiterating the Mission’s existing priorities, the Council specified that they would include support for the organization of future elections, including the parliamentary and district council elections as foreseen for 2018 and the presidential elections in 2019.263 The Council called upon UNAMA to increase efforts to achieve greater coherence with other United Nations entities based on a “One United Nations” approach in close consultation with the Government of Afghanistan.264 The Council further stressed the role of UNAMA in supporting an inclusive Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process while also calling upon all regional and international partners of Afghanistan to continue to support peace and reconciliation through the Kabul Process, working towards holding early and direct talks between the Government and the Taliban, and called for the effective implementation of the strategic plan for peace and reconciliation presented by the High Peace Council.265

The Council welcomed the Government’s commitment to empowering women politically and economically and reiterated the importance of increasing the full and effective participation and leadership of women in decision-making.266 The Council also called for enhanced efforts to secure the rights of women and girls and to ensure that they were protected from violence and abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence, and that perpetrators were held accountable.267 In the resolution, the Council further underlined the need to hold accountable perpetrators, organizers, financiers and sponsors of all attacks targeting civilians and Afghan and international forces and urged all States, in accordance with their obligations under international law and Council resolutions, to cooperate actively with the Government of Afghanistan and all other relevant authorities in that regard.268

In a presidential statement issued on 23 July 2018, the Council noted the conclusion of the voter registration for the parliamentary elections in October 2018, underscored the importance of developing sustainable democratic institutions in Afghanistan on the basis of inclusive, transparent and credible elections and stressed the need to promote the full and safe participation of women and minority groups, as voters and candidates.269 The Council further stressed the importance of a secure environment for conducting elections, condemned in the strongest terms those who resorted to violence to obstruct the electoral process, including the Taliban and ISIL (Da’esh) affiliates, and reaffirmed its commitment to ensuring the ability of all Afghan citizens to exercise their civil and political rights.270

Developments in Afghanistan were also considered elsewhere under the items entitled “Security Council mission” and “Maintenance of international peace and security”.271

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262 Resolution 2405 (2018), paras. 3 and 4. For more information on the mandate of UNAMA, see part X, sect. II.
263 Resolution 2405 (2018), para. 6 (b).
264 Ibid., paras. 7 and 9. See also para. 6 (c).
265 Ibid., paras. 11–13.
266 Ibid., paras. 19 and 39.
267 Ibid., para. 38.
268 Ibid., para. 23.
270 Ibid., ninth and twelfth paragraphs.
271 For more information, see part I, sects. 33 and 37, respectively.

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### Meetings: the situation in Afghanistan

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<td>S/PV.8315 23 July 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8354 17 September 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (S/2018/824)</td>
<td>11 Member States</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Afghan youth representative, Head of the Delegation of the European Union</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
18. The situation in Myanmar

During the period under review, the Security Council held three meetings under the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar”. The three meetings took the form of briefings.272 No decisions were adopted by the Council under this item during 2018. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. In addition, the Council conducted a mission to Bangladesh and Myanmar from 28 April to 2 May 2018.273

In 2018, the Council was briefed by the Secretary-General, the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, the United Nations High

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272 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

273 For more information on the Council’s mission to Myanmar and Bangladesh, see part I, sect. 33.
Commissioner for Refugees, the Associate Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Goodwill Ambassador, and the Chair of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar. Discussions in the Council were focused on the security, humanitarian, and human rights situation in Rakhine State, the status of the Rohingya refugees across the border in Bangladesh and internally displaced persons and the conditions necessary for their return, restrictions on humanitarian access, progress in the implementation by the Government of Myanmar of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State as a means of addressing the root causes of the crisis, and the need for accountability for crimes committed against the Rohingya.

In his briefing to the Council on 13 February 2018, the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs noted, that five months since the start, in August 2017, of the large-scale violence that forced 688,000 Rohingya to leave Myanmar for Bangladesh, the outflow of people continued, although at a lower rate, and that large-scale acts of violence had subsided. Nevertheless, he emphasized the insecurity of the Rohingya from Bamar and Rakhine communities and the lack of humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas. The Assistant Secretary-General further urged the Government to take a leadership role in promoting intercommunal cohesion and creating an environment conducive to dialogue and the respect for basic human rights. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees underscored the absence of conditions necessary for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and called for increased humanitarian support. He also endorsed the recommendations of the Advisory Commission for a solution focused on a two-track approach involving, first, access to citizenship and the restoration of rights for the Rohingya and, second, inclusive development aimed at improving living conditions.

During the briefing held on 28 August 2018, the Secretary-General reiterated that conditions had not been met for the return of refugees and asked Council members to join him in urging the authorities in Myanmar to cooperate with the United Nations and ensure immediate, unimpeded and effective humanitarian access. He added that accountability was essential for genuine reconciliation among all ethnic groups in the country. The Secretary-General further informed the Council of his appointment of a Special Envoy on Myanmar in April 2018, who had commenced a process of consultations in furtherance of the Secretary-General’s policy of engagement to encourage positive actions by the Government, help defuse tensions among communities and build confidence and trust. The Associate Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme provided an overview of efforts to implement the tripartite memorandum of understanding signed between the Government of Myanmar, the United Nations Development Programme and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as a framework for creating sustainable conditions for voluntary returns. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Goodwill Ambassador drew the attention of Council members to the significant underfunding of international humanitarian efforts and implored the Council to encourage a more robust international response in that regard.

In a letter dated 16 October 2018 to the President of the Council, the representatives of Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States requested a meeting on the situation in Myanmar and for the Chair of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, established by the Human Rights Council, to formally brief the Council, which, they explained, would enable Council members to receive further information on the situation and its implications on international peace and security. In a letter dated 18 October 2018 addressed to the President of the Council, the representatives of Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea and the Russian Federation objected to the holding of the requested meeting, maintaining that it was outside of the mission’s mandate, would set a bad precedent for the Council and would erode the mandate and duplicate the work of the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council.

On 24 October 2018, the Chair of the independent fact-finding mission on Myanmar gave a briefing on the findings and recommendations of the report of the fact-finding mission of 12 September 2018, highlighting the consistent patterns of human rights violations in Kachin, Rakhine and Shan States, in addition to serious violations of international humanitarian law, committed primarily by the

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274 S/PV.8179, p. 2.
275 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
276 Ibid., pp. 3–5.
Myanmar military, which—according to the report—could amount to the gravest crimes under international law. The Chair called upon the Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court or another international ad hoc tribunal and to impose targeted individual sanctions against those most responsible for serious crimes. The provisional agenda was adopted by a procedural vote at the outset of the meeting. In their statements before and after the vote, the representatives of Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation voiced their opposition to holding the meeting, maintaining, inter alia, that it was beyond the role of the Council as provided by the Charter. Other Council members who had voted in favour of the provisional agenda underscored the importance of the briefing for the Council to fulfil its responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Meetings: the situation in Myanmar

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<tr>
<td><strong>S/PV.8179</strong> 13 February 2018</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Myanmar</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S/PV.8333</strong> 28 August 2018</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Myanmar</td>
<td>Associate Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Goodwill Ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S/PV.8381</strong> 24 October 2018</td>
<td>Letter dated 16 October 2018 from the representatives of Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the</td>
<td>Chair of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar</td>
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282 A/HRC/39/64.
283 S/PV.8381, pp. 4–6.
284 For details on procedural votes on the agenda, see part II, sect. I.A.
285 S/PV.8381, p. 2 (China), pp. 2–3 (Russian Federation), p. 4 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of)) and p. 19 (Kazakhstan). For more information on relations with the General Assembly, see part IV, sect. I.
286 S/PV.8381, p. 3 and p. 6 (United Kingdom), p. 9 (Netherlands), p. 9 (United States), p. 10 (France) and p. 17 (Peru).
19. The situation in Cyprus

During the year 2018, the Security Council held two meetings and adopted two resolutions concerning the situation in Cyprus. More information on the meetings, including on outcomes, is given in the table below. The Council also held two closed meetings with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001).\(^\text{287}\)

\(^\text{287}\) Held on 16 January and 12 July 2018 under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B”; see S/PV.8157 and S/PV.8308. For more information on the mandate of UNFICYP, see part X, sect. I.

During the two meetings of the Council, no statements were made. The Council unanimously adopted two resolutions: resolution 2398 (2018) on 30 January and resolution 2430 (2018) on 26 July 2018. By these resolutions, the Council extended the mandate of UNFICYP for six months, respectively, in accordance with the recommendations contained in the reports of the Secretary-General.\(^\text{288}\) In both resolutions, the Council requested the Secretary-General to maintain transition planning in relation to a settlement, guided by progress in the negotiations, and encouraged the sides to engage with each other, as well as with UNFICYP and the United Nations good offices.

mission.\(^{289}\) In addition, the Council noted the need to consider adjustments, as appropriate, to the mandate of UNFICYP, its force levels and other resources and concept of operations, while taking into account developments on the ground and the views of the parties.\(^{290}\)

In its resolution 2398 (2018), the Council welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on the strategic review of UNFICYP\(^{291}\) and endorsed the implementation of its recommendations.\(^{292}\) It also welcomed the progress of the leaders-led process and urged the sides and all involved participants to renew their political will and commitment to a settlement.\(^{293}\) The Council also called upon the two leaders to reach convergences on the core issues, intensify work with the objective of enhancing intercommunal contacts and improving the lives of the Cypriots and improve the public atmosphere to secure a settlement.\(^{294}\) The Council also stressed the importance of the full and effective participation of civil society and women at all stages of the peace process and urged their involvement in the development of post-conflict strategies, as well as the full and effective participation of youth.\(^{295}\)

In its resolution 2430 (2018), the Council welcomed again the progress of the leaders-led process while noting the lack of progress towards a settlement since the conclusion of the Conference on Cyprus. The Council also urged the sides and all involved participants to seize the important opportunity presented by the appointment of the United Nations consultant, Jane Holl Lute, to conduct in-depth consultations on a way forward, by engaging constructively in those consultations and renewing their political will and commitment to a settlement.\(^{296}\) In that regard, the Council called upon the sides, specifically the leaders of the two Cypriot communities, and all involved parties to actively engage with openness and creativity, fully commit to a settlement process and avoid any actions that might damage the chances of success.\(^{297}\) Recalling its call in resolution 2398 (2018) to the two leaders to reach convergences on the core issues, it also called upon them to increase and strengthen the participation of civil society in the process, with a view to mobilizing greater support for the settlement process at large.\(^{298}\) The Council again stressed the importance of the full and effective participation of civil society and women at all stages of the peace process and urged their involvement in the development and implementation of post-conflict strategies, including by revitalizing the Technical Committee on Gender Equality and considering the proposal of the Secretary-General to conduct a gender-sensitive socioeconomic impact assessment. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to increase the number of women in UNFICYP and to ensure the meaningful participation of women in all aspects of operations.\(^{299}\) In addition, stressing the importance of the full and effective participation of youth, the Council recognized the important work of the Bi-Communal Technical Committee on Education and called upon both sides to facilitate intercommunal youth contacts.\(^{300}\)

In 2018, by an exchange of letters, the Council endorsed the appointment by the Secretary-General of a new Force Commander of UNFICYP.\(^{301}\)

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\(^{289}\) Resolutions 2398 (2018), para. 5; and 2430 (2018), para. 6.

\(^{290}\) Resolutions 2398 (2018), sixteenth preambular paragraph; and 2430 (2018), eighteenth preambular paragraph.

\(^{291}\) S/2017/1008.

\(^{292}\) Resolution 2398 (2018), para. 10.

\(^{293}\) Ibid., para. 1.

\(^{294}\) Ibid., para. 4.

\(^{295}\) Ibid., para. 7.

\(^{296}\) Resolution 2430 (2018), para. 1.

\(^{297}\) Ibid., para. 2.

\(^{298}\) Ibid., para. 5 (d).

\(^{299}\) Ibid., paras. 8 and 12.

\(^{300}\) Ibid., para. 9.


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### Meetings: the situation in Cyprus

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20. Items relating to the situation in the former Yugoslavia

A. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

During 2018, the Security Council held two meetings and adopted one resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter in connection with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council continued the consideration of this item in the context of semi-annual briefings by the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In his briefings to the Council in 2018, the High Representative provided updates on the developments covered in his two reports. While noting the positive developments achieved by the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the reporting period, in particular towards the integration with the European Union, the High Representative also expressed concerns regarding the slow pace in implementing urgent electoral reforms and strengthening the rule of law, and regretted the escalation in divisive public rhetoric, in particular in view of the general elections held on 7 October 2018.

During the discussions, Council members emphasized the need for the urgent implementation of key reforms, including the introduction of the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Council members further expressed concerns about the persistence of ethnic tensions undermining the political and social stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as about the proliferation of violent extremism and radicalization in the country. In addition, members of the Council reiterated calls upon the competent authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the steps required to complete the 5 plus 2 agenda, necessary for the closure of the Office of the High Representative.

Following the elections on 7 October 2018, on 6 November 2018, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2443 (2018), in which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it renewed the authorization of the multinational stabilization force, EUFOR-Althea, and the continued presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the country for a period of 12 months, starting from the date of the adoption of the resolution. The Council also urged the parties to engage constructively on swift government formation at all levels and to prioritize the implementation of comprehensive reforms, and further called upon the parties to refrain from any polarizing unconstructive policy, action and rhetoric. At the meeting, before and after the vote, the representatives of the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom expressed differing views on the process of drafting the resolution and on the engagement as members of the Contact Group and of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Resolution 2443 (2018), paras. 3 and 4. For more information on the mandate of EUFOR-Althea, see part VIII, sect. III.

Resolution 2443 (2018), para. 8.

S/PV.8392, p. 4 (Russian Federation) and p. 5 (United Kingdom).
Meetings: the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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<td>S/PV.8248 8 May 2018</td>
<td>Letter dated 2 May 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/416)</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia</td>
<td>High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<td>S/PV.8392 6 November 2018</td>
<td>Letter dated 30 October 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/974)</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia</td>
<td>High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Head of the Delegation of the European Union</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
<td>Resolution 2443 (2018) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)</td>
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During the period under review, the Security Council held four meetings in connection with the item entitled “Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)”. All meetings took the form of briefings and no decisions were adopted by the Council under this item during 2018. More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

As in the past, the Council considered the item through briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) further to the reports of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999). In 2018, briefings were focused on the increase in tensions between Pristina and Belgrade, the lack of substantive progress and setbacks in the normalization of relations between the two through the European Union-facilitated dialogue and the establishment of the association/community of Serb-majority municipalities.

Speakers at those meetings also focused on the launch of the new enlargement strategy of the European Union for the Western Balkans. The attempt to abrogate the law on the Specialist Chambers by a number of members of the ruling coalition in the Kosovo Assembly was referenced in the discussions of the Council as a cause of concern, as well as the murder on 16 January 2018 of a prominent Kosovo Serb politician and the arrest in March of the Director of the Kosovo office of the Government of Serbia and lead negotiator for Belgrade in the European Union-facilitated dialogue after entering northern Kosovo against the advice of the Kosovo authorities. Council members also focused on the work of UNMIK, which had realigned its focus and priorities towards promoting longer-term reconciliation, as well as the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Kosovo Force. In addition, during the meetings of the Council, certain Council members argued that it was no longer necessary for the Council to receive

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308 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

309 For more information on the mandate of UNMIK, see part X, sect. I.
quarterly reports of the Secretary-General or be briefed every three months on the situation in Kosovo, while others considered the idea of changing the format and periodicity of Secretariat briefings on Kosovo to be inappropriate at that juncture.  

On 17 December, the Council held an urgent meeting at the request of the Permanent Representative of Serbia to discuss the 14 December decision by the Kosovo Assembly to transform the Kosovo Security Force into armed forces. In his letter to the President of the Council, the Permanent Representative of Serbia emphasized that resolution 1244 (1999) provided for the deployment of an international security presence and that “no establishment of any other armed force” was provided for in the resolution. At the meeting, Council members discussed whether the transition of the Kosovo Security Force into armed forces was the sovereign right of Kosovo or a violation of resolution 1244 (1999). Council members also assessed the impact of this decision on regional stability. At the same meeting, the Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on the heightened tensions between Belgrade and Pristina due to the announcement by the government of Kosovo of an increase in the tariff on goods imported from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from 10 to 100 per cent.

See, for example, S/2018/1111.


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<td>S/2018/76 7 February 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/2018/76)</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Vlora Çitaku</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees&lt;sup&gt;a,b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>S/2018/8399 14 November 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/2018/981)</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Vlora Çitaku</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/2018/8427 17 December 2018</td>
<td>Letter dated 14 December 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Serbia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1111)</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hashim Thaçi</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<sup>a</sup> The Special Representative of the Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference from Pristina.

<sup>b</sup> Serbia was represented by its First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>c</sup> Serbia was represented by its President.
21. Items relating to Ukraine

A. Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)

During the period under review, the Security Council held four meetings, including one high-level meeting, in connection with the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)” and adopted one presidential statement. Except for one, all meetings took the form of briefings. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

During 2018, the Council heard briefings from the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Chief Monitor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. Briefers focused on the deterioration of the security situation along the line of contact dividing eastern Ukraine, including sniper fire and mine and unexploded ordnance contamination. Briefers also touched upon the lack of progress in the implementation of the Minsk agreements and the humanitarian crisis resulting from the conflict, in particular the issue of humanitarian access, the situation of displaced persons, the threat to civilians posed by shelling and the impact of the destruction of civilian infrastructure.

These topics were also discussed by Council members. They focused, in particular, on the need for all parties to comply with the ceasefire and on the impact of the conflict on the civilian population and the potential threat of long-term environmental damage posed by attacks on civilian infrastructure. Speakers also focused on the human rights situation in Crimea, affecting, among other groups, the Crimean Tatar community. Council members also discussed the updates of the joint investigation team on the Downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH-17, emphasizing the importance of abiding by resolution 2166 (2014). They also considered the possibility of deploying a United Nations-mandated peacekeeping mission to eastern Ukraine.

At the request of six Council members, the Council held a meeting on 30 October under this item and the item entitled “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)” to discuss the announcement of leadership elections in Donetsk and Luhansk on 11 November 2018 and the potential impact on efforts for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. At the outset of the meeting, the representative of Sweden noted that the meeting was being held under two items “without the formal creation of a new agenda item”. He further indicated that the two items remained separate and distinct. The representative of Sweden objected to the invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the briefers proposed by the Russian Federation. The representative of Sweden indicated that France, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States would oppose the invitation if the matter was put to a procedural vote. In response, the representative of the Russian Federation requested “for reasons of transparency” the participation of the “heads of the central electoral commissions of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics”. Immediately thereafter, the Council held a procedural vote on the proposal to extend the invitation under rule 39. The proposal was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs on the situation in Ukraine, including the increase in violations of the ceasefire by the parties to the Minsk agreements, the humanitarian situation and the impact of the conflict on civilians.

Against the backdrop of heightened tensions, on 26 November, the Council met to address the security incident that had occurred the previous day near Crimea involving a confrontation between Ukrainian

314 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
315 S/PV.8270 and S/PV.8386.
316 Ibid.
317 S/PV.8270, S/PV.8386 and S/PV.8410.
and Russian vessels when the former attempted to enter the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait. The meeting was held further to a meeting held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”. At the meeting, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs briefed the Council on the incident and called for the immediate de-escalation of tensions in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. In the discussion that ensued, Council members expressed concern about the escalation of tensions and called upon the parties to refrain from actions that could aggravate the situation. Many Council members reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The representative of the Russian Federation argued instead that Ukraine had violated the border in a place that had been Russian territory before 2014.

During the review period, the Council issued the first presidential statement in relation to the situation in Ukraine. In that statement, the Council expressed grave concern about the deterioration of the security situation in eastern Ukraine and its impact on the civilian population, condemned the continuous violations of the ceasefire regime, welcomed the work of United Nations agencies in addressing the humanitarian situation and expressed support for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. The Council also reaffirmed its full support for resolution 2166 (2014) on the downing of flight MH-17 and underlined the need for strict compliance with resolution 2202 (2015) on the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

In 2018, the Council also considered the situation in Ukraine under the item entitled “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”.

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Meetings: Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
<th>Sub-item</th>
<th>Other documents</th>
<th>Rule 37 invitations</th>
<th>Rule 39 and other invitations</th>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8270 29 May 2018</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Chief Monitor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<td>S/PV.8276 6 June 2018</td>
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<td>S/PRST/2018/12</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8386 30 October 2018</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
<td>14 Council members, all invitees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8410 26 November 2018</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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</tbody>
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For more information on the briefing, see part I, sect. 32.

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For: Russian Federation; against: France, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States; abstaining: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait.
B. Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)

During the period under review, the Security Council held one meeting in connection with the item entitled “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)” and the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)”. A summary of the meeting is provided in part I, section 21.A. More information on the meeting, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

Meeting: Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8386</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 October 2018³</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14 Council members, all invitees</td>
<td>Procedural vote (rule 39) 1-7-7³</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³ This meeting was held also under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)”.

³ Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, France, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.

³ For: Russian Federation; against: France, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States; abstaining: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait.


During 2018, the Security Council held four meetings under the item “Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218)”. All four meetings took the form of briefings. More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

In a letter from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General, annexed to the letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister informed the Secretary-General that, on 4 March 2018, Sergei Skripal and his daughter, Yulia Skripal, had been poisoned in Salisbury and were in critical condition. The Prime Minister further stated that a police officer had also been exposed in the attack and remained seriously ill and that specialist military troops had been deployed to assist in the investigation and to secure the sites of contamination. According to the Prime Minister, hundreds of members of the public had also been affected by the incident. She further stated that the United Kingdom police had identified that the chemical used in Salisbury was a specific nerve agent from a class of chemical warfare agents known as “Novichoks”, highly toxic poisons that prevented the normal functioning of the nervous system. According to the Prime Minister, the Government of the United Kingdom believed that, as she had stated to Parliament, it was highly likely that the Russian Federation had been responsible for the attack, given its combined

³²⁹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
capability in chemical warfare, intent to weaponize the agent and motive to target the principal victim. She further stated that the United Kingdom was determined to bring to account those responsible for the crime in accordance with the rule of law. She described the attack as a clear challenge by a State Member of the United Nations to the rules-based international order, which had to be addressed with the support of the international community.330

The first meeting under this item was held on 14 March 2018. During that meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom affirmed that the incident had been an unlawful use of force and a violation of Article 2 of the Charter.331 During the same meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the letter contained “totally irresponsible assertions” and included threats to a sovereign State and permanent member of the Council that were contrary to international law and Article 2 (4) of the Charter. The Russian Federation further underlined that his country considered the unfounded accusations in the appeal on 13 March by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General “totally unacceptable”.332 Many members of the Council expressed concern regarding the use of a chemical weapon against civilians and the threat that it posed to the international non-proliferation regime,333 while others called for the respect of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) and looked forward to a full and thorough investigation.334

In the subsequent meetings under this agenda item, discussions were focused on the meetings of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague. On 18 April 2018, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs informed the Council that the United Kingdom had requested technical assistance from the OPCW Technical Secretariat under article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention. She also informed the Council that the Director General of OPCW had deployed a technical assistance team to the United Kingdom in late March 2018. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs also stated that the results of the analysis by the OPCW-designated laboratories of the environmental and biomedical samples collected by the OPCW technical assistance team confirmed the findings of the United Kingdom relating to the identity of the toxic chemical that was used in Salisbury on 4 March and that this was transmitted, on 12 April 2018, in a report of the Technical Secretariat to the United Kingdom and to all other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.335 At the same meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that there was nothing in the OPCW report that supported the British version of the involvement of the Russian Federation in the Salisbury incident and that the speedy analysis conducted by OPCW only confirmed that such a substance could have been produced in any laboratory that had the right equipment.336

On 5 September 2018, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom transmitted to the President of the Security Council a statement made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to Parliament on 5 September 2018 concerning the investigation into the attack in Salisbury of 4 March 2018.337 At the Council meeting on 6 September 2018, the representative of the United Kingdom informed the Council that, while the Skripals were recovering, two other persons had fallen ill after being exposed to Novichok in Amesbury, resulting in the passing of one of them on 8 July 2018. The representative of the United Kingdom also noted that the OPCW independent expert laboratories had again confirmed the identification by the United Kingdom of the Novichok nerve agent and that charges had been brought against two Russian nationals by the Crown Prosecution Service. She further stated that the Government of the United Kingdom had concluded that the two individuals named in the police investigation were in fact officers of the Russian military intelligence service.338 The representative of the Russian Federation firmly rejected the “groundless accusations” of his country’s involvement in the poisoning by toxic chemicals in Salisbury in March 2018 and stated that the Russian Federation had never developed, produced or stockpiled the toxic chemicals referred to as Novichok.339

331 S/PV.8203, p. 2.
332 Ibid., p. 8.
333 Ibid., pp. 4–5 (France), p. 5 (Kuwait), p. 6 (Poland), p. 6 (Peru), pp. 6–7 (Sweden) and pp. 10–11 (Netherlands).
334 Ibid., p. 5 (Kuwait), p. 7 (Sweden), p. 7 (Kazakhstan) and p. 7 (Ethiopia).
335 S/PV.8237, p. 2.
336 Ibid., p. 12.
338 S/PV.8343, pp. 2–3.
339 Ibid., p. 11.
Meetings: Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218)

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Middle East

23. The situation in the Middle East

During the period under review, the Security Council held 47 open meetings in relation to the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”.\textsuperscript{340} In 2018, most meetings held under the item took the form of briefings.\textsuperscript{341} In the context of those meetings, the Council considered a variety of topics, principally, the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, the conflict in Yemen, the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The Council also met once, in January 2018, to consider the developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran. During the period under review, the Council adopted seven resolutions and issued one presidential statement in connection with the item. The Council, however, failed to adopt four draft resolutions in relation to the situations in the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen owing to the negative vote of one or more permanent members of the Council in two cases and the failure to obtain the required number of votes in the other two cases. In addition, the Council held three closed meetings with countries contributing troops and police to UNDOF and UNIFIL.\textsuperscript{342} More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the tables below.

The meetings in the Council during the period under review in relation to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic focused on three defined aspects: the political process to end the conflict; the proliferation and use of chemical weapons; and the humanitarian situation in the country. With regard to the political process, the Council heard monthly briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, who updated the Council on the efforts aimed at reaching a political agreement and de-escalating the conflict. The Special Envoy gave a briefing to the Council on the progress of the Geneva consultations, the Astana arrangements and the Congress of the Syrian National Dialogue, held in Sochi, Russian Federation, in January 2018. He also gave a briefing to the Council on other developments concerning the armed conflict in the country and, in particular, the implementation of resolution 2401 \textsuperscript{(2018) of 24 February 2018, in which the Council had demanded the cessation of hostilities for a 30-day humanitarian pause.\textsuperscript{343} Other developments covered were the ceasefire agreement reached in Duma in March 2018 between the military of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam), as well as the agreement between the Russian Federation and Turkey of 17 September 2018 to establish a demilitarized zone in Idlib. The Special Envoy also gave a briefing to the Council on the negotiations on and challenges to the formation of the constitutional committee agreed to in the final statement of the Congress of the Syrian National Dialogue.\textsuperscript{344} According to the statement, a constitutional committee would be formed to draft a constitutional reform as a contribution to the political settlement under the auspices of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 2254 \textsuperscript{(2015), and would comprise “at the very least” the Government, opposition representatives in the intra-Syrian talks, Syrian experts, civil society, independents, tribal leaders and women.\textsuperscript{345}}

With respect to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council heard regular briefings by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and her Deputy on the progress in the implementation of resolution 2118 \textsuperscript{(2013) on the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. The briefings focused on the process of the destruction of the two remaining chemical weapons production facilities, as well as the work of the fact-finding mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Government and non-State actors. The briefings also addressed the viability of establishing an accountability mechanism.

\textsuperscript{340} The provisional agenda for the 8209th meeting was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes (see S/PV.8209). For more information on the adoption of the agenda, see part II, sect. II.A.

\textsuperscript{341} For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

\textsuperscript{342} Under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353\textsuperscript{(2001), annex II, sections A and B”, the Council held two meetings in relation to UNDOF, on 14 June 2018 (see S/PV.8286) and 11 December 2018 (see S/PV.8417); and one meeting in relation to UNIFIL, on 9 August 2018 (see S/PV.8326).

\textsuperscript{343} Resolution 2401 \textsuperscript{(2018), para. 1.}

\textsuperscript{344} Letter dated 14 February 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/121), annex.

\textsuperscript{345} Ibid., p. 4.
to attribute responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic further to the expiration of the mandate of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, in November 2017. In that regard, further to the alleged chemical weapons attack in Duma on 7 April 2018, the Council voted on three separate draft resolutions: one sponsored by 26 Member States, and two sponsored by the Russian Federation. The draft resolution sponsored by 26 Member States and one of the draft resolutions sponsored by the Russian Federation proposed the establishment of the United Nations Independent Mechanism of Investigation. However, by the draft sponsored by 26 Member States, the Council would have requested the Syrian authorities to grant the Mechanism and OPCW personnel “immediate and unfettered” access to any sites, materials and individuals deemed of importance for the purpose of its mandate. The draft sponsored by the Russian Federation specified, by contrast, that such access would be “justified based on the assessment of the facts and circumstances known at the time”.

The Council voted on the draft sponsored by 26 Member States first, and failed to adopt it owing to the negative vote of the Russian Federation, a permanent member of the Council. The representative of the Russian Federation explained that the draft proposed replicated the former Mechanism’s “flawed working methods”. The representative of China regretted that the draft did not take into consideration some of the concerns of certain Council members regarding the Mechanism’s working methods. The first of the two draft resolutions sponsored by the Russian Federation was then voted on; the Council failed to adopt it, owing to it not having received the required number of votes. Subsequently, the second draft resolution sponsored by the Russian Federation was voted on, by which the Council would have expressed its support for the fact-finding mission. However, the draft resolution contained no provisions on the establishment of an investigation mechanism. The Council also failed to adopt the draft resolution, it not having received the required number of votes. The draft resolution was criticized by several Council members for its failure to create a mechanism to ensure accountability for the attacks and for not stressing the need for the independence of the fact-finding mission. Moreover, some speakers complained at the lack of sufficient time for negotiation of the draft.

With respect to the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council heard regular briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator and his Deputy, as well as the Director of the Coordination and Response Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The briefings focused on the detrimental humanitarian effects on the civilian population of continued military operations, particularly in and around Idlib and eastern Ghutah, including frequent, indiscriminate attacks affecting critical infrastructure and civilian objects, obstructions to humanitarian aid delivery, massive displacements across the country and the prospects of the return of internally displaced persons to areas of origin, including to places formerly controlled by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh). The briefers updated the Council on the United Nations cross-border operations and other humanitarian initiatives, as well as on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), in which the Council had demanded all parties to cease hostilities for a durable 30-day humanitarian pause throughout the Syrian Arab Republic.

In 2018, all decisions of the Council relating to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic concerned the humanitarian situation in the country. On 24 February 2018, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), in which it underscored the obligation of all Member States under Article 25 of the Charter to carry out its decisions, and demanded all parties to cease hostilities without delay and engage immediately to ensure the full and comprehensive implementation of the demand for a durable humanitarian pause for at least 30 consecutive days throughout the Syrian Arab Republic. The Council also demanded that the parties engage immediately to enable the “safe, unimpeded and sustained” delivery of humanitarian aid and services and medical evacuations of the critically sick and wounded, in accordance with applicable international law. The Council affirmed that the cessation of hostilities did not apply to military operations against ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Nusrah

348 S/2018/321, para. 7; and S/2018/175, para. 5.
350 S/2018/175, para. 9.
351 S/PV.8228, p. 4.
352 Ibid., p. 6.
354 Ibid., pp. 14–15 (United Kingdom), p. 15 (Sweden), p. 17 (Kuwait), p. 18 (France) and pp. 18–19 (Peru).
355 Ibid., p. 18 (Netherlands).
356 Ibid., p. 15 (Equatorial Guinea), p. 16 (United States) and p. 18 (Netherlands).
357 Resolution 2401 (2018), para. 1.
Front, and all other associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as designated by the Council.358 The Council also reiterated its demand that all parties immediately comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law.359 On 13 December 2018, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2449 (2018), in which it renewed the 12-month authorization first granted in resolution 2165 (2014) for cross-border humanitarian access to the Syrian Arab Republic and the associated monitoring mechanism until 10 January 2020.360 The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and some of the developments concerning the use of chemical weapons were also addressed under other items, namely, “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” and “Threats to international peace and security”.361

In relation to the conflict in Yemen, the Council continued to focus on three distinct areas: the political process to find a solution to the conflict; the humanitarian situation in the country; and the sanctions measures in place against individuals and entities designated as engaging in or providing support for acts threatening the peace, security or stability of Yemen.

Regarding the political process, the Council heard briefings on the political developments by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, in particular the continued fighting between the Government of Yemen and Ansar Allah and the efforts of the Special Envoy to relaunch the peace process. In that regard, in his briefing to the Council on 2 August 2018, the Special Envoy expressed the intention to bring the parties together to Geneva on 6 September 2018 for a first round of consultations.362 After the Houthis had failed to arrive at the scheduled talks, the Special Envoy announced to the Council, on 11 September 2018, that he would continue his consultations with the parties on confidence-building measures, including the reopening of Sana’a airport and the exchange of prisoners, throughout the following weeks during his visits to Sana’a, Riyadh and Muscat.363 On 14 December 2018, the Special Envoy gave a briefing to the Council on the consultations between the parties held in Stockholm, which had resulted in the signing, on 13 December 2018, of the Stockholm Agreement, circulated to the Council by the Secretary-General in a letter dated 20 December 2018.364 According to the Stockholm Agreement, the parties had reached an agreement on the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra’a’s Isa, an executive mechanism on activating the prisoner exchange agreement, and a statement of understanding on Ta’izz.

Regarding the humanitarian situation, the Council continued to hear briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Director of the Coordination and Response Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The briefings focused on the adverse consequences of the conflict on the country’s economy and its civilian population, including severe malnutrition and the increasing risk of famine caused by the obstruction of humanitarian deliveries at the ports of entry to the country and restrictions placed by the Government on imports of essential commodities, consequences which were further exacerbated by the spread of cholera and diphtheria. In that regard, the briefers often called upon the parties to open the humanitarian corridors to allow the delivery of food, fuel and medicine, and called upon Member States and other donors to increase humanitarian donations and inject foreign capital into the Yemeni economy.

With regard to the sanctions measures imposed in connection with the conflict in Yemen, on 26 February 2018, during its 8190th meeting, the Council voted on two draft resolutions: one sponsored by the United Kingdom365 and one sponsored by the Russian Federation.366 At the outset of the meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom expressed concern over the alleged use of arms of Iranian origin in Yemen in violation of resolution 2216 (2015) and explained that the text of the draft resolution submitted by his delegation provided a balanced and impartial assessment of the situation in Yemen but did not “shy away” from calling out those whose actions undermined international peace and security.367 While expressing support for the majority of its provisions, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that he could not concur with the “unconfirmed conclusions” of the Panel of Experts on Yemen included in the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom.368 The two draft resolutions were voted on

358 Ibid., para. 2.
359 Ibid., para. 7.
360 Resolution 2449 (2018), para. 3.
361 For more information, see part I, sects. 24 and 36.
362 S/PV.8323, p. 2.
363 S/PV.8348, p. 3.
367 S/PV.8190, p. 3.
368 Ibid. See also S/2018/156, ninth and tenth preambular paragraphs.
in sequence. The Council voted on the draft resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom first and failed to adopt it owing to the negative vote of the Russian Federation, a permanent member of the Council. The draft resolution sponsored by the Russian Federation was adopted unanimously as resolution 2402 (2018). Following the vote, the representative of China noted that there remained “significant differences” among Council members on some elements of the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and that it was necessary for the Council members to negotiate and meet each other halfway in order to give full play to the sanctions mechanism. The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia expressed similar reservations, regretting that some concerns expressed had not been taken into account by the delegation of the United Kingdom.

By resolution 2402 (2018), the Council renewed the sanctions measures imposed pursuant to resolutions 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015), namely, an asset freeze, a travel ban and an arms embargo. The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 28 March 2019. In addition to resolution 2402 (2018), the decisions of the Council in 2018 relating to the conflict in Yemen also addressed the humanitarian situation in the country and the ceasefire agreed to under the Stockholm Agreement. On 15 March, the Council issued a presidential statement in which it expressed its grave concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen, including the outbreaks of cholera and diphtheria and the threat of famine, as well as the high levels of violence, in particular the indiscriminate attacks resulting in civilian casualties. The Council condemned the ballistic missile attacks by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia, called upon the parties to allow access for humanitarian aid to the affected areas and stressed the need for humanitarian aid to be gender- and age-sensitive. The Council also called upon all Member States to fully implement the arms embargo as required by the relevant resolutions. On 21 December 2018, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2451 (2018), in which it endorsed the Stockholm Agreement and authorized the Secretary-General to establish an advance team for an initial period of 30 days to support and facilitate its immediate implementation, including the request for the United Nations to chair the Redeployment Coordination Committee. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to submit proposals on how the United Nations would fully support the Stockholm Agreement and to report to the Council on progress regarding the implementation of the resolution on a weekly basis.

During the period under review, the mandate of UNDOF was renewed twice for periods of six months each, by resolutions 2426 (2018) and 2450 (2018), until 31 December 2018 and 30 June 2019, respectively. The mandate of UNDOF remained unchanged throughout the reporting period. By resolution 2450 (2018), the Council took note of the independent review and encouraged the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNDOF and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to continue relevant discussions on the recommendations resulting therefrom to improve mission performance and the implementation of the UNDOF mandate. The situation in the area of operations of UNDOF was also addressed under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.

In connection with Lebanon, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2433 (2018), in which it extended the mandate of UNIFIL for a period of one year, until 31 August 2019. In the resolution, the Council called for the Government of Lebanon to develop a plan to increase its naval capabilities, with the goal of ultimately decreasing the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force and transitioning its responsibilities to the Lebanese Armed Forces, and encouraged the deployment by the Government of a model regiment and an offshore patrol vessel in the UNIFIL area of operations. The Council welcomed the initiatives undertaken by the Secretary-General to standardize a culture of performance in peacekeeping, and called upon him to continue his efforts to develop an integrated performance policy framework and apply it to UNIFIL. The Council requested the Secretary-General and the troop-contributing countries to seek to

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369 S/PV.8190, p. 6.
370 Ibid., p. 7.
371 Resolution 2402 (2018), para. 2. For more information, see part VII, sect. III, “Measures not involving the use of armed force in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter”.
372 Resolution 2402 (2018), para. 5. For more information, see part IX, sect. I, “Committees”.
374 Ibid., third, fourth and sixth paragraphs.
375 Ibid., tenth paragraph.
376 Resolution 2451 (2018), paras. 2 and 5.
377 Ibid., paras. 6 and 7.
379 For more information, see part X, sect. I.
380 Resolution 2450 (2018), para. 10.
381 For more information, see part I, sect. 24.
382 Resolution 2433 (2018), para. 1.
383 Ibid., paras. 7 and 8.
384 Ibid., para. 23.
increase the number of women in UNIFIL and to ensure their meaningful participation in all aspects of operations, and more broadly requested UNIFIL to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate. The situation in Lebanon was also addressed under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.

On 5 January 2018, the Council met under this item to discuss the situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, during which the Assistant-Secretary General for Political Affairs delivered a briefing on the anti-government protests which had taken place in late December 2017 and early January 2018. During the meeting, some Council members expressed various reservations about the holding of the meeting.

For the purposes of facilitating the coverage of this item, the meetings are set out below under five separate headings, namely, (a) Syrian Arab Republic; (b) Yemen; (c) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; (d) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon; and (e) other.

Meetings: the situation in the Middle East – Syrian Arab Republic

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<tr>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
<th>Sub-item</th>
<th>Other documents</th>
<th>Rule 37 invitations</th>
<th>Rule 39 and other invitations</th>
<th>Speakers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8171 30 January 2018</td>
<td>Letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/84)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
<td>Seven Council members, invitee</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8174 5 February 2018</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>High Representative for Disarmament Affairs</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8181 14 February 2018</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria</td>
<td>Seven Council members, all invitees</td>
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</table>

385 Ibid., paras. 23 and 24. For more information, see part X, sect. I.
386 For more information, see part I, sect. 24.
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<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
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<td>Secretary-General, 14 Council members,$ invitee</td>
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<td>Four Council members (China, France, Russian Federation, United States)</td>
<td>Procedural vote (rule 9) 8-4-3$</td>
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<td>19 March 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8217</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on the</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian</td>
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<td>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</td>
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<td>S/PV.8221 4 April 2018</td>
<td>Letter dated 28 March 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/283)</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<td>Draft resolution S/2018/175 not adopted 6-7-2*</td>
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<sup>9</sup> Six Council members, all invitees
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<td>S/PV.8344 6 September 2018</td>
<td>Letter dated 28 August 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/804)</td>
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<td>S/PV.8345 7 September 2018</td>
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<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Director of Operations and Advocacy of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>Other documents</td>
<td>Rule 37 invitations</td>
<td>Rule 39 and other invitations</td>
<td>Speakers</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8347 11 September 2018</td>
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<td>Iran (Islamic Republic of), Turkey</td>
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<td>S/PV.8373 17 October 2018</td>
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<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8383 26 October 2018</td>
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<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8390 5 November 2018</td>
<td>Letter dated 29 October 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/971)</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>High Representative for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria</td>
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<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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### Meeting record and date
- **S/PV.8411** 29 November 2018

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<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Decision and vote</th>
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### S/PV.8423 13 December 2018

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<th>Sub-item</th>
<th>Rule 37 invitations</th>
<th>Speakers</th>
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### S/PV.8434 20 December 2018

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<th>Rule 37 invitations</th>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Decision and vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* The representative of Ethiopia did not make a statement.

* Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Equatorial Guinea, France, Netherlands, Peru, United Kingdom and United States.

* Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Peru, Russian Federation and United States.

* Kuwait (President of the Security Council) was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

* The Under-Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference from Geneva.

* Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.

* The representative of Sweden did not make a statement. The representative of Kuwait spoke also on behalf of Sweden.

* The Special Envoy participated in the meeting via videoconference from Brussels.

* For: France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom; against: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation; abstaining: Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia.

* The Netherlands (President of the Security Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. The representative of Kuwait spoke also on behalf of Sweden.

* Albania, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Slovenia, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

* For: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation; against: France, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom; abstaining: Côte d’Ivoire, Kuwait.

* For: Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States; against: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Russian Federation; abstaining: China.
Meetings: the situation in the Middle East – Yemen

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<tr>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
<th>Sub-item</th>
<th>Other documents</th>
<th>Rule 37 invitations</th>
<th>Rule 39 and other invitations</th>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Decision and vote for (for-against-abstaining)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8191 27 February 2018</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Director of the Coordination and Response Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8235 17 April 2018</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8323 2 August 2018</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Director of the Coordination and Response Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeting record and date</td>
<td>Sub-item</td>
<td>Other documents</td>
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<td>Speakers</td>
<td>Decision and vote for-against-abstaining</td>
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<td>S/PV.8348</td>
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<td>11 September 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8361</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>16 November 2018</td>
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<tr>
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<td>21 December 2018</td>
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a Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.
b For: Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States; against: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Russian Federation; abstaining: China, Kazakhstan.
The Special Envoy participated in the meeting via videoconference from Amman.
The Founder and Director of the Peace Track Initiative participated in the meeting via videoconference from Ottawa.
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Ethiopia, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.

Meetings: the situation in the Middle East — United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

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<th>Rule 39 and other invitations</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8432 19 December 2018</td>
<td>Israel, Lebanon</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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### Meetings: the situation in the Middle East – Other

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<th>Speakers</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8152 5 January 2018</td>
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<td>Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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#### 24. The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

During the period under review, the Security Council held 15 meetings in connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”. The Council continued to hear monthly briefings and hold quarterly open debates to consider this item. In addition, the Council held two unscheduled briefings and failed to adopt two competing draft resolutions in connection with the situation in the Gaza Strip. Under this item, the Council also considered developments in Iran (Islamic Republic of), Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen and the overall political situation in the Middle East. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

During 2018, the Council heard briefings in most meetings held under this item by the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General. The Council also heard briefings, on occasion, by the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs. In the context of the monthly briefings, the Special Coordinator reported on the deteriorating situation in the Gaza Strip, the developments in the West Bank with regard to settlement activities and violence, the situation in the Golan Heights, the regional dynamics and the status of the peace process. During those briefings, concerns were also raised over the funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. On 20 February 2018, in the context of a monthly briefing to the Council under this item, the President of the State of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, was invited to participate (the representative of Israel was also invited to participate). At that meeting, Mr. Abbas called for an international conference to form a multilateral mechanism in support of the parties to negotiate all permanent status issues as defined by the Oslo Accords, within a specific time frame and to secure full United Nations membership for the State of Palestine and mutual recognition of Palestinian and Israeli statehood along the 1967 lines.

Every three months, briefings were also used to report on the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016). During those briefings, which took place in March, June, September and December, the Special Coordinator reported on the Israeli settlement activities, on the violence against civilians, including acts of terror, incitement, provocation and inflammatory rhetoric, on the steps and efforts to advance the peace process and on the actions taken by all States to distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967. On 14 May 2018, 10 Council members addressed a letter to the Secretary-General in which they noted the practice of presenting oral reports on the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016) and requested the Secretary-General to circulate a written report thereon. On 18 June 2018, the Secretary-General presented the sixth quarterly report on the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016) in written form. No other written report was presented during the period under review. On 21 December 2018, 10 Council members and 3 incoming members addressed a letter to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council with reference to the letter sent on 14 May concerning the lack of

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388 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
389 For more information, see part I, sect. 23, “The situation in the Middle East”.
390 For more information on participation, see part II, sect. VII.
391 S/PV.8183, pp. 8–9.
implementation of resolution 2334 (2016).\textsuperscript{394} In the letter, the signatories reaffirmed their conviction that written reports would contribute to furthering the implementation of the resolution. They also expressed their expectation of receiving written reports at least every second reporting occasion, and once again requested the Secretary-General to circulate a written report on the implementation of the resolution to the Council prior to its meetings designated for the follow-up to resolution 2334 (2016).

Concerning the situation in the Gaza Strip and in response to the rise in violence in March and May 2018, the Council held additional meetings, in the context of which Council members heard a briefing by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, on 30 March, and by the Special Coordinator, on 15 May. At the meeting of 30 March, the Assistant Secretary-General reported to the Council that about 30,000 people had participated in the so-called Great March of Return at various locations in Gaza, resulting in violence. He also reported that violence had broken out in the West Bank, with an estimated 900 Palestinians demonstrating, mostly in central West Bank cities, such as Ramallah and Hebron.\textsuperscript{395} An additional meeting was also held on 15 May, against the backdrop of the violence that had erupted further to the demonstrations as part of the Great March of Return as well as in protest of the relocation of the United States Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem the day before.\textsuperscript{396} At the meeting, the Special Coordinator informed the Council about the clashes in the West Bank and the deteriorating situation, with reports indicating that at least 60 people had been killed and 1,300 injured.\textsuperscript{397} At the monthly briefing held on 19 November 2018, the Special Coordinator informed the Council of the efforts of his team to ensure a return to the 2014 ceasefire agreement further to the escalation of violence in the period from 11 to 13 November triggered by an operation of the Israel Defense Forces inside the Gaza Strip in which a local commander of the Hamas Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and six other Palestinians had been killed.\textsuperscript{398}

During 2018, the Council held open debates every quarter, in January, April, July and October. At those meetings, Council members and Member States alike considered the Israeli settlement activity, the security situation in the West Bank and the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. Speakers also focused on the decision of the United States to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, as well as on its decision to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Amid the worsening security situation in the Gaza Strip following the Great March of Return, on 1 June 2018, the Council failed to adopt two competing draft resolutions, sponsored by Kuwait\textsuperscript{399} and the United States,\textsuperscript{400} respectively. Before the vote, the representative of the United States affirmed that the draft resolution presented by Kuwait represented “a grossly one-sided view” of what had taken place in Gaza and warned that, regardless of how others chose to vote, the United States would oppose the draft resolution and would veto it. She added that in spite of the responsibility of Hamas for the awful living conditions in Gaza, the diversion of humanitarian assistance into military infrastructure and attacks on humanitarian access points, as well as its refusal to cooperate with the Palestinian Authority to unite in the pursuit of peace, the draft resolution sponsored by Kuwait made no mention of Hamas.\textsuperscript{401} The draft resolution sponsored by Kuwait was voted on first and was not adopted owing to the negative vote of the United States, a permanent member of the Council. In her statement after the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom affirmed that both draft resolutions contained elements that were either imbalanced or too vague to be viable; while the draft resolution sponsored by Kuwait failed to name terrorist actors, the draft resolution sponsored by the United States did not adequately reference the responsibilities and obligations of Israel with regard to Gaza.\textsuperscript{402} Other members of the Council also raised concerns regarding each of the texts presented.\textsuperscript{403} The draft resolution sponsored by the United States was then put to a vote and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes, with one vote in favour, by the United States. In the explanation of the vote that ensued, some members of the Council voiced concerns about the lack of prior negotiations and regretted the absence of a more holistic consideration of the situation in Gaza in the text presented by the United States.\textsuperscript{404}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{394} S/2018/1150.
  \item \textsuperscript{395} S/PV.8219, pp. 2–3.
  \item \textsuperscript{396} S/PV.8256.
  \item \textsuperscript{397} Ibid., pp. 2–4.
  \item \textsuperscript{398} S/PV.8405, pp. 2–4.
  \item \textsuperscript{399} S/2018/516.
  \item \textsuperscript{400} S/2018/520.
  \item \textsuperscript{401} S/PV.8274, pp. 2–3.
  \item \textsuperscript{402} Ibid., p. 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{403} Ibid., pp. 10–11 (Netherlands) and pp. 11–12 (Ethiopia).
  \item \textsuperscript{404} Ibid., p. 9 (France), p. 9 (Peru), p. 10 (Sweden) and p. 11 (Kazakhstan).
\end{itemize}
### Meetings: the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

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<th>Rule 39 and other invitations</th>
<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8183 20 February 2018</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, President of the observer State of Palestine</td>
<td>Secretary-General, all Council members, all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8214 26 March 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process</td>
<td>Seven Council members, invitee(^d)</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8219 30 March 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Permanent Observer of the observer State of Palestine</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8244 26 April 2018</td>
<td>31 Member States(^c)</td>
<td>Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Head of the Delegation of the European Union, Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Permanent Observer of the observer State of Palestine, Permanent Observer of the observer State of the Holy See, Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees(^d)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeting record and date</td>
<td>Sub-item</td>
<td>Other documents</td>
<td>Rule 37 invitations</td>
<td>Rule 39 and other invitations</td>
<td>Speakers</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8256 15 May 2018</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent Observer of the observer State of Palestine, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8265 23 May 2018</td>
<td>Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process</td>
<td>Kazakhstan, invitee</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8289 19 June 2018</td>
<td>Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process</td>
<td>Invitee</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8316 24 July 2018</td>
<td>25 Member States</td>
<td>Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Permanent Observer of the observer State of Palestine, Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8329 22 August 2018</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs</td>
<td>Invitee</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8358 20 September 2018</td>
<td>Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process</td>
<td>All Council members, invitee</td>
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Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8375 and S/PV.8375 (Resumption 1)</td>
<td>18 October 2018</td>
<td>28 Member States</td>
<td>Permanent Observer of the observer State of Palestine, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Executive Director of B’Tselem, Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union, Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States, Permanent Observer of the observer State of the Holy See</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8405</td>
<td>19 November 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process</td>
<td>All Council members, invitee</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8429</td>
<td>18 December 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process</td>
<td>All Council members, invitee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Argentina, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Estonia, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
- The Special Coordinator participated in the meeting via videoconference from Jerusalem. Maldives was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. The representative of Turkey spoke on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation; the representative of the United Arab Emirates spoke on behalf of the Group of Arab States; the representative of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement; and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
- Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, United Kingdom and United States.
- The Special Coordinator participated in the meeting via videoconference from Jerusalem.
- Bahrain, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.
- The representative of Iraq spoke on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation: the representative of Tunisia spoke on behalf of the Group of Arab States; the representative of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement; and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine.
- Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.
- For: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Peru, Russian Federation, Sweden; against: United States; abstaining: Ethiopia, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom.
- For: United States; against: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Kuwait, Russian Federation; abstaining: China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom.
- Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.
During 2018, the Security Council held five meetings and adopted one resolution in connection with the situation concerning Iraq. With the unanimous adoption of resolution 2421 (2018), the Council renewed the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) for a period of 10 months, until 31 May 2019. Except for one, all meetings under this item during the period under review took the form of briefings. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

During the period under review, the Council heard briefings on a quarterly basis by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and Head of UNAMI on the situation in Iraq. Against the backdrop of the defeat of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), the Special Representative briefed the Council on the holding and status of parliamentary elections, as well as on the activities of UNAMI in the areas of political dialogue and national reconciliation. In that regard, the Special Representative noted that the voluntary and dignified return of internally displaced persons, under conditions of safety and security, was critical for the success and credibility of the elections. He also briefed the Council on the public protests following allegations of electoral fraud and mismanagement of the parliamentary elections. The Special Representative also made reference to the question of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and property. During his final briefing to the Council, the Special Representative reported that the Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant had arrived in Iraq on 30 October.

The Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism and the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate gave one briefing to the Council, on the joint visit to Iraq in March 2018 and the dispatch of a joint scoping mission by the Office and the Executive Directorate at the beginning of May 2018 to identify specific elements of programmatic support to the Government of Iraq.

The Permanent Observer and Head of the Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to the United Nations also gave one briefing to the Council, on the topic of missing persons from the 1991 Gulf War and the work of the tripartite mechanism, chaired by ICRC, to trace the persons still unaccounted for as a result of the conflict. At the same meeting, a representative of the Women Empowerment Organization in Iraq and coordinator of the Iraqi cross-sector task force for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) gave a briefing to the Council on the situation of women in Iraq and the work of the task force in its development of a national action plan.

At the five above-mentioned meetings, Council members discussed the progress of national elections, the overall political process and the reconstruction efforts in the context of the progressive liberation and recovery of territories that were under the control of

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405 Resolution 2421 (2018), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNAMI, see part X, sect. II.
406 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
407 S/PV.8184, p. 2.
408 S/PV.8324, p. 2.
409 S/PV.8184, p. 3; S/PV.8271, p. 4; and S/PV.8324, p. 4.
410 S/PV.8396, p. 3. For more information, see part VI, sect. II, “Investigation of disputes and fact-finding”, and part IX, sect. III, “Investigative bodies”.
411 S/PV.8271, pp. 4–7.
412 S/PV.8324, pp. 4–5.
413 Ibid., p. 5.
ISIL (Da’esh). In that regard, certain Council members expressed their support for the Investigative Team and called upon the Government of Iraq to cooperate with it. Council members also focused on the humanitarian issues faced by the country, including the return of internally displaced persons.

At its 8285th meeting, on 14 June 2018, the Council renewed the mandate of UNAMI for a period of 10 months, until 31 May 2019, by resolution 2421 (2018), adopted unanimously.\(^414\) As explained in the meeting, the decision to extend the mandate for a period of 10 months was made to better align mandate renewals with the budget cycle, in keeping with the findings of the independent external assessment of UNAMI.\(^415\) In the resolution, the Council welcomed the results of the assessment,\(^416\) and decided that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and UNAMI, taking into account the views of the Government of Iraq,\(^417\) would prioritize the provision of advice, support and assistance on advancing inclusive political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation.\(^418\) In addition, the Council decided that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMI would further advise, support and assist the Government of Iraq, inter alia, on the development of processes for holding elections and on constitutional review, as well as approaching gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate and advising the Government in ensuring the participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels.\(^419\)

The security situation in Iraq and the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) were also considered by the Council under the items entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts” and “Maintenance of international peace and security”.\(^420\)

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\(^{414}\) Resolution 2421 (2018), para. 1.

\(^{415}\) S/PV.8285, p. 2 (United States). See also S/2017/966.

\(^{416}\) Resolution 2421 (2018), para. 5. For more information on the mandate of UNAMI, see part X, sect. II.


\(^{418}\) Resolution 2421 (2018), para. 2 (a).

\(^{419}\) Ibid., paras. 2 (b) and (e).

\(^{420}\) For further details, see part I, sects. 31 and 37.

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### Meetings: the situation concerning Iraq

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8271 30 May 2018</td>
<td>Eighteenth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013) (S/2018/353)</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2367 (2017) (S/2018/359)</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, Executive Directorate, Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>Five Council members (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Peru, United States), all invitees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Thematic issues

#### 26. United Nations peacekeeping operations

During the period under review, the Security Council held seven meetings, adopted two resolutions and issued one presidential statement in connection with the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”. Two of the meetings took the form of briefings, three were convened for the adoption of a decision and, of the remaining two, one was a debate and the other an open debate. The open debate was a high-level meeting to discuss collective action to improve United Nations peacekeeping, while the debate was the first annual meeting on the reform of peacekeeping held pursuant to resolution 2378...
Following established practice, the Council held annual briefings with selected force commanders and police commissioners of United Nations peacekeeping operations. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In 2018, the Council heard one briefing by the Secretary-General and one briefing by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations briefed the Council twice, while the Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions briefed the Council once, as did the force commanders and the police commissioners of various peacekeeping operations. In addition, the Council was briefed twice by representatives of two non-governmental organizations.

Discussions in the Council under this item focused on the need for a collective approach to strengthening the effectiveness of peacekeeping. In that regard, speakers underlined the importance of improving the performance of and strengthening accountability of peacekeeping personnel, improving safety and security and ensuring better equipment and training. Discussions also referred to the need for well-defined and achievable mandates, political solutions to guide the work of missions and integrated strategies on which to base the measurement of overall mandate implementation. The discussions also pointed to the need for the greater involvement of women in peacekeeping and the prevention of and accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse.

At the high-level open debate held on 28 March 2018, the Secretary-General called for a “quantum leap” in collective engagement and announced the launch of the new “Action for Peacekeeping” initiative, aimed at developing mutually agreed principles and commitments for creating peacekeeping operations fit for the future. In that regard, he requested Member States, including the Council, to sharpen and streamline mission mandates, sustain political engagement and push for political solutions and inclusive peace processes. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission underlined the need for close cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union to move forward the political processes underpinning peacekeeping operations and for complementarity between the two organizations. The Council also heard a briefing by a representative of a non-governmental organization from Gao, Mali, who described the political, security and protection situation in her country and called upon the United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to support the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.

On 9 May 2018, the Force Commanders of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), MINUSMA and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) provided the Council with an overview of key mandate implementation challenges in their missions. The Force Commander of UNAMID called for transition strategies to be embedded in the renewal of mission mandates. The Force Commander of MINUSMA concurred with the findings of the report of Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz on improving the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers, and highlighted the need for personnel training, intelligence capacity and decentralized decision-making to deal with complex security environments. The UNMISS Force Commander described the need for a political solution in South Sudan as an imperative that would improve the Mission’s prospects of achieving its mandate.

On 12 September 2018, at the annual debate on peacekeeping reform held pursuant to resolution 2378 (2017), the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations informed the Council that the Secretary-General, within the framework of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, had put forward a “Declaration of Shared Commitments on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” to all Member States for their endorsement. He outlined the measures undertaken by the Secretariat to enhance peacekeeping performance and the efforts of the Secretariat and Member States to increase the number of women in peacekeeping and on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, particularly of children. The Chief Executive Officer of Keeping Children Safe called upon world leaders to champion the safety of children at the highest levels by requiring all organizations involved in peacekeeping to implement robust international child-safeguarding standards.

422 S/PV.8218 and S/PV.8349. See also resolution 2378 (2017), para. 10.
423 S/PV.8251 and S/PV.8393.
425 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
On 6 November 2018, at the annual meeting of the Council with United Nations police commissioners, the Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions updated the Council on the status of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, noting that 150 Member States had endorsed the Declaration of Shared Commitments and that the independent strategic reviews of missions, eight of which had been conducted over the course of the past year, were essential if United Nations police were to fulfill their role in keeping the peace and creating the space for political dialogue and preventive diplomacy. In her briefing, the Police Commissioner of UNMISS described how the Mission had implemented its protection of civilians mandate, including to address sexual and gender-based violence, through community-oriented and gender-responsive policing. The Police Commissioner of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo described the work of his staff in supporting the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to combat organized crime and the activities of armed groups. The Police Commissioner of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti noted that the integral role of the Mission in supporting Haiti in its reform of the security and justice sector had enabled it to address the issue of the rule of law in a more coordinated and comprehensive manner. The representative of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime gave a briefing to the Council on the links between organized crime and conflict and on the need for the policing function to be part of an integrated response in peacekeeping operations.

In its decisions during the period under review, the Council focused on the collective action to enhance peacekeeping and the role of police, justice and corrections components. In a presidential statement issued on 14 May 2018, the Council reaffirmed the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. The Council welcomed the initiatives of the Secretary-General to standardize “a culture of performance” in United Nations peacekeeping and expressed support for the development of a comprehensive and integrated performance policy framework that ensured effective and full implementation of mandates, identified clear standards of performance for evaluating civilian and uniformed personnel and included comprehensive and objective methodologies based on clear and well-defined benchmarks to ensure accountability for underperformance and incentives for outstanding performance. The Council expressed support for the vision of the Secretary-General for the reform of the peace and security pillar and welcomed his efforts to mobilize all partners and stakeholders in support of more effective peacekeeping through the Action for Peacekeeping initiative.

By resolution 2436 (2018) of 21 September 2018, the Council reaffirmed its support for the development of a comprehensive and integrated performance policy framework and outlined examples of outstanding performance, and noted that the framework should specify measures for performance accountability that included a range of responses proportionate to the performance failures. Highlighting the need for the full implementation of protection mandates, the Council affirmed that, where mandated, peacekeepers were authorized to use all necessary means, which included the use of force when required. The Council requested the Secretary-General to act with urgency to initiate special investigations into alleged instances of significant performance failure, to provide detailed reporting on their findings and implementation plans to the Council and relevant Member States, and to ensure that decisions in that context were predicated on objective performance data.

By resolution 2447 (2018), the Council underscored the importance of integrating police, justice and corrections activities into the mandates of peacekeeping operations and special political missions from their outset to support the achievement of strategic goals and to address the root causes of conflict. The Council requested the Secretary-General to enhance the coherence, performance and effectiveness of United Nations assistance in that context, ensure coordination with the United Nations country team and other United Nations actors, ensure timely planning and benchmarks for mission transitions and ensure that data streams related to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations included police, justice and corrections institutions and were centralized to improve the analytical evaluation of mission operations.

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432 S/PV.8393, pp. 2–4.
433 Ibid., pp. 4–6.
434 Ibid., pp. 6–7.
435 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
436 Ibid., pp. 8–10.
437 S/PRST/2018/10, third paragraph.
438 Ibid., thirteenth paragraph.
439 Ibid., twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth paragraphs.
440 Resolution 2436 (2018), para. 1.
441 Ibid., para. 6.
442 Ibid., paras. 10–12.
443 Resolution 2447 (2018), para. 1.
444 Ibid., para. 6 (a)–(d).
### Meetings: United Nations peacekeeping operations

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<th>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8349 12 September 2018</td>
<td>11 Member States</td>
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<td>13 Council members, all invitees</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Sub-item</td>
<td>Other documents</td>
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<td>Speakers</td>
<td>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</td>
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*Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.*

*The Netherlands was represented by its Prime Minister; Côte d’Ivoire was represented by its Minister of State and Minister of Defence; Sweden was represented by its Minister for Policy Coordination and Energy; Poland was represented by its Deputy Foreign Minister; Kazakhstan was represented by its Deputy Minister of Defence; France was represented by its Secretary of State attached to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs; the United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for the Commonwealth and the United Nations; and the United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Member of the President’s Cabinet.*
27. International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

During the period under review, the Security Council held four meetings relating to the work of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. The Council adopted one presidential statement and one resolution, under Chapter VII of the Charter. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In 2018, the Council heard semi-annual briefings by the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals and by the Prosecutor on the work of the Mechanism. At those meetings, the Council considered the progress achieved as well as the challenges to the implementation of the mandate of the Mechanism during the reporting period, in particular with regard to the enforcement of sentences. In that connection, most Council members called upon Member States to cooperate with the Office of the Prosecutor in locating and apprehending fugitives remaining at large. Speakers also recognized the role of the two former Tribunals and of the Mechanism in providing access to justice and international criminal law as a way to build sustainable peace.

The decisions of the Council dealt with most of the aspects discussed in those meetings. On 19 March 2018, the Council issued a presidential statement in which it requested the Mechanism to present its report on the progress of its work by 15 April 2018. In addition, the Council requested the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals to carry out a thorough examination of the Mechanism’s report, as well as the report on the evaluation of the methods and work of the Mechanism by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), and to present its views.

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445 In a note by the President of the Security Council dated 2 February 2018 (S/2018/90), the Council agreed that issues pertaining to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, established by resolution 19966 (2010), would be considered under an item entitled “International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals”, under which the Council would also consider issues pertaining to the items entitled “International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991” and “International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994”. For more information on the mandates of the two Tribunals and of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, see part IX, sect. IV, “Tribunals”.

446 S/PV.8278 and S/PV.8416.

447 S/PRST/2018/6, fifth paragraph.
and any findings or recommendations for the Council’s consideration in its review of the work of the Mechanism.\textsuperscript{448} The Council noted with concern that the Mechanism faced problems in the relocation of acquitted persons and convicted persons who had completed serving their sentences, and emphasized the importance of the successful relocation of such persons.\textsuperscript{449} Furthermore, the Council stressed its determination to combat impunity for those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law and the necessity that all persons indicted by the two Tribunals, including the remaining fugitives, were brought to justice.\textsuperscript{450}

On 27 June 2018, the Council adopted, albeit not unanimously, resolution 2422 (2018), under Chapter VII of the Charter, by which it appointed the Prosecutor of the Mechanism with effect from 1 July 2018 until 30 June 2020.\textsuperscript{451} In the resolution, the Council urged all States to intensify their cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to the Mechanism, in particular to achieve the arrest and surrender of all remaining fugitives indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{452} The Council noted the concerns expressed by some Member States with respect to the early release of persons convicted by the Tribunal, and encouraged the Mechanism to consider an appropriate solution.\textsuperscript{453} In addition, the Council welcomed the report submitted by the Mechanism to the Council and the report of OIOS on the evaluation of the methods and work of the Mechanism.\textsuperscript{454} In that regard, the Council requested the Mechanism to implement the recommendations made by the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals and to continue to take steps to further enhance efficiency and effective and transparent management.\textsuperscript{455} With a view to strengthening independent oversight of the Mechanism, the Council recalled that, as set out in its presidential statement of 19 March 2018, future reviews carried out pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1966 (2010) should include evaluation reports sought from OIOS with respect to the methods and work of the Mechanism.\textsuperscript{456}

During the period under review, the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint the judges nominated to fill the two vacancies resulting from the resignation of one judge and the passing of another judge of the Mechanism. In addition, the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to reappoint 23 judges and the President of the Mechanism, as well as of the nomination of the Prosecutor for reappointment for a new term of office, which was decided, as referenced above, by the Council in resolution 2422 (2018). In accordance with article 10 of the statute of the Mechanism, the President of the Security Council addressed a letter to the President of the General Assembly transmitting the list of nominations for the two judge vacancies in the roster of the Mechanism to the Assembly.\textsuperscript{457}

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\textsuperscript{448} Ibid., sixth and eighth paragraphs.
\textsuperscript{449} Ibid., ninth paragraph.
\textsuperscript{450} Ibid., tenth paragraph.
\textsuperscript{451} Resolution 2422 (2018), para. 1.
\textsuperscript{452} Ibid., para. 4.
\textsuperscript{453} Ibid., para. 10.

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Meetings: International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8278 6 June 2018</td>
<td>Letter dated 13 April 2018 from the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals addressed to the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, the Prosecutor of the Mechanism, the Secretary-General</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Rwanda, Serbia*</td>
<td>President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Prosecutor of the Mechanism</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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### Meeting record and date

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<td>resolution submitted by Peru (S/2018/628)</td>
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<td>(Peru, Russian Federation), invitee</td>
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<td>S/PV.8416 11 December 2018</td>
<td>Note by the Secretary-General on the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (S/2018/569)</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Rwanda, Serbiaa</td>
<td>President of the Mechanism, Prosecutor of the Mechanism</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<td>Letter dated 19 November 2018 from the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1033)</td>
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a Serbia was represented by its Minister of Justice.

b For: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States; against: none; abstaining: Russian Federation.
28. Children and armed conflict

During the period under review, the Security Council held one high-level meeting and adopted one resolution in connection with the item entitled “Children and armed conflict”. More information on the meeting, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in table 1.

Further to the concept note circulated by Sweden, the Council held a high-level open debate on 9 July 2018 under the sub-item entitled “Protecting children today prevents conflicts tomorrow”. At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Executive Director of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and a civil society representative from Colombia.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General provided an overview of the trends regarding children and armed conflict, as presented in the report of the Secretary-General for 2017, and expressed profound shock at the over 21,000 violations against children perpetrated by armed groups, Government forces and unknown armed actors. Noting the examples of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Myanmar and Somalia, she highlighted a sharp rise in the number of abductions, an elevated number of children killed or injured, the use of children in suicide attacks, the targeting of schools and hospitals, denials of access and attacks on humanitarian convoys, and the unlawful detention of children allegedly associated with armed groups. In terms of positive developments, the Special Representative highlighted, inter alia, the progress in the adoption and implementation of action plans for the protection of children in the Central African Republic, Mali, Nigeria and the Sudan, and the advances in that context attained through the peace process in Colombia. Emphasizing the important connection between child protection and any strategy to reach and sustain peace, she also noted the work of her Office pursuant to the presidential statement of 31 October 2017 to compile good practices and guidance on the integration of child protection into peace processes.

In her remarks, the Executive Director of UNICEF highlighted the short- and longer-term threats facing children in the context of armed conflict and called for zero tolerance of all violations against children. She stressed the importance of fully reintegrating children into their communities through quality education, training and psychosocial support and upholding their rights as a fundamental part of any peace process. The civil society representative described her experience as a child soldier recruited by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) and spoke to Council members on behalf of the Group of Young Consultants on Childhood, Adolescence and Armed Conflict. In her remarks, she made a series of recommendations on how to address the root causes that compelled children to join armed groups, on ensuring that children were consulted in the process of reintegration, on tackling the specific issues affecting girls in the reintegration process and on acknowledging children as victims who were entitled to reparations.

During their deliberations, Council members and other speakers expressed concern over the increased number of violations against children in 2017 and underlined the responsibility of the international community to respond to those developments. They also acknowledged the positive developments, including the release of over 10,000 children by armed forces and groups and the signing of new national action plans. Many speakers noted that the primary responsibility for the protection of children lay with Member States and called upon those that had not done so to commit to the relevant international instruments. They also stressed the importance of ending impunity and ensuring accountability. Speakers emphasized the need for peace operations to prioritize and have the resources necessary to monitor child protection issues, including through support for child protection advisers, and called for the provision of timely, objective and accurate information to the Council on violations and abuses against children, including through the monitoring and reporting mechanism on grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict.

At the outset of the high-level open debate, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2427 (2018). In the resolution, the Council called upon States and the United Nations to mainstream child protection into all relevant activities in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations with the aim of sustaining peace and preventing conflict.

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459 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
460 S/PV.8305.
463 S/PV.8305, pp. 2–4.
464 Ibid., pp. 4–6.
465 Ibid., pp. 6–8.
466 Resolution 2427 (2018), para. 3.
The Council expressed its commitment to consider and use the tools of the United Nations system to ensure that early warning of potential conflicts translated into early, concrete preventive action, including towards the goal of protecting children, while acknowledging that serious abuses and violations against children could be an early indication of a descent into conflict or an escalation of conflict.\(^{467}\) The Council called upon Member States and United Nations entities, including the Peacebuilding Commission, to ensure that the views of children were taken into account in programming activities throughout the conflict cycle.\(^{468}\) The Council expressed deep concern at the military use of schools in contravention of applicable international law, and urged all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian character of schools, encouraged Member States to take concrete measures to deter the use of schools by armed forces and non-State armed groups, urged Member States to ensure that attacks on schools were investigated and that those responsible were prosecuted, and called on the United Nations country-level task forces to enhance the monitoring and reporting on the military use of schools.\(^{469}\) The Council also urged concerned Member States to mainstream child protection and ensure that the specific needs of girls and boys were fully taken into account at all stages of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, including through the development of a gender- and age-sensitive process.\(^{470}\) The Council further encouraged Member States to focus on long-term and sustainable reintegration opportunities for children, including access to health care, psychosocial support and education programmes, as well as raising awareness within communities.\(^{471}\) In addition, the Council reiterated its request to the Secretary-General to ensure that, in all of his reports on country-specific situations, the matter of children and armed conflict was included as a specific aspect of the report.\(^{472}\)

In 2018, the Council addressed the children and armed conflict agenda in a number of its country- and region-specific decisions, as well as in decisions relating to thematic items; selected provisions of those decisions are listed in table 2. The Council, inter alia: (a) condemned and demanded the cessation of and accountability for violations and abuses against children, and demanded compliance with international instruments; (b) urged the implementation of action plans and programmes on children and armed conflict; (c) underscored the importance of taking into account child protection concerns in the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration processes and security sector reform; (d) requested monitoring, analysis and reporting on child protection concerns; (e) called for the introduction of protection of children as a cross-cutting issue in the United Nations system; and (f) imposed or called for the imposition of measures against perpetrators of violations and abuses against children.

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467 Ibid., paras. 7–8.
468 Ibid., para. 23.
469 Ibid., para. 16.
470 Ibid., para. 24.
471 Ibid., para. 26.
472 Ibid., para. 38.

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**Table 1**

**Meetings: children and armed conflict**

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<td>S/PV.8305 9 July 2018</td>
<td>Protecting children today prevents conflicts tomorrow</td>
<td>Draft resolution submitted by 98 Member States(^a) (S/2018/667)</td>
<td>110 Member States(^b)</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Executive Director of the United Nations Children’s Fund, civil society representative, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the</td>
<td>All Council members, 73 invitees under rule 37, all other invitees(^e)</td>
<td>Resolution 2427 (2018) 15-0-0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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\(^a\) S/2018/465

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\(^b\) S/2018/465

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\(^e\) S/2018/465

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### Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2018

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<th>Meeting record and date</th>
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a Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zimbabwe.

b Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Tanzania (United Republic of), Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

c Sweden (President of the Security Council) was represented by its Prime Minister; and the Netherlands was represented by the Prime Minister of Aruba.

d Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Yemen. Ireland was represented by its Minister for Children and Youth Affairs; Luxembourg was represented by its Minister for Foreign and European Affairs; and Ukraine was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. The representative of Argentina spoke on behalf of the signatories of the Safe Schools Declaration; the representative of Canada spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict; the representative of Estonia spoke also on behalf of Latvia and Lithuania; the representative of Norway spoke on behalf of the five Nordic countries; and the representative of Viet Nam spoke on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

e The Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine.
Table 2
Provisions relevant to children and armed conflict, by theme and agenda item

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<td><strong>Action plans and programmes on children and armed conflict</strong></td>
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### Introduction of child protection as a cross-cutting issue in the United Nations system, including through the deployment of child protection advisers in United Nations peace operations

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<td>Agenda item</td>
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29. **Protection of civilians in armed conflict**

During 2018, the Security Council held three meetings to consider the protection of civilians in armed conflict, including one high-level meeting, which took the form of an open debate.\(^{473}\) The Council adopted one resolution and one presidential statement under this item. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in table 1.

Further to a concept note circulated by Poland,\(^{474}\) the Council held a ministerial-level open debate on 22 May 2018, with the purpose of advancing the protection of civilians at all levels and encouraging efforts to enhance respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law, as well as to develop and implement policies and strategies to avoid civilian harm in the conduct of hostilities, including in the context of the “global effort” called for by the Secretary-General in his report of May 2017.\(^{475}\) At the meeting, the Council heard briefings from the Secretary-General, the Director General of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Secretary-General of the Iraqi Al-Amal Association. The Secretary-General gave a briefing to the Council first, and stated that the most effective way

\(^{473}\) For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.


\(^{475}\) S/2017/414.
to protect civilians was to prevent and end conflicts. Further to his report, the Secretary-General described the situation of civilians in conflict zones and recalled his recommendations to improve the protection of civilians through national policy frameworks, engagement with non-State armed groups and ensuring accountability for serious violations. The Director General of the International Committee of the Red Cross highlighted four issues of concern, namely, the use of heavy explosive weapons in populated areas, the protection of health care, the deprivation of liberty and the people who go missing in armed conflict. He cautioned that any normalization of violations could have a terrible impact and underlined that a more positive focus on international humanitarian law could improve compliance. The Secretary-General of the Iraqi Al-Amal Association spoke about the situation of civilians in Iraq and urged the Council to ensure that civilians were protected in line with legal obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Following the briefings, Member States discussed the means to strengthen accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, providing practical examples of national initiatives implemented in that regard. Speakers also focused on the need to enhance the protection of medical personnel and facilities pursuant to resolution 2286 (2016), as well as on the implementation of protection mandates by United Nations peacekeeping operations. Following the meeting, on 29 June 2018, Poland circulated a summary of the open debate.

On 24 May 2018, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2417 (2018), which focused on the connection between armed conflict and conflict-induced food insecurity and the threat of famine. In the resolution, the Council strongly condemned the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, as well as the unlawful denial of humanitarian access. In that connection, the Council recalled that it had adopted and could consider adopting sanctions measures that could be applied to individuals or entities obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Council strongly urged States to conduct, in an independent manner, full, prompt, impartial and effective investigations within their jurisdiction into violations of international humanitarian law related to the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and, where appropriate, to take action against those responsible.

In the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide information on the humanitarian situation and response, including on the risk of famine and food insecurity in countries with armed conflict, as part of his reporting on country-specific situations, as well as to report swiftly to the Council when the risk of conflict-induced famine and widespread food insecurity in armed conflict contexts occurred. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to brief it on the implementation of the resolution within his annual briefing on the protection of civilians.

On 21 September 2018, the Council adopted a presidential statement in which it recognized the contribution of the updated aide-memoire for the consideration of issues pertaining to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, including its enhanced focus on the protection of medical facilities and personnel and on the use of starvation as a method of warfare. The Council also recognized the contribution of the aide-memoire as a practical tool that provided a basis for improved analysis and diagnosis of key protection issues. In accordance with past practice, the aide-memoire was contained in the annex to the presidential statement.

Throughout 2018, the Council continued the practice of hearing briefings by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs concerning the protection of civilians in armed conflict under country and region-specific items. The Council also included protection-related provisions in most of its

**References**


477 S/PV.8264, pp. 2–4.

478 Ibid., pp. 4–6.

479 Ibid., pp. 6–7.


481 Resolution 2417 (2018), paras. 5–6.

482 Ibid., para. 9.

483 Ibid., para. 10.

484 Ibid., paras. 11–13.

485 S/PRST/2018/18, seventh paragraph. The initial aide-memoire was adopted on 15 March 2002 (S/PRST/2002/6, annex).


487 During 2012 and 2013, the Council heard briefings by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 4 times at public meetings and 25 times in consultations; during 2014 and 2015, the Council heard briefings by the Office 32 times at public meetings and 42 times in consultations; and during 2016 and 2017, the Council heard briefings by the Office 44 times at public meetings and 56 times in consultations. In 2018 alone, the Council heard briefings by the Office 27 times in public meetings and 16 times in consultations in a total of 43 briefings during the year.
 resolutions and presidential statements in relation to both country- or region-specific and thematic items.488

The Council focused on multiple aspects and used a variety of language formulas to address the protection of civilians in its decisions; selected provisions of those decisions are listed in table 2. In particular, the Council: (a) condemned all forms of attacks against civilians, especially against women and children and including attacks against schools, hospitals and medical facilities; (b) called upon all parties to conflict to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law and called for accountability measures against perpetrators of such crimes; (c) demanded that all parties to armed conflict ensure unhindered access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, particularly in the context of conflict-induced famine, and ensure the safety of humanitarian and medical personnel as well as United Nations personnel; (d) emphasized the primary responsibility of States to comply with their relevant obligations to protect civilians; (e) requested additional monitoring mechanisms as well as reporting arrangements in order to improve the protection of civilians in armed conflict; and (f) adopted or expressed its intention to adopt targeted measures, such as sanctions, against perpetrators. In addition, the Council practice of strengthening the mandates of United Nations peace operations with a view to protecting civilians continued to evolve. During the reporting period, the Council requested several missions to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the protection of civilians, including by strengthening local community engagement and empowerment, early warning systems and information-sharing mechanisms.489

488 For information on other cross-cutting issues before the Council, see part I, sect. 28, “Children and armed conflict”, and sect. 30, “Women and peace and security”.

489 For additional information on mandates and decisions relevant to peacekeeping and political missions, see part X.

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30. Women and peace and security

In 2018, the Security Council held two meetings, including one high-level meeting, under the item entitled “Women and peace and security”. Both meetings took the form of open debates. During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any decisions. More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in table 1.

Further to the concept note circulated by Peru, the Council held an open debate on 16 April 2018 under the sub-item “Preventing sexual violence in conflict through empowerment, gender equality and access to justice”. At the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Deputy Secretary-General, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and a Senior Researcher from Kalandan Press. The Deputy Secretary-General noted that during 2018 in Myanmar, and in many other conflict situations, sexual violence had once again been used as a tactic to advance military, economic and ideological objectives, and it had again been a driver of massive forced displacement. She affirmed the common responsibility to bring justice, recognition and reparations to the survivors of sexual violence – not only justice in the courtroom but also social justice and economic empowerment. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict noted that the annual open debate on sexual violence in conflict provided a critical opportunity for taking stock of progress or regression on the issue. She stressed that, while significant normative and operational progress had been achieved, sexual violence continued to be employed as a tactic of war and terrorism and as a tool of political repression. She proposed three recommendations: first, she called on the international community to give serious consideration to the establishment of a reparations fund for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence; second, she encouraged a more operational response to stigma alleviation and, in cases where survivors faced ongoing risks, she encouraged States to adopt special quota projects to help relocate women and children to third countries; third, she recommended marshalling sustained political resolve and resources equal to the scale of the challenge, noting that the gender-based violence response in humanitarian settings remained chronically underfunded. Speaking also on behalf of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, the Senior Researcher from Kalandan Press stated that the international community, particularly the Security Council, had failed the Rohingya people and that the recent crisis could have been prevented if warning signs had not been ignored. She reported on her research and on evidence of rape by Government troops and noted that similar situations existed around the world. She affirmed that the rule of law must drive the response to the Rohingya crisis and called for the Security Council to refer the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court. During the meeting, several speakers noted the importance of imposing targeted sanctions against perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence and supported the Secretary-General’s recommendation to introduce sexual violence as a designation criterion for sanctions.

On 25 October 2018, further to a concept note circulated by the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the

\[^{490} \text{For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.}]
\[^{491} \text{S/2018/311, annex.}]
\[^{492} \text{S/PV.8234.}]
\[^{493} \text{Ibid., pp. 2–3.}]
\[^{494} \text{Ibid., pp. 3–6.}]
\[^{495} \text{Ibid., pp. 6–7.}]
\[^{496} \text{Ibid., p. 39 (Mexico), p. 42 (Italy), p. 62 (Sudan), p. 65 (Bangladesh), p. 66 (Ireland) and p. 79 (Argentina).}]
\[^{498} \text{S/2018/904, annex.}]

Council held a high-level open debate under the sub-item “Promoting the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda and sustaining peace through women’s political and economic empowerment”. At the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Secretary-General, the Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and the General Director of the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling. The Secretary-General noted that, despite progress in some areas, the participation of women in formal peace processes remained extremely limited. He emphasized that the meaningful participation of women was directly linked to more sustainable peace and underscored that a “gendered approach” to peace and security meant supporting peacebuilding at the local level, even during conflict. As peace processes faltered at the national and international levels, he stressed the importance of supporting local women’s groups that negotiated humanitarian access and supported community resilience. He urged the Security Council to invest in gender equality and women’s empowerment, not only as ends in themselves, but as critical means of achieving the overarching aim of preventing and ending conflict and building peace and prosperity. The Executive Director of UN-Women noted the clear gender inequality in women’s access to resources, which she indicated was a reflection of the non-prioritization of women’s needs and the relegation of women to small-scale and local peripheral initiatives. She shared three priorities for 2020, namely: to stop supporting, brokering and paying for peace negotiations that excluded women; to ensure that the 15 per cent minimum target for projects advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment was met by all relevant entities and peace and security funds; and to protect women activists, peacebuilders and human rights defenders. The General Director of the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling gave a briefing to the Council on the situation of Palestinian women and called on the Security Council to act to ensure women’s meaningful participation in conflict prevention, democratic transition, reconciliation efforts and humanitarian work. During the discussion that ensued, a number of speakers noted the insufficient participation of women as delegates, mediators and negotiators in peace processes and referred to the need for gender-sensitive conflict analysis.

During the period under review, the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security continued to be convened in accordance with resolution 2242 (2015).

In 2018, the Council referred to issues relating to women and peace and security under numerous items on its agenda and addressed in its decisions a wide variety of measures in connection with the women and peace and security agenda; selected provisions of those decisions are listed in table 2. In particular, the Council: (a) stressed the importance of women’s full and meaningful the participation of women in conflict prevention and resolution and in public affairs and governance; (b) called for measures to combat sexual violence, including through monitoring, analysing and reporting on conflict-related sexual violence, as well as for the prosecution of perpetrators of sexual violence; (c) called for gender mainstreaming to be taken into account as a cross-cutting issue; and (d) called for the meaningful participation of women in peacekeeping operations.


499 S/PV.8382.
500 Ibid., pp. 3–4.
501 Ibid., pp. 6–8.
502 Ibid., pp. 8–10.
### Table 1
Meetings: women and peace and security

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<td>47 Member States†</td>
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<td>Deputy Secretary-General, all Council members, ‡ all invitees ‡</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence (S/2018/250)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Letter dated 2 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/311)</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8382 25 October 2018</td>
<td>Promoting the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda and sustaining peace through women’s political and economic empowerment</td>
<td>70 Member States§</td>
<td>Six invitees under rule 39, ‡ Permanent Observer of the observer State of the Holy See</td>
<td>Secretary-General, all Council members, ‡ all invitees ‡</td>
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Meeting record and date

Sub-item

Other documents

Rule 37 invitations

Rule 39 and other invitations

Speakers

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Letter dated 9 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/904)

Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czechia, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Maldives, Mali, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Portugal, Qatar, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine and United Arab Emirates.


Sweden was represented by its Minister for Culture and Democracy.

Canada was represented by its Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security; Norway spoke on behalf of the five Nordic countries; and Mali spoke on behalf of the Human Security Network.

Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechia, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.


Sweden was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; the Netherlands was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Côte d’Ivoire spoke also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia.

Germany was represented by its Minister of State in the Federal Foreign Office; Slovenia was represented by its State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Ukraine was represented by the First Deputy Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine.

Table 2
Provisions relevant to women and peace and security, by theme and agenda item

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| The situation in Mali                                                      | Resolution 2423 (2018) | 38 (d) (iii) |
| Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan              | Resolution 2406 (2018) | 7 (a) (i), 7 (a) (vi) |
|                                                                             | Resolution 2416 (2018) | 28        |
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**Thematic**

| United Nations peacekeeping operations                                     | Resolution 2436 (2018) | 7         |

**Role of women in countering terrorism and violent extremism**

| Country- and region-specific | The situation in Afghanistan | Resolution 2405 (2018) | 30        |
| Peace consolidation in West Africa                                      | S/PRST/2018/16          | Twelfth    |

| Thematic | Maintenance of international peace and security | S/PRST/2018/2 | Tenth |
| ThREATS to international peace and security                             | S/PRST/2018/9           | Seventh   |

**Participation of women in peacekeeping operations**

| Country- and region-specific | The situation in Cyprus | Resolution 2430 (2018) | 12        |
| The situation in the Central African Republic                           | Resolution 2448 (2018) | 57        |
| The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo           | Resolution 2409 (2018) | 51        |
| The situation in Mali                                                   | Resolution 2423 (2018) | 58        |
| The situation in the Middle East                                        | Resolution 2426 (2018) | 10        |
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| Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan           | Resolution 2416 (2018) | 27        |
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| The situation in Somalia                                                | Resolution 2431 (2018) | 22        |
| The situation concerning Western Sahara                                  | Resolution 2414 (2018) | 15        |
|                                                                             | Resolution 2440 (2018) | 12        |

**Thematic**

| United Nations peacekeeping operations                                     | S/PRST/2018/10        | Seventeenth |
|                                                                             | Resolution 2436 (2018) | 19          |
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Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

Agenda item | Decision | Paragraph
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Participation of women in the security sector and in security sector reform
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The situation in the Central African Republic | Resolution 2448 (2018) | 40 (b) (iv)
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo | Resolution 2409 (2018) | 37 (ii) (b)
Peace consolidation in West Africa | S/PRST/2018/3 | Twelfth

31. Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

During the period under review, the Security Council held four meetings under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts” and issued one presidential statement. Three of the meetings took the form of briefings and one was convened for the adoption of a decision. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

The Council’s deliberations during 2018 continued to focus on topics addressed in previous years, such as the sanctions measures against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh) and Al-Qaida, the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and the countering of the threat of terrorism through the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and international cooperation. The discussions also focused on the response to extremist propaganda and the underlying conditions causing young men and women to be lured into violent extremism, the implementation of resolution 2341 (2017), on the protection of critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks, and the establishment of an investigative mechanism to document crimes committed by ISIL (Da’esh) in Iraq.

The Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism gave briefings to the Council twice, on 8 February and 23 August 2018. During his first briefing, he noted that the fight against ISIL (Da’esh) was entering a new phase and that the report of the Secretary-General showed that the group and its affiliates continued to pose a significant and evolving threat around the world. As explained in the report, ISIL (Da’esh) was no longer focused on conquering and holding territory; instead, it had been forced to adapt and focus primarily on smaller and more motivated groups of individuals who remained committed to inspiring, enabling and carrying out attacks. In addition, returning foreign terrorist fighters, and those who had relocated to other regions, continued to present a considerable threat to international security. While the structure of the global propaganda machinery of ISIL (Da’esh) continued to deteriorate, members and sympathizers of the group were still able to use social media and encrypted technology and communications tools to communicate and coordinate and facilitate attacks. He noted that the ability of ISIL (Da’esh) to generate revenue had been considerably weakened, largely owing to its loss of control of oil and gas fields in the Syrian Arab Republic; its revenues had fallen by more than 90 per cent since 2015.

In his second briefing, the Under-Secretary-General reiterated that ISIL (Da’esh) remained a serious and significant concern and that its evolution from a proto-State structure into a covert network brought new challenges. The Under-Secretary-General highlighted how the United Nations system was strengthening the coordination, coherence and effectiveness of its counter-terrorism efforts in support of Member States. He also reported on his visit to Afghanistan on 14 and 15 August 2018, during which he had held high-level consultations with the President, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other Cabinet members and senior officials of the Government of Afghanistan.

For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. 1.


506 S/PV.8178, p. 2.


508 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. 1.
Afghanistan responsible for countering terrorism.\textsuperscript{509} Also at the meeting on 23 August 2018, the Council heard briefings from the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and from a Senior Research Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence.

In her briefing, the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate highlighted three key challenges associated with the issue of returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters, namely: the difficulties in conducting comprehensive risk assessments and prosecutions of foreign terrorist fighter returnees, as requested in resolution 2396 (2017); the new demands posed by the imprisonment of returned foreign terrorist fighters, including the potential for in-prison radicalization; and the risks posed by the release of imprisoned foreign terrorist fighters and their potential to re-engage in terrorist activities.\textsuperscript{510} The representative of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence presented research on the strategic, tactical and operational engagement of women and minors by ISIL (Da’esh), an issue which she stressed required immediate and urgent attention.\textsuperscript{511}

The Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism briefed the Council once, on 13 February 2018, to provide an update on the implementation of resolution 2341 (2017), relating to the protection of critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{512} The Chair encouraged Member States to develop national strategies for reducing risks and to incorporate those strategies into their national counter-terrorism plans. He stressed the importance of Governments and the private sector sharing information on threats, vulnerability and measures to mitigate risks. He also stressed the importance of including other relevant Council resolutions, such as resolution 2309 (2016), on civil aviation, and resolution 2322 (2016), on international judicial cooperation, in work to protect critical infrastructure.\textsuperscript{513}

On 21 December 2018, the Council issued a presidential statement noting that it had reviewed the implementation of the sanctions measures concerning ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida, as described in paragraph 1 of resolution 2368 (2017), in accordance with paragraph 104 of resolution 2368 (2017), and that no further adjustments to the measures were necessary at that time.\textsuperscript{514} Also in the presidential statement, the Council noted that it would continue to evaluate the implementation of such measures and make adjustments, as necessary.\textsuperscript{515}

At the meeting held on 21 December 2018, the representative of Sweden, speaking also on behalf of France, Kuwait, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, welcomed the adoption of the presidential statement. He reiterated their strong support for the mandate of the Ombudsperson to the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and welcomed the continued discussions on how to ensure respect for due process standards across sanctions regimes.\textsuperscript{516} He also encouraged the Council to consider, during further evaluation of the implementation of the measures, the proposals put forward by the Group of Like-Minded States on Targeted Sanctions in its letter dated 7 December 2018 to the President of the Council.\textsuperscript{517}

\textsuperscript{509} S/PV.8330, pp. 2–4.
\textsuperscript{510} Ibid., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{511} Ibid., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{512} S/PV.8180, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{513} Ibid., pp. 2–3.
\textsuperscript{514} S/PRST/2018/21.
\textsuperscript{515} For more information, see part VII, sect. III, “Measures not involving the use of armed force in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter”.
\textsuperscript{516} S/PV.8437, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{517} S/2018/1094. For more information on the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as well as the Ombudsperson, see part IX, sect. I.B “Committees established under Chapter VII of the Charter”.
Meetings: threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8178 8 February 2018</td>
<td>Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat (S/2018/80)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td>All Council members, Under-Secretary-General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8180 13 February 2018</td>
<td>Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat (S/2018/770)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, Executive Directorate, Senior Research Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8437 21 December 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>One Council member (Sweden)</td>
<td>S/PRST/2018/21</td>
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</table>

a The representative of Peru spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism.
b The United Kingdom was represented by its Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

### 32. Briefings

During the period under review, the Security Council held four meetings, in the form of briefings, that were not explicitly connected to any specific item before it. More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in the tables below.

In 2018, two of the meetings were held under the item “Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council”. On 3 October 2018, the Council held a joint briefing of the three committees related to counter-terrorism, namely, the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). The briefing covered the work of the three committees, including their ongoing cooperation and that of their groups of experts in detecting and countering the spread of terrorism, in particular the evolving threat to international peace and security posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), Al-Qaida and affiliates, stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters.
addressing the threat posed by returning and relocating foreign fighters, countering terrorism financing and preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials by and to non-State actors and the use of such weapons for terrorist purposes.\textsuperscript{518} In addition, on 17 December 2018, the Council held the customary end-of-the-year briefing by the outgoing Chairs of the various subsidiary bodies.\textsuperscript{519}

Consistent with prior practice, the Council held one meeting under the item “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”.\textsuperscript{520} During the briefing, the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) gave a briefing to the Council on the situation in and around Ukraine, as well as on other priorities of OSCE for the year, including the protracted conflicts in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. Additionally, the Chairperson-in-Office briefed the Council on the role of OSCE in addressing security concerns in the Mediterranean and transnational threats such as terrorism, radicalization, trafficking in arms, drugs, cultural goods and hazardous waste, and the links between terrorism and organized crime, as well as trafficking in persons, migration, corruption and cybersecurity.

As in previous years, the Council heard a briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice at a closed meeting.\textsuperscript{521}

\textsuperscript{518} S/PV.8364.  
\textsuperscript{519} S/PV.8428.  
\textsuperscript{520} S/PV.8200.  
\textsuperscript{521} S/PV.8380.  

**Meetings: briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8364 3 October 2018</td>
<td>Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaeda and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities; Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism; Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004); all other Council members</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8428 17 December 2018</td>
<td>Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011)</td>
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Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

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and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011); Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa; Deputy Permanent Representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the United Nations on behalf of the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004); Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006); Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.

Before his briefing, the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) delivered a joint statement on behalf of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), in which he highlighted the continuing cooperation among the three committees and their expert groups.
Meetings: briefings by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

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<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8200 8 March 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy</td>
<td>All Council Members, Sweden was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.</td>
<td></td>
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Meetings: briefings by the President of the International Court of Justice

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<th>Meeting record and date</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8380 24 October 2018 (closed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>President of the International Court of Justice</td>
<td>Council members, President of the International Court of Justice</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

33. Security Council mission

During the period under review, the Security Council dispatched the following three missions to the field: (a) Afghanistan; (b) Bangladesh and Myanmar; and (c) the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The missions were composed of representatives of all members of the Council. Further to the missions, the Council held three meetings under the item entitled “Security Council mission”, at which it heard briefings by the representatives of the Council members leading or co-leading the missions. More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below. 522

During the missions, as reported during the briefings, Council members met with Government officials, 523 members of Parliament, 524 representatives of political parties including, in some cases, the political opposition, 525 and civil society organizations, 526 including women’s non-governmental organizations. 527

In Afghanistan and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Council members had meetings with the leadership of the United Nations field missions, namely, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 528 and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 529 In Afghanistan, Council members met also with the Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and representatives of electoral management bodies and the leadership of the Resolute Support Mission of the North Atlantic Treaty

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522 For more information on the composition and reports of the missions, see part VI, sect. II.A, “Security Council missions”.
523 S/PV.8158 (Afghanistan); S/PV.8255 (Bangladesh and Myanmar); and S/PV.8369 (Democratic Republic of the Congo).
524 S/PV.8158 (Afghanistan); S/PV.8255 (Bangladesh and Myanmar); and S/PV.8369 (Democratic Republic of the Congo).
525 S/PV.8369 (Democratic Republic of the Congo).
526 S/PV.8158 (Afghanistan); S/PV.8255 (Bangladesh and Myanmar); and S/PV.8369 (Democratic Republic of the Congo).
527 S/PV.8158 (Democratic Republic of the Congo).
Organization.\textsuperscript{530} In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Council members met with representatives of the Majorité présidentielle and the opposition, as well as with a group of women candidates and representatives of the Independent National Electoral Commission and the Episcopal Conference of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.\textsuperscript{531} In Bangladesh, Council members travelled to Cox’s Bazar, where they met with the United Nations country team and representatives of the Government and visited two refugee camps, including the Kutupalong refugee camp, the largest refugee camp in the world.\textsuperscript{532} In Myanmar, Council members met with State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces, and the members of the Committee for the Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State.\textsuperscript{533}

At the briefing on the mission to Bangladesh and Myanmar, held on 14 May 2018, in addition to the representatives of the Council members who led or co-led the mission, other members of the Council, as well as the representatives of Bangladesh and Myanmar, made statements.\textsuperscript{534}

\textsuperscript{530} S/PV.8158. See also letter dated 6 August 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/575).
\textsuperscript{531} S/PV.8369.
\textsuperscript{532} S/PV.8255.
\textsuperscript{533} Ibid.

### Meetings: Security Council mission

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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8255 14 May 2018</td>
<td>Briefing by Security Council mission to Bangladesh and Myanmar (28 April to 2 May 2018)</td>
<td>Letter dated 26 April 2018 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/391)</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Myanmar</td>
<td>Twelve Council members,\textsuperscript{a} all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Report not yet issued)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} China, Equatorial Guinea, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.
34. Items relating to non-proliferation

A. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

During the period under review, the Security Council held two meetings, including one high-level meeting, in relation to the item entitled “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”. Both meetings took the form of briefings. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

On 18 January 2018, the Council held a high-level meeting under the sub-item entitled “Confidence-building measures”, further to a concept note circulated by Kazakhstan. At that meeting, the Secretary-General noted that the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery were taking place in an environment of increasing military budgets and the over-accumulation of weapons, coupled with a serious growth in regional tensions. He added that, in such a geopolitical context, confidence-building measures that supported arms control, non-proliferation and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction were extremely important. In that context, he expressed his belief that the United Nations could play a central role in assisting Member States in developing, augmenting and supporting confidence-building measures. He added that such measures were not an end in themselves and that preventing, mitigating and resolving conflict required comprehensive political solutions, including verifiable disarmament and non-proliferation. He expressed his intention to explore opportunities to generate new direction and impetus for the global disarmament agenda. He further stressed that, going forward, the Security Council in particular could provide leadership by demonstrating unity and continuing to highlight the importance of dialogue and diplomacy as essential means for building confidence. Following the Secretary-General’s briefing, speakers focused, among other issues, on the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, including the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as the recently adopted Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

On 12 April 2018, the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) gave a briefing to the Council, focusing on the progress made by Member States in implementing the resolution, including the outcome of the 2016 comprehensive review, and in implementing resolution 2325 (2016), which had been subsequently adopted by the Council. He noted that a report on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) from all Member States remained one of the highest priorities for the Committee, together with the voluntary national action plans. He also provided an overview of the outreach activities undertaken by the Committee and of events that had been attended by members of the Committee and of the Group of Experts. Speakers stressed the need for States to fully implement resolution 1540 (2004) and subsequent relevant resolutions, including the recently adopted resolution 2325 (2016). Also on 12 April 2018, the Chair of the Committee transmitted to the President of the Security Council its seventeenth programme of work for the period from 1 February 2018 to 31 January 2019, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 2325 (2016). In 2018, the Council heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee under a separate item of the agenda entitled “Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council”.

535 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
537 S/PV.8160, pp. 3–4.
538 The Treaty was adopted on 7 July 2017 and was opened for signature by the Secretary-General on 20 September 2017 (A/CONF.229/2017/8).
539 S/PV.8230, pp. 2–4.
541 S/PV.8364 and S/PV.8428. For more details, see part I, sect. 32.
## Meetings: non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

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<th>Speakers</th>
<th>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8160 18 January 2018</td>
<td>Confidence-building measures</td>
<td>Letter dated 2 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary-General, all Council members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8230 12 April 2018</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>All Council members</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Kazakhsthan was represented by its President; in the course of the meeting, the President was replaced by its Minister of Foreign Affairs; Kuwait was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Poland was represented by its President; the Russian Federation was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; the United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for Asia and the Pacific; and the United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Member of the President's Cabinet.

*b* The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

### B. Non-proliferation

In 2018, the Security Council held two meetings under the item entitled “Non-proliferation” and did not adopt any decisions. All meetings took the form of briefings. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs briefed the Security Council twice in relation to the fifth and sixth reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).542

On 27 June 2018, the Under-Secretary-General stated that the International Atomic Energy Agency had reported to the Council that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to implement its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. She informed the Council that, on 8 May 2018, the United States had announced its withdrawal from the agreement. She underlined that the Secretary-General deeply regretted that setback and that he believed that issues not directly related to the Plan should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments. She also stated that the Secretary-General called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to consider carefully the concerns expressed by Member States about its activities allegedly contrary to the restrictive measures contained in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).543

On 12 December 2018, the Under-Secretary-General stated that the Secretary-General welcomed the reaffirmation by participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of their commitments to its full and effective implementation and that it was essential that the Plan continued to work for all participants, including by delivering tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people. She reported that the Secretary-General regretted the reimposition by the United States of the sanctions lifted pursuant to the Plan, after its withdrawal.544

At the same meeting, the Secretary of State of the United States stated that the Charter of the United Nations bestowed upon the Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and that his country would seek to work with all other members of the Council to reimpose the ballistic missile restrictions outlined in resolution 1929 (2010).545

Also at the same meeting, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action had been seriously...
challenged by the unilateral and unlawful conduct of the United States in withdrawing from the Plan and reimposing illegal sanctions, which was a clear violation of resolution 2231 (2015). The representative of the European Union also gave a briefing to the Council at both meetings on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

At the meetings on 27 June and 12 December 2018, the representative of the Netherlands gave a briefing to the Council as the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The representative of the European Union also gave a briefing to the Council at both meetings on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.  

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546 Ibid., p. 24.

547 Ibid., pp. 5–6; and S/PV.8297, pp. 6–7.

548 S/PV.8418, pp. 3–5; and S/PV.8297, pp. 4–6.

### Meetings: non-proliferation

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/1089)</td>
<td>Germany, Iran (Islamic Republic)</td>
<td>Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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</table>
C. Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

During the period under review, the Security Council held three meetings and adopted one resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter. Of the three meetings held, one was a high-level meeting and the other two took the form of briefings. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

On 21 March 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2407 (2018), by which it extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) until 24 April 2019. Also in that resolution, the Council decided that the mandate of the Panel would apply also with respect to the measures imposed in resolutions 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017) and expressed its intent to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding a further extension no later than 24 March 2019.\

On 17 September 2018, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs gave a briefing to the Council. She remarked that, while there had been positive developments related to the nuclear-weapon and ballistic-missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in recent months, there continued to be signs of the development and maintenance of both programmes. She expressed hope that the positive developments, together with the various summits held between the leaders of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea and between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States, would contribute to advancing sustainable peace and complete and verifiable denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. In addition, she gave a briefing on the United Nations Command, which had been established in accordance with resolution 84 (1950). She explained that, in resolution 84 (1950), the Council had recommended that all Member States providing military forces and other assistance to the Republic of Korea made such forces and other assistance available to a “unified command under the United States of America” and that it had requested the United States to designate the commander of such forces. She noted that the United Nations Command was not a United Nations operation or body, nor did it come under the command and control of the United Nations. During the ensuing discussion, some speakers noted that the United Nations Command was a legacy of the Cold War era. While some speakers questioned its current legitimacy and legality, others deemed it inappropriate to openly debate the legal status of the United Nations Command or its action on a specific issue that was not part of the agenda. Speakers welcomed the inter-Korean dialogue and, in particular, the upcoming inter-Korean summit, as well as the Singapore summit between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States. Most speakers underlined the importance of the full implementation of the sanctions measures in facilitating the diplomatic efforts and stressed that the

\[\text{Resolution 2407 (2018), para. 1. For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), see part IX, sect. I.B.}\]

\[\text{Resolution 2407 (2018), para. 1. For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), see part IX, sect. I.B.}\]

\[\text{S/PV.8353, pp. 2–3.}\
\[\text{Ibid. p. 9 (China), p. 12 (United Kingdom) and p. 20 (Russian Federation).}\
\[\text{Ibid., p. 9 (China) and p. 20 (Russian Federation).}\
\[\text{Ibid., p. 22 (Republic of Korea).}\

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unity of the Council remained critical. Referring to a midterm report of the Panel of Experts and the controversy over its content, the speakers reaffirmed the instrumental role of the Panel of Experts in monitoring and facilitating the effective implementation of the sanctions measures and stressed the need to uphold its independence and impartiality in fulfilling its role.


On 27 September 2018, the Council held a high-level meeting presided by the Secretary of State of the United States. At the meeting, speakers commended the continuing diplomatic efforts in denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, in particular the convening of the presidential summits. Speakers also dwelled on the continuing sanctions violations with differing views as to the need for modification of the existing sanctions measures. Nevertheless, many speakers reiterated the need for the Council to remain united in its approach towards the denuclearization of the peninsula.


Meetings: non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8353 17 September 2018</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan, Republic of Korea</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8363 27 September 2018</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan, Republic of Korea</td>
<td>All Council members, a All invitees b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Fourteen Council members were represented at the ministerial level: the United States was represented by its Secretary of State; Kuwait was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; China was represented by its State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs; the United Kingdom was represented by its Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; Equatorial Guinea was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; and Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, the Russian Federation and Sweden were represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

b Japan and the Republic of Korea were represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

35. Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

During the period under review, the Security Council held five meetings (including two high-level meetings), adopted one resolution and issued one presidential statement under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”. Two of the meetings took the form of briefings, two were convened for the adoption of a decision and one was a debate. As in previous years, in 2018, the presentation of the annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission in a formal meeting of the Council in June was followed by an informal interactive dialogue.

558 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In 2018, the Council heard briefings from a variety of speakers. The Secretary-General participated in the two high-level meetings. In his briefings, he emphasized that the Peacebuilding Commission provided a platform for complementarity and partnership across the pillars of the United Nations and underlined its convening and bridging role among diverse actors and stakeholders in bringing national and local voices to the table.\(^\text{559}\) He gave a briefing on his recommendations and options to bolster the work of the Organization on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, as laid out in his most recent report (S/2018/43), and underscored the need for more holistic and inclusive approaches, new and strengthened partnerships, and adequate and predictable resources for peacebuilding and development actors during the conflict cycle.\(^\text{560}\) In his briefings, the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union addressed the work of the African Union on post-conflict reconstruction and development and the plans to scale up the stabilization efforts on the continent.\(^\text{561}\) The Chairperson of the African Union Commission focused on the African Union framework document on post-conflict reconstruction and development, the African Solidarity Initiative and the partnership with the United Nations.\(^\text{562}\) The Council also heard a briefing by the current and former Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission on the role of the Commission in peacebuilding and sustaining peace and improving its role as an advisory body to the Council, as well as on the most recent session of the Commission regarding efforts to mobilize stakeholders and assist countries and regions in pursuing their peacebuilding priorities.\(^\text{563}\)

In 2018, the Council’s discussions focused on the need for an integrated approach to conflict prevention.\(^\text{564}\) Several speakers called for more coherence with regard to peacebuilding activities\(^\text{565}\) and warned against the temptation of applying one-size-fits-all approaches.\(^\text{566}\)

The decisions of the Council addressed some of the issues mentioned above. On 26 April 2018, in parallel to the high-level event at the General Assembly on peacebuilding and sustaining peace and the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 72/276, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2413 (2018).\(^\text{567}\) In the resolution, the Council welcomed the presentation of the Secretary-General’s report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace\(^\text{568}\) and took note of the decision by the General Assembly to invite the relevant bodies and organs of the United Nations to further advance, explore and consider the implementation of the recommendations and options contained in that report. Also in the resolution, the Council took note of the decision by the General Assembly to request the Secretary-General to present an interim report to it during its seventy-third session, further elaborating on his recommendations and options, and also took note of the decision of the Assembly to request the Secretary-General to submit to it, during its seventy-fourth session, a detailed report in connection with the next comprehensive review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture.

On 18 December 2018, the Council issued a presidential statement in which it recalled its resolutions 2413 (2018) and 2419 (2018) recognized that development, peace and security and human rights were interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that effective peacebuilding must involve the entire United Nations system.\(^\text{569}\) The Council also acknowledged the progress achieved by the Peacebuilding Commission and underscored that the Commission had an important role as a dedicated intergovernmental advisory body to bring coherence to international peacebuilding efforts.\(^\text{570}\) The Council noted the importance of the informal interactive dialogues between the Council and the Peacebuilding Commission as a useful venue for exercising the advisory role of the Commission, including the dialogues with the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in

\(^{559}\) S/PV.8243, p. 2; and S/PV.8413, p. 3.

\(^{560}\) S/PV.8243, p. 3; and S/PV.8413, pp. 2–3.

\(^{561}\) S/PV.8243, p. 6.

\(^{562}\) S/PV.8413, pp. 4–5.

\(^{563}\) S/PV.8243, pp. 4–5; and S/PV.8301, pp. 2–5.


\(^{565}\) S/PV.8243, pp. 7–8 (Peru), p. 12 (Netherlands), p. 19 (Poland), p. 22 (United States) and pp. 24–25 (Ethiopia); and S/PV.8413, p. 18 (Poland), p. 23 (Sweden), p. 24 (Kazakhstan), pp. 25–26 (Ethiopia) and p. 32 (Senegal).

\(^{566}\) S/PV.8243, p. 8 (Peru) and p. 23 (Russian Federation); and S/PV.8413, p. 9 (Equatorial Guinea) and p. 17 (Russian Federation).

\(^{567}\) The day before (25 April 2018), the Council had held a high-level briefing (S/PV.8243) at the same time as the high-level event convened by the President of the General Assembly in accordance with General Assembly resolution 70/262 and Security Council resolution 2282 (2016).


\(^{569}\) S/PRST/2018/20, first, seventh and eighth paragraphs.

\(^{570}\) Ibid., ninth paragraph.
Africa. In that regard, the Council encouraged the Peacebuilding Commission to present concise, targeted, context-specific and applicable recommendations to the Council, at its request, on issues related to peacebuilding and sustaining peace in countries considered by both bodies. The Council emphasized the need to further harness the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in advancing and supporting an integrated and coherent approach with respect to multidimensional peacekeeping mandates.

Furthermore, the Council acknowledged the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in advising the Council, at its request, during transitions related to the withdrawal of peacekeeping operations and special political missions. In addition, the Council welcomed the Peacebuilding Commission’s collaboration with regional and subregional organizations and emphasized that inclusivity was key to advancing national peacebuilding processes and objectives, including the full and effective participation of women and youth.

Meetings: peacebuilding and sustaining peace

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<th>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8243 25 April 2018</td>
<td>Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding and sustaining peace (S/2018/43)</td>
<td>Letter dated 9 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/325)</td>
<td>State Secretary for Regional Affairs and Multilateral Global Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania (Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission), Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union</td>
<td>Secretary-General, all Council members,a all invitees</td>
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571 Ibid., eleventh paragraph.  
572 Ibid., twelfth and thirteenth paragraphs.  
573 Ibid., fifteenth paragraph.  
574 Ibid., seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth paragraphs.
36. Threats to international peace and security

During the period under review, the Security Council held six meetings and issued one presidential statement in connection with the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security.” Five of the meetings took the form of briefings and one was convened for the adoption of a decision. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In 2018, under this item, the Council addressed issues related to the link between counter-terrorism and transnational organized crime and the mandate of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, established pursuant to resolution 2379 (2017), and the commencement of its work. Departing from previous practice, the Council also specifically considered conflict-specific and regional issues, namely the situation in the Middle East region, focusing on the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and the Palestinian question. With respect to the Syrian Arab Republic, discussions focused on the reports of a chemical weapons attack in Duma on 7 April 2018 and the bombing of Syrian military targets by the United States, France and the United Kingdom on 13 April 2018, as well as the work of the fact-finding mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab

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For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
Republic and how the Council should ensure accountability in that context. On the Palestinian question, Council members discussed the escalation of violence between Israel and Gaza in May 2018 and the overall humanitarian conditions in Gaza.

In connection with counter-terrorism, on 8 May 2018, the Council issued a presidential statement in which it recalled its concern about the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, strongly encouraged Member States and regional, subregional and international organizations to enhance cooperation and strategies to prevent terrorists from benefiting from transnational organized crime, to build the capacity to secure their borders against and investigate and prosecute such terrorists and transnational organized criminals working with them, and to continue conducting research to better understand the nature and scope of the links that might exist between terrorists and transnational organized criminals.576 Also in that statement, the Council called on Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting from the financial proceeds of transnational organized crime and gaining support from transnational organized criminal groups and to prevent the movement of terrorists by effective national border controls.577 The Council also encouraged the United Nations, as well as regional and subregional organizations, to continue their endeavours in assisting Member States in their capacity-building and in sharing effective practices to prevent and combat terrorism that might benefit from transnational organized crime.578

Regarding the work of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, on 4 December 2018, further to its first report submitted to the Council,579 the Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team gave a briefing to the Council on the formal commencement of the Investigative Team’s activities, on 20 August 2018, and its deployment to Iraq, on 29 October 2018.580 He stated that investigative activities were expected to commence in early 2019 and noted the Team’s priorities of, inter alia, standardizing its operating procedures and collecting and analysing evidence gathered by the Iraqi authorities to identify existing gaps. The Special Adviser emphasized the importance of the Investigative Team being established as an independent, objective and trusted source of evidentiary material capable of conducting its work to the highest possible standards in support of the Government of Iraq and other Member States.581

Under the new sub-item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the Council heard briefings on two occasions from the Secretary-General and once each from the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and the Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. At the meeting held on 9 April 2018, the Special Envoy gave a briefing to Council members regarding reports of a chemical weapons attack in Duma on 7 April 2018. He noted that a number of States had expressed suspicion that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic was responsible for the alleged chemical attack, while others had strongly questioned the credibility of those allegations. The Special Envoy further informed the Council that, hours after the attack, the Governments of the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic, on one side, and Jaysh Al-Islam, on the other, had reached an agreement encompassing a ceasefire. He urged the two Governments to ensure the protection of civilians and the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). He called on all sides to ensure respect for international humanitarian and human rights law and emphasized the need for the Council to prevent impunity and any further use of chemical weapons and not to allow an uncontrollable situation to develop in the Syrian Arab Republic.583 In his briefing, the Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs stated that the Council must unite in the face of the continuing threat of chemical weapons and fulfil its responsibilities, including regarding a dedicated mechanism for accountability.584

On 13 April, the Secretary-General stated that the situation in the Middle East was in chaos to such an extent that it had become a threat to international peace and security. In that regard, the Secretary-General stated that existing divisions in the region were reflected in a multiplicity of conflicts, several of which were clearly linked to the threat of global terrorism. He mentioned in particular the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the conflicts

576 S/PRST/2018/9, second and third paragraphs. For more information on the work of the Council related to counter-terrorism in 2018, see part I, sect. 31, “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”.
577 Ibid., tenth and eleventh paragraphs.
578 Ibid., twelfth paragraph.
581 S/PV.8412, pp. 2–5.
582 For more details, see part I, sect. 23, “The situation in the Middle East”. See also part III, sect. II.B, “Constitutional discussion relating to Article 2 (4)”.
583 S/PV.8225, pp. 2–4.
584 Ibid., p. 4.
in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Yemen. He stated that the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic represented the most serious threat to international peace and security and expressed his outrage regarding the continued reports of the use of chemical weapons in the country. In that regard, the Secretary-General referred to his letter to the Council dated 11 April 2018, including his appeal to the Council to fulfil its duties and not give up on efforts to agree upon a dedicated, impartial, objective and independent mechanism for attributing responsibility with regard to the use of chemical weapons.\textsuperscript{586}

In his briefing on 14 April, the Secretary-General informed Council members about reports of air strikes on three military locations in the Syrian Arab Republic conducted by the United States, France and the United Kingdom on 13 April. He reminded Member States that there was an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations and with international law in general. The Secretary-General added that there could be no military solution to the crisis.\textsuperscript{587} At that same meeting, the Council failed to adopt a draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation owing to the lack of the required number of votes. In the draft resolution, the Council would have condemned the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic by the United States and its allies in violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. In their statements after the vote, the representatives of Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru and Sweden, explaining their decision to either vote against or abstain in the vote on the draft resolution, noted that the text, in their view, did not provide the necessary elements to address the alleged use of chemical weapons.\textsuperscript{588} The representatives of Ethiopia and Kazakhstan called for a constructive approach without further aggravating tensions.\textsuperscript{589} The representative of France stated that the results of the vote demonstrated that Council members understood the circumstances of, reasons for and objectives of the military action taken.\textsuperscript{590} The representative of China expressed support for the draft resolution on the basis of its principled position against any unilateral military action in violation of the Charter and international law.\textsuperscript{591}

Regarding the Palestinian question, on 30 May 2018, the Council heard a briefing by the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General on the escalation of violence with the shelling of Israel from Gaza by the Hamas Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad between 28 and 30 May, Israeli retaliatory fire, and the humanitarian situation in Gaza. The Special Coordinator noted the key priorities in addressing the situation, namely preventing a war with potential regional implications, addressing the urgent humanitarian needs of the population, and supporting Egyptian efforts at reconciliation between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.\textsuperscript{592}

\textsuperscript{585} S/PV.8233, pp. 23–24 (Sweden), pp. 23–24 (Netherlands), p. 24 (Kuwait) and p. 25 (Peru).
\textsuperscript{586} Ibid., p. 23 (Ethiopia and Kazakhstan).
\textsuperscript{587} Ibid., p. 23.
\textsuperscript{588} Ibid., p. 24.
\textsuperscript{589} S/PV.8272, pp. 2–3. For more details, see part I, sect. 24, “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question.”

Meetings: threats to international peace and security

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<td>S/PV.8225 9 April 2018</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria,\textsuperscript{4} Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8231 13 April 2018</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>Secretary-General, all Council members, invitee</td>
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### Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2018

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<td>S/PV.8233 14 April 2018</td>
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<td>Draft resolution submitted by Russian Federation (S/2018/355)</td>
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<td>Secretary-General, all Council members, invitee</td>
<td>Draft resolution S/2018/355 not adopted 3-8-4&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>S/PV.8247 8 May 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8272 30 May 2018</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General,&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt; Permanent Observer of the observer State of Palestine to the United Nations</td>
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<td>All Council members, all invitees</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PV.8412 4 December 2018</td>
<td>Letter dated 15 November 2018 from the Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1031)</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant</td>
<td></td>
<td>All Council members and invitees</td>
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<sup>a</sup> The Special Envoy joined the meeting via videoconference from Geneva.

<sup>b</sup> For: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Russian Federation; against: Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States; abstaining: Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Peru.

<sup>c</sup> The Special Coordinator joined the meeting via videoconference from Jerusalem.
Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

37. Maintenance of international peace and security

During the period under review, the Security Council held 16 meetings (including 5 high-level meetings) under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”. The Council also adopted two resolutions, one of them under Chapter VII of the Charter, and issued two presidential statements. Of the 16 meetings held under the item during the reporting cycle, 6 were briefings to the Council, 4 were open debates, 3 were debates and 3 were held to adopt Council decisions. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

During 2018, the Council held meetings under a broad range of sub-items of both a thematic and a regional nature. The thematic sub-items were: (a) purposes and principles of the Charter in the maintenance of international peace and security; (b) youth and peace and security; (c) upholding international law within the context of the maintenance of international peace and security; (d) mine action; (e) understanding and addressing climate-related security risks; (f) mediation and settlement of disputes; (g) corruption and conflict; (h) non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (i) root causes of conflict: the role of natural resources; and (j) strengthening multilateralism and the role of the United Nations. The region-specific sub-items were: (a) building regional partnership in Afghanistan and Central Asia as a model to link security and development; (b) comprehensive review of the situation in the Middle East and North Africa; and (c) migrant smuggling and human trafficking in Libya (addressed under the sub-item entitled “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2380 (2017) (S/2018/807)”).

In 2018, while the Council held meetings on sub-items that had already been considered in the past under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, some of them addressed new themes, such as corruption and conflict, and strengthening multilateralism and the role of the United Nations.

In relation to corruption and conflict, Council members discussed the challenge posed by corruption to maintaining peace and security, noting the impact that corruption had on the socioeconomic development of a country, and stressed the need for good governance. At the meeting, several Council members objected to the consideration of the sub-item, noting that corruption in itself was not a threat to international peace and security, and that other organs were better suited to addressing it. In connection with strengthening multilateralism and the role of the United Nations, Member States reiterated their commitment to multilateralism, with the United Nations at its centre, and highlighted the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement and peacekeeping action as paragons of multilateralism.

In 2018, the decisions of the Council addressed some of the themes outlined above. In a presidential statement adopted on 18 January 2018, the Council recognized that development, peace and security, and human rights were interconnected and mutually reinforcing and underlined the importance of putting an emphasis on conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding and sustaining peace, sharing best practices and formulating forward-looking recommendations and strategies on them in the light of the increasingly transnational nature of the causes of conflict. The Council also commended the Secretary-General for his efforts to enhance the performance of the Secretariat’s peace and security pillar and encouraged him to continue his efforts to, inter alia, ensure better use of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy tools in cooperation with regional and subregional organizations. In that connection, the Council acknowledged the determined work to strengthen strategic cooperation and coordination among the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations that could play an important role in conflict prevention. The Council also reaffirmed the important role of women in peacebuilding and noted the substantial link between women’s full and meaningful involvement in efforts to prevent, resolve and rebuild from conflict and the

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593 S/PV.8162; S/PV.8185; S/PV.8262; S/PV.8307 and S/PV.8362.
594 The provisional agenda for the 8409th meeting was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes (see S/PV.8409). For more information on the adoption of the agenda, see part II, sect. II.A.
595 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
596 For more information on new sub-items, see part II, sect. II.A.
597 See S/PV.8346.
598 S/PV.8346, p. 15 (Russian Federation), pp. 16–17 (Plurinational State of Bolivia) and p. 21 (Ethiopia). For more information on the Council’s relations with other organs, see part IV.
599 See S/PV.8395.
600 S/PRST/2018/1, sixth and seventh paragraphs.
601 Ibid., fifteenth and sixteenth paragraphs.
602 Ibid., seventeenth paragraph.
effectiveness and long-term sustainability of those efforts.\textsuperscript{603}

Regarding regional partnerships created by Member States in Central Asia and Afghanistan, the Council adopted a presidential statement on 19 January 2018. In the statement, the Council encouraged making conflict prevention and resolution central to the work of the United Nations system in the region.\textsuperscript{604} The Council also recognized that there could not be a purely military solution to Afghanistan and underlined the importance of an inclusive, Afghan-led and -owned peace process for the long-term prosperity and stability of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{605} The Council underscored the importance of continued progress on electoral reform and towards holding credible and inclusive parliamentary and presidential elections and stressed the importance of preventive diplomacy, inter alia, through engaging constructively with Member States to ensure long-term stability, security and development.\textsuperscript{606} The Council expressed its support for the joint efforts of the countries in Central Asia towards the enhancement of a zone of peace, cooperation and prosperity.\textsuperscript{607} The Council also emphasized that, to support Afghanistan emerging sustainably from conflict, there was a need for a comprehensive and integrated approach that incorporated and strengthened coherence between all sectors.\textsuperscript{608}

Further to the meeting held on 23 April 2018 on youth and peace and security,\textsuperscript{609} on 6 June 2018, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2419 (2018), in which it reaffirmed its commitment to the full implementation of resolution 2250 (2015). In the resolution, the Council recognized the role that youth could play in conflict prevention and resolution and in efforts to peacebuilding and sustaining peace.\textsuperscript{610} Also in the resolution, the Council recommended that the Peacebuilding Commission include, in its discussions and advice, ways to engage youth meaningfully in national efforts to build and sustain peace and expressed its intention to invite civil society, including youth-led organizations, to brief the Council in country-specific considerations and relevant thematic areas.\textsuperscript{611} The Council also requested the Secretary-General to submit to it a report on the implementation of that resolution and on the implementation of resolution 2250 (2015), no later than May 2020.\textsuperscript{612}

Further to the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2380 (2017), on the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons in the Mediterranean sea off the coast of Libya,\textsuperscript{613} the Council adopted resolution 2437 (2018) under Chapter VII of the Charter, in which it renewed for 12 months the authorization set out in paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution 2240 (2015) and reiterated its resolutions 2312 (2016) and 2380 (2017) and its presidential statement of 16 December 2015 (S/PRST/2015/25).\textsuperscript{614} Also in its resolution 2437 (2018), the Council renewed the reporting requests set out in paragraphs 17 and 18 of resolution 2240 (2015).\textsuperscript{615}

In addition, on 26 November 2018, the Council held a procedural vote further to the request of the Russian Federation for an extraordinary meeting under the sub-item “Violation of the borders of the Russian Federation”. The provisional agenda for the meeting failed to obtain the required number of votes, with four members voting in favour, seven against and four abstaining. After the procedural vote, the representative of the Russian Federation made a statement.\textsuperscript{616}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{603} Ibid., nineteenth paragraph.
\bibitem{604} S/PRST/2018/2, second paragraph.
\bibitem{605} Ibid., third paragraph.
\bibitem{606} Ibid., second and fifth paragraphs.
\bibitem{607} Ibid., eighth paragraph.
\bibitem{608} Ibid., twentieth paragraph. For more information on the situation in Afghanistan, see part I, sect. 17.
\bibitem{609} See S/PV.8241.
\bibitem{610} Resolution 2419 (2018), paras. 3 and 10.
\bibitem{611} Ibid., paras. 15 and 18.
\bibitem{612} Ibid., para. 22.
\bibitem{613} S/2018/807.
\bibitem{614} Resolution 2437 (2018), para. 2.
\bibitem{615} Ibid., para. 3.
\bibitem{616} S/PV.8409, pp. 2–5. For more information on discussions concerning the agenda, see part II, sect. II.C.
\end{thebibliography}
### meetings: maintenance of international peace and security

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<td>Seven invitees</td>
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<td>Co-Chair of the International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change, Deputy Secretary-General</td>
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<td>S/PV.8395 9 November 2018</td>
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(S/2018/586)  
(S/2018/901)  
(S/2018/807)  
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(S/2018/981)
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<sup>a</sup> Afghanistan, Belgium, Germany, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

<sup>b</sup> Equatorial Guinea was represented by the Secretary of State of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; Kuwait was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; the United States was represented by its Deputy Secretary of State; Kazakhstan (President of the Security Council), Poland and the Russian Federation were represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs; the United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for Asia and the Pacific; and the Netherlands was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>c</sup> Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs; and Afghanistan was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>d</sup> Kuwait (President of the Security Council) was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Kazakhstan was represented by its First Deputy Foreign Minister; Côte d’Ivoire and Poland were represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs; and the United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President’s Cabinet.

<sup>e</sup> The Netherlands (President of the Security Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation.

<sup>f</sup> The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Executive Director of the World Food Programme participated in the meeting via videoconference from Dublin and from Biele, Switzerland, respectively.

<sup>g</sup> Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Norwegian, Pakistan, Panama, Portugal, Qatar, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Yemen.

<sup>h</sup> Envoy of the Secretary-General on Youth; lead author of the Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security; member of the Advisory Council of the World Young Women’s Christian Association; Executive Director of the organization URU, Central African Republic; State Secretary for Regional Affairs and Multilateral Global Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, in his capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission; Deputy Secretary General for Economic and Global Issues of the European External Action Service; High Representative for the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations; and Permanent Observer for the International Organization of la Francophonie to the United Nations.

<sup>i</sup> Poland was represented by its Foreign Minister.

<sup>j</sup> Belgium was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Croatia was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign and European Affairs; Norway was represented by its Secretary of State; Denmark was represented by its Secretary of State for Foreign Policy; Switzerland was represented by its State Secretary of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs; Finland was represented by its Under-Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Iceland, Maldives, Montenegro and Turkey were represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs; Bulgaria, Estonia and Ukraine were represented by their Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs; and Kenya was represented by its Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs.

<sup>k</sup> Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Maldives, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.

<sup>l</sup> Chef de Cabinet of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General; Senior Judge at and President Emeritus of the International Court of Justice; President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals; Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations; Permanent Observer of the observer State of the Holy See to the United Nations; and Permanent Observer of the observer State of Palestine to the United Nations.

<sup>m</sup> Poland (President of the Security Council) was represented by its President; Equatorial Guinea was represented by its Vice-President; Kazakhstan was represented by its Minister of Justice; the Netherlands was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; the United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for Africa and the Department of International Development; and the United States was represented by its Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President’s Cabinet.

<sup>n</sup> Estonia, Indonesia, Latvia and Lithuania were represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs; and Georgia was represented by its First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. The representative of Belgium spoke on behalf of the Group of Like-Minded States on Targeted Sanctions. The representative of Norway spoke on behalf of the five Nordic countries. The representative of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Although invited under rule 37, the representative of Maldives did not make a statement.
Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay.

Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay.

Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey and United Arab Emirates.

The Russian Federation was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Netherlands was represented by the Prime Minister of Curacao; Sweden (President of the Security Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Kazakhstan was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Nauru was represented by its President, who spoke on behalf of the 12 Pacific small island developing States; Iraq was represented by its Minister of Water Resources; the representative of Maldives spoke on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States; the representative of Trinidad and Tobago spoke on behalf of the Caribbean Community; and the representative of the Sudan spoke on behalf of the Arab Group.

Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Estonia, Fiji, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Maldives, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.

The United Kingdom (President of the Security Council) was represented by its Minister of State for the Commonwealth and the United Nations. Equatorial Guinea spoke also on behalf of Côte d’Ivoire and Ethiopia.

The representative of Norway spoke on behalf of the five Nordic countries; the representative of Turkey spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of Mediation; and the representative of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Eight Council members were represented at the Head of State or Government level: Bolivia (Plurinational State of) (President), Equatorial Guinea (President), France (President), Netherlands (Prime Minister), Peru (President), United Kingdom (Prime Minister) and United States (President of the Security Council) (President). Seven Council members were represented at the ministerial level: Côte d’Ivoire (Vice-President), Kuwait (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs), China (State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Ethiopia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Kazakhstan (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Russian Federation (Minister for Foreign Affairs) and Sweden (Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Belgium, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.

Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Libya, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.

Côte d’Ivoire spoke also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia.

Argentina, Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.

Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations, speaking on behalf of the President of the General Assembly; President of the Economic and Social Council; President of the International Court of Justice (via videoconference from The Hague); Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations; Permanent Observer and Head of Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the United Nations; and Permanent Observer of the observer State of the Holy See.

The representative of Norway spoke on behalf of the five Nordic countries; the representative of Singapore spoke on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; and the representative of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

For: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation; against: France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States; abstaining: Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Peru.
38. Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

During the period under review, the Security Council held three meetings in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”. Two of the meetings took the form of briefings and one was an open debate. The Council did not adopt any decisions. More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

On 18 July 2018, the Council held a meeting to consider the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union gave a briefing to the Council on the collaboration between the two organizations. She focused on three aspects of the report of the Secretary-General on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa, including on the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union. Firstly, with regard to the complex peace and security challenges facing Africa, she stated that the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union was a necessity, while recognizing also the critical role played by subregional organizations. Secondly, regarding the need for partnership and recognizing the imperative of even closer collaboration with the African Union, she noted that the increasing number of joint missions, joint briefings, joint reports and declarations and joint messages illustrated progress in that sense. Concerning conflict prevention, she called for more joint analyses and assessments and for the two organizations to align their early warning indicators. Thirdly, regarding the issues of predictable and sustainable financing for peace support operations of the African Union, she affirmed that it was essential that they be framed within the context of a common political strategy. The Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union highlighted the significant progress made in the partnership between the two organizations and the coherence in their decision-making. He focused on the commitment to enhance collaboration, cooperation and coordination and made reference to the agreement to enhance consultations prior to decision-making. He noted, however, that despite the progress achieved, challenges remained, particularly with regard to the relationship between the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council: more work was needed to achieve greater coherence and coordination when dealing with crisis situations. He also recalled the consistent advocacy of the African Union for predictable and sustainable financing through United Nations-assessed contributions for African Union-led peace operations and expressed his hope that the meeting would serve as impetus for the Council to move forward in that regard. Also at the meeting, speakers noted the strengthening of the collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union and expressed support for the Council’s consideration of increased funding for the peace operations of the African Union. In addition, some speakers made reference to the need to enhance cooperation in the area of conflict prevention and resolution.

On 5 September 2018, the Council held a meeting, for the first time under the item, in relation to the situation in Nicaragua. At the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Chief of Staff to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS) on the efforts that the General Secretariat of OAS had undertaken in Nicaragua and on the situation from the perspective of a regional organization. He reported on the consequences of the crisis, as well as on the actions taken by the various organs of OAS to address the crisis since 18 April 2018. He asserted that there could not be a genuine solution for Nicaragua without heeding the voice of its people through the holding of free, fair, democratic and transparent elections. In that regard, he reiterated the invitation of the General Secretariat to the Government of Nicaragua to resume and accelerate the work to ensure the completion of

617 For more information on the format of meetings, see Part II, sect. I.
619 S/PV.8314, pp. 2–4.
620 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
electoral reforms by January 2019. Also at the meeting, Council members expressed differing views about the holding of the meeting. While some argued that the internal crisis in the country posed no threat to international peace and security and called for respect for sovereignty and for refraining from interfering in domestic affairs, other Council members maintained that considering the situation in Nicaragua was consistent with the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Council members further recognized the key role played by regional organizations in that regard.

On 6 December 2018, the Council held an open debate on the role of States, regional arrangements and the United Nations in the prevention and resolution of conflicts further to the concept note circulated by Côte d’Ivoire. At the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Secretary-General, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the President of the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States. The Secretary-General stated that, for the United Nations, prevention was an end in itself and should never be seen as the instrument of any other political agenda. He noted that prevention saved lives and made economic sense. He also focused on collaboration by the United Nations with regional organizations and on the key role played by them in implementing a global multidimensional strategy to meet the challenges ahead.

Meetings: cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

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623 S/PV.8340, pp. 2–3.
624 For more information on discussions concerning the agenda, see part II, sect. II.C.
626 Ibid., pp. 8–9 (United Kingdom), p. 10 (France), p. 11 (Netherlands) and p. 19 (United States). For further details on the discussion, see part VIII, sect. I.B.
627 Ibid., p. 7 (Kuwait), p. 8 (United Kingdom), p. 9 (Peru), p. 11 (Netherlands), p. 13 (Poland) and p. 15 (Sweden).
629 See S/PV.8414.
630 Ibid., pp. 2–4.
### Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

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<td>Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)</td>
<td>Chief of Staff to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, civil society leader and former Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defence of Nicaragua</td>
<td>All Council members, all invitees (^b)</td>
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| S/PV.8414               | The role of States, regional arrangements and the United Nations in the prevention and resolution of conflicts | 42 invitees \(^c\) | Chairperson of the African Union Commission, President of the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States, Acting Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations | Secretary-General, all Council members, all invitees \(^d\) |
| 6 December 2018         | Letter dated 28 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/1064) | | | |

\(^a\) Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, United States and United Kingdom. Sweden (President of the Security Council) was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Equatorial Guinea spoke also on behalf of Côte d'Ivoire and Ethiopia.

\(^b\) Nicaragua was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

\(^c\) Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Mali, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Sudan, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.

\(^d\) Côte d'Ivoire was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

\(^e\) Ireland was represented by its Minister for Children and Youth Affairs. Norway spoke on behalf of the five Nordic countries; and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Acting Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine.
Part II

Provisional rules of procedure and related procedural developments
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Introductory note

Part II of the present Supplement covers the practice of the Security Council in relation to its provisional rules of procedure and relevant Articles of the Charter of the United Nations. Since the provisional rules of procedure are routinely applied by the Council at its formal meetings, the main focus of part II is on special applications of the rules in the proceedings of the Council, rather than on the standard applications of the rules.

Part II is divided into 10 sections, set out in the order of the relevant chapters of the provisional rules of procedure, as follows: section I, meetings and records (Article 28 of the Charter and rules 1–5 and 48–57); section II, agenda (rules 6–12); section III, representation and credentials (rules 13–17); section IV, presidency (rules 18–20); section V, Secretariat (rules 21–26); section VI, conduct of business (rules 27, 29–30 and 33); section VII, participation (Articles 31–32 of the Charter and rules 37 and 39); section VIII, decision-making and voting (Article 27 of the Charter and rules 31–32, 34–36, 38 and 40); section IX, languages (rules 41–47); and section X, provisional status of the rules of procedure (Article 30 of the Charter).

The remaining rules are covered in other parts of the present Supplement, as follows: rule 28, concerning subsidiary organs of the Council, in parts IX and X; and rule 61, concerning relations with other United Nations organs, in part IV.

During the period under review, there were no instances of the application of rules 58 to 60, concerning the admission of new Members, and therefore the present Supplement contains no material relating to those rules.

* * *

During the period under review, the Council held a total of 288 meetings. Most of the meetings were public, with a total of 275 public meetings and 13 private meetings held in 2018. The Council held a total of 120 informal consultations of the whole in 2018, and Council members continued to meet in the framework of informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings, following past practice. During the period under review, the Council continued to expand the practice of holding also “wrap-up sessions” at the end of the month. While one such session was conducted during a public meeting, held under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, all other “wrap-up sessions” were held as informal meetings.

In 2018, the Council was seized of 68 agenda items. The Council added the item entitled “Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218)” to the list of matters of which it was seized, and the item entitled “The situation in Sierra Leone” was removed from the list. While being seized of 68 items, the Council considered 49 items at its meetings in 2018. Of the 49 items considered by the Council in 2018, 28 concerned country-specific and regional situations and 21 dealt with thematic and other issues.

During the period under review, the Council adopted 54 resolutions and issued 21 statements by the President. The Council also issued 8 notes by the President and 34 letters from the President. Four draft resolutions were not adopted for lack of the required nine affirmative votes and three draft resolutions were not adopted because of the negative vote of a permanent member.

1 See S/PV.8173.
In 2018, objections to the adoption of the agenda and to the extension of invitations pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure led to procedural votes on four occasions. A discussion also took place with regard to the adoption of the programme of work in connection with objections raised by Council members to the holding of a proposed meeting in September 2018 (see case 6).

Aspects relating to the working methods of the Council continued to be raised and discussed in Council meetings, in particular in the context of an open debate under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” held on 6 February 2018, during which aspects of the procedure and practice of the Council were discussed (see cases 1, 7 and 10). Speakers exchanged views on aspects relating to the format of Council meetings and on the participation in Council meetings. The discussion was focused also on cooperation and communication between the Council and the Secretariat, as well as on issues pertaining to the decision-making process and initiatives to restrain the use of the veto, penholdership and the drafting of outcome documents of the Council.

2 See S/PV.8175. The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 24 January 2018 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2018/66), and a summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting in a communication from the representative of Kuwait (S/2018/399).
I. Meetings and records

Note

Section I covers the practice of the Council concerning meetings, publicity and the records of the Council, in relation to Article 28 of the Charter of the United Nations and rules 1 to 5 and 48 to 57 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council.

Article 28

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.

2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.

3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

Rule 1

Meetings of the Security Council shall, with the exception of the periodic meetings referred to in rule 4, be held at the call of the President at any time he deems necessary, but the interval between meetings shall not exceed fourteen days.

Rule 2

The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Security Council.

Rule 3

The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council if a dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35 or under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, or if the General Assembly makes recommendations or refers any question to the Security Council under Article 11 (2), or if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99.

Rule 4

Periodic meetings of the Security Council called for in Article 28 (2) of the Charter shall be held twice a year, at such times as the Security Council may decide.

Rule 5

Meetings of the Security Council shall normally be held at the seat of the United Nations.

Any member of the Security Council or the Secretary-General may propose that the Security Council should meet at another place. Should the Security Council accept any such proposal, it shall decide upon the place and the period during which the Council shall meet at such place.

Rule 48

Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public. Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting.

Rule 49

Subject to the provisions of rule 51, the verbatim record of each meeting of the Security Council shall be made available to the representatives on the Security Council and to the representatives of any other States which have participated in the meeting not later than 10 a.m. of the first working day following the meeting.

Rule 50

The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within two working days after the time indicated in rule 49, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in the verbatim record.

Rule 51

The Security Council may decide that for a private meeting the record shall be made in a single copy alone. This record shall be kept by the Secretary-General. The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within a period of ten days, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in this record.

Rule 52

Corrections that have been requested shall be considered approved unless the President is of the opinion that they are sufficiently important to be submitted to the representatives on the Security Council. In the latter case, the representatives on the Security Council shall submit within two working days any comments they may wish to make. In the absence of
objections in this period of time, the record shall be corrected as requested.

Rule 53

The verbatim record referred to in rule 49 or the record referred to in rule 51, in which no corrections have been requested in the period of time required by rules 50 and 51, respectively, or which has been corrected in accordance with the provisions of rule 52, shall be considered as approved. It shall be signed by the President and shall become the official record of the Security Council.

Rule 54

The official record of public meetings of the Security Council, as well as the documents annexed thereto, shall be published in the official languages as soon as possible.

Rule 55

At the close of each private meeting the Security Council shall issue a communiqué through the Secretary-General.

Rule 56

The representatives of the Members of the United Nations which have taken part in a private meeting shall at all times have the right to consult the record of that meeting in the office of the Secretary-General. The Security Council may at any time grant access to this record to authorized representatives of other Members of the United Nations.

Rule 57

The Secretary-General shall, once each year, submit to the Security Council a list of the records and documents which up to that time have been considered confidential. The Security Council shall decide which of these shall be made available to other Members of the United Nations, which shall be made public, and which shall continue to remain confidential.

This section comprises five subsections, namely: A. Meetings, concerning the convening of meetings pursuant to rules 1 to 5 as well as rule 48; B. Informal consultations of the whole; C. Other informal meetings of the members of the Security Council; D. Discussions concerning meetings; and E. Records, which are maintained pursuant to rules 49 to 57.

During the period under review, the Council held 288 meetings, of which 275 were public meetings and 13 were private meetings. In addition, in 2018, the Council held a total of 120 informal consultations of the whole.

In 2018, the Council also continued to hold “wrap-up sessions” at the end of the month. While one wrap-up session was conducted as a public meeting held under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, all other such sessions were held as informal gatherings.

During the period under review, Council members also continued to hold informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings. Figure I shows the total number of informal consultations of the whole and the total number of public and private meetings held during the period from 2009 to 2018.

In 2018, the question of the format of meetings was raised during an open debate concerning the working methods of the Council (see case 1).

3 See S/PV.8173.
A. Meetings

Application of rules relating to meetings

During the period under review, there were no intervals exceeding 14 days between meetings of the Council, as provided for under rule 1 of the provisional rules of procedure. The Council continued to convene more than one meeting a day, on certain occasions.

In 2018, the Council did not hold any periodic meetings pursuant to rule 4 or any meetings away from Headquarters in accordance with rule 5.

During the reporting period, nine Council members submitted to the President of the Council a letter dated 16 October 2018 in which they requested a meeting of the Council and explicitly cited rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure in support of their request. Further to that letter, the Council convened a meeting on 24 October 2018. In addition, at the 8409th meeting, held on 26 November 2018 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the proposed sub-item “Violation of the borders of the Russian Federation”, the representative of the Russian Federation made a statement explicitly referring to rule 2. Against the backdrop of heightened tensions in the Sea of Azov between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, objections to the provisional agenda for the meeting led to a procedural vote. The provisional agenda was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes.

In 2018, no requests were received explicitly citing rule 3 of the provisional rules of procedure. During the period under review, there were, however, several requests to convene meetings in which either rule 2 or 3, and/or Article 35, was cited implicitly. Table 1 lists the cases in which an urgent or emergency meeting of the Council was requested without explicit reference to rule 2 or 3 and/or Articles 34 or 35 of the Charter.

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4 Letter dated 16 October 2018 from the representatives of Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/926), requesting a meeting of the Council to hear a briefing by the Chair of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar.

5 See S/PV.8381.

6 S/PV.8409, p. 2. For more information on this item, see part I, sect. 37.

7 For more information on the adoption of the agenda, see sect. II.A.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter addressed to the Secretary-General or the President of the Council</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Meeting convened (record and date)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 17 May 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/472)</td>
<td>Transmission of a statement issued on 14 April 2018 by the President of the Russian Federation, announcing the convening of an emergency meeting of the Security Council to consider the missile attacks carried out on that date against the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>S/PV.8233 14 April 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 14 December 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Serbia addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1111)</td>
<td>Request for an urgent meeting to consider the decision of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Pristina to transform the Kosovo Security Force into armed forces</td>
<td>S/PV.8427 17 December 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Complaints raised by Member States concerning the application of rule 3**

During the period under review, in a letter dated 31 March 2018 to the President of the Security Council,8 the representative of Israel expressed disappointment and outrage at the events that had taken place in the Council the previous day. He emphasized that Kuwait, with full knowledge that the Permanent Mission of Israel and Jews everywhere had been observing the first night of Passover, had “hijacked” previously scheduled consultations, had forced an open meeting of the Council and had invited the delegation of the observer State of Palestine to present remarks that they had been advised to prepare well in advance. He underlined that Israel had not been given the same advance notice and had been barred from taking part in the deliberations owing to the observance of the religious holiday.9

In a letter dated 31 August 2018 to the President of the Security Council,10 the representative of Serbia expressed disappointment and regret that, notwithstanding established practice and owing to a unilateral decision, no meeting of the Security Council to discuss the situation in Kosovo and Metohija had been convened in the month of August during the presidency of the United Kingdom.11 He also expressed disappointment that discussions in respect of the meetings on Kosovo and Metohija had not continued, as indicated pursuant to the adoption of the programme of work for that month.

**Format**

**Public meetings**

The Council continued to convene meetings in public as provided for in rule 48 of the provisional rules of procedure, mainly for the purposes of (a) receiving briefings on country-specific or regional situations, or thematic issues, under its consideration; (b) holding debates on particular items; and (c) adopting decisions.12 In 2018, the Council held a total of 275 public meetings. By comparison, the Council had held 282 public meetings in 2017 and 237 in 2016.

During the review period, the Council held 15 high-level meetings at which two or more Council members were represented at the ministerial or higher levels, of which 13 were on thematic items, and 2 were on regional and country-specific items (see table 2). In 2018, the Council held four meetings at which more than half the Council members were represented at the ministerial or higher levels; those meetings were held in connection with the items entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, “United Nations peacekeeping operations” and “Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea”. On 26 September 2018, at the 8362nd meeting of the Council, held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, in connection with the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,13 eight Council members were represented at the level of

9 For more information on participation, see sect. VII.
11 For more information on the presidency, see sect. IV.
12 In the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 (S/2017/507, annex, para. 21), Council members expressed their intention to continue to include the following formats for public meetings: open debate, debate, briefing and adoption.
13 See S/PV.8362.
Head of State or Government,\textsuperscript{14} and seven were represented by high-level officials.\textsuperscript{15} This was the largest number of Council members represented at a high level at a Council meeting in 2018. It was also the highest number of Heads of State or Government representing Council members since the previous summit meeting, held on 24 September 2014 under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Equatorial Guinea, France, Peru, Poland and the United States were represented by their Presidents; the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were represented by their Prime Ministers.

\textsuperscript{15} Côte d’Ivoire was represented by its Vice-President; Kuwait was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; and China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Sweden were represented by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

\textsuperscript{16} See S/PV.7272.

Table 2
High-level meetings, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>High-level participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| S/PV.8160 18 January 2018 | Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction | Heads of State or Government (2)
Kazakhstan (President), Poland (President)
Ministerial level (4)
Kuwait (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Russian Federation (Minister for Foreign Affairs), United Kingdom (Minister of State for Asia and the Pacific), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President’s Cabinet) |
| S/PV.8162 19 January 2018 | Maintenance of international peace and security | Ministerial level (8)
Equatorial Guinea (Secretary of State of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Kazakhstan (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Kuwait (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Netherlands (Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs), Poland (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Russian Federation (Minister for Foreign Affairs), United Kingdom (Minister of State for Asia and the Pacific), United States (Deputy Secretary of State) |
| S/PV.8185 21 February 2018 | Maintenance of international peace and security | Ministerial level (5)
Côte d’Ivoire (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Kazakhstan (First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), Kuwait (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Poland (Minister for Foreign Affairs), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President’s Cabinet) |
| S/PV.8199 8 March 2018 | The situation in Afghanistan | Ministerial level (2)
Netherlands (Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation), Sweden (State Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs) |
| S/PV.8218 28 March 2018 | United Nations peacekeeping operations | Heads of State or Government (1)
Netherlands (Prime Minister) |
| | | Ministerial level (7)
Côte d’Ivoire (Minister of State and Minister for Defence), France (Minister of State attached to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), Kazakhstan (Deputy Minister for Defence), Poland (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Minister for Policy Coordination and Energy), United Kingdom (Minister of State for the Commonwealth and the United Nations), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President’s Cabinet) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>High-level participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8243 25 April 2018</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and sustaining peace</td>
<td>Ministerial level (4) Côte d’Ivoire (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Netherlands (Director General for Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Peru (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Minister for Foreign Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8262 17 May 2018</td>
<td>Maintenance of international peace and security</td>
<td>Heads of State or Government (1) Poland (President)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ministerial level (4) Equatorial Guinea (Vice-President), Kazakhstan (Minister of Justice), Netherlands (Minister for Foreign Affairs), United States (Permanent Representative to the United Nations and member of the President’s Cabinet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8264 22 May 2018</td>
<td>Protection of civilians in armed conflict</td>
<td>Ministry level (2) Kazakhstan (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), Poland (Minister for Foreign Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8270 29 May 2018</td>
<td>Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)</td>
<td>Ministry level (2) Netherlands (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Poland (Minister for Foreign Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8305 9 July 2018</td>
<td>Children and armed conflict</td>
<td>Heads of State or Government (2) Netherlands (Prime Minister of Aruba), Sweden (Prime Minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8307 11 July 2018</td>
<td>Maintenance of international peace and security</td>
<td>Heads of State or Government (1) Netherlands (Prime Minister of Curáçao)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ministerial level (2) Kazakhstan (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Minister for Foreign Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8362 26 September 2018</td>
<td>Maintenance of international peace and security</td>
<td>Heads of State or Government (8) Bolívia (Plurinational State of) (President), Equatorial Guinea (President), France (President), Netherlands (Prime Minister), Peru (President), Poland (President), United Kingdom (Prime Minister), United States (President)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ministerial level (7) Côte d’Ivoire (Vice-President), Kuwait (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs), China (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Ethiopia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Kazakhstan (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Russian Federation (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Minister for Foreign Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8363 27 September 2018</td>
<td>Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Ministerial level (14) China (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Côte d’Ivoire (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Equatorial Guinea (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Ethiopia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), France (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Kazakhstan (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Kuwait (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Netherlands (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Poland (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Peru (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Russian Federation (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Minister for Foreign Affairs), United Kingdom (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs), United States (Secretary of State)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Private meetings

During the period under review, the Council continued to hold some meetings in private, in accordance with rule 48 of the provisional rules of procedure. Private meetings continued to constitute a small percentage of all Council meetings; only 13, or approximately 4.5 per cent, of a total 288 meetings held in 2018 were private.

Of the 13 private meetings held in 2018, 12 (92.3 per cent) were meetings with troop- and police-contributing countries held under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B”. One private meeting was devoted to the annual briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice.

Figure II shows the percentage of public and private meetings during the period concerned, and figure III shows the breakdown of private meetings by type, as described above. Table 3 provides information on all private meetings held by the Council during the period under review, by item and in chronological order.

Figure II
Public and private meetings, 2018
Figure III
Private meetings, 2018

Table 3
Private meetings, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B (12 meetings)</td>
<td>S/PV.8157, 16 January 2018; S/PV.8196, 6 March 2018; S/PV.8197, 6 March 2018; S/PV.8222, 5 April 2018; S/PV.8279, 6 June 2018; S/PV.8281, 7 June 2018; S/PV.8286, 14 June 2018; S/PV.8308, 12 July 2018; S/PV.8326, 9 August 2018; S/PV.8367, 9 October 2018; S/PV.8374, 17 October 2018; S/PV.8417, 11 December 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice (1 meeting)</td>
<td>S/PV.8380, 24 October 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Informal consultations of the whole

Informal consultations of the whole are not official meetings of the Council. The members gather in private for the purpose of holding discussions and receiving briefings from the Secretariat and representatives of the Secretary-General. These meetings are held in the Consultations Room, adjacent to the Security Council Chamber.

During the period under review, members of the Council continued to meet often in informal consultations of the whole; they met in that capacity a total of 120 times in 2018 (see figure I). Frequently, informal consultations of the whole were held immediately after public meetings of the Council.

Pursuant to the Council’s established practice, no official records of informal consultations were issued, and non-members were not invited. On several occasions, however, statements to the press were issued or elements to the press were read out by the President of the Council following informal consultations. Such statements and elements were drafted in line with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, in which the Council members encouraged the President of the Council to make efforts, whenever appropriate, to suggest, at the end of consultations, general lines or elements to be used when providing briefings to the press, in order to make consultations result-oriented and increase the transparency of the work of the Council while securing confidentiality.

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17 Not all statements to the press were issued as a result of informal consultations. For a complete list of statements issued during the review period, see www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/statements-made-press-president-security-council-2018.
18 S/2017/507, annex, para. 54.
C. Other informal meetings of the members of the Security Council

During the period under review, the Council continued to hold informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings. Informal interactive dialogues are convened at the initiative of one or more Council members, with the participation of all Council members, and are presided by the President of the Security Council for the month. Invitees to informal interactive dialogues may include non-members of the Council who would otherwise not be invited to informal consultations.

Arria-formula meetings may be convened at the initiative of one or more Council members or, in some instances, by non-members of the Council, with the participation of all or some Council members. They are not presided by the President of the Council. Frequently, the Council member or members convening the Arria-formula meeting also chair the meeting. In addition, invitees to Arria-formula meetings may include non-members of the Council, relevant organizations and/or relevant individuals.

Neither of the two types of meeting is considered a formal meeting of the Council; neither type of meeting is announced in the Journal of the United Nations or in the Council’s programme of work and no official records are prepared. In past practice, Arria-formula meetings were closed to the public; in recent practice, these meetings have been open to the public or even broadcast. Informal interactive dialogues are not open to the public or broadcast.

Informal interactive dialogues

During the reporting period, the Council held six informal interactive dialogues. As provided for in the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, when public meetings are not appropriate, the members of the Council may utilize private meetings to seek the views of Member States that are parties to a conflict and/or other interested and affected parties. The note further provides that, when it deems appropriate, the Council may also utilize informal dialogues. Five of the six informal interactive dialogues held in 2018 concerned country-specific or regional situations, as shown in table 4.

19 For more information on informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings, see S/2017/507, annex, paras. 92, 95 and 97–99.

20 Of the 21 Arria-formula meetings held in 2018, 17 were broadcast.


Table 4
Informal interactive dialogues, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Participants (including non-members of the Council)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 February</td>
<td>The situation concerning Iraq (independent external review of United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI))</td>
<td>All Council members; two members of the UNAMI external assessment team; Deputy Director of the Middle East and West Asia Division of the Department of Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East (chemical weapons)</td>
<td>All Council members; Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; High Representative for Disarmament Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 April</td>
<td>Peace and security in Africa (joint visit by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the African Union to Darfur, the Central African Republic and Addis Ababa)</td>
<td>All Council members; Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 June</td>
<td>The situation in Libya (European Naval Force)</td>
<td>All Council members; Force Commander of the European Naval Force – Mediterranean Operation Sophia; Deputy Secretary-General for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response at the European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part II. Provisional rules of procedure and related procedural developments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Participants (including non-members of the Council)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 June 2018</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and sustaining peace (report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its eleventh session (S/2018/83))</td>
<td>All Council members; Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support; Director of the Americas Division in Department of Political Affairs; Director of the Africa I Division in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Deputy Director of the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support at the United Nations Development Programme; Romania (as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission); Germany and Republic of Korea (as Vice-Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission); Colombia; Liberia; Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Arria-formula meetings

As provided for in the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the members of the Council may utilize Arria-formula meetings as a flexible and informal forum for enhancing their deliberations and for enhancing their contact with civil society and non-governmental organizations. According to that note, Council members may invite, on an informal basis, any Member State, relevant organization or individual to participate in Arria-formula meetings. During the period under review, the Council held a total of 21 such meetings. They are listed in table 5.

Table 5
Arria-formula meetings, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Organizer(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 February 2018</td>
<td>The electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 February 2018</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question: prospects for the two-State solution for peace</td>
<td>Bolivia (Plurinational State of), France, Kuwait, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 March 2018</td>
<td>Implementing the cessation of hostilities in the Syrian Arab Republic: the Syrian Arab Republic opposition speaks</td>
<td>France, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March 2018</td>
<td>The Russian occupation of Crimea: the role and limits of the Security Council and the good offices of the Secretary-General in addressing violations of the Charter of the United Nations and international law</td>
<td>Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 March 2018</td>
<td>Human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>France, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 April 2018</td>
<td>Enhancing synergies between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations to address the nexus between terrorism and transnational organized crime</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Peru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 Ibid., para. 98.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Organizer(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 April 2018</td>
<td>Religious leaders for a safe world</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May 2018</td>
<td>Ending and preventing grave violations against children through action plans: best practices from African States</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire, France, Poland, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 June 2018</td>
<td>Maritime crime as a threat to international peace and security</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Netherlands, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 July 2018</td>
<td>Relations between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court: achievements, challenges and synergies</td>
<td>Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, France, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 September 2018</td>
<td>Syrian voices on preventing a death trap in Idlib</td>
<td>France, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 September 2018</td>
<td>Corruption and conflict</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 October 2018</td>
<td>Silencing the guns in Africa: how can the United Nations-African Union partnership contribute to a continent free of conflict</td>
<td>Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 October 2018</td>
<td>Moving from a culture of impunity to a culture of deterrence: the use of sanctions in addressing sexual violence in conflict</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire, France, Netherlands, Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 October 2018</td>
<td>Protecting children born of sexual violence in conflict zones</td>
<td>Bolivia (Plurinational State of), France, Germany, Poland, South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 October 2018</td>
<td>Water, peace and security</td>
<td>Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Belgium, Dominican Republic, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 November 2018</td>
<td>Protection of the environment during armed conflict</td>
<td>Germany, Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 2018</td>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 December 2018</td>
<td>Situation of persons with disabilities in armed conflict</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire, Germany, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Children’s Fund, International Disability Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 December 2018</td>
<td>Raising the effectiveness of atrocity crimes prevention: the role of the Security Council and its members</td>
<td>Belgium, Côte d’Ivoire, Germany, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, Office for Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Office of Legal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 December 2018</td>
<td>Protecting medical care in conflict: from policy to practice</td>
<td>Belgium, Côte d’Ivoire, France, Germany, Peru, Sweden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other informal meetings

Following the practice started in 2007, the Council met with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. In this connection, and in accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the members of the Council acknowledged the importance of annual joint consultative meetings and informal dialogues with the members of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, to exchange views on ways to strengthen cooperation and partnership.

D. Discussions concerning meetings

Questions pertaining to the meetings of the Council and to other forms of informal gatherings of members of the Council were discussed during the open debate on the working methods of the Council held on 6 February 2018, under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” (see case 1).

Case 1
Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

During the open debate on the working methods of the Council, held at the 8175th meeting on 6 February 2018, a number of speakers discussed aspects and formats of the meetings and informal meetings of Council members. Several speakers referred to and welcomed the practice of holding wrap-up sessions at the end of the monthly presidency of the Council. The representatives of Chile and Australia encouraged a greater use of monthly wrap-up sessions, and the representative of Guatemala regretted the increasingly irregular holding of such sessions.

With regard to briefings, the representative of the United States suggested more frequently inviting humanitarian and human rights organizations to speak under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure and asking them to provide more input for briefings and reports. The representative of Poland stressed the need to fully utilize the potential of the Secretariat, including the Department of Political Affairs and added that briefings on situations that might escalate would help the Council discharge its primary responsibility effectively, in line with a prevention-oriented approach. The representative of Sweden encouraged continued and enhanced briefings by and interactions with representatives of civil society. The representative of Ethiopia stressed that briefings by special representatives should be concise and to the point, and the representative of the United Kingdom emphasized the need to make sure that the briefings received from the Secretariat were comprehensive. The representatives of the United Kingdom, Sweden and New Zealand encouraged the Council to make the best use of the Secretariat’s insights, including through better and more frequent situational awareness briefings. The representative of Turkey opined that there was still room for improvement, inter alia, in terms of more informative briefings. The representative of France stressed the need for the Council to continue to adapt the format of its meetings to the subjects addressed and noted that, in certain cases, the Council could avoid redundancy when public briefings were followed by closed consultations. The representative of Finland noted that holding informal briefings for all Member States on the monthly

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25 See S/2017/507, annex, para. 97. In the note, the members of the Council also underscored the importance of increased coordination, cooperation and interaction with other relevant bodies including regional organizations, among them the African Union (para. 93) and agreed to consider joint missions of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to conflict situations in Africa (para. 122). For more information on the cooperation of the Council with regional and subregional organizations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter, see part VIII.

26 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 24 January 2018 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2018/66), and a summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting in a communication from the representative of Kuwait (S/2018/399).

27 S/PV.8175, p. 10 (Peru); p. 28 (Switzerland, on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group); p. 36 (Pakistan); p. 40 (Singapore); pp. 45–46 (Ukraine); p. 54 (Cuba); and p. 59 (Uruguay).

28 Ibid., p. 44 (Chile); and p. 52 (Australia).

29 Ibid., p. 50.

30 Ibid., p. 7.

31 Ibid., p. 12.

32 Ibid., p. 19.

33 Ibid., p. 13 (Ethiopia); and p. 15 (United Kingdom).

34 Ibid., p. 15 (United Kingdom); p. 19 (Sweden); and p. 45 (New Zealand).

35 Ibid., p. 34.

36 Ibid., p. 9.
programme of work increased the flow of information.\textsuperscript{37}

A number of speakers emphasized the relevance of Arria-formula meetings and/or informal interactive dialogues to increase the Council’s openness and transparency and to foster interaction between Council members and the wider membership.\textsuperscript{38} The representative of the Russian Federation opposed the use of Arria-formula meetings and interactive dialogues as “propaganda performances” and called for those formats to be used specifically to raise awareness on issues on the agenda of the Council.\textsuperscript{39} The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela also expressed concern about what he considered to be abuses committed when convening Arria-formula meetings to deal with situations of countries that were not on the Council’s agenda and did not represent a threat to international peace and security. He further suggested that the holding of Arria-formula meetings be governed by a regulatory body.\textsuperscript{40}

A number of speakers called also for a greater use of open debates, in order to, inter alia, continue efforts to improve transparency in the work of the Council.\textsuperscript{41} The representatives of Sweden and Japan proposed exploring ways to make a better use of open debates.\textsuperscript{42} In this regard, the representative of Sweden suggested introducing open debates where Council members would not make statements, but rather listen to the broader membership in preparation for subsequent decisions by the Council.\textsuperscript{43} With regard to the adoption of any outcomes of open debates, a few speakers encouraged the Council to take into account the contributions made by non-members.\textsuperscript{44} In this connection, the representatives of Portugal and Costa Rica stated that, whenever an open debate was expected to have an outcome, the Council should postpone its adoption to a later stage, in order to allow for the outcome to reflect the input of non-members of the Council.\textsuperscript{45}

The representative of Peru noted that closed consultations complemented open debates and favoured greater interaction among the Council members and with the Secretariat.\textsuperscript{46} The representative of Ethiopia, while reaffirming the importance of open briefings and debates, emphasized the value of holding closed consultations in order to have frank exchanges of views.\textsuperscript{47} A number of speakers encouraged the Council to hold more open meetings whenever possible, stressing that closed consultations should be kept to a minimum and should be the exception, rather than the rule.\textsuperscript{48} The representative of Lebanon suggested that non-members of the Council should participate in the closed consultations that concerned them, and the representative of Belgium suggested that the Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission could also be invited.\textsuperscript{49}

### E. Records

During the period under review, verbatim records were issued following each public meeting of the Council, in accordance with rule 49 of the provisional rules of procedure, and communiqués were issued following private meetings, in accordance with rule 55. No questions were raised at Council meetings regarding the application of rules 49 to 57 in connection with the preparation, access to and issuance of verbatim records, communiqués or other documents.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 53.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 9 (France); p. 26 (Hungary); p. 36 (Pakistan); p. 40 (Singapore); p. 44 (Chile); p. 50 (Guatemala); p. 52 (Australia); p. 53 (Finland); p. 57 (Maldives); and p. 59 (Uruguay).
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 56.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p. 9 (France); p. 37 (Portugal); p. 44 (Chile); p. 47 (Indonesia); p. 50 (Guatemala); p. 52 (Australia); p. 53 (Finland); p. 54 (Cuba); and p. 59 (Uruguay).
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 19 (Sweden); and p. 24 (Japan).
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 19 (Sweden).
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p. 26 (Hungary); p. 37 (Portugal); p. 45 (New Zealand); and p. 61 (Costa Rica).
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p. 37 (Portugal); and p. 61 (Costa Rica).
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 10.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 13.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 29 (Switzerland, speaking on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group); p. 30 (Islamic Republic of Iran); p. 34 (Turkey); p. 45 (Ukraine); pp. 54–55 (Cuba); pp. 55–56 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela); p. 59 (Uruguay); and p. 62 (Algeria).
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 38 (Lebanon); and p. 46 (Belgium).
II. Agenda

Note

Section II deals with the practice of the Council concerning the agenda, in relation to rules 6 to 12 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council.

Rule 6
The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

Rule 7
The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council.

Only items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives on the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council had previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda.

Rule 8
The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives on the Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

Rule 9
The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda.

Rule 10
Any item of the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless the Security Council otherwise decides, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting.

Rule 11
The Secretary-General shall communicate each week to the representatives on the Security Council a summary statement of matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration.

Rule 12

The provisional agenda for each periodic meeting shall be circulated to the members of the Security Council at least twenty-one days before the opening of the meeting. Any subsequent change in or addition to the provisional agenda shall be brought to the notice of the members at least five days before the meeting. The Security Council may, however, in urgent circumstances, make additions to the Agenda at any time during a periodic meeting.

The provisions of rule 7, paragraph 1, and of rule 9, shall apply also to periodic meetings.

During the period under review, the Secretary-General continued the practice of distributing communications from States, from organs of the United Nations or from himself concerning any matter for the consideration of the Council, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and pursuant to rule 6 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. The Secretary-General also continued to draw up a provisional agenda for each meeting of the Council and to communicate the provisional agenda to the representatives on the Council, in accordance with rules 7 and 8. The practice relating to the circulation of communications or the preparation of the provisional agenda was not discussed or questioned during the period under review. No periodic meetings were held in 2018; therefore, rule 12 was not applied. This section is therefore focused on the practice and discussion regarding rules 9 to 11, organized under the following three main headings: A. Adoption of the agenda (rule 9); B. Matters of which the Security Council is seized (rules 10 and 11); and C. Discussions concerning the agenda.

A. Adoption of the agenda (rule 9)

In accordance with rule 9 of the provisional rules of procedure, the first item of the agenda for each meeting of the Council is the adoption of the agenda.

Voting on the adoption of the agenda

During the period under review, objections were raised three times to the adoption of the agenda. In all three cases, the objections led to a procedural vote. On two occasions, the Council failed to adopt the
provisional agenda for the meeting, for lack of the required number of affirmative votes: on 19 March 2018, at the 8209th meeting, which had been convened under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East” in connection with the situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic; and on 26 November 2018, at the 8409th meeting, which had been convened under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” in connection with the heightened tensions between the Russian Federation and Ukraine in the Sea of Azov. At the 8381st meeting, held on 24 October 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar” and in connection with the issue of Rakhine State, the procedural vote resulted in the adoption of the provisional agenda.⁵²

⁵⁰ See S/PV.8209.
⁵¹ See S/PV.8409.
⁵² See S/PV.8381.

### Newly introduced agenda items

During the period under review, the Council included the item entitled “Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218)” in the list of matters of which it was seized. The item was considered for the first time at the 8203rd meeting of the Council, on 14 March 2018.⁵³

From 1998 to 2007, the Council added between 8 and 23 new items to its agenda every year. Since 2008, however, the number of new items introduced has decreased significantly, with no more than 3 new items added each year (see figure IV).

⁵³ See S/PV.8203. For more information on this item, see part I, sect. 22.

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**Figure IV**

**Number of newly introduced agenda items per year, 1998–2018**

![Figure IV](image-url)
Modification of agenda items

As set out in the note by the President of the Security Council dated 2 February 2018, following consultations among Council members, the Council agreed that, henceforth, issues pertaining to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals would be considered under an item entitled “International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals”. The earlier consideration by the Council of issues pertaining to the items entitled “International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991” and “International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994” would be subsumed under the new item.

Consideration of country-specific situations under existing items of a regional nature

During the period under review, the Council continued the practice of using existing items of a regional nature for the consideration of evolving country-specific situations. For example, the Council continued to consider the situations in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen under the items entitled “The situation in the Middle East” and “The situation concerning the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”. In 2018, the Council also discussed the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”. Under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the Council deliberated on the country- or region-specific sub-items entitled “Building regional partnership in Afghanistan and Central Asia as a model to link security and development” and “Comprehensive review of the situation in the Middle East and North Africa” and the topic of migrant smuggling and human trafficking in Libya, addressed under the sub-item entitled “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2380 (2017) (S/2018/807)”. Furthermore, the Council addressed the sub-item entitled “The situation in Nicaragua” under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”.

Inclusion of new sub-items under existing items

During the period under review, the Council continued its practice of adding new sub-items to existing items, for the consideration of evolving general and cross-border threats to international peace and security. Table 6 contains a selection of sub-items introduced in 2018, in chronological order of their introduction.

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>New sub-item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8160 18 January 2018</td>
<td>Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction</td>
<td>Confidence-building measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8218 28 March 2018</td>
<td>United Nations peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>Collective action to improve United Nations peacekeeping operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8234 16 April 2018</td>
<td>Women and peace and security</td>
<td>Preventing sexual violence in conflict through empowerment, gender equality and access to justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.8241 23 April 2018</td>
<td>Maintenance of international peace and security</td>
<td>Youth and peace and security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

55 For more information on these items, see part I, sects. 23 and 24, respectively.
56 For more information, see part I, sect. 36.
57 For more information, see part I, sect. 37.
58 For more information, see part I, sect. 38.
59 The table does not include routine sub-items relating to briefings by Security Council missions, briefings by the Chairs of Security Council committees, letters addressed to the President of the Security Council, reports of the Secretary-General and meetings of the Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B.
B. Matters of which the Security Council is seized (rules 10 and 11)

During the period under review, the Council was seized of 68 items.60 Pursuant to rule 11 of the provisional rules of procedure and the note by the President dated 30 August 2017,61 the Secretary-General continued to communicate each week to the representatives on the Council a summary statement of matters of which the Council was seized and of the stage reached in their consideration.62 The practice of including an item in the summary statement upon its adoption at a formal meeting of the Council remained unchanged. On 14 March 2018, at its 8203rd meeting, the Council considered one new item, entitled “Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218)”, which was subsequently included in the summary statement.63

According to the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the preliminary annual summary statement issued in January each year by the Secretary-General of matters of which the Council is seized identifies the items that have not been considered by the Council during the preceding three years and are therefore subject to deletion. An item is deleted unless a Member State notifies the President of the Council, by the end of February, of its request that the item be retained on the list, in which case the item will remain on the list for an additional year. If no Member State requests the item’s retention on the list, the first summary statement issued in March of that year reflects its deletion.64

During the period under review, in accordance with rule 11 and the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the Council continued the practice of reviewing the summary statement at the beginning of

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62 See, for example, S/2018/10/Add.1 and S/2018/10/Add.2.
63 See S/2018/10/Add.11.
64 S/2017/507, annex, paras. 15 and 16.
each year in order to determine whether the Council had concluded its consideration of any items. In 2018, of 16 items identified for deletion in January, only the item entitled “The situation in Sierra Leone” was deleted in March; the remaining 15 items were retained for one additional year at the request of Member States (see table 7).65


Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Date of first and last consideration</th>
<th>Proposed for deletion in 2018</th>
<th>Status in March 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The India-Pakistan question</td>
<td>6 January 1948; 5 November 1965</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Retained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hyderabad question</td>
<td>16 September 1948; 24 May 1949</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Retained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 20 February 1958 from the representative of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
<td>21 February 1958; 21 February 1958</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Retained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 11 July 1960 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council</td>
<td>18 July 1960; 5 January 1961</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Retained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 31 December 1960 from the Minister for External Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council</td>
<td>4 January 1961; 5 January 1961</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Retained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent</td>
<td>4 December 1971; 27 December 1971</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Retained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 3 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council</td>
<td>9 December 1971; 9 December 1971</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Retained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complaint by Cuba</td>
<td>17 September 1973; 18 September 1973</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Retained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation between Iran and Iraq</td>
<td>26 September 1980; 31 January 1991</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Retained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 1 October 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council</td>
<td>2 October 1985; 4 October 1985</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Retained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation between Iraq and Kuwait</td>
<td>2 August 1990; 17 June 2013</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Retained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Georgia</td>
<td>8 October 1992; 15 June 2009</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Retained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>27 November 1995; 26 March 2014</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Deleted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security</td>
<td>24 September 2003; 21 February 2014</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>Retained</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While it remained seized of 68 items during the review period, the Council considered 49 items at its meetings in 2018. Of the 49 items considered in 2018 at meetings of the Council, 27 concerned country-specific and regional situations and 22 concerned thematic and other issues. At its 8386th meeting, held on 30 October 2018 to discuss the announcement of leadership elections in Donetsk and Luhansk, the Council considered two items jointly, namely, “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)” and “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)”. At the meeting, the representative of Sweden nonetheless clarified that, while the meeting had been convened under two items, they remained separate and distinct, and future Security Council meetings could be held on each item separately.

Table 8 provides an overview of the items on the agenda of the Council and those items that were considered at formal meetings of the Council during the period under review.

____________________
66 See S/PV.8386.
67 Ibid., p. 2.

Table 8

Items on the agenda of the Council and their consideration at formal meetings, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Considered at a formal meeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country-specific and regional situations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African region</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and security in Africa</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace consolidation in West Africa</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Burundi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in the Central African Republic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in the Great Lakes region</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Liberia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Libya</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Mali</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Somalia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation concerning Western Sahara</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 20 February 1958 from the representative of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-General</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 1 October 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 19 April 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Americas</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 11 July 1960 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Considered at a formal meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 31 December 1960 from the Minister for External Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complaint by Cuba</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 2 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The question concerning Haiti</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hyderabad question</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The India-Pakistan question</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Myanmar</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Cyprus</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Georgia</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 3 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10409)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation between Iran and Iraq</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation concerning Iraq</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation between Iraq and Kuwait</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in the Middle East</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total, country-specific and regional situations</strong></td>
<td><strong>28 items</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thematic and other issues</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children and armed conflict</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of the draft report of the Security Council to the General Assembly</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Considered at a formal meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizations in maintaining international peace and security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election of a member of the International Court of Justice&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General issues relating to sanctions</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S/2017/507)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of international peace and security</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-proliferation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding and sustaining peace</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of international peace and security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of civilians in armed conflict</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Council mission</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to international peace and security</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women and peace and security</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total, thematic and other issues                                     | 21 items                       |
| Total number of items on the agenda                                  | 68 items<sup>a</sup>           |
| Total number of items discussed                                      | 49 items                       |

<sup>a</sup> In 2018, the Council considered two items, entitled “Date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice” and “Election of a member of the International Court of Justice”, that had not been on the list of items of which the Council was seized.

C. Discussions concerning the agenda

During the period under review, the discussions on the agenda of the Council occurred mainly in connection with country- or region-specific items and related to the adoption of the agenda (see cases 2, 3 and 4).

Case 2
The situation in the Middle East

At the 8209th meeting, convened on 19 March 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East” to hear a briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in connection with the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, Council members expressed differing views about the holding of the meeting<sup>68</sup>. Some Council members expressed objections to the adoption of the agenda, leading to a procedural vote. Prior to the vote, the representative of France indicated that his country and six other Council members had collectively requested the briefing, for “functional and substantive reasons”. He argued that human rights were a fundamental aspect of the crisis that the Council had not dealt with since the last such briefing by the then-High Commissioner in 2014. He stressed that there had been other briefings by the High Commissioner on situations on the Council’s agenda since that time and emphasized that the Syrian Arab Republic should not and could not be an exception.<sup>69</sup>

The representative of the Russian Federation argued that

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<sup>68</sup> See S/PV.8209. For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 23.

<sup>69</sup> S/PV.8209, p. 2.
there was no justification for such a meeting, since human rights was not a subject on the Council’s agenda, but rather fell under the mandate of the Human Rights Council.\textsuperscript{70} He emphasized that the Russian Federation was not against consideration of the item on the provisional agenda, which was an existing agenda item, but against the holding of the meeting in the proposed format.\textsuperscript{71} The representative of China also expressed opposition to the holding of deliberations in the Council on the question of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic.\textsuperscript{72} The provisional agenda for the meeting was put to the vote. The Council failed to adopt the provisional agenda for lack of the required number of affirmative votes.\textsuperscript{73}

**Case 3**

**Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security**

At its 8340th meeting, held on 5 September 2018 under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council addressed the situation in Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{74} At the meeting, Council members expressed differing views about the holding of the meeting, including on whether the situation in Nicaragua should be on the Council’s agenda. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed gratitude to the United States delegation for putting the matter on the Council’s agenda, emphasizing the need for the Council to be made aware of the concerns of regional organizations.\textsuperscript{75} The representative of the Russian Federation stressed that the issue of Nicaragua had no place on the agenda of the Council, as the domestic political situation in the country did not pose a threat to international peace and security. He accused the United States, which held the presidency of the Council that month, of using a regional rationale in order to “shovel” the issue of Nicaragua onto the agenda of the Council.\textsuperscript{76} The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia opposed the manipulation of agenda items whose legitimate purpose was to support cooperation mechanisms with regional organizations.\textsuperscript{77} The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela rejected the practice of exploiting items on the agenda of the Council to force a discussion on domestic matters, underscoring that the practice set a dangerous precedent and constituted a flagrant violation of the Charter and of the mandate of the Council.\textsuperscript{78} The representative of Nicaragua said that there was consensus in the Council that the situation in his country did not represent a threat to international peace and security and that its inclusion on the Council’s agenda was a clear interference in the internal affairs of Nicaragua and a violation of the Charter and international law.\textsuperscript{79}

**Case 4**

**Maintenance of international peace and security**

Following heightened tensions between the Russian Federation and Ukraine in the Sea of Azov, the Council held its 8409th meeting on 26 November 2018, under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Violation of the borders of the Russian Federation”.\textsuperscript{80} Objections to the adoption of the agenda led to a procedural vote in the Council. Prior to the vote, the representative of the United States delivered a statement, also on behalf of the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, to oppose the holding of a discussion on the serious escalation in the Strait of Kerch under a sub-item entitled “Violation of the borders of the Russian Federation”, as proposed by the delegation of the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{81} The representative of the Russian Federation said that the counter-demand by Ukraine to hold a separate meeting under a different agenda item was merely an attempt to avoid responsibility for undermining international security and added that the agenda item proposed by Ukraine was inappropriate.\textsuperscript{82} The provisional agenda for the meeting was put to the vote. The Council failed to adopt the agenda for lack of the required number of affirmative votes.\textsuperscript{83} After the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed regret for the result of the vote and

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} The proposal received 8 votes in favour (France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States), 4 against (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation) and 3 abstentions (Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia).
\textsuperscript{74} See S/PV.8340. For more information on this item, see part I, sect. 38.
\textsuperscript{75} S/PV.8340, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., p. 22.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 20.
\textsuperscript{80} See S/PV.8409. For more information on this item, see part I, sect. 37.
\textsuperscript{81} S/PV.8409, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{83} The proposal received 4 votes in favour (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation), 7 against (France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States) and 4 abstentions (Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Peru).
emphasized that no one could prevent the Russian Federation, as a permanent member of the Security Council, from raising an issue in the Council under an agenda item relating to that issue. He accused the Council members that had voted against the provisional agenda of being more concerned about which agenda item the meeting was held under than about solving the problem. He said that he would not make a statement at the meeting convened under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)” (see case 5), as that agenda item was not appropriate for the discussion at hand, and would instead confine himself to the statement made during the current meeting in explanation of vote.84

Case 5
Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)

Following the 8409th meeting, convened on 26 November 2018 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Violation of the borders of the Russian Federation” (see case 4),85 the Council held its 8410th meeting on the same day, under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)”86 Following a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, the representative of the United Kingdom referred to the 8409th meeting and expressed disappointment at the explanation of vote delivered by the Russian Federation after the procedural vote, which had resulted in the agenda for the meeting not being adopted. He stressed that the representative of the Russian Federation had delivered not an explanation of vote, but rather a substantive statement, and in doing so, had shown contempt for the Security Council and its members by not accepting the outcome of a procedural vote by the Council. The representative of the United Kingdom added that, while the Russian Federation had regularly discussed the situation in Ukraine under a different agenda item in the past, it had deliberately chosen a provocative title for the meeting convened earlier in the day.87 Echoing the argument made by the United Kingdom, the representative of Poland stressed that, at the 8409th meeting, following the procedural vote, the representative of the Russian Federation had delivered a de facto full and substantial statement, which ran against the practices and procedures of the Security Council.88 The representative of the Netherlands also expressed support for the procedural point put forward by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Poland.89 With regard to the agenda for the 8409th meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation emphasized that his delegation felt absolutely justified in proposing to hold a meeting under a different agenda item to discuss the situation in and around Ukraine.90

III. Representation and credentials

Note

Section III covers the practice of the Council concerning representation and the credentials of its members, in relation to rules 13 to 17 of the provisional rules of procedure.

Rule 13

Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative on the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before he takes his seat on the Security Council. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of the State or of the Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting credentials.

Rule 14

Any Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by

84 S/PV.8409, pp. 2–3.
85 See S/PV.8409. For more information on this item, see part I, sect. 37.
86 See S/PV.8410.
it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before the first meeting which he is invited to attend.

Rule 15

The credentials of representatives on the Security Council and of any representative appointed in accordance with rule 14 shall be examined by the Secretary-General who shall submit a report to the Security Council for approval.

Rule 16

Pending the approval of the credentials of a representative on the Security Council in accordance with rule 15, such representative shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives.

Rule 17

Any representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection has been made within the

Security Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights as other representatives until the Security Council has decided the matter.

During the period under review, in accordance with rule 13 of the provisional rules of procedure, the credentials of the representatives of the members of the Council were communicated to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General subsequently submitted his report to the Council pursuant to rule 15. Such reports were transmitted to the Council when there were changes in the representation of members of the Council,91 as well as when representatives of the newly elected members of the Council were designated prior to the beginning of each term.92 No discussions regarding the interpretation and application of rules 13 to 17 arose during the period under review.

IV. Presidency

Note

Section IV covers the practice of the Council concerning the monthly rotation of the presidency, the role of the President and the temporary cession of the chair by the President during the consideration of a particular question with which the Member State he or she represents is directly connected, in relation to rules 18 to 20 of the provisional rules of procedure.

Rule 18

The presidency of the Security Council shall be held in turn by the members of the Security Council in the English alphabetical order of their names. Each President shall hold office for one calendar month.

Rule 19

The President shall preside over the meetings of the Security Council and, under the authority of the Security Council, shall represent it in its capacity as an organ of the United Nations.

Rule 20

Whenever the President of the Security Council deems that for the proper fulfilment of the responsibilities of the presidency he should not preside over the Council during the consideration of a particular question with which the member he represents is directly connected, he shall indicate his decision to the Council. The presidential chair shall then devolve, for the purpose of the consideration of that question, on the representative of the member next in English alphabetical order, it being understood that the provisions of this rule shall apply to the representatives on the Security Council called upon successively to preside. This rule shall not affect the representative capacity of the President as stated in rule 19, or his duties under rule 7.

This section comprises two subsections, namely: A. The role of the President of the Security Council (rules 18 and 19); and B. Discussions concerning the presidency of the Security Council.

In 2018, there were no instances of the application of rule 20. In January 2018, during the presidency of Kazakhstan, a flag installation ceremony for newly elected members of the Council was held, for the first time in the history of the Council.93

92 For the report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the representatives and deputies and alternate representatives of members of the Security Council elected for the period 2018 to 2019, see S/2017/1107.

A. Role of the President of the Security Council (rules 18 and 19)

In accordance with rule 18 of the provisional rules of procedure, the presidency of the Council was held in turn for one calendar month by the members of the Council in the English alphabetical order. In addition to presiding over meetings of the Council, informal consultations of the whole and informal interactive dialogues, the President of the Council continued to perform several functions under the authority of the Council, in accordance with rule 19. These functions included (a) briefing non-members of the Council and the media on the monthly programme of work of the Council at the beginning of the month; (b) representing the Council and delivering statements on its behalf, including the presentation of the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly; and (c) delivering statements or elements to the press, following informal consultations of the whole or whenever Council members reached an agreement on a text. The Presidents of the Council continued to maintain the practice of holding monthly meetings with the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly. In October 2018, the President of the Security Council participated in a dialogue with the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on the theme “Renewing Commitment to Multilateralism”. Representatives of Council members continued to submit, in their national capacities, assessments providing information on the main aspects of the work of the Council during the month of their respective presidencies.

Following previous practice, and in accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the introduction to the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly for 2017 was prepared under the coordination of the President of the Council for the

September 2017 (China), who continued the practice of convening informal meetings with Member States to exchange views on the annual report, a practice initiated in 2008.

In 2018, during their respective presidencies, Council members continued to take the initiative of bringing to the attention of the Council emerging general and cross-border threats to international peace and security, at times adding new sub-items to existing thematic items with a view to informing the deliberations. In several such instances, to frame the discussion, a concept paper prepared by the monthly presidency was circulated prior to the meeting. A number of Council members continued also the practice of circulating summaries of the meetings they had organized during their presidencies.

In the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the incoming presidencies were encouraged to discuss the provisional monthly programme of work with other members of the Council well in advance of their respective presidencies. The note also provided that Council members, during their respective presidencies, should ordinarily plan no more than four days per week of Council business, Fridays normally being allocated to facilitate the work of the Council’s

99 See S/PV.8335.
100 For more information on referrals by Member States pursuant to Article 35 of the Charter, see part VI, sect. I.A.
101 For example, at its 8234th meeting, held on 16 April 2018, the Council had before it a concept note on the theme “Preventing sexual violence in conflict through empowerment, gender equality and access to justice” (S/2018/311, annex) (see S/PV.8234); at its 8372nd meeting, held on 16 October 2018, the Council had before it a concept note on the theme “Maintenance of international peace and security: root causes of conflict – the role of natural resources” (S/2018/901, annex) (see S/PV.8372).
102 For example, a summary of the high-level thematic briefing held on 18 January 2018 on the theme “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: confidence-building measures” was circulated after the meeting by the representative of Kazakhstan (S/2018/107); a summary of the ministerial-level briefing held on 21 February 2018 on the subject of the “Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security” was circulated after the meeting by the representative of Kuwait (S/2018/318); and a summary of the open debate held on 22 May 2018 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict was circulated after the meeting by the representative of Poland (S/2018/684).
103 S/2017/507, annex, para. 2.
subsidiary bodies. During the period under review, a
complaint was raised in a communication to the
Council regarding the role of the President. In a letter
dated 29 June 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of
the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the President of
the Security Council, Morocco expressed its
“astonishment and surprise” that a new letter from the
“polisario” had been circulated among Council
members by the presidency, adding that
communications from non-State actors and armed
groups such as the “polisario” should not, under any
circumstances, be circulated, even informally, to the
members of the Council through the presidency.

B. Discussions concerning the presidency
of the Security Council

In 2018, aspects of the presidency of the Security
Council were discussed during Council meetings. At its
8339th meeting, held on 4 September 2018 under
the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the
President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, the
Council discussed the provisional programme of work
for September proposed by the United States, which
held the presidency for that month (see case 6).

At the 8340th meeting of the Council, held on
5 September 2018 under the item entitled,
“Cooperation between the United Nations and regional
and subregional organizations in maintaining
international peace and security”, the Council
addressed the situation in Nicaragua (see case 3). In
the discussion that followed the briefings by the Chief
of Staff to the Secretary-General of the Organization of
American States and by civil society leader and former
Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defence of
Nicaragua, Felix Maradiaga, the representative of the
Russian Federation accused the United States of using
a regional rationale in order to “shovel” the issue of
Nicaragua onto the agenda of the Council. The
representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
rejected the practice of exploiting items on the agenda
of the Council to force a discussion on the domestic
situations of sovereign countries and underscored that
such practice set a dangerous precedent and attested to
the “arbitrary nature” of the presidency of the Council
under the United States. At the 8345th meeting of
the Council, held on 7 September 2018 under the item
entitled “The situation in the Middle East” in
connection with the situation in Idlib in the Syrian
Arab Republic, some Council members thanked the
United States for having convened a meeting on the
topic. The representative of the Russian Federation,
however, stated that the presidency had formulated the
topic of the meeting in a “curious way”. He pointed
out that the meeting had been convened to consider
the situation in the Middle East, with an emphasis on the
situation in Idlib, as if that location were a separate
State entity rather than an integral part of the Syrian
Arab Republic. The representative of the Syrian
Arab Republic opined that many Member States were
facing an “unprecedented challenge” wherein the
presidency of the Council was simultaneously playing
the role of adversary and arbiter. In that regard, he
criedized the presidency for forcing a discussion on the
situation in Idlib and, more broadly, for forcing
discussions in the Council on a number of other issues
that, in his view, did not constitute threats to
ternational peace and security. He added that it had
become common practice for three Western countries
that were permanent members of the Security Council
to use their Council presidencies to rally others against
his country and his Government.

Case 6 Implementation of the note by the President of
the Security Council (S/2017/507)

The Council held its 8339th meeting on
4 September 2018, under the item entitled
“Implementation of the note by the President of the
Security Council (S/2017/507)”, to discuss the
provisional programme of work for the month
proposed by the presidency of the United States. At
the outset of the meeting, the representative of the
United States explained that the meeting was taking
place further to concerns or issues raised by some
Council members in connection with the provisional
programme of work during the monthly breakfast of
permanent representatives. The representative of the
Plurinational State of Bolivia noted that the provisional
programme of work envisioned a meeting on the
situation in Nicaragua to be held under the item
titled “Cooperation between the United Nations and
regional and subregional organizations in the
maintenance of international peace and security”. In
that regard, he stressed that the situation in Nicaragua
should not be addressed within the Security Council
primarily because it did not constitute a threat to

104 Ibid., para. 1.
106 See S/PV.8339.
107 See S/PV.8340. For more information on this item, see
part I, sect. 38.
109 Ibid., p. 22.
110 S/PV.8345, p. 7 (France); p. 10 (Poland); p. 11
(Côte d’Ivoire); and p.13 (the Netherlands).
111 Ibid., p. 17.
112 Ibid., p. 22.
113 See S/PV.8339.
114 Ibid., p. 2.
international peace and security. A number of speakers, echoing the statement that the situation in Nicaragua did not pose a threat to international peace and security, opposed any involvement by the Security Council and objected to the inclusion of the meeting in the programme of work. The representative of Kazakhstan expressed reservations regarding the inclusion of the issue in the provisional programme of work. The representative of Peru expressed support for the provisional programme of work presented by the presidency and emphasized the importance of many of the planned meetings. He pointed out that, if the issue of Nicaragua was presented in the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, then Article 54 thereof provided the basis for the United Nations to be kept informed of the activities of regional organizations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security. In that sense, and on the basis of the merits of preventive diplomacy, he stated that the proposed meeting would be pertinent and that his delegation was ready to support it. The representative of Poland concurred with the representative of Peru and expressed appreciation for the fact that the question of Nicaragua would be discussed under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security”. A number of speakers expressed support for the proposed programme of work and for holding a discussion on the situation in Nicaragua from a preventive perspective. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed support for the proposed programme of work and for the proposed discussion on the situation in Nicaragua, emphasizing in particular that, pursuant to Article 34 of the Charter, the Security Council might investigate any dispute or situation that could lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuation of the dispute or situation was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of Kuwait stated that the issue of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention were a priority and stressed the importance of the regional dimension and the role played by regional organizations in the context of Nicaragua. Nevertheless, he emphasized the importance of unity, stressing that if the Council were to contribute to addressing the situation, it must be united. The representative of the United States recalled that the Council had dealt many times with the African Union on regional issues; there was thus no reason for it not to deal with the Organization of American States on regional issues as well. After having resumed her functions as President of the Council, the representative of the United States noted that, although there was no consensus on the adoption of the provisional programme of work, there was no requirement in the provisional rules of procedure that the programme of work be adopted. She added that the adoption of the programme of work was rather a practice, not a requirement, and concluded that the Council would proceed in its work without the adoption of the programme of work for the month.

V. Secretariat

Note

Section V covers the practice of the Security Council concerning the functions and powers of the Secretary-General in connection with meetings of the Council, in relation to rules 21 to 26 of its provisional rules of procedure.

For specific instances in which the Secretary-General was requested or authorized to carry out other functions in accordance with Article 98, see part IV.
Rule 23

The Secretary-General may be appointed by the Security Council, in accordance with rule 28, as rapporteur for a specified question.

Rule 24

The Secretary-General shall provide the staff required by the Security Council. This staff shall form a part of the Secretariat.

Rule 25

The Secretary-General shall give to representatives on the Security Council notice of meetings of the Security Council and of its commissions and committees.

Rule 26

The Secretary-General shall be responsible for the preparation of documents required by the Security Council and shall, except in urgent circumstances, distribute them at least forty-eight hours in advance of the meeting at which they are to be considered.

During the period under review, and in accordance with previous practice, the Secretary-General and senior officials of the Secretariat continued to attend Council meetings and to provide briefings to the Council, as requested. The Council also continued to request briefings by senior officials from the Secretariat. At a meeting held on 16 October 2018 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the representative of Sweden noted that it was essential for the regular reporting from the Secretariat to include more integrated analysis of the drivers of conflict; in that connection, he stressed that gender analysis was key. The representative of France called on the Secretariat to integrate the natural resources dimension into its reports and to find the expertise required for that through the support of the specialized agencies of the United Nations.

A number of aspects of briefings and reporting by the Secretariat were discussed under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” (see case 7).

Case 7

Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

At its 8175th meeting, held on 6 February 2018 under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, the Council held an open debate on its working methods organized by Kuwait, which held the presidency of the Council for the month. During the meeting, the Council discussed cooperation and communications between the Council and the Secretariat.

Concerning the cooperation between the two organs, the representative of Peru emphasized that it was important that the Council’s working methods ensure timely cooperation with the Secretariat in addressing risks and emerging threats to international peace and security and that such cooperation was vital in preventing the occurrence, escalation and continuation of conflict. He further encouraged greater interaction between Council members and the Secretariat. Welcoming developments in response to the need for a strategic overview and a prevention-oriented approach within the Council, the representative of Poland expressed the need for the Council to fully utilize the potential of the Secretariat, emphasizing that briefings on situations that might escalate would help the Council to discharge its primary responsibility effectively. The representative of the United Kingdom encouraged the Council to continue its efforts to make its meetings more effective and action-oriented, by making sure that briefings from the Secretariat were comprehensive, which, in turn, could be accomplished by promoting more interactivity in consultations and seeking outcomes from meetings. He further urged the Council to make the best use of the Secretariat’s insights, including through situational awareness briefings, in order to do more on preventative diplomacy. The representative of Brazil encouraged the Secretariat to make the proper arrangements to allow for special envoys and special representatives of the Secretary-General to brief country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission prior to Security Council meetings so that the Commission could fully carry out its advisory role vis-à-vis the Security Council.

With regard to reports and other communications by the Secretariat, the Executive Director of Security Council Report recalled the note by the President of the Security Council dated 30 August 2017, in which

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126 S/PV.8372, p. 12.
127 Ibid., p. 16.
128 See S/PV.8175. The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 24 January 2018 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2018/66), and a summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting in a communication from the representative of Kuwait (S/2018/399).
129 S/PV.8175, p. 10.
130 Ibid., p. 12.
131 Ibid., p. 15.
132 Ibid., p. 25.
133 S/2017/507.
Council members sought to encourage the presentation of information from the Secretariat to the Council “in the most helpful manner” and lamented that, during negotiations on that note, Council members had not agreed on a reference to situational awareness briefings. The representative of Ethiopia stressed that reports of the Secretary-General were particularly useful for elected members, who might have no other means of gathering adequate information, and noted that the challenge was to ensure that those reports were more concise, timely, relevant and to the point. Briefings by special representatives should also be concise and to the point and should highlight the latest developments and draw attention to issues that might require a response or action on the part of the Council. The representative of New Zealand stated that strengthening the situational awareness of the Council was key to enabling it to act early and prevent conflict; he added that, where issues were fast-moving, with competing accounts on the ground, the Secretariat could play an important role in providing authoritative information to Council members. The representative of Côte d’Ivoire urged the Secretariat to ensure that all reports and other required working documents be made available as soon as possible and in all working languages of the Organization in order to enable their consideration by the various delegations. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela regretted that, in some cases, the Secretariat had not submitted written reports mandated by Security Council resolutions. He emphasized in particular that the report on the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016) concerning Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories had not been submitted and indicated that members had been limited to listening to oral presentations by the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General.

On the engagement with troop- and police-contributing countries, the representative of Germany called for more timely, interactive and action-oriented consultations among the Council, contributing States and the Secretariat. The representative of Belgium stressed the need to further strengthen tripartite dialogues among troop- and police-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat in terms of preparation of meetings, the degree of interaction among participants and transparency of expected outcomes. The representative of Uruguay opined that formal and informal consultation meetings among the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries could be further enhanced.

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134 S/PV.8175, p. 4.
135 Ibid., p. 13.
136 Ibid., p. 45.
137 Ibid., p. 16.

VI. Conduct of business

Note

Section VI covers the practice of the Council concerning the conduct of business at its meetings, in relation to rules 27, 29, 30 and 33 of its provisional rules of procedure.

Rule 27

The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

Rule 29

The President may accord precedence to any rapporteur appointed by the Security Council.

The Chairman of a commission or committee, or the rapporteur appointed by the commission or committee to present its report, may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the report.

Rule 30

If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled.

Rule 33

The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting:

1. To suspend the meeting;
2. To adjourn the meeting;
3. To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour;

4. To refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur;

5. To postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or

6. To introduce an amendment.

Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.

In 2018, no explicit reference was made to rules 27, 29 and 30. During the period under review, the President of the Council routinely requested speakers to limit their statements to four or five minutes. Frequently, the President also requested delegations with lengthy statements to circulate their texts in writing and to deliver a condensed version when speaking in the Chamber. Pursuant to such requests, delegations frequently delivered a shortened version of the statement and subsequently circulated the full text in writing or made it available online. Following an established practice, during the period under review, joint statements were delivered by both Council members and other Member States who had been invited to participate in Council meetings.

Regarding the speaking order, according to the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the speaking order for meetings of the Council is established, as a general practice, by means of a draw or, in certain cases, by the use of a sign-up sheet. The President of the Council, as a general practice, delivers his or her national statement last of all Council members; in certain cases, however, the President may make his or her national statement before the other members take the floor. In certain cases, the President of the Council may adjust the list of speakers and inscribe first the delegation(s) responsible for the drafting process, in order to allow it or them to make an introductory or explanatory presentation. When an unscheduled or emergency meeting is convened, the President may adjust the list of speakers so that the delegation having requested the meeting can speak before other Council members in order to present the rationale for convening the meeting. The President of the Council may inscribe first the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Council when they present their work, as occurred on several occasions during the period under review. According to established practice, the list of speakers was adjusted according to protocol when high-level officials were representing

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148 Ibid., para. 25. For example, at the 8175th meeting on 6 February 2018, under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, the representative of Kuwait and President of the Council for the month took the floor after the briefing by the Executive Director of Security Council Report and delivered a single statement comprising introductory remarks and his national statement before the other members took the floor (S/2017/507, pp. 4–6).
149 S/2017/507, annex, para. 26. For example, at the 8277th meeting, held on 6 June 2018 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the representative of Sweden, who had been the co-penholder of resolution 2419 (2018) together with Peru, took the floor prior to the vote to give introductory remarks (S/2017/507, pp. 2–3).
150 S/2017/507, annex, para. 26. For example, at the 8219th meeting, held on 30 March 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the representative of Kuwait, who had requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council, delivered a statement before other Council members (S/2017/507, p. 3).
151 S/2017/507, annex, para. 27. For example, at the 8229th meeting, held on 11 April 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in Mali”, the representative of Sweden spoke before other Council members and briefed the Council in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017), concerning Mali (S/2017/507, p. 5).
Council members at a meeting. In 2018, non-members of the Council having a direct interest in the matter under consideration spoke before Council members, consistent with prior practice and the note by the President dated 30 August 2017.153

In the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the Council affirmed its understanding that open debates could benefit from the contributions of both Council members and the wider membership, expressed its commitment to continue to take steps to improve the focus and interactivity of its open debates and acknowledged the usefulness of concept notes to help to focus the discussion.154 During the period under review, Council members continued the practice of circulating concept notes prior to open debates; the concept notes were frequently annexed to letters addressed to the Secretary-General or the President of the Security Council.155

The Council continued to use videoconferencing at its meetings, a practice that has become common since its introduction in 2009,156 resulting in an average of 56 briefings held via videoconferencing per year. In 2018, the Council was briefed via videoconferencing 91 times, from different locations, including Bangui, Jerusalem, Kinshasa and Tripoli.157

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Note

Section VII covers the practice of the Council concerning the extension of invitations to non-members of the Council to participate in meetings of the Council. Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter of the United Nations and rules 37 and 39 of the provisional rules of procedure describe circumstances in which invitations can be extended to non-members of the Council to participate, without vote, when the Council so decides.

Article 31

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

Article 32

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

152 S/2017/507, annex, paras. 29–30. For example, at the 8199th meeting, held on 8 March 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in Afghanistan”, Netherlands (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation and Sweden was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Both representatives took the floor after the briefers but before other Council members (S/PV.8199, pp. 10–13). At the 8264th meeting, held on 22 May 2018 under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, Poland (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Kazakhstan was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Both representatives also took the floor after the briefers but before other Council members (S/PV.8264, pp. 7–11). For more information on high-level meetings, see sect. I.

153 S/2017/507, annex, para. 33. For example, at the 8167th meeting, held on 25 January under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the representative of Israel, who was invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, and the Permanent Observer of the observer State of Palestine, who was invited in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and previous practice, both took the floor before the Council members, following established practice (S/PV.8167, pp. 5–11). At the 8354th meeting, held on 17 September 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in Afghanistan”, the representative of Afghanistan, who was invited under rule 37, spoke before the Council members, following established practice (S/PV.8354, pp. 5–7). For more information concerning participation in Council meetings, see sect. VII.

154 Ibid., paras. 38, 43 and 40.

155 For example, at its 8234th meeting, held on 16 April 2018, the Council had before it a concept note annexed to the letter dated 2 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Peru to the Secretary-General (S/2018/311) (see S/PV.8234); at its 8372nd meeting, held on 16 October 2018, the Council had before it a concept note annexed to the letter dated 9 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the Secretary-General (S/2018/901) (see S/PV.8372).

156 S/2017/507, annex, para. 60.

157 For more information on participation in Council meetings via videoconferencing, see section VII.B.
Part II. Provisional rules of procedure and related procedural developments

Rule 37
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.

Rule 39
The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

During the period under review, the Council continued to invite non-members to participate in its meetings. The invitations were extended by the President at the beginning or during Council meetings either under the "relevant provisions" of the Charter without an explicit reference to a specific Article or rule, or under rule 37 or rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council. Specifically, Member States continued to be invited under rule 37, while representatives of the Secretariat, other United Nations organs, specialized agencies, funds and programmes, regional and other intergovernmental organizations, or other invitees, including representatives of non-governmental organizations, were invited under rule 39. While Member States requested invitations in letters addressed to the President of the Council, in most cases these were not circulated as documents of the Council.158

In accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the Council had invited newly elected members to observe all meetings of the Council as from 1 October 2017, namely, during the three-month period immediately preceding their term of membership.159

This section is divided into four subsections, namely: A. Invitations extended under rule 37; B. Invitations not expressly extended under rule 37 or rule 39; and D. Discussions relating to participation.

A. Invitations extended under rule 37
In accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and the provisional rules of procedure, all States, whether Members of the United Nations or not, can be invited to participate in Council meetings when (a) the interests of a Member State are "specially affected" (Article 31 of the Charter and rule 37); (b) a Member State or a non-Member State is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Council (Article 32 of the Charter); and (c) a Member State brings a matter to the attention of the Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter (rule 37).160

During the period under review, there were no changes to the procedure for extending invitations to Member States to participate in the proceedings of the Council. Member States invited under rule 37, in accordance with previous practice, continued to speak occasionally in other capacities, for example on behalf of international or regional organizations, or groups of States, by delivering joint statements.161 There was, further, no instance in 2018 of a request from a Member State to participate in a Council meeting being put to a vote at a public meeting. In a letter dated 1 June 2018 to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Turkey considered it deeply regrettable that his delegation’s request to be included on the list of speakers at the 8274th meeting, held on 1 June 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, was not accommodated owing to the objection of one permanent member of the Council.163

B. Invitations extended under rule 39
In accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, members of the Secretariat or other persons may be invited to supply the Council with

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158 See letter dated 14 December 2018 from the representative of Serbia to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1111), in which the Government of Serbia requested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the decision of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Pristina to transform the Kosovo Security Force into armed forces.
159 S/2017/507, annex, paras. 140.
160 For more details on referral of a dispute or situation to the Council by States, see part IV, sect. I.A.
161 For example, at the 8175th meeting, on 6 February 2018, the representative of Switzerland spoke on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (S/PV.8175, pp. 28–29). At the 8244th meeting, on 26 April 2018, the representative of Tunisia spoke on behalf of the Group of Arab States; and the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (S/PV.8244, pp. 32–33 and pp. 40–42). At the 8307th meeting, on 11 July 2018, the President of Nauru spoke on behalf of the 12 Pacific small island developing States (S/PV.8307, pp. 25–26).
information or give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

Following previous practice, an invitation under rule 39 was extended to a representative of a Member State, on an exceptional basis, only if his or her participation was in a role other than that of representative of a State, for example, as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission164 or one of its country-specific configurations.165

164 For example, at the 8301st meeting, on 29 June 2018, the representatives of the Republic of Korea and Romania were invited under rule 39 in their capacities as former and current Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission.

165 For example, the following representatives were invited under rule 39 in their capacities as Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission: at the 8187th meeting, on 22 February, the representative of Morocco in his capacity as Chair of the Central African Republic configuration (S/PV.8187, p. 2); at the 8337th meeting, on 30 August 2018, the representative of Brazil in his capacity as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration (S/PV.8337, p. 2); and at the 8408th meeting, on 21 November 2018, the representative of Switzerland in his capacity as Chair of the Burundi configuration (S/PV.8408, p. 2).

In 2018, a total of 350 invitations were extended under rule 39 (see figure V).

Figure V
Invitations under rule 39, 2009–2018
Part II. Provisional rules of procedure and related procedural developments

Of the 350 invitees under rule 39 in 2018, 246 were men and 104 were women. As shown in figure VI, in recent years prior to 2018, the number of male speakers invited to Council meetings under rule 39 has been 3 to 4 times higher than the number of female speakers invited under the same rule. This notwithstanding, the percentage of women invited under rule 39 increased during the period under review, from 24.1 per cent in 2017 to 29.7 per cent in 2018.

![Figure VI: Invitations under rule 39, 2009–2018](image)

For the purposes of this part of the Repertoire, invitations extended under rule 39 are classified according to four main categories, namely: (a) officials of the United Nations system; (b) invitees from international organizations other than the United Nations; (c) officials representing regional intergovernmental organizations; and (d) representatives of other entities such as non-governmental organizations. During the period under review, invitations under rule 39 were most often extended to officials of the United Nations system; representatives of other entities, such as non-governmental organizations, were invited less frequently, as shown in figure VII.

166 In previous Supplements, separate categories were used for invitees representing the Secretariat and Security Council subsidiary bodies and those representing other United Nations organs, subsidiary bodies or agencies. For the sake of simplicity, the two categories have now been subsumed under the category “United Nations system”, which includes officials of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

167 For example, at the 8163rd meeting, on 23 January 2018, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations was invited under rule 39 (see S/PV.8163).

168 For example, at the 8435th meeting, on 20 December 2018, the Vice-President of the World Bank for Africa was invited under rule 39 (see S/PV.8435).

169 For example, at the 8264th meeting, on 22 May 2018, the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations was invited under rule 39 (see S/PV.8264).

170 For example, at the 8382nd meeting, on 25 October 2018, the General Director of the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling was invited under rule 39 (see S/PV.8382).
In one instance, at the 8386th meeting, held on 30 October 2018 under the items entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)” and “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)”, in connection with the developments in eastern Ukraine, objections to a request to extend an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure led to a procedural vote (see case 9). 171

Videoconferencing

The Council continued the practice of inviting speakers who participated in the meetings via videoconferencing, a practice that has become increasingly common since its introduction in 2009. 172

In the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the Council members reiterated their intention to resort more often to the use of videoconferencing for briefing the Council, where appropriate, while preserving a balanced approach between videoconferencing and briefings in person, including during open meetings. 173

C. Invitations not expressly extended under rule 37 or rule 39

During the period under review, the Council extended several invitations not expressly under rule 37 or rule 39 (see table 9). Invitations to representatives of the Holy See and the State of Palestine to participate in meetings of the Council were routinely extended “in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the previous practice in this regard”, without specification of any rule.

171 See S/PV.8386.
172 For example, at the 8212th meeting, on 22 March 2018, the Deputy Secretary-General briefed the Council via videoconference from Monrovia (see S/PV.8212, p. 2). For more information on videoconferencing, see sect. VI.

173 S/2017/507, annex, para. 60.
Table 9
Invitations not expressly extended under rule 37 or rule 39, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Invitee</th>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
<th>Item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State of Palestine</td>
<td>S/PV.8305, 9 July 2018</td>
<td>Children and armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8262, 17 May 2018</td>
<td>Maintenance of international peace and security</td>
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<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8293, 25 June 2018</td>
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<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8264, 22 May 2018</td>
<td>Protection of civilians in armed conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8167, 25 January 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8183, 20 February 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8219, 30 March 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8244, 26 April 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8256, 15 May 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8274, 1 June 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8316, 24 July 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8375, 18 October 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8272, 30 May 2018</td>
<td>Threats to international peace and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>S/PV.8305, 9 July 2018</td>
<td>Children and armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8262, 17 May 2018</td>
<td>Maintenance of international peace and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8293, 25 June 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8334, 29 August 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8395, 9 November 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8407, 20 November 2018</td>
<td>Peace and security in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8264, 22 May 2018</td>
<td>Protection of civilians in armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8167, 25 January 2018</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8244, 26 April 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8316, 24 July 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8375, 18 October 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8218, 28 March 2018</td>
<td>United Nations peacekeeping operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8234, 16 April 2018</td>
<td>Women and peace and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8382, 25 October 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Discussions relating to participation

During the period under review, when non-members of the Council were invited to participate in a meeting, Council members generally spoke before Member States invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure and before those not expressly invited under any rule, except on some occasions when parties directly involved in the matter under consideration took the floor before Council members. The practice of the Council with regard to persons invited under rule 39 was less consistent and the order of speaking depended on whether or not they were participating in the meeting to brief the Council.

For example, at meetings held under the item entitled “The situation in Afghanistan”, the representative of Afghanistan, who was invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, spoke after the briefers but before the Council members, following established practice (see S/PV.8199, S/PV.8294, S/PV.8354 and S/PV.8426). At quarterly open debates held under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the representative of Israel, who was invited under rule 37, and the Permanent Observer of the observer State of Palestine, who was invited in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and previous practice but without specification of any rule, both spoke after the briefers but before the Council members, following established practice (see S/PV.8167, S/PV.8244, S/PV.8316 and S/PV.8375). For more information on the order of speaking, see sect. VI.
In 2018, issues concerning participation in Council meetings were raised on a number of occasions. At the 8175th meeting, held on 6 February 2018 in connection with the Council’s working methods, the representative of the United States suggested that invitations to speak under rule 39 be extended more frequently to humanitarian and human rights organizations and that they be asked to provide more input into briefings and reports. At the 8234th meeting, held on 16 April 2018 in connection with women and peace and security, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict acknowledged the participation of Razia Sultana, on behalf of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, emphasizing that Ms. Sultana, born in northern Rakhine State, Myanmar, was the first Rohingya woman to brief the Council on the plight of her people. The Special Representative further stressed that her perspective was particularly valuable on the eve of the Council’s first visit to Myanmar and Bangladesh. At the 8375th meeting, held on 18 October 2018 in connection with the Palestinian question, the representative of Israel criticized the Plurinational State of Bolivia, which held the presidency for the month, for having invited the Executive Director of B’Tselem to participate in the meeting and argued that B’Tselem had been invited to “defame” Israel’s “strong democracy”. Additional examples are illustrated in cases 8 and 9.

Case 8
The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

At its 8219th meeting, held on 30 March 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the Council met for an emergency meeting requested by Kuwait to discuss the developments that followed the March of Return near the Gaza fence. During his intervention, the representative of the United States noted that it was extremely unfortunate that Israel was unable to attend the meeting and participate in the discussion because it was taking place during the celebration of Passover. He emphasized that it was “vital” for the Council to take a balanced approach to all matters that came before it and opined that the Council should have found an arrangement to enable all the parties to participate. The representatives of the United Kingdom, Poland and the Netherlands also expressed regret that the representative of Israel was unable to participate in the meeting owing to the start of Passover.

Case 9
Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)

Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)

At its 8386th meeting, held on 30 October 2018, the Council met to discuss the announcement of leadership elections in Donetsk and Luhansk. The representative of Sweden, also on behalf of France, the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States, objected to the request by the Russian Federation to invite Elena Kravchenko to participate in the meeting under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, noting that the “so-called elections” in what were “misleadingly referred to as the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics” in eastern Ukraine, scheduled for 11 November 2018, were an infringement on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and in breach of the letter and the spirit of the Minsk agreements. He stressed that the suggested briefer did not represent the legal authorities or civil society of Ukraine and underlined that allowing a representative of an “illegal separatist entity” to participate in a Council meeting would set a dangerous precedent. He concluded that the briefer proposed by the Russian Federation was not competent for the purpose at hand as stipulated in rule 39 and indicated that, if the matter were put to a procedural vote, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States would oppose the invitation. The representative of the Russian Federation responded that, although the delegations of France, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States had proposed to discuss the elections in eastern Ukraine, those delegations had not invited representatives of the area concerned to participate in the meeting. He emphasized that, for reasons of transparency, the Russian Federation had insisted on a public meeting and had requested the participation of the “heads of the central electoral commissions of the Donetsk and Luhansk

175 S/PV.8175, p. 7.
176 S/PV.8234, p. 3.
177 S/PV.8375, p. 11.
178 See S/PV.8219.
179 Ibid., p. 4.
180 Ibid., p. 5 (United Kingdom); p. 9 (Poland); and p. 9 (Netherlands).
181 S/PV.8386, p. 2.
182 Ibid.
Part II. Provisional rules of procedure and related procedural developments

People’s Republics”. He expressed the hope that Council members would be interested in “receiving complete information on the true state of affairs in Ukraine” and called on them not to submit to pressure or to “obstruct a briefing to the Council by the representative of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics and parties to the Minsk agreements”\(^1\). The proposal to extend an invitation to Ms. Kravchenko under rule 39 was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Ibid., pp. 2–3.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 3.

VIII. Decision-making and voting

Rule 34

It shall not be necessary for any motion or draft resolution proposed by a representative on the Security Council to be seconded before being put to a vote.

Rule 35

A motion or draft resolution can at any time be withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it.

If the motion or draft resolution has been seconded, the representative on the Security Council who has seconded it may require that it be put to the vote as his motion or draft resolution with the same right of precedence as if the original mover had not withdrawn it.

Rule 36

If two or more amendments to a motion or draft resolution are proposed, the President shall rule on the order in which they are to be voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Council shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed until all amendments have been put to the vote, but when an amendment adds to or deletes from the text of a motion or draft resolution, that amendment shall be voted on first.

Rule 38

Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding rule, or in application of Article 32 of the Charter, to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative on the Security Council.

Rule 40

Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
This section comprises five sub-sections, namely: A. Decisions of the Council; B. Penholdership and sponsorship in accordance with rule 38; C. Decision-making by voting; D. Decision-making without a vote; and E. Discussions concerning the decision-making process.

In 2018, rule 31 of the provisional rules of procedure was routinely applied in Council meetings. There were no instances of departure from the Council’s standard practice of adopting a single decision at a meeting. In addition, there were no instances of motions or amendments requiring voting, withdrawal of draft resolutions or requests for separate voting on parts of a draft resolution; consequently, there were no occasions on which rules 34 to 36 were invoked. During the period under review, there were multiple instances of competing draft resolutions put to a vote in connection with the items entitled “The situation in the Middle East” and “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, as outlined below.

A. Decisions of the Council

During the period under review, the Council continued to adopt, at its meetings, resolutions and statements by the President, in addition to taking procedural decisions. Decisions of the Council also took the form of notes by or letters from the President, which were seldom adopted at meetings and, in most cases, were issued as documents of the Council.

In 2018, the Council adopted a total of 54 resolutions and issued 21 presidential statements. The Council also issued 8 notes by the President and 34 letters from the President. Figure VIII shows the total number of resolutions adopted and statements and notes by, and letters from, the President issued during the past decade (2009 to 2018).

Figure VIII
Resolutions adopted and statements and notes by and letters from the President issued, 2009–2018
Competing draft resolutions

In three instances during the period under review, more than one draft resolution was put to a vote. This notwithstanding, no discussion took place regarding the application of rule 32 of the provisional rules of procedure. At the 8190th meeting, held on 26 February 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the Council adopted resolution 2402 (2018), whereas draft resolution S/2018/156 was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.185 At the 8228th meeting, held on 10 April 2018, also under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the Council failed to adopt draft resolution S/2018/321 owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council and did not adopt draft resolutions S/2018/175 and S/2018/322 for lack of the required number of votes.186 At the 8274th meeting, held on 1 June 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the Council failed to adopt draft resolution S/2018/516 owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council and did not adopt draft resolution S/2018/520 for lack of the required number of votes.187

B. Penholdership and sponsorship in accordance with rule 38

A draft resolution may be submitted by any member of the Council. The note by the President dated 30 August 2017 contains the stipulation that the members of the Council support, where appropriate, the informal arrangement whereby one or more Council members, as penholder(s), initiate and chair the informal drafting process.188 According to the note, any member of the Council may be a penholder, and more than one Council member may act as co-penholders, when it is deemed to add value, taking into account as appropriate the expertise and/or contributions of Council members on the subjects.189 In the note, the Council members reaffirmed that all members of the Council should be allowed to participate fully in the preparation of, inter alia, the resolutions, presidential statements and press statements of the Council and that the drafting of all documents such as resolutions, presidential statements and press statements should be carried out in an inclusive manner that would allow participation of all members of the Council.190 The members of the Council also encouraged the penholder or co-penholders, depending on the subject and the urgency of the situation on the ground, to provide a reasonably sufficient time for consideration by all Council members when draft resolutions, presidential statements and press statements of the Council were placed under a silence procedure.191

According to rule 38 of the provisional rules of procedure, any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with rule 37 or in application of Article 32 of the Charter to participate in the discussions of the Council may also submit a proposal, but a proposal may be put to a vote only at the request of a Council member. Those Member States that submit a draft resolution become sponsors of the draft resolution. A draft resolution is described as a presidential text if all the Council members agree to be co-sponsors.

Of a total of 54 resolutions adopted by the Council in 2018, one was a presidential text, namely resolution 2439 (2018) relating to the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.192

During the period under review, the Council considered a total of 61 draft resolutions, four of which were sponsored by non-members of the Council, as shown in table 10.

185 S/PV.8190, p. 4.
186 S/PV.8228, pp. 5, 8–9 and 14.
188 S/2017/507, annex, para. 78.
189 Ibid., para. 79.
190 Ibid., para. 80.
191 Ibid., para. 82.
192 For more information on past practice concerning presidential texts, see Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017, part II, sect. VIII.B.
C. Decision-making by voting

According to Article 27 (2) and (3) of the Charter, decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine Council members. On all other matters, that is, substantive or non-procedural matters, an affirmative vote of nine Council members is required, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. The result of a vote in the Council often does not in itself indicate whether the Council considers the matter voted upon to be procedural or substantive. For example, whether a vote is procedural or not cannot be determined when a proposal is: (a) adopted by a unanimous vote; (b) adopted by an affirmative vote of all permanent members; or (c) not adopted, having failed to obtain the nine affirmative votes required. When a proposal is adopted, having obtained nine or more affirmative votes, with one or more permanent members casting a negative vote, that indicates that the vote is considered procedural. Conversely, if the proposal is not adopted, the matter voted upon is considered to be substantive. On certain occasions, in its early years, the Council found it necessary to decide, by vote, the question whether the matter under consideration was procedural within the meaning of Article 27 (2). This procedure is
known as the “preliminary question”, after the language used in the San Francisco Statement on Voting Procedure. In recent years, including during the period under review, however, there have been no instances of the Council deciding to examine the preliminary question. Furthermore, procedural motions, such as the adoption of the agenda, the extension of invitations, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting, have generally been decided upon by the Council without a vote. When such motions were voted upon, the vote was considered procedural. In 2018, the Council voted on procedural matters on four occasions (see table 11).

Table 11
**Cases in which the vote indicated the procedural character of the matter, 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
<th>Subject of proposal</th>
<th>Vote (for-against-abstaining)</th>
<th>Permanent members casting negative vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The situation in the Middle East</td>
<td>S/PV.8209 19 March 2018</td>
<td>Adoption of the agenda</td>
<td>8-4-3</td>
<td>China, Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in the Myanmar</td>
<td>S/PV.8381 24 October 2018</td>
<td>Adoption of the agenda</td>
<td>9-3-3</td>
<td>China, Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)</td>
<td>S/PV.8386 30 October 2018</td>
<td>Invitation under rule 39</td>
<td>1-7-7</td>
<td>France, United Kingdom, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of international peace and security</td>
<td>S/PV.8409 26 November 2018</td>
<td>Adoption of the agenda</td>
<td>4-7-4</td>
<td>France, United Kingdom, United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a For more information on the adoption of the agenda, see sect. II.A.
b For more information on participation, see sect. VII.

**Adoption of resolutions**

During the period under review, the majority of resolutions adopted by the Council (45 of 54) were adopted unanimously. Nine resolutions were adopted without a unanimous vote (see table 12).

Table 12
**Resolutions adopted without a unanimous vote, 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
<th>Votes in favour</th>
<th>Votes against</th>
<th>Abstentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2410 (2018)</td>
<td>The question concerning Haiti</td>
<td>S/PV.8226 10 April 2018</td>
<td>13 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 (China, Russian Federation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2414 (2018)</td>
<td>The situation concerning Western Sahara</td>
<td>S/PV.8246 27 April 2018</td>
<td>12 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3 (China, Ethiopia, Russian Federation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Meeting record and date</td>
<td>Votes in favour</td>
<td>Votes against</td>
<td>Abstentions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2418 (2018)</td>
<td>Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan</td>
<td>S/PV.8273 31 May 2018</td>
<td>9 (Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>6 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2422 (2018)</td>
<td>International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals</td>
<td>S/PV.8295 27 June 2018</td>
<td>14 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 (Russian Federation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2428 (2018)</td>
<td>Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan</td>
<td>S/PV.8310 13 July 2018</td>
<td>9 (Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>6 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2440 (2018)</td>
<td>The situation concerning Western Sahara</td>
<td>S/PV.8387 31 October 2018</td>
<td>12 (China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Ethiopia, Russian Federation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2441 (2018)</td>
<td>The situation in Libya</td>
<td>S/PV.8389 5 November 2018</td>
<td>13 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 (China, Russian Federation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2448 (2018)</td>
<td>The situation in the Central African Republic</td>
<td>S/PV.8422 13 December 2018</td>
<td>13 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 (China, Russian Federation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2449 (2018)</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East</td>
<td>S/PV.8423 13 December 2018</td>
<td>13 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 (China, Russian Federation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Draft resolutions not adopted

According to Article 27 (3) of the Charter, a draft resolution on non-procedural matters is not adopted when it fails to obtain the nine affirmative votes required, or when a negative vote is cast by a permanent member. During the period under review, there were four instances in which a draft resolution was not adopted because it failed to obtain the nine affirmative votes required, and three occasions when a draft resolution was not adopted owing to a negative vote cast by a permanent member (see table 13).

Table 13
Draft resolutions not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member or for lack of the requisite number of votes, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Draft resolution</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
<th>Votes in favour</th>
<th>Votes against</th>
<th>Abstentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/2018/156</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East</td>
<td>S/PV.8190 26 February 2018</td>
<td>11 (Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>2 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Russian Federation)</td>
<td>2 (China, Kazakhstan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2018/321</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East</td>
<td>S/PV.8228 10 April 2018</td>
<td>12 (Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>2 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Russian Federation)</td>
<td>1 (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2018/175</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East</td>
<td>S/PV.8228 10 April 2018</td>
<td>6 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation)</td>
<td>7 (France, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>2 (Côte d’Ivoire, Kuwait)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2018/322</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East</td>
<td>S/PV.8228 10 April 2018</td>
<td>5 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation)</td>
<td>4 (France, Poland, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>6 (Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2018/355</td>
<td>Threats to international peace and security</td>
<td>S/PV.8233 14 April 2018</td>
<td>3 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Russian Federation)</td>
<td>8 (Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States)</td>
<td>4 (Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Peru)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2018/516</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question</td>
<td>S/PV.8274 1 June 2018</td>
<td>10 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Peru, Russian Federation, Sweden)</td>
<td>1 (United States)</td>
<td>4 (Ethiopia, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2018/520</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question</td>
<td>S/PV.8274 1 June 2018</td>
<td>1 (United States)</td>
<td>3 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Kuwait, Russian Federation)</td>
<td>11 (China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D. Decision-making without a vote

A procedural or substantive motion may be adopted in the Council without a vote or by consensus. In 2018, one resolution was adopted without a vote, namely resolution 2403 (2018) of 28 February 2018, concerning the date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice.

Statements by the President on behalf of the Council continued to be adopted by consensus. A total of 21 statements by the President were adopted during the period under review. In contrast with past practice, according to which most of the statements adopted were read out at meetings, during the period under review, 16 of 21 statements were adopted without the text being read out.

Following past practice, during the period under review, notes and letters by the President of the Council were adopted by consensus and issued as official documents of the Council. In 2018, the Council issued 8 notes and 34 letters by the President. Notes and letters by the President are rarely adopted during Council meetings. During the period under review, one note by the President, namely, the note concerning the adoption of the draft report of the Council to the General Assembly for the period from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2017, was adopted during a meeting of the Council, in line with past practice.

E. Discussions concerning the decision-making process

During the period under review, both procedural and non-procedural aspects of the decision-making process were discussed during Council meetings. In particular, Council members and the wider membership addressed issues pertaining to the exercise of the veto, penholdership and the negotiation process leading to the adoption of outcome documents, as reflected in case 10. In addition, at the 8395th meeting, held on 9 November 2018 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Strengthening multilateralism and the role of the United Nations”, one speaker, the representative of Georgia, referred explicitly to Article 27 of the Charter. He recalled that, in 2009, the Russian Federation had vetoed the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia and emphasized that, as the Russian Federation was party to the conflict, for it to use its veto power was in direct contradiction with Chapter V, Article 27 (3) of the Charter, which stipulated that “a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting”.

Case 10
Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

On 6 February 2018, at the initiative of Kuwait, which held the presidency for the month, the Council convened its 8175th meeting as an open debate. At the meeting, a number of speakers expressed views on penholdership and other aspects pertaining to the negotiation and drafting of Security Council outcome documents. The representative of Kuwait noted that the participation of Member States in the decision-making process within the Council remained “weak” and stressed the importance of engaging with the wider membership, especially affected States, and to consult with them before making any decisions. The representative of Italy encouraged Council members to

193 For more information on the election of members of the International Court of Justice, see part IV, sect. I.E.
194 The complete list of statements by the President adopted during the review period is available at www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/statements-made-president-security-council-2018.
195 For example, in a meeting under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)”, the President of the Council read out the statement (see S/PV.8276).
196 The complete list of notes by the President of the Security Council issued in 2018 is provided in part I, sect. XIII, of the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly at its seventy-third session (A/73/2) or available at www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/notes-president-security-council-2018. The complete list of letters from the President of the Council issued in 2018 is provided in part I, sect. III, of the same report or available at www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/letters-exchanged-between-secretary-general-and-president-security-council-2018.
197 S/2018/797, at the 8335th meeting (see S/PV.8335).
198 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 1 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations to the Secretary-General (S/2018/982).
199 S/PV.8395, p. 71.
200 Ibid.
201 See S/PV.8175. The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 24 January 2018 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2018/66), and a summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting in a communication from the representative of Kuwait (S/2018/399).
202 S/PV.8175, pp. 4–5.
engage in timely consultations during the drafting process, including with the broader membership, in particular interested States and regional organizations.\(^{203}\)

In connection with the decision-making process within the Council, the representatives of Equatorial Guinea and New Zealand said that, at times, decisions were negotiated among the permanent members without input from the elected members, leaving elected members with limited options.\(^{204}\) The representative of Equatorial Guinea emphasized that the process should be more inclusive in order to improve transparency, and the representative of New Zealand stressed that the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Council’s decisions were maximized when the Council “worked as 15 rather than 5”.\(^{205}\) Noting that penholdership was at times distorted to exclude meaningful input from elected members, the representative of New Zealand called on the elected members to be ambitious and to enact the change they wished to see in the Council.\(^{206}\)

The representative of Italy welcomed co-penholdership as a practice that allowed for wider participation of Council members in the drafting process and that could consequently add value to the Council’s outcomes.\(^{207}\) The representative of Chile stated that the drafting process should be more inclusive and that the elected members should be included as co-penholders, “preferably in interregional groups”.\(^{208}\) Several other speakers emphasized the importance of inclusivity in the decision-making process in the Council and called for enhanced consultation in that regard with concerned countries and with those with relevant expertise.\(^{209}\) The representative of Ethiopia emphasized that the idea of co-penholdership should be seriously explored, not only to enable elected members to contribute to shaping Council’s outcome documents, but also to improve unity and consensus among Council members.\(^{210}\) The representative of Singapore opined that more could be done to strengthen the voice of elected Council members, including through a review of the penholder system.\(^{211}\) The representative of Peru underscored the importance of complementing the work of the penholders with the views of the Chairs of subsidiary bodies and noted that the reports of panels of experts and field visits provided substantive, first-hand information that was “vital” when drafting resolutions or statements.\(^{212}\)

The language of the note by the President of the Security Council dated 30 August 2017 was referred to by the representatives of Kazakhstan, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Switzerland to emphasize that penholders or co-penholders of Council decisions needed to present and to discuss drafts with Council members in at least one round of consultations.\(^{213}\) The representative of Ethiopia stressed the importance of allowing adequate time for consultations on Council decisions and noted that penholders had a special responsibility in that regard.\(^{214}\) The representative of Japan stressed that penholders had the heavy responsibility to pursue the best possible outcome through an inclusive process, by providing sufficient time for the consideration of drafts by all members or proactively reaching out to those with expertise outside of the Council.\(^{215}\) The representative of China stressed that full consultations should be conducted with a view to achieving consensus and that efforts should be made to ensure that all members had adequate time to examine draft resolutions and presidential statements.\(^{216}\) In this regard, the representative of Costa Rica suggested establishing procedures, including allowing sufficient time for the consideration of proposals and establishing silence procedures, for informal consultations during the drafting process.\(^{217}\)

A number of speakers called for a distribution of penholdership among all Council members.\(^{218}\) The representative of Sweden noted that penholdership should be evenly distributed between permanent and elected members and among members from different regions.\(^{219}\) Emphasizing that penholders were almost exclusively the permanent members and that the level of participation of elected members in the adoption of outcome documents continued to be at their discretion.

\(^{203}\) Ibid., p. 43.
\(^{204}\) Ibid., p. 17 (Equatorial Guinea); and p. 44 (New Zealand).
\(^{205}\) Ibid.
\(^{206}\) Ibid., pp. 44–45.
\(^{207}\) Ibid., p. 43.
\(^{208}\) Ibid., p. 44.
\(^{209}\) Ibid., p. 35 (Pakistan); p. 38 (Lebanon); and p. 47 (Belgium).
\(^{210}\) Ibid., p. 14.
\(^{211}\) Ibid., p. 40.
\(^{212}\) Ibid., p. 10.
\(^{213}\) S/2017/507, annex, para. 81; and S/PV.8175, p. 11 (Kazakhstan); p. 21 (Plurinational State of Bolivia); and p. 28 (Switzerland).
\(^{214}\) Ibid., p. 14.
\(^{215}\) Ibid., p. 24.
\(^{216}\) Ibid., p. 23.
\(^{217}\) Ibid., p. 61.
\(^{218}\) Ibid., p. 8 (Russian Federation); p. 19 (Sweden); pp. 21–22 (Plurinational State of Bolivia); p. 28 (Switzerland, on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group); p. 29 (Germany); p. 35 (Pakistan); p. 61 (Costa Rica) and p. 63 (Egypt).
\(^{219}\) Ibid., p. 19.
the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia encouraged more appointments of elected members as penholders.220 The representative of Switzerland stated that elected members should be enabled to engage actively on all issues and should be entrusted with more penholderships, adding that an increase in the use of co-penholderships could be explored.221 Recalling that, in principle, any Council member could serve as penholder, the representative of Germany noted that, in practice, the list of actual penholders continued to be very short and expressed the hope that a more inclusive practice would emerge.222 The representative of Costa Rica called for greater participation by the non-permanent members, as well as formalized consultations among all members of the Council when making decisions on the distribution of penholder responsibilities. Furthermore, he encouraged the practice of enabling Council members to postpone the adoption of decisions or outcomes of open debates in order to take into consideration the contributions of participants.223 The representative of Egypt emphasized that the functioning of the Security Council was a collective responsibility that required full participation by all its members on an equal footing and a fair distribution of duties and functions, including in the drafting of Council documents.224

In the discussion, a number of speakers called also for restraint in the use of the veto and expressed support for the code of conduct promoted by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, whereby members of the Council pledged not to vote against any draft resolution intended to prevent crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes.225 Several speakers also expressed support for the suspension of the veto in case of mass atrocities as presented in the political statement by France and Mexico.226 In this connection, the representative of Mexico stated that those initiatives were aimed at improving the efficiency of the Council, while fostering a new culture of responsibility and accountability among the permanent members and contributing to the effectiveness, legitimacy and accountability of the Council.227 The representative of Ukraine noted that, while a Council without the veto was a “distant and uncertain reality”, responsible members of the international community should pledge not to resort to the veto when considering cases that had “all the hallmarks of crimes against humanity and mass atrocities”.228 Noting that the Council had “found it difficult” to adopt a draft resolution on the Rohingya humanitarian crisis, owing mostly to the possibility of the veto being exercised against any such draft resolution, the representative of Bangladesh stressed that the exercise of the veto should be avoided in cases that involve mass atrocities.229 The representative of Indonesia stressed that regulating the use of the veto would be a great push to elevate the effectiveness and global credibility of the Council. Until veto regulation was realized, permanent members should circulate to all General Assembly members a formal explanation in cases where the veto was exercised.230 The representative of Australia expressed the need to move “urgently, decisively and in unison” to agree on clear restraint of the veto. He noted that, too often, the Council had failed in its mandate because narrow interests had prevailed over those of the most vulnerable.231 The representatives of Kuwait, Sweden and Turkey addressed the question of the use of the veto to protect national interests, emphasizing that the practice diminished the Council’s efficiency and credibility and prevented the Council from carrying out its responsibilities.232 The representative of Mexico noted that the use of the veto had prevented the effective fulfilment of the responsibilities entrusted to the Council and added that the use of the veto had “obstructed and derailed” the common interest and had encouraged division among members.233 The representative of Equatorial Guinea stated that the existence of the veto was an obstacle to the work of the Council, which at times had prevented the Council from making clear to the world that there was no place for impunity.234 The representative of Liechtenstein emphasized that, in particular in the recent past, the

220 Ibid., pp. 21–22.
221 Ibid., p. 28.
222 Ibid., p. 29.
223 Ibid., p. 61.
224 Ibid., p. 63.
225 Ibid., p. 5 (Kuwait); p. 10 (Peru); p. 17 (Equatorial Guinea); p 26 (Hungary); p. 29 (Switzerland, on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group); p. 42 (Liechtenstein); p. 46 (Ukraine); p. 47 (Indonesia); p. 51–52 (Saudi Arabia); pp. 52–53 (Australia); pp. 56–57 (Maldives); p. 57 (Mexico); p. 60 (Uruguay); and pp. 61–62 (Costa Rica).
226 Ibid., p. 5 (Kuwait); pp. 9–10 (France); p. 17 (Equatorial Guinea); p. 21 (Netherlands); p 26 (Hungary); p. 46 (Ukraine); p. 47 (Indonesia); p. 49 (Bangladesh); p.53 (Australia); pp. 56–57 (Maldives); p. 57 (Mexico); and p. 60 (Uruguay).

227 Ibid., p. 57.
228 Ibid., p. 46.
229 Ibid., p. 49.
230 Ibid., p. 47.
231 Ibid., pp. 52–53.
232 Ibid., p. 5 (Kuwait); pp. 19–20 (Sweden); and p. 34 (Turkey).
233 Ibid., p. 57.
234 Ibid., p. 17.
veto had repeatedly been used “in stark opposition” to the spirit of the Charter, preventing the Council from fulfilling its tasks thereunder, including on matters relating to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and to the reaffirmation of international law with respect to the situation in the Middle East.235

The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the veto was a cornerstone of the entire architecture of the Security Council. He stressed that it was not a privilege, but an instrument pledging and guaranteeing the Council’s ability to reach balanced decisions.236 The representatives of Sweden and Mexico stressed that the veto was not a right, but a responsibility.237 The representatives of Equatorial Guinea, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Cuba stated that the veto was an anachronistic and anti-democratic privilege.238 The representative of Equatorial Guinea added that the veto should be re-evaluated with a view to evolving more inclusive and democratic decision-making measures.239 Arguing that the veto was determined by long-outdated historical circumstances and that no change to the Council working methods would prevent the interests of a few from hindering the maintenance and pursuit of peace and prosperity for all, the representative of South Africa called for a comprehensive reform of the Security Council.240

Note

Section IX covers rules 41 to 47 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, which relate to the official and working languages of the Council, interpretation and the languages of meeting records and published resolutions and decisions.

Rule 41

Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be both the official and the working languages of the Security Council.

Rule 42

Speeches made in any of the six languages of the Security Council shall be interpreted into the other five languages.

Rule 43

[Deleted]

Rule 44

Any representative may make a speech in a language other than the languages of the Security Council. In this case, he shall himself provide for interpretation into one of those languages. Interpretation into the other languages of the Security Council by the interpreters of the Secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first such language.

IX. Languages

Rule 45

Verbatim records of meetings of the Security Council shall be drawn up in the languages of the Council.

Rule 46

All resolutions and other documents shall be published in the languages of the Security Council.

Rule 47

Documents of the Security Council shall, if the Security Council so decides, be published in any language other than the languages of the Council.

In the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, Council members encouraged the Secretariat to maintain the translation of all United Nations sanctions lists into all official languages of the United Nations and to continue to ensure that the information on the websites of the subsidiary bodies of the Council, including the reports of sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, was accurate and updated in all official languages.241

During the period under review, rules 41 to 47 were applied consistently. At several meetings, speakers delivered their statements in a language other than the six official languages of the United Nations, as

235 Ibid., p. 42.
236 Ibid., p. 8.
237 Ibid., pp. 19–20 (Sweden); and p. 57 (Mexico).
238 Ibid., p. 18 (Equatorial Guinea); p. 22 (Plurinational State of Bolivia); and p. 55 (Cuba).
239 Ibid., p. 18.
240 Ibid., p. 33.
provided in rule 44. The matter of working languages was addressed in different contexts throughout the year during the regular work of the Council. For example, at the 8175th meeting, held on 6 February 2018 in connection with the working methods of the Security Council, the representative of Côte d’Ivoire urged the Secretariat to ensure that all reports and other required working documents were made available as soon as possible and in all working languages of the Organization in order to enable their consideration by the various delegations. At the 8375th meeting, held on 18 October 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the representative of Israel delivered his statement in English but addressed the Executive Director of B’Tselem with a few sentences in Hebrew, which were recorded in the webcast of the meeting, but not in the verbatim record.

In the discussion that followed, the representative of the United Kingdom stressed that the meeting was an open debate and that not understanding what was being said in the Chamber defeated the purpose of the open debate. She wished to know what the representative of Israel had said to the Executive Director of B’Tselem in Hebrew and emphasized that, if speakers used a language for which there was no interpretation, the presidency should stop them and ask them to speak in one of the six official languages. In a letter dated 26 October 2018 to the President of the Security Council, the representatives of France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom defined the remarks made by the representative of Israel to the Executive Director of B’Tselem during the open debate as “deeply regrettable”. Emphasizing that those remarks had been delivered in a language for which interpretation was not provided, the representatives stressed in their letter that the incident constituted a breach of the procedures of the Council and of the basic rules and that it undermined the point of an open debate. They requested that the presidency of the Council, as well as all incoming presidencies, ensure that the incident did not set a precedent and that, in general, all speakers used one of the six official languages.

X. Provisional status of the rules of procedure

Note

Section X covers the deliberations of the Council concerning the provisional status of the rules of procedure of the Council, last amended in 1982. Article 30 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Since their adoption by the Council at its first meeting, held on 17 January 1946, the rules of procedure have remained provisional.

Article 30

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

During the period under review, the question of the status of the provisional rules of procedure, including in connection with Article 30 of the Charter, was raised at the 8175th meeting, held on 6 February 2018, under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” During the debate, Council members referred to the work carried out by the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions and to the efforts that led to the adoption of the note by the President dated 30 August

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2017,\textsuperscript{248} and exchanged views on the working methods of the Council. Several speakers stressed that the rules of procedure of the Council should cease to be provisional and should become permanent and definitive, in order to improve the transparency and accountability of the Council, as well as the predictability and effectiveness of its work.\textsuperscript{249}

\textsuperscript{248} S/2017/507.

\textsuperscript{249} S/PV.8175, pp. 17–18 (Equatorial Guinea); p. 21 (Plurinational State of Bolivia); p. 32 (South Africa); p. 40 (Singapore); p. 55 (Cuba); and p. 62 (Algeria).
Part III
Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations
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Introductory note

Part III covers the consideration by the Security Council of Articles contained in Chapter I of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, namely Articles 1 (2), 2 (4), 2 (5) and 2 (7). Part III consists of four sections. Section I features material relating to the principle of self-determination of peoples under Article 1 (2) of the Charter. Section II covers material relevant to the prohibition of the use of force or the threat of the use of force as enshrined in Article 2 (4). Section III deals with the obligation of States to refrain from assisting a target of the Council’s enforcement action as stipulated in Article 2 (5). Section IV highlights the Council’s consideration of the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations in the internal affairs of States, as regulated by Article 2 (7).

In 2018, the Council continued to deliberate on the principle of self-determination regarding the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, the situation in Kosovo, the situation in eastern Ukraine and the situation concerning Western Sahara, as well as more broadly in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security. It discussed the application of Article 2 (4) in connection with the situation in the Middle East, the attack in Salisbury, the United Kingdom, and the situation in eastern Ukraine, as well as during several open debates held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”. The Council reflected upon the principles enshrined in Article 2 (7) of the Charter during its consideration of the situations in Burundi and Nicaragua, as well as in its discussions on the relationship between United Nations peacekeeping operations and host countries. The Council did not make any explicit references to the application of Article 2 (5) of the Charter during the year. No Council decisions adopted during the reporting period contained explicit references to any of these Articles. Nonetheless, this part includes Council decisions featuring language relating to the principles enshrined in Articles 1 (2), 2 (4), 2 (5) and 2 (7). This part also includes explicit and implicit invocations of Articles 1 (2), 2 (4) and 2 (7) made in the correspondence addressed to the Council during the period under review.
I. Principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples under Article 1, paragraph 2

Article 1, paragraph 2

[The Purposes of the United Nations are:] To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

Note

Section I concerns the practice of the Council regarding the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as enshrined in Article 1 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations. Subsection A features decisions relevant to the principle enshrined in Article 1 (2). Subsection B describes the references made to the principle of self-determination in Council discussions during the reporting period. Subsection C sets out instances in which the principle of self-determination was invoked in communications addressed to the Council.

A. Decisions relating to Article 1 (2)

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly invoke Article 1 (2) in its decisions. However, several implicit references in its decisions are relevant to the interpretation and application of Article 1 (2). Those implicit references were made in connection with the envisaged referendum in Western Sahara (see table 1).

Table 1

Decisions containing implicit references to Article 1 (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision and date</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The situation concerning Western Sahara</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution 2414 (2018) 27 April 2018</td>
<td>Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect (fourth preambular paragraph)</td>
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<td><strong>See also resolution 2440 (2018), sixth preambular paragraph</strong></td>
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<td>Calls upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and notes the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect (para. 3)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>See also resolution 2440 (2018), para. 4</strong></td>
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<td>Affirms its full support for the intention of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy in this context to relaunch the negotiations with a new dynamic and a new spirit with the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations (para. 13)</td>
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</table>

B. Constitutional discussions relating to Article 1 (2)

During the period under review, Article 1 (2) was not explicitly invoked in the deliberations of the Council. However, speakers made references to the principle of self-determination in the context of both country-specific and thematic discussions.

At the 8183rd meeting, held on 20 February under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the President of the State of Palestine asserted that the State of
Palestine would “present any agreement reached with Israel to a general referendum among our people so as to respect democracy and strengthen legitimacy”. At the same meeting, several speakers expressed support for the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. Similar references to the principle of self-determination were made by speakers at other meetings held under the same item.

On 21 February, at the 8185th meeting, held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security”, the Secretary-General stated that the Charter’s principles – namely, the non-use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention, cooperation, self-determination and the sovereign equality of Member States – remained the foundation of international relations. The representatives of Kuwait and the United States echoed his statement, both recalling the need to respect the principles and purposes of the Charter, including equal rights and the right to self-determination. The representative of Kuwait lamented that those principles and purposes were “flagrantly flouted” in ways that undermined not only regional peace and security, but also international security in general.

In relation to the item entitled “Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)”, at the 8254th meeting, held on 14 May 2018, the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia pointed out that the situation concerning Kosovo was not a fight for self-determination or freedom, because the Albanians in Kosovo were “not a people who did not have a State of their own”, adding that Albanians had already exercised their right to self-determination by establishing the State of Albania.

In connection with the situation in eastern Ukraine, at the 8270th meeting, held on 29 May 2018 under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)”, the representative of the Russian Federation recalled that the provisions of the Minsk agreements included “residents’ right to linguistic self-determination, broad self-governance and support for cross-border cooperation with Russia”. At the same meeting, the representative of the United States accused the Russian forces of seizing the Parliament building in Crimea back in 2014 and imposing an “illegitimate referendum on the people”.

In the context of the meetings held under the item entitled “The situation concerning Western Sahara”, many speakers referred to the need for a lasting and mutually acceptable solution that provided for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

Moreover, Article 1, including language relating to the principles enshrined in paragraph 2, was also referenced at the 8262nd meeting, held on 17 May under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, as featured in case 1.

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1 S/PV.8183, p. 10.
2 Ibid., p. 20 (Kazakhstan), p. 23 (Poland) and p. 28 (Kuwait).
4 S/PV.8185, p. 2. The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 1 February 2018 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2018/85) and a summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting in a communication from the representative of Kuwait (S/2018/318).
5 S/PV.8185, p. 7 (Kuwait, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs) and p. 12 (United States).
6 Ibid., p. 7.
7 S/PV.8254, p. 25.
8 S/PV.8270, p. 23.
9 Ibid., p. 16.
10 See S/PV.8246, p. 2 (United States), p. 3 (Ethiopia), pp. 5–6 (Sweden), p. 6 (United Kingdom), p. 7 (Kuwait), pp. 7–8 (Plurinational State of Bolivia), p. 8 (Netherlands) and p. 9 (Peru); and S/PV.8387, p. 2 (United States), p. 4 (Sweden and United Kingdom), p. 5 (Ethiopia), p. 7 (Netherlands and Peru) and p. 8 (Plurinational State of Bolivia).
Case 1
Maintenance of international peace and security

At the 8262nd meeting, held on 17 May 2018, at the initiative of Poland, which held the presidency for the month, the Council held an open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Upholding international law within the context of the maintenance of international peace and security”.11

At the meeting, the representative of Qatar underscored that it was essential to avoid any undermining of international peace and security and uphold Article 1 of the Charter and stressed the need to respect the right of people to self-determination.12 The representative of Uruguay emphasized the importance of not losing sight of the principles of non-intervention and self-determination in dealing with internal conflicts.13 The representative of Armenia stressed that “equal rights and self-determination for peoples” were fundamental principles enshrined in the Charter and that the right to self-determination by freely determining one’s political status and freely pursuing one’s economic, social and cultural development belonged to all peoples. He added that the right to self-determination should not be “restricted, suspended or turned into an issue of territorial dispute”, that the principle of that right was a “binding and universally

11 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 3 May 2018 from the representative of Poland to the Secretary-General (S/2018/417/Rev.1), and a summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting in a communication from the representative of Poland (S/2018/560).
12 S/PV.8262, p. 58.
13 Ibid., pp. 68–69.

C. Invocation of the principle enshrined in Article 1 (2) in communications

During the period under review, no explicit references to Article 1 (2) were made in the communications addressed to the Council. However, the principle of self-determination was invoked in numerous communications addressed or brought to the attention of the Council, including communications from Member States relating to Western Sahara,15 the Middle East, including the Palestinian question,16 Nagorno-Karabakh17 and the India-Pakistan question.18 In his reports to the Council pursuant to resolution 2367 (2017), regarding the 2017 referendum for Iraqi Kurdistan,19 and on the situation concerning Western Sahara,20 the Secretary-General also made references to the principle of self-determination.

II. Prohibition of the threat or use of force under Article 2, paragraph 4

Article 2, paragraph 4

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Note

Section II covers the practice of the Council concerning the principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force under Article 2 (4) of the Charter. Subsection A includes implicit references to Article 2 (4) in decisions adopted by the Council. Subsection B highlights constitutional discussions relating to the threat or use of force. Subsection C features explicit references in communications to the Council to the principle enshrined in Article 2 (4), as well as implicit invocations of Article 2, including language relating to the principles enshrined in paragraph 4.

14 Ibid., pp. 87–88.
16 See, for example, S/2018/458; S/2018/470; and S/2018/858.
18 See, for example, S/2018/308, annex; and S/2018/695, annex.
A. Decisions relating to Article 2 (4)

During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any decision containing explicit references to Article 2 (4). In a number of its decisions, however, the Council underlined the principles of Article 2 (4) by (a) reaffirming the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations; (b) reiterating the importance of good-neighbourliness and non-interference by States in the internal affairs of others; (c) calling for the cessation of support by States to armed groups engaged in destabilizing national and regional peace and security; and (d) calling upon parties to withdraw all military forces from a disputed area. The four themes are covered below.

Affirmation of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations

In 2018, the Council stressed the prohibition of the threat or use of force against other Member States through a few of its decisions, in particular concerning the future status of Abyei and the situation in the Middle East (see table 2).

Table 2
Decisions in which the Council affirmed the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision and date</th>
<th>Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2416 (2018) 15 May 2018</td>
<td>Reiterating that the territorial boundaries of States shall not be altered by force and that any territorial disputes shall be settled exclusively by peaceful means, affirming the priority it attaches to the full and urgent implementation of all outstanding issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and underscoring that the future status of Abyei shall be resolved by negotiations between the parties in a manner consistent with the Agreement and not by the unilateral actions of either party (third preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Also see resolution 2445 (2018), third preambular paragraph</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in the Middle East</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2426 (2018) 29 June 2018</td>
<td>Stressing that both parties must abide by the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and scrupulously observe the ceasefire (third preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Also see resolution 2450 (2018), third preambular paragraph</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stresses the obligation on both parties to scrupulously and fully respect the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, calls on the parties to exercise maximum restraint and prevent any breaches of the ceasefire and the area of separation, encourages the parties to take advantage of the liaison function of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force regularly to address issues of mutual concern, as appropriate, and underscores that there should be no military activity of any kind in the area of separation, including military operations by the Syrian Arab Armed Forces (para. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Also see resolution 2450 (2018), para. 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reiteration of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation among States

During the period under review, the Council reiterated in several of its decisions the principles enshrined in Article 2 (4) of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation, in particular with regard to the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya and South Sudan and the Sudan. Furthermore, in many country-specific situations, the Council consistently reaffirmed its respect for or commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of States.
Table 3  
Decisions in which the Council affirmed the principle of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation among States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision and date</th>
<th>Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The situation in the Central African Republic</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Resolution 2399 (2018) 30 January 2018 | Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Central African Republic, and recalling the importance of the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph)  
 *Also see resolution 2448 (2018), second preambular paragraph* |
| S/PRST/2018/14 13 July 2018 | The Security Council reaffirms its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Central African Republic, and recalls the importance of the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (final paragraph) |
| **The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo** |
| Resolution 2409 (2018) 27 March 2018 | Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as all States in the region and emphasizing the need to respect fully the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (third preambular paragraph)  
 *Also see resolution 2424 (2018), second preambular paragraph* |
| **The situation in Libya** |
| S/PRST/2018/11 6 June 2018 | The Security Council calls on all Libyans to improve the atmosphere for national elections by all means possible, including by working constructively towards the unification of the military and economic institutions of Libya; unified and strengthened national security forces, under civilian government authority; and the unifying of the Central Bank of Libya, and recalls the need for Member States to cease support to and official contact with parallel institutions that claim to be the legitimate authority but are outside of the Libyan Political Agreement, as stipulated by it (sixth paragraph) |
| **Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan** |
| Resolution 2406 (2018) 15 March 2018 | Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of South Sudan, and recalling the importance of the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph) |
| Resolution 2429 (2018) 13 July 2018 | Recalling the importance of the principles of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, good-neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations among States in the region (third preambular paragraph) |
Part III. Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations

Decision and date | Provision
---|---
Resolution 2445 (2018) 15 November 2018 | Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Sudan and South Sudan, and to the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph)

*Also see resolution 2416 (2018), second preambular paragraph*

### Calls for the cessation of support by States to armed groups engaged in destabilizing national and regional peace and security

During the period under review, the Council adopted decisions calling upon States to refrain from or prevent the provision of any form of support or assistance to armed groups, including through the financing of their activities, in relation to the situations in Burundi\(^21\) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.\(^22\)

\(^{21}\) S/PRST/2018/7, sixth paragraph.

\(^{22}\) Resolution 2409 (2018), para. 23.

### Calls upon parties to withdraw all military forces from a disputed area

During the period under review, the Council adopted decisions calling upon the parties to the dispute in eastern Ukraine to withdraw military equipment from the conflict zone and urging the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar, located on the border between Israel and Lebanon.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision and date</th>
<th>Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)</td>
<td>The Security Council condemns continuous violations of the ceasefire regime, especially the use of heavy weapons prohibited by the Minsk agreements, responsible for tragic deaths, including among civilians, and calls for the implementation of disengagement commitments and the immediate withdrawal of heavy weapons in accordance with relevant provisions of the Minsk agreements (second paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2018/12 6 June 2018</td>
<td>Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Sudan and South Sudan, and to the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2433 (2018) 30 August 2018</td>
<td>Urges the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, which has actively engaged Israel and Lebanon to facilitate such a withdrawal (para. 16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. Constitutional discussions relating to Article 2 (4)

During the period under review, Article 2 (4) of the Charter was explicitly invoked 16 times at seven Council meetings. In addition, Article 2 was broadly referred to six times at four Council meetings with an emphasis on the principles enshrined in Article 2 (4).

At the 8175th meeting, held on 6 February under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, the representative of Mexico expressed concern about the use of references to Article 51 of the Charter by some States to address threats to international peace and security with military action, which, he stated, “coupled with the ambiguous language of recent Council resolutions”, ran the risk of a “de facto broadening of exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force, as set out in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter”.\(^23\) The representative of Brazil stressed the need to devote more attention to the working methods of the Council as they related to the use of force, and in particular, the invocation of self-defence under Article 51. In that connection, he considered it critical

\(^{23}\) S/PV.8175, p. 58.
that States provide sufficient information regarding the attack based on which self-defence was being invoked to allow for the appraisal of the proportionality and necessity of interventions.\textsuperscript{24}

At the 8181st meeting, held on 14 February 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic opened his statement by noting that Article 2 (1), (4) and (7) of the Charter provided for respect for the principle of the sovereign equality of all Member States and provided that all Members should refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.\textsuperscript{25}

At the 8203rd meeting, held on 14 March 2018 under the item entitled “Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218)”, the representative of the United Kingdom said that the Russian Federation was responsible for the nerve agent attack in Salisbury against Sergei Skripal in what the United Kingdom considered to be an “unlawful use of force and a violation of Article 2 of the Charter”.\textsuperscript{26} In reference to the letter from the United Kingdom, the representative of the Russian Federation said that it contained threats to a sovereign State and permanent member of the Council that were “contrary to international law and Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.”\textsuperscript{27}

At the 8270th meeting, held on 29 May under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)\textsuperscript{28}”, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands stated that “the illegal annexation of Crimea and the active, destabilizing role of Russia in Donbass” went directly against Article 2 (4) of the Charter. At the 8410th meeting, held on 26 November under the same item, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation “constituted a deliberate violation of international agreements and commitments, including Article 2 of the Charter”.\textsuperscript{29}

At the 8432nd meeting, held on 19 December also under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the representative of Lebanon condemned the “constant violations” of Lebanese sovereignty by Israel by land, air and sea, in contravention of resolution 1701 (2006) and of “a key provision” of Article 2 (4) of the Charter.\textsuperscript{30}

Cases 2 to 5 below, which cover relevant deliberations of the Council under the items entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and “Threats to international peace and security”, feature the remaining 11 explicit invocations of Article 2 (4), as well as 4 broader invocations of Article 2, including language relating to paragraph 4, and several implicit references to the principles of the non-use of force and non-interference. Also, Article 2 (4) was implicitly invoked at various other Council meetings during the reporting period.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., pp. 24–25. For more information on the practice concerning Article 51 and the right to self-defence, see part VII, sect. X.

\textsuperscript{25} S/PV.8181, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{26} S/PV.8203, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p. 8.

\textsuperscript{28} S/PV.8270, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{29} S/PV.8410, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{30} S/PV.8432, p. 14.

Case 2
Maintenance of international peace and security

At its 8185th meeting, held on 21 February 2018, at the initiative of Kuwait, which held the presidency for the month, the Council held an open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security”. The debate began with a statement by the Secretary-General, who stressed that Charter principles – such as the non-use of force, non-intervention and the sovereign equality of Member States – remained the foundation of international relations, and that the values proclaimed by the Charter, including good-neighbourliness, remained guideposts for global harmony. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait stated that it was essential that the Council worked together to end aggression and to ensure respect for the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. The representative of the United Kingdom recalled that February marked the fourth anniversary of the “illegal annexation of Crimea, in breach of Article 2 of the Charter”. He called upon the Russian Federation to abide by the Minsk agreements and reiterated the importance of upholding the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

The representative of the Russian Federation underscored that the purposes and principles of the Charter, including non-interference in the internal affairs of States, represented “the basis for neighbourly relations among States and their mutually beneficial and constructive cooperation for the benefit of all”. He noted, however, that throughout the history of the United Nations, there were “numerous examples of open disregard for the Charter, right up to the illegal use of force”. He also stated that, instead of collective action, what was being witnessed were unilateral measures and threats, including threats of force, incompatible with international law and order. He stated that some States manipulated “concepts such as the responsibility to protect, the rule of law, human rights up front, and other intrusive instruments” in order to achieve unilateral goals. He further disapproved of the “new phenomenon” of States accusing other countries of interference, while persistently engaging in such interference themselves. The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia categorically rejected the use or threat of use of force unless it was in full compliance with Chapter VII of the Charter and the multilateral system underpinning the Organization. He condemned States that claimed that their interests prevailed over others and were willing to use their military power to protect those interests, and noted that breaches of the purposes and principles of the Charter included not only intervention but also the threat of the use of force. He concluded by stating that justice existed to promote coexistence by emphasizing peace and dialogue and not force or other unilateral actions.

The representative of Peru expressed concern about the “unsystematic manner” in which the Charter was often interpreted. He pointed out that the Charter principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference often conflicted with principles of justice and the obligation of States to act in accordance with the Charter itself, including in the area of human rights. While noting that this tended to result in an impasse, he reiterated that the principles of Article 2 were geared towards collective action and emphasized that the Charter required State cooperation, while still respecting sovereignty, “to carry out the purposes listed in Article 1”. On a similar note, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Côte d’Ivoire stated that the growing number of inter-State conflicts and civil wars was “straining the United Nations peacekeeping system”. He noted that this raised the question of the legitimacy, legality and necessity of the use of force to prevent a civilian massacre without prior authorization from the Council. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland stated that acts undertaken without respect for Article 2 diminished the significance of the Charter and the global peace architecture. He added that, as the Council had proved “to be a guardian of the purposes and principles of the Charter”, the Council should therefore be considered the “ultimate custodian” of the principle of the territorial sovereignty of States and the prohibition of the threat or use of force.

32 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 1 February 2018 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2018/85), and a summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting in a communication from Kuwait (S/2018/318).
33 S/PV.8185, p. 2.
34 Ibid., p. 7.
36 Ibid., pp. 22–23.
37 Ibid., pp. 28–29.
38 Ibid., p. 19.
39 Ibid., p. 11.
40 Ibid., p. 9.
Case 3
Maintenance of international peace and security

At the 8262nd meeting, held on 17 May 2018, at the initiative of Poland, which held the presidency for the month, the Council held an open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Upholding international law within the context of the maintenance of international peace and security”. Numerous speakers underlined the paramount importance of the principles of the non-use of force and non-intervention. The representative of the European Union emphasized that all States must refrain from actions that were in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter, which prohibited the threat or use of force. The representative of Peru referred to the prohibition against the use of force as “one of the cornerstones of the international order”. However, he expressed concern that some countries were testing arguments and interpretations that were “ultimately alien to international law”. Likewise, the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia criticized the “reinterpretation, redefining or selective application of the provisions” of the Charter and other international instruments by some States. He noted that this was “reflected in interventions, occupations, regime-change policies and the application of unilateral coercive measures”, which, in flagrant violation of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, had “led to humanitarian disasters” and “destroyed entire nations under the rationale of enforcing international law”. He specified that Article 2 (4) of the Charter was “very clear” in calling upon Member States to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial or political independence of any State and further noted that one could “clearly not claim to defend international law by violating international law”. The representative of Sri Lanka underscored that upholding international law within the context of the maintenance of international peace and security required “absolute adherence to Article 2 of the Charter”, which included the prohibition of the threat or use of force.

The representative of the Russian Federation noted that the principles of good faith and cooperation among States were being increasingly replaced by military, sanctions-based or political pressure, “taking the world back to an era before the Charter, when all disputes between States were resolved by force”. Mentioning Article 2 (4), he specified that military force against a State was only permitted when sanctioned by the Council or in self-defence. More explicitly, he criticized the United States and its coalition partners for their presence in the Syrian Arab Republic as they had not been invited by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and condemned the coalition’s strikes on the country on 14 April 2018 as illegal. He noted that only the United Kingdom had “attempted” to validate its actions, using the concept of “humanitarian intervention as essential to preventing the suffering of the Syrian people”. The representative of the Russian Federation rejected, however, this justification and claimed that to use humanitarian intervention as a justification for an armed attack on a sovereign State was “absurd”. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran complained that certain Member States tended to use intimidation and the use or threat of force to impose their will on others, especially in the case of the Middle East. He stated that unilateral measures, in the form of illegal recourse to war, occupation, aggression and denial of the sovereignty of Member States, were “obvious manifestations of the rule of power, not the rule of law”. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela accused the United States of conducting a “systematic campaign of acts of aggression” against his country, stressing that the adoption and implementation of unilateral coercive measures, including even the threat of military intervention, were in flagrant violation of international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter.

The representative of the United States criticized the argument that a nation’s sovereignty precluded...
outside action even when people were suffering. While recognizing the sovereignty of her country and that of other nations, she noted that joining the United Nations itself was a freely chosen act of sovereignty. She further stated that Governments could not use sovereignty as a shield when they committed mass atrocities, spread weapons of mass destruction or perpetrated acts of terrorism and added that, in such instances, the Council must be prepared to act.\(^50\)

The representative of Brazil referred to the reinterpretation of the law on self-defence and problematic readings of Article 2 (4) of the Charter. He expressed disagreement with applying self-defence as a response to non-State actors. He further emphasized that Article 51 was an exception to Article 2 (4) and that self-defence must be interpreted as a response to an armed attack undertaken by, or somehow attributable to, a State. The representative of Brazil went on to note that Article 2 (4) did not envisage the use of force as a “self-help mechanism” or as a response to violations of general international law, and expressed disagreement with the tendency to unilaterally resort to force for protecting human rights or forestalling international crimes. He rejected the viewpoint that Article 2 (4) prohibited the use of force only when it went against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State and stressed that the aim of Article 2 (4) was to reinforce the prohibition of the use of force. He added that a resolve to stop human rights violations and defeat terrorism could not allow States to ignore international law.\(^51\) Other States also expressed concern about ambiguities regarding Article 2 (4). The representative of Cyprus, for example, urged States to refrain from actions in violation of Article 2 (4) and expressed concerns about attempts to “open the door of Article 51” to address the threat of terrorism in response to armed attacks by non-State actors.\(^52\) Likewise, the representative of Mexico expressed concern over what his country considered to be a lack of legal clarity regarding whether the use of force against non-State actors was permissible and stated that the Council should analyse the responsibilities of States under the Charter.\(^53\)

During the debate, numerous States specifically referred to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation as illegal and/or an act of aggression,\(^54\) or a violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity.\(^55\) The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Latvia considered the annexation a violation of the fundamental principle of territorial integrity and highlighted the need for a rules-based system so that powerful countries did not annex parts of other countries, or whole countries, on false pretexts.\(^56\) The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lithuania referred to the actions of the Russian Federation as blatant breaches of the Charter.\(^57\) Likewise, the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia asserted that the Russian Federation had been illegally occupying two regions of Georgia, namely, Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia. He also affirmed that the aggression against Georgia was not an isolated incident and that similar patterns had been identified later in Ukraine and could be repeated elsewhere.\(^58\) The representative of France warned against States recognizing any annexation, such as the illegal annexation of Crimea, resulting from a territorial acquisition obtained by the threat or use of force.\(^59\) The representative of the Russian Federation, however, referred to the issue of Crimea as “settled”. He further argued that the way it had become part of the Russian Federation had been in full compliance with international law and specifically the right to self-determination.\(^60\) The representative of Ukraine defined the occupation by the Russian Federation of territories in Ukraine as an act of aggression against his country both in Crimea and Donbass and a worrying trend of the revanchist policy of the Russian Federation of using military force against other States.\(^61\)

Furthermore, the representative of Cyprus criticized what his country believed to be the threat of the use of force in the Eastern Mediterranean by Turkey, accusing Turkey of interfering with his country’s inherent and inalienable sovereign rights to explore and exploit its offshore natural resources.\(^62\) The representative of Turkey responded by justifying his country’s right to intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.\(^63\) The representative of Cyprus, in reply to the statement by the representative of Turkey, called the actions of Turkey on the island an act of aggression and stressed that no country could lawfully intervene in

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\(^{50}\) Ibid., p. 17.

\(^{51}\) Ibid., pp. 44–45.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., pp. 79–80.

\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 47.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., p. 12 (Poland), p. 18 (United Kingdom), p. 22 (Sweden), p. 29 (France) and p. 66 (Norway).

\(^{55}\) Ibid., p. 12 (Poland), p. 33 (Lithuania), p. 34 (Latvia), pp. 60–61 (Ukraine) and p. 63 (Germany).

\(^{56}\) Ibid., p. 34.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., p. 33.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 37.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., p. 29.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., p. 27.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., p. 61.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., p. 80.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., p. 81.
another country unless it did so in accordance with explicit provisions of the Charter.\textsuperscript{64} Similarly, the representative of Azerbaijan cited his country’s experiences with facing “armed aggression” and referenced several Council resolutions in which the Council had acknowledged that such acts had constituted violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. He demanded the withdrawal of occupying forces in the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the restoration of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of his country.\textsuperscript{65} The representative of Djibouti affirmed that his country continued to face the threat to international peace and security created by the unlawful use of force by Eritrea against his country in 2008. He added that threats of force continued to emanate from Eritrea and the risk of violent confrontation was high.\textsuperscript{66}

**Case 4**

**Maintenance of international peace and security**

At its 8395th meeting, held on 9 November 2018, at the initiative of China, which held the presidency for the month, the Council held an open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Strengthening multilateralism and the role of the United Nations”.\textsuperscript{67} During the meeting, several speakers affirmed their commitment to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter, including those of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States,\textsuperscript{68} and the prohibition of the use of force.\textsuperscript{69} Some Member States also underlined the links between multilateralism and those principles. In that regard, the representative of the Russian Federation indicated that the Charter outlined the principles of multilateralism, including the key elements for a “polycentric” world order and the basic principles and norms of international relations, from the sovereign equality of States and the prohibition of interference in their internal affairs to the ban on the use of force in international relations without the permission of the Council or beyond the limits of self-defence. He added that the people had the right to determine their future without outside interference in their internal affairs.\textsuperscript{70} The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia stated that the main strength of multilateralism derived from the degree of attachment to, and respect for, the purposes and principles of the Charter. He further emphasized that any measure adopted unilaterally by one State to the detriment of another, with the use of force or other coercive measures, was illegal and contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter.\textsuperscript{71} The representative of Equatorial Guinea stated that multilateralism was necessary in order to preserve, inter alia, dialogue, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and international equality among States.\textsuperscript{72} The representative of Cuba asserted that the purposes and principles of the Charter formed the basis of multilateralism and the international system. He further argued that the principles of international law enshrined in the Charter, including refraining from the threat or use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes, must continue to be the foundation of international law and should always guide the actions of States and international relations.\textsuperscript{73} The representative of Brazil noted that the alternatives to multilateralism were grim and involved fragmentation, unilateralism and more frequent use of force. He also recalled that the prohibition of the use of force was the rule and that self-defence was an exception.\textsuperscript{74} The representative of Mexico stressed that multilateralism could not be called into question just because one or more countries violated the Charter with the threat of the use of force, and the representative of Lithuania indicated that inaction by the Council and the international community encouraged aggression and the use of force and threatened the multilateral system, which was based on international law.\textsuperscript{75}

The representative of Liechtenstein underscored that a key aspect of the Charter, and therefore a fundamental task of the Council, was to enforce the rules governing the use of force. He further noted that the Charter had made the use of force illegal except in self-defence or per authorization by the Council. He also indicated that, further to the resolution adopted in December 2017 by the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in which the Assembly activated the jurisdiction of the

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p. 96.  
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 76.  
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p. 73.  
\textsuperscript{67} The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 1 November 2018 from the representative of China to the Secretary-General (S/2018/982).  
\textsuperscript{68} S/PV.8395, p. 14 (Russian Federation), p. 17 (Kuwait), pp. 26–27 (Ethiopia), p. 42 (Pakistan), p. 57 (Cuba) and p. 76 (Morocco).  
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., p. 14 (Russian Federation), p. 37 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), p. 41 (Australia), p. 52 (African Union), p. 57 (Cuba) and p. 60 (Qatar).  
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., pp. 14–15.  
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p. 25.  
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. 22.  
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., pp. 57–58.  
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 62.  
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 35 (Mexico) and p. 63 (Lithuania).
Court over the crime of aggression, the Council had an additional tool available to enforce a decision on the legality of the use of force when an act of aggression was in manifest violation of the rules of the Charter.76

**Case 5**

**Threats to international peace and security**

At its 8225th meeting, held on 9 April 2018 under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the Council was briefed on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Syrian Arab Republic noted that, on 7 April, reports had emerged of an alleged chemical weapons attack in the Syrian city of Duma. He noted that several States had expressed suspicion that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic had been responsible for the attack but that the Government, as well as several other States, had questioned the credibility of the allegations and had considered them to be “a fabrication or/and a provocation”.77 After the briefing, several Council members underlined their firm opposition to the use or threat of force.78 Some stated that there was no military solution to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic.79 The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia rejected unilateral actions, which his country deemed illegal and contrary to the principles of the Charter.80

The representative of the Russian Federation stated that his delegation had called the meeting because Washington, “with London and Paris blindly following its lead”, was being confrontational against both the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic, with threats of the use of force against a sovereign State.81 The representative of the United States stated that her country would respond to the use of chemical weapons whether the Council discharged its duty or demonstrated its utter and complete failure to protect the people of the Syrian Arab Republic.82 Similarly, the representative of France said that his country would assume its full responsibility in the fight against the proliferation of chemical weapons.83

After Council members delivered their statements, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic accused France, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of providing chemical weapons to terrorists in the Syrian Arab Republic. He further accused those Governments of attempting to justify their act of aggression by fabricating evidence that his Government had used chemical weapons against its citizens.84

Four days later, at its 8231st meeting, the Council again was convened under the same sub-item. The Secretary-General addressed the Council and noted that the Syrian Arab Republic represented the most serious threat to international peace and security as it involved proxy wars with several national armies. He reiterated that there was no military solution to the conflict and expressed his concern that the inability to reach a compromise regarding the establishment of an accountability mechanism for the alleged chemical attacks in the Syrian Arab Republic could lead to a full-blown military escalation.85 After the Secretary-General’s briefing, several Council members also reiterated that there was no military solution to the conflict.86 A number of Council members specified their opposition to the threat or use of force unless it fell under the conditions set out in the Charter.87 The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia stated that Council members were ignoring the main reason that the Council had been convened, namely, that one State had threatened the illegal use of force against another State in violation of the Charter. Expressing concern over constant attacks on multilateralism, he directly quoted Article 2 (4) and warned that it would be very dangerous to fight an alleged violation of international law with another violation of international law and the Charter. He specified that the use of force was only permissible in self-defence in line with Article 51 or, alternatively, when approved by the Council.88 Similarly, the representative of Equatorial Guinea stated that a unilateral military response could be counterproductive and would lead to even more suffering and chaos.89

The representative of the Russian Federation pointed out that, while the Russian military was in the Syrian Arab Republic on the invitation of the legitimate

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76 Ibid., p. 30.
77 S/PV.8225, p. 2.
78 Ibid., p. 15 (China), p. 21 (Plurinational State of Bolivia) and p. 22 (Peru).
79 Ibid., p. 15 (China), p. 18 (Côte d’Ivoire) and p. 21 (Kuwait and Plurinational State of Bolivia).
80 Ibid., p. 21.
81 Ibid., p. 5.
82 Ibid., p. 11.
83 Ibid., p. 13.
85 S/PV.8231, p. 3.
86 Ibid., p. 7 (China), p. 12 (Equatorial Guinea) and p. 20 (Peru).
87 Ibid., p. 7 (China), p. 12 (Equatorial Guinea), p. 14 (Plurinational State of Bolivia) and p. 16 (Kazakhstan).
88 Ibid., pp. 13–14.
89 Ibid., p. 12.
Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, dangerous military preparations were being undertaken for an illegal use of force against a sovereign State in violation of the norms of international law. He went on to say that it was not only the use of force that was forbidden by the Charter, but even threats of its use, such as the threats contained in statements and actions by the United States and its allies, that were forbidden. The representative of the United States responded by criticizing the use by the Russian Federation of the veto to protect the Syrian Arab Republic and specified that if the United States and its allies chose to act, it would be in defence of an agreed upon principle and international norm. Similarly, the representative of France specified that France could not allow fundamental values and standards of humanity, such as those that emanated from the Charter, to be thwarted without reaction. The representative of the United Kingdom specified that her country would not sacrifice the international order to the desire of the Russian Federation to protect its ally at all costs. After all Council members had spoken, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic also quoted Article 2 (4) of the Charter. He accused “three permanent members of the Council” of dragging the entire world towards the abyss of war and aggression and further specified that, if France, the United Kingdom and the United States undermined his country’s sovereignty, the Syrian Arab Republic would engage in self-defence, as permitted by Article 51 of the Charter.

On 14 April, at its 8233rd meeting, the Council met for a third time under the same sub-item. The Secretary-General reported to the Council that, on the previous night, France, the United Kingdom and the United States had engaged in air strikes on three military locations in the Syrian Arab Republic. In that regard, the Council voted on a draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation condemning the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic by the United States and its allies in violation of international law and the Charter. The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes.

During the meeting, the representative of Poland expressed his country’s support for the strikes of the previous night and the representative of the Netherlands referred to them as understandable. Conversely, the representative of Ethiopia considered the strikes to be difficult to defend as being consistent with the principles of the Charter. The representative of Kazakhstan reiterated that military action could only be used when approved by the Council and noted that the strikes of the previous night lacked that approval. The representative of Côte d’Ivoire noted that the use of force had to be approved by the Council to preserve its essential legal authority and to thereby prevent any deviation or abuse. The representative of Equatorial Guinea emphasized his country’s opposition to the use of force in international relations and stressed that it was only acceptable when in line with the principles of international law and the provisions of the Charter. The representative of Sweden, while acknowledging the need to address the issue of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, underscored that there was an obligation to act consistently with the Charter and international law. The representative of Peru stated that any response to the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic had to be consistent with the Charter, international law and Council resolutions.

The representative of China noted that any unilateral military action that circumvented the Council was in violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter and international law. Likewise, the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia rejected the threat or use of force without prior Council authorization and expressly referred to the strikes as a breach of the Charter. He stated that all unilateral actions ran counter to international law and that such actions were attacks on multilateral organizations, the Council, the Charter and the international community.

The representative of the Russian Federation read a statement from his country’s President calling the actions of the United States and its allies an act of aggression against a sovereign State without permission from the Council and in violation of the Charter and the norms and principles of international law. He also stated that it was time that the United

90 Ibid., p. 4.
91 Ibid., p. 6.
92 Ibid., p. 9.
93 Ibid., p. 10.
94 Ibid., pp. 21–22.
95 S/PV.8233, p. 2.
97 S/PV.8233, pp. 22–23. The draft resolution received three votes in favour (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Russian Federation), eight against (Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States) and four abstentions (Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Peru).
98 Ibid., p. 11 (Poland) and p. 13 (Netherlands).
99 Ibid., p. 16.
100 Ibid., p. 10.
101 Ibid., p. 18.
102 Ibid., p. 17.
103 Ibid., p. 12.
104 Ibid., p. 18.
105 Ibid., p. 10.
States learned that it was the Charter that governed the international code of conduct on the use of force.\textsuperscript{107} The representative of the United States responded by pointing to the unique threat of chemical weapons. She indicated that the coalition had acted to deter future chemical weapons use and further asserted that the United States and its allies were not going to permit the use of such weapons without consequence.\textsuperscript{108} The representative of France claimed that his country’s actions were fully in line with the objectives and values of the preamble of the Charter and necessary to address the violations by the Syrian Arab Republic of its obligations stemming from the law, treaties and its own commitments.\textsuperscript{109}

The representative of the United Kingdom outlined that the legal basis for its use of force against the Syrian Arab Republic was the concept of humanitarian intervention and emphasized her country’s view that it could not be illegal to use force to prevent the killing of such numbers of innocent people. She argued that, on an exceptional basis, the use of force was permitted if there was evidence – generally accepted by the international community as a whole – of extreme humanitarian distress and it was objectively clear that, if lives were to be saved, there was no practicable alternative. She noted, however, that the use of force had to be necessary, proportional and limited to the aim of relieving that humanitarian distress.\textsuperscript{110} The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the United Kingdom was trying to “substitute” the Charter. He reiterated that the Russian Federation and other countries had rejected the concept of humanitarian intervention precisely because they did not want it used as a justification to violate the Charter.\textsuperscript{111} In response, the representative of the United Kingdom repeated that humanitarian intervention under the legal framework she outlined was fully within the principles and purposes of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{112}

In response to statements by Council members, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic accused France, the United Kingdom and the United States of flagrant violations of the principles of international law and the Charter.\textsuperscript{113}

C. Invocation of the principle enshrined in Article 2 (4) in communications

The correspondence addressed to the Council during 2018 included eight explicit references to Article 2 (4) of the Charter and three implicit references in which Article 2 was broadly invoked, including language relating to the principles enshrined in paragraph 4.

In identical letters dated 1 February 2018 to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic condemned the military activities of Turkey in the northern Syrian Arab Republic, calling them “a flagrant attack against the territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic and a violation of the provisions of the Charter”, and indicated that such activities violated in particular Article 2 (4).\textsuperscript{114}

On 16 February, the Permanent Representatives of Liechtenstein and Switzerland addressed a letter to the President of the Council in which they noted that, with the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression taking legal effect on 17 July 2018, the Council would soon have a new tool at its disposal that would complement the prohibition of the illegal use of force enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the Charter. They added that, if the Court’s new jurisdiction was incorporated diligently into the Council’s toolbox, the Council’s power to refer to Court matters relating to the crime of aggression would have tremendous potential to deter the illegal use of force in the future.\textsuperscript{115}

In response to a letter dated 26 March 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia addressed to the President of the Council, in which Saudi Arabia had referred to the Islamic Republic of Iran as the Houthis’ “sponsors” and had accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of providing the Houthis with ballistic missiles,\textsuperscript{116} the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in identical letters dated 29 March to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, said that the usual scenario for the political and military authorities of Saudi Arabia had been to “repeat their unfounded assumptions and allegations followed by the threat of use of force against a United Nations Member State in clear defiance of Article 2 (4) of the Charter”.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., pp. 5–6.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., p. 9.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., p. 25.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., pp. 19–22.
\textsuperscript{114} S/2018/82.
\textsuperscript{115} S/2018/130.
\textsuperscript{116} S/2018/266.
\textsuperscript{117} S/2018/278.
On 11 April, the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed identical letters to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council in response to threats made by France, the United Kingdom and the United States to use military force against the Syrian Arab Republic. The Permanent Representative stated that the Council was required to "exercise its mandates under Article 1, paragraph 1, and Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, in maintaining international peace and security, the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace and in ensuring that all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State".  

On 19 September, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed a letter to the Secretary-General in response to "inflammatory statements" by the Prime Minister of Israel on 29 August, "threatening Iran with nuclear annihilation", which the Islamic Republic of Iran considered "a serious violation of international law, in particular Article 2 (4) of the Charter".

In a letter dated 12 September addressed to the President of the Council, the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic informed the President of the Council of "violations" committed by the Netherlands "against its obligations and responsibilities", in particular with regard to Article 2 of the Charter, which set out "the duty of each Member State not to interfere in the internal affairs of other Member States", by providing support and financing to terrorist armed groups in the Syrian Arab Republic.

In response to identical letters dated 26 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council on the activities of Hizbullah in Lebanon, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon, in identical letters dated 12 November to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, referred to the allegations contained in the letter from Israel as threats that violated Article 2 (4) of the Charter.

On 27 November 2018, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine addressed a letter to the Secretary-General transmitting a statement by the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine in reaction to the incident between Russian and Ukrainian vessels in the Sea of Azov, calling the incident an "act of armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, as defined, in particular, in Article 2 of the Charter". In a subsequent letter dated 10 December addressed to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine transmitted an address by the parliament of Ukraine to, inter alia, the United Nations, referring to the same incidents in similar terms.

In a letter dated 24 December 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran indicated that, at a press conference on 29 November, the special representative of the United States for the Islamic Republic of Iran had threatened the Islamic Republic of Iran by stating that the United States had "the military option on the table" and would "not hesitate to use military force", in clear violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter. In another letter also dated 24 December 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran called the "hostile policies and practices, as well as the threats, plots and plans" of Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran "illegal" and blatant violations of Article 2 (4) of the Charter.

\[^{118}\text{S/2018/332.}\]
\[^{119}\text{S/2018/859.}\]
\[^{120}\text{S/2018/839.}\]
\[^{121}\text{S/2018/960.}\]
\[^{122}\text{S/2018/1018.}\]
\[^{123}\text{S/2018/1053, annex.}\]
\[^{124}\text{S/2018/1112, annex.}\]
\[^{125}\text{S/2018/1155.}\]
\[^{126}\text{S/2018/1156.}\]
Part III. Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations

III. Obligation under Article 2, paragraph 5, to refrain from assisting the target of enforcement action

Article 2, paragraph 5

All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

Note

Section III covers the practice of the Council with regard to the principle enshrined in Article 2 (5) of the Charter, in particular the obligation of Member States to refrain from providing assistance to a State against which the United Nations has taken preventive or enforcement action. During the period under review, Article 2 (5) was not explicitly invoked in the decisions of the Council. The Council, however, included language of relevance to the interpretation of Article 2 (5) in decisions concerning the situations in Libya128 and the Central African Republic.129 While Article 2 (5) was not explicitly invoked in meetings of the Council during 2018, implicit references of relevance to the interpretation of Article 2 (5) were made at two meetings of the Council during the review period. At a meeting held under the item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, the representative of Japan called upon all Member States to “immediately stop supplying refined petroleum products” to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.130 At a meeting held under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the representative of the United States accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of providing weapons and associated material to the Houthi movement in Yemen, in contravention of the arms embargo provisions set out in resolution 2216 (2015) and in violation of resolution 2231 (2015).131 The correspondence addressed to the Council in 2018 did not contain any material relating to Article 2 (5).

IV. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of States by the United Nations under Article 2, paragraph 7

Article 2, paragraph 7

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

Note

Section IV concerns the practice of the Council in relation to the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations in the internal affairs of States enshrined in Article 2 (7) of the Charter. Subsection A features implicit references to that Article in the decisions of the Council. Subsection B features the deliberations of the Council touching upon the principle enshrined in Article 2 (7). Subsection C provides a brief summary of explicit references to Article 2 (7) in the correspondence addressed to the Council.

A. Decisions relating to Article 2 (7)

In 2018, Article 2 (7) was not explicitly referred to in the decisions of the Council. However, in two decisions adopted under the item entitled “The situation in Afghanistan”, the Council decided that the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan would continue to lead and coordinate the international civilian efforts within their mandate and in a manner consistent with Afghan sovereignty, leadership and ownership,132 and reaffirmed its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan.

127 For the practice of the Council relating to assistance by Member States to United Nations action in accordance with the Charter, see part V (Article 25) and part VII (Articles 43 and 49).
128 Resolution 2434 (2018), eighteenth preambular paragraph.
130 S/PV.8353, p. 23.
131 S/PV.8439, p. 4.
132 Resolution 2405 (2018), paras. 6 and 7.
and underscored its support to the Afghan electoral process as a fully Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process. In a resolution adopted under the item entitled “The situation in the Central African Republic”, the Council emphasized the need for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic to act in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Central African Republic while carrying out its mandate. Also, in a resolution adopted under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the Council reaffirmed its commitment to and respect for the principles of political independence, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all States in conducting all peacekeeping activities. In a presidential statement issued under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”, the Council again reaffirmed the same commitment in conducting both peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities.

### B. Constitutional discussions relating to Article 2 (7)

During the period under review, Article 2 (7) was explicitly invoked three times during the deliberations of the Council. At a meeting held on 14 February 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic opened his statement invoking, inter alia, Article 2 (7), adding that no provision of the Charter authorized the United Nations to intervene in matters that were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. At a meeting held on 17 October under the same item, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic recalled the language of Article 2 (7) and indicated that some Council members seemed “to have forgotten about it”. Article 2 (7) was also explicitly referenced during a meeting held under the item entitled “The situation in Burundi”, which is the subject of case 6. Article 2, including language relating to the principles enshrined in paragraph 7, was broadly invoked once, as featured in case 7. The Council also addressed the relationship between the mandates of peacekeeping operations and the need to respect the sovereignty of host States enshrined in Article 2 (7), as discussed in case 8. Furthermore, in 2018, Member States made numerous statements of relevance to the interpretation and application of Article 2 (7) of the Charter without engaging in constitutional discussions.

### Case 6

**The situation in Burundi**

At its 8189th meeting, held on 26 February 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in Burundi”, the Council was briefed on the situation in Burundi by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi. In addressing the content of the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the country, and specifically the concerns raised on the decision of the Government of Burundi to hold a referendum on a constitutional amendment, the Special Envoy stressed that such expression of concern could not be interpreted as interference in the country’s internal affairs by denying the country its sovereign right to amend its own Constitution. The representative of Equatorial Guinea stated that the situation in Burundi was an internal matter that must be resolved through a genuine and inclusive political negotiation process.

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134 Resolution 2448 (2018), para. 53.
135 Resolution 2447 (2018), fifth preambular paragraph.
136 S/PRST/2018/20, fourth paragraph.
137 S/PV.8181, p. 10.
139 See, for example, under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, S/PV.8414, p. 17 (Russian Federation), p. 20 (United Kingdom), pp. 37–38 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), pp. 54–55 (Cuba) and p. 57 (Islamic Republic of Iran); under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, S/PV.8262, p. 17 (United States), p. 24 (Plurinational State of Bolivia), pp. 68–69 (Uruguay), pp. 69 (Kenya) and p. 72 (Austria), and S/PV.8346, p. 15 (Russian Federation) and p. 17 (Plurinational State of Bolivia); under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”, S/PV.8407, p. 7 (China), p. 27 (Egypt) and p. 46 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement); under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, S/PV.8264, p. 26 (Russian Federation) and p. 59 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement); under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, S/PV.8290, p. 9 (China) and p. 19 (Ethiopia); under the item entitled “The situation concerning Iraq”, S/PV.8184, p. 10 (Iraq); under the item entitled “The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, S/PV.8318, p. 17 (Plurinational State of Bolivia), p. 18 (China), p. 19 (Russian Federation) and p. 21 (Democratic Republic of the Congo); and under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, S/PV.8412, p. 8 (Russian Federation), p. 10 (Kuwait), p. 16 (China), p. 17 (Ethiopia), p. 18 (Plurinational State of Bolivia) and pp. 20–21 (Iraq).
140 S/2018/89.
141 S/PV.8189, p. 2.
among Burundians. He also stressed that, as a sovereign country, Burundi enjoyed the right to adopt any legislative initiative that it deemed appropriate, noted that many countries had gone through similar constitutional processes that had been considered internal affairs and emphasized that the case of Burundi should not be treated differently. The representative of Peru considered the proposed revision of the Constitution to be a matter that fell within the country’s domestic sovereignty while underlining the importance of the initiative being conducted in an inclusive manner with the broad participation of the population. The representative of Burundi noted that the United Nations and its Member States were in no way empowered to discuss the constitutional affairs of sovereign States and criticized the report of the Secretary-General for having flagrantly violated the principle of respect for the sovereign equality of States enshrined in Article 2 (7) of the Charter. He further noted that the contents of the report constituted an interference in the domestic affairs of Burundi and cautioned the Council against such variance in the interpretation of the Charter.

Case 7
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

At its 8340th meeting, held on 5 September 2018 under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council discussed the situation in Nicaragua. During the meeting, the representatives of the Russian Federation, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela argued against the discussion of domestic matters of sovereign States by the Council. The representative of the Russian Federation added that the meeting was a “blatant interference in the affairs of a sovereign State”, which had discredited and replaced the notion of preventive diplomacy. While expressing support for the principle of preventive diplomacy, the representative of Kazakhstan cautioned against external influence in the internal affairs of independent countries. The representative of Kuwait emphasized his country’s full commitment to the principles stipulated in Article 2 of the Charter, which called for respecting the sovereignty of States and refraining from interfering in their internal affairs. The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia expressed his opposition to the holding of the meeting based on the Charter, which clearly established the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States. He further emphasized that, if the international community truly wished to help Nicaragua to resolve its problems, it had to do so in the framework of the Charter, respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Nicaragua and condemn any interference, interventionism or policy of regime change. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua asserted that the inclusion of the meeting on the Council’s agenda was a clear interference in the internal affairs of Nicaragua and a violation of the Charter.

The representatives of Ethiopia and China also rejected any involvement of the Council in the situation in Nicaragua, and while the former asserted that the situation at the current stage remained “an internal matter of Nicaraguans”, the latter reiterated its call for adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries.

Case 8
United Nations peacekeeping operations

At the 8218th meeting, held on 28 March 2018 under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the representative of China underscored the need to adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter and, in that regard, to fully respect the sovereignty of host countries and avoid arbitrarily taking over responsibilities that fell under the purview of national sovereignty. The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, and the representative of Cuba also emphasized that peacekeeping operations must be carried out in strict compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, including the respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of States, as well as non-interference in their internal affairs. Similarly, the representative of El Salvador stated that the principles enshrined in the Charter,

142 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
143 Ibid., p. 10.
144 Ibid., p. 11.
145 S/PV.8340, p. 6 (Russian Federation), p. 16 (Plurinational State of Bolivia) and p. 22 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).
146 Ibid., p. 6.
147 Ibid., p. 14.
148 Ibid., p. 7.
149 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
150 Ibid., p. 20.
151 Ibid., p. 15 (Ethiopia) and p. 18 (China).
152 S/PV.8218, p. 25.
153 Ibid., p. 34 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) and pp. 74–75 (Cuba).
especially the principles of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of States and of non-intervention in internal affairs, were fundamental to promoting international peace and security. She added that respect for the principles of peacekeeping was essential to the success of operations on the ground.\footnote{Ibid., p. 57.} The representative of Viet Nam asserted that respect for international law and the Charter, including the principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign States and the consent of the parties, should serve as the foundation for all United Nations peacekeeping operations.\footnote{Ibid., p. 80.}

The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia underscored that a preventive approach was indispensable to an appropriate design and understanding of mandates, whatever their nature, with regard to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, promoting national ownership and without using the approach as an intervention tool.\footnote{Ibid., p. 28.} The representative of Nepal noted that peacekeeping operations should be complementary to inclusive domestic political processes, thereby ensuring their own impartiality and credibility and supporting domestic capacity-building, and cautioned against undermining the host country’s sovereignty or its prerogative of initiating a nationally led peace process.\footnote{Ibid., p. 58.} The representative of the Philippines affirmed that, if the politics of peacekeeping were not national, they amounted to “foreign interference”.\footnote{Ibid., p. 56.}

At the 8349th meeting, held on 12 September under the same item, the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia stressed that peacekeeping operations must respect the rule of law, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each of the countries in which they operated and indicated that peacekeeping operations should neither be seen nor used as intervention forces.\footnote{S/PV.8349, p. 22.} The representatives of Kuwait and China also reiterated the need for peacekeeping operations to respect the sovereignty of host countries.\footnote{Ibid., p. 14 (Kuwait) and p. 23 (China).}

C. Invocation of the principle enshrined in Article 2 (7) in communications

During the period under review, the principle enshrined in Article 2 (7) of the Charter was explicitly invoked once in communications addressed to the Council, in a letter dated 3 May 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia transmitting a resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States with regard to Iranian intervention in the internal affairs of Arab States.\footnote{S/2018/423, annex.}
Part IV

Relations with other United Nations organs
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Introductory note

Part IV of the present Supplement covers the practice of the Security Council with regard to Articles 4–6, 10–12, 15 (1), 20, 23, 24 (3), 65, 93, 94, 96 and 97 of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the relations of the Council with other principal organs of the United Nations, namely, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice. Material relating to the relations of the Security Council with the Secretariat is featured in part II, section V, which deals with the administrative functions and powers of the Secretary-General in connection with meetings of the Council pursuant to rules 21 to 26 of its provisional rules of procedure. The Trusteeship Council was inactive during the period under review.¹

During the period under review, the General Assembly continued to address recommendations to the Council regarding the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council and the Assembly, in parallel and within the limitations imposed by the Charter, considered the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and in the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, both organs collaborated on the election of judges to fill vacancies on the roster of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals and elected new members of the International Court of Justice consistent with the respective applicable provisions of the statutes of the Mechanism and the Court, the provisional rules of procedure of the Council and the rules of procedure of the Assembly. The Council also reappointed the Prosecutor of the Mechanism. In 2018, Council members continued to discuss the relations between the Council and subsidiary organs of the Assembly, in particular the Human Rights Council, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacebuilding Commission.

In October 2018, the President of the Security Council participated in a dialogue with the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on the theme “Renewing commitment to multilateralism”. In November, the Council was briefed by the Permanent Representative of Qatar, on behalf of the President of the General Assembly, by the President of the Economic and Social Council and by the President of the International Court of Justice during an open debate on strengthening multilateralism and the role of the United Nations, organized by China, which held the presidency of the Council for that month. During 2018, the Council did not address any requests to the Economic and Social Council for information or assistance, nor did it make recommendations or decide on measures with regard to the judgments rendered by the Court or request that it give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

¹ The Trusteeship Council completed its mandate under the Charter in 1994 and suspended its operations on 1 November 1994. For more information see Repertoire, Supplement 1993–1995, chap. VI, part III.
I. Relations with the General Assembly

Note

Section I focuses on various aspects of the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly in accordance with Articles 4–6, 10–12, 15 (1), 20, 23, 24 (3), 93, 94, 96 and 97 of the Charter, rules 40, 60 and 61 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council and Articles 4, 8, 10–12 and 14 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

This section is divided into eight subsections. Subsection A deals with the election by the General Assembly of the non-permanent members of the Council, in accordance with Article 23 of the Charter. Subsections B and C concern the functions and powers of the Assembly vis-à-vis Articles 10 to 12, with a particular focus on the practice and authority of the Assembly to make recommendations to the Council. Subsection D covers instances in which a decision by the Council must be taken prior to that of the Assembly under Articles 4 to 6, 93 and 97, such as the admission of new Members or the appointment of judges to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. Subsection E examines the practices for the election of members of the International Court of Justice, requiring concurrent action by the Council and the Assembly. Subsection F covers the annual and special reports of the Council to the Assembly, in accordance with Articles 15 and 24 (3) of the Charter. Subsection G concerns Council relations with the subsidiary organs established by the Assembly that played a part in the work of the Council during 2018. Subsection H features other Council practice bearing on relations with the Assembly.

A. Election by the General Assembly of the non-permanent members of the Security Council

Article 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

During the period under review, at its seventy-second regular session, the General Assembly elected five non-permanent members to the Council in accordance with Article 23 of the Charter, to replace those whose terms of office were to expire on 31 December 2018 (see table 1).

On 6 February 2018, during discussions on the working methods of the Council held under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, some speakers praised the move of the elections of non-permanent members of the Council by the Assembly from October to June. Moreover, in General Assembly resolution 72/313, adopted on 17 September 2018 under the item entitled “Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly”, the Assembly welcomed efforts to afford elected members of the Council appropriate opportunities to prepare for their tenure, and also welcomed the note by the President of the Security Council, in which the elected Council members were invited to observe some of its meetings and activities as from 1 October immediately preceding their term of membership.

2 Rule 40 of the provisional rules of procedure is also covered in part II, sect. VIII, “Decision-making and voting”.

4 General Assembly resolution 72/313, para. 26.
Table 1  
Election by the General Assembly of non-permanent members of the Security Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>General Assembly decision</th>
<th>Plenary meeting and date of election</th>
<th>Members elected for the term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019–2020</td>
<td>72/419</td>
<td>93rd 8 June 2018</td>
<td>Belgium, Dominican Republic, Germany, Indonesia, South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Recommendations made by the General Assembly to the Security Council under Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter

Article 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations or by the Security Council or by a state which is not a member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 3, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

During the period under review, the General Assembly addressed recommendations to the Council regarding the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Several of those recommendations concerned the powers and functions of the Council under Articles 10 and 11 (1) of the Charter. The relevant provisions of the resolutions of the Assembly are set out in table 2. In Assembly resolution 72/313, adopted under the item entitled “Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly”, Member States acknowledged the role and authority of the Assembly, as established in Article 10 of the Charter, to make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Council or to both, on questions or matters within the scope of the Charter, except as provided in Article 12 thereof, and reaffirmed the role and authority of the Assembly, including on questions relating to international peace and security, in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 and 35 of the Charter, bearing in mind that the Council had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In the same resolution, the Assembly invited the Presidents of the Assembly to maintain the practice of holding monthly meetings with the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council in order to ensure cooperation, coordination and exchange of information on cross-cutting issues related to the work of the Organization.

In another resolution, under the item entitled “United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa”, the Assembly recalled the provisions of Article 11 (1) of the Charter, noting that the consideration of the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and arms limitation, was a function of the Assembly.

In connection with Article 11 (2) of the Charter, the General Assembly made recommendations to the Council with regard to specific questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security or requesting action by the Council concerning those questions. In its recommendations, which were in reference to items already on the Council’s agenda, the Assembly called on the Council to ensure accountability, including through consideration of referral of the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the International Criminal Court.

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5 Ibid., seventh preambular paragraph and para. 6.
6 Ibid., para. 91.
7 General Assembly resolution 73/75, first preambular paragraph.
and to consider the further development of sanctions in order to effectively target those who appeared to be most responsible for human rights violations. The Assembly also encouraged the Council to ensure accountability of those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law or violations and abuses of human rights law in the Syrian Arab Republic. The relevant provisions of the resolutions of the Assembly are set out in table 3.

The General Assembly did not draw the attention of the Council to any situations under Article 11 (3) of the Charter. 8

Concerning the deliberations in the Council, during the period under review, no explicit references were made to Article 10 or Articles 11 (1), (3) or (4) of the Charter. Article 11 (2) of the Charter was referred to twice, during an open debate on the working methods of the Council organized by Kuwait, which held the presidency of the Council for the month of February. 9 During that debate, held at the 8175th meeting, on 6 February 2018, the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Algeria both stressed that the Council should fully take into account the recommendations of the General Assembly on matters relating to international peace and security, consistent with Article 11 (2), of the Charter. 10 At the same meeting, several speakers commented on the interaction between the Council and the Assembly. The representative of Estonia, speaking on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, emphasized that the interaction between the Council and the Assembly needed to be improved, “to live up to the expectations of the membership and the new standards of openness and transparency”. 11 The representative of Colombia noted that, during the current reform process of the peace and security and development pillars, the relationship and interaction between the Council and the Assembly was “an ongoing process that should be subject to ongoing review and improvements”. 12 The representative of Colombia also recognized efforts made by the various presidents of the Council, including through meetings with the President of the General Assembly, to make the discussions on situations more democratic. The representative of Maldives opined that meetings between the presidents of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council would “go a long way in enhancing coordination” among the work of the three organs. 13

In addition, Article 11 was broadly invoked once during deliberations of the Council on the maintenance of international peace and security, by the representative of Côte d’Ivoire, who indicated that its provisions granted the General Assembly the powers “to study and discuss all issues and principles relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and to bring them to the attention” of Member States and the Council. 14

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8 For information on other referrals to the Security Council, see part VI, sect. I.
9 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 24 January 2018 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2018/66), and a summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting in a communication from the representative of Kuwait (S/2018/399).
10 S/PV.8175, p. 31 (Islamic Republic of Iran) and p. 62 (Algeria).
11 Ibid., p. 36.
12 Ibid., p. 41.
13 Ibid., p. 56.
14 S/PV.8262, p. 25.

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Table 2

Recommendations to the Security Council in resolutions of the General Assembly regarding the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Assembly resolution and date</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>72/311 10 September 2018</td>
<td>Recognizes the growing and emerging challenges and risks facing United Nations peacekeeping operations and political missions, and in this regard takes note of the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and the report of the Secretary-General entitled “The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations”, as well as the recommendations supported by Member States in the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, in particular on prevention, mediation and stronger global regional partnerships, including between the United Nations and the African Union, and encourages the Security Council, as appropriate, to consult with relevant regional organizations, particularly the African Union, especially if transitioning from a regional to a United Nations peacekeeping operation (para. 12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Part IV. Relations with other United Nations organs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Assembly resolution and date</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Report of the International Criminal Court</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73/7 29 October 2018</td>
<td>Encourages further dialogue between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, and welcomes in this regard the increased interaction of the Security Council with the Court under various formats, including the holding of open debates on peace and justice and working methods, with a special focus on the role of the Court (para. 20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensive review of special political missions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73/101 7 December 2018</td>
<td>Encouraging enhanced exchanges of information, in an appropriate manner, among the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat, making use of the advisory role of the Peacebuilding Commission, when relevant, on overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions (eighth preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terrorism and human rights</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73/174 17 December 2018</td>
<td>Encourages the Security Council, the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to strengthen, within their mandates, the links, cooperation and dialogue with relevant human rights bodies, giving due regard to the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law in their ongoing work relating to counter-terrorism (para. 34)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3

**Recommendations to the Security Council in resolutions of the General Assembly with regard to specific questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Assembly resolution and date</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 73/180 17 December 2018 | Encourages the Security Council to continue its consideration of the relevant conclusions and recommendations of the commission of inquiry and take appropriate action to ensure accountability, including through consideration of referral of the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the International Criminal Court and consideration of the further development of sanctions in order to target effectively those who appear to be most responsible for human rights violations that the commission has said may constitute crimes against humanity (para. 12)  
Also encourages the Security Council to continue to discuss the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including the country’s human rights situation, in the light of the serious concerns expressed in the present resolution, and looks forward to its continued and more active engagement on this matter (para. 13) |
| **Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic** |
| 73/182 17 December 2018 | Emphasizes the need to ensure that all those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law or violations and abuses of human rights law are held to account through appropriate, fair and independent domestic or international criminal justice mechanisms, in accordance with the principle of complementarity, stresses the need to pursue practical steps towards this goal, and for that reason encourages the Security Council to take appropriate action to ensure accountability, noting the important role that the International Criminal Court can play in this regard (para. 33) |
C. Practice in relation to Article 12 of the Charter

Article 12

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Subsection C covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 12 of the Charter. Article 12 (1) limits the authority of the General Assembly with regard to any dispute or situation in respect of which the Council is exercising its functions under the Charter.

During the period under review, no reference was made to Article 12 (1) in decisions of the Council, nor did the Council request the General Assembly to make a recommendation with regard to any dispute or situation. Nonetheless, in relation to the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, speakers made reference to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, established by the Assembly in 2016 to closely cooperate with the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic.15 In that connection, as well as in connection with the Palestinian question, Member States at various meetings expressed their intention to continue to avail themselves of other forums, including the Assembly, to pursue efforts to enforce international law in instances when the Council failed to act.16

Under Article 12 (2), the Secretary-General is required to notify the General Assembly of the matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security being dealt with by the Council or with which the Council has ceased to deal.

During the period under review, in accordance with that provision, the Secretary-General continued to notify the General Assembly of the matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which were being dealt with by the Council or with which the Council had ceased to deal.17 The notification was based on the summary statements of matters of which the Council was seized and the stage reached in their consideration, which were circulated each week to the members of the Council in accordance with rule 11 of its provisional rules of procedure.18 The consent of the Council, required under Article 12 (2), was obtained through the circulation of the draft notification by the Secretary-General to the members of the Council. Following receipt of the notification, the Assembly formally takes note of it in the form of a decision.19

16 See, for example, under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, S/PV.8174, p. 14 (Netherlands), and S/PV.8221, p. 4 (United States) and p. 6 (Netherlands); under the item entitled “Women and peace and security”, S/PV.8234, p. 29 (Liechtenstein); under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, S/PV.8244, p. 23 (Kuwait), and S/PV.8256, p. 4 (Kuwait); under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, S/PV.8262, pp. 15–16 (Netherlands), p. 43 (Liechtenstein), p. 46 (Ireland), pp. 47–48 (Mexico), p. 52 (Belgium), p. 53 (Italy), p. 61 (Ukraine) and pp. 80–81 (Turkey); and under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, S/PV.8264, p. 78 (South Africa) and p. 85 (New Zealand).

17 See A/73/300.

18 For more information, see part II, sect. II.B, “Matters of which the Council is seized (rules 10 and 11)”.

19 See General Assembly decision 72/562 of 12 September 2018, in which the General Assembly took note of the notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12 (2), dated 1 September 2017 (A/72/300); see also Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017, part IV, I.C. As at 31 December 2018, the General Assembly had not taken note of the notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12 (2) of 1 September 2018 (A/73/300).

15 For more information on the establishment of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic, see Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017, part IV, sect. I.C.
D. Practice in relation to provisions of the
Charter involving recommendations
made by the Security Council to the
General Assembly

Article 4
1. Membership in the United Nations is open
to all other peace-loving states which accept the
obligations contained in the present Charter and, in
the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing
to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such state to
membership in the United Nations will be effected by a
decision of the General Assembly upon the
recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 5
A member of the United Nations against which
preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the
Security Council may be suspended from the exercise
of the rights and privileges of membership by the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the
Security Council. The exercise of these rights and
privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

Article 6
A Member of the United Nations which has
persistently violated the Principles contained in the
present Charter may be expelled from the Organization
by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of
the Security Council.

Article 93, paragraph 2
A state which is not a Member of the United
Nations may become a party to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice on conditions to be
determined in each case by the General Assembly upon
the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 97
The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-
General and such staff as the Organization may
require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by
the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the
Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative
officer of the Organization.

Rule 60
The Security Council shall decide whether in its
judgement the applicant is a peace-loving State and is
able and willing to carry out the obligations contained
in the Charter and, accordingly, whether to recommend
the applicant State for membership.

If the Security Council recommends the applicant
State for membership, it shall forward to the General
Assembly the recommendation with a complete record
of the discussion.

If the Security Council does not recommend the
applicant State for membership or postpones the
consideration of the application, it shall submit a
special report to the General Assembly with a complete
record of the discussion.

In order to ensure the consideration of its
recommendation at the next session of the General
Assembly following the receipt of the application, the
Security Council shall make its recommendation not
less than twenty-five days in advance of a regular
session of the General Assembly, nor less than four
days in advance of a special session...

The Charter provides for joint decision-making by
the Council and the General Assembly in relation to a
number of matters, but requires a decision by the
Council to be taken first. This is the case with respect to
the admission, suspension or expulsion of Members
(Articles 4, 5 and 6), the appointment of the Secretary-
General (Article 97) and the conditions under which a
State that is not a Member of the United Nations may
become a party to the Statute of the International Court
of Justice (Article 93 (2)). In addition, the statute of
the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal
Tribunals provides that the judges of the Mechanism
shall be elected by the Assembly from a list submitted
by the Council.

During the period under review, no questions arose
concerning the conditions of accession to the Statute of
the International Court of Justice. There was no
reference to Articles 4, 5 or 6 and no activity with regard
to the admission of new Members or the suspension or
expulsion of any Member State during the reporting
period. In 2018, the Assembly and the Council reflected
on best practices regarding the most recent selection and
appointment of the Secretary-General, which had taken

20 Articles 4 (3) and 69 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice provide for the Security Council to make
recommendations to the General Assembly regarding the
conditions under which a State which is a party to the
Statute but is not a Member of the United Nations may
participate in electing members of the Court and in
making amendments to the Statute.

21 Article 10 of the statute of the International Residual
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (resolution 1966
(2010), annex 1).
place in 2016.\textsuperscript{22} The Council and the Assembly also collaborated in 2018 on the election of judges to fill vacancies in the roster of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals.

**Membership in the United Nations: references to Articles 4 and 6**

The admission of a State to membership in the United Nations and the suspension or expulsion of a Member State from the Organization are effected by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council (Articles 4 (2), 5 and 6 of the Charter). In accordance with rule 60 of its provisional rules of procedure, the Council submits to the Assembly, within specified time limits, its recommendations concerning each application for membership, together with a record of its discussions in relation to the application.

During the period under review, the Council did not recommend the admission of any State for membership in the United Nations. It made no negative recommendations, which would have required the submission of a special report to the General Assembly. In addition, the Council did not recommend the suspension or expulsion of any Member State. Nonetheless, at the 8183rd meeting, held on 20 February 2018 on the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the President of the State of Palestine indicated that, in the future, the State of Palestine would intensify its work to achieve admission to the United Nations as a full Member and called on the Council to realize that goal.\textsuperscript{23} At the 8244th meeting, held on 26 April on the same item, the representatives of Cuba and Jordan expressed their countries’ support for the admission of the State of Palestine as a full Member of the Organization.\textsuperscript{24}

**Procedure for the selection and appointment of the Secretary-General**

During the reporting period, the procedure for the selection and appointment of the Secretary-General was discussed briefly by the Council during an open debate on its working methods, held under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”.\textsuperscript{25} At the 8175th meeting, held on 6 February 2018, the representative of Estonia, speaking on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, encouraged the Council to review its working methods with a view to improving its interaction with the General Assembly, on the basis of discussions held among Council members during the recent selection of a new Secretary-General; recalled the “collective responsibility of the Security Council to reach consensus on a recommendation to the General Assembly for the appointment of the Secretary-General”; and discouraged the use of colour-coded ballots during straw polling to ensure that the equal rights and role of all Council members in the process be upheld. The Group further called for regular public briefings by the Council on the nomination of candidates and for open communication regarding straw poll results.\textsuperscript{26} At the same meeting, the representative of Cuba referred to the 2016 selection and appointment of the Secretary-General as an “unprecedented process of consultations and exchange of views with Member States”.\textsuperscript{27}

In resolution 72/313, adopted on 17 September 2018, the General Assembly reiterated that the process of selecting and appointing the Secretary-General differed from the process used for the executive heads of the organizations of the United Nations system, given the roles of the Council and the Assembly in accordance with Article 97 of the Charter, and emphasized that the process of selection of the Secretary-General was guided by the principles of transparency and inclusiveness, building on best practices and participation of all Member States.\textsuperscript{28} In the same resolution, the Assembly reaffirmed its commitment to continue, through the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly, in accordance with the provisions of Article 97 of the Charter, its examination of innovative ways to improve the process of selecting and appointing the Secretary-General; welcomed the collaboration between the Assembly and the Council in launching the process and circulating information on the nominated candidates during the most recent selection of the Secretary-General; and encouraged

\textsuperscript{22} For more information on the procedure for the selection of the Secretary-General carried out in 2016, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017*, part IV, sect. I.D.

\textsuperscript{23} S/PV.8183, pp. 8–9.

\textsuperscript{24} S/PV.8244, pp. 52 and 63.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 54.

\textsuperscript{26} S/PV.8175, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{27} General Assembly resolution 72/313, para. 66.
improvement in the interaction between the two organs in all stages of the process to further enhance transparency.29

Appointment of judges and Prosecutor to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

By its resolution 1966 (2010) of 22 December 2010, the Council established the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals to carry out residual functions of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994. According to the statute of the Mechanism, the judges of the Mechanism are elected by the General Assembly from a list submitted by the Council. In the event of a vacancy in the roster of judges of the Mechanism, the Secretary-General appoints a judge after consultation with the Presidents of the Council and of the Assembly, for the remainder of the term of office concerned. After consultation with the President of the Council and the judges of the Mechanism, the Secretary-General appoints the President of the Mechanism from among the judges. The Prosecutor is appointed by the Council on nomination by the Secretary-General.30

During the period under review, following the resignation of one judge of the Mechanism and the passing of another, the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint judges nominated to fill those vacancies for the remainder of their respective terms of office.31 In addition, the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to reappoint 23 judges and the President of the Mechanism, as well as of the nomination of the Prosecutor for reappointment for a new term of office.32 Thereafter, by resolution 2422 (2018) of 27 June 2018, pursuant to article 14 (4) of the statute of the Mechanism, the Council appointed the Prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, with effect from 1 July 2018 until 30 June 2020.33 On 16 November 2018, the President of the Security Council addressed a letter to the President of the General Assembly, transmitting to the Assembly the list of nominations for filling two judge vacancies in the roster of the Mechanism.34 At its 65th plenary meeting, held on 21 December 2018, and pursuant to article 10 of the statute of the Mechanism, the Assembly elected one judge from the list of nominees transmitted by the Council, for a term of office until 30 June 2020.35 As at end of 2018, the Assembly had not yet agreed on the selection of the second judge. For further details on the actions taken by the Secretary-General, the Council and the Assembly in connection with the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, see table 4.36

29 Ibid., paras. 69 and 73.
30 Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (resolution 1966 (2010), annex 1).
32 See S/2018/627. Concerning the President of the Mechanism, the Secretary-General informed the Council that, pursuant to article 11, paragraph 1, of the statute and after consultation with the judges of the Mechanism, he intended to reappoint the current President for a new term of office from 1 July 2018 to 18 January 2019 and to appoint a different judge as President with effect from 19 January 2019 to 30 June 2020 (S/2018/626).
33 Resolution 2422 (2018), para. 1.
34 A/73/578.
35 See General Assembly decision 73/415 A.
36 For more information, see part I, sect. 27.
Table 4
Actions of the Security Council and the General Assembly concerning the judges and the Prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter from the Secretary-General</th>
<th>Letter from the President of the Security Council</th>
<th>Security Council resolution and date</th>
<th>Transmittal to the General Assembly</th>
<th>General Assembly decision or resolution and date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/2018/190, transmitting nomination to fill one judge vacancy in the roster of the Mechanism</td>
<td>S/2018/191, taking note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint the judge nominated to fill the vacancy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2018/255, transmitting letter from the President of the General Assembly concurring with the appointment of the nominated judge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2018/626, informing Council of his intention to reappoint 23 judges and the President of the Mechanism and transmitting the nomination of the Prosecutor for reappointment</td>
<td>S/2018/627, taking note of the intention of the Secretary-General to reappoint 23 judges and the President of the Mechanism, as well as his nomination of the Prosecutor for reappointment</td>
<td>2422 (2018)</td>
<td>27 June 2018 (para. 1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2018/652, transmitting letter from the President of the General Assembly concurring with the reappointment of 23 judges of the Mechanism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2018/963, transmitting information on the nominations for the two judge vacancies in the roster of the Mechanism</td>
<td>S/2018/756, requesting the Secretary-General to invite Member States to submit nominations to fill two judge vacancies in the roster of the Mechanism</td>
<td></td>
<td>A/73/578</td>
<td>73/415 A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2018/1151, transmitting nomination to fill one judge vacancy in the roster of the Mechanism</td>
<td>S/2018/1152, taking note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint the judge nominated to fill the vacancy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* See S/2019/84.

E. Election of members of the International Court of Justice

Rule 40
Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Rule 61
Any meeting of the Security Council held in pursuance of the Statute of the International Court of Justice for the purpose of the election of members of the Court shall continue until as many candidates as are required for all the seats to be filled have obtained in one or more ballots an absolute majority of votes.
The election of members of the International Court of Justice requires action by the Council in conjunction with the General Assembly, with the two organs proceeding independently of one another. The procedure for the election is set out in rules 40 and 61 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, Articles 4, 8, 10 to 12, 14 and 15 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and rules 150 and 151 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly. During the period under review, the Council held an election for one member of the International Court of Justice, to fill a vacancy resulting from the resignation of a judge, as described in case 1.

Case 1
Election of a member of the International Court of Justice

By a note dated 19 February 2018, the Secretary-General informed the Council of the resignation of a judge from Japan as a member of the Court, effective 7 June 2018. At its 8193rd meeting, held on 28 February 2018, the Council met under the item entitled “Date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice”. At the meeting, the Council adopted without a vote resolution 2403 (2018), by which it decided, in accordance with Article 14 of the Statute of the Court, that the election to fill the vacancy would take place on 22 June 2018 at a meeting of the Council and at a meeting of the General Assembly at its seventy-second session. In accordance with Article 5 (1) of the Statute of the Court, national groups were invited to submit nominations to the Secretary-General no later than 16 May 2018. The name and curriculum vitae of the candidate nominated by the national groups were transmitted in separate notes by the Secretary-General as documents of the Assembly and the Council.

At its 8292nd meeting, held on 22 June 2018, the Council proceeded with the election of a member of the International Court of Justice to fill the above-mentioned vacancy. On the first ballot, at the 8292nd meeting of the Council and the 97th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the candidate from Japan obtained the requisite absolute majority of votes in both bodies and was, therefore, elected as a member of the Court for a term of office beginning on 22 June 2018, until 5 February 2021, in accordance with Article 10 (1) and Article 15 of the Statute of the Court.

F. Annual and special reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly

Article 15, paragraph 1

The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.

Article 24, paragraph 3

The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Rule 60, paragraph 3

If the Security Council does not recommend the applicant State for membership or postpones the consideration of the application, it shall submit a special report to the General Assembly with a complete record of the discussion.

During 2018, the Council maintained its practice of submitting annual reports to the General Assembly pursuant to Article 24 (3) of the Charter. One annual report was submitted to the Assembly covering, for the first time and in accordance with the note by the President of the Council dated 30 August 2017, an annual and special reports of

37 Rule 40 of the provisional rules of procedure is also covered in part II, sect. VIII, “Decision-making and voting”.
38 Articles 4, 10 to 12, 14 and 15 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice establish the procedures for the following: (a) the nomination of the judges by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration; (b) the majority necessary for the election of judges; (c) the number of meetings to be held for the purpose of the election of judges; (d) the holding of a joint conference in the event of more than three meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly; (e) the filling of vacancies; and (f) the term of office applied to elected judges filling out a vacancy. Article 8 provides that the two organs shall proceed independently.
39 Rules 150 and 151 of the General Assembly provide that the election of the members of the Court shall take place in accordance with the Statute of the Court and that any meeting of the Assembly held in pursuance of the Statute of the Court for the purpose of electing members of the Court shall continue until as many candidates as are required for all the seats to be filled have obtained, in one or more ballots, an absolute majority of votes.
40 S/2018/133.
41 S/PV.8193.
42 Resolution 2403 (2018), third preambular paragraph and operative paragraph.
44 See the memorandum by the Secretary-General on the election of a member of the International Court of Justice (A/72/872-S/2018/487).
45 S/PV.8292 and A/72/PV.97. See also General Assembly decision 72/404 B.
46 S/2017/507.
entire calendar year, from 1 January to 31 December 2017.\textsuperscript{47} The introduction of the annual report was prepared by the delegation of China, as President of the Council for the month of July 2017, in accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017.

The Council considered and adopted without a vote the draft annual report at its 8335th meeting, held on 30 August 2018.\textsuperscript{48} During the meeting, the representative of China highlighted the importance of the report as required under Article 24 of the Charter and noted that, in summarizing the activities of the Council for the year 2017, China had “sought to be as objective as possible” and had “made the utmost effort to describe the background information for all Council actions in order to improve the transparency of the Council’s work”. He further indicated that, during the drafting process, China had sought the views and comments of relevant Members of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{49}

The General Assembly considered the annual report at the 114th plenary meeting of its seventy-second session under the item entitled “Report of the Security Council”, on 12 September 2018.\textsuperscript{50} In addition, as in previous years, the Assembly, in a resolution adopted under the item entitled “Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly”, commended improvements in the quality of the annual report and welcomed the willingness of the Council to continue to consider other suggestions concerning further improvements.\textsuperscript{51} No special reports were submitted by the Council to the Assembly during the reporting period.

**Case 2**

**Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)**

At its 8175th meeting, held on 6 February 2018 under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, the Council held an open debate on its working methods organized by Kuwait, which held the presidency of the Council for the month.\textsuperscript{52} During the meeting, the Council discussed the improvement of its annual report to the General Assembly. Several speakers stated that the annual reports of the Council to the Assembly should be more analytical.\textsuperscript{53} The representative of Hungary said that the reports should contain a more substantive and comprehensive evaluation of the work of the Council.\textsuperscript{54} The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, echoed by the representative of Algeria, added that the reports should assess the work of the Council, include the views expressed by members during the consideration of agenda items and elaborate on the circumstances leading to the adoption of outcomes.\textsuperscript{55} The representative of Lebanon stressed that the reports should “ask difficult questions”, “draw on lessons learned” and “call for common action”. She further expressed interest in seeing featured, in the upcoming report covering the year 2017, the reasons behind the “crippling effect of vetoes” exercised by permanent Council members during 2017.\textsuperscript{56} The representative of Colombia, echoed by the representative of Cuba, noted that it was essential that annual reports submitted by the Council to the Assembly be informative and contribute to a better understanding of the decision-making process in the Council, for the benefit of the general public and the wider membership.\textsuperscript{57} Furthermore, the representatives of Ukraine and Algeria stressed the importance of the timely issuance of monthly assessments to aid the preparation of the annual reports.\textsuperscript{58} The representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Algeria added that the Assembly might “consider proposing parameters for the elaboration of such assessments”.\textsuperscript{59} The representative of the Netherlands welcomed the inclusion of information on the work of Security Council sanctions committees and of international tribunals in the Council’s annual reports.\textsuperscript{60} In addition, the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Cuba and Algeria called upon the Council to submit special reports for consideration by the Assembly in accordance with Articles 15 and 24 of the Charter.\textsuperscript{61}

**G. Relations with subsidiary organs established by the General Assembly**

During the period under review, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the

\textsuperscript{47} A/72/2.
\textsuperscript{48} S/2018/797.
\textsuperscript{49} S/PV.8335, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{50} A/72/PV.114. See also General Assembly decision 72/563.
\textsuperscript{51} General Assembly resolution 72/313, para. 17.
\textsuperscript{52} The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 24 January 2018 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2018/66), and a summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting in a communication from the representative of Kuwait (S/2018/399).
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 26.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. 31 (Islamic Republic of Iran) and p. 62 (Algeria).
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 38.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 41 (Colombia) and p. 55 (Cuba).
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 46 (Ukraine) and p. 62 (Algeria).
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 31 (Islamic Republic of Iran) and p. 62 (Algeria).
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p. 20.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p. 31 (Islamic Republic of Iran), p. 55 (Cuba) and p. 62 (Algeria).
Palestinian People participated in the work of the Council. The Chair or Vice-Chair of the Committee participated in four meetings concerning the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. On the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, the President of the Council participated in the 393rd meeting of the Committee, on 28 November 2018. The sixteenth session of the Human Rights Council recalled the commitments that the Government of Burundi undertook during the thirty-sixth session of the Human Rights Council to re-establish full mutual cooperation with the Human Rights Council and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; and welcomed the interaction of Morocco with the special procedures of the Human Rights Council. No decision of the Council made reference to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations during the reporting period. Decisions concerning the relations with the Peacebuilding Commission, a joint subsidiary organ of the Security Council and the General Assembly, are covered in detail in part IX, section VII.

Table 5 below contains all the provisions of the decisions in which the Security Council made explicit reference to the Human Rights Council.

Table 5
Security Council decisions containing references to subsidiary organs of the General Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision and date</th>
<th>Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Rights Council</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2409 (2018) 27 March 2018</td>
<td>Reiterates its condemnation of the violence witnessed in the Kasai region over the past year, further reiterates the importance and urgency of prompt and transparent investigations into violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights in the region, as well as its intention to closely monitor progress of the investigations into these violations and abuses, including the joint investigations by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in order to bring to justice and hold accountable all those responsible, and looks forward to their results; further calls upon the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to continue to cooperate with the team of international experts on the situation in the Kasai regions, as mandated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 35/33; and urges the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to fully cooperate with the United Nations team deployed, as agreed, to assist the Congolese authorities investigations into the deaths of the two United Nations experts in March 2017, and ensure all perpetrators are brought to justice and held accountable (para. 14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| The situation in Burundi |
| S/PRST/2018/7 5 April 2018 | The Security Council reiterates its regret at the decision by the Government of Burundi to suspend all cooperation and collaboration with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which has been present in the country since 1995 to strengthen the country’s rule of law institutions, and calls for a swift solution through dialogue between OHCHR and the Government in order to enable OHCHR to fully resume its activities, including its monitoring and reporting functions, and fulfil its mandate. The Security Council recalls the commitments that the Government of Burundi undertook during the thirty-sixth session of the Human Rights Council to re-establish full mutual cooperation with the Human Rights Council and OHCHR, including full cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner in Bujumbura, and to accept the visit of a team of three experts from the Office to collect information on the human rights situation in Burundi. It notes that discussions regarding revisions to the draft memorandum of understanding between Burundi and the United Nations concerning the updated terms for the Office of the High Commissioner in Burundi have been ongoing for over a year and urges the Government of Burundi to take steps to swiftly finalize the agreement with OHCHR without further delay (thirteenth paragraph) |

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The situation concerning Western Sahara

Resolution 2414 (2018) 27 April 2018

Welcoming in this regard, steps and initiatives taken by Morocco, and the role played by the National Council on Human Rights regional commissions operating in Dakhla and Laayoune, and the country’s interaction with special procedures of the Human Rights Council (eighteenth preambular paragraph)

See also resolution 2440 (2018), twentieth preambular paragraph

The relationship between the Security Council and the Human Rights Council was referred to in Council deliberations in the context of the protection of civilians in armed conflict and the working methods of the Council. Participants in Security Council meetings also reaffirmed the mandate of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and underlined its relevance during Council discussions relating to the mandates of peacekeeping operations in the context of the situations in Mali and Western Sahara, as well as during deliberations concerning the review of peacekeeping operations and cooperation in that regard with regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union. The Security Council also referred to the bridging and advisory role of the Peacebuilding Commission in deliberations on the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, the maintenance of international peace and security, the protection of civilians in armed conflict and women and peace and security.

Key discussions on the interaction between the Council and the subsidiary organs established by the General Assembly with respect to their distinct functions and mandates are highlighted in cases 3, 4, 5 and 6, in relation to the situation in Myanmar, United Nations peacekeeping operations, the implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507), which concerns the working methods of the Council, and peacebuilding and sustaining peace, respectively.

Case 3
The situation in Myanmar

During the period under review, the Council discussed its relations with the Human Rights Council at its 8381st meeting, held on 24 October 2018, under the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar”, during which the Council was briefed on the issue of Rakhine State by the Chair of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar established by the Human Rights Council.

During a discussion on the provisional agenda of the meeting prior to its adoption, the representative of China voiced his country’s opposition to the holding of the meeting, indicating that the fact-finding mission was a special mechanism of the Human Rights Council that did not have a mandate to brief the Security Council. He added that there was no precedent of the Security Council receiving a briefing from a country-specific special mechanism of the Human Rights Council and that, by receiving such a briefing, the Council would be encroaching on the mandates of the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, violating provisions of the Charter. The representative of the Russian Federation indicated that the report of the fact-finding mission had already been discussed both in the Human Rights Council and in the Third Committee of the General Assembly and added that there was “no added value” in considering the report also in the Security Council and that doing so would “cast doubt on the remit of the Human Rights Council”. In contrast, the representative of the United Kingdom, speaking also on behalf of Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden and the United States, explained that the group of Council members had requested the Chair of the fact-finding mission to brief the Council because the

64 See, for example, S/PV.8264, pp. 38–39 (Germany), p. 41 (Hungary) and p. 71 (Montenegro), in connection with the protection of civilians in armed conflict; and S/PV.8175, pp. 58–59 (Slovakia), in connection with the working methods of the Council.
65 S/PV.8298, p. 5 (Russian Federation); and S/PV.8246, p. 4 (Russian Federation).
66 S/PV.8407, p. 46 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), pp. 47–48 (Indonesia) and pp. 61–62 (Senegal), with regard to peace and security in Africa; and S/PV.8414, p. 18 (Russian Federation), in connection with the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations.
67 S/PV.8414, p. 29 (Netherlands), p. 45 (South Africa) and p. 64 (European Union).
68 S/PV.8262, p. 70 (Kenya); S/PV.8334, p. 49 (Romania), p. 51 (Ireland) and p. 58 (Italy); and S/PV.8372, p. 12 (Sweden).
69 S/PV.8264, p. 83 (Algeria).
70 S/PV.8382, p. 19 (China).
71 S/PV.8381, p. 2.
72 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
situation in Myanmar clearly endangered international peace and security and the report of the fact-finding mission included “a specific request for the Council to act” to ensure accountability for crimes in Myanmar. The provisional agenda was adopted, having received nine votes in favour, three votes against and three abstentions in a procedural vote. After the vote, the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia explained the reasons for his country’s vote against the holding of the meeting, pointing out that there was no precedent of a special mechanism of the Human Rights Council reporting to the Security Council and that such reporting would be beyond the mandate of the fact-finding mission in question. He underscored the division of labour among the principal organs of the United Nations and stressed the importance of respecting the mandate of each organ, noting that human rights issues had “their own space for debate” within the Human Rights Council. While acknowledging and appreciating the Chair’s briefing, the representative of Kazakhstan indicated that his country had abstained during the procedural vote because the invitation to brief the Council extended to the fact-finding mission – mandated by the Human Rights Council – was beyond the mission’s mandate. The representatives of the Russian Federation and China expressed regret that the Security Council had decided to proceed with the briefing by the Chair of the fact-finding mission without the consensus of Council members. Moreover, the representative of Ethiopia explained that his country did not believe that the Council’s course of action would help to make progress in ongoing efforts, where building mutual confidence and trust among those concerned were so critical.

The representative of the Netherlands stressed that the findings of the fact-finding mission demanded action not only from the Human Rights Council, the General Assembly and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, but also from the Security Council. The representatives of the United States, Sweden and Peru highlighted the importance of the briefing by the Chair of the fact-finding mission to

the Security Council. The representative of France emphasized the importance for the Security Council to “continue to rely upon the work of the instruments established by the Human Rights Council in order to fully carry out its mandate to maintain international peace and security”. The representative of Kuwait welcomed the recommendation of the fact-finding mission that the Security Council should ensure accountability for crimes in Myanmar. The representative of Bangladesh, who had been invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, urged the Council to consider a course of action in reaction to the report of the fact-finding mission in order to “pre-empt the possible recurrence of such crimes in Myanmar and elsewhere”, adding that “it would be an affront to the victims to relegate the action” on the report solely to the General Assembly.

Case 4
United Nations peacekeeping operations

During the period under review, the Council discussed the role of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in two out of seven meetings held under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”.

At its 8218th meeting, held on 28 March 2018, the Council held a high-level open debate organized by the Netherlands, which held the presidency of the Council for the month, under the sub-item entitled “Collective action to improve United Nations peacekeeping operations”. At the meeting, the Deputy Minister of Defence of Kazakhstan emphasized that all new proposals and conditions in relation to peacekeeping operations had to be carefully reviewed by the Special Committee. The representative of Equatorial Guinea, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement) and the representative of Cuba underscored that the Special Committee was the only body of the United Nations tasked with studying all issues related to peacekeeping operations, including measures to improve the Organization’s ability to carry out those operations. The representative of Brazil indicated that the Special Committee offered Member States “a great

73 Ibid., p. 3.
74 Ibid., p. 3 (in favour: Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States; against: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Russian Federation; abstaining: Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan). For more information on procedural votes, see part II, sect. VIII.C.
75 Ibid., p. 4.
76 Ibid., p. 19.
77 Ibid., p. 20 (Russian Federation) and p. 21 (China).
78 Ibid., p. 15.
79 Ibid., p. 9.
80 Ibid., p. 9 (United States), p. 13 (Sweden) and p. 17 (Peru).
81 Ibid., p. 10.
82 Ibid., p. 12.
83 Ibid., p. 27.
84 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 2 March 2018 (S/2018/184).
85 S/PV.8218, p. 15.
86 Ibid., p. 27 (Equatorial Guinea), p. 35 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) and p. 74 (Cuba).
opportunity” to reflect upon and help to strengthen, in a democratic setting, “the fundamental political consensus” that underpinned peacekeeping partnerships. The representative of Mexico said that the Council needed to improve its interaction with other organs of the Organization in order to maximize the efficiency, effectiveness and security of their members and to allocate adequate, timely and predictable resources to operations. The representative of Guatemala said that the development of United Nations peacekeeping mandates calling for more robust operations for the protection of civilians should be carefully considered by the Special Committee in order to analyse the scope of such development. The representative of Slovenia stressed the need for close cooperation between the Council, the Special Committee and other partners in order to improve the security of peacekeepers and civilians alike. The representative of Uruguay, commending the efforts carried out in different forums, pointed out that the recent session of the Special Committee had resulted in “points of agreement” that addressed various aspects of peacekeeping, such as the security and performance of peacekeepers, the concept of the protection of civilians, and triangular cooperation.

At its 8349th meeting, held on 12 September 2018, regarding peacekeeping reform, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations informed the Council that the Secretariat was investing significant resources and efforts in developing an integrated performance policy framework, as requested by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and supported by the Council. The representative of the Russian Federation indicated that Member States, with the help of the Special Committee, should be able to reach a consensus solution on the effectiveness of peacekeeping. He further noted that the effectiveness of the blue helmets was dependent on “transparent, comprehensible work by the Secretariat”, whose training materials and guidelines should “correspond fully with the parameters defined by the Special Committee”. He added that the Special Committee was the platform best suited to support a trilateral cooperation format to address the matter of peacekeeping performance and warned against the Council bypassing the Special Committee.

Case 5
Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

At its 8175th meeting, held on 6 February 2018, the Council held an open debate under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” organized by Kuwait, which held the presidency of the Council for the month. During the meeting, many speakers discussed ways to enhance the relation of the Council with the Peacebuilding Commission. The representatives of the United Kingdom, Norway and Argentina welcomed the new language contained in the note by the President with regard to maintaining communication with the Commission in its advisory role to the Council. The representatives of Germany and Italy, also referring to the language in the note by the President, stressed the need for closer cooperation between the Council and the Commission and for the Council to “regularly request, deliberate and draw upon the Commission’s specific, strategic and targeted advice”. The representative of Sweden similarly underscored that the relationship between the Council and the Commission should become a closer and more strategic one. The representative of Guatemala welcomed the language included in the note by the President on the Council’s interaction with the Commission and its configurations. He also stressed, echoed by the representative of Slovakia, that it was important that the Council draw from the Commission’s advisory role and from its configurations in order to achieve efficiencies in conflict prevention and sustaining peace. The representative of Indonesia stated that “greater drawing” by the Council on the expertise of the Commission would enable the Council to develop “more comprehensive solutions” to conflicts.

The representatives of China, Switzerland (speaking on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group) and Morocco pointed to the regular exchanges between the Council and the Peacebuilding Commission and its country-specific configurations as areas in which progress had been

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87 Ibid., p. 36.
88 Ibid., p. 42.
89 Ibid., p. 43.
90 Ibid., p. 62.
91 Ibid., p. 63.
93 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
94 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 24 January 2018 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2018/66), and a summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting in a communication from the representative of Kuwait (S/2018/399).
96 Ibid., pp. 29–30 (Germany) and p. 43 (Italy).
97 Ibid., p. 19.
98 Ibid., p. 50 (Guatemala) and pp. 58–59 (Slovakia).
99 Ibid., p. 48.
made in improving the Council’s working methods and increasing its effectiveness.\(^{100}\) The representative of Japan noted that pen holders of Council decisions should be proactive in reaching out to those outside the Council with expertise, including the Chair of the Commission.\(^{101}\) The representative of Brazil stated that deliberations in the Council would benefit from more frequent exchanges of views with the Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Commission, which, he indicated, could be done informally, in addition to formal briefings to the Council. He suggested that special representatives and special envoys of the Secretary-General could brief the configurations before Council meetings to enable the Commission to play its advisory role to the Council. He further noted that the Council could consider inviting the Chairs of country-specific configurations to join some of its official missions to the field.\(^{102}\) The representative of Germany expressed his country’s conviction that the relationship between the Council and the Commission should be strengthened to enhance the Organization’s ability to move from crisis response to long-term peacebuilding. He added that one way of enhancing such collaboration would be by regularly inviting the Chairs of country-specific configurations to participate in public Council meetings.\(^{103}\) The representative of South Africa stressed the need to continue enhancing the relationship between the two bodies. He further highlighted the importance of the Commission, in its advisory role to the Council, in improving coordination and coherence among international actors in the areas of prevention and sustaining peace in Africa. He stated that the Council “could do more” to draw on the expertise of the Commission during the renewal of mission mandates.\(^{104}\) The representative of Turkey said that better coordination between the Council and the Commission was crucial.\(^{105}\) The representative of Portugal stressed the importance of enhanced consultation with the Commission in the areas of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and sustaining peace and encouraged the Council to regularly invite the Chairs of the Commission and of its country-specific configurations as briefers or participants in informal dialogues, as necessary.\(^{106}\) The representative of Belgium encouraged “all initiatives to galvanize” the relationship between the Council and the Commission, adding that the activities of the Commission should contribute to enriching the Council’s discussions in meetings of country-specific configurations and in those devoted to regions or topics. He also suggested that the Council invite Chairs of country-specific configurations to participate in closed consultations upon the Commission’s return from a visit to a specific country.\(^{107}\) The representative of Costa Rica stated that the practice of annual consultations between the Council and the Commission should be institutionalized.\(^{108}\) The representative of Egypt indicated that the programmes of work of the Council and the Commission must be coordinated to ensure that the Council received the Commission’s contribution at the right time and before the Council considered the issues concerned. He also stated that the procedure for proposing informal informative discussions with the Commission on issues on the agenda of the Council must be streamlined.\(^{109}\)

### Case 6

**Peacebuilding and sustaining peace**

During 2018, the Council discussed its interaction with the Peacebuilding Commission during two of the five meetings held in 2018 under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”.

At its 8243rd meeting, held on 25 April 2018, the Council held a high-level briefing organized by Peru, which held the presidency of the Council for the month, to discuss the report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding and sustaining peace.\(^{110}\) During the meeting, the Secretary-General indicated that the Commission could bring far greater strategic coherence to international efforts by “providing a platform for complementarity and partnership across the pillars of the United Nations” and urged the Council to build on the example of collaboration between the two bodies with regard to the Sahel to achieve “greater operational and policy coherence in other contexts and situations”.\(^{111}\) The State Secretary for Regional Affairs and Multilateral Global Affairs of Romania, in his capacity as Chair of the Commission, referring to the draft resolutions on peacebuilding and sustaining peace being considered at the time by the General Assembly

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\(^{100}\) Ibid., p. 22 (China), p. 29 (Switzerland) and p. 39 (Morocco).

\(^{101}\) Ibid., p. 24.

\(^{102}\) Ibid., p. 25.

\(^{103}\) Ibid., p. 30.

\(^{104}\) Ibid., p. 32.

\(^{105}\) Ibid., pp. 34–35.

\(^{106}\) Ibid., p. 37.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., p. 46.

\(^{108}\) Ibid., p. 61.

\(^{109}\) Ibid., p. 64.

\(^{110}\) S/2018/43. The Council also had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 9 April 2018 from the representative of Peru to the Secretary-General (S/2018/325). For more information on high-level meetings, see part II, sect. I.A.2.

\(^{111}\) S/PV.8243, p. 2.
and the Council, reaffirmed the readiness of the Commission to provide a forum for Member States to discuss the recommendations and options contained in the report of the Secretary-General. He further underscored that the Commission served as a bridge between the three principal organs of the United Nations and noted that, through its convening role, the Commission fostered coherence at the intergovernmental level and helped the Organization to be more valuable, strategic and effective in the field.\textsuperscript{112} The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru welcomed the cooperation between the Council and the Commission.\textsuperscript{113} The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden said that the Commission was one of the tools at the disposal of the Council for engaging in early action and added that the Commission was “a vehicle for collaborative action and partnerships”, which was “uniquely placed to convene international actors for coordinated and strategic responses for sustaining peace”. She further noted that the Council could unlock the full potential of the Commission through more informal and frequent interactions between the two bodies.\textsuperscript{114} The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands stressed the need for the Council and the Commission to complement each other in the preparation for the transition of peacekeeping operations, as the Commission could provide the Council with the perspectives of various stakeholders and advice on socioeconomic and long-term development challenges.\textsuperscript{115} The representative of China highlighted the comparative advantage of the Commission in integrating political, security and development aspects of situations and expressed support for a greater use of the Commission’s advisory role to the Council.\textsuperscript{116} The representatives of the United Kingdom and France praised the recent collaboration between the Council and the Commission in the development of a peacebuilding plan for Liberia.\textsuperscript{117} The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia indicated that strengthening dialogue and coordination among the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission should allow for complementarity between peace and security initiatives, with the goal of achieving sustainable peace.\textsuperscript{118} The representative of Ethiopia emphasized the need to scale up the contributions of the Commission in its convening, bridging and advisory roles and welcomed recent advice provided by the Commission to the Council on various regional and country-specific issues.\textsuperscript{119} 

At its 8413th meeting, held on 5 December 2018 under the same item and under the sub-item entitled “Post-conflict reconstruction and peace, security and stability”, the Council held a high-level debate organized by Côte d’Ivoire, which held the presidency for the month.\textsuperscript{120} At the meeting, the Council continued to discuss the collaboration between the two bodies. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the potential of the Peacebuilding Commission as an advisory body had yet to be fully realized and indicated that it would be beneficial for the Council to be informed about the national peacebuilding priorities of States whose situations were on both bodies’ agendas, adding that the transmission of such information and the Commission’s unanimous advice could be “an excellent complement” to the reports of the Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{121} The representative of France commended the valuable work of the Commission as a complement to the work of the Council.\textsuperscript{122} The representative of Sweden underscored that the Commission was a key adviser to the Council in sustaining peace because it could convene actors around the nexus between peace and security, human rights and development, as well as assist with regional approaches, work to strengthen national ownership and develop partnerships for innovative solutions.\textsuperscript{123} The representative of Ethiopia welcomed the comprehensive advice provided by the Commission to the Council on regional and country-specific issues.\textsuperscript{124}

### H. Other Security Council practice bearing on relations with the General Assembly

During the period under review, the Council was briefed once by the Permanent Representative of Qatar on behalf of the President of the General Assembly, during an open debate held on 9 November 2018 under the sub-item entitled “Strengthening multilateralism and the role of the United Nations” organized by China, which held the presidency of the Council for the month.\textsuperscript{125} At the meeting, the Permanent Representative

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{112} Ibid., pp. 4–5.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Ibid., p. 8.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} Ibid., pp. 9–10.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p. 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 18.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p. 13 (United Kingdom) and p. 15 (France).
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 16.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p. 25.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 28 November 2018 from the representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the Secretary-General (S/2018/1063).
  \item \textsuperscript{121} S/PV.8413, p. 17.
  \item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p. 22.
  \item \textsuperscript{123} Ibid., p. 24.
  \item \textsuperscript{124} Ibid., p. 26.
  \item \textsuperscript{125} S/PV.8395. The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 1 November 2018 from the representative of China to the Secretary-General (S/2018/982).
\end{itemize}
read out a statement on behalf of the President of the Assembly, in which the President of the Assembly emphasized the need to foster mutually reinforcing and coordinated efforts among the main organs of the Organization to boost and uphold multilateralism and underscored that the Assembly, the Council and other United Nations organs and entities all played crucial, complementary roles, within their respective mandates, in fostering international peace and security. The President of the Assembly further indicated that she would continue regular consultations and periodic exchanges of information with the Secretary-General, the President of the Economic and Social Council and the President of the Security Council on “important issues pertaining to international peace and security”. On 31 October 2018, the President of the Council had participated in a dialogue with the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on the theme “Renewing commitment to multilateralism”.

There were no special sessions of the General Assembly convoked at the request of the Security Council pursuant to Article 20 of the Charter. Nonetheless, in June 2018, the Assembly resumed its tenth emergency special session, pursuant to Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950. This was done at the request of the Chair of the Group of Arab States and the Chair of the Summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, as a result of the negative vote by the United States on 1 June 2018 on a draft resolution regarding the protection of the Palestinian civilian population in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.

A number of resolutions and presidential statements adopted by the Council during 2018 contained specific references to the General Assembly in connection with policy and implementation issues other than those covered in subsections A, D, E and G above. With regard to the environmental footprint of large United Nations peacekeeping operations, the Council requested the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to consider the environmental impact of their operations when fulfilling their mandated tasks and to manage them as appropriate and in accordance with applicable and relevant Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and regulations.

On the question concerning Haiti, the Council recalled General Assembly resolution 71/161 on the new United Nations approach to cholera in Haiti and noted the continued progress in reductions of suspected cases of cholera, while reaffirming the importance of the continued support of the international community to the United Nations efforts to combat cholera in Haiti.

In the context of peacebuilding and sustaining peace, the Council took note of the decision of the General Assembly to invite the relevant United Nations bodies and organs, including the Peacebuilding Commission, to further advance, explore and consider the implementation, as appropriate, of the recommendations and options contained in the report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, during the seventy-second and seventy-third sessions of the Assembly, and of the decision of the Assembly to request the Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly, during its seventy-third session, an interim report further elaborating on his recommendations and options, including those on financing for United Nations peacebuilding activities. The Council also took note of the decision of the Assembly to request the Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly, during its seventy-fourth session, a detailed report in connection with the next comprehensive review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture.

126 S/PV.8395, pp. 4–5. The meeting is also the subject of case 7, on the relationship between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.
127 A/ES-10/PV.38.
128 See the letter dated 8 June 2018 from the representatives of Algeria and Turkey to the President of the General Assembly (A/ES-10/786).
129 See S/PV.8274, pp. 3–4. For further details, see part I, sect. 24, “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.

131 Resolution 2410 (2018), tenth preambular paragraph.
132 Resolution 2413 (2018), paras. 2, 3 and 4. Furthermore, in a presidential statement issued on 18 December 2018, the Council recalled its resolution 2413 (2018), in which it, inter alia, took note of the General Assembly decision, as contained in Assembly resolution 72/276, paragraph 2, to invite the relevant United Nations bodies and organs, including the Peacebuilding Commission, to further advance, explore and consider the implementation, as appropriate, of the recommendations and options contained in the report of the Secretary-General, in accordance with the established procedures, during the seventy-third session of the Assembly (S/PRST/2018/20, third paragraph).
With regard to youth and peace and security, in a resolution adopted in follow-up to a debate held on the topic on 23 April 2018, the Council defined the term “youth” as persons between the ages of 18 and 29 and further noted the variations in the definition of the term that might exist, including the definition of youth in General Assembly resolutions 50/81 and 56/117.  

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**II. Relations with the Economic and Social Council**

*Article 65*

_The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request._

**Note**

Section II concerns the relationship between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, with a particular focus on the practice of the Security Council in relation to Article 65 of the Charter. It covers the deliberations of the Security Council concerning relations with the Economic and Social Council, including the participation of the President of the Economic and Social Council in a meeting of the Security Council held in November 2018. The Security Council did not address any requests to the Economic and Social Council for information or assistance, nor did it explicitly refer to Article 65 of the Charter in any outcome documents. The Security Council did not include any references to its relations with the Economic and Social Council in its communications.

**Discussions concerning relations with the Economic and Social Council**

During the period under review, the President of the Economic and Social Council briefed the Council once, at an open debate held in November, under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Strengthening multilateralism and the role of the United Nations”, which is one of the subjects of case 7. In the previous month, the President of the Security Council had participated in a dialogue with the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on the theme “Renewing commitment to multilateralism”.

Several references were made in 2018 to the relations between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in the deliberations of the Security Council. The key discussions in this regard, including the only explicit reference to Article 65, were held in the context of thematic debates under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and during an open debate on the Security Council’s working methods, as featured in cases 7 and 8, respectively.

**Case 7**

_Maintenance of international peace and security_

In 2018, during thematic debates held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the Security Council discussed the division of labour among the principal organs of the United Nations in terms of addressing the adverse effects of climate change and the role that cooperation among the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly could play in strengthening multilateralism.

At its 8307th meeting, held on 11 July 2018, the Council held a high-level open debate under the sub-item entitled “Understanding and addressing climate-related security risks”, organized by Sweden, which held the presidency for the month. During the meeting, the representative of Ethiopia, echoed by the representative of Maldives (speaking on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States), affirmed that the Economic and Social Council, along with the General Assembly and its relevant subsidiary bodies and the relevant intergovernmental frameworks, should continue to play the primary role in addressing the root causes of climate change and its adverse effects. This notwithstanding, both representatives concurred that, when the impacts of climate change posed a threat to international peace and security or to the survival of a country, the Security Council had a role to play and should take appropriate action within its mandate. The representative of the Sudan, speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States, indicated that, while the Group of Arab States recognized the Security Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace

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133 S/PV.8241. For further details, see part I. sect. 37, “Maintenance of international peace and security”.

134 Resolution 2419 (2018), sixth preambular paragraph.

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135 A summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting in a communication from the representative of Sweden (S/2018/749).

136 S/PV.8307, p. 19 (Ethiopia) and p. 26 (Maldives).
and security, it was important to “not overlook the role of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council” in addressing the impact of climate change “so as to avoid duplication and overlap” in the role of the different organs and without prejudice to their complementary mandates.\(^{137}\)

At its 8395th meeting, held on 9 November 2018 under the sub-item entitled “Strengthening multilateralism and the role of the United Nations”,\(^{138}\) the Security Council held an open debate, during which the President of the Economic and Social Council, the President of the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Representative of Qatar participated, the latter speaking on behalf of the President of the General Assembly. During her intervention, the President of the Economic and Social Council suggested that members of the Security Council should consider whether the use of Article 65 of the Charter, relating to the exchange of information between the two councils, “could be a way to strengthen the dialogue between the two councils”.\(^{139}\) The representative of Hungary emphasized that stronger cooperation among the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council could play “a truly important role” in strengthening multilateralism.\(^{140}\) The representative of the Holy See made reference to the dialogue between the Presidents of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council as an important step towards renewing the commitment of the United Nations to multilateralism.\(^{141}\) The representative of Ecuador also mentioned the dialogue and noted that the meeting had been an opportunity to consider the fundamental role of multilateralism in dealing with urgent challenges.\(^{142}\)

Case 8
Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

At its 8175th meeting, held on 6 February 2018 under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, the Council held an open debate on its working methods organized by Kuwait, which held the presidency of the Council for the month.\(^{143}\) During the meeting, the Security Council discussed, inter alia, its relationship with the Economic and Social Council.

Addressing the matter of the mandates of different United Nations organs, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed his country’s “serious reservations” about considering thematic subjects in the Security Council, especially those that came under the remit of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council or other United Nations bodies, and added that such practice violated the established division of labour and distracted the Council from its “priority tasks”.\(^{144}\) The representative of China similarly stated that, when deliberating thematic issues, the Security Council needed to coordinate with the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and other United Nations bodies so that each could play its respective role and to avoid duplication.\(^{145}\) The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran called upon the Security Council to “cease its ongoing attempts to shift issues on the agenda of the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council over to the Security Council”.\(^{146}\)

On the interaction between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, the representative of Portugal underscored that consultations between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission and the Economic and Social Council increased “the power of synergies” and strengthened “a more coordinated United Nations response in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and sustaining peace”. He encouraged the Security Council to regularly invite the President of the Economic and Social Council as a brief or a participant in informal dialogues.\(^{147}\) The representative of Indonesia noted that improved collaboration with the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council would enable the Security Council to develop more comprehensive solutions to increasingly complex and multidimensional conflicts.\(^{148}\) The representative of Maldives added that regular meetings between the presidents of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council would “go a long way in enhancing coordination” on the work of the three organs.\(^{149}\) The representative of Bahrain also highlighted the importance of stepping up coordination, cooperation and interaction among the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.\(^{150}\)
III. Relations with the International Court of Justice

Article 94
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.

2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.

Article 96
1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.

Note

Section III concerns the relationship between the Council and the International Court of Justice. In accordance with Article 94 of the Charter, the Council may make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment rendered by the Court if a party to a case fails to perform its obligations under that judgment. Pursuant to Article 96, the Council may also request the Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. In addition, pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, notice of any provisional measures to be taken to preserve the rights of parties may be given by the Court to the parties and to the Council.

During the period under review, the Council did not make recommendations or decide on measures with regard to the judgments rendered by the Court, nor did it request the Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. In line with the practice of the Council, the President of the International Court of Justice was invited to participate in one private meeting of the Council, on 24 October 2018, under the item entitled “Briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice”.151 In addition, the President of the Court and, on his behalf, a Senior Judge and President Emeritus of the Court each participated in open debates of the Council held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”.152 Elections of members of the Court held concurrently by the Council and the General Assembly during the period under review are covered in section I.E above. During the review period, no explicit references to Articles 94 or 96 of the Charter were made in decisions of the Council. Subsection A concerns the deliberations of the Council concerning relations with the Court and subsection B covers communications concerning relations with the Court.

A. Discussions concerning relations with the International Court of Justice

During the period under review, reference was made in the deliberations of the Council to the role of the International Court of Justice in connection with the peaceful settlement of disputes and to the relationship between the Council and the Court. At the 8175th meeting, held on 6 February 2018 under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” concerning the Council’s working methods,153 the representative of Brazil indicated that there was no compelling reason for the annual briefing by the President of the Court to be held in private.154 At the 8185th meeting, held on 21 February 2018 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security”, the Secretary-General encouraged Member States to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and to make greater use of the Court to help to settle and avoid the escalation of their disputes.155 The representative of Sweden stated that the Council should “more actively consider the possibility of recommending referrals to the Court”.156 The representative of France underscored “the essential role” of the Court in the maintenance of peace and international security.157

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151 S/PV.8380.
152 S/PV.8395 and S/PV.8262, respectively.
153 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 24 January 2018 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2018/66), and a summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting in a communication from the representative of Kuwait (S/2018/399).
154 S/PV.8175, p. 25.
155 S/PV.8185, p. 3.
156 Ibid., p. 21.
Similarly, the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia praised the Court’s “probity and independence” as “indispensable for guaranteeing peace and security”. The representative of the Netherlands indicated that the Court could achieve its objectives only when all Member States accepted its compulsory jurisdiction, and exhorted all Member States, and especially the permanent members of the Council, to do so.

During the 8334th meeting, held on 29 August 2018 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the representative of Pakistan recalled that, while the Council could refer disputes to the Court for an advisory opinion, it should also use its mandatory enforcement authority under Chapter VII of the Charter to refer a dispute to the Court so that the determination of the Court be binding on the parties, irrespective of whether or not they had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.

In 2018, there were eight explicit references to Article 94 and three to Article 96 of the Charter during the deliberations of the Council. At the 8395th meeting, held on 9 November 2018 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Strengthening multilateralism and the role of the United Nations”, the President of the International Court of Justice indicated that the Court relied on multilateral institutions to ensure compliance with its decisions, and pointed out that such compliance could be achieved by the Council under Article 94. The representative of Peru stressed the need to promote “a more systematic interaction” between the Council and the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, urged the Council to make greater use of the International Court of Justice, an organ which had played “an important role” in promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes and as a source of advisory opinions and interpretations on the relevant norms of international law and on controversial issues. The other seven references to Article 94 and the three references to Article 96 were invoked during an open debate of the Council held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, which is the subject of case 9.

**Case 9**

**Maintenance of international peace and security**

On 17 May 2018, at the initiative of Poland, which held the presidency for the month, the Council held an open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Upholding international law within the context of the maintenance of international peace and security”. A Senior Judge and President Emeritus of the Court, speaking on behalf of the President of the Court, emphasized that the Court could actively contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in parallel with the Council, adding that the constitutional framework of the United Nations envisaged an “organic and synergic relationship” between the two organs “with the potential of peace being reinforced by combining political and judicial approaches to finding solutions”. He referred to Article 94 of the Charter four times and Article 96 twice as part of the constitutional basis for cooperation and coordination between the Court and the Council in ensuring that the decisions of the Court be given effect, and noted that the advisory function of the Court could be a very useful tool in the maintenance of international peace and security by “elucidating the relevant and legal questions” relating to situations on the agenda of the Council. The Minister of State for Africa of the United Kingdom and the representative of Greece underscored the important contributions that the Court had made and could make in the maintenance of international peace and security. The representatives of Slovakia, Argentina and Norway emphasized the important role of the Court in the peaceful settlement of disputes. The representative

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158 Ibid., p. 29.
159 Ibid., pp. 26–27.
161 S/PV.8395, p. 7.
162 Ibid., p. 27.
163 Ibid., p. 37.
164 The Council had before it a concept noted annexed to a letter dated 3 May 2018 from the representative of Poland to the Secretary-General (S/2018/417/Rev.1), and a summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting in a communication from the representative of Poland (S/2018/560).
165 S/PV.8262, p. 3.
166 Ibid., p. 4.
167 Ibid., pp. 5–7.
168 Ibid., p. 19 (United Kingdom) and p. 42 (Greece).
169 Ibid., p. 40 (Slovakia), p. 65 (Argentina) and p. 66 (Norway).
of Japan further indicated that the Council and the Court could work “complementarily and in a mutually reinforcing manner” in the peaceful settlement of disputes.\textsuperscript{170} The representative of Uruguay added that the Council should strengthen its relations with the Court for the peaceful settlement of disputes.\textsuperscript{171} The representative of Australia called upon the Council to continue to encourage States to settle disputes by peaceful means, including through the use of the Court.\textsuperscript{172} The representative of Germany stated that the Court could and should play a more important role in the peaceful settlement of disputes, emphasizing that Member States had to respect and implement the Court’s decisions.\textsuperscript{173} The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, commended the role of the Court in fostering the pacific settlement of disputes under the relevant provisions of the Charter, including Article 94, and urged the Council to consider having its decisions reviewed by the Court given the need to ensure compliance with the Charter and international law.\textsuperscript{174} The representative of Peru stated that it would be “appropriate to request more frequent advisory opinions of the Court, in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter”.\textsuperscript{175} Many speakers echoed Peru in calling for the Council to make use of the tools provided by the Court, particularly by requesting its advisory opinions.\textsuperscript{176} The representative of South Africa indicated that, by requesting the Court’s advisory opinions “when confronted with complex legal questions”, the Council could play a role in the promotion of the rule of law, and emphasized that the Council had an important role to play in the enforcement of decisions of the Court, in accordance with Article 94 of the Charter.\textsuperscript{177} The representative of Rwanda also indicated that the Council should promote the rule of law through recourse to the Court.\textsuperscript{178} The representative of Kenya, recalling that the Council had only referred parties to a dispute to the Court once, in 1947, stated that the Council should explore how it could objectively use such a platform given “the increasing inter-State tensions”.\textsuperscript{179} The representative of Djibouti expressed his disapproval of what his country viewed as the Council’s reluctance to encourage States to submit their disputes to the Court for arbitration.\textsuperscript{180} The representative of France indicated that the Court had a “major role to play in providing the necessary clarifications for a harmonious interpretation of international law”.\textsuperscript{181} The representative of Pakistan stated that the Council should have “greater recourse to the International Court of Justice on legal matters”.\textsuperscript{182} The representative of Sri Lanka indicated that the key organs of the United Nations, including the Council and the Court, could make a collective contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security in dealing with disputes of complex political and legal dimensions.\textsuperscript{183} The representative of Mexico recalled that the Council had the ability to carry out the judgments of the Court in cases of non-compliance.\textsuperscript{184} The representative of Lebanon also stressed that the Council should use the authority vested in it under Article 94 of the Charter to “give effect to decisions by the Court”.\textsuperscript{185} Several speakers also encouraged all Member States that had not yet done so to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court.\textsuperscript{186}

B. Communications concerning relations with the International Court of Justice

During the period under review, the Council continued to exchange letters with the Secretary-General and to receive his reports on the progress of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission established to facilitate the implementation of the ruling of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002 on the land and maritime boundary dispute between the two countries.\textsuperscript{187}

\begin{itemize}
\item[170] Ibid., p. 43.
\item[171] Ibid., p. 68.
\item[172] Ibid., p. 59.
\item[173] Ibid., p. 63.
\item[174] Ibid., p. 82.
\item[175] Ibid., p. 19.
\item[176] Ibid., p. 24 (Plurinational State of Bolivia), p. 39 (Egypt), p. 47 (Mexico), p. 57 (South Africa), p. 64 (Jamaica), p. 73 (Djibouti), p. 82 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement) and p. 87 (Ghana).
\item[177] Ibid., p. 57.
\item[178] Ibid., p. 88.
\item[179] Ibid., p. 70.
\item[180] Ibid., p. 73.
\item[181] Ibid., p. 29.
\item[182] Ibid., p. 48.
\item[183] Ibid., p. 74.
\item[184] Ibid., p. 47.
\item[185] Ibid., p. 76.
\item[186] Ibid., p. 25 (Côte d’Ivoire), p. 40 (Slovakia), p. 43 (Japan), pp. 52–53 (Italy), p. 71 (Austria) and p. 74 (Djibouti).
\end{itemize}
Part V
Functions and powers of the Security Council
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**Introductory note**

Part V of the present Supplement covers the functions and powers of the Security Council, as provided for in Articles 24, 25 and 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, and is accordingly divided into three sections. Under each section, explicit and implicit references to those Articles in decisions, communications and meetings of the Council during 2018 are listed. Part V also includes case studies that examine specific instances in which those Articles were discussed or which otherwise illustrate how the Council has applied Articles 24, 25 and 26.

As covered in section I, in 2018 the Council made no explicit reference to Article 24 of the Charter in its decisions and instead referred implicitly to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in 13 of its decisions in connection with various country- or region-specific items, such as the situation in Libya, the question concerning Haiti, and reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan, as well as with thematic ones, such as children and armed conflict, the maintenance of international peace and security, peacebuilding and sustaining peace, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, threats to international peace and security, and United Nations peacekeeping operations. The primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security was also the subject of discussions during Council meetings in connection with a variety of items, including cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, the maintenance of international peace and security, and the implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507).

During the period under review, as described in section II, the Council referred to Article 25 in two resolutions, in which it underscored that Member States were obligated under Article 25 of the Charter to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council. Both resolutions were adopted in connection with the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”. During deliberations, speakers made explicit reference to Article 25 on eight occasions: twice in connection with the implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507), once regarding the situation in the Middle East, four times in relation to the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, and once in connection with threats to international peace and security.

With regard to Article 26, as described in section III and consistent with past practice, the Council made no reference in its decisions to its responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. Nevertheless, Article 26 was explicitly invoked during deliberations of the Council on two occasions: in relation to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regarding the situation in the Middle East.
I. Primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24

Article 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII.

3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Note

Section I covers the practice of the Security Council concerning its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24 of the Charter and is divided into two subsections. Subsection A deals with decisions adopted in 2018 that refer to the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Subsection B examines references to the Council’s primary responsibility pursuant to Article 24 made in discussions held during Council meetings.

During the period under review, none of the decisions adopted by the Council contained explicit references to Article 24 of the Charter. A concept note for a ministerial briefing of the Council on the theme “Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security”, annexed to a letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,

contained two explicit references to the Article. In the concept note, prepared by Kuwait, which held the presidency of the Council for the month of February 2018, Council members were encouraged to focus on discussing means to best utilize the tools available to the Council as set out in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter for it to discharge its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as outlined in Article 24. It was also indicated that the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991 was a vivid example of the Council’s ability to utilize the tools available in the Charter to act collectively and uniformly to carry out its responsibility and duty as conferred upon it in Article 24. Explicit references to Article 24 were also made in many instances during meetings of the Council, as further described in subsection B.

A. Decisions referring to the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 24 of the Charter in its decisions. However, implicit reference was made to the Article in nine resolutions and four presidential statements. The Council referred to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on numerous occasions while taking a multiplicity of actions, as further described below. The Council referred to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in several resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, by which it imposed measures under Article 41 and/or authorized the use of force under Article 42. In general, references to the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security were included in preambular paragraphs of resolutions and in the initial paragraphs of presidential statements.

Resolutions

In 2018, nine resolutions contained implicit references to Article 24 of the Charter. In those resolutions the Council reaffirmed, recalled, reiterated, bore in mind or indicated that it was mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Of the nine resolutions, three were adopted under country- or region-specific items on the agenda of the Council.

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1 Article 24 (3), under which the Council is required to submit annual and special reports to the General Assembly, is covered in part IV, sect. I.F.

relating to Haiti, Libya and the Sudan. In all three resolutions, the Council acted explicitly under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Following past practice regarding the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, in its resolution 2429 (2018), the Council underlined, without prejudice to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the importance of the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union with regard to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

In connection with the question concerning Haiti, by its resolution 2410 (2018), mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti until 15 April 2019 and authorized the Mission to use “all necessary means” to carry out its mandate. In relation to the situation in Libya, by its resolution 2420 (2018), mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council extended for a further 12 months the authorizations as set out in its resolution 2357 (2017) concerning the implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.

In addition, the Council referred to its responsibility to maintain international peace and security in six resolutions concerning thematic issues.

Of the six resolutions, one was adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, as explained below.

Under the item entitled “Children and armed conflict”, the Council adopted resolution 2427 (2018), in which it reiterated its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and its commitment to address the widespread impact of armed conflict on children and the long-term consequences it has for durable peace, security and development.

In its resolution 2419 (2018), adopted under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the Council bore in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and reaffirmed the important role youth can play in the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

Also under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the Council adopted resolution 2437 (2018), in which it indicated that it was mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and reaffirmed the necessity to put an end to the ongoing proliferation of the smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Libya. By the same resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council renewed for a further period of 12 months the authorizations as set out in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 2240 (2015) to intercept vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya.

In connection with the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, in its resolution 2417 (2018), the Council, reiterating its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, recalled the link between armed conflict and violence and conflict-induced food insecurity and the threat of famine, and strongly condemned the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare.

Under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the Council adopted resolution 2436 (2018), in which, bearing in mind its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council reaffirmed

3 Resolutions 2410 (2018), penultimate preambular paragraph; 2420 (2018), third preambular paragraph; and 2429 (2018), sixth preambular paragraph.
4 Resolution 2429 (2018), sixth preambular paragraph. For information on decisions involving regional arrangements or agencies, see part VI, sect. III.D. For more information on regional arrangements, see part VIII.
5 Resolution 2410 (2018), penultimate preambular paragraph and paras. 1 and 14. For more information on the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti and on the peacekeeping and political missions in general, see part X. For more information concerning measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter, see part VII, sect. IV.A.
6 Resolution 2420 (2018), third preambular paragraph and para. 1. For more information on the practice concerning measures not involving the use of armed force in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter, see part VII, sect. III.A.
7 Resolutions 2417 (2018), seventh preambular paragraph; 2419 (2018), seventh preambular paragraph; 2427 (2018), second preambular paragraph; 2436 (2018), first preambular paragraph; 2437 (2018), penultimate preambular paragraph; and 2447 (2018), second preambular paragraph.
8 Resolution 2427 (2018), second preambular paragraph.
9 Resolution 2427 (2018), second and tenth preambular paragraphs.
10 Resolution 2419 (2018), seventh and tenth preambular paragraphs.
11 Resolution 2417 (2018), seventh preambular paragraph and paras. 1 and 5.
its support for the development of a comprehensive and integrated performance policy framework for evaluating all United Nations civilian and uniformed personnel working in and supporting peacekeeping operations. Under the same item, the Council adopted resolution 2447 (2018), in which, reaffirming its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it underscored the importance of integrating United Nations support to police, justice and corrections areas into the mandates of peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

**Presidential statements**

During the period under review, the Council made implicit references to Article 24 in four presidential statements, reaffirming its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as well as its commitment to upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter. In a presidential statement issued on 18 January 2018, the Council, within its mandate to maintain international peace and security, also noted the importance of continuing to strive towards sustainable peace and achieving a world free of violent conflicts by the centenary of the United Nations.

In addition, under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, the President of the Security Council issued a statement on 8 May 2018 in which the Council reaffirmed its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and recalled its concern about the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime.

**B. Discussions relating to the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security**

During the period under review, Article 24 was explicitly and implicitly referred to at numerous meetings of the Council. Explicit references to Article 24 were made at meetings held under the items entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, “Maintenance of international peace and security”, “The situation in the Middle East” and “Threats to international peace and security”.

The following case studies illustrate the broad range of issues discussed during the period under review with respect to the Council’s primary responsibility pursuant to Article 24. The discussions were held in connection with the situation in Myanmar (case 1), the situation in the Middle East (case 2), cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security (case 3), the implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507), which concerns the working methods of the Council (case 4) and the maintenance of international peace and security (cases 5 and 6).

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12. Resolution 2436 (2018), first preambular paragraph and para. 1. For further information on the background to this decision, see part I, sect. 26, “United Nations peacekeeping operations”.


18. S/PV.8340, p. 7 (Kuwait).


21. S/PV.8185, p. 20 (Sweden); S/PV.8262, p. 10 (President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals), p. 25 (Côte d’Ivoire), p. 36 (Georgia), p. 48 (Pakistan), p. 68 (Uruguay), p. 76 (Lebanon) and p. 80 (Turkey); and S/PV.8346, p. 17 (Plurinational State of Bolivia).

22. S/PV.8152, p. 6 (Kuwait); S/PV.8383, p. 12 (Equatorial Guinea); and S/PV.8406, p. 8 (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

23. S/PV.8233, p. 15 (Kuwait) and p. 17 (Equatorial Guinea).
Case 1
The situation in Myanmar

At its 8381st meeting, held on 24 October 2018, the Council was briefed on the human rights situation in Rakhine State in Myanmar by the Chair of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, established by the Human Rights Council. While the meeting was requested by nine Council members pursuant to rule 2 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, four other Council members objected to the request. In the light of the divergent views expressed by Council members, the adoption of the agenda was put to a procedural vote. Before the adoption of the agenda, the representative of China expressed his country’s opposition to the holding of the briefing, indicating that the Council’s primary responsibility was the maintenance of international peace and security and asserting that the Council “should not get involved in country-specific human rights issues”. He added that, by receiving a briefing from the fact-finding mission on Myanmar, the Security Council would encroach on the mandates of the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, violate provisions of the Charter and weaken the responsibilities and roles of various United Nations bodies. The representative of the Russian Federation also opposed the holding of the briefing, indicating that his country saw “no added value” in considering in the Security Council a report that had already been taken up in both the Human Rights Council and the Third Committee of the General Assembly and stressing the need to avoid the duplication of efforts in the work of the principal organs of the United Nations. The representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland stated, however, that the situation in Myanmar clearly endangered international peace and security and pointed out that, in the report of the fact-finding mission, a specific request had been made for the Council to act.

The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, taking the floor after the procedural vote, noted that the Charter unequivocally established that the primary responsibility of the Council was the maintenance of international peace and security and that the Council was not the place to deal with human rights issues, as such issues had their own space for debate within their relevant specialized body. He also underscored the importance of respecting the mandate of each United Nations organ in order to avoid overlapping, duplication and interference with the work being done in each body. The representative of Myanmar also objected to the holding of the briefing and accused “some members” of the Council of hijacking “the human rights issue for their political purposes”.

The representative of the United Kingdom took the floor again after the procedural vote and emphasized that the Council had the “solemn responsibility” to consider “some of the worst things that a Government can do to its own people” and decide how to proceed. The representative of the Netherlands recalled that the findings of the fact-finding mission demanded action not only by other United Nations bodies but also by the Security Council, stressing that it was time that the Council “shoulder its responsibility”. The representative of France emphasized that it was important for the Security Council to continue to rely on the work of the instruments established by the Human Rights Council in order to carry out its own mandate and noted that the Security Council could not ignore facts that amounted to “the highest level of severity within the scale of international crimes” unless it relinquished its own responsibilities.

The representative of the United States of America also expressed support for the holding of the briefing, arguing that the “forcible movement” of hundreds of thousands of people across borders was “undeniably” a matter of international peace and security. The representative of Peru, also referring to the humanitarian situation, affirmed that his country was in favour of holding the briefing, stated that the responses aimed at resolving the crisis thus far

24 See S/2018/926. For more information on requests for meetings, see part II, sect. I.A.
26 S/PV.8381, p. 3 (the provisional agenda received nine votes in favour (Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States), three against (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Russian Federation) and three abstentions (Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan)). For more information on procedural votes, see part II, sect. VIII.C, “Decision-making by voting”.
27 S/PV.8381, p. 2. For more information about the relationship between the Security Council and other United Nations organs, see part IV.
28 S/PV.8381, pp. 2–3.
remained insufficient and appealed to the Council to continue to pay due attention to the plight of the Rohingya refugees.36

Case 2
The situation in the Middle East

On 5 January 2018, at its 8152nd meeting, the Council held a briefing on the situation in the Middle East. In accordance with rule 37 of its provisional rules of procedure, the Council invited the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to participate in the meeting. The Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, invited in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, briefed the Council at the outset of the meeting on the ongoing developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran. He explained that protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran started on 28 December 2017, when hundreds of Iranians had gathered, in a largely peaceful manner, chanting slogans against economic hardships. He reported that, as the protests had escalated, some had turned violent, with reports indicating that protesters had been detained and had died, although he noted that the Secretariat could not confirm or deny the authenticity of the images that had been broadcast or the extent of the violence. He added that, on 3 January 2018, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had announced the end of the anti-Government protests.37

During the meeting, the representative of Kuwait referred explicitly to Article 24 of the Charter, noting that the Council was charged with “addressing any genuine threat to global security and stability”. While expressing hope that the demonstrations in the Islamic Republic of Iran would not become a threat to international peace and security, he called for the role of the Council in early action and prevention to be strengthened.38 The representative of Peru similarly indicated that the Council, as the organ with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, should have the ability to contribute to conflict prevention.39

Several Council members, however, called into question the holding of the meeting, indicating that the situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran following the protests did not endanger international peace and security.40 The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia categorically rejected what his country considered to be attempts by some countries to “push” for meetings of the Council on issues that did not pose a threat to international peace and security, arguing that such action risked having the Council be “instrumentalized” for political ends.41 The representative of Equatorial Guinea indicated that the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran did not in principle constitute a threat to international peace and security and thus should be addressed and discussed in the “competent forums set up by the United Nations for that purpose”.42 The representative of Ethiopia also questioned whether the Council was the appropriate forum to discuss human rights issues.43 The representative of China, recalling that the Council bore the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as established in the Charter, underscored that the Council should not discuss the internal affairs or the human rights situation of countries.44 The representative of Kazakhstan also considered the developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran as a domestic issue that did not represent a threat to international peace and security and therefore did not fall under the mandate of the Council.45 Stressing that the subject of the meeting did “not correspond to the Council’s prerogatives under the Charter”, the representative of the Russian Federation accused the United States of misusing the forum of the Council and of undermining the authority of the Council as the principal organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.46 The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran deplored the Council’s decision to hold a meeting on an issue that fell outside the scope of the mandate of the Council and indicated that holding such a meeting put “on display” the failure of the Council to fulfil its real responsibility in maintaining international peace and security.47

In contrast, the representative of the United States noted that her country did not agree with the view that debates on the subject of human rights had no place in the Council, arguing that freedom and human dignity could not be separated from peace and security.48 The representative of the Netherlands also made reference to the Council’s responsibility to act

36 Ibid., p. 17.
37 S/PV.8152, p. 2.
38 Ibid., p. 6.
39 Ibid., p. 8.
40 For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I.
41 S/PV.8152, p. 5.
42 Ibid., p. 11.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., p. 12.
48 Ibid., p. 3.
“early and decisively when fundamental freedoms are under threat”.49

Case 3
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 5 September 2018, the Council held its 8340th meeting, under the sub-item entitled “The situation in Nicaragua”.

The Chief of Staff to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS) briefed the Council on the efforts that the General Secretariat of OAS had been undertaking in Nicaragua and noted its concern at the loss of life and the deterioration of democracy and political and social coexistence in the country, as well as the corresponding effect on the economic situation.50 The Nicaraguan civil society representative provided testimony to the Council and requested that the Council consider adopting a specific resolution on the situation in Nicaragua.51

Following the briefings, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed his country’s opposition to the holding of the meeting, stressing that the issue of the situation in Nicaragua had “no place on the Security Council’s agenda” and that the domestic political situation in Nicaragua did not pose a threat to international peace and security.52 The representative of Kazakhstan also said that the situation in Nicaragua was not a threat to international peace and security and therefore should not fall under the Council’s mandate.53 The representative of Ethiopia similarly underscored that the situation in Nicaragua remained an internal matter that did not constitute a threat to international peace and security and recalled that, according to the Charter, a determination of a threat would serve as the basis for the Council’s involvement.54 The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia also rejected the holding of the meeting, as his country did not consider that the internal situation in Nicaragua constituted a threat to the region or the world. He also cautioned Council members against turning the Council into “an instrument for political or ideological ends”.55 The representative of China also stated that the situation in Nicaragua did not constitute a threat to international peace and security and expressed opposition to the Council’s involvement.56

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua referred to the inclusion of the situation in Nicaragua on the agenda of the meeting as an act of interference in the internal affairs of the country and a violation of the Charter and international law.57 He added that the Council was not the appropriate body for addressing issues of human rights. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela underscored that the Council’s consideration of domestic situations of sovereign countries was a “flagrant violation” of the mandate of the Council.58

In contrast, the representative of Kuwait, while acknowledging the lack of consensus among Council members on the holding of the meeting, highlighted the ability of the Council to investigate situations that might have a negative impact on international peace and security and underscored the Council’s role in preventive diplomacy in accordance with the Council’s mandate as outlined in Article 24 of the Charter.59 Several Council members welcomed the holding of the meeting to discuss the situation in Nicaragua and echoed the statement made by the representative of Kuwait regarding the relevance of the topic to the work of the Council in the context of preventive diplomacy.60

Case 4
Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

At its 8175th meeting, held on 6 February 2018, the Council held an open debate on its working methods organized by Kuwait, which held the presidency of the Council for that month.61 During the meeting, many speakers made explicit and implicit references to Article 24 of the Charter.

49 Ibid., p. 9.
50 S/PV.8340, pp. 2–4.
51 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
52 Ibid., p. 6.
54 Ibid., p. 15. For further information on the determination of a threat by the Council, see part VII, sect. I.
55 S/PV.8340, p. 16.
56 Ibid., p. 18.
57 Ibid., pp. 19–20. For more information concerning the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States by the United Nations, see part III, sect. IV.
58 S/PV.8340, p. 22.
59 Ibid., p. 7.
60 Ibid., pp. 7–8 (United Kingdom), p. 11 (Netherlands) and p. 13 (Côte d’Ivoire).
61 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 24 January 2018 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2018/66), and a summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting in a communication from the representative of Kuwait (S/2018/399).
The representative of Cuba indicated that the work of the Council was a shared responsibility borne by all Member States and noted that, in line with Article 24 of the Charter, the Members of the United Nations recognized that the Council acted on behalf of Member States in the discharge of its functions. The representative of Maldives said that, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, the Council deliberated and discussed the maintenance of international peace and security. He further underscored that the work of the Council was a collective responsibility undertaken on behalf of the whole membership for the common good of humankind. The representative of Mexico made reference to the primary responsibility of the Council pursuant to Article 24 of the Charter and recalled that, in discharging its duty, the Council acted on behalf of Member States. Many other speakers also made implicit reference to Article 24 of the Charter by recalling that the Council, in discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, acted on behalf of the Members of the United Nations.

The representative of France noted that the Council, being the organ of the United Nations with the primary responsibility for issues of international peace and security in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, should, when necessary, be able to reflect on its own work and examine it critically in order to ensure effectiveness in its work. The representative of Equatorial Guinea underscored that the debate was a clear sign of the genuine interest of all Member States in enhancing the transparency, inclusiveness and openness of the work of the Council in order to ensure that the Council “truly” acted on behalf of all Member States, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter. Also referring to Article 24 of the Charter and the responsibility of the Council to act on behalf of the entire membership of the United Nations, the representative of Australia called for greater engagement by Council members with the broader membership. The representative of Uruguay, recalling that Article 24 of the Charter provided for the Council to act on behalf of Member States, encouraged increased interaction between the Council and the United Nations.

The representative of Egypt also recalled that the Council acted on behalf of all Member States and added that the practical implementation of Article 24 required continuous efforts to ensure that the Council became more democratic, inclusive, open and transparent in its interactions with Member States, as well as responsive to their concerns and ideas.

Case 5
Maintenance of international peace and security

At its 8185th meeting, held on 21 February 2018, the Council held a high-level open debate under the sub-item entitled “Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security”.

In his opening remarks, the Secretary-General noted that, while the Charter’s principles were as relevant as ever, its tools should be updated and used with greater determination, starting with prevention. He further stated that the international community spent far more time and resources responding to crises than preventing them. He underscored that the United Nations must rebalance its approach to international peace and security and aim to help countries to avert the outbreak of crises that take a high toll on humankind. He recalled in that regard that the Charter conferred upon the Council powers and responsibilities in the field of conflict prevention.

The former Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, indicated that the primary responsibility vested in the Council to maintain international peace and security was needed “more than ever” and underscored that addressing the root causes of conflict and working towards conflict prevention, alongside other stakeholders, would make the Council and the Organization stronger.

The representative of Sweden explicitly invoked Article 24 of the Charter when referring to the responsibility of elected and non-elected members of the Council to act on behalf of all Members of the United Nations and in accordance with the Charter, its purposes and principles. In that regard, he stated that the use of the veto by permanent members of the Council to protect narrow national interests in

62 S/PV.8175, p. 55.
63 Ibid., p. 56.
64 Ibid., p. 57.
66 Ibid., p. 8.
67 Ibid., p. 17.
68 Ibid., p. 52.
69 Ibid., p. 59.
70 Ibid., p. 63.
71 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 1 February 2018 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2018/85).
72 S/PV.8185, pp. 2–3.
73 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
situations of mass atrocities was “totally unacceptable”.74

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland recalled the Council’s “pivotal role” as a “guardian” of the maintenance of international peace and security and pledged to engage in efforts to strengthen the Council’s role in that regard.75 The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Côte d’Ivoire called upon the Council to “take stock” of the impact of global challenges on international peace and security.76

The representative of China called for support for the Council, “as the collective security machinery for the maintenance of international peace and security”, in seeking the peaceful settlement of conflict through dialogue and consultation.77 The representative of the Netherlands, focusing on the areas in which his country considered that the Council could act more effectively, underlined that, when conflict prevention failed, the Council had the primary responsibility to restore international peace and security.78

Two Council members pointed out that certain policies and actions could undermine the Council’s exercise of its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of Ethiopia indicated that the Council had yet to take full advantage of the Charter’s provisions in order to “overcome the constraints of self-defeating policies”, which led to double standards that, in turn, undermined the credibility of the Council in carrying out its mandate to maintain international peace and security.79 In the same vein, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that the manipulation of certain concepts and other “intrusive instruments” that did not enjoy consensus support in the Council had not lessened its burden as the organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.80

Case 6
Maintenance of international peace and security

On 17 May 2018, the Council, at its 8262nd meeting, held a high-level open debate under the sub-item entitled “Upholding international law within the context of the maintenance of international peace and security”.81 During the debate, many speakers focused on the Council’s role in promoting international law pursuant to its obligation to maintain international peace and security. The impact of the Council’s work on the rule of law and the need for unity within the Council in order to carry out its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.82 Several speakers emphasized the Council’s role in promoting adherence to the rule of law and in defending the integrity of international norms while carrying out its mandate.83 The representative of Côte d’Ivoire welcomed the role of the Council, as the guarantor of the maintenance of international peace and security pursuant to Article 24 of the Charter, in promoting the rule of law.84 The representative of France referred to the Council as a “guarantor of international legality when exercising its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”.85 Quoting Article 24 of the Charter, the representative of Uruguay recalled that the primary responsibility of the Council must be fulfilled within the framework of international law, respecting the principles set by the international legal order.86 The representative of Lebanon, invoking Article 24 (2) of the Charter, recalled that the Council was required to abide by the purposes and principles of the United Nations in the discharge of its duties and stressed that faithful respect for those provisions would prevent double standards and the selective application of international law.87 The representative of Peru noted that the Council’s mandate included the promotion of a
rules-based international order, which was evident in the Council’s role in the maintenance of the regimes for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\(^{89}\) The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Latvia underscored that the Council’s actions had implications with respect to international law given the Council’s role as the main guarantor of international peace and security.\(^{90}\) The First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia, referring to the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security pursuant to Article 24 of the Charter, emphasized the importance of discussing the ways in which international law is respected and its implications around the world.\(^{91}\) The representative of Brazil indicated that the Council, as the “primary guardian” of international peace and security, should defend the integrity of the norms that form the collective security system and added that full respect for international law was a prerequisite for achieving and sustaining peace.\(^{92}\)

Several participants also recalled that the Council’s mandate to maintain international peace and security was conferred by the wider membership of the Organization, as noted in Article 24 (1). The representative of China stressed that the Council represented the will of all Member States in fulfilling its duties to maintain international peace and security.\(^{93}\) The President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, highlighting that the Council was a representative political body, recalled that, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, the Members of the United Nations had agreed that, in carrying out its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council acted on their behalf.\(^{94}\) The representative of Sweden also made reference to the obligation of the members of the Council to shoulder their responsibility to act on behalf of all Members of the United Nations to maintain peace and rejected the use of the veto by permanent Council members as a tool to protect national interests in situations of serious violations of international law.\(^{95}\) The representative of Pakistan, while noting that Article 24 of the Charter had made the Council “an embodiment” of the collective aspirations of the membership for international peace and security, stated that the Council had “often faltered at the altar of political expediency”.\(^{96}\)

During the debate, several Member States called for the unity of the Council in order to ensure that the Council carried out its primary responsibility. In that regard, the representative of Peru, echoed by the representatives of Kuwait and Croatia, stressed the importance of unity of the Council in upholding international law and shouldering its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.\(^{97}\) The representative of Turkey said that current Council dynamics prevented it from adequately delivering through “prompt and effective action” on its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, as entrusted to the Council by the wider membership pursuant to Article 24 of the Charter. He added that the Council’s failure to carry out that responsibility on behalf of the whole membership was a “serious blow” to international law.\(^{98}\)

\(^{89}\) Ibid., p. 20.  
\(^{90}\) Ibid., p. 34.  
\(^{91}\) Ibid., p. 36.  
\(^{92}\) Ibid., p. 45.  
\(^{93}\) Ibid., p. 20.

### II. Obligation of Member States to accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council under Article 25

**Article 25**

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

**Note**

Section II, which covers the practice of the Security Council during 2018 in relation to Article 25 of the Charter, concerning the obligation of Member States to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council, is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers references made in decisions of the Council, while subsection B examines how Article 25 emerged in discussions held during the Council’s meetings.

During the period under review, Article 25 was explicitly invoked in two resolutions, as described in subsection A. Article 25 was also explicitly referred to
during several meetings of the Council, as described in subsection B.

Explicit references to Article 25 were made in several documents circulated to the Council, concerning the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action further to resolution 2231 (2015)\(^9\) and the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016) on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question.\(^10\) Article 25 was also mentioned for the first time in a report of the Secretary-General on the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine.\(^11\)

**A. Decisions referring to Article 25**

During the period under review, two resolutions were adopted, namely resolutions 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018) concerning the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, that contained explicit references to Article 25. By those resolutions, the Council underscored that Member States were obligated under Article 25 of the Charter to accept and carry out the Council’s decisions.\(^12\)

By its resolution 2401 (2018), the Council also demanded that all parties to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic cease hostilities and ensure the implementation of a humanitarian pause for at least 30 consecutive days, and allow safe, unimpeded and sustained access for humanitarian convoys, including medical and surgical supplies, to requested areas and populations, as well as safe and unconditional medical evacuations.\(^13\)

In addition, by its resolution 2449 (2018), the Council renewed, until 10 January 2020, the authorization for United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners to provide cross-border humanitarian assistance and the mandate of the United Nations Monitoring Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic.\(^14\)

**B. Discussions relating to Article 25**

In 2018, Article 25 was explicitly and implicitly referred to at numerous meetings of the Council. Explicit references to Article 25 were made during several meetings of the Council held under the items entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, \(^105\) “The situation in the Middle East”, \(^106\) “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, \(^107\) and “Threats to international peace and security”. \(^108\) In addition, during a high-level open debate held on 17 May 2018 under the sub-item entitled “Upholding international law within the context of the maintenance of international peace and security”, the representative of Japan discussed challenges in the implementation of Council decisions for the peaceful settlement of disputes. He indicated that, although Member States were legally obligated to carry out decisions of the Council, non-Council members often faced challenges in following the content of such decisions, which affected their implementation. He further emphasized that it was “incumbent” upon Council members to explain the content of Council resolutions to the wider membership in order to promote their implementation and enhance their effectiveness.\(^109\)

The case studies described below illustrate the most salient constitutional discussions relating to the interpretation or application of Article 25 during the period under review, in connection with the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (case 7) and the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question (case 8).

**Case 7**

**Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**

At its 8160th meeting, on 18 January 2018, the Council held a high-level debate under the sub-item entitled “ Confidence-building measures”.\(^110\) In his opening remarks, the Secretary-General emphasized the importance of the “universal and complete” implementation by Member States of all disarmament and non-proliferation obligations and called upon all States able to do so to provide capacity-building assistance in that regard.\(^111\)

\(^12\) Resolutions 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018), final preamular paragraph.
\(^13\) Resolution 2401 (2018), paras. 1, 5, 6 and 8.
\(^14\) Resolution 2449 (2018), para. 3.
\(^105\) S/PV.8175, p. 5 (Kuwait) and p. 42 (Liechtenstein).
\(^106\) S/PV.8195, p. 19 (Kuwait).
\(^107\) S/PV.8167, p. 16 (Kuwait) and p. 41 (League of Arab States); S/PV.8183, p. 28 (Kuwait); and S/PV.8274, p. 17 (Kuwait).
\(^108\) S/PV.8233, p. 15 (Kuwait).
\(^109\) S/PV.8262, p. 43.
\(^110\) The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 2 January 2018 from the representative of Kazakhstan to the Secretary-General (S/2018/4).
\(^111\) S/PV.8160, p. 3.
During the meeting, several Council members referred implicitly to the commitment made by Member States to comply with Council decisions, as stipulated in Article 25 of the Charter. The President of Poland noted that the stockpiling of chemical weapons, the development of military nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile programmes and provocative tests of those weapons were “clear violations of international law in general, and of the respective Security Council resolutions in particular”. Addressing the issue of the threat of weapons of mass destruction being acquired by non-State actors, the representative of Sweden underscored the need for collective efforts to uphold the non-proliferation regime and, echoed by the representatives of France and the Netherlands, emphasized that all States must work to implement their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004). The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation also called upon all States to comply with their obligations under resolution 1540 (2004) and recalled that the Council was required to respond “severely” to any breach thereof. The Minister of State for Asia and the Pacific of the United Kingdom noted that the international community could prevent nuclear, chemical and biological material from “falling into the hands of terrorists” by working towards the full and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The representative of Ethiopia stressed the importance of compliance by all Member States with the various decisions and measures taken by the Council and reaffirmed his country’s commitment to fulfilling its obligations under relevant Council resolutions and upholding the international non-proliferation regime.

The implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as endorsed by the Council in its resolution 2231 (2015), was also discussed. In that regard, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation warned that if the Plan of Action were to fail, and “especially if one of the members of the P5+1 was responsible”, such a situation would send “an alarming message” about the international security architecture, including the prospects for resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. The representative of the United States indicated that her country continued to uphold its commitments under the Plan of Action and called upon the international community to demand that the Islamic Republic of Iran fulfill its obligations under resolution 2231 (2015) and to collectively respond to the country’s violations of the agreement. The representative of Côte d’Ivoire called for the international community to mobilize in support of the Plan of Action, in accordance with resolution 2231 (2015), as “the safest guarantee for preventing an arms race in the Middle East”.

With regard to the situation on the Korean peninsula, the representative of the United States called upon Member States to fulfil their obligations and implement all Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The representative of Sweden, speaking in the context of the testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, noted the need for all Member States to implement relevant Council decisions in a full and comprehensive manner.

Case 8
The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

On 25 January 2018, at its 8167th meeting, the Council held an open debate on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, against the backdrop of the decision of the United States to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

During the meeting, two participants made explicit reference to Member States’ obligations under Article 25 of the Charter. The representative of Kuwait underscored the binding nature of Council resolutions, pursuant to Article 25, and indicated that it was incumbent upon the members of the Council “to insist on the implementation of the Council’s resolutions”. He further noted that parties to a conflict should not be allowed to “shirk” the implementation of Council resolutions. Rejecting the unilateral decision by the United States to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations noted that Council resolutions could not be challenged “simply because they were adopted several years ago by previous Governments or administrations” and called upon Israel to “stop flouting international legitimacy and breaching Security Council resolutions, in line with Article 25 of the Charter”.

112 Ibid., p. 7.
113 Ibid., p. 16 (Sweden), p. 18 (France) and p. 24 (Netherlands).
114 Ibid., p. 11.
116 Ibid., p. 22.
117 Ibid., p. 10.
118 Ibid., p. 12.
119 Ibid., p. 20.
120 Ibid., p. 12.
121 Ibid., p. 17.
122 S/PV.8167, p. 16.
123 Ibid., pp. 40–41.
Several participants implicitly recalled the agreement by Member States to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council and exhorted Israel, specifically, to comply with Council resolutions. The Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations stressed that resolution 2334 (2016) was “the best chance” for salvaging the two-State solution, indicated that the failure to implement the relevant resolutions and to hold Israel accountable for its non-compliance and violations fostered impunity and diminished peace prospects and called upon the international community to mobilize the political will to implement the relevant resolutions and to “revive the peace option.” 124 The representative of Peru, recognizing the right of Israel to safeguard its own security and existence through “legitimate self-defence”, recalled the obligation to comply with Council resolutions and in particular the urgency of ending the practices of building settlements, demolishing buildings and evicting residents in the occupied Palestinian territories, in line with resolution 2334 (2016). 125

The representative of Liechtenstein, expressing support for a two-State solution and the international legal framework in which such a solution could be achieved, recalled that resolutions 478 (1980) and 2334 (2016) continued to be binding on all Member States. 126 The representative of Indonesia noted that the legally binding status of Council resolutions on Jerusalem under the Charter was “unquestionable” and urged Member States not to take provocative actions or make pronouncements contrary to the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions regarding Jerusalem. 127 The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, also underscored the binding nature of Council resolutions and called upon the Council to ensure that its own resolutions were upheld, while condemning the continued settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territories by Israel as a “direct and deliberate violation” of the relevant United Nations resolutions, including Council resolution 2334 (2016). 128 The representative of Cuba emphasized that the Council should require compliance with the resolutions it had adopted on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. 129

The representative of Turkey, speaking on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, recalled that the Council had reaffirmed that measures designed to alter the demographic composition, character or status of East Jerusalem were invalid and illegal and stressed the importance of the full implementation of resolution 2334 (2016) for the advancement of peace. He also called upon States to uphold their obligations under the relevant United Nations resolutions and warned the Council that if it failed to address persistent non-compliance with its resolutions, Israel would be “further emboldened to continue its violations” in the occupied Palestinian territories. 130 The representative of Bangladesh also expressed concern over Israel’s “total disregard for complying with the provisions of resolution 2334 (2016)”. 131 while the representative of Kuwait noted that Israel was “in material breach” of the resolution. 132 The representative of Malaysia indicated that prospects for the peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained dim owing to the continued “defiance and violations” by Israel of relevant Council resolutions, including resolution 2334 (2016), and demanded that Israel fully comply with all of its obligations under the relevant resolutions. 133 The representative of Maldives also called upon Israel to fully implement the Council’s decisions and respect the legal obligations under the Charter. 134

Other speakers called upon States to abide by their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter. The representative of China called upon the international community to remain committed to the relevant United Nations resolutions. 135 The representative of the United Arab Emirates, speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States, emphasized the importance for Member States, especially Council members, to meet their commitments in implementing Council resolutions and honour their obligations as stipulated thereunder. 136 The representative of Jordan stressed that the implementation of Council resolutions was “the only way” to address the challenges and achieve balance in the Middle East. 137

124 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
125 Ibid., p. 27.
126 Ibid., p. 32.
127 Ibid., p. 34.
128 Ibid., pp. 41–42.
129 Ibid., p. 32.
130 Ibid., p. 53.
131 Ibid., p. 60.
132 Ibid., p. 16.
133 Ibid., p. 62.
134 Ibid., p. 29.
136 Ibid., p. 55.
137 Ibid., p. 36.
III. Responsibility of the Security Council to formulate plans to regulate armaments under Article 26

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Note

Section III covers the practice of the Security Council concerning its responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, pursuant to Article 26 of the Charter.

During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any decisions explicitly invoking Article 26 of the Charter. No communications to the Council contained any reference to Article 26. Article 26, however, was mentioned explicitly during two meetings of the Council, as described below.

Discussions relating to Article 26

At its 8160th meeting, held on 18 January 2018, the Council discussed the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In his intervention, the representative of Côte d’Ivoire recalled the two pillars for the Council’s work on non-proliferation, namely, the pursuit of objectives in furtherance of the maintenance of international peace and security and the Council’s responsibility to establish a system for the regulation of armaments, as provided for in Article 26 of the Charter.138

Article 26 was also explicitly mentioned at the 8221st meeting of the Council, held on 4 April 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”. In connection with the call for the implementation of an investigative mechanism on the issue of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, the representative of Equatorial Guinea called upon Council members to reflect on Article 26 of the Charter. He recalled that one of the powers of the Council was to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources.139

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138 S/PV.8160, p. 20.
139 S/PV.8221, p. 15.
Part VI
Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter
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Introductory note

Part VI of the present Supplement covers the practice of the Security Council with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes within the framework of Chapter VI (Articles 33 to 38) and Articles 11 and 99 of the Charter of the United Nations. It is divided into four main sections.

Section I illustrates how States brought disputes or situations to the attention of the Council during the period under review, pursuant to Article 35 of the Charter. It also surveys the practice of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, under Articles 11 (3) and 99 of the Charter, respectively, in drawing the attention of the Council to situations which are likely to threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Section II describes investigative and fact-finding activities performed by the Council and other bodies that may be deemed to fall under the scope of Article 34, including Council missions. Section III provides an overview of the decisions of the Council taken with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes. It specifically illustrates recommendations of the Council to parties to a conflict and its support for the efforts of the Secretary-General in the peaceful settlement of disputes. Section IV reflects constitutional discussions on the interpretation or application of the provisions of Chapter VI and Article 99.

The practice of the Council with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes is not discussed in an exhaustive manner in part VI, which focuses instead on selected materials that highlight the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter in the decisions and deliberations of the Council. Actions with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the context of the United Nations field missions authorized under Chapter VII are covered in the relevant sections of parts VII and X. Joint or parallel efforts undertaken by the Council and regional arrangements or agencies in the pacific settlement of disputes are covered in part VIII.

During 2018, as described in section I, Member States brought various matters to the attention of the Council, several of which it had not been previously seized. The Council convened four public meetings in response to communications from Member States, including one under a new agenda item in connection with the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, United Kingdom. In their communications, the most common request made by Member States was for the Council to convene a meeting to consider the dispute or situation in question. The Secretary-General continued drawing the attention of the Council to situations already on its agenda that were deteriorating and requested it to take appropriate action.

As described in section II, the Council dispatched a total of three missions in 2018: one to Afghanistan, one to Bangladesh and Myanmar, and one to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council acknowledged the investigative functions of the Secretary-General in connection with the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Mali and South Sudan and also discussed the investigative work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Human Rights Council.

As described in section III, the Council highlighted the obligation of parties to settle their disputes peacefully, the importance of conflict prevention and sustaining peace, the good offices and mediation role of the Secretary-General, and the importance of inclusivity in political processes. The Council called on parties to situations or disputes to cease hostilities and conclude permanent ceasefires, implement inclusive peace and reconciliation processes, resolve outstanding disputes and address the root causes of conflict. The Council recognized the specific
good offices efforts of the Secretary-General in attempts to end violence through the cessation of hostilities and the implementation of permanent ceasefires, inclusive political and reconciliation processes, the resolution of outstanding disputes, supporting political transitions and peacebuilding and addressing cross-border threats and cross-cutting issues related to the prevention of conflict.

As described in section IV, during 2018, the discussions in the Council focused on the importance and need for greater use of peaceful means in the settlement of disputes, with a particular emphasis on the role of mediation and the meaningful participation of women at all stages of political decision-making, the relevance of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter in comparison with the provisions of Chapter VII in the context of United Nations peacekeeping, the referral by the Council of legal disputes to the International Court of Justice and the role of the Secretary-General in providing the Council with early warning and bringing to its attention matters which, in his opinion, might threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.
I. Referral of disputes or situations to the Security Council

Article 11

... 
3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Note

Within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, Articles 35 (1) and (2) are generally regarded as the basis on which Member States and States that are not members of the United Nations may refer disputes to the Security Council. Under Articles 11 (3) and 99, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, respectively, may also bring to the attention of the Council situations that are likely to threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

The practice of the Council in this regard is described below in three subsections. Subsection A provides an overview of the referrals of disputes or situations by States to the Council pursuant to Article 35. Subsections B and C deal with referrals to the Council by the Secretary-General and the General Assembly, respectively, of matters likely to endanger international peace and security.

In 2018, further to a letter from the United Kingdom, the Council convened a meeting in connection with the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, United Kingdom. The meeting took place under a new item entitled “Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218)”. The Council also convened meetings further to communications submitted by Member States under existing items, namely “Threats to international peace and security”, “The situation in Myanmar” and “Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)”.

No State which was not a member of the United Nations brought any dispute or situation to the attention of the Council during the period under review. Neither the General Assembly nor the Secretary-General explicitly referred to the Council any matters likely to endanger international peace and security.

A. Referrals by States

During the period under review, certain situations were referred to the Council pursuant to Article 35 (1) of the Charter by individual Member States and groups of affected or concerned Member States. The majority of such situations were referred to the Council without an explicit reference to Article 35. Article 35 was expressly mentioned in seven communications from Member States, namely from Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, in connection with a series of airspace incidents involving the three countries at the beginning of 2018. No State which was not a member of the United Nations brought any dispute or situation to the attention of the Council under Article 35 (2) during the year.

Communications in response to which the Council convened meetings are shown in table I. As shown in that table, in 2018, the Council convened four public meetings in response to communications submitted to its President. Owing to the large volume of communications received by the Council, communications from States that merely conveyed information about a dispute or situation and did not

1 S/2018/434.
contain a request for a Council meeting or other specific Council action have not been included in table 1, with the exception of the letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218), which gave rise to its inclusion as a new item on the agenda of the Council.

In the letter dated 13 March from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission, the United Kingdom transmitted a letter from its Prime Minister to the Secretary-General providing information regarding the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, United Kingdom, on 4 March 2018. According to the letter, the Government of the United Kingdom believed that it was “highly likely” that the Russian Federation was responsible for the attack. The letter described the attack as a clear challenge by a State Member of the United Nations to the rules-based international order. Further to the communication, the Council convened a meeting on 14 March 2018 under a new item entitled “Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218)”.5

Matters brought to the attention of the Council in communications submitted by Member States during the period under review sometimes fell beyond the scope of Chapter VI of the Charter relating to the pacific settlement of disputes. For example, in its letter dated 17 May 2018, the Russian Federation transmitted a statement by its President on the missile attacks against the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic carried out on 14 April 2018.6 In that statement, the President of the Russian Federation described the attack by the United States, supported by its allies, as an “act of aggression against a sovereign state”, committed without a mandate from the Council and in violation of the Charter and norms and principles of international law. The Council, however, did not determine the existence of any new threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in connection with those communications.7

In most cases, the type of action requested by Member States was for the Council to convene a meeting to consider the dispute or situation in question.8 For example, by a letter dated 16 October 2018, nine members of the Council requested a meeting of the Council on the situation in Myanmar, during which the Chair of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, established by the Human Rights Council, would formally brief the Council and enable it to “receive further information on the situation and its implications for international peace and security”.9

In addition to the communications featured in table 1, Member States brought some matters to the attention of the Council of which it was not seized. For example, in a series of communications, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates drew the attention of the Council to allegations of violations of their respective airspace and interference with civilian flights.

In a letter dated 2 January 2018, the Permanent Representative of Qatar informed the Council that a United Arab Emirates warplane had violated the airspace of Qatar without prior notification to or approval from the competent Qatari authorities. According to the letter, the incident was a “flagrant violation of the sovereignty of Qatar”, a threat to regional stability and security and a direct violation of the principles of respecting State sovereignty and maintaining international security and peace as set out in the Charter. In the letter, the Permanent Representative of Qatar cautioned that, should such a violation recur, Qatar would take every measure required to defend its borders, airspace and national security, in accordance with international law and norms.10 On 18 January 2018, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations wrote to the President of the Council in accordance with Article 35, bringing to the attention of the Council recent incidents in which Qatar had put the security and safety of international civil aviation at risk. The letter contained a description of the incidents, which were described as “regrettable and serious” and as behaviour that might ultimately lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute in the sense provided for in Article 34.11 In a letter dated 4 April 2018, the Permanent Representative of Bahrain to the United Nations informed the Council of “menacing and hostile actions” by Qatar that threatened the safety of navigation of civil aircraft and urged the international community to demand that Qatar immediately end those actions and observe the rules of international law.12

Subsequent communications followed during 2018 from Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, in which similar accusations were

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5 S/PV.8203.
7 For more information concerning the determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, see part VII, sect. I.
8 For more information on requests by Member States to convene a meeting of the Council, see part II, sect. I.
9 S/2018/926. For further information on the meeting, see part IV, sect. I, case 3, “The situation in Myanmar”.
exchanged. While Article 35 was invoked in some of those letters,\textsuperscript{13} in others it was not.\textsuperscript{14} However, a meeting of the Council was not requested in any of those communications.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication</th>
<th>Action requested of the Security Council</th>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218)</strong></td>
<td>To convene an emergency meeting to discuss the aggressive actions by the United States and its allies</td>
<td>S/PV.8203 14 March 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threats to international peace and security</strong></td>
<td><strong>Letter dated 17 May 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/472)</strong></td>
<td>To convene a meeting on the situation in Myanmar, pursuant to rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure, to receive further information on the situation and its implications for international peace and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The situation in Myanmar</strong></td>
<td><strong>Letter dated 16 October 2018 from the representatives of Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/926)</strong></td>
<td>To convene a meeting on the situation in Myanmar, pursuant to rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure, to receive further information on the situation and its implications for international peace and security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. **Referrals by the Secretary-General**

Article 99 of the Charter provides that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Like Article 35, Article 99 does not specify the means by which the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Council any matter that may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. During the period under review, the Secretary-General did not invoke Article 99, either directly or by implication. Nevertheless, he continued drawing the attention of the Council to situations already on its agenda that were deteriorating and requested it to take appropriate action. During 2018, Member States made references to horizon-scanning and situational awareness meetings in connection with the Council’s meetings on United Nations peacekeeping operations and cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations.\textsuperscript{15} Discussions of relevance for Article 99 are featured in cases 10, 11 and 12 below.

In his letters transmitting the monthly reports of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons submitted pursuant


\textsuperscript{15} S/PV.8218, p. 53; and S/PV.8414, p. 65.
to paragraph 12 of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, the Secretary-General continued to express concern regarding the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and drew the attention of the Council to the need to ensure accountability for such use.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, on 11 April 2018, in a letter addressed to the President of the Council, the Secretary-General referred to the deliberations of the Council which had taken place on 10 April 2018 regarding the ongoing allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and expressed his deep disappointment that the Council had been unable to agree upon a dedicated mechanism to attribute responsibility in that regard. The Secretary-General noted the seriousness of allegations regarding the use of chemical weapons in Duma (eastern Ghutah) and appealed to the Council to fulfil its duties and not to give up on efforts to agree upon a dedicated, impartial, objective and independent mechanism.\textsuperscript{17} The Secretary-General also noted his concern regarding the situation in the Middle East and, particularly, in the Syrian Arab Republic in two meetings of the Council held under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, as described in further detail in case 12 below.

C. Referrals by the General Assembly

Under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, the General Assembly may call the attention of the Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security. During the period under review, the General Assembly did not refer any such situations to the Council under that Article.\textsuperscript{18}

Note

Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the Security Council may investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

II. Investigation of disputes and fact-finding

subsection B to investigative and fact-finding functions of the Secretary-General; and subsection C to other instances of investigative functions acknowledged by the Council.

During the reporting period, the Council dispatched three missions to the field: one to Afghanistan, one to Bangladesh and Myanmar, and one to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The objectives of the missions were to express support for peace processes, assess the situation on the ground, urge the full implementation of its decisions and express support for United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Council acknowledged the investigative functions of the Secretary-General by taking note of the report of the mapping project describing serious violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law in the Central African Republic; reitering its intention to closely monitor progress of the joint investigations by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office into violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights in the Kasai region; welcoming the commitment of the Secretary-General to doing everything possible to ensure that the perpetrators of the killing of two members of the Group of Experts


\textsuperscript{17} S/2018/333.

\textsuperscript{18} For more information on the relations between the Council and the General Assembly, see part IV, sect. I.
on the Democratic Republic on the Congo and four Congolese nationals in 2017 were brought to justice; mandating the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to support the work of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, established pursuant to resolution 2379 (2017); welcoming the establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry on Mali; and taking note of the reports on the human rights situation in South Sudan issued by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Secretary-General. The Council also recognized the investigative work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Human Rights Council in connection with the situations in Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. Council members deliberated on the investigative functions of the Secretary-General and other bodies of the United Nations in relation to the situation in Myanmar, the situation in Iraq and the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic.

A. Security Council missions

During 2018, the Council dispatched three missions consisting of all 15 Council members: one to Afghanistan, one to Bangladesh and Myanmar, and one to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. None of the Council missions in the period under review was explicitly charged with investigative tasks. The objectives of the missions were, inter alia, to: (a) underline the support of the Council for the peace, development and stabilization processes in Afghanistan and the importance of continued progress on electoral reform and the holding of credible and inclusive elections in 2018 and 2019; (b) urge the full implementation of the presidential statement of the Council of 6 November 2017 regarding the cessation of hostilities, the granting of humanitarian access and the respect for international human rights law and international humanitarian law in Myanmar;19 assess the efforts of the Government of Bangladesh and United Nations agencies in supporting the refugees in Bangladesh and seek the views of all concerned parties, including the Rohingya refugee community, regarding the situation in Rakhine State and Bangladesh; and (c) encourage stakeholders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to create all the conditions necessary to ensure an environment conducive to the peaceful and inclusive conduct of political activities and ensure that the presidential elections of 23 December 2018 took place with the requisite conditions of transparency, credibility, inclusivity and security, and assess the security situation in the country and the ability of MONUSCO to implement its mandate.

Table 2 provides more information on the missions dispatched in 2018, including their duration and composition and the related documents.

Table 2
Security Council missions, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Composition</th>
<th>Terms of reference</th>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
<th>Item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 January 2018</td>
<td>3 May 2018</td>
<td>17 January 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 April–2 May 2018</td>
<td>Bangladesh and Myanmar</td>
<td>All Council members (Kuwait (co-leader), Peru (co-leader), United Kingdom (co-leader))</td>
<td>S/2018/391</td>
<td>No report available</td>
<td>S/PV.8255</td>
<td>Security Council mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>26 April 2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>14 May 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 October 2018</td>
<td>15 November 2018</td>
<td>11 October 2018</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 S/PRST/2017/22.
In 2018, the Council referred to its missions in one of its decisions. In resolution 2419 (2018), in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the Council reiterated the importance of its missions taking into account youth-related considerations including, as appropriate, through consultations with local and international youth groups. Council members also discussed the utility of the Council’s missions in the context of meetings on its working methods, as described in case 1.

Case 1
Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

On 31 January 2018, the Council held its 8173rd meeting, under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”. The representative of Kazakhstan gave a briefing to the Council as part of the wrap-up session at the end of the presidency of Kazakhstan in January 2018. He described the Council’s mission to Afghanistan from 12 to 15 January 2018, which had been aimed at gaining first-hand information concerning threats facing the country and its potential, as one of the highlights of the presidency. He added that the mission had been able to demonstrate the support of the Council for the country and its commitment to peace and reconciliation. The representative of Kuwait reaffirmed the importance of such missions, which provided an opportunity to follow developments in conflict zones, understand the real challenges faced by the countries in question and realize the responsibilities of the Council to meet all needs and requirements so as to achieve international peace and security.

On 6 February 2018, at its 8175th meeting, further to a concept note circulated by Kuwait, which held the presidency for that month, the Council held an open debate under the sub-item entitled “Working methods of the Security Council”. In its statement to the Council, the Executive Director of Security Council Report, a non-governmental organization, noted that, with five missions having taken place in both 2016 and 2017, the Council was clearly convinced of their value. He suggested that the value of such missions could be enhanced not just by the standard formulation of terms of reference and subsequent briefing, as described in the note by the President, but by more strategic prior discussion of the objectives around which the Council could unite and subsequent discussion of the follow-up.

The representative of Côte d’Ivoire stated that Council missions to conflict areas were a direct way for the Council to gather information, making it possible not only to assess whether progress had been made but also to bring pressure to bear on the parties to a conflict in order to induce them to better fulfil their commitments, for example in the framework of a peace agreement. The representative of Peru noted that the reports of Council missions provided substantive, first-hand information that was vital when drafting resolutions or statements. The representative of Equatorial Guinea stated that the Council should clearly define: (a) the decision-making process on the deployment of missions; (b) the mission composition; (c) the timeline for the submission of reports and the way they were crafted; and (d) the decision-making process regarding a mission’s outcome.

The representative of Sweden highlighted that the President, in his note, had pointed out the preventive role of Council missions, which should be further explored, including through the use of mini-missions by a smaller number of Council members. Similarly, the representative of Lebanon called on the Council to devote more missions to the prevention of conflict. Noting the utility of a future Council mission to Bangladesh and Myanmar to reaffirm its support to refugees and displaced persons, the representative of Bangladesh stated that Council missions should be organized in a way that responded to the most urgent conflict and humanitarian situations under its consideration.

The representatives of Côte d’Ivoire and Egypt referred to the possibility of deploying joint field missions with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The representative of Brazil proposed inviting the Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission country-specific configurations to join some of the Council’s missions.

20 Resolution 2419 (2018), para. 4.
21 S/PV.8173, pp. 2–3.
22 Ibid., p. 17.
24 S/PV.8175, p. 4.
25 Ibid., p. 16.
26 Ibid., p. 10.
27 Ibid., p. 17.
28 Ibid., p. 19.
29 Ibid., p. 38.
30 Ibid., p. 49.
31 Ibid., p. 16 (Côte d’Ivoire) and p. 64 (Egypt).
32 Ibid., p. 25. For more information on the Council missions dispatched in 2018, see part I, sect 33.
B. Investigative and fact-finding functions of the Secretary-General

In its decisions during the period under review, the Council acknowledged the investigative or fact-finding functions of the Secretary-General in connection with five items on its agenda, namely the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Mali and South Sudan. The relevant provisions of those decisions are set out in table 3 below.

In connection with the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council took note of the report of the mapping project conducted further to Council resolution 2301 (2016) by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, which described serious violations and abuses of international human rights and violations of international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Central African Republic between January 2003 and December 2015, and called upon the authorities of the Central African Republic to follow up on the recommendations.\(^{33}\)

With respect to the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council reiterated the importance and urgency of prompt and transparent investigations into violations of international humanitarian law and violations of abuses of human rights in the Kasai region, as well as its intention to closely monitor the progress of the investigations into those acts, including the joint investigations by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in order to bring to justice and hold accountable all those responsible.\(^{34}\) In addition, the Council urged the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to fully cooperate with the United Nations team deployed to assist with the national investigation into the deaths of two members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and four Congolese nationals in 2017 and to ensure that all perpetrators were brought to justice.\(^{35}\)

The Council also welcomed the work of the United Nations team and the commitment of the Secretary-General that the United Nations would do everything possible to ensure that the perpetrators of that crime were brought to justice.\(^{36}\)

In relation to the situation in Iraq, the Council mandated UNAMI to, inter alia, promote accountability and the protection of human rights, and judicial and legal reform, and support the work of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, established pursuant to resolution 2379 (2017).\(^{37}\)

Regarding the situation in Mali, the Council welcomed the establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry on Mali, the mandate of which is described further below, encouraged its operationalization and called upon the parties to cooperate fully with it.\(^{38}\) The Council also requested the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to support the operations of the International Commission of Inquiry.\(^{39}\)

Finally, the Council took note of the reports on the human rights situation in South Sudan issued by UNMISS and the Secretary-General, as well as the Mission’s joint report with OHCHR on freedom of expression in South Sudan.\(^{40}\)

\(^{33}\) Resolution 2448 (2018), para. 28.

\(^{34}\) Resolution 2409 (2018), para. 14.

\(^{35}\) Ibid. For more information, see letter dated 31 October 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/917) and The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Supplement 2016–2017 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.20.VII.1), part VI, sect. II.B.

\(^{36}\) Resolution 2424 (2018), fourth preambular paragraph.

\(^{37}\) Resolution 2421 (2018), para. 2 (d). For more information on the mandate of UNAMI, see part X, sect. II, “Special political missions”. For more information on the mandate of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, see part IX, sect. III, “Investigative bodies”.

\(^{38}\) Resolution 2423 (2018), twenty-third preambular paragraph and para. 15.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., para. 38 (a) (iii). For more information on the mandate of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I, “Peacekeeping operations”.

\(^{40}\) Resolution 2406 (2018), seventeenth and twentieth preambular paragraphs.
### Table 3
**Variables relating to investigative and/or fact-finding activities by the Secretary-General, 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision and date</th>
<th>Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The situation in the Central African Republic</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2448 (2018) 13 December 2018</td>
<td>Takes note in this regard of the report of the mapping project describing serious violations and abuses of international human rights and violations of international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Central African Republic between January 2003 and December 2015 and further calls on the authorities of the Central African Republic to follow up on the recommendations (para. 28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2409 (2018) 27 March 2018</td>
<td>Reiterates its condemnation of the violence witnessed in the Kasai region over the past year, further reiterates the importance and urgency of prompt and transparent investigations into violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights in the region, as well as its intention to closely monitor progress of the investigations into these violations and abuses, including the joint investigations by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in order to bring to justice and hold accountable all those responsible, and looks forward to their results; further calls upon the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to continue to cooperate with the team of international experts on the situation in the Kasai region, as mandated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 35/33, and urges the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to fully cooperate with the United Nations team deployed, as agreed, to assist the Congolese authorities’ investigations into the deaths of the two United Nations experts in March 2017, and ensure all perpetrators are brought to justice and held accountable (para. 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2424 (2018) 29 June 2018</td>
<td>Reiterating the need for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to swiftly and fully investigate the killing of the two members of the Group of Experts and the four Congolese nationals accompanying them and bring those responsible to justice, welcoming the Secretary-General’s commitment that the United Nations will do everything possible to ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice, further welcoming the work of the United Nations team deployed to assist the Congolese authorities in their investigations, in agreement with the Congolese authorities, and calling for continued cooperation (fourth preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The situation concerning Iraq</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolution 2421 (2018) 14 June 2018</td>
<td>Decides further that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, at the request of the Government of Iraq, and taking into account the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary-General (S/2018/430), shall:</td>
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<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Promote accountability and the protection of human rights, and judicial and legal reform, in order to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq, in addition to supporting the work of the investigative team established in resolution 2379 (2017) (para. 2 (d))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The situation in Mali</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2423 (2018) 28 June 2018</td>
<td>Recognizing the essential contribution of the transitional justice mechanisms referred to in the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali to the promotion of a durable peace in Mali and accountability for human rights abuses and violations, noting the gradual progress achieved in the operationalization of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, stressing the need for the Government to extend its mandate beyond December 2018, welcoming the establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry, in accordance with the Agreement, and encouraging its operationalization (twenty-third preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welcomes the establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry, in accordance with the Agreement and as requested by resolution 2364 (2017), and calls upon all parties to cooperate fully with it (para. 15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part V

Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter

Decision and date

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decides that the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali shall include the following priority tasks:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (a) **Support to the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali** ...
| (iii) To support the implementation of the reconciliation and justice measures of the Agreement, especially in its part V, by continuing its current activities, including with respect to the support of the operations of the International Commission of Inquiry (para. 38 (a) (iii)) |

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

Resolution 2406 (2018) 15 March 2018

Taking note of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights report on the freedom of expression in South Sudan, condemning the use of media to broadcast hate speech and transmit messages instigating violence against a particular ethnic group, a practice that has the potential to play a significant role in promoting mass violence and exacerbating conflict, and calling on the Government of South Sudan to immediately condemn and counter increasing hate speech and ethnic violence and to promote reconciliation among its people, including through a process of justice and accountability (seventeenth preambular paragraph)

Taking note with interest of the reports on the human rights situation in South Sudan issued by UNMISS and the Secretary-General, as well as the report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan and the separate opinion, expressing grave concern that according to some reports, including the African Union Commission of Inquiry report on South Sudan released on 27 October 2015, there were reasonable grounds to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed and the report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan released on 23 February 2018 that war crimes and crimes against humanity may have been committed, emphasizing its hope that these and other credible reporting will be duly considered by any transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms for South Sudan, including those established in the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, stressing the importance of collection and preservation of evidence for eventual use by the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, and encouraging efforts in this regard (twentieth preambular paragraph)

During the reporting period, the Secretary-General undertook one new investigative action, in relation to the situation in Mali. In his letter dated 19 January 2018 addressed to the President of the Council, the Secretary-General informed the Council that, in response to a request made by the Government of Mali on 5 April 2016, and taking into consideration article 46 of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, he had decided to establish an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate allegations of abuses and serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including allegations of conflict-related sexual violence, committed in the territory of Mali from 1 January 2012 to the date of the establishment of the Commission. The Secretary-General added that the decision was consistent with and in furtherance of Council resolution 2364 (2017), in which the Council had decided that one of the priority tasks of MINUSMA would be to support the implementation of the reconciliation and justice measures in the Agreement, including with respect to the establishment and operations of an international commission of inquiry. He noted his expectation that the findings of the Commission would complement and help advance ongoing efforts to fight impunity by competent Malian authorities and the International Criminal Court.41

In his letter dated 19 January 2018 addressed to the President of the Council, the Secretary-General requested an extension of the time frame for the submission of the terms of reference for the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in order to continue the efforts to reach

an agreement with the Government of Iraq.\textsuperscript{42}
Following the Council’s approval of his request for an extension,\textsuperscript{43} the Secretary-General submitted the terms of reference for the Council’s approval in a letter dated 9 February 2018.\textsuperscript{44} They were approved by the Council on 13 February 2018.\textsuperscript{45} The terms of reference, which were acceptable to the Government of Iraq and consistent with resolution 2379 (2017), outlined the mandate, structure and composition of the Investigative Team, the standards and procedural requirements for the collection, preservation, storage and use of evidence, and cooperation between the Investigative Team and other entities.\textsuperscript{46}

In 2018, Council members also made reference to the investigative authority of the Council and the role of the Secretary-General in their discussions. For example, at the 8152nd meeting, held on 5 January 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, in connection with events in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that no one was forcing the situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran onto the agenda of the Council, which was “perfectly empowered, through Article 34 of the Charter to investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security”.\textsuperscript{47} In contrast, the representative of the Russian Federation maintained that the subject of the meeting did not correspond with the Council’s prerogatives under the Charter and that the references made to Article 34 during the meeting were inappropriate.\textsuperscript{48}

Similarly, at the 8340th meeting, held on 5 September 2018 under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, in connection with the situation in Nicaragua, the representative of Kuwait noted that Article 34 of the Charter underscored the role of the Council to apply preventive diplomacy in order to prevent conflicts and address situations and crises as early as possible if there were any early warning signs of such conflicts that could endanger international peace and security.\textsuperscript{49} The representative of the

\textsuperscript{42} S/2018/63.
\textsuperscript{43} S/2018/64.
\textsuperscript{44} S/2018/118.
\textsuperscript{45} S/2018/119.
\textsuperscript{46} S/2018/118, annex.
\textsuperscript{47} S/PV.8152, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 13.
\textsuperscript{49} S/PV.8340, p. 7.

Plurinational State of Bolivia responded that the argument for addressing the situation in Nicaragua under Article 34 was not applicable, for no dispute or situation was being investigated that could lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute whose continuance could endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.\textsuperscript{50}

Subsequent to the termination of the mandate of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in November 2017, the Council continued its deliberations on the viability of establishing an accountability mechanism to investigate and attribute responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (see cases 2 and 4). The Council also discussed the mandate and the commencement of work of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (see case 3).

Case 2
The situation in the Middle East

On 5 February 2018, the Council held its 8174th meeting, under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”. During that meeting, it heard a briefing by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, further to the fifty-second monthly report of the Director General of OPCW.\textsuperscript{51} The High Representative stated that the OPCW fact-finding mission continued to look into all allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. Noting that new reports by the mission were pending, she added that should those investigations conclude that there had been the use, or likely use, of chemical weapons, the obligation to enact a meaningful response would be further intensified. In that regard, she expressed her hope, and the hope of the Secretary-General, that such a response would favour unity, not impunity.\textsuperscript{52}

During the discussion, Council members expressed their concern about and condemned reports on the use of chemical weapons and stated that there was a need for the Council to establish a mechanism to ensure accountability for their use. The representative of Sweden stated that the Council had a responsibility to protect the international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and to ensure accountability.\textsuperscript{53}
The representative of Peru maintained that, in order to provide credible deterrence against the use of such weapons, it was urgent to establish an attributive mechanism with the highest standards of professionalism, objectivity, transparency and independence to fill the gap left by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. The representative of the Netherlands added that the fundamental characteristics of any accountability mechanism were the principles of impartiality, independence, comprehensiveness and effectiveness. The representative of Poland was of the view that any future mechanism would not operate in a void, it had to build on the Joint Investigative Mechanism, and its mandate could not deviate from resolution 2235 (2015).

The representative of the United States stated that the latest draft resolution of the Russian Federation on the establishment of such a mechanism did not meet the criteria of independence and impartiality, particularly as the proposal did not take into consideration the findings of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, altered the process for the selection of investigators, provided for unnecessary and arbitrary investigative standards and allowed for the Council to review the findings and to decide whether to include them in the final report. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed criticism of the draft proposal for focusing solely on non-State actors, limiting the role of the investigative experts to merely gathering evidence, raising the burden of proof to the standard of “beyond reasonable doubt” and insisting on the conduct of site visits despite the explicit provision in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction for other ways to gather relevant evidence.

Describing the proposal of the Russian Federation as a new and positive opportunity to reach the goal of creating a transparent accountability mechanism, the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia called on Council members to commit themselves to a process of purposeful negotiation and echoed the call of the Secretary-General for the Council to demonstrate unity on the issue. The representative of the Russian Federation criticized the work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, arguing that it had formed its conclusions on the basis of disinformation supplied by militant groups. The representative of Côte d’Ivoire called for the establishment of an accountability mechanism that was acceptable to all and capable of identifying perpetrators and bringing them to justice.

On 10 April 2018, at the 8228th meeting, held under the same item, the Council considered three draft resolutions regarding the investigation of alleged chemical weapons attacks in the Syrian Arab Republic, further to the alleged chemical attack in Duma on 7 April 2018. One of the draft resolutions was sponsored by 26 Member States and the remaining two were sponsored by the Russian Federation. In the draft sponsored by 26 Member States and in one of the resolutions sponsored by the Russian Federation, the establishment of the United Nations Independent Mechanism of Investigation was proposed. Among other differences, while the draft sponsored by 26 Member States contained a request to all parties within the Syrian Arab Republic to provide Mechanism and OPCW personnel “immediate and unflettered access” to sites, materials and individuals deemed to be of importance for the purpose of its mandate, the draft sponsored by the Russian Federation specified that such access would be “justified based on the assessment of the facts and circumstances known at the time”.

The draft sponsored by 26 Member States was voted on first and the Council failed to adopt it, owing to the negative vote of the Russian Federation, a permanent member of the Council. The representative of the Russian Federation explained that the draft proposed replicated the “flawed working methods” of the Joint Investigative Mechanism. The representative of China regretted that the draft did not take into consideration some of the concerns of certain Council members regarding the mechanism’s working methods. The first of the two draft resolutions sponsored by the Russian Federation was voted on second and the Council failed to adopt it owing to the

54 Ibid., p. 8.
55 Ibid., p. 13.
56 Ibid., p. 9.
57 Ibid., pp. 3–4.
58 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
59 Ibid., p. 7.
60 Ibid., p. 11.
61 Ibid., p. 12.
62 See S/PV.8228. For more information on Council deliberations on a new structure for the investigation of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, see part IX, sect. VIII, “Subsidiary organs of the Security Council proposed but not established”.
65 S/2018/321, para. 7; and S/2018/175, para. 5.
67 S/2018/175, para. 9.
68 S/PV.8228, p. 4.
69 Ibid., p. 6.
lack of the required number of votes. The second draft resolution sponsored by the Russian Federation was voted on last and the Council failed to adopt it owing to the lack of the required number of votes. In the text of that draft resolution, support was expressed for the OPCW fact-finding mission but the text contained no provisions on the establishment of an investigation mechanism. In the draft resolution, the Council would have welcomed the decision of the Director General of OPCW to send the fact-finding mission experts for investigation in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention to the site of the alleged incident in Duma and adjacent areas and would have requested the fact-finding mission to report the results of that investigation to the OPCW Executive Council as soon as possible. It would also have requested the Director General to keep the Council informed of progress. In addition, the Council would have demanded that all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic facilitate free and safe access for the mission to relevant sites and provide any information and evidence, in accordance with resolution 2118 (2013), in relation to the alleged incident in Duma and adjacent areas.

Speaking before the vote on the draft resolution, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the draft resolution was a practical, non-confrontational and depoliticized initiative in support of OPCW, which would help the specialists to determine what had or had not taken place in Duma. The draft proposed was criticized by several Council members for its failure to create a mechanism to ensure accountability for the attacks and for not stressing the need for the independence of the fact-finding mission. The representative of the United States criticized the draft resolution for containing a request to OPCW to send its fact-finding mission to Duma when the mission was already under way and when it already had a mandate to investigate and collect samples. The representative of the Netherlands expressed serious reservations about the text of the draft resolution because the fact-finding mission did not require the Council’s authorization for site visits. He stated that his delegation did not want to set a precedent that such authorization was required. Explaining his country’s abstention in the voting, the representative of Kuwait stated that there was no need for such a draft resolution. He called instead for an international, independent, impartial, neutral and professional body or mechanism that would investigate the incident and identify the party that had used chemical weapons. The representative of Kazakhstan expressed support for the draft resolution, given the importance of sending the fact-finding mission to Duma, saying that, even if the only information obtained was about the kind of substance used, it would still be very useful to understand who the perpetrators might have been and, at the very least, establish that a chemical attack had taken place.

Case 3
Threats to international peace and security

On 4 December 2018, at the 8412th meeting of the Council, under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, further to his first report, dated 15 November 2018, the Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant gave a briefing to the Council on the formal commencement of the Investigative Team’s activities, on 20 August 2018, and its deployment to Iraq on 29 October 2018. The Special Adviser announced that investigative activities would commence in early 2019 and he set out the key priorities of the Investigative Team, which included gathering and analysing the evidence within Iraq to discern patterns and subsequently fill identified gaps. He underlined that the dual imperatives of the Investigative Team, namely ensuring independence and seeking cooperation, and demonstrating impartiality and pursuing national engagement, did not represent a dichotomy and that there was no contradiction in upholding independence while supporting national accountability.

In their discussions, many Council members welcomed the preparatory work undertaken by the Investigative Team and the progress made toward the commencement of its investigations. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that it was vital for the Investigative Team to help secure accountability for the victims of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in order to bring closure to those who still suffered. The representative of Sweden maintained that, given how difficult it had proved to advance accountability for the violations and abuses of

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70 S/2018/322, para. 3.
71 Ibid., para. 4.
72 S/PV.8228, p. 13.
73 Ibid., pp. 14–15 (United Kingdom), p. 15 (Sweden), p. 17 (Kuwait), p. 18 (France) and pp. 18–19 (Peru).
74 Ibid., p. 18 (Netherlands).
75 Ibid., p. 16.
76 Ibid., p. 18.
77 Ibid., p. 17.
78 Ibid.
80 S/PV.8412, p. 5.
81 Ibid., p. 6.
international humanitarian law and human rights law in
the conflicts on the agenda of the Council, the decision
to establish the Investigative Team was particularly
significant and a major achievement.\(^2\) According
to the representative of Poland, by resolution 2379
(2017), the Council had recognized, in a united way,
the importance of judicial accountability to the
maintenance of international peace and security.\(^3\) The
representative of the Russian Federation described
the Investigative Team as a bold kind of innovation for
the Council given that it was neither judicial nor
prosecutorial and that the evidence it collected was to
be used by the Iraqi judicial system and other national
judicial bodies exclusively upon agreement with the
Government of Iraq.\(^4\) The representative of Kuwait
stated that the Investigative Team’s mission
represented a fundamental part of the comprehensive
systematic approach to eliminating terrorism.\(^5\)

A number of speakers emphasized the importance
of the Investigative Team collecting evidence in
accordance with international standards.\(^6\) The
representative of China expressed the hope that the
Investigative Team would prioritize the conduct of
targeted, field-based investigations.\(^7\) The
representative of Poland encouraged the Investigative
Team to pay special attention to sexual and gender-
based crimes and to all abuses committed against
children.\(^8\) Some speakers maintained that, in
accordance with the practices of the United Nations,
the evidence collected by the Investigative Team
should not be used in trials that could lead to capital
punishment being imposed.\(^9\)

The representative of the United Kingdom stated
that the Investigative Team’s strong focus on
engagement with the Government of Iraq would be
crucial to the success of its work.\(^10\) The representative
of the United States underscored that the Government
of Iraq should give the Investigative Team the space to
operate effectively and noted that independence and
impartiality were essential to the Team’s credibility.\(^11\)

The representatives of China, Ethiopia and the Russian
Federation stated that the Investigative Team must
operate with full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq and
for its jurisdiction over crimes committed in Iraqi
territory.\(^12\) The representative of the Netherlands noted
that the Investigative Team’s ability to build
relationships with affected communities, especially
women, would be crucial to its work.\(^13\) Emphasizing
the importance of cooperation with other United
Nations mechanisms, the representative of France
welcomed the cooperation of the Investigative Team
with UNAMI and the Committee pursuant to
concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups,
undertakings and entities, and its team of experts.\(^14\)
The representative of Kazakhstan called on the
Investigative Team to cooperate with all organizations,
agencies of the United Nations, the private sector,
academia, the media and non-governmental
organizations.\(^15\) The representative of the Russian
Federation cautioned the leadership of the Investigative
Team against any contact with the International,
Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the
Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law
Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March
2011, established by the General Assembly in its
resolution 71/248.\(^16\) The representatives of Poland and
Sweden welcomed the Investigative Team’s intention
to achieve geographical, gender, ethnic and religious
balance among its Iraqi members.\(^17\)

C. Other instances of investigative
functions acknowledged by the
Security Council

During the period under review, the Council
recognized the investigative functions of other bodies
of the United Nations, such as OHCHR and the Human
Rights Council, in relation to the situations in Burundi,
the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and South Sudan. Table 4 contains the
provisions of Council decisions referring to such
functions.

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\(^{82}\) Ibid., pp. 14–15.
\(^{83}\) Ibid., p. 13.
\(^{84}\) Ibid., p. 8.
\(^{85}\) Ibid., p. 10.
\(^{86}\) Ibid., p. 9 (Netherlands), p. 11 (Kazakhstan), p. 12
(Equatorial Guinea), p. 14 (Poland), p. 18 (Plurinational
State of Bolivia) and p. 19 (Iraq).
\(^{87}\) Ibid., p. 16.
\(^{88}\) Ibid., p. 14.
\(^{89}\) Ibid., p. 9 (Netherlands), p. 13 (France), p. 14 (Poland)
and p. 15 (Sweden).
\(^{90}\) Ibid., p. 6.
\(^{91}\) Ibid., p. 7.
\(^{92}\) Ibid., p. 8 (Russian Federation), p. 16 (China) and p. 17
(Ethiopia).
\(^{93}\) Ibid., p. 9.
\(^{94}\) Ibid., p. 13.
\(^{95}\) Ibid., p. 11.
\(^{96}\) Ibid., p. 8.
\(^{97}\) Ibid., p. 14 (Poland) and p. 15 (Sweden).
**Table 4**

**Decisions relating to investigation and inquiry by United Nations bodies and related organizations, 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision and date</th>
<th>Provision</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The situation in Burundi</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2018/7 5 April 2018</td>
<td>The Security Council reiterates its regret at the decision by the Government of Burundi to suspend all cooperation and collaboration with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which has been present in the country since 1995 to strengthen the country’s rule of law institutions, and calls for a swift solution through dialogue between OHCHR and the Government in order to enable OHCHR to fully resume its activities, including its monitoring and reporting functions, and fulfill its mandate. The Security Council recalls the commitments that the Government of Burundi undertook during the thirty-sixth session of the Human Rights Council to re-establish full mutual cooperation with the Human Rights Council and OHCHR, including full cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner in Bujumbura, and to accept the visit of a team of three experts from the Office to collect information on the human rights situation in Burundi. It notes that discussions regarding revisions to the draft memorandum of understanding between Burundi and the United Nations concerning the updated terms for the Office of the High Commissioner in Burundi have been ongoing for over a year and urges the Government of Burundi to take steps to swiftly finalize the agreement with OHCHR without further delay (thirteenth paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The situation in the Central African Republic</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2448 (2018) 13 December 2018</td>
<td>Stressing the urgent and imperative need to end impunity in the Central African Republic and to bring to justice perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law and of abuses and violations of human rights, including in the context of the peace process led by the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation, welcoming in this regard the official launch of investigations by the Special Criminal Court and the steps initiated by the Government of the Central African Republic in establishing other transitional justice mechanisms to ensure accountability for past crimes and reparation for victims while promoting national reconciliation, and underlining the need to bolster the other national accountability mechanisms as well as the support for the work of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Central African Republic (eleventh preambular paragraph) Further authorizes the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic to pursue the following tasks of its mandate, bearing in mind that these tasks as well as those in paragraph 39 above are mutually reinforcing: ... (e) Support for national and international justice, the fight against impunity, and the rule of law ... (ii) To help build the capacities of the national human rights institution coordinating with the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights, as appropriate (para. 40 (e) (ii))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Resolution 2409 (2018) 27 March 2018 | Reiterates its condemnation of the violence witnessed in the Kasai region over the past year, further reiterates the importance and urgency of prompt and transparent investigations into violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights in the region, as well as its intention to closely monitor progress of the investigations into these violations and abuses, including the joint investigations by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in order to bring to
justice and hold accountable all those responsible, and looks forward to their results; further calls upon the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to continue to cooperate with the team of international experts on the situation in the Kasai region, as mandated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 35/33, and urges the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to fully cooperate with the United Nations team deployed, as agreed, to assist the Congolese authorities’ investigations into the deaths of the two United Nations experts in March 2017, and ensure all perpetrators are brought to justice and held accountable (para. 14)

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

Resolution 2406 (2018) 15 March 2018

Taking note of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights report on the freedom of expression in South Sudan, condemning the use of media to broadcast hate speech and transmit messages instigating violence against a particular ethnic group, a practice that has the potential to play a significant role in promoting mass violence and exacerbating conflict, and calling on the Government of South Sudan to immediately condemn and counter increasing hate speech and ethnic violence and to promote reconciliation among its people, including through a process of justice and accountability (seventeenth preambular paragraph)

Council members made reference to the investigative functions of OPCW and the Human Rights Council in their written communications. For example, in a letter dated 10 January 2018, the United States transmitted an assessment of the positions of the Russian Federation regarding the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and the work of the OPCW fact-finding mission and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. On 22 January 2018, the Russian Federation submitted a letter transmitting the comment by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the “attempts to distort Russian approaches to investigating the use of chemical weapons in Syria” by the United States. Furthermore, in connection with the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, United Kingdom, the Russian Federation transmitted, in a letter dated 21 March 2018, an aide-memoire in which it stated that it was looking forward to an official, detailed report by OPCW on all aspects of the Skripal case. It expressed its expectation that the OPCW Technical Secretariat would conduct a comprehensive, independent investigation that complied with all the relevant provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Regarding the situation in Myanmar, in a letter dated 27 September 2018 addressed to the President of the Council, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations brought to the Council’s attention the report of the detailed findings of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar dated 17 September 2018. In a letter dated 16 October 2018, nine Council members requested a meeting of the Council on the situation in Myanmar and a formal briefing to the Council by the Chair of the fact-finding mission, which would enable Council members to receive further information on the situation and its implications for international peace and security. In a letter dated 16 October 2018 addressed to the President of the Council, the Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the United Nations strongly objected to the invitation of the fact-finding mission to provide a briefing to the Council, citing concerns regarding the mandate, sincerity and independence of the fact-finding mission and concerns that such an exercise would be beyond the mandate of the Human Rights Council and would set a bad precedent, with serious negative consequences. Similarly, in a letter dated 18 October 2018, the Permanent Representatives of Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea and the Russian Federation to the United Nations strongly objected to the holding of a briefing by the fact-finding mission, maintaining that it was outside the fact-finding mission’s mandate, that it would set a bad precedent for the Council and would erode the mandate of the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council and duplicate the work of other United Nations bodies. At its 8381st meeting, held on 24 October 2018 under the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar”, the

100 S/2018/252.
105 S/PV.8381.
Council heard a briefing by the Chair of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar on the findings and recommendations contained in the report of the fact-finding mission dated 12 September 2018.\(^{106}\)

Further to the meeting held on 10 April 2018 to consider three draft resolutions regarding the investigation of alleged chemical weapons attacks in the Syrian Arab Republic (see case 2), the Council discussed the mandate and work of the OPCW fact-finding mission (see case 4).

**Case 4**

**The situation in the Middle East**

On 6 September 2018, at the 8344th meeting of the Council, held under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs gave a briefing to the Council further to the fifty-ninth monthly report of the Director-General of OPCW submitted pursuant to resolution 2118 (2013).\(^{107}\) The High Representative noted that, on 6 July 2018, the OPCW Technical Secretariat had issued an interim report of the OPCW fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Duma on 7 April 2018, which had been circulated to the Council.\(^{108}\) She added that the fact-finding mission continued to collect and analyse information and would provide a final report on its findings in due course. In addition, she reported on the activities of the fact-finding mission pertaining to four additional incidents, in Khirbat Masasinah on 7 July and 4 August 2017, Salamiyah on 9 August 2017 and Suran on 8 November 2017. The High Representative further informed the Council that, at its fourth special session, held in June 2018, the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention had decided, inter alia, that the OPCW Technical Secretariat should put in place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic in those instances in which the OPCW fact-finding mission determined or had determined that use or likely use had occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism had not issued a report.\(^{109}\)

Along with other speakers, the representative of Poland condemned the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and expressed her delegation’s conviction that those responsible for such attacks had to be held accountable, which was crucial to preserving the integrity of the Chemical Weapons Convention. She stated that Poland was looking forward to the development by OPCW of arrangements necessary to identify the perpetrators in accordance with the decision of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention at its fourth special session.\(^{110}\) The representative of Peru added that it was critical that investigations such as those being carried out by OPCW were able to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons, with a view to guaranteeing accountability and access to justice, as well as the effectiveness of an international rules-based order.\(^{111}\) The representative of the Netherlands called for follow-up to the conclusions of the OPCW fact-finding mission and its future attribution mechanism by referring the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to the International Criminal Court and the sharing of information with the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic.\(^{112}\) The representative of Equatorial Guinea stated that access to places of investigation required that the security of the personnel of the OPCW fact-finding mission be guaranteed on a permanent basis.\(^{113}\)

The representative of the Russian Federation described the decision that the OPCW Technical Secretariat would identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons as not legitimate because it was not in line with the goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention and was not recognized by the Russian Federation.\(^{114}\) The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia stated that it was essential that any investigation into the use or possible use of chemical weapons included on-site visits as a critical element, with the aim of conducting conclusive and verifiable investigations. He also opined that, regardless of the powers granted to the Technical Secretariat and the Director-General of OPCW at the fourth special session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Council still had the obligation to reach consensus on the creation of an independent, impartial and representative investigative mechanism.\(^{115}\)

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\(^{106}\) A/HRC/39/64.  
\(^{107}\) S/2018/804, enclosure.  
\(^{108}\) S/2018/732, enclosure II.  
\(^{109}\) S/PV.8344, pp. 2–3.

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\(^{110}\) Ibid., p. 6.  
\(^{111}\) Ibid., p. 4.  
\(^{112}\) Ibid., p. 13.  
\(^{113}\) Ibid., p. 8.  
\(^{114}\) Ibid., pp. 7–8.  
\(^{115}\) Ibid., pp. 9–10.
III. Decisions of the Security Council concerning the pacific settlement of disputes

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

Note

Article 33 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations expressly provides the framework for parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means. According to Article 33 (2), the Security Council shall call on the parties to settle their disputes by such peaceful means as provided for in Article 33 (1). The Council may recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment for the settlement of disputes under Article 36 (1). According to Article 36 (2) and (3), the Council should take into consideration procedures for the settlement of the dispute already adopted by the parties and legal disputes should, as a general rule, be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice. Article 37 (2) envisages that, following a referral, the Council shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate. Article 38 provides that the Council may make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

Section III examines the decisions of the Council in 2018 in connection with the peaceful settlement of disputes within the framework of Chapter VI of the Charter. Decisions explicitly adopted under Chapter VII have not been considered for the purposes of this section and are covered in parts VII and X. Subsections A to C illustrate ways in which the Council addressed the pacific settlement of disputes in the context of, respectively, thematic issues, country-specific and regional situations, and the settlement of disputes involving the Secretary-General. Subsection D addresses regional arrangements and agencies, noting that decisions of the Council in support of the pacific settlement of disputes by regional organizations are covered in part VIII.

A. Decisions of the Security Council concerning thematic issues

The present subsection provides an overview of the decisions of the Council adopted on thematic issues that relate to the pacific settlement of disputes. During the period under review, the Council’s decisions highlighted, among others, the obligation of parties to settle disputes by peaceful means, the importance of conflict prevention and resolution and sustaining peace, the good offices and mediation role of the Secretary-General and the importance of inclusivity in
the pacific settlement of disputes. A more detailed description of the Council’s decisions relating to these subjects is set out below.

**Pacific settlement of disputes**

The Council recalled that the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, should, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice, and urged such parties to settle their disputes by such means.116

**Conflict prevention and resolution and sustaining peace**

More broadly on conflict prevention, the Council expressed concern over the growing number of conflicts in different geographical areas all over the globe and underlined the urgent need for redoubled efforts for their prevention and resolution.117 The Council also underlined the importance of promoting the ability of the United Nations to deliver on its founding determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and putting emphasis on conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the light of the increasingly transnational nature of the causes, consequences and contributing factors of conflict.118

The Council recalled that a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy should include early warning, preventive deployment, mediation, peacekeeping, non-proliferation, accountability measures and post-conflict peacebuilding and recognized that those components were interdependent, complementary and non-sequential.119 The Council stressed that the prevention of conflict remained a primary responsibility of States and that actions undertaken within the framework of conflict prevention by the United Nations should support and complement the roles of national Governments.120 For the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council underlined the profound need to focus on, inter alia, advancing further conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy tools, facilitating the Council’s consideration of prevention issues, and streamlining the activities and enhancing and strengthening the role of its Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa.121 In reference to Afghanistan, the Council encouraged relevant entities of the United Nations system to work towards preventing conflict and noted the importance of addressing the conflict in that country in a comprehensive manner with the use of preventive diplomacy tools in support of durable peace and prosperity.122

With respect to early warning, the Council acknowledged that serious abuses and violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law, including against children, could be an early indication of a descent into conflict or the escalation of conflict, as well as a consequence thereof.123 The Council expressed its commitment to considering and using the tools of the United Nations system to ensure that early warning of potential conflicts was translated into early, concrete preventive action, including towards the goal of protecting children and with a view to building sustainable peace.124

The Council recognized that sustaining peace should be understood as a goal and a process to build a common vision of a society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population were taken into account, which encompassed activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development.125 Sustaining peace, according to the Council, was a shared task and responsibility that needed to be fulfilled by the Government and all other national stakeholders and should flow through all three pillars of the engagement of the United Nations at all stages of conflict.126 For attaining sustainable peace, including through engagement on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the Council emphasized the importance of, inter alia, creating potential for scrutinizing the specific relationship between security and development, utilizing a revamped regional approach and strengthening coordination within the United Nations.127 Furthermore, the Council recognized that

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116 S/PRST/2018/1, fourth paragraph.
117 Ibid., third paragraph.
118 Ibid., seventh paragraph.
119 Ibid., eleventh paragraph.
120 Resolution 2427 (2018), para. 9.
121 S/PRST/2018/1, twenty-second paragraph.
123 Resolution 2427 (2018), para. 7.
124 Ibid., para. 8
125 S/PRST/2018/20, second paragraph.
126 Ibid.
127 S/PRST/2018/1, twenty-fourth paragraph.
United Nations police, justice and corrections components in peace operations could contribute to building and sustaining peace by supporting host States.\textsuperscript{128}

In the context of United Nations peacekeeping operations, the Council stressed that the primacy of politics should be the hallmark of the approach of the United Nations to the resolution of conflict, including through mediation, good offices, the monitoring of ceasefires and assistance to the implementation of peace accords and that political solutions should guide the design and deployment of such operations. The Council also stressed that political solutions were the cornerstone of mandate implementation and remained key to reach sustainable peace and security.\textsuperscript{129}

The Council recognized that effective peacebuilding must involve the entire United Nations system and emphasized the importance of joint analysis and effective strategic planning.\textsuperscript{130} The Council underscored that the Peacebuilding Commission had an important role to play as a dedicated intergovernmental advisory body to bring coherence to international peacebuilding efforts.\textsuperscript{131} The Council underscored the importance of peacebuilding, emphasized the need to engage and collaborate with regional actors in policy-related and country-specific issues and acknowledged the significant role of the Peacebuilding Commission and United Nations integrated peacebuilding offices in, inter alia, supporting national efforts to build and sustain peace, as well as addressing cross-border threats in accordance with existing mandates.\textsuperscript{132}

**Good offices and mediation role of the Secretary-General**

The Council encouraged the Secretary-General to continue enhancing the use of his good offices, dispatching representatives, special envoys and mediators, to help facilitate durable, inclusive and comprehensive settlements and to continue his early engagement in the prevention of potential conflicts.\textsuperscript{133} The Council also encouraged the Secretary-General, inter alia, to enhance the ability of the United Nations to coherently support the pacific settlement of disputes by Member States and to ensure the better use of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy tools, in cooperation with regional and subregional organizations and other relevant actors.\textsuperscript{134} Furthermore, the Secretary-General was encouraged to provide periodic updates to the Council on the status of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy efforts.\textsuperscript{135}

The Council specifically stressed the important role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict in carrying out her mandate regarding the protection of children affected by armed conflict, including the importance of facilitating better collaboration between the United Nations and concerned Governments, and in supporting the enhancement of dialogue with concerned United Nations agencies, Governments and parties to an armed conflict.\textsuperscript{136}

**Inclusion of women and youth and child protection in the pacific settlement of disputes**

The Council stressed the importance of women’s empowerment and equal participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and the need to increase the role and leadership of women in decision-making and with regard to conflict prevention and resolution and peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{137} The Council noted the substantial link between women’s full and meaningful involvement in efforts to prevent, resolve and rebuild from conflict and the effectiveness and long-term sustainability of those efforts.\textsuperscript{138} The Council stressed the need to increase women’s roles in decision-making and with regard to conflict prevention and resolution and peacebuilding, including in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict, and the importance of considering gender-related issues in all discussions pertinent to sustaining peace.\textsuperscript{139}

The Council recognized the important and positive contribution of youth in efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and affirmed the important role that youth could play in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and as a key aspect of the sustainability, inclusiveness and success of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts.\textsuperscript{140} The Council called on all relevant actors to consider ways to increase the inclusive representation of youth for the prevention and resolution of conflict, including when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, and

\textsuperscript{128} Resolution 2447 (2018), para. 8.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., ninth paragraph.
\textsuperscript{130} S/PRST/2018/10, fourth paragraph.
\textsuperscript{131} S/PRST/2018/20, eighth paragraph.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., eighteenth paragraph.
\textsuperscript{133} S/PRST/2018/1, eighteenth paragraph.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., sixteenth paragraph.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., last paragraph.
\textsuperscript{136} Resolution 2427 (2018), para. 5.
\textsuperscript{137} S/PRST/2018/1, nineteenth paragraph.
\textsuperscript{138} S/PRST/2018/10, sixteenth paragraph.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} S/PRST/2018/1, twentieth paragraph.
to take into account the meaningful participation and views of youth.\textsuperscript{141} The Council recognized the role of youth in promoting a culture of peace and intercultural and interreligious dialogue aimed at discouraging their participation in acts of violence and also recognized that youth and youth-led civil society could play an important role in peacebuilding and efforts to sustain peace.\textsuperscript{142} The Council recommended that the Peacebuilding Commission include in its discussions and advice ways to engage youth meaningfully in national efforts to build and sustain peace and urged the Secretary-General and his special envoys to take into account the views of youth in relevant discussions and to facilitate the equal and full participation of youth at decision-making levels, paying particular attention to the inclusion of young women.\textsuperscript{143}

The Council stated that it remained convinced that the protection of children should be an important aspect of any comprehensive strategy to prevent and resolve conflict and to build and sustain peace.\textsuperscript{144} In that regard, it called upon Member States and the United Nations to mainstream child protection into all relevant activities in conflict prevention and conflict and post-conflict situations with the aim of sustaining peace and preventing conflict.\textsuperscript{145} The Council welcomed the launch of a process to compile practical guidance on the integration of child protection issues into peace processes and underlined the importance of engaging armed forces and armed groups on child protection concerns during peace and peacebuilding processes.\textsuperscript{146} Furthermore, in relation to the situation in Afghanistan, the Council underlined the importance of paying due attention to child protection concerns within peace and reconciliation efforts.\textsuperscript{147}

B. Recommendations of the Security Council concerning country-specific and regional situations

Article 33 (2) of the Charter provides that the Council shall call upon the parties to settle disputes by the means established in Article 33 (1), when deemed necessary. In addition, Article 36 (1) provides that the Council may recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. Article 37 (2) establishes further that if the Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate. Article 38 provides that, without prejudice to Articles 33 to 37, the Council may make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute, if all the parties so request.

The present subsection provides an overview of the practice of the Council relating to the pacific settlement of disputes in situations specific to a country or region. In dealing with complex situations in which the Council determined the existence of a threat to international peace and security, the Council utilized the tools available under Chapter VII of the Charter in parallel with those available under Chapter VI, with a view to restoring peace and to recommending procedures or methods for the pacific settlement of disputes. With the exception of one explicit reference to Article 33 of the Charter, in a decision relating to the situation in Somalia, described below, the decisions featured in this overview do not include those adopted expressly under Chapter VII; they are covered in parts VII and X.

In 2018, the Council made a wide range of recommendations with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes, most of which, as in previous periods, were primarily intra-State conflicts. As described in the overview below, the Council called upon parties to: (a) cease hostilities and implement permanent ceasefires; (b) implement inclusive peace, reconciliation and State-building processes; (c) resolve outstanding political disputes; and (d) address the root causes of conflict.

Cessation of hostilities and ceasefire

With grave security and humanitarian conditions in the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen continuing, the Council urged warring parties to immediately cease hostilities and create conditions for a permanent ceasefire. The Council welcomed the unilateral cessation of hostilities by the parties in Darfur and called for the full respect for and implementation of the ceasefire terms in Lebanon and Ukraine, as well as in the Golan Heights.

Under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the Council addressed the situation in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, as well as in the Golan Heights.\textsuperscript{148} With regard to the Golan Heights, the Council once again stressed the obligation

\textsuperscript{141} Resolution 2419 (2018), para. 2.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., paras. 9 and 10.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., paras. 15 and 16.
\textsuperscript{144} S/PRST/2018/1, twenty-first paragraph.
\textsuperscript{145} Resolution 2427 (2018), para. 3.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., para. 22.
\textsuperscript{147} S/PRST/2018/2, eleventh paragraph.
\textsuperscript{148} For more information, see part I, sect. 23, “The situation in the Middle East".
of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to scrupulously and fully respect the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, called on the parties to exercise maximum restraint and prevent any breaches of the ceasefire and the area of separation and encouraged the parties to take advantage of the liaison function of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force to address issues of mutual concern.\(^{149}\) In connection with the situation in Lebanon, the Council reiterated its call for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution.\(^{150}\)

With respect to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council demanded that all parties cease hostilities without delay and engage immediately to ensure full and comprehensive implementation of that demand, for a durable humanitarian pause for at least 30 consecutive days throughout the Syrian Arab Republic, to enable the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid.\(^{151}\) In addition, the Council called upon all parties to respect and fulfil their commitments to existing ceasefire agreements, including the full implementation of resolution 2268 (2016), and called upon Member States to use their influence with the parties to ensure implementation of the cessation of hostilities and the fulfilment of existing commitments and to support efforts to create conditions for a durable and lasting ceasefire.\(^{152}\) The Council also recalled its demand for the full and immediate implementation of resolution 2254 (2015) to facilitate a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition, in accordance with the Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué as set forth in the International Syria Support Group statements, in order to end the conflict.\(^{153}\)

Regarding the conflict in Yemen, while expressing its grave concern at the continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation, the Council called upon all parties to the conflict to abandon preconditions and engage in good faith with the United Nations-led process, with the meaningful participation of women and other underrepresented groups in order to overcome obstacles and reach a political solution.\(^{154}\) Following the conclusion, on 13 December 2018, of the Stockholm Agreement, comprising the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif, and Ra’a’s Isa, an executive mechanism on activating the prisoner exchange agreement and the Statement of Understanding on Ta’izz, the Council called on the parties to implement the Agreement according to the timelines determined in it.\(^{155}\) The Council insisted on the full respect by all parties of the ceasefire agreed for Hudaydah governorate and the mutual redeployment of forces and called on the parties to continue to engage constructively, in good faith and without preconditions, with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, including on continued work towards stabilizing the Yemeni economy and on Sana’a airport, and participating in the next round of talks, in January 2019.\(^{156}\)

Under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, in connection with the situation in Darfur, the Council demanded that all parties to the conflict immediately cease all acts of violence and commit themselves to a sustained and permanent ceasefire.\(^{157}\) The Council reiterated its support for the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as a viable framework for the peace process in Darfur and demanded that the non-signatory armed movements refrain from impeding its implementation.\(^{158}\) The Council urged the Government of the Sudan and the armed movements to make immediate progress on the implementation of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel-sponsored Roadmap Agreement, including the signing of cessation of hostilities and humanitarian assistance agreements among the parties, and also urged the non-signatory armed groups to sign it without delay.\(^{159}\) In addition, the Council, while welcoming the announcement of the unilateral cessation of hostilities by the Government and by armed movements, including the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdel Wahid, urged all parties to adhere to their unilateral cessations of hostilities and to allow unhindered humanitarian access to populations in need.\(^{160}\)

Under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)\(^{161}\)”, the Council condemned the continuous violations of the ceasefire regime in eastern Ukraine and called for the implementation of disengagement commitments.\(^{161}\)

The Council encouraged all the parties to recommit to

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\(^{150}\) Resolution 2433 (2018), para. 4.

\(^{151}\) Resolution 2401 (2018), para. 1.

\(^{152}\) Ibid., para. 3.

\(^{153}\) Resolution 2449 (2018), para. 5.

\(^{154}\) S/PRST/2018/5, second and twelfth paragraphs.
the peace process and to implement all the measures agreed in order to achieve immediate progress in the implementation of the Minsk agreements.\textsuperscript{162}

**Implementation of inclusive peace, State-building and reconciliation processes**

Referring to the situations in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Libya and Somalia, the Council called for the parties on the ground to implement inclusive peace, State-building and reconciliation processes, taking note in particular of the need for the creation of conditions for the conduct of peaceful and credible elections. The Council also urged genuine dialogue to resolve the outstanding political crises in Burundi and Guinea-Bissau and underscored the importance of peaceful, transparent and credible elections in the West African region.

In connection with the situation in Afghanistan, the Council welcomed the continuing efforts of the Government of Afghanistan to advance the peace process to promote an inclusive, Afghan-led and Afghan-owned dialogue on reconciliation and political participation, including the effective and meaningful participation of women, as laid forth in the Kabul Conference Communiqué.\textsuperscript{163} In relation to the parliamentary and district council elections on 20 October 2018 and the presidential elections in 2019, the Council called on all parties concerned to adhere to the fundamental requirements laid out by the electoral law and all other relevant regulations and to uphold the highest standards of integrity throughout that important and historic process, so that the final outcome reflected the will of the people of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{164}

On the situation in Burundi, the Council reiterated its deep concern over the slow progress in the inter-Burundian dialogue and called for all Burundian stakeholders to participate actively and unconditionally in that process.\textsuperscript{165} It added that it was crucial that all parties, most especially the Government, committed to the East African Community-led process and reached an agreement ahead of the 2020 elections and stressed that dialogue was the only viable process for a sustainable political settlement in Burundi.\textsuperscript{166} Further, the Council called on States in the region to contribute to finding a political solution in Burundi, refrain from any interference and respect their obligations under international law.\textsuperscript{167}

Under the item entitled “Central African region” and in connection with the conflict in the Central African Republic, the Council urged the armed groups in that country to cease all forms of violence and destabilizing activities, lay down their arms immediately and unconditionally and engage constructively in the peace process.\textsuperscript{168} Taking note of planned elections across the Central African region in the upcoming period, the Council emphasized the need for national stakeholders to work together to facilitate the timely preparation for and holding of peaceful, transparent and credible elections with a level playing field for all candidates and the full, equal and effective participation of women.\textsuperscript{169}

In connection with the item entitled “The situation in the Central African Republic”, the Council reiterated its support to the President of the Central African Republic, Faustin Archange Touadera, in his efforts to promote lasting peace and stability in the Central African Republic and called on the authorities to take all the necessary steps, without delay, to advance the dialogue with armed groups and promote national reconciliation.\textsuperscript{170} The Council underscored the urgent need for further progress in an ambitious and inclusive dialogue between the authorities and the armed groups, as well as all segments of society, promoting the full and effective participation of women, and encouraged the President to cement and broaden national ownership of the peace process.\textsuperscript{171}

Under the item entitled “The situation in Guinea-Bissau”, the Council called upon the stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau to strictly respect and comply with the Conakry Agreement and the Economic Community of West African States road map in addressing their differences and the challenges facing their country.\textsuperscript{172} The Council also called upon the authorities and all stakeholders, including the military, political parties and civil society, to engage in inclusive, genuine dialogue and to work together to consolidate the

\textsuperscript{162} S/PRST/2018/12, fifth paragraph.

\textsuperscript{163} Resolution 2405 (2018), para. 10. See also S/PRST/2018/2, third, fourth and tenth paragraphs. For more information, see part I, sect. 17, “The situation in Afghanistan”.

\textsuperscript{164} S/PRST/2018/15, sixth paragraph.

\textsuperscript{165} S/PRST/2018/7, second paragraph. For more information, see part I, sect. 4, “The situation in Burundi”.

\textsuperscript{166} S/PRST/2018/7, second paragraph.

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., sixth paragraph.

\textsuperscript{168} S/PRST/2018/17, tenth paragraph. For more information, see part I, sect. 9, “Central African region”.

\textsuperscript{169} S/PRST/2018/17, fifteenth paragraph.

\textsuperscript{170} S/PRST/2018/14, third paragraph. For more information, see part I, sect. 7, “The situation in the Central African Republic”.

\textsuperscript{171} S/PRST/2018/14, fourth paragraph.

\textsuperscript{172} Resolution 2404 (2018), para. 6. For more information, see part I, sect. 8, “The situation in Guinea-Bissau”.
In connection with the situation in Libya, the Council reaffirmed its endorsement and full support for the United Nations Action Plan for Libya and reiterated its call for all Libyans to work together in a spirit of compromise in the inclusive political process under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya. The Council welcomed all efforts to strengthen an inclusive political dialogue among all Libyans within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement, affirming that the Agreement remained the only viable framework to end the political crisis. The Council called upon all Member States to urge all Libyans to work constructively to ensure that the required conditions were in place for national elections, as well as to promote the meaningful and equal participation of women in the political process, including the election process.

With respect to the situation in Somalia, the Council welcomed the commitment of the Federal Government of Somalia, in accordance with the rule of law, to continuing to make progress on inclusive, transparent and accountable State-building and federalism through the next phase of the constitutional review process, also welcomed the commitment of the Federal Government and the federal member states to working closely together in that regard and encouraged dialogue with civil society and the Somali public, including the integration of women and youth. The Council urged the Federal Government and the federal member states to pursue reconciliation talks at the local, regional and national levels, including a resumption of the dialogue with “Somaliland”. The Council also urged the Federal Government and the federal member states to prioritize efforts to implement the national security architecture agreement.

In connection with the item entitled “Peace consolidation in West Africa”, the Council welcomed the positive developments in several West African countries, including the continued efforts being made to carry out political, constitutional and security sector reforms to improve governance, consolidate democracy and increase peaceful participation, as well as the steps being taken to promote human rights, and encouraged national stakeholders, including civil society, to continue to engage in dialogue in a spirit of tolerance and inclusivity. The Council emphasized the need for national stakeholders to work together to facilitate the timely preparation for and holding of peaceful, transparent and credible elections and urged them to work towards the increased participation of women. Reiterating its concern over the situation in Guinea-Bissau, the Council called upon all political leaders to uphold the provisions of the Conakry Agreement and to complete its implementation without further delay.

Resolution of outstanding disputes

In connection with the situations in Cyprus, the Abyei Area, the border between the Sudan and South Sudan, and Western Sahara, the Council called on the parties to resolve outstanding disputes through dialogue with a view to reaching a political settlement.

Regarding the item entitled “The situation in Cyprus”, the Council called upon the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to put their efforts behind further work on reaching convergences on the core issues, intensify work with the technical committees with the objective of enhancing intercommunal contacts and improving the daily lives of Cypriots, improve the public atmosphere for negotiation to secure a settlement and increase the participation of civil society in the process, as appropriate. The Council also called upon them to actively engage with openness and creativity, fully commit to a settlement process under the auspices of the United Nations, use the United Nations consultations to restart negotiations and avoid any actions that might damage the chances of success. The Council stressed the importance of the full and effective participation of civil society, and women in particular, at all stages of the peace process and also stressed the importance of the full and effective participation of youth.

Regarding the disputed Abyei Area, under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, the Council requested the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to take

173 Resolution 2404 (2018), para. 9.
174 S/PRST/2018/11, first paragraph. For more information, see para. 1, sect. 13, “The situation in Libya”.
176 Ibid., fifth paragraph.
177 Resolution 2408 (2018), para. 11. For more information, see para. 1, sect. 13, “The situation in Somalia”.
179 S/PRST/2018/13, seventh paragraph.
180 S/PRST/2018/3, fourth paragraph. For more information, see para. 1, sect. 11, “Peace consolidation in West Africa”.
183 Resolutions 2398 (2018), para. 4, and 2430 (2018), para. 5. For more information, see para. 1, sect. 19, “The situation in Cyprus”.
184 Resolution 2430 (2018), para. 2.
185 Ibid., paras. 8 and 9.
certain steps towards the implementation of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area, of 20 June 2011, to make progress toward the establishment of Abyei Area interim institutions, including through implementation of all Abyei Joint Oversight Committee decisions, and to implement confidence-building measures among the communities in the Abyei Area, ensuring the involvement of women at all stages. The Council also reiterated its determination that the Sudan and South Sudan should demonstrate measurable progress on border demarcation and outlined specific measures that the parties would need to take before the Council would consider a further extension of the mandate of United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei to support the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.

Under the item entitled “The situation in Somalia” and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council urged Djibouti and Eritrea to continue efforts to settle their border dispute peacefully in a manner consistent with international law by conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or by any other means of Pacific dispute settlement identified in Article 33 of the Charter upon which they agreed. The Council also urged the two countries to engage on the issue of the Djiboutian combatants missing in action, including through the mediation of any relevant party of their own choosing.

In relation to the item entitled “The situation concerning Western Sahara”, the Council emphasized the need to make progress toward a realistic, practicable and enduring political solution based on compromise. The Council called upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith and called upon the neighbouring States to make important contributions to the political process and to increase their engagement in the negotiating process. Expressing its full support for the renewed negotiations process expected before the end of 2018, the Council encouraged Morocco, the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), Algeria and Mauritania to work constructively with the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, in the spirit of compromise, throughout the duration of the process to ensure a successful outcome.

Addressing the root causes of conflict and peacebuilding

Regarding the situation in Liberia, and in the context of the Liberia peacebuilding plan entitled “Sustaining peace and securing development” submitted by the Secretary-General to the Council pursuant to resolution 2333 (2016), the Council emphasized the need for expanded efforts by the authorities to address the root causes of conflict, reinvigorate reconciliation processes, promote land reform, advance constitutional and institutional reforms, promote the active participation of women and youth in peacebuilding, extend State authority and social services throughout the country, continue to improve respect for human rights and build trust between Liberian citizens and government institutions.

C. Decisions involving the Secretary-General in the Council’s efforts at the pacific settlement of disputes

While Article 99 of the Charter provides that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, the Charter does not specifically define the role of the Secretary-General in relation to matters of peace and security. The work of the Council regarding conflict prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes has, however, required the involvement of the Secretary-General in all relevant aspects of that agenda.

During the period under review, the Council recognized the good offices work of the Secretary-General, as well as that of his special representatives and envoys, in efforts to end violence through the cessation of hostilities and the implementation of permanent ceasefires, inclusive political and reconciliation processes, the resolution of outstanding disputes, support for political transitions and peacebuilding, and addressing cross-border threats and cross-cutting issues.

\[186\] Resolution 2416 (2018), paras. 6 and 16. For more information, see part I, sect. 10, “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”.

\[187\] Resolutions 2412 (2018), paras. 1 and 3, and 2438 (2018), paras. 1 and 3.

\[188\] Resolution 2444 (2018), para. 7.

\[189\] Ibid., para. 6.

\[190\] Resolution 2414 (2018), para. 2. For more information, see part I, sect. 1, “The situation concerning Western Sahara”.

\[191\] Resolution 2414 (2018), paras. 3 and 4.

\[192\] Resolution 2440 (2018), para. 3.


\[194\] S/PRST/2018/8, fifth paragraph. For more information, see part I, sect. 2, “The situation in Liberia”.
Good offices to end violence

The Council welcomed the appointment of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, affirmed its support for his mission and called on all parties to allow him full and unhindered access to all relevant parties in Yemen.195 The Council also welcomed the Special Envoy’s presentation of a framework for negotiations in Stockholm and his plan to discuss it during the next round of talks to pave the way for the resumption of formal negotiations towards a political solution.196 The Council authorized the Secretary-General to establish and deploy an advance team to begin monitoring and to support and facilitate the immediate implementation of the Stockholm Agreement, including the request for the United Nations to chair the Redeployment Coordination Committee.197

Good offices in support of political and reconciliation processes

The Council highlighted the role of the Secretary-General in supporting inclusive political, national reconciliation and State-building processes in Afghanistan, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau and Somalia and in the Central African region.

In connection with the situation in Afghanistan, having welcomed the continuing efforts of the Government of Afghanistan to advance the peace process, the Council encouraged the Government to make use of the good offices of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to support that process, as appropriate.198

Regarding the situation in Burundi, the Council reiterated its full support to the Secretary-General and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi in their efforts to engage and work with the Government of Burundi to help overcome the current political impasse and foster an inclusive reconciliation process.199 It called on the Secretary-General and the Government to expeditiously finalize and implement the status of the mission agreement for the Office of the Special Envoy, in order to work with the Government and other concerned stakeholders to support the East African Community-led inter-Burundian dialogue and in the areas of security and rule of law, engage with all stakeholders in the crisis and work with all Burundian parties to develop confidence-building measures, improve the human rights and security situations and foster an environment conducive to political dialogue.200

In reference to the Central African region, the Council recalled the important work of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and acknowledged the role of UNOCA in promoting inclusive political dialogue in Cameroon, Chad, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe, in encouraging stability in the region and in preventing or mitigating election-related crises.201 The Council encouraged the Special Representative and UNOCA to continue to support the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and increase regional efforts to advance the peace and reconciliation process in the Central African Republic through the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation and its road map that had been adopted in Libreville on 17 July 2017.202 The Council welcomed the support of UNOCA in facilitating the then upcoming elections in the States of the Central African region.203

Regarding the Central African Republic, the Council renewed its strong support to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and MINUSCA in the implementation of the mandate of the Mission in support of the Central African Republic authorities, including its support to the peace process.204 The Council welcomed the joint visit in Bangui of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union in April 2018 and underlined the importance of the synergy between the two organizations in supporting the peace process in the Central African Republic.205

In connection with the situation in Guinea-Bissau, the Council called for the implementation of the recommendations of the strategic review mission regarding the need for the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau to refocus its existing efforts towards political capacities in support of the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau.206

195 S/PRST/2018/5, twelfth paragraph.
196 Resolution 2451 (2018), para. 4.
197 Ibid., para. 5.
198 Resolution 2405 (2018), para. 10.
199 S/PRST/2018/7, sixteenth paragraph.
200 Ibid.
201 S/PRST/2018/17, third paragraph.
202 Ibid., eleventh paragraph.
203 Ibid., fifteenth paragraph.
204 S/PRST/2018/14, seventh paragraph.
205 Ibid., sixth paragraph.
206 Resolution 2404 (2018), para. 2.
Concerning the situation in Libya, the Council reaffirmed its endorsement and full support for the United Nations Action Plan for Libya, reiterated its call for all Libyans to work together in a spirit of compromise in the inclusive political process under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and underscored the importance of the role of the United Nations in facilitating a Libyan-led political solution to the challenges facing the country. The Council also recognized the key role of the Special Representative in consulting with Libyan parties to set the constitutional basis for elections and to adopt the necessary electoral laws.

Regarding the situation in Somalia, the Council underscored the importance of the support of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia to the Government-led inclusive political process, including the provision of United Nations good offices functions to support the peace and reconciliation process of the Federal Government, in particular with regard to the consolidation of state formation, mediation, the prevention and resolution of conflicts, constitutional review processes, resource- and revenue-sharing, the improved accountability of Somali institutions and the strengthening of the rule of law.

**Good offices in support of the resolution of outstanding disputes**

The Council acknowledged the role of the Secretary-General in supporting the relaunching of political negotiations for the resolution of outstanding disputes in connection with the situation in Cyprus, the Abyei Area and Western Sahara.

In connection with Cyprus, the Council welcomed the Secretary-General’s willingness and expressed its full support for his good offices to remain available to assist the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, should they jointly decide to re-engage in negotiations with the necessary political will. The Council requested the Secretary-General to maintain transition planning in relation to a settlement and encouraged the sides to engage with each other, as well as with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and the United Nations good offices mission in that regard. The Council urged the sides and all involved participants to seize the important opportunity presented by the appointment by the Secretary-General of a United Nations consultant to conduct in-depth consultations on a way forward, by engaging constructively in those consultations and renewing their political will and commitment to a settlement under the auspices of the United Nations.\(^{212}\)

With respect to the situation in the Abyei Area, the Council encouraged the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan to continue coordinating efforts towards calling for full implementation of the 2011 agreements between the two Governments. The Council also encouraged the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei to coordinate with the Panel and the Special Envoy on reconciliation, community sensitization and political peace processes.\(^{214}\)

In connection with the situation concerning Western Sahara, the Council affirmed its full support for the intention of the Secretary-General and the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara to relaunch the negotiations with a new dynamic and a new spirit with the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable political solution, which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter. The Council encouraged Morocco, Frente POLISARIO, Algeria and Mauritania, which had responded positively to the invitation to an initial round-table meeting in Geneva, to work constructively with the Personal Envoy, in the spirit of compromise, through the duration of the process to ensure a successful outcome.\(^{216}\)

**Good offices in support of political transition and peacebuilding**

In connection with the situation with Liberia, the Council welcomed the continued implementation of the Liberia peacebuilding plan entitled “Sustaining peace and securing development” submitted by the Secretary-General to the Council pursuant to resolution 2333 (2016).\(^{217}\) Expressing its appreciation for the important contribution of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which completed its mandate on 30 March 2018, the Council requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study of the role of UNMIL in the resolution of conflicts and challenges in Liberia through the contributions of good offices, political mediation, the sanctions regime and other relevant factors that allowed

\(^{207}\) S/PRST/2018/11, first paragraph.

\(^{208}\) Ibid., eleventh paragraph.

\(^{209}\) Resolution 2408 (2018), para. 3.


\(^{211}\) Ibid.

\(^{212}\) Resolution 2430 (2018), para. 1.

\(^{213}\) Resolution 2416 (2018), para. 8.

\(^{214}\) Resolution 2445 (2018), para. 9.


\(^{216}\) Resolution 2440 (2018), para. 3.

\(^{217}\) S/PRST/2018/8, fifth paragraph.
for the successful completion of the Mission’s mandate and transition to the United Nations country team.\textsuperscript{218}

**Good offices to address cross-border challenges**

Concerning West Africa and the Sahel, the Council expressed full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel and looked forward to ongoing activities undertaken by the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel in the areas of conflict prevention, mediation and good offices, subregional and regional cooperation to address the root causes of conflict and cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security, and the promotion of good governance.\textsuperscript{219}

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\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., third and fourth paragraphs.

\textsuperscript{219} S/PRST/2018/3, third paragraph.

### IV. Discussion on the interpretation or application of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter

**Note**

Section IV features the main discussions in the Security Council in 2018 with regard to the interpretation of specific provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the role of the Council and the Secretary-General in the peaceful settlement of disputes. It excludes those that concern regional organizations, which are covered in part VIII.

During the period under review, explicit references were made to Article 33,\textsuperscript{220} Article 36\textsuperscript{221} and Article 99,\textsuperscript{222} as well as to Chapter VI\textsuperscript{223} of the Charter during deliberations, but in most cases this did not give

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\textsuperscript{220} In connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, see S/PV.8185, p. 21 (Sweden), p. 24 (France) and p. 26 (Netherlands); S/PV.8262, p. 16 (Kazakhstan), p. 61 (Ukraine), p. 63 (Germany), p. 73 (Djibouti) and p. 74 (Sri Lanka); and S/PV.8334, p. 11 (Plurinational State of Bolivia), p. 15 (Netherlands), p. 18 (Kuwait), p. 22 (Russian Federation), p. 38 (Ukraine), p. 42 (Germany), p. 46 (Portugal), p. 52 (Sri Lanka), p. 55 (Djibouti), p. 60 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), p. 64 (South Africa), p. 66 (Cyprus), p. 69 (Viet Nam), p. 71 (United Arab Emirates) and p. 73 (Armenia); in connection with threats to international peace and security, see S/PV.8233, p. 17 (Equatorial Guinea); in connection with the situation in Somalia, see S/PV.8398, p. 12 (Djibouti); and S/PV.8322, p. 8 (Djibouti); and in connection with the letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136), see S/PV.8410, p. 8 (Kuwait).

\textsuperscript{221} In connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, see S/PV.8262, pp. 4 and 7 (Senior Judge at and President Emeritus of the International Court of Justice), p. 19 (Peru), p. 24 (Plurinational State of Bolivia), p. 39 (Egypt), p. 52 (Italy), p. 71 (Austria) and p. 74 (Djibouti).

\textsuperscript{222} In connection with the implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507), see S/PV.8175, p. 19 (Sweden), p. 48 (Bangladesh) and p. 53 (Australia); and S/PV.8339, p. 5 (Kuwait); in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, see S/PV.8185, p. 8 (Kuwait), p. 20 (Peru) and p. 21 (Sweden); S/PV.8262, p. 90 (Slovenia); S/PV.8395, p. 29 (United Kingdom); and S/PV.8334, p. 38 (Ukraine) and p. 58 (Italy); in connection with United Nations peacekeeping operations, see S/PV.8218, p. 66 (Ukraine); and in connection with the protection of civilians in armed conflict, see S/PV.8264, p. 57 (Republic of Korea).

\textsuperscript{223} In connection with the implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507), see S/PV.8173, p. 7 (Peru); and S/PV.8175, p. 20 (Netherlands), p. 35 (Pakistan) and p. 60 (Bahrain); in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, see S/PV.8185, p. 3 (Secretary-General), p. 7 (Kuwait), p. 17 (Ethiopia), pp. 19–20 (Peru), p. 20 (Sweden) and p. 24 (France); S/PV.8262, p. 11 (Poland), p. 14 (Equatorial Guinea), p. 19 (Peru), p. 24 (Plurinational State of Bolivia), p. 28 (France), p. 32 (Kuwait), p. 42 (Greece), p. 48 (Pakistan), p. 55 (European Union), p. 59 (Australia), p. 61 (Ukraine), p. 64 (Jamaica), p. 66 (Norway), p. 70 (Kenya), p. 76 (Lebanon), p. 82 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), p. 84 (Viet Nam), p. 85 (Portugal), p. 86 (United Arab Emirates), p. 89 (Rwanda) and p. 90 (Slovenia); S/PV.8293, p. 20 (Peru); S/PV.8395, p. 3 (Secretary-General), p. 10 (Sweden), p. 26 (Ethiopia), p. 29 (United Kingdom), p. 42 (Pakistan), p. 47 (Switzerland), p. 61 (Turkey) and p. 76 (Morocco); and S/PV.8334, p. 8 (United Kingdom), p. 11 (Plurinational State of Bolivia), p. 12 (Poland), p. 13 (France), p. 16 (Peru), pp. 18–19 (Kuwait), pp. 20–21 (China), p. 27 (Egypt), pp. 28–29.
rise to a constitutional discussion. No explicit references were made to Articles 37 or 38.

The section is divided into four subsections: A. Reference to peaceful means of settlement in the light of Article 33 of the Charter; B. Relevance of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter in comparison to the provisions of Chapter VII; C. Referral of legal disputes to the International Court of Justice in the light of Article 36 (3) of the Charter; and D. Utilization of Article 99 of the Charter by the Secretary-General for the pacific settlement of disputes. The section features cases in which there were relevant constitutional discussions during the period under review.

A. Reference to peaceful means of settlement in the light of Article 33 of the Charter

Article 33 of the Charter stipulates that any dispute that is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security should first be addressed through negotiation, mediation or other peaceful means, and states that the Council can call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means. During the period under review, discussions with respect to Article 33 were held in connection with the following items: (a) “Maintenance of international peace and security” (cases 5 and 6); and (b) “Women and peace and security” (case 7).

Case 5
Maintenance of international peace and security

On 17 May 2018, at its 8262nd meeting, further to a concept note\footnote{S/2018/417/Rev.1, annex.} circulated by Poland, which held the presidency for that month, the Council held a high-level open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Upholding international law within the context of the maintenance of international peace and security”. Speaking on behalf of the Secretary-General, the Chef de Cabinet stated that the Charter did not prescribe the use of any particular means of settlement for disputes between Member States, nor did it establish any particular hierarchy among them. Member States were free to choose between negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements and other peaceful means of their choice. The Council could call on States to settle their disputes and draw their attention to the means available to them, recommend to States that they use a particular means of settlement, as well as support States in using the means they had chosen, or it could task the Secretary-General to assist them in trying to reach a settlement or even establishing a subsidiary organ for that purpose.\footnote{Ibid., p. 14.}

In the ensuing discussion, the representative of Poland described Chapter VI of the Charter as the most useful tool at the international community’s disposal in the case of disagreements and imminent conflicts.\footnote{Ibid., p. 11.} The representative of Equatorial Guinea stated that, to achieve a just and safe world, it was important to promote the resolution of disputes through peaceful means as an essential part and basic principle of international law enshrined in Chapter VI.\footnote{Ibid., p. 21.} The representative of Sweden noted that international rules were not only essential for the maintenance of international peace and security but also confirmed the duty of all States to settle disputes by peaceful means.\footnote{Ibid., p. 52.} The representative of Italy recalled that States had broad discretion in choosing mechanisms to settle disputes and that they should show good faith and goodwill to settle their differences, including through non-judicial means, provided that they were inspired by adherence to fundamental legal principles.\footnote{Ibid., p. 7.} The representative of Argentina maintained that any method for the peaceful settlement of disputes

(Pakistan), p. 32 (Liechtenstein), p. 36 (Guatemala), p. 39 (Mexico), p. 50 (Estonia), pp. 53–54 (Cuba), p. 56 (Morocco), p. 60 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), p. 63 (Slovenia), p. 64 (Maldives), pp. 64–65 (South Africa) and p. 76 (Indonesia); in connection with the letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218), see S/PV.8203, p. 6 (Peru); in connection with the question concerning Haiti, see S/PV.8226, p. 4 (Plurinational State of Bolivia) and p. 6 (Equatorial Guinea); in connection with peacebuilding and sustaining peace, see S/PV.8243, p. 19 (Poland); in connection with the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, see S/PV.8244, p. 40 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela); in connection with peace and security in Africa, see S/PV.8407, p. 46 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela); and in connection with cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, see S/PV.8340, p. 7 (Kuwait) and p. 8 (United Kingdom); and S/PV.8414, p. 36 (Pakistan), p. 37 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) and p. 57 (Indonesia).
was equally valid for resolving conflicts. Referring specifically to negotiation, he stressed the importance of ensuring that the parties to disputes complied in good faith with the calls for negotiations made by United Nations bodies and refrained from any action that could undermine their obligation to solve the conflict by peaceful means. He added that States outside a dispute should also refrain from conduct that could sabotage a peaceful settlement.\textsuperscript{230}

The representative of Ukraine underscored that the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes created obligations for the principal organs of the United Nations, including the Council, especially in the application of Chapters VI and VII of the Charter.\textsuperscript{231} The representative of Kuwait stated that the Council must use all the tools provided under Chapter VI, including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement, to help prevent the outbreak of conflict.\textsuperscript{232} The representative of Jamaica stated that it should be incumbent on the parties involved in a dispute to explore all available prospects for peaceful resolution, and for the United Nations to be able to play a part in facilitating that solution, particularly in the face of protracted disagreements for which all reasonable approaches had not been fully exploited.\textsuperscript{233} The representative of Rwanda added that the Council needed to make more effective use of the procedures and framework for the pacific settlement of disputes, particularly Articles 33 to 38 of the Charter.\textsuperscript{234}

The representative of Peru stressed the importance of strengthening the capacities of the United Nations in preventive diplomacy and the early warning required for that purpose, in compliance with Articles 34 and 99 of the Charter.\textsuperscript{235} The representative of Sweden maintained that the Council had to do more than react to violence and had to utilize early warning tools to the fullest extent possible. Noting the commitment of the Secretary-General to conflict prevention and peaceful settlements, he encouraged him to integrate the relevant international law perspectives and tools more clearly in reporting to the Council.\textsuperscript{236} Similarly, the representative of the United Arab Emirates proposed that the Council request a report by the Secretary-General on the various modalities of dispute settlement that would outline the use and practice of such modalities in mitigating disputes.\textsuperscript{237}

The representative of Austria underscored the need to enhance national expertise in mediation and preventive diplomacy.\textsuperscript{238} The representative of Lithuania highlighted that advancing preventive diplomacy, early action and mediation remained vital to preventing conflicts and mass atrocities and described putting an end to impunity and ensuring accountability as crucial elements of conflict prevention.\textsuperscript{239} The representative of the European Union called on the Council to continue holding early discussions on situations at risk of violent conflict on a more systematic basis. He added that members of the Council should not vote against a credible draft resolution on timely and decisive action to end the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or to prevent such crimes. The representative of the European Union also stated that the Council could strive to make greater use of Article 34 of the Charter to investigate disputes or situations.\textsuperscript{240} The representative of Norway called on the Council to show unity in giving full support to mediation efforts and good offices and welcomed the initiatives of the Secretary-General for strengthening conflict prevention and mediation.\textsuperscript{241}

A number of speakers recognized the important role of regional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes.\textsuperscript{242} The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia stated that the effective application of negotiation, mediation, reconciliation, prevention and the legal arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as the primary use of the provisions of Chapter VI and VIII of the Charter, were indispensable to the analysis and comprehensive consideration of conflicts and their particularities.\textsuperscript{243}

### Case 6

#### Maintenance of international peace and security

On 29 August 2018, at its 8334th meeting, further to a concept note\textsuperscript{244} circulated by the United Kingdom, which held the presidency for that month, the Council held an open debate under the item entitled

\textsuperscript{230} Ibid., p. 65.
\textsuperscript{231} Ibid., p. 61.
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., p. 32.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid., p. 64.
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid., p. 89.
\textsuperscript{235} Ibid., p. 19.
\textsuperscript{236} Ibid., p. 22.
\textsuperscript{237} Ibid., p. 86.
\textsuperscript{238} Ibid., p. 71.
\textsuperscript{239} Ibid., p. 33.
\textsuperscript{240} Ibid., p. 55.
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., p. 66.
\textsuperscript{242} Ibid., p. 11 (Poland), p. 16 (Kazakhstan), p. 66 (Norway), p. 70 (Kenya) and p. 87 (Ghana).
\textsuperscript{243} Ibid., p. 24.
\textsuperscript{244} S/2018/586, annex.
“Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Mediation and settlement of disputes”. In his briefing, the Secretary-General noted that a surge in diplomacy for peace was one of the key priorities of his tenure and stressed that prevention included investment in mediation, peacebuilding and sustainable development. He stated that mediating an end to complex conflicts required bringing together all available mediation tracks in a coordinated way. He made reference to the work of his special representatives and envoys, the Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisers, the High-level Advisory Board on Mediation, regional and subregional organizations and private mediation actors, including non-governmental organizations. He emphasized the importance of inclusive mediation and recommended investing in women’s meaningful participation and leadership in peace processes, paying greater attention to the gender dimensions of conflict, doing more to engage with young people and investing in the mediation and conciliation opportunities offered by information technology. The Secretary-General underlined that the Council played a central role in conflict resolution, particularly when it signalled to warring parties that they had to settle their disputes peacefully.\(^\text{245}\)

In his remarks, the Archbishop of Canterbury, invited under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure and speaking as a member of the High-level Advisory Board on Mediation and a religious leader, underscored that mediation could be effective only when it was conducted in the context of structures of reconciliation. He urged the Council to commit to the ongoing transformation of violent conflict into non-violent disagreement and eventually into a truly inclusive approach to participation in mediation and reconciliation.\(^\text{246}\) The Co-founder of PAIMAN Alumni Trust addressed the role of women in mediation, stating that the Council should acknowledge the complexity of wars as a critical first step that could lead to designing mediation processes that addressed that complexity by drawing on the vast resources of local actors, especially women. She also highlighted that women’s mediatory roles at informal levels had often served as blueprints for negotiations, adding that women should be involved in mediation and peace process because, at a basic level, their participation was a question of equity and equality.\(^\text{247}\)

During the deliberations, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the peaceful resolution of conflicts was enshrined in the Charter as both a founding purpose and a principle of the Organization’s work.\(^\text{248}\) The representative of Ukraine recalled that Article 33 of the Charter provided an obligation for the peaceful settlement of disputes and a toolkit for doing so.\(^\text{249}\) In that regard, numerous speakers referred to mediation as one of the essential tools for the pacific settlement of disputes and the prevention of conflict.\(^\text{250}\)

The representative of Egypt highlighted the responsibility of the Council, in line with the mandate given to it under Chapter VI of the Charter, to make all efforts to use, support and activate peaceful means such as negotiation, investigation, mediation and judicial settlement, or resort to regional bodies, organizations and other peaceful means in order to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes.\(^\text{251}\) The representative of the Netherlands encouraged the Council to use tools such as mediation before situations became a threat to international peace and security.\(^\text{252}\) Speaking on behalf of the Group of Friends of Mediation, the representative of Turkey highlighted the importance of the Council and the entire United Nations strengthen their capacity to undertake prevention and recalibrating their approach from responding to conflict towards sustaining peace.\(^\text{253}\)

The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the United Nations had made good progress in the previous decade to professionalize and strengthen its mediation role, with the establishment of the Mediation Support Unit, the Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisers and the High-level Advisory Board on Mediation. He underscored the important mediation work conducted by peacekeeping operations and special political missions.\(^\text{254}\) The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia expressed appreciation for the efforts of the Secretary-General to prioritize conflict prevention as a guide for the work of the entire United Nations system and to place emphasis on mediation as a key tool for that purpose.\(^\text{255}\) Several speakers highlighted the good offices role of the Secretary-

\(^{245}\) S/PV.8334, pp. 2-4.

\(^{246}\) Ibid., pp. 4 and 6.

\(^{247}\) Ibid., pp. 6-7.

\(^{248}\) Ibid., p. 22.

\(^{249}\) Ibid., p. 38.


\(^{251}\) Ibid., p. 27.

\(^{252}\) Ibid., p. 15.

\(^{253}\) Ibid., p. 26.

\(^{254}\) Ibid., p. 9.

\(^{255}\) Ibid., p. 11.
General in that context, including through his special representatives and envoys. The representative of the United States noted that mediation should not be blind to the realities of what people were doing to each other on the ground and that, when diplomacy did not work, the Council needed to pursue a meaningful response, showing the parties that there would be consequences if they did not commit to talks. The representative of Brazil underscored that sanctions regimes should be designed in close coordination with the mediators and those in the field. Similarly, in reference to Article 33 of the Charter, the representative of Djibouti expressed the view that mediation would have a better chance of success if the parties understood that one of the consequences of failure would be arbitration or litigation, not a continued stalemate.

Several speakers stated that mediation should be undertaken in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and should take into account the fundamental principles of national responsibility and respect for State independence, sovereignty and equality in international relations. The representative of Russia added that the most effective way of resolving conflicts was through direct dialogue between conflicting parties and the political will to find mutually acceptable solutions. The representative of Sri Lanka opined that the pacific settlement of disputes could not be forced and that the parties to a conflict had to be persuaded by the merits of mediation. The representative of Argentina stated that the higher obligation of Member States to settle their disputes by peaceful means could never be subject only to the consent of the parties.

The representative of Peru underlined that mediation must be conducted in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The representative of Liechtenstein stated that mediation processes had to address serious crimes and victims’ calls for justice. The representative of Maldives asserted that mediation would be effective only if mediators and the mediation process were objective, inclusive and, most importantly, impartial.

Council members and other speakers widely concurred on the need for the United Nations to coordinate its mediation work with and support the mediation capacity-building of regional and subregional organizations. The representative of Equatorial Guinea stated that the United Nations needed to continue its multifaceted support to strengthen the mediation role of the African Union. The representative of the Sudan added that regional and subregional organizations, as well as neighbouring countries, were always the best placed and the most capable of acting as mediators.

A significant aspect of the discussion focused on the importance of inclusivity in mediation. Many speakers referred to the importance of the inclusion of women and youth in mediation processes. For example, the representative of Sweden opined that mediation support teams needed gender expertise to understand how women’s rights were part of the issues under discussion. The representative of the United Kingdom noted that women being involved in peacekeeping increased the probability of peace lasting much longer. He added that the United Nations system, Member States, civil society and religious leaders had to do more to promote women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution at all levels, including through the appointment of women mediators. The representative of Spain called for the training of youth in mediation and for their incorporation into negotiation processes, thereby empowering them as agents to resolve disputes peacefully and preventing the spread of radicalism.

**Case 7**

**Women and peace and security**

On 25 October 2018, at its 8382nd meeting, further to a concept note circulated by the Plurinational State of Bolivia, which held the presidency for that month, the Council held a high-level open debate under the item entitled “Women and peace and security”. The focus of the discussion was

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257 Ibid., pp. 23–24.

258 Ibid., p. 25.

259 Ibid., p. 55.

260 Ibid., p. 21 (China), p. 22 (Russian Federation), p. 43 (Spain), p. 48 (India), pp. 52–53 (Sri Lanka), pp. 53–54 (Cuba), p. 56 (Morocco), p. 69 (Viet Nam) and p. 75 (Bahrain).

261 Ibid., p. 22.

262 Ibid., p. 52.

263 Ibid., p. 39.

264 Ibid., p. 16.

265 Ibid., p. 32.

266 Ibid., p. 63.

267 Ibid., p. 10.

268 Ibid., p. 47.

269 Ibid., p. 20.

270 Ibid., p. 9.

271 Ibid., p. 43.

the sub-item entitled “Promoting the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda and sustaining peace through women’s political and economic empowerment”. Opening the debate, the Secretary-General noted that, despite progress in some areas, the participation of women in formal peace processes remained extremely limited. He urged the Council to invest in gender equality and women’s empowerment as critical means of preventing and ending conflict.\textsuperscript{273}

The Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) highlighted that women on the front lines were negotiating ceasefires, civilian safe zones, the demobilization of fighters and humanitarian access at the local level and drawing up protection plans at the community level in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. She called on the Council to stop supporting peace agreements that excluded women.\textsuperscript{274} During her briefing on the status of Palestinian women, the General Director of the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling called on the Council to ensure women’s meaningful participation in conflict prevention, democratic transition, reconciliation efforts and any humanitarian work and to use all tools at its disposal to ensure women’s meaningful participation and ensure that gender analysis was integrated into any discussions of the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.\textsuperscript{275}

During the deliberations, Council members and speakers invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure highlighted the importance of the inclusion of women in political processes across the conflict spectrum. The representative of Sweden opined that empowering women and increasing women’s political participation was one of the most effective tools for advancing global peace and security.\textsuperscript{276} Similarly, the representative of Côte d’Ivoire, speaking also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia, noted the general consensus that restoring sustainable peace and stability in a post-crisis context required the active participation of women.\textsuperscript{277} The representative of Peru stated that when women participated more at every level of political life, societies were less inclined to conflict and more inclined to maintain and consolidate peace.\textsuperscript{278} The representative of the United Kingdom maintained that when women meaningfully participated in peace processes, the resulting agreement was 35 per cent more likely to last at least 15 years.\textsuperscript{279} The representative of the United States expressed the view that countries with high rates of gender inequality were more likely to experience instability and deadly conflict.\textsuperscript{280}

The representative of Kuwait stated that intensifying efforts aimed at the useful political participation of women began with ensuring the political, social and economic rights of women and empowering them to secure an education and basic services.\textsuperscript{281} The representative of Slovenia stated that obstacles to women’s political and economic participation, such as sexual and gender-based violence, contributed to prolonged insecurity and threatened solutions for sustainable peace.\textsuperscript{282} The representative of the Republic of Korea called for the empowerment of local communities as a sustainable and long-term solution to sexual violence.\textsuperscript{283} The representative of Hungary maintained that the protection of the rights of women and girls and their economic empowerment were powerful means for the prevention of, and their protection in, conflict and a prerequisite for their participation in all aspects of life.\textsuperscript{284}

Most speakers during the meeting concurred that, despite the progress achieved, there was a need for further improvement in the participation of women in political processes. The representative of Sweden stated that participation was about having influence, not counting heads.\textsuperscript{285} Noting the successful inclusion of women in the comprehensive peace agreement in Colombia of 2016, the representative of the Netherlands underlined that civil society had played a big role in that peace process.\textsuperscript{286} The representative of Kuwait stated that women should be empowered to participate in the implementation of peace agreements through specific and tangible procedures and mechanisms.\textsuperscript{287} The representative of Slovakia underlined the importance of women’s participation

\textsuperscript{273} S/PV.8382, p. 4.  
\textsuperscript{274} Ibid., pp. 5 and 7.  
\textsuperscript{275} Ibid., p. 10.  
\textsuperscript{276} Ibid., p. 12.  
\textsuperscript{277} Ibid., p. 17.  
\textsuperscript{278} Ibid., p. 20.  
\textsuperscript{279} Ibid., p. 14.  
\textsuperscript{280} Ibid., p. 23.  
\textsuperscript{281} Ibid., p. 19.  
\textsuperscript{282} Ibid., p. 30.  
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid., p. 43.  
\textsuperscript{284} Ibid., p. 44.  
\textsuperscript{285} Ibid., p. 11.  
\textsuperscript{286} Ibid., p. 13.  
\textsuperscript{287} Ibid., p. 19.
and full involvement in all stages of security sector reform.\textsuperscript{288}

Regarding the role of the United Nations, the representative of Sweden highlighted a number of improvements, including that all political and peacekeeping missions had a women and peace and security mandate, discussions in the Council were better informed, mandates were more precise, decisions were more inclusive and the number of briefers from civil society organizations had increased considerably, leading to better input. In terms of further progress, she emphasized that special representatives and envoys of the Secretary-General should be measured on how they implemented and delivered on women and peace and security, gender expertise in political and peacekeeping missions should be strategically positioned and conflict analysis should be improved and should include gender equality considerations.\textsuperscript{289} While noting that more than 70 per cent of Council resolutions and nearly 90 per cent of presidential statements included provisions on women’s rights and participation, the representative of France called on the Council to reach 100 per cent.\textsuperscript{290}

The representative of China stated that women were increasingly becoming important participants in, builders of and contributors to peace processes and that they played an indispensable role in preventing conflict, maintaining peace, reconciling differences and integrating social groups. In that regard, he added that the international community needed to strengthen coordination and cooperation so that women could fully play their role in maintaining international peace and security.\textsuperscript{291} The representative of Slovakia emphasized that women’s political and economic empowerment needed to be at the centre of women and peace and security efforts to ensure women’s political empowerment and equal participation in all spheres of life.\textsuperscript{292} The representative of Italy stated that women peacekeepers improved dispute resolution, built trust with communities and were more likely to be accepted by civilians, and thereby advance stability and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{293} The representative of the United States encouraged the United Nations leadership and the special representatives of the Secretary-General to take the lead in empowering gender advisers and facilitators to support their work.\textsuperscript{294} A number of speakers noted the important efforts of the Secretary-General to achieve gender parity in the United Nations system.\textsuperscript{295}

In terms of regional cooperation, the representative of Côte d’Ivoire, speaking also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia, affirmed the commitment of the African Union to working to strengthen the role of women in peace and security processes, including through promoting gender equality in executive and legislative systems and strengthening the role of women in mediation and prevention strategies.\textsuperscript{296} Similarly, the representative of the European Union, speaking on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and Ukraine, affirmed the commitment of the European Union, together with other regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the African Union, to integrating a stronger gender dimension into all peace and security efforts.\textsuperscript{297}

\section*{B. Relevance of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter in comparison to the provisions of Chapter VII}

During the period under review, some discussions in the Council touched upon the distinction between Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter. During the 8334th meeting, under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” (see case 6), various references were made to the interaction and distinction between the two Chapters. Two speakers opined that logic and the Charter called on the Council to focus on Chapter VI before resorting to Chapter VII.\textsuperscript{298} The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that Chapter VII must be invoked as a measure of last resort.\textsuperscript{299}

\textsuperscript{288} Ibid., p. 36.

\textsuperscript{289} Ibid., p. 11.

\textsuperscript{290} Ibid., p. 24.

\textsuperscript{291} Ibid., p. 18.

\textsuperscript{292} Ibid., p. 36.

\textsuperscript{293} Ibid., p. 54.

\textsuperscript{294} Ibid., p. 22.


\textsuperscript{296} Ibid., p. 17.

\textsuperscript{297} Ibid., p. 58.

\textsuperscript{298} S/PV.8334, p. 19 (Kuwait) and p. 64 (South Africa).

\textsuperscript{299} Ibid., p. 31.
of Pakistan maintained that, while Chapter VII was the ultimate instrument for the implementation of Council resolutions, its latent efficacy could be greatly enhanced through a timely and judicious application of Chapter VI. The Council deliberated more extensively about the distinction between Chapter VI and Chapter VII in connection with the question concerning Haiti (see case 8).

Case 8
The question concerning Haiti

At its 8226th meeting, held on 10 April 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2410 (2018), in which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it renewed the mandate of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) for a period of one year, until 15 April 2019. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions. In her statement after the vote, the representative of the United States said that the Council had expressed its support for equipping peacekeeping missions with what was needed to protect civilians, and that the case of MINUJUSTH was no different. The representative of the United Kingdom added that MINUJUSTH had to have the tools it needed to make the transition in Haiti a success and that included continued authorization under Chapter VII to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate.

In contrast, in explaining the decision of his delegation to abstain in the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation questioned the use of Chapter VII in the case of MINUJUSTH, the mandate of which was focused on helping the Government of Haiti to strengthen its own capacity and to monitor human rights. In that regard, he insisted that invoking Chapter VII, if it was even applicable to the situation in Haiti, should be contemplated only as a last resort for issues of physical safety. The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia expressed concern about the penholders “overstepping their boundaries” without considering the positions and opinions of other Council members, not to mention those of the host country, which had requested that the mandate of the Mission be governed by Chapter VI, as the situation in Haiti was not a threat to regional or international peace and security. Similarly, the representative of Equatorial Guinea, despite voting in favour, expressed his country’s preference for priority to have been given to the spirit of trust between the Mission and the Government of Haiti and for those provisions to have been included under Chapter VI. Finally, in his remarks to the Council, the representative of Haiti deplored the fact that the recommendations delivered through Council members had not been taken into account despite the unanimous view that MINUJUSTH was a mission of support and technical assistance for the national institutions responsible for upholding the rule of law in Haiti.

C. Referral of legal disputes to the International Court of Justice in the light of Article 36 (3) of the Charter

Article 36 (3) of the Charter provides that, in making recommendations under Article 36, the Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should, as a general rule, be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court. During the period under review, a discussion with respect to Article 36 (3) was held in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” (see case 9).

Case 9
Maintenance of international peace and security

On 17 May 2018, at its 8262nd meeting, further to a concept note circulated by Poland, which held the presidency for that month, the Council held a high-level open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Upholding international law within the context of the maintenance of international peace and security”. Speaking on behalf of the Secretary-General, the Chef de Cabinet stated that, where States had agreed to use the International Court of Justice as a means for settling their dispute, the Council had a role in ensuring that the Court’s judgment was properly observed. She also called on Member States to consider accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction.

300 Ibid., p. 28.
301 China and the Russian Federation abstained in the vote on the draft resolution. For more information on the mandate of MINUJUSTH, see part X, sect. I, “Peacekeeping operations”.
302 S/PV.8226, p. 2.
303 Ibid., p. 5.
304 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
305 Ibid., p. 4.
306 Ibid., p. 6.
307 Ibid., p. 7.
309 S/PV.8262, p. 3.
A Senior Judge at and President Emeritus of the International Court of Justice, speaking on behalf of the President of the Court, referred to Article 2 (3) of the Charter, which provided that all States Members of the United Nations should settle their disputes “by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered”. He highlighted the inclusion of the words “and justice” as clearly signifying that international peace and security were to be maintained in parallel with the realization of justice. For that reason, the International Court of Justice could play a role in actively contributing to the maintenance of peace and security in parallel with the Council. He recalled that the Council was empowered, at any stage of a dispute, to make recommendations as part of its duty and that, as provided in Article 36, the Council should take into consideration the fact that legal disputes should, as a general rule, be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice. Referring to the significance of the Corfu Channel case, whereby the Council had recommended that Albania and the United Kingdom defer their dispute to the Court, newly established at that time, he opined that the Council could pay more attention to its discretionary power under Article 36 (3) and invited it to take inspiration from that early instance of constructive cooperation between the two institutions and consider additional possibilities.\(^\text{310}\)

In the subsequent discussion, the representative of Peru expressed support for the provision in Article 36 of the Charter for the Council to recommend that parties to a legal dispute should, as a general rule, resort to the Court.\(^\text{311}\) The representative of Uruguay echoed that view and underscored that the Council should promote the settlement of disputes, especially legal ones, through the Court where other means had proved ineffective.\(^\text{312}\) Noting that parties had been referred by the Council to the Court only once, in 1947, the representative of Kenya stated that the Council should look into ways to objectively use that platform, given the increasing inter-State tensions, with their tragic implications for regional and international peace and security.\(^\text{313}\)

In reference to Article 36 of the Charter, speakers highlighted that it was important that the Council made use of all the tools and mechanisms provided by the Court, including the delivery of advisory opinions, which represented a preventive way to settle disputes and contributed significantly to the fulfilment of the obligation of States to settle their international disputes through peaceful means.\(^\text{314}\) The representative of Equatorial Guinea referred to the border dispute between his country and Gabon as an example of a legal dispute being settled before the International Court of Justice.\(^\text{315}\) Highlighting the importance of judicial settlement as a means of prevention, the representative of Germany called for Member States to respect and implement the decisions of the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and other tribunals and arbitration mechanisms.\(^\text{316}\) In that regard, a number of speakers called upon Member States that had not yet done so to recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.\(^\text{317}\) Expanding on the principle of consent, the representative of Djibouti maintained that the Council would not compel any State to go to court or arbitration, but that it would use its influence to have disputing States consent to doing so as an effective means of resolving disputes that, if left unresolved, could constitute threats to international peace and security. As an alternative to working directly with the disputing parties, he added that the Council could request the intervention of the Secretary-General and the use of his good offices to help the parties agree on the settlement of their dispute by one of the means listed in Article 33, including judicial settlement or arbitration.\(^\text{318}\)

D. Utilization of Article 99 of the Charter by the Secretary-General for the pacific settlement of disputes

Article 99 of the Charter stipulates that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. In the discussions of the Council presented below, Member States encouraged the Secretary-General to fully exercise his power under Article 99 and to strengthen the effectiveness of his good offices. References to the multiple tools available to the Secretary-General under Article 99 were discussed in connection with the following items: (a) “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” (see case 10); (b) “Maintenance of international peace and

\(^{310}\) Ibid., pp. 4 and 7.

\(^{311}\) Ibid., p. 19.

\(^{312}\) Ibid., p. 68.

\(^{313}\) Ibid., p. 70.

\(^{314}\) Ibid., p. 24 (Plurinational State of Bolivia), p. 47 (Mexico), p. 73 (Djibouti) and p. 82 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).

\(^{315}\) Ibid., p. 14.

\(^{316}\) Ibid., p. 63.

\(^{317}\) Ibid., p. 25 (Côte d’Ivoire), p. 40 (Slovakia), p. 43 (Japan), p. 52 (Italy), p. 71 (Austria) and p. 74 (Djibouti).

\(^{318}\) Ibid., p. 73.
Case 10
Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

On 6 February 2018, at its 8175th meeting, further to a concept note\(^{319}\) circulated by Kuwait, which held the presidency for that month, the Council held an open debate under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council S/2017/507”. In his remarks to the Council, the Executive Director of Security Council Report, a non-governmental organization, opined that, at a time when the Council and the Secretary-General were focused on the prevention of conflict, it was important for Council members to reach an agreement among themselves and with the Secretariat on how the Council wished to be kept well informed and therefore to be ready to engage promptly on emerging threats to peace and security.\(^{320}\)

During the discussion, several Council members and other speakers referred to the good offices role of the Secretary-General. The representative of Sweden stated that the Council’s preventive role had to be operationalized, as foreseen in its sustaining peace resolutions and the Charter. That included the Secretary-General’s utilization of mediation, good offices and his full powers under Article 99 of the Charter. While calling for better and more frequent use of situational awareness briefings, he expressed the hope that, with the reformed Secretariat, the input of the Secretary-General would be more holistic as regards peace and security.\(^{321}\) The representative of Bangladesh observed that, in the context of the situation in Myanmar, the Secretary-General had risen to the occasion by exercising his authority under Article 99 to raise the awareness of the Council about the potential threats posed by the crisis to international peace and security. He urged that that practice be encouraged on a more regular basis, as warranted by any humanitarian exigency likely to be compromised by otherwise political considerations.\(^{322}\) The representative of Australia encouraged the Secretary-General to make full use of his prerogative under Article 99 to bring to the Council’s attention to any matter that might threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.\(^{323}\)

Case 11
Maintenance of international peace and security

On 21 February 2018, at its 8185th meeting, further to a concept note\(^{324}\) circulated by Kuwait, which held the presidency for that month, the Council held an open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security”. In his remarks, noting that mediation was one of the paths suggested by Chapter VI of the Charter, the Secretary-General recalled that his own good offices were available to the Council at all times to help prevent, manage or resolve conflicts.\(^{325}\)

In his remarks, the representative of Kuwait stressed the important and key role played by the Secretary-General in bringing any matter to the attention of the Council, pursuant to Article 99 of the Charter.\(^{326}\) The representative of Peru cited the remarks made by the Secretary-General at the time, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, in connection with the situation in the Persian Gulf in 1991, including that there was a complementarity “between the Secretary-General being fully equipped with the means presupposed in Article 99 of the Charter and the Security Council (in conformity with the spirit of Article 34) maintaining a peace agenda not confined to items formally inserted”.\(^{327}\) The representative of Sweden called upon the Secretary-General to make even greater use of his prerogatives, including under Article 99, to bring to the attention of the Council any matter that, in his opinion, might threaten the maintenance of international peace and security and encouraged Council members to be responsive to such petitions. He noted that the Secretary-General had taken that step in relation to Myanmar in late 2017, bringing the Council’s attention to the situation there and its potential implications beyond the borders of that country.\(^{328}\)

The representative of Côte d’Ivoire highlighted the good offices of the Secretary-General, which he described as a fundamental element of conflict prevention and resolution through preventive diplomacy. He added that the effectiveness of that instrument, however, lay in the ability of the Secretary-General to embody the moral authority of the United Nations and his persuasive force, particularly with regard to the

\(^{320}\) S/PV.8175, p. 4.
\(^{321}\) Ibid., p. 19.
\(^{322}\) Ibid., p. 48.
\(^{323}\) Ibid., p. 53.
Council and the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{329} Similarly, the representative of France welcomed the efforts of the Secretary-General to strengthen the mediation component of his work by making full use of his good offices, as well as the mediation mechanisms and expertise in the Secretariat, the mobilization of which depended on the ability to anticipate and act prior to crises, through early warning and action.\textsuperscript{330}

**Case 12**

**Threats to international peace and security**

On 13 April 2018, the Council held its 8231st meeting, under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”. In his briefing, the Secretary-General stated that the situation in the Middle East was in chaos to such an extent that it had become a threat to international peace and security.\textsuperscript{331} He also stated that existing divisions in the region were reflected in a multiplicity of conflicts, several of which were clearly linked to the threat of global terrorism. He mentioned in particular the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Yemen. He said that the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic represented the most serious threat to international peace and security. He recalled his letter to the Council of 11 April 2018, in which he had expressed his deep disappointment that the Council was unable to agree upon a dedicated mechanism to attribute responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and reiterated his appeal to the Council to fulfil its duties in that regard.\textsuperscript{332}

During the discussion, the representative of Sweden, echoed by the representative of Equatorial Guinea, noted that the Secretary-General had offered to support efforts in the Council to find a way forward on the issue of chemical weapons through his good offices.\textsuperscript{333} The representative of Sweden called on all Council members to muster the political will and respond to the appeal by the Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{334} The representatives of Ethiopia, Kazakhstan and Sweden concurred with the views expressed by the Secretary-General about the risks of the current impasse and added that the Council must, at all costs, avoid the situation spiralling out of control.\textsuperscript{335} The representative of Côte d’Ivoire encouraged the Secretary-General to make use of his good offices with stakeholders to restore peace and calm, in order to prevent any further escalation of the situation.\textsuperscript{336}

One day later, on 14 April 2018, at the Council’s 8233rd meeting, held under the same item and sub-item, the Secretary-General gave a briefing to Council members on reports of air strikes conducted by the United States, France and the United Kingdom in the Syrian Arab Republic on 13 April. He stated that, as the Secretary-General, he had a duty to remind Member States that there was an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter, and with international law in general. The Secretary-General underscored that there could be no military solution to the crisis and that the solution had to be a political one that was credible and met the aspirations of the Syrian people to dignity and freedom, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué.\textsuperscript{337}

Concurring with the emphasis of the Secretary-General on the need for a political process, the representative of the United Kingdom proposed that the Council utilize the upcoming retreat with the Secretary-General, hosted by Sweden, to reflect on next steps and the way back to such a process.\textsuperscript{338} The representative of Sweden concurred with the statement of the Secretary-General regarding the obligation of Member States to act consistently with the Charter and international law and expressed regret that the Council could not unite behind the call of the Secretary-General for action.\textsuperscript{339} The representative of Ethiopia appealed to the members of the Council, especially the permanent members, to help create a situation where diplomacy would have the upper hand and the primacy of politics would be the guide for coming out of a troubled moment in history.\textsuperscript{340} The representative of Peru encouraged the Secretary-General to redouble his efforts in accordance with the prerogatives entrusted to him in the Charter with a view to helping resolve the stalemate in the Council and to establish a mechanism for the attribution of responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.\textsuperscript{341}

\textsuperscript{329} Ibid., p. 10.

\textsuperscript{330} Ibid., p. 24.

\textsuperscript{331} S/PV.8231, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{332} S/PV.8231, pp. 2–3. See also S/2018/333.

\textsuperscript{333} S/PV.8231, p. 11 (Sweden) and p. 12 (Equatorial Guinea).

\textsuperscript{334} Ibid., p. 12.

\textsuperscript{335} Ibid., p. 11 (Sweden), p. 16 (Kazakhstan) and p. 17 (Ethiopia).

\textsuperscript{336} Ibid., p. 19.

\textsuperscript{337} S/PV.8233, pp. 2–3.

\textsuperscript{338} Ibid., p. 8.

\textsuperscript{339} Ibid., p. 12.

\textsuperscript{340} Ibid., pp. 16–17.

\textsuperscript{341} Ibid., p. 18.
Part VII

Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression (Chapter VII of the Charter)
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Introductory note

Part VII of the present Supplement deals with action taken by the Security Council with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, including Articles 39 to 51. This part is divided into 10 sections, each focusing on selected material to highlight the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter VII by the Council in its deliberations and decisions. Sections I to IV cover material related to Articles 39 to 42, which regulate the Council’s power to determine threats to international peace and security and to take the appropriate action in response to those threats, including the imposition of sanctions measures or the authorization of the use of force. Sections V and VI focus on Articles 43 to 47, regarding the command and deployment of military forces. Sections VII and VIII address, respectively, the obligations of Member States under Articles 48 and 49, while sections IX and X address, respectively, the practice of the Council with respect to Articles 50 and 51. The sections contain subsections on discussions held within the Council regarding the proper interpretation and implementation of the Articles governing the Council’s primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security.

During the period under review, as in previous periods, the Council adopted 50 per cent of its resolutions (27 out of 54 resolutions) explicitly under Chapter VII of the Charter. Most of those resolutions concerned the mandates of United Nations and regional peacekeeping missions or multinational forces, and the imposition, extension, modification or termination of sanctions measures.

As discussed in section I, the Council affirmed in 2018 that the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan, and Yemen, as well as the severity of the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, continued to constitute threats to regional and/or international peace and security. In connection with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council maintained its determination that the situation in the region continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security.

With respect to specific countries, the Council recalled past determinations of threats to international peace and security of significance in those situations. For example, in connection with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council recalled its determination that the unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constituted a threat to international peace and security. Regarding Afghanistan, the Council referred to the threat posed by the production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs originating in Afghanistan. In relation to Libya, the Council reaffirmed its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constituted one of the most serious threats to peace and security. Similarly, on Mali, the Council strongly condemned the activities of terrorist organizations and referred to them as a threat to international peace and security in the region.

Concerning Somalia, the Council determined that incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, as well as the flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo. Likewise, with respect to the situation in the Central African region, the Council recalled that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition continued to pose threats to international peace and security.
As in past practice, the Council continued to reaffirm that terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constituted threats to international peace and security. Moreover, in 2018, some of the discussions in the Council focused on the existential nature of some of the identified threats to international peace and security and the planet, and the need for greater multilateral cooperation.

As set out in section II, in 2018, the Council adopted measures to prevent the aggravation of the situations in South Sudan and Yemen, which were of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 40 of the Charter.

As covered in section III, during the period under review, the Council imposed new measures under Article 41 in connection with the situation in South Sudan and terminated the sanctions measures on Eritrea. The Council renewed the existing measures concerning the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen. The Council also made modifications to the sanctions regimes concerning Libya, Somalia and South Sudan. No changes were made to the measures concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and associates, and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, as well as those concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lebanon and the Sudan. As far as judicial measures were concerned, no action was taken in 2018. Procedurally, the Council agreed that issues pertaining to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals would be considered under the item entitled “International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals”.

As described in section IV, the Council reiterated authorizations granted prior to 2018 to United Nations peacekeeping missions and multinational forces to use force under Chapter VII of the Charter, with regard to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan (including Darfur and Abyei). In that regard, the Council renewed the authorization to use force to discharge the protection-of-civilians mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, the United Nations Rapid Deployment Force in Somalia, the African Union Mission in Somalia, the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo, the African Union Mission in Somalia, and the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. Moreover, the Council reiterated the authorization granted to the French forces in the Central African Republic and Mali to take all necessary measures to support MINUSCA and MINUSMA, respectively, in fulfilling the mandated tasks. With respect to the situation in Somalia, the Council also extended the authorization to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. In relation to the situation in Libya, the Council reiterated its authorization to Member States to take all necessary measures when confronting migrant smugglers and when carrying out the inspection of vessels in the implementation of the arms embargo. With regard to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council authorized the Member States acting under the EUFOR-Althea and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) presence to take “all necessary measures” to effect the implementation of and ensure compliance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to, at the request of either EUFOR-Althea or NATO, take “all necessary measures” in their defence.
As described in sections V to VIII, in the context of peacekeeping, the Council called upon Member States to contribute troops and other assets, including aerial force enablers, while Member States continued to call for greater interaction and enhanced consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries during the period under review. In addition, the Council frequently requested compliance with its decisions adopted under Chapter VII by States and non-State actors alike. As covered in section X, Article 51 as well as the principle of individual and/or collective self-defence were cited abundantly in communications addressed to the Council and in its discussions. This led to substantive deliberations during the period under review on the scope and interpretation of the right to self-defence under a wide range of agenda items.
I. Determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Note

Section I concerns the practice of the Council with regard to the determination of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter. It provides information regarding the determination of the existence of a threat by the Council and examines instances in which a threat was debated. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A provides an overview of the decisions of the Council relating to the determination of a “threat to the peace”, and subsection B contains a series of case studies describing some of the arguments advanced during the Council’s deliberations in connection with the determination of a threat in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter and the adoption of some of the resolutions mentioned in subsection A.

A. Decisions relating to Article 39

During the period under review and consistently with previous periods, the Council did not explicitly invoke Article 39 of the Charter in any of its decisions. In addition, the Council did not determine the existence of any breach of the peace, act of aggression or new threat to international peace and security. This notwithstanding, the Council continued to monitor the evolution of existing and emerging conflicts and situations so as to determine, reaffirm and recognize the existence of continuing threats.

Throughout 2018, the Council determined that the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan, and Yemen, as well as the devastating humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, continued to pose threats to international peace and security and/or threats to international peace and security in the respective regions.1

In Africa, with respect to the situation in the Central African region, the Council recalled that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition continued to pose threats to international peace and security.2 The Council also made a determination of the existence of such threat in connection with the item entitled “Peace consolidation in West Africa”.3 With regard to the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council recognized the recurring threat of the Ebola virus and recalled its resolution 2177 (2014), in which it determined that the unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constituted a threat to international peace and security. In addition, recalling that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, the Council expressed concern that the security situation would negatively impact the ability

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2 S/PRST/2018/17, seventeenth paragraph.

to respond to and contain the outbreak of the Ebola virus.\(^4\)

With respect to the situation in Libya, the Council reaffirmed its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constituted one of the most serious threats to peace and security.\(^5\) In connection with the situation in Mali, the Council strongly condemned the activities of terrorist organizations operating in the country and the Sahel region, including the Mouvement pour l’unification et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa), Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Mourabitoune, Ansar Eddine, and associated individuals and groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Ansar al-Islam, stating that they constituted a threat to peace and security in the region and beyond.\(^6\)

With reference to the situation in Somalia, the Council determined that incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somali coast, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, were important factors exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region.\(^7\) Moreover, the Council expressed concern over the continued threat to the peace and stability of the country and the region posed by Al-Shabaab.\(^8\) The Council also condemned any flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo, including when they resulted in supplies to Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region. In that regard, the Council expressed concern at reports of increased illegal flows of weapons and ammunition supplied from Yemen to Somalia.\(^9\) In relation to the situation in South Sudan and the Sudan, the Council recognized that the current situation in Abyei and along the border between the Sudan and South Sudan continued to constitute a serious threat to international peace and security.\(^10\)

In Asia, in connection with the situation in Afghanistan, the Council continued to recognize the “threat to the international community” posed by the production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs originating in Afghanistan.\(^11\) The Council made a similar determination under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, and further took note of the significant increase in the cultivation, production, trade and trafficking of illicit drugs in Afghanistan, which continued to pose a threat to peace and stability in the region and beyond.\(^12\)

In Europe, in connection with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council determined that the situation in the region continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security.\(^13\)

During 2018, the Council also made reference to threats to international peace and security in several decisions adopted in connection with thematic items. In that regard, under the item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, the Council determined that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security.\(^14\) Under the item “Threats to international peace and security”, the Council reaffirmed that terrorism posed a threat to international peace and security and that countering that threat required collective efforts on national, regional and international levels.\(^15\)

The relevant provisions of the decisions, concerning country- or region-specific or thematic issues, in which the Council referred to continuing threats to peace and security during the period under review are set out in tables 1 and 2, respectively.

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\(^{4}\) Resolution 2439 (2018), second and third preambular paragraphs.

\(^{5}\) Resolution 2420 (2018), penultimate preambular paragraph.

\(^{6}\) Resolution 2423 (2018), sixteenth preambular paragraph.

\(^{7}\) Resolution 2442 (2018), penultimate preambular paragraph.

\(^{8}\) Resolution 2444 (2018), fourth preambular paragraph.

\(^{9}\) Ibid., seventh preambular paragraph.


\(^{11}\) Resolution 2405 (2018), para. 34.

\(^{12}\) S/PRST/2018/2, fourteenth and fifteenth paragraphs.

\(^{13}\) Resolution 2443 (2018), penultimate preambular paragraph.

\(^{14}\) Resolution 2407 (2018), penultimate preambular paragraph.

\(^{15}\) S/PRST/2018/9, fifth paragraph.
Table 1
Decisions in which the Council referred to continuing threats to the peace, by region and country, in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision and date</th>
<th>Provision</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Central African region</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2018/17 10 August 2018</td>
<td>The Security Council recalls that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition continue to pose threats to international peace and security, cause significant loss of life and contribute to instability and security in Central Africa, and, in this regard, encourages the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) to continue to contribute, in its capacity as the secretariat for the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, to countering this threat and calls for sustainable assistance by international and bilateral donors. The Security Council commends UNOCA’s support for regional anti-piracy efforts, in cooperation with the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the member States of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, to address maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. The Council encourages UNOCA to continue to work with UNOWAS, ECCAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission to support the full operationalization of the Yaoundé process architecture for safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea, particularly the Interregional Coordination Centre for Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea (seventeenth paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The situation in the Central African Republic</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2399 (2018) 30 January 2018</td>
<td>Determining that the situation in the Central African Republic continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph) See also resolutions 2446 (2018) and 2448 (2018) (penultimate preambular paragraphs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2409 (2018) 27 March 2018</td>
<td>Determining that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph) See also resolutions 2424 (2018) (penultimate preambular paragraph) and 2439 (2018) (third preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2439 (2018) 30 October 2018</td>
<td>Recognizing the recurring threat of the Ebola virus in the region since it was first discovered in 1976 and recalling its resolution 2177 (2014) concerning the 2014 Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa (second preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The situation in Libya</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2420 (2018) 11 June 2018</td>
<td>Reaffirming its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2434 (2018) 13 September 2018</td>
<td>Recalling its determination in its resolution 2213 (2015) that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (final preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2441 (2018) 5 November 2018</td>
<td>Determining that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The situation in Mali</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2423 (2018) 28 June 2018</td>
<td>Strongly condemning the activities in Mali and in the Sahel region of terrorist organizations, including the Mouvement pour l’unification et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Mourabitoune, Ansar Eddine, and associated individuals and groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Ansar al-Islam, which continue to operate in Mali and constitute a threat to peace and security in the region and beyond, human rights abuses and violations, and violence against civilians, notably women and children, committed in Mali and in the region by terrorist groups (sixteenth preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision and date</td>
<td>Provision</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 May 2018</td>
<td>Determining that the situation in Mali continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph) See also resolution 2432 (2018) (penultimate preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 November 2018</td>
<td>Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph) See also resolution 2431 (2018) (penultimate preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 November 2018</td>
<td>Condemning Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia and beyond, expressing concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace and stability of Somalia and the region, and further expressing concern at the presence of affiliates linked to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh) and the security implications of the situation in Yemen for Somalia (fourth preambular paragraph) Condemning any flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia, including when they result in supplies to Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to ISIL (also known as Da’esh) and when they undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region, and expressing concern at reports of increased illegal flows of weapons and ammunition supplies from Yemen to Somalia (seventh preambular paragraph) Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 February 2018</td>
<td>Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (second preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June 2018</td>
<td>Determining that the situation in the Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and security (final preambular paragraph) See also resolution 2429 (2018) (final preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March 2018</td>
<td>Determining that the situation in South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph) See also resolution 2418 (2018) (penultimate preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 April 2018</td>
<td>Recognizing that the current situation in Abyei and along the border between the Sudan and South Sudan continues to constitute a serious threat to international peace and security (final preambular paragraph) See also resolutions 2412 (2018), 2416 (2018), 2438 (2018) and 2445 (2018) (final preambular paragraphs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 January 2018</td>
<td>The Security Council recalls that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons continue to pose threats to international peace and security, cause significant loss of lives and contribute to instability and security in many regions, including in West Africa and the Sahel, and, in this regard, encourages the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel to consider work that could contribute to countering this threat and calls for sustainable assistance by international and bilateral donors (twenty-second paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision and date</td>
<td>Provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2018/16 10 August 2018</td>
<td>The Security Council recalls that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons continue to pose threats to international peace and security, cause significant loss of lives, and contribute to instability and security in many regions, including in West Africa and the Sahel (sixteenth paragraph)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Asia**

**The situation in Afghanistan**

Resolution 2405 (2018) 8 March 2018 Calls upon States to strengthen their efforts as well as international and regional cooperation to counter the threat to the international community posed by the production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs originating in Afghanistan which significantly contribute to the financial resources of the Taliban and its associates and could also benefit Al-Qaida, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh) affiliates and other terrorist groups, and to act in accordance with the principle of common and shared responsibility in addressing the drug problem of Afghanistan, including through cooperation against the trafficking in illicit drugs and precursor chemicals, also underlining the importance of border management cooperation, emphasizes the need for enhanced regional and international support of the National Drug Action Plan of Afghanistan, and welcomes the continued efforts of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in empowering the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics in its implementation, and appreciates the work of the Paris Pact initiative, its “Paris-Moscow” process and its partners, including the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as well as the work of the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre for combating the illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors, and encourages the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities to continue to pay attention to the linkages between the proceeds of organized crime, inter alia, the illicit production and trafficking of drugs and their chemical precursors and the financing, respectively, of the Taliban, including the Haqqani Network, and of ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities; (para. 34) |

**Europe**

**The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Resolution 2443 (2018) 6 November 2018 Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph) |

**Middle East**

**The situation in the Middle East**

Resolution 2401 (2018) 24 February 2018 Determining that the devastating humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic continues to constitute a threat to peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph) See also resolution 2449 (2018) (penultimate preambular paragraph) |

Resolution 2402 (2018) 26 February 2018 Determining that the situation in Yemen continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph) |

Resolution 2433 (2018) 30 August 2018 Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (final preambular paragraph) |

Resolution 2451 (2018) 21 December 2018 Determining that the situation in Yemen continues to constitute a threat to regional and international peace and security (final preambular paragraph) |
Table 2
Decisions in which the Council referred to continuing threats to the peace, by thematic issue, in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision and date</th>
<th>Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maintenance of international peace and security</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2018/2 19 January 2018</td>
<td>The Security Council underscores the importance of close coordination between Afghanistan and the Central Asian States in combating the significant increase in the cultivation, production, trade and trafficking of illicit drugs in Afghanistan, as reflected in the Afghanistan Opium Survey published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on 15 November 2017, which continue to pose a threat to peace and stability in the region and beyond, and emphasizes the need for enhanced regional and international support of the National Drug Action Plan of Afghanistan (fourteenth paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Security Council in this regard appreciates the work of UNODC, calls upon States to strengthen international and regional cooperation to counter the threat to the international community posed by the cultivation, production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs originating in Afghanistan which significantly contribute to the financial resources of the Taliban and its associates, and to act in accordance with the principle of common and shared responsibility in addressing the drug problem of Afghanistan, including through cooperation against the trafficking in illicit drugs and precursor chemicals, and welcomes cooperation between Afghanistan and Central Asian States and relevant regional and international organizations and initiatives (fifteenth paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution 2407 (2018) 21 March 2018</td>
<td>Determining that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threats to international peace and security</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2018/9 8 May 2018</td>
<td>The Security Council reaffirms that terrorism poses a threat to international peace and security and that countering this threat requires collective efforts on national, regional and international levels on the basis of respect for international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and further reaffirms its commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and stresses that Member States have the primary responsibility in countering terrorist acts and violent extremism conducive to terrorism (fifth paragraph)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Discussions relating to Article 39

During the period under review, several issues regarding the interpretation of Article 39 and the determination of threats to international peace and security arose during the Council’s deliberations. An explicit reference to Article 39 was made at the 8395th meeting, held on 9 November 2018, by the representative of Liechtenstein, who asserted that the role of the Council was a “crucial aspect” in the discussion on the conditions for the exercise by the International Criminal Court of the jurisdiction over the crime of aggression owing to the Council’s competence under Article 39 to make a determination that an act of aggression had been committed.16

During 2018, the Council engaged in a discussion on the threat that the persistent violation and lack of respect of international law posed to international peace and security, under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” (see case 1). Under the same item, the Council also addressed, in two separate discussions, the evolving nature of the contemporary threats to international peace and security, including those of an existential nature, such as the threat posed by climate change (see cases 2 and 3).

16 S/PV.8395, p. 31. For more information on the meeting, see case 1 below.
On 5 January 2018, the Council met under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East” to discuss the threat posed by the alleged human rights violations during the anti-government protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran of late December 2017 and early January 2018 (see case 4).

Further to the alleged chemical weapons attack in Duma of 7 April 2018, the Council discussed, on three occasions during the same month, the threat to international peace and security posed by the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “The situation in the Middle East” (see case 5).

On 23 May and 15 November 2018, the Council held two meetings under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” and deliberated on whether the situation in the Sahel constituted a threat to international peace and security and on the potential imposition of a mandate under Chapter VII for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel.\(^{17}\)

On 5 September 2018, the Council considered the situation in Nicaragua under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”.\(^{18}\) During the meeting, a former member of the Government of Nicaragua and civil society leader invited under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure emphasized the urgency of the situation, which, he stated, threatened the peace and security “of an entire region”,\(^{19}\) whereas several Council members and the representatives of Nicaragua and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela disagreed and determined that the situation did not pose such a threat.\(^{20}\)

During the period under review, the Council also continued to discuss a wide array of other threats to international peace and security considered by the Council in the past, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,\(^{21}\) terrorism, in particular the threats posed by terrorist organizations, including ISIL (Da’esh), Nusra Front and Al-Qaida, and by foreign terrorist fighters,\(^{22}\) and the potential for regional conflicts and tensions to threaten regional and international peace and security, in particular in the Middle East and North Africa.\(^{25}\)

In addition, although less frequently than in previous years, the Council considered the threat to international peace and security posed by the nuclear activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.\(^{24}\) Further to the letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the President of the Council (S/2018/218) following the alleged nerve agent attack in the United Kingdom of 4 March 2018, the Council discussed the threat to international peace and security emanating from the use of chemical weapons.\(^{25}\)

**Case 1**

**Maintenance of international peace and security**

On 17 May 2018, at its 8262nd meeting, held under the above-mentioned item, the Council, at the initiative of Poland, which held the presidency for the month, considered the sub-item entitled “Upholding international law within the context of the maintenance

\(^{17}\) S/PV.8266 and S/PV.8402. For more information on peacemaking operations led by regional arrangements, including the Joint Force, see part VIII, sect. III.

\(^{18}\) S/PV.8340. For more information on the meeting in the context of the Council’s discussions concerning the agenda and the role of regional organizations in addressing the situation in Nicaragua, see part II, sect. II.C, case 3, and part VIII, sect. I.B, case 3, respectively.

\(^{19}\) S/PV.8340, p. 4.


\(^{21}\) See, for example, under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, S/PV.8362; “The situation in the Middle East”, S/PV.8344; and “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, S/PV.8160 and S/PV.8230.

\(^{22}\) See, for example, under the item entitled “Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council”, S/PV.8364; “Maintenance of international peace and security”, S/PV.8293; S/PV.8362; and “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, S/PV.8178 and S/PV.8330.

\(^{23}\) See, for example, under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, S/PV.8293; and “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, S/PV.8167 and S/PV.8244.

\(^{24}\) See, under the item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, S/PV.8363. For more information on the discussion by the Council of the threat to international peace and security posed by the nuclear activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea throughout 2016 and 2017, see Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017, part VII, sect. I.B, case 3.

of international peace and security”.26 During the debate, numerous speakers underscored the importance of respect for international law in combating threats to international peace and security. Other speakers focused on the threat to international peace and security posed by violations of international law. Among them, the representatives of the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Cuba expressed the view that violations of international law in and of themselves posed a threat to international peace and security, and the representative of the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine maintained that impunity and double standards undermined international law and, therefore, threatened international peace and security.27 The representative of Kenya, noting that a politically skewed application of international law would erode the foundation of a rules-based international system and bring into question the credibility of the Council, warned that the alternative to the application of international human rights law and humanitarian law had proven to be an even greater threat to international peace and security as compared to the traditional drivers of conflict.28 The representative of Lithuania, referring to several examples of non-compliance with international law and violations of sovereignty in Europe, underscored that such blatant breaches of the Charter constituted a threat to international peace, security and stability.29 Also in relation to regional conflicts, the representative of Sweden claimed that the continuous aggression by the Russian Federation and its annexation of Crimea was an ongoing breach of international law and that the redrawing of borders backed by military power represented a threat beyond Ukraine and a challenge to the international legal order and the Charter, and thus a threat to all States.30 The representative of Ukraine also emphasized that the violation of fundamental principles of international law by a permanent member of the Council was one of the most serious current threats to international peace and security.31

Several speakers identified and discussed other contemporary threats to international peace and security. The representative of Estonia pointed out that modern conflicts threatening international peace and security were characterized by an increasingly broader use of new technologies, and that international law was applicable when cyber means were used to threaten international peace and security.32 The representative of Portugal stated that it might be necessary to further develop the existing legal framework to better deal with new and interlinked global threats such as climate change, new typologies of conflicts, transnational organized crime or terrorism.33 The representative of Kazakhstan said that there was no greater threat to international peace and security than the continued existence of nuclear weapons.34 The representative of Lebanon determined that the “disputed maritime border and the exclusive economic zone between Lebanon and Israel” remained a source of conflict that could threaten the peace and security of the region.35 While the representative of the United States maintained that the regimes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) posed a threat to peace and security internationally, the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela said that it was the “United States regime” that represented a real threat to peace and regional and international stability.36 The representative of Jamaica said that new and emerging threats to international peace and security were being fuelled by a myriad social, economic and political factors that provided a breeding ground for discontent, conflict and strife.37

Case 2
Maintenance of international peace and security

At its 8395th meeting, held on 9 November 2018 under the above-mentioned item, at the initiative of China, which held the presidency for the month, the Council considered the sub-item entitled “Strengthening multilateralism and the role of the United Nations”.38 In the context of this topic, speakers noted the complex and, in some cases, existential nature of contemporary threats to international peace and security. In this regard, several speakers underlined

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26 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 3 May 2018 from the representative of Poland to the Secretary-General (S/2018/417/Rev.1).
27 S/PV.8262, p. 23 (Plurinational State of Bolivia), p. 77 (Cuba) and p. 96 (Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine).
28 Ibid., p. 69.
29 Ibid., p. 33.
30 Ibid., p. 22.
31 Ibid., pp. 60–61.
32 Ibid., pp. 34–35.
33 Ibid., p. 85.
34 Ibid., p. 16.
35 Ibid., p. 76.
36 Ibid., p. 17 (United States) and p. 83 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).
37 Ibid., p. 64.
38 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 1 November 2018 from the representative of China to the Secretary-General (S/2018/982).
the significance of international cooperation and collective action in addressing them.\textsuperscript{39}

The representative of Argentina expressed concern that the maintenance of international peace and security was increasingly threatened by serious new challenges such as organized crime, cybercrime and terrorism, which required effective and efficient responses based on dialogue, consensus, cooperation and multilateralism, which no individual State in the international community was able to provide on its own.\textsuperscript{40}

The representative of Norway noted that terrorism was a “truly global threat” and stressed the need for a global response.\textsuperscript{41} The representative of the Philippines stated that it was the most pressing threat to peace and security in the world and affirmed that the fight against terrorism demanded total and sincere cooperation.\textsuperscript{42} The representative of Estonia noted the threat to international peace and security posed by cyber means, adding that new technologies were increasingly used in modern conflicts threatening international peace and security.\textsuperscript{43} The representative of Kuwait also stated that, as a result of advances in technology, the threats facing the world were transnational and more complicated and interlinked than ever before, and further underlined the need for collective action in confronting such challenges.\textsuperscript{44} The representative of Slovenia maintained that the new threats were more complex, multidimensional and quickly multiplying, and that, owing to this interdependence, only through international cooperation could solutions be found and progress achieved.\textsuperscript{45} The representative of Ireland emphasized that there were new and very different threats to international peace and security, to the very survival of the planet and to the stable development of societies.\textsuperscript{46} The representative of Malaysia warned that the evolving nature of the traditional threats and non-traditional security challenges could undermine many of the gains that had already been achieved.\textsuperscript{47}

The representative of the Russian Federation noted the attempts to “drag some countries into military alliances” such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “with invocations of the inadmissibility of meddling in their internal affairs actually accompanied by shameless interference”. He further noted that that bloc mindset only produced additional threats to international security and was ruinous for the principles of multilateralism.\textsuperscript{48} The representative of Poland said that there were significant new threats and challenges to international peace and security, including foreign fighters, violent extremism, cyberattacks, refugee flows, uncontrolled migration and information warfare, that her country believed undermined global stability, stressing that there was no way to tackle those issues in an effective way unilaterally and achieve a sustainable outcome.\textsuperscript{49} The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia categorically rejected the imposition of unilateral measures, which was a flagrant violation of multilateralism and a serious threat to the international order.\textsuperscript{50} On the other hand, the representative of the United Kingdom emphasized that effective collective action required resolving threats that challenged collective security on the world stage, including migration, cybercrime, modern-day slavery, terrorist threats, disease or climate change, and that action to uphold international peace and security could not only mean action by consensus, since threats to international peace and security often involved a challenge to international law and norms.\textsuperscript{51}

The representative of Peru expressed concern over the proliferation of conflicts and the emergence of new threats to international peace and security, as well as their root causes, including growing inequality, the effects of climate change, armament and transnational organized crime.\textsuperscript{52} In a similar vein, the representatives of Sweden and Germany noted the importance of preventing threats to international peace and security.\textsuperscript{53} The representative of Sweden added that, for the Council to be able to fulfil its task, it had to act on a full range of threats to international peace and security, be better at identifying risks and root causes of conflicts and ensure that its response was comprehensive.\textsuperscript{54} The representative of Germany further asserted that, as an incoming member of the Council in 2019, his delegation would focus on the catalysts and drivers of conflict, human rights, climate change and sexual violence against women.\textsuperscript{55}

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\textsuperscript{39} S/PV.8395, p. 10 (Sweden), p. 27 (Peru) and p. 58 (Cuba).
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 50.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p. 70.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 81.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 49.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p. 36.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 67.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 82.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 19.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., p. 25.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 28.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 27.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., p. 10 (Sweden) and p. 56 (Germany).
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 10.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. 56.
Commenting on the mandate of the Council, the representative of Spain said that flagrant and mass violations of human rights and international humanitarian law were threats to international peace and security that should be taken into consideration by the organs to which the Charter attributed that responsibility, in particular the Council.\textsuperscript{56}

**Case 3**

**Maintenance of international peace and security**

At its 8307th meeting, held on 11 July 2018, the Council held a high-level debate under the abovementioned item and the sub-item entitled “Understanding and addressing climate-related security risks”. During the meeting, a discussion on climate change as a threat to international peace and security arose. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden said that the threat that a changing climate posed to societies and to international peace and security could not be underestimated.\textsuperscript{57} The representative of France added that the threat of climate change to international peace and security was an objective fact that could not be denied.\textsuperscript{58} The Prime Minister of Curaçao, the Netherlands, underscored that the Council had a responsibility to act in situations where climate change threatened international stability and security.\textsuperscript{59} The representative of Maldives, speaking on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States, emphasized the importance for the United Nations to have a full understanding of how climate change threatened international peace and security, and the representative of Trinidad and Tobago, acknowledging that the threat to the peace and security of all humankind from climate change was real, emphasized that it was even greater for small island developing States.\textsuperscript{60}

Other speakers discussed the linkages between climate change and threats to international peace and security, including the ways in which the former could aggravate the latter. The Deputy Secretary-General, who briefed the Council at the outset of the meeting on climate-related risks, highlighted the “complex relationship between climate change and conflict”. She further emphasized the need to understand climate change as one issue within a web of factors that could lead to and exacerbate conflict, adding that climate change acted as a threat multiplier, applying additional stress on prevailing political, social and economic pressure points.\textsuperscript{61} The Minister for Water Resources of Iraq stated that the rising temperature of the Earth’s surface, if not a concrete threat on its own, which he deemed it was, undoubtedly magnified the threats posed by other risks and increased their complexity and intensity in many regions of the world. With regard to the situation in the Middle East, he added that the inequity of access to water represented a real threat to peace and stability in the region.\textsuperscript{62} The representative of Kazakhstan said that climate change was a threat multiplier as it could result in poverty, food insecurity, illegal migration, internal displacement, social instability and bitter conflicts because high-risk areas were essentially agricultural, and recalled that the flight over scarce natural resources, such as land and water, had also resulted in long and brutal hostilities.\textsuperscript{63} Similarly, the representative of Poland stressed that the negative impacts of climate change on global peace and security could not be neglected since they were threat multipliers that could aggravate poverty, environmental degradation and social tensions and could lead to escalations of local and regional conflicts.\textsuperscript{64} The President of Nauru noted that, since it had acknowledged that the adverse effects of climate change might aggravate existing threats to international peace and security, the Council had begun to consider the issue according to specific geopolitical contexts.\textsuperscript{65} The representative of the Sudan, speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States, similarly underlined that climate change and environmental degradation exacerbated such threats.\textsuperscript{66}

The representative of Peru stressed that it was crucial to understand that the growing socioeconomic and environmental impacts of climate change led to humanitarian crises and conflicts, which in turn could pose a threat to international peace and security because of their scope.\textsuperscript{67} The representative of Ethiopia recalled a presidential statement of 20 July 2011, in which the Council expressed concern that possible adverse effects of climate change might, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security. He added that, when the impacts of climate change became threats to the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council had a role

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 43.
\textsuperscript{57} S/PV.8307, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p. 27.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., pp. 4–5.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., p. 10.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p. 23.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 25.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p. 28.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., p. 12.
to play in analysing the conflict and the security implications and finding a path to peace and security.68

The representative of the Russian Federation nonetheless expressed his disappointment about the meeting and categorized its holding as “yet another attempt to link the issue of preserving the environment to threats to international peace and security”. He further claimed that those who promulgated the idea that climate change was a threat to security did not bring scientifically sound, specific details to bear or clear explanations of the notions of security, conflict, threats or stability as they related to the climate issue.69 In contrast, the representative of the United States asserted that, while the Council most often focused on armed conflict as the most conventional threat to international peace and security, it was right to also consider natural phenomena and disasters as they had taken lives, destroyed homes, affected resources and caused widespread displacement both within and beyond national borders.70 The representative of France, recalling that the impacts of climate change were multiplying the risks to international stability, concluded that both the Council and the General Assembly should speak out on that threat.71

Case 4
The situation in the Middle East

On 5 January 2018, the Council held its 8152nd meeting to discuss the alleged human rights violations that occurred during the anti-government protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran in late December 2017 and early January 2018. During the meeting, the representative of France stated that, however worrying, the events did not constitute per se a threat to international peace and security, and the representative of Equatorial Guinea said that the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran did not, in principle, constitute such a threat.72 The representative of China similarly stressed that the situation did not pose any threat to international peace and security, and the representative of Kazakhstan stated that the developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran were a domestic issue outside the Council’s mandate since they did not represent a threat to international peace and security.73 The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia expressed his delegation’s categorical rejection of other delegations’ attempts to push for meetings on issues that did not pose a threat to international peace and security, which posed the risk of the Council becoming “instrumentalized for political ends”, and stated that the situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran was therefore not an issue that belonged on the agenda of the Council.74 The representative of the Russian Federation expressed regret at the “misuse of the forum of the Security Council”. He cautioned about declaring a threat to international peace and security and establishing the grounds “for the necessity of outside interferences” in the country’s internal affairs, drawing parallels with the events in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2011.75

The representative of Kuwait, expressing hope that the situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran would not evolve into further violence, underscored the importance of preventive diplomacy and the role of the Council in addressing situations in which there were signs of future threats to regional and international peace and security at an early stage.76 The representative of the United Kingdom stated that, too often, the security interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran were pursued in a way that destabilized and directly threatened others, supported terrorism and distorted the country’s economy, and asserted that such regional activities risked increasing international conflict and threatened international peace and security.77

Case 5
Threats to international peace and security

During the period under review, the Council held three meetings within the space of six days to discuss the threat posed by the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic further to the alleged chemical weapons attack in Duma on 7 April 2018. On 9 April 2018, the Council held an emergency meeting under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security” and for the first time under the sub-item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”.78 During the meeting, several speakers determined that the use of chemical weapons constituted a threat to international peace and

68 Ibid., pp. 18–19.
69 Ibid., p. 15.
70 Ibid., p. 13.
72 S/PV.8152, p. 5 (France) and p. 11 (Equatorial Guinea).
73 Ibid., p. 12 (China) and p. 14 (Kazakhstan).
74 Ibid., p. 5.
75 Ibid., pp. 12–13.
76 Ibid., p. 6.
77 Ibid., p. 7.
78 S/PV.8225. For further details on the proposals to establish a new mechanism to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, see part I, sect. 23, and part IX, sect. VIII. For more information on emergency meetings held and new sub-items introduced in 2018, see part II, sects. I.A and II.A, respectively.
security. The representative of Côte d’Ivoire said that the use of chemical weapons violated the most fundamental norms of international law and posed threats to collective security. The representative of Ethiopia remarked that threats to international peace and security were becoming increasingly complex by the day. He noted that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was posing a real danger and the international norms on the use of chemical weapons were being undermined. He further acknowledged the primary responsibility of the Council for the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security and regretted that the Council had not been able to effectively address the new and emerging threats and challenges to peace and security. The representative of Kazakstan similarly underscored that the Council was the main and sole body authorized to counter threats to international peace and security, adding that, unfortunately, the situation within the Council was becoming increasingly strained.

The representatives of the Russian Federation, Equatorial Guinea and the Syrian Arab Republic expressed support for the holding of the meeting under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security.” The representative of Equatorial Guinea explained that it was an appropriate topic, as the recent events in the Middle East represented a genuine threat to peace and security, not only in that region but also at the international level.

On 13 April 2018, the Council convened another meeting under the same item to discuss the situation in the Middle East. In his briefing to the Council, the Secretary-General focused on the state of affairs across the entire region and held that the situation in the Middle East was in chaos to such an extent that it had become a threat to international peace and security and that the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic in particular represented the most serious threat to international peace and security. Expressing similar views, the representative of France claimed that, for seven years, the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic had constituted without a doubt a grave threat to international peace and security, as defined by the Charter. He emphasized that that threat was related to the “repeated, organized and systematic use of chemical weapons by the Bashar Al-Assad regime”. He added that the Council was justified in taking measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, but that its action had been paralyzed by the use of the veto for several years. The representative of Peru noted the atrocity crimes committed with impunity and stated that the conflict had deteriorated into a serious threat to regional and global stability. The representative of Sweden asserted that the use of chemical weapons constituted a grave threat to international peace and security, and the representative of Kuwait stated that he shared the Secretary-General’s concern that the Middle East was experiencing crises and challenges that unquestionably represented threats to international peace and security. In his statement at the end of the meeting, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic thanked the Secretary-General for his comprehensive and accurate briefing. He added that the Secretary-General spoke in a manner commensurate with the threats to international peace and security posed by the allegations and accusations against the Syrian Arab Republic and its allies.

On 14 April 2018, following the air strikes carried out against the Syrian Arab Republic by the United States, the United Kingdom and France, the Council held another emergency meeting under the same item. During the meeting, the Council voted on a draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation, which the Council failed to adopt owing to an insufficient number of votes in favour. During the discussion, the Secretary-General reiterated that the Syrian Arab Republic represented the most serious threat to international peace and security in the world. The representative of Sweden recalled the Council’s primary responsibility to act in response to threats to international peace and security and reiterated that the use of chemical weapons constituted a threat to international peace and security. The representative of Peru emphasized the need to prevent the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic from spiralling out of control and causing a greater threat to

79 S/PV.8225, p. 15 (Sweden), p. 21 (Plurinational State of Bolivia) and p. 22 (Peru).
80 Ibid., p. 17.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., p. 19.
83 Ibid., p. 5 (Russian Federation), p. 18 (Equatorial Guinea) and p. 25 (Syrian Arab Republic).
84 Ibid., p. 18.
85 S/PV.8231.
86 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
stability in the region and to international peace and security.\textsuperscript{95}

The representative of the Russian Federation read out a statement by the President of his country, in which the latter had characterized the strike by the United States and its allies as an “act of aggression against a sovereign State”.\textsuperscript{96} The representative of the

Syrian Arab Republic called upon the Council to firmly condemn that aggression, which would exacerbate the tensions in the region and was a threat to international peace and security throughout the world.\textsuperscript{97}

II. Provisional measures to prevent an aggravation of the situation in accordance with Article 40 of the Charter

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Note

Section II covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 40 of the Charter, regarding provisional measures to prevent an aggravation of the situation. During the period under review, no explicit reference to Article 40 was made during the deliberations of the Council, nor was there any discussion of constitutional significance on its interpretation. Similarly, there was no explicit reference to Article 40 in any of the communications of the Council. The decisions of the Council of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 40 are discussed below.

Decisions relating to Article 40

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly cite Article 40 in any decisions it adopted. This notwithstanding, certain decisions in which the Council demanded and urged the implementation of measures in relation to the situations in South Sudan and the Middle East (Yemen) were of relevance for the interpretation and application of this provision. The relevant provisions of those decisions are set out in table 3.

While Article 40 suggests that provisional measures to prevent the aggravation of a conflict would be adopted prior to the imposition of measures under Chapter VII (Articles 41 and 42), the practice of the Council reflects a more flexible interpretation of that provision. Given the prolonged, complex and rapidly changing nature of conflicts dealt with by the Council, provisional measures have been imposed in parallel to the adoption of measures under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter.

In 2018, in connection with the situation in the Middle East (Yemen), in its resolution 2451 (2018), the Council called upon the parties to implement the Stockholm Agreement and respect fully the ceasefire agreed for Hudaydah Governorate that came into force on 18 December 2018.\textsuperscript{98} The Council also called for the mutual redeployment of forces to be carried out from the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra’s Isa to agreed locations within 21 days of the ceasefire coming into force.\textsuperscript{99} The Council expressed its intention to consider further measures to support the implementation of the resolution and all other relevant resolutions and to alleviate the humanitarian situation in the country.\textsuperscript{100}

In relation to the situation in South Sudan, in its resolution 2406 (2018), the Council demanded that all parties immediately end the fighting throughout the country and that the leaders of South Sudan implement the permanent ceasefire declared in the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and ceasefires for which they had respectively called on 11 July 2016 and 22 May 2017, as well as the

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., p. 18.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., p. 3. For a comprehensive coverage of the Council’s
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., para. 7.
\textsuperscript{98} Resolution 2451 (2018), para. 3.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., para. 7.

The Council expressed its intention to consider all appropriate measures, as demonstrated through the adoption of resolutions 2206 (2015), 2290 (2016) and 2353 (2017) against those who took actions that undermined the peace, stability and security of South Sudan. In its resolution 2428 (2018), the Council demanded that the leaders of South Sudan fully and immediately adhere to the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access, and the 27 June 2018 Khartoum Declaration of Agreement between Parties of the Conflict of South Sudan and allow full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to help ensure timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to all those in need. The Council also expressed its intent to continue to impose any sanctions that might be appropriate to respond to the situation, including the designation of senior individuals responsible for actions or policies that threatened the peace, security or stability of South Sudan, and affirmed that it would be prepared to adjust the measures contained in the resolution, including by strengthening through additional measures, in the light of the implementation of the parties’ commitments, including the ceasefire, and compliance with the resolution and other applicable resolutions.

Table 3
Decisions in which the Council called for compliance with provisional measures and expressed its intent to take action in the event of non-compliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of measure</th>
<th>Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cessation of hostilities</td>
<td>Calls on the parties to implement the Stockholm Agreement according to the timelines determined in it, insists on the full respect by all parties of the ceasefire agreed for Hudaydah Governorate, which came into force on 18 December 2018, and the mutual redeployment of forces to be carried out from the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra’s Isa to agreed locations outside the city and the ports within 21 days of the ceasefire coming into force; a commitment not to bring any military reinforcements to the city, the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra’s Isa, and the Governorate; and a commitment to remove any military manifestations from the city, all of which are central to the successful implementation of the Stockholm Agreement, and further calls on the parties to continue to engage constructively, in good faith and without preconditions with the Special Envoy for Yemen, including on continued work towards stabilizing the Yemeni economy and on Sana’a airport, and participating in a next round of talks in January 2019 (para. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council action in the event of failure to comply</td>
<td>Requests the Secretary-General to report on progress regarding implementation of this resolution, including any breaches of commitments by the parties, on a weekly basis, as called for by the parties, until further notice, and expresses its intention to consider further measures, as necessary, to support the implementation of this resolution and all other relevant Security Council resolutions and to alleviate the humanitarian situation and support a political solution to end the conflict (para. 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessation of hostilities</td>
<td>Demands that all parties immediately end the fighting throughout South Sudan, and further demands that the leaders of South Sudan implement the permanent ceasefire declared in the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and ceasefires for which they respectively called on 11 July 2016 and 22 May 2017, as well as the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access signed on 21 December 2017, and ensure that subsequent decrees and orders directing their commanders to control their forces and protect civilians and their property are fully implemented (para. 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Ibid., para. 2.
3. Ibid., para. 3.
4. Ibid., paras. 25 and 26.
### Part VII. Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression (Chapter VII of the Charter)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of measure</th>
<th>Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of movement and non-interference with the work of United Nations and humanitarian personnel</td>
<td>Demands that the Transitional Government of National Unity of South Sudan comply with the obligations set out in the Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan concerning the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, and immediately cease obstructing the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in the performance of its mandate, and further demands that the Transitional Government of National Unity immediately cease obstructing international and national humanitarian actors from assisting civilians and facilitate freedom of movement for the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism, and calls on the Transitional Government of National Unity to take action, to deter, and to hold those responsible to account for any hostile or other actions that impede UNMISS or international and national humanitarian actors (para. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council action in the event of failure to comply</td>
<td>Expresses its intention to consider all appropriate measures, as demonstrated by the adoption of resolutions 2206 (2015), 2290 (2016) and 2353 (2017) against those who take actions that undermine the peace, stability and security of South Sudan, stresses the sanctity of United Nations protection sites, specifically underscores that individuals or entities that are responsible or complicit in, or have engaged in, directly or indirectly, attacks against UNMISS personnel and premises and any humanitarian personnel, may meet the designation criteria, and in this regard takes note of the 20 February 2018 special report of the Secretary-General on the renewal of the mandate of UNMISS (S/2018/143) that the steady resupply of weapons and ammunition to South Sudan has directly affected the safety of United Nations personnel and the ability of UNMISS to carry out its mandate, takes note of the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 8 February 2018, which states that signatories to the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access should be deprived of the means to continue fighting, and further expresses its intention to consider all measures, including an arms embargo, as appropriate, to deprive the parties of the means to continue fighting and to prevent violations of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access (para. 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan (resolution 2428 (2018) of 13 July 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demands that the leaders of South Sudan fully and immediately adhere to the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access, and the 27 June 2018 Khartoum Declaration and allow, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law and the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to help ensure timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to all those in need (para. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expresses its intent to monitor and review the situation at 90-day intervals from the adoption of this resolution or more frequently, as needed, and invites the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission to share relevant information with the Council, as appropriate, on its assessment of the parties’ implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, adherence to that Agreement, the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access and the 27 June 2018 Khartoum Declaration, and the facilitation of unhindered and secure humanitarian access, also expresses its intent to continue to impose any sanctions that may be appropriate to respond to the situation, which may include the designation of senior individuals responsible for actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of South Sudan (para. 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirms also that it shall be prepared to adjust the measures contained in this resolution, including by strengthening through additional measures, as well as modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of the progress achieved in the peace, accountability and reconciliation process, and in light of the implementation of the parties’ commitments, including the ceasefire, and compliance with this and other applicable resolutions (para. 26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. Measures not involving the use of armed force in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of all communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Note

Section III covers decisions of the Council imposing measures not involving the use of force, pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter. In 2018, the Council, under Chapter VII, lifted the sanctions on Eritrea and imposed an arms embargo on South Sudan.

During the review period, the Council explicitly referred to Article 41 in the preambles of resolution 2407 (2018) in connection with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and of resolution 2418 (2018) in connection with the extension of sanctions measures on South Sudan.

No judicial measures were imposed under Article 41. This notwithstanding, as discussed in part IX, the Council agreed that issues pertaining to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals would be considered under the item entitled “International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals”.106

The present section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A outlines the decisions in which the Council imposed, modified or terminated measures under Article 41. It is organized under two main headings, dealing with decisions on issues of a thematic and country-specific nature. Subsection B covers the Council’s deliberations during the review period and is also organized under two headings, each highlighting the salient issues that were raised in the deliberations in connection with Article 41, with respect to thematic items or country-specific items.

A. Decisions relating to Article 41

Decisions on thematic issues relating to Article 41

The Security Council adopted a number of decisions on issues of a thematic nature concerning sanctions measures and their implementation.

In resolution 2427 (2018), adopted under the item entitled “Children and armed conflict”, the Council recalled the obligations of all parties to armed conflict under international humanitarian law and human rights law for the protection of children in armed conflict.107 It reiterated its readiness to adopt targeted and graduated measures against persistent perpetrators of violations and abuses committed against children and to consider including provisions pertaining to parties to armed conflict that engaged in activities in violation of international law relating to the rights and protection of children in armed conflicts, when establishing, modifying or renewing the mandate of relevant sanctions regimes.108

In resolution 2417 (2018), adopted under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, the Council noted the devastating impact on civilians of ongoing armed conflict and related violence and emphasized with deep concern that ongoing armed conflicts and violence had devastating humanitarian consequences. It expressed concern over the growing number of armed conflicts all over the globe and reaffirmed the need for all parties to armed conflict to respect the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in the provision of humanitarian assistance, including medical assistance.109 In that context, the Council recalled that it had adopted and could consider adopting sanctions measures, where appropriate and in line with existing practice, that could be applied to individuals or entities obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance.110

Under the same item, in a presidential statement issued on 21 September 2018, the Council reaffirmed its commitment to the protection of civilians in armed

107 Resolution 2427 (2018), sixth and thirteenth preambular paragraphs.
108 Ibid., para. 32.
109 Resolution 2417 (2018), third, fourth and nineteenth preambular paragraphs.
110 Ibid., para. 9.
conflict as one of its core issues and to the continuing and full implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Council that addressed the protection of civilians, women and peace and security, children and armed conflict, and peacekeeping. It also expressed its intent to continue to address the protection of civilians in the context of both country-specific and thematic items on its agenda. In this connection, the Council updated the aide-memoire for the consideration of issues pertaining to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, originally adopted in 2002. As explained in the introduction to the aide-memoire, it was intended to facilitate the Council’s consideration of issues relevant to the protection of civilians in armed conflict and to serve as a reference tool on the Council’s practice in that area, by listing the main themes and specific issues for consideration emerging from the practice and providing, in an addendum, verbatim examples of Council-agreed language on themes and issues.

Under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, the Council issued a presidential statement on 21 December 2018, in which it affirmed that, following the review of the implementation of the measures as described in resolution 2368 (2017), no further adjustments to the measures with respect to all individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Da’esh and Al-Qaida sanctions list were necessary. The Council further stated that it would continue to evaluate the implementation of such measures and make adjustments, as necessary.

Decisions on country-specific issues relating to Article 41

During the period under review, as set out below, the Council established an arms embargo on South Sudan (see case 8), decided to reflect sexual and gender-based violence as an explicit designation criterion in the sanctions regimes on Libya (see case 9), Somalia (see case 11) and South Sudan (see case 8), and terminated the sanctions measures against Eritrea (see case 11).

The Council renewed the existing measures concerning the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen. The Council also made modifications to the sanctions regime concerning South Sudan. No changes were made to the measures concerning ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida and associates, and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, as well as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lebanon and the Sudan.

The present subsection concerning the developments in each of the sanctions regimes does not include reference to the subsidiary bodies of the Council responsible for their implementation. The decisions of the Council relating to the subsidiary bodies are described in detail in part IX, section I.B.

The categories of sanctions measures used in the present subsection, such as arms embargo, asset freeze or travel ban, are for clarification purposes only, and are not intended to serve as legal definitions of the measures. In addition, developments in the sanctions measures imposed by the Council during the period under review are categorized according to the following main actions taken by the Council: “establishment”, “modification”, “extension”, “limited extension” or “termination”.

The sanctions regimes are discussed below in the order of their establishment. Each of the following subsections consists of a narrative section describing the most significant developments in 2018 and a table including all relevant provisions of Council decisions concerning changes to a sanctions regime, according to the categories outlined above (a number indicates the corresponding paragraph of the Council resolution). Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of relevant decisions adopted in 2018 by which the Council established or modified sanctions measures it had previously imposed.

111 S/PRST/2018/18, first and sixth paragraphs.
112 Ibid., seventh paragraph.
113 Ibid., annex.

115 An action by the Council is categorized as an “establishment” when a sanctions measure is initially imposed by the Council.
116 When a change is introduced to the measure, it is categorized as a “modification”. A measure is modified when (a) elements of the measure are terminated or newly introduced, (b) information on designated individuals or entities is modified, (c) exemptions to the measure are introduced, modified or terminated or (d) elements of the measure are otherwise modified.
117 An action by the Council is categorized as an “extension” when the sanctions measure concerned is not modified or terminated and the Council extends or restates the measure without specifying an end date.
118 An action by the Council is categorized as a “limited extension” when the sanctions measure concerned is extended for a specific period of time, including a date upon which the measure will terminate unless further extended by the Council.
119 An action by the Council is categorized as a “termination” when the Council ends the specific sanctions measure. However, if only an element of the measure is terminated, but other elements of that measure remain, the action will be categorized as a modification of the measure.
Table 4  
Overview of country-specific decisions on measures pursuant to Article 41, in place or imposed, in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanctions regime</th>
<th>Resolutions by which measures were established or subsequently modified</th>
<th>Resolutions adopted in 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
### Part VII. Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression

(Chapter VII of the Charter)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanctions regime</th>
<th>Resolutions by which measures were established or subsequently modified</th>
<th>Resolutions adopted in 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1636 (2005)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2266 (2016) 2342 (2017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5
Overview of measures pursuant to Article 41, in place or imposed, in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanctions regime</th>
<th>Type of measure</th>
<th>Arms embargo</th>
<th>Asset freeze</th>
<th>Travel ban or restrictions</th>
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</table>

¹ Sanctions measures on Eritrea were lifted on 14 November 2018, pursuant to resolution 2444 (2018).
² Sanctions measures in effect from 14 November 2018, pursuant to resolution 2444 (2018).
³ Pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006), the Council decided, inter alia, that States should take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. In 2018, by resolution 2433 (2018), the Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) and requested the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), including an annex on the implementation of the arms embargo.
**Somalia and Eritrea**

In 2018, the Council adopted resolutions 2442 (2018) and 2444 (2018) related to the sanctions measures imposed by the Council concerning Somalia and Eritrea, by which it extended, modified or terminated the existing targeted measures. On 14 November 2018, by resolution 2444 (2018), the Council lifted the arms embargo, travel ban, asset freeze and targeted sanctions on Eritrea while keeping in place the measures concerning Somalia.\(^{120}\) Table 6 provides an overview of the changes to the measures authorized by the Council in 2018.

On 6 November 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2442 (2018), in which it decided that the arms embargo did not apply to supplies of weapons and military equipment or the provision of assistance destined for the sole use of Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations authorized to fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.\(^{121}\) The Council also kept under review the possibility of applying targeted sanctions against individuals or entities that planned, organized, facilitated or illicitly financed or profited from piracy operations in the event that they met the listing criteria set out in paragraph 43 of resolution 2093 (2013). The Council also called upon all States to cooperate fully with the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, including on information-sharing regarding possible violations of the arms embargo or charcoal ban.\(^{122}\)

Shortly thereafter, on 14 November 2018, by resolution 2444 (2018), the Council decided, from the date of adoption of the resolution, to lift the arms embargo, travel ban, asset freeze and targeted sanctions imposed on Eritrea in its resolutions 1907 (2009), 2023 (2011), 2060 (2012) and 2111 (2013).\(^{123}\) The Council also recognized that, during the course of its current and four previous mandates, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea had not found conclusive evidence that Eritrea supported Al-Shabaab and underlined the importance of continuing efforts towards the normalization of relations between Djibouti and Eritrea for regional peace, stability and reconciliation.\(^{124}\) In addition, expressing satisfaction that funds derived from the mining sector of Eritrea were not contributing to violations of resolutions 1844 (2008), 1862 (2009), 1907 (2009) or 2023 (2011), the Council decided that States were no longer required to undertake the measures set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2023 (2011), designed to prevent funds derived from the mining sector of Eritrea from being used to contribute to violations of the aforesaid resolutions.\(^{125}\)

Concerning Somalia, the Council reaffirmed the arms embargo and related exemptions imposed by previous resolutions on Somalia. It reiterated that the delivery of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training, intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces, to provide security for the Somali people, and the entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying arms and related material for defensive purposes did not amount to a violation of the arms embargo.\(^{126}\) It also welcomed the improvements made by the Federal Government of Somalia in weapon registration, recording and marking procedures and reiterated that the Council was committed to monitoring and assessing improvements in order to review the arms embargo when all conditions set out in Council resolutions were met.\(^{127}\) In this connection, the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a technical assessment regarding the arms embargo, with options and recommendations for improving implementation, by 15 May 2019.\(^{128}\)

The Council also reaffirmed its decision regarding the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal as set out in paragraph 22 of resolution 2036 (2012) and reiterated that individuals and entities engaged in acts that violated the charcoal ban could be listed for targeted measures. The Council also reiterated paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014) and decided to renew, until 15 November 2019, the authorization for Member States to inspect vessels and to seize and dispose of any prohibited items bound to or from Somalia, where there were grounds to believe that the vessels were in violation of the charcoal ban and arms embargo as set out in paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014).\(^{129}\)

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120 Resolution 2444 (2018), paras. 4, 13–16 and 41–45.
121 Resolution 2442 (2018), paras. 14 and 16.
122 Ibid., para. 11.
123 Resolution 2444 (2018), para. 4.
124 In the resolution, the Council welcomed the meetings between the President of Djibouti and the President of Eritrea, between the representative of the Government of Eritrea and the Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and between the representative of the Government of Eritrea and the Coordinator of the Monitoring Group (paras. 1, 2 and 3). For information on the Committee and the Monitoring Group, see part IX, sect. I.B.
125 Ibid., para. 5.
126 Ibid., paras. 13–15.
127 Ibid., para. 17.
128 Ibid., para. 32.
129 Ibid., paras. 41 and 44.
Council decided that the asset freeze should not be applied to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance.\(^{130}\)

Furthermore, the Council decided that acts that threatened the peace, security or stability of Somalia could also include but were not limited to planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence and, on the basis of such criteria, reiterated its willingness to adopt targeted measures against concerned individuals and entities.\(^{131}\)

\(^{130}\) Ibid., para. 48.

\(^{131}\) Ibid., paras. 50 and 51.

Table 6

Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning Somalia and Eritrea, in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provisions relating to sanctions measures</th>
<th>Resolutions establishing measures</th>
<th>Resolutions adopted during the review period (paragraph)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms embargo (Somalia)</td>
<td>733 (1992), para. 5</td>
<td>Exemption (16)</td>
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<td>Extension (13)</td>
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<td>Exemption (14, 15)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arms embargo (Eritrea)</td>
<td>1907 (2009), paras. 5 and 6</td>
<td>Termination (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset freeze (Somalia)</td>
<td>1844 (2008), para. 3</td>
<td>Extension (50)</td>
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<td>Exemption (48)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asset freeze (Eritrea)</td>
<td>1907 (2009), para. 13</td>
<td>Termination (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business restrictions (Eritrea)</td>
<td>2023 (2011), para. 13</td>
<td>Termination (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charcoal ban (Somalia)</td>
<td>2036 (2012), para. 22</td>
<td>Extension (41)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Limited extension (44)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Travel ban (Somalia)</td>
<td>1844 (2008), para. 1</td>
<td>Extension (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel ban (Eritrea)</td>
<td>1907 (2009), para. 10</td>
<td>Termination (4)</td>
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</table>

**Taliban and associated individuals and entities**

During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any new resolutions concerning the sanctions measures on the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan, as designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011). The Committee continued to oversee the implementation of the asset freeze, arms embargo and travel ban or restrictions as previously imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) and 1390 (2002).\(^{132}\)

\(^{132}\) For information on the Committee and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, see part IX, sect. I.B.

**ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities**

During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any new resolutions concerning the sanctions measures on ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida and associates. In a presidential statement, dated 21 December 2018, the Council stated that it had reviewed the implementation of the measures described in paragraph 1 of resolution 2368 (2017) and that no further adjustments to the measures were necessary at that time. The Council further stated that it would continue to evaluate the implementation of such measures and make adjustments, as necessary, to support their full implementation with respect to all
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list.133

**Iraq**

During 2018, the Council did not adopt any new resolutions concerning the remaining sanctions measures on Iraq, consisting of an arms embargo, with exemptions, and an asset freeze on senior officials, State bodies, corporations and agencies of the former Iraqi regime. Pursuant to resolution 1483 (2003), the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003) continued to oversee the implementation of the asset freeze and maintain the lists of individuals and entities.134


134 For information on the Committee, see part IX, sect. I.B.

**Democratic Republic of the Congo**

During the period under review, by resolution 2424 (2018), the Council renewed the sanctions measures on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, comprising an arms embargo, a travel ban, an asset freeze and restrictions on transportation and aviation, until 1 July 2019. It also renewed the exemptions to the arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban.135 Table 7 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.

In resolution 2424 (2018), the Council further reaffirmed that the asset freeze and travel ban measures contained in previous resolutions would apply to individuals and entities as designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo for engaging in or providing support for acts that undermined the peace, stability or security of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as set forth in paragraph 7 of resolution 2293 (2016) and paragraph 3 of resolution 2360 (2017).136

135 Resolution 2424 (2018), para. 1.

136 Ibid., para. 2. For information on the Committee and the Group of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.

<p>| Table 7 | Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in 2018 |
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Provisions relating to sanctions measures</strong></th>
<th><strong>Resolutions establishing measures</strong></th>
<th><strong>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph)</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms embargo</td>
<td>1493 (2003), para. 20</td>
<td>Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asset freeze</td>
<td>1596 (2005), para. 15</td>
<td>Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Travel ban or restrictions</td>
<td>1596 (2005), para. 13</td>
<td>Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation and aviation sanctions measures</td>
<td>1807 (2008), paras. 6 and 8</td>
<td>Limited extension (1)</td>
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</table>

**Sudan**

During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any new resolution modifying sanctions measures on the Sudan. However, in resolution 2400 (2018), by which it extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, the Council recalled the sanctions measures and designation criteria established by previous resolutions and reaffirmed the related exemptions.137 The Council also expressed its intent to regularly review the measures on Darfur, in the light of the evolving situation on the ground and the reports submitted by the Panel of Experts.138 In addition, in resolution 2429 (2018), in the context of the renewal of the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the Council expressed its

137 Resolution 2400 (2018), para. 1.

138 Ibid., para. 3. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.
intent to consider imposing additional measures against any party that impeded the peace process in Darfur, which was reiterated in a presidential statement on 11 December 2018.

**Lebanon**

During the period under review, the Council did not make any modifications to the sanctions measures established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005), consisting of an asset freeze and a travel ban. These measures were to be imposed on individuals designated by the International Independent Investigation Commission or the Government of Lebanon, as suspected of involvement in the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing in Beirut that killed the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafic Hariri, and 22 others.

**Democratic People’s Republic of Korea**

During the period under review, the Council did not make any modifications to the sanctions measures concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) continued to oversee the implementation of the asset freeze, arms embargo, travel ban and other restrictions previously imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017). By resolution 2407 (2018), the mandate of the Panel of Experts supporting the Committee was extended until 24 April 2019.

**Libya**

During the period under review, the Council adopted two resolutions relating to the sanctions measures concerning Libya, one of which modified the measures in place. Table 8 provides an overview of the changes to the measures in 2018.

By resolution 2420 (2018), adopted on 11 June 2018, the Council extended the authorizations concerning the strict implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya for a further period of 12 months. These authorizations were originally set forth in resolution 2292 (2016) and had been previously extended by resolution 2357 (2017). The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report within 11 months on the implementation of resolution 2420 (2018).

On 5 November 2018, by resolution 2441 (2018), the Council decided to extend, until 15 February 2020, the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution 2146 (2014) to prevent the illicit export of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya. The Council further decided that the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution 2146 (2014) would apply with respect to vessels loading, transporting or discharging petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, illicitly exported or attempted to be exported from Libya. In this connection, the Council requested the Government of Libya, among others, to inform the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya of vessels transporting petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, illicitly exported from Libya.

In the same resolution, the Council reaffirmed that the travel ban and asset freeze measures also applied to individuals and entities determined by the Committee to be engaging in, or providing support for, acts that threatened the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstructed or undermined the successful completion of its political transition. The Council also reaffirmed that such acts could include, but were not limited to, planning, directing, sponsoring or participating in attacks against United Nations personnel, including members of the Panel of Experts on Libya and decided that such acts could also include

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139 Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 31.
140 S/PRST/2018/19, fifth paragraph.
141 Resolution 1636 (2005), fourth preambular paragraph and para. 3. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005), see part IX, sect. I.B.
142 For information on the Committee and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.
143 Resolution 2407 (2018), para. 1.
144 Resolutions 2420 (2018) and 2441 (2018). For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.
145 Resolution 2420 (2018) is not included in the table as it does not contain provisions extending or modifying the sanctions measures.
146 Resolution 2420 (2018), para. 1.
147 Resolutions 2292 (2016), paras. 3–5; and 2357 (2017), para. 1.
148 Resolution 2420 (2018), para. 2.
149 Resolution 2441 (2018), para. 2.
150 Ibid., para. 3.
but were not limited to planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence.\(^{151}\)

In addition, in resolution 2441 (2018), the Council called upon Member States to report to the Committee on the actions they had taken to implement effectively the travel ban and asset freeze measures in relation to all individuals on the sanctions list, including those designated by the Committee on 7 June 2018 and 11 September 2018.\(^{152}\)

The Council expressed its readiness to consider reviewing the arms embargo and, at the request of the Government of National Accord, to consider changes to the asset freeze, when appropriate.\(^{153}\)

\(^{151}\) Ibid., para. 11.


\(^{153}\) Resolution 2441 (2018), paras. 7 and 13.

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**Guinea-Bissau**

During 2018, the sanctions regime for Guinea-Bissau, consisting of a travel ban, continued to remain in force, but did not undergo any modifications.\(^ {154}\) In resolution 2404 (2018), the Council decided to review the sanctions measures within seven months from the date of adoption of the resolution, expressed its readiness to take additional measures to respond to further worsening of the situation in Guinea-Bissau and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report and recommendations on, inter alia, the continuation of the sanctions regime imposed by the Council further to resolution 2048 (2012).\(^ {155}\) The report of the Secretary-General was submitted to the Council on 28 August 2018.\(^ {156}\)

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**Central African Republic**

During the period under review, the Council adopted two resolutions related to the sanctions measures concerning the Central African Republic.\(^ {157}\) Table 9 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the review period.\(^ {158}\)

On 30 January 2018, by resolution 2399 (2018), the Council extended until 31 January 2019 all three sanctions measures concerning the Central African Republic, namely an arms embargo, a travel ban and an asset freeze, as well as the related exemptions.\(^ {159}\) In connection with the arms embargo, the Council authorized Member States to seize, register and dispose

\(^{154}\) For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau, see part IX, sect. I.B.

\(^{155}\) Resolution 2404 (2018), paras. 26–28.

\(^{156}\) S/2018/791.
of prohibited arms and related materiel upon discovery.\footnote{160}{Ibid., para. 2.} By resolution 2399 (2018), the Council indicated that the arms embargo would not apply to supplies intended solely for the support of or use by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the European Union training missions deployed in the country, French forces and other Member States forces providing training and assistance to the country’s security forces, including State civilian law enforcement institutions, intended solely for the support of or use in the Central African Republic process of security sector reform, in coordination with MINUSCA.\footnote{161}{Ibid., para. 1 (a) and (b). Other exemptions to the arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban were set forth in para. 1 (c)–(h) (arms embargo), para. 14 (travel ban) and paras. 17–19 (asset freeze).}

By this resolution, the Council also decided that individuals and entities who committed acts of incitement to violence, in particular on an ethnic or religious basis, that undermined the peace, stability or security of the Central African Republic and then engaged in or provided support for acts that undermined the peace, stability or security of the country could meet the criteria for designation by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic.\footnote{162}{Ibid., para. 22.}

Further to the request of the Council in paragraph 43 of resolution 2399 (2018), the Secretary-General, in a letter dated 31 July 2018 to the President of the Council, proposed benchmarks to assess the arms embargo measures in the Central African Republic.\footnote{163}{S/2018/752.}

On 13 December 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2448 (2018), acknowledging the important contribution of the Council-mandated sanctions regime to the peace, stability and security of the Central African Republic. The Council recalled that individuals or entities that undermined peace and stability in the country could be listed for targeted measures.\footnote{164}{Resolution 2448 (2018), eighteenth preambular paragraph and para. 9.}

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**Table 9**

Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning the Central African Republic, in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provisions relating to sanctions measures</th>
<th>Resolutions establishing measures</th>
<th>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph) 2399 (2018)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms embargo</td>
<td>2127 (2013), para. 54</td>
<td>Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asset freeze</td>
<td>2134 (2014), paras. 32 and 34</td>
<td>Limited extension (16) Exemption (17–19)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Travel ban or restrictions</td>
<td>2134 (2014), para. 30</td>
<td>Limited extension (9) Exemption (14)</td>
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**Yemen**

In 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2402 (2018), extending the asset freeze and travel ban, as well as the relevant exemptions to those measures, until 26 February 2019.\footnote{165}{Resolution 2402 (2018), para. 2.} Table 10 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.

In resolution 2402 (2018), the Council reaffirmed the designation criteria established in prior resolutions and its intention to keep the situation in Yemen under continuous review, as well as its readiness to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in the resolution in the light of developments in the country.\footnote{166}{Ibid., paras. 3, 4 and 12.} The Council also called upon Member States that had not already done so to report to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) on the steps taken to implement the sanctions measures and recalled that Member States undertaking cargo inspections pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 2216 (2015) were required to submit written reports to the Committee.\footnote{167}{Ibid., para. 10.}
South Sudan

During the period under review, the Council adopted three resolutions concerning the sanctions measures on South Sudan.168 By resolution 2428 (2018), in addition to extending the asset freeze and travel ban, as well as the relevant exemptions to those measures, the Council imposed an arms embargo on the country affecting arms and related materiel of all types and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel.169 Table 11 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.170

On 15 March 2018, in the context of the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the Council expressed, in resolution 2406 (2018), its intention to consider all appropriate measures against those who took actions that undermined the peace, stability and security of South Sudan. The Council also took note of the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 8 February 2018, in which the Peace and Security Council stated that signatories to the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access should be deprived of the means to continue fighting, and expressed its intention to consider all measures, including an arms embargo, as appropriate, to deprive the parties of the means to continue fighting and to prevent violations of the Agreement.171

On 31 May 2018, by resolution 2418 (2018), the Council renewed the asset freeze and travel ban, as well as the relevant exemptions, until 15 July 2018.172 In the resolution, the Council also requested the Secretary-General to report, by 30 June 2018, on whether, since the adoption of the resolution, any fighting had taken place among the parties to the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access and whether the parties had reached a viable political agreement. The Council also decided that, if the Secretary-General reported such fighting or lack of a viable political agreement, it would consider applying sanctions measures to the individuals listed in annex 1 to the resolution and/or an arms embargo.173

On 13 July 2018, by resolution 2428 (2018), the Council decided to impose an arms embargo until 31 May 2019, by which all Member States would immediately take the measures necessary to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the territory of South Sudan of arms and related materiel of all types and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel. The Council also decided on a series of exemptions concerning, inter alia, arms and related materiel for the support of or use by United Nations personnel, including UNMISS and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, and non-lethal military equipment for humanitarian or protective use.174 In addition, by resolution 2428 (2018), the Council renewed the asset freeze and travel ban and all related exemptions until 31 May 2019.175 The Council also reaffirmed that those measures would apply to individuals and entities responsible for, complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threatened the peace, security or stability of South Sudan and decided that they would apply to the individuals identified in annex 1 to the resolution.176 The Council also underscored that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provisions relating to sanctions measures</th>
<th>Resolutions establishing measures</th>
<th>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph) 2402 (2018)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms embargo</td>
<td>2216 (2015), paras. 14–16</td>
<td>Extension (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset freeze</td>
<td>2140 (2014), paras. 11 and 13</td>
<td>Limited extension (2) Exemption (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel ban or restrictions</td>
<td>2140 (2014), para. 15</td>
<td>Limited extension (2) Exemption (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10

Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning Yemen, in 2018

168 Resolutions 2406 (2018), 2418 (2018) and 2428 (2018). For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.
169 Resolution 2428 (2018), paras. 4 and 12.
170 Resolution 2406 (2018) is not included in the table as it does not contain provisions extending or modifying the sanctions measures.
171 Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 3.
172 Resolution 2418 (2018), para. 1.
173 Ibid., para. 3.
174 Resolution 2428 (2018), paras. 4 and 5.
175 Ibid., para. 12.
176 Ibid., paras. 13 and 17.
actions or policies that threatened the peace, security or stability of South Sudan could include, inter alia, planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence in South Sudan, and the engagement by armed groups or criminal networks in activities that destabilized the country through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources.  

Furthermore, the Council expressed concerns at reports of misappropriation and diversion of public resources and serious concern at the reports of financial impropriety involving the Transitional Government of National Unity, both of which posed a risk to the peace, security and stability of South Sudan. In this context, the Council underscored that individuals engaged in actions or policies that had the purpose or effect of expanding or extending the conflict in the country could be listed for travel and financial measures.

Table 11
Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning South Sudan, in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provisions relating to sanctions measures</th>
<th>Resolutions establishing measures</th>
<th>Resolutions adopted during the review period (paragraph)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asset freeze</td>
<td>2206 (2015), paras. 12 and 14</td>
<td>Limited extension (1) Exemption (1) Exemption (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited extension (12) Modification (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel ban or restrictions</td>
<td>2206 (2015), para. 9</td>
<td>Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited extension (12) Modification (16) Exemption (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms embargo</td>
<td>2428 (2018), para. 4</td>
<td>Establishment (4) Exemption (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mali

In 2018, the Council adopted two resolutions related to the sanctions measures concerning Mali. Table 12 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.

In resolution 2423 (2018), the Council expressed its intention to follow closely the timely implementation of the road map adopted on 22 March 2018 and to respond with measures pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) should the parties not implement the agreed-upon commitments within the announced time frame.

By resolution 2432 (2018), the Council extended the asset freeze and travel ban, as well as the relevant exemptions to those measures, until 31 August 2019. The Council reaffirmed the designation criteria established in resolution 2374 (2017) and its intention to keep the situation in Mali under continuous review, as well as its readiness to review the appropriateness of the sanctions measures in the light of developments in the country.

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177 Ibid., para. 14 (e) and (j).
178 Ibid., para. 15.
179 Resolutions 2423 (2018) and 2432 (2018). For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.
180 Resolution 2423 (2018) is not included in the table as it does not contain provisions extending or modifying the sanctions measures.
181 Resolution 2423 (2018), sixth preambular paragraph and para. 3.
182 Resolution 2432 (2018), para. 1.
183 Ibid., paras. 2 and 5.
Table 12
Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning Mali, in 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provisions relating to sanctions measures</th>
<th>Resolutions establishing measures</th>
<th>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asset freeze</td>
<td>2374 (2017), para. 4</td>
<td>Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel ban or restrictions</td>
<td>2374 (2017), para. 1</td>
<td>Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Discussions relating to Article 41

The present subsection covers the discussions in the Council regarding the use of sanctions and other measures pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter, organized under two main headings: thematic issues, and country- and region-specific issues.

During the period under review, Article 41 was explicitly referred to on two occasions at Council meetings. On 25 June 2018, at the 8293rd meeting, held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that sanctions were a vital part of the Council’s arsenal, and, as made clear by Article 41, sanctions gave very real effect to the Council’s decisions and turned words in the Chamber into tangible consequences for those who threatened international peace and security.\(^\text{184}\) On 29 August 2018, at the 8334th meeting, held also under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the representative of Cuba regretted that the Council was too quick to seek recourse in the provisions of Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter without having fully exhausted all other options, including those provided for in Chapter VI, and without considering their consequences, including the short- and long-term effects of imposing sanctions, in particular for political processes aimed at achieving the peaceful settlement of conflicts.\(^\text{185}\)

The use of sanctions was widely discussed by Council and non-Council members in deliberations in relation to both thematic and country- or region-specific items during 2018. Under the thematic item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the Council considered how sanctions regimes could assist in preventing and resolving conflicts related to natural resources (see case 6). The Council also discussed the question of including sexual and gender-based violence as an explicit designation criterion across different sanctions regimes under the thematic item entitled “Women and peace and security” (see case 7). The Council held similar discussions in the context of the sanctions measures concerning Libya (see case 9) and Somalia (see case 11).

The importance of sanctions as a tool of the Council was further raised during discussions on the imposition of an arms embargo on South Sudan (see case 8), combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking in Libya (see case 10) and the termination of sanctions on Eritrea coupled with the renewal of sanctions measures on Somalia (see case 11).

Discussions on thematic issues relating to Article 41

Case 6

Maintenance of international peace and security

On 16 October 2018, at the initiative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, which held the presidency for the month, the Council convened its 8372nd meeting, held under the above-mentioned item and the sub-item entitled “Root causes of conflict – the role of natural resources”.\(^\text{186}\) At that meeting, the Council heard a briefing from the Secretary-General, who addressed links between internal armed conflicts and natural resources, emphasizing the work of the United Nations in addressing the growing threat of climate-related security risks. He maintained that the unfair distribution of natural resources, and corruption and mismanagement, could and did lead to conflict, and that those pressures could exacerbate existing

\(^\text{185}\) S/PV.8334, p. 53.

\(^\text{186}\) The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 9 October 2018 from the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the Secretary-General (S/2018/901).
ethnic or religious divides within societies and across borders.  

Council members all agreed that conflict was too frequently fuelled by competition over natural resources. Speaking ahead of all Council members, the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia maintained that multinational corporations and foreign interests were often behind the exploitation of natural resources in conflict situations. He stressed that sanctions regimes should be “more dynamic and effective” and called for sanctions to be applied to the networks that made up the entire chain of those involved in conflict, as well as to the “commercial enablers” and “financial facilitators”, to prevent multinational corporations from profiting from illegally obtained natural resources on the global market. The representative of Peru underscored the links established between illegal extractors of natural resources and criminal organizations, calling upon the sanctions committees of the Council to pay special attention to illicit trafficking networks dealing in natural resources emanating from countries affected by conflict and the corresponding illegal flows, in line with the presidential statement of 25 June 2007. The representative of Poland stressed the need for a “comprehensive and innovative” approach, as the issue of natural resources and conflict concerned the actions of private companies and armed groups, as well as Governments. In that regard, recalling also the presidential statement of 25 June 2007, she stated that expert groups and sanctions regimes offered a variety of mechanisms and could play a role in helping the Governments concerned to prevent the illegal exploitation of resources from further fuelling the conflict.

The representative of Côte d’Ivoire, speaking also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia, noted that the Council had used various tools to address the links between natural resources and conflict, including sanctions on natural resources, and urged the Council to take stock of the lessons learned from the implementation of those measures in order to strengthen the Council’s role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts linked to natural resources. The representative of the Netherlands underscored that the illegal trade in natural resources should be grounds for sanctions, as revenues from illegal exploitation and trade were used to destabilize countries.

The representative of Kuwait called for sanctions regimes adopted by the Council to include explicit mandates with specific terms of reference so as to prevent the trafficking and illegal exploitation of natural resources. He noted, however, that preventive diplomacy based on dialogue and mediation remained the best means to prevent conflicts, including those linked to claims pertaining to natural resources.

The representative of Sweden advocated for the Council to assess and address the issue of natural resources in a more structured and proactive way, by including more integrated analysis in the regular reporting from the Secretariat, such as gender analysis, given that women were important actors in addressing the drivers and root causes of conflict. He noted, however, that the Council needed also to follow up such information with action, through the mandates of peacekeeping missions, in collaboration with United Nations country teams and other relevant actors, as well as through targeted measures on individuals, entities or goods involved in fuelling conflict through illicit trade. The representative of France further emphasized the need to address the inequitable access of women to resources when establishing designation criteria linked to the exploitation of natural resources.

The representative of China stated that sanctions imposed by the Council were not an end in themselves and should be carefully targeted for a precise impact on organizations engaged in illicit extraction, while minimizing the effects on the normal exploitation conducted by the countries concerned. The representative of the United States said that sanctions regimes remained a critical tool for addressing the destabilizing impact of the trade in illicit resources and that States needed to do more to strengthen the implementation of United Nations sanctions regimes seeking to eliminate trade in natural resources that contributed to conflict. The representative of the United Kingdom stressed that, while sanctions regimes could provide a useful tool for tackling the role of natural resources in perpetuating conflict, their success relied on the implementation by not only all Council

187 S/PV.8372, pp. 2–3.
188 Ibid., pp. 3–4.
189 Ibid., p. 7. See also S/PRST/2007/22.
191 S/PV.8372, p. 16.
192 Ibid., pp. 6–7.
members but also all of the other States Members of the United Nations.199

Case 7
Women and peace and security

On 16 April 2018, at the initiative of Peru, which held the presidency for the month, the Council convened its 8234th meeting, held under the above-mentioned item and the sub-item entitled “Preventing sexual violence in conflict through empowerment, gender equality and access to justice”.200

During the meeting, the Council considered the latest report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence.201 During the discussion, several speakers expressed support for the inclusion of sexual violence as a separate designation criterion in sanctions regimes.202 The representatives of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Kazakhstan and Lithuania explicitly concurred with the recommendation of the report, calling on the Council sanctions committees to include sexual violence as part of the designation criteria.203 The representative of the Netherlands called on the Council to systematically and explicitly incorporate and apply sexual violence as a designation criterion in sanctions regimes, in particular in those regimes targeting the actors listed in the report.204 She stressed that sanctions could not be an alternative to prosecution for crimes that were punishable under international law. For conflict-affected areas where United Nations sanctions regimes did not exist, she further urged the Council to consider the adoption of targeted sanctions regimes that would allow for the inclusion of a specific designation criterion on sexual violence.205 In a similar vein, the representative of Germany said that, in addition to including sexual violence as a designation criterion for sanctions regimes much more regularly, the Council should also refer cases of sexual violence to the International Criminal Court.206

Concerning sanctions regimes already in place, but without separate designation criteria on sexual violence, the representative of Sweden encouraged the panels of experts to report such crimes under international humanitarian law and/or human rights criteria.207 Noting the Council’s first-ever separate designation criterion on conflict-related sexual violence in the sanctions regime for the Central African Republic in 2017, she added that having such criteria was not enough and that sanctions committees also needed gender expertise. In her words, the Council had responded to this need by adding new language when renewing the regime in 2018.208 Similarly, the representative of Canada called on the Council to explicitly include sexual violence as a designation criterion within United Nations sanctions regimes where such crimes were persistently perpetrated and said that sanctions committees should be supported by dedicated gender and sexual violence expertise and draw on information from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict.209

The representative of Argentina stressed that crimes involving sexual violence constituted the most serious international crimes and must be prevented and punished through the use of available tools, including the sanctions regimes.210 The representative of Mexico underscored that the international community needed to acknowledge that sanctions were one of the most effective ways of punishing perpetrators of sexual violence. He noted, however, that sanctions would continue to have a “limited impact” in terms of combating sexual violence in conflict if they were not accompanied by cooperation, both within and outside the United Nations system, on investigating and documenting those types of war crimes in an impartial and effective manner.211 The representative of Ireland urged the Council to be consistent and timely in its use of sanctions against perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence.212 The representative of Italy, while noting the ability of the Council to deter sexual and gender-based violence with targeted sanctions, stressed the need to ensure that sanctions were implemented effectively in order to increase the cost of allowing or using sexual violence in conflict.213

199 Ibid., p. 18.
200 S/PV.8234. The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 2 April 2018 from the representative of Peru addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/311).
202 S/PV.8234, p. 12 (France), p. 27 (Canada), p. 34 (Spain), p. 54 (Germany), p. 72 (Costa Rica) and p. 74 (Montenegro).
204 Ibid., p. 23.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid., p. 54.
207 Ibid., p. 9.
208 Ibid., pp. 8–9. For reference, see resolutions 2339 (2017), para. 17 (c); and 2399 (2018), para. 35.
209 S/PV.8234, p. 27.
210 Ibid., p. 79.
211 Ibid., p. 39.
212 Ibid., p. 66.
213 Ibid., p. 42.
While the representative of Croatia welcomed the emphasis on the urgency of ensuring that sexual violence considerations were explicitly and consistently reflected in prevention efforts, peace processes and sanctions regimes, the representative of the United States regretted that sanctions tools at the Council’s disposal to punish the perpetrators of sexual violence remained “terribly underutilized”.

The representative of the Russian Federation expressed concern at the attempts to broaden the interpretation of the scope of the Council’s mandate on combating sexual violence in conflict by using a different term – “conflict-related sexual violence” – and noted that what appeared to be mere technical differences in the terminology ran the risk of going beyond the Council’s remit and infringing on the mandates of other United Nations bodies.

Discussions on country-specific issues relating to Article 41

Case 8

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

At its 8273rd meeting, held on 31 May 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2418 (2018), albeit not unanimously. The representative of the United States noted that the Council had not imposed an arms embargo, even though the need was obvious, and had not sanctioned a single individual since 2015. She noted that the parties had violated the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in South Sudan and neither the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) nor the African Union had applied consequences for the violators. The representatives of the United Kingdom, Sweden and France were of the view that resolution 2418 (2018) was an important step in increasing the international pressure on the parties to compromise in the interest of peace, which could help to put an end to the violence in South Sudan and advance the political process.

Those who abstained expressed concern that the threat of additional sanctions measures and designations could have a negative effect on the peace process and stressed the need to coordinate the efforts of regional organizations and the United Nations. Speaking before the vote, the representative of Ethiopia explained that IGAD was at the critical moment of concluding the high-level revitalization forum and presenting its bridging proposal, and that the adoption of the draft resolution would be detrimental to the process. He said that by taking action without synchronizing or calibrating its position regarding the African Union, the Council would be seriously undermining the peace process. He further noted that IGAD had reaffirmed its commitment to take targeted measures against parties and individuals found to be spoilers, which had also been reinforced by the African Union. The representative of Ethiopia said that his country would be abstaining because the text was manifestly harmful to the peace process and undermined the efforts of the region, the subregion, IGAD and the African Union. The representative of Equatorial Guinea, also speaking before the vote, said that the inclusion of a list of individuals on whom sanctions would be imposed would hinder the negotiations taking place on the ground.

After the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation said that it was wrong to introduce sanctions against high-ranking individuals who were involved in the peace negotiation process sponsored by IGAD. He expressed doubt that the introduction of sanctions against members of the Government of South Sudan and an arms embargo could play a positive role in reaching a political settlement. He indicated that during the course of work on a new draft resolution in July 2018, the Russian Federation would also proceed from the position that it was unacceptable to have any preordained stance on broadening sanctions. He also rejected the penholders’ damaging and disrespectful position of imposing a too-strict time frame on the Council, which was simply unacceptable when taking far-reaching decisions on sanctions under Chapter VII.

The representative of China stated that the threat of an arms embargo and possible designations were not conducive to furthering the political peace process. China had maintained a consistent position on the issue of sanctions based on the belief that sanctions were a means to an end, not an end in and of themselves. He added that the Council should exercise great caution in

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214 Ibid., p. 71.
215 Ibid., p. 10.
216 Ibid., p. 17.
217 The draft resolution received nine votes in favour (Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States) and six abstentions (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation). See S/PV.8273, p. 4.
218 S/PV.8273, p. 2.
219 Ibid., p. 5 (United Kingdom), p. 5 (Sweden) and p. 7 (France).
220 Ibid., pp. 3–4.
221 Ibid., p. 4.
222 Ibid., p. 6.
implementing sanctions, and its action ought to help to advance the political settlement process in South Sudan. The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia said that decisions to impose sanctions measures against those who violated cessation of hostilities agreements and obstructed peace processes must be agreed in principle in conjunction with the relevant regional and subregional organizations. The representative of Kazakhstan, deeply concerned at the reports of continuing military actions and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, expressed readiness to discuss appropriate additional measures by the Council against those who violated the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan had abstained from voting on resolution 2418 (2018) because it did not adequately reflect the concerns of the States of the region with regard to the timing of such actions.

On 13 July 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2428 (2018), with six abstentions. Speaking before the vote, the representative of the United States said that the goal of the draft resolution (S/2018/691) was to help the people of South Sudan by stopping the flow of weapons that armed groups were using to fight one another and terrorize the people. Reaffirming that the United States supported the peace process in South Sudan, the representative stated that the arms embargo was a measure to protect civilians, help stop the violence and end the “cycle of broken promises to stick to the ceasefire”, in order for negotiations to work.

The representative of Ethiopia said that resorting to immediate sanctions would amount to not taking into account the progress that had been made in the peace process to date and that the adoption of the draft resolution might confuse the parties, which would find it difficult to reconcile the action of the Council with the reality of the peace process. The representative of Equatorial Guinea stated that the imposition of sanctions by the Council would involve not just a counterproductive interference in the undeniable positive progress that had been made on the ground, but would also reflect a clear lack of consideration for the States and regional organizations involved.

Speaking after the vote, the representative of France explained that the resolution was not intended to undermine negotiations conducted by IGAD but to protect civilian populations and that the arms embargo was one of the most important measures that the Council could adopt to protect South Sudanese civilians. He added that by adopting individual sanctions against two important military leaders from both sides, the Council was sending the clear message that impunity for acts of violence against civilians and violations of the most basic human rights and international humanitarian law could no longer be tolerated. The representative of the Netherlands especially welcomed the sanctions imposed against the two individuals, whose responsibility for gross human rights violations had been well documented. He also said that the imposition of an arms embargo underscored the fact that there was no military solution to the conflict in South Sudan. He further welcomed the “insertion of specific designation criteria for sexual violence” in resolution 2428 (2018).

The representative of China noted that the African Union and IGAD had indicated on several recent occasions that it was neither advisable nor helpful to impose additional sanctions on South Sudan, and said that the Council must listen to the legitimate aspirations of regional organizations and countries in Africa and take a cautious stance when it came to imposing sanctions. The representative of the Russian Federation noted that the member States of IGAD had declared that expanding the sanctions pressure on South Sudan was highly inopportune. He expressed his firm belief that imposing sanctions on active participants in the political process or members of the Government was counterproductive and that an arms embargo would not have a positive effect on the political settlement process.

In response to the statements made by other Council members, the representative of the United Kingdom said that resolution 2428 (2018) was designed to protect the people of South Sudan through its imposition of a long-needed arms embargo and targeted sanctions against two individuals whose acts had expanded and extended the conflict. At the end of the meeting, the representative of South Sudan

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223 Ibid.
224 Ibid., p. 7.
225 Ibid.
226 The draft resolution received nine votes in favour (Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States) and six abstentions (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation). See S/PV.8310, p. 5.
228 Ibid., p. 4.
229 Ibid., p. 4.
230 Ibid., p. 5.
231 Ibid., p. 6.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
234 Ibid., p. 9.
thanked the Council members that had abstained from voting. Referring to the statements made by the representatives of Ethiopia and Equatorial Guinea, he explained that it was not the resolution itself that would undermine peace, but the adoption of a resolution at a time when the peace process was making positive advances, because it would tilt the balance for the parties that were negotiating.  

Case 9
The situation in Libya

At its 8389th meeting, held on 5 November 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2441 (2018), with two abstentions. By resolution 2441 (2018), the Council renewed the sanctions measures and exemptions related to oil and petroleum concerning Libya and reaffirmed other existing measures, including that the travel ban and asset freeze measures would apply to individuals and entities determined by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya to be engaging in or providing support for other acts that threatened the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstructed or undermined the successful completion of its political transition. By that resolution, the Council decided that such acts might also include planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence.

Following the vote, the representative of Sweden said that his country was particularly pleased to have introduced the act of planning, directing or committing sexual and gender-based violence as a separate and distinct criterion for listing under the sanctions. He expressed hope that highlighting the problem of sexual violence would make a decisive change, compel compliance and trigger accountability on the ground in Libya and that the Council would continue to expand its listing criteria in other sanctions regimes.

The representatives of the Netherlands and France also welcomed the introduction of sexual and gender-based violence as a designation criterion for sanctions. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Council had taken an important step by expanding the designation criteria to include gender-based violence, which sent a powerful signal that such crimes would not be tolerated by the international community.

The representative of the Russian Federation, which had abstained from the vote on resolution 2441 (2018), stated that the actions incorporated in the new provision specifying sexual and gender-based violence as a separate criterion were already fully covered in the existing listing criteria, and that the existence of precedents in other sanctions regimes, namely the regimes concerning the Central African Republic and South Sudan, did not mean that the practice should automatically apply to all country situations. He further stated that any “unjustified appearance” of a gender component in the work of the Panel of Experts of the Committee would distract the experts from their main tasks. It had occurred to no one to consider whether Council sanctions on specific individuals for sexual violence in Libya would actually help to prevent such crimes. He added that resolution 2441 (2018) had been adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, based on which the Council identified the presence of threats to international peace and security and adopted decisions on measures to be taken. He further recalled that the issue of sexual and gender-based violence was considered by specialized bodies, such as the Human Rights Council and the Commission on the Status of Women.

Case 10
The situation in Libya

At the 8263rd meeting of the Council, held on 21 May 2018, following a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, the representative of the United Kingdom expressed great concern over reports of what appeared to be slave auctions run by migrant traffickers. He expressed support for the Council to take action through sanctions regimes to signal that traffickers could not act with impunity. The representative of the United States underscored that the Council was considering sanctions against six individuals involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking in Libya. Highlighting that those designations would be an important step towards holding the perpetrators of abuses accountable, she stated that there was strong regional support for the designations and expressed...
regret that the Council had not yet reached consensus on such designations.\textsuperscript{243} The representative of France highlighted his country’s work with its European and American partners, with the support of the Government of Libya, on the adoption by the Council of sanctions targeting migrant smugglers, and expressed hope that there would soon be a list in that respect adopted by the relevant sanctions committee. He reiterated the position of France that those responsible for trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of migrants must be subject to sanctions within the existing United Nations sanctions regime. He further expressed hope that consensus on the matter would be reached soon.\textsuperscript{244} The representative of Peru also expressed support for imposing sanctions on trafficking networks.\textsuperscript{245}

The representative of Sweden stressed that serious efforts were needed to safeguard against human rights abuses and violations, create accountability and promote changes in behaviour in order to end impunity, and that the Council needed to come together and send a strong signal in that regard. He called for the Council to impose sanctions to target those responsible for smuggling and trafficking in persons.\textsuperscript{246} The representatives of Côte d’Ivoire and the Netherlands expressed support for the inclusion of persons or entities engaged in the trafficking or smuggling of migrants on the list of sanctions of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya.\textsuperscript{247}

At the 8341st meeting of the Council, held under the same item on 5 September 2018, the representative of France stressed his concern for the humanitarian situation in Libya, in particular the plight of migrants and refugees, who were victims of human rights violations. He emphasized that those who threatened the peace, security and stability of Libya would be subject to international sanctions, in line with the resolutions of the Council.\textsuperscript{248} The representative of Côte d’Ivoire noted with deep concern the persistence of the smuggling of migrants and welcomed the Council’s imposition of sanctions on six individuals involved in human trafficking in Libya.\textsuperscript{249} The representative of the United States echoed this statement, reiterating support for the Council’s use of sanctions to respond to migrant trafficking.\textsuperscript{250} In that context, the representative of the Netherlands stressed that implementing the sanctions measures diligently should remain the Council’s priority.\textsuperscript{251}

The representative of the Russian Federation expressed concern over the situation of migrants and refugees in Libya and the abuses of their rights, but added that a long-term solution to that problem was certainly not to be found through sanctions. He said that attention should be paid to criminality in countries of destination for migrants and that the root causes of mass migrations, such as socioeconomic situations and conflicts, should be addressed.\textsuperscript{252}

The representative of Libya called for the Council to take decisive action and impose severe sanctions on the perpetrators of human rights violations.\textsuperscript{253} The representative of Equatorial Guinea highlighted that human trafficking was a lucrative source of income for human-trafficking networks. He urged the Council to take appropriate steps, stating that Equatorial Guinea would support all well-founded, impartial and suitable proposals that could help to end all acts that constituted violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.\textsuperscript{254}

**Case 11**

**The situation in Somalia**

At its 8398th meeting, held on 14 November 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2444 (2018), by which it decided to lift the arms embargo, travel ban, asset freeze and targeted sanctions imposed on Eritrea by the Council in its resolutions 1907 (2009), 2023 (2011), 2060 (2012) and 2111 (2013), and to renew the partial lifting of the arms embargo and exemption measures concerning Somalia.\textsuperscript{255}

All the Council members, as well as the representatives of Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, welcomed the termination of the sanctions on Eritrea. In addition, Council members noted that the easing of tensions in the Horn of Africa, particularly the rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the positive dynamic between Djibouti and Eritrea, was a key factor in their decision to lift the sanctions.\textsuperscript{256}

\textsuperscript{243} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., p. 9.
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid., p. 11.
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., p. 12.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid., p. 13 (Côte d’Ivoire) and p. 18 (Netherlands).
\textsuperscript{248} S/PV.8341, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., pp. 13–14.
\textsuperscript{250} Ibid., p. 19.
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid., p. 11.
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid., p. 21.
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{255} Resolution 2444 (2018), paras. 4, 13, 14, 41, 44 and 48.
\textsuperscript{256} S/PV.8398, pp. 2–3 (United Kingdom), p. 3 (Ethiopia), p. 4 (Sweden), pp. 4–5 (Kazakhstan), p. 5 (Russian Federation), p. 6 (United States), pp. 5–6 (France), p. 7
current lack of evidence connecting Eritrea to Al-Shabaab, which the Council recognized in paragraph 1 of resolution 2444 (2018), was also cited by the representative of the United States as a basis for its affirmative vote. The representative of the Russian Federation said that throughout the years no convincing evidence had been produced that proved Asmara was supporting destructive forces in the region. He added that in the wake of the changes that had occurred in the Horn of Africa, the classification of the dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea as a threat to international peace and security was also outdated.

The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia noted that sanctions should be assessed in the light of the evolving situation and the context on the ground and that the lifting of sanctions on Eritrea was imperative. Similarly, the representative of Kuwait said that the lifting of sanctions was a message to the international community that the Council responded to positive developments and lifted sanctions when the reasons for which they were imposed no longer existed.

The representative of Ethiopia noted that the lifting of sanctions on Eritrea did not mean that the region was free of challenges. Cooperation among the countries of the Horn of Africa and the serious support of the international community were still needed as the region continued to move forward towards greater peace, stability and economic integration. The representative of Djibouti welcomed the lifting of sanctions on Eritrea and noted that the unanimous support of Council members for the adoption of resolution 2444 (2018) underlined the importance of the settlement of disputes in a peaceful manner, consistent with international law. The representative of Eritrea thanked Ethiopia and Somalia for having called for the immediate lifting of the sanctions, and expressed his country’s appreciation for the constructive engagement that the United Kingdom, as the penholder, and Kazakhstan, as Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, had had with his delegation.

Concerning the situation in Somalia, the representative of the United Kingdom welcomed the progress made to date on security reform and said that she looked forward to further cooperation between the Somali authorities and the Panel of Experts on the implementation of the arms embargo. The representatives of Sweden, France and Poland expressed similar views concerning the critical role of the sanctions regime in the international effort to defeat Al-Shabaab, in particular in curtailing its sources of funding by combating illicit trafficking in arms and Somali charcoal. The representative of Sweden noted that the sanctions regime allowed the important build-up of the Somali national force, while the representative of France said that the exemptions from the arms embargo that the sanctions regime provided for enabled Somalia to acquire the equipment it needed to combat terrorist groups, with the support of its international partners. The representative of the United States, while acknowledging the significant progress made by Somalia over the past decade, noted that Somali capacity, including regarding the implementation of the remaining arms restrictions and the ban on the trade of Somali charcoal, remained limited owing to the country’s security conditions, corruption and uneven progress in governance.

The representative of the Netherlands welcomed the “addition of stand-alone sanctions criteria for sexual and gender-based violence” in resolution 2444 (2018). He stated that those who committed such heinous acts should know that the Council had showed its commitment to responding to such practices. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed regret that the authors of the resolution had included provisions affirming sexual and gender-based violence as a separate criterion for the imposition of sanctions, despite the fact that such behaviour was covered under the existing listing criteria. He reminded the Council that issues pertaining to sanctions were clearly regulated under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which was about the presence of threats to international peace and security. He stated that any broader interpretation of that position ran the risk of a loss of sanctions instruments’ effectiveness.

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257 Ibid., p. 6.
258 Ibid., p. 5.
259 Ibid., p. 8.
260 Ibid., p. 9.
261 Ibid., p. 3.
262 Ibid., pp. 12–13.
263 Ibid., p. 13.
264 Ibid., p. 2.
265 Ibid., p. 4 (Sweden), pp. 6–7 (France) and p. 7 (Poland).
266 Ibid., p. 4 (Sweden) and pp. 6–7 (France).
267 Ibid., p. 6.
268 Ibid., p. 7.
and relevance. He emphasized that the issue of sexual and gender-based violence was not part of the direct remit of the Council and said that if States wanted to discuss such issues, they should raise them in the Human Rights Council and the Commission on the Status of Women.\textsuperscript{269}

In his intervention, the representative of Somalia raised several points in relation to the sanctions imposed on Somalia. First, he noted that the outdated sanctions against Somalia constituted one of the longest-standing United Nations sanctions regimes ever imposed and one with the broadest mandate as well. He stressed the importance of having clearly defined benchmarks to monitor the complete lifting of sanctions on Somalia, contending that if no specific, clear and verifiable steps were set forth, the incentives to comply with the Council’s demands would be undercut and the effectiveness of ending the sanctions regime would drastically diminish. Second, he stated that Council sanctions should target terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), which remained serious threats to the peace and stability of Somalia. He claimed that the flow of illegal weapons and resources into Somalia could only be curbed by targeting and destroying the existing trade networks used by such terrorist groups. He also asked for help to improve the capacity of Somalia to monitor and safeguard its land borders and other sea and air access points. Third, citing the recent reports of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea,\textsuperscript{270} he asserted that the construction by the United Arab Emirates of a military base in Berbera clearly defied Council resolutions and served to undermine the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia. Lastly, he expressed the view that the quality of the reports of the Monitoring Group had been mixed owing to minimal time spent on the ground in Somalia and the Group’s level of expertise. He recommended that the Panel of Experts on Somalia, established pursuant to resolution 2444 (2018), be relocated in order to better perform its mandated tasks. Moreover, its experts should be drawn from a pool of individuals with a higher level of technical and regional expertise.\textsuperscript{271}

\textsuperscript{269}Ibid., p. 5.

\textsuperscript{270}S/2017/924 and S/2018/1002.

\textsuperscript{271}S/PV.8398, pp. 10–11.

IV. Measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter

\textbf{Article 42}

\textit{Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.}

\textbf{Note}

Section IV covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 42 of the Charter, regarding the authorization of the use of force by peacekeeping operations and multinational forces, as well as interventions by regional organizations.\textsuperscript{272}

\textsuperscript{272}The Council’s authorization of the use of force by regional organizations is covered in part VIII. The authorization of the use of force by peacekeeping operations is covered in part X in the context of the mandates of peacekeeping operations.

During the period under review, the Council authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter, with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security by several peacekeeping missions and multinational forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan (including Darfur and Abyei).

This section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A outlines decisions in which the Council authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter and subsection B covers discussions of the Council of relevance for Article 42.

\textbf{A. Decisions relating to Article 42}

During the review period, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 42 of the Charter in its decisions. This notwithstanding, the Council adopted several resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter by which it authorized peacekeeping missions and multinational forces, including those deployed by...
regional organizations, to use “all necessary measures”, “all necessary means” or “all the means” for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.

For information on the authorization of the use of force by missions in the past, including some of the missions covered below, see previous Supplements. For further information on the specific mandates of each of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, see part X of the present Supplement.

In 2018, the Council reiterated its authorization to use force in relation to various situations and disputes. In Africa, in relation to the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council renewed the authorization for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic to take “all necessary means” to carry out its mandate, and for the French forces to use “all the means” to provide operational support to the Mission when under serious threat.

With regard to the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council reiterated its authorization to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to take “all necessary measures” to carry out its mandate.

With respect to the flows of arms and related materiel transferred to or from Libya in violation of the arms embargo, the Council extended the authorizations first granted in paragraphs 4 and 8 of resolution 2292 (2016) to Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, to use “all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” when conducting inspections of vessels and seizing items in the course of such inspections, emphasizing that the inspections should be carried out in compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law and “without causing undue delay to or undue interference with the exercise of freedom of navigation”. In connection with migrant smuggling into, through and from the Libyan territory, the Council renewed the authorizations granted in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 2240 (2015) to Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, that were engaged in the fight against migrant smuggling and human trafficking, to use “all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” in confronting migrant smugglers or human traffickers when carrying out inspections of vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that they had reasonable grounds to suspect were being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking and to seize such vessels that were confirmed to be used for such activities. The Council also reaffirmed paragraph 11 of resolution 2240 (2015), which clarified that the authorization to use force applied only when confronting migrant smugglers and human traffickers on the high seas off the Libyan coast and would not affect the rights and obligations of Member States under international law.

With regard to the situation in Mali, the Council reiterated the authorization for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to use “all necessary means” to carry out its mandate, and for the French forces also to use “all necessary means” until the end of the mandate of MINUSMA to intervene in support of the Mission when under imminent and serious threat, upon the request of the Secretary-General, within their respective capacities and areas of deployment. Moreover, the Council requested MINUSMA to continue to carry out its mandate with a “proactive and robust posture”.

In connection with the situation in Somalia, the Council reiterated the authorization for the African Union Mission in Somalia to take “all necessary measures”, in full compliance with participating States’ obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law and in full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its mandate, as set out in paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 2372 (2017). In addition, the Council renewed, for a period of 13 months, the authorizations granted by paragraph 10 of resolution 1846 (2008) and paragraph 6 of resolution 1851 (2008) to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.

With regard to the situation in Darfur in the Sudan, the Council extended the authorization for the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur to take the necessary action, as set out in

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274 Ibid., para. 69.
275 Resolution 2409 (2018), para. 35.
276 Resolution 2420 (2018), para. 1.
277 Resolution 2437 (2018), para. 2.
278 Ibid.
279 Resolution 2423 (2018), para. 32.
280 Ibid., para. 53.
281 Ibid., para. 33.
282 Resolutions 2415 (2018), para. 1; and 2431 (2018), para. 6.
paragraph 15 of resolution 1769 (2007), and also urged the mission to take “all necessary measures” within its rules of engagement to protect United Nations personnel and equipment.284

In connection with the situation in Abyei, the Council recalled that the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, as set out in paragraph 3 of resolution 1990 (2011), included taking the “necessary actions” to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, irrespective of its source, and in that regard underlined that peacekeepers were authorized to use “all necessary means”, including force when required, in order to protect civilians under threat of physical violence.285

With regard to the situation in South Sudan, the Council authorized the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to use “all necessary means” to carry out its mandated tasks and also authorized the Regional Protection Force to use “all necessary means, including undertaking robust action where necessary and actively patrolling”, to accomplish its mandate.286 The Council further underscored that the mandate of UNMISS included authority to use “all necessary means” to protect United Nations personnel, installations and equipment, to protect civilians from threats, irrespective of their source, to create conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to support the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and the peace process.287

In the Americas, concerning the situation in Haiti, the Council authorized the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti to use “all necessary means” to carry out its mandate to support and develop the Haitian National Police.288

In Europe, in relation to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council authorized the Member States acting under the EUFOR-Althea and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) presence to take “all necessary measures” to effect the implementation of and ensure compliance with annexes 1-A and 2 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina;289 and to, at the request of either EUFOR-Althea or NATO, take “all necessary measures” in defence of the EUROR-Althea or NATO presence.290

In the Middle East, in connection with the situation in Lebanon, the Council renewed its authorization for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to take “all necessary action” in areas of deployment of its forces, to ensure that its area of operations was not utilized for hostile activities, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its mandate, to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and humanitarian workers, and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.291

B. Discussions relating to Article 42

During the period under review, two explicit references to Article 42 of the Charter were made in the context of the Council’s deliberations. The first was made at the 8262nd meeting of the Council, held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, by the representative of Brazil, who underscored that States that engaged in military operations under Article 42 should have to report to the Council periodically so that their adherence to the mandate could be multilaterally monitored.292 The second explicit reference to Article 42 was made at the 8334th meeting, held under the same item, by the representative of Cuba, who, noting with concern the increasing tendency of the Council to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter “excessively and hastily”, regretted that the Council was too quick to seek recourse in the provisions of Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter without having fully exhausted other options, including those provided for in Chapter VI, and without considering the consequences.293

During the period under review, the Council deliberated upon the effectiveness of the use of force by peacekeeping operations in carrying out protection-of-civilians mandates under the items entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security (case 12), “United Nations peacekeeping operations” (case 13) and “Protection of civilians in armed conflict” (case 14).

284 Resolution 2429 (2018), paras. 15 and 48.
285 Resolution 2445 (2018), para. 11.
286 Resolution 2406 (2018), paras. 7 and 9.
287 Ibid., para. 12.
289 Resolution 2443 (2018), para. 5.
290 Ibid., para. 6.
292 S/PV.8262, p. 45.
293 S/PV.8334, p. 53.
Case 12
Maintenance of international peace and security

On 21 February 2018, at the initiative of Kuwait, which held the presidency for the month, the Council convened its 8185th meeting, held under the above-mentioned item and the sub-item “Aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security”.

During the meeting, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait underscored that in certain circumstances, where peaceful means would not lead to resolving crises, Chapter VII allowed for the use of force so as to maintain or restore international peace and security. He affirmed that the liberation of Kuwait had demonstrated the effectiveness and legitimacy of Chapter VII through a legitimate military response to a despicable military invasion. The representative of France echoed that statement, recalling that the liberation of Kuwait had shown that the use of force in accordance with the Charter was sometimes necessary to uphold international law.

The representative of Côte d’Ivoire stated that the use of force to maintain international peace and security must be authorized exclusively by the Council in order to give it the legal authority necessary to prevent any type of excess and abuse. In a similar vein, the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia held that the use of force must be considered as a last resort only when all other methods had been exhausted, in accordance with Chapter VII and in strict compliance with the system of multilateralism.

On 17 May 2018, at the initiative of Poland, which held the presidency for the month, the Council convened its 8262nd meeting, held under the same item and under the sub-item “Aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security”.

The representative of Peru affirmed that one of the cornerstones of the international order was the prohibition of the use of force in any way that was incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations. He expressed his concern about some countries testing arguments and interpretations that were ultimately alien to international law and that undermined the system of collective security. The representative of Brazil asserted that the prohibition of the use of force was a peremptory norm; it was the rule. Self-defence and authorization under Chapter VII were the exceptions to it. The use of armed force in any manner inconsistent with the Charter constituted aggression, as defined in General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX). While acknowledging that the use of force might be envisaged in exceptional circumstances, he warned that decisions on the use of force that were informed by subjective unilateral criteria would make peace a “far-distant objective”. He urged Member States not to open the door for unilateralism, thereby jeopardizing the collective security system. He followed by saying that Council resolutions were adopted on behalf of the international community and that those authorized to take action on behalf of others were accountable to those that authorized them. States that engaged in military operations to implement measures envisaged in Article 42 should have to report periodically to the Council, so that their adherence to the mandate could be multilaterally monitored. He further pointed out that those troops might not be wearing blue helmets, but they were acting “on the authority and legitimacy of a blue text”.

The representative of Mexico expressed particular concern about the authorization of the use of force against non-State actors, due to a lack of legal clarity in that regard.

The representative of the United States emphasized that Governments could not use sovereignty as a shield to commit mass atrocities, spread weapons of mass destruction or engage in terrorism. The Council must be prepared to act in such instances, using its wide-ranging authority to impose sanctions, establish tribunals and authorize the use of force, and to resort when necessary to its “broad authority under Chapter VII”. The representative of France stated that the Council’s decisions containing measures under Chapter VII, including the authorization to use force, helped to enforce international law and ensure that violations did not go unpunished.

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294 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 1 February 2018 from the representative of Kuwait addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/85).
295 S/PV.8185, p. 8.
297 Ibid., p. 11.
298 Ibid., p. 28.
299 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 3 May 2018 from the representative of Poland addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/417/Rev.1).
301 Ibid., pp. 44–45.
302 Ibid., p. 47.
303 Ibid., p. 17.
304 Ibid., pp. 28–29.
**Case 13**  
**United Nations peacekeeping operations**

On 28 March 2018, at the initiative of the Netherlands, which held the presidency for the month, the Council convened its 8218th meeting, held under the above-mentioned item and the sub-item entitled “Collective action to improve United Nations peacekeeping operations”. At the meeting, the representative of the European Union underscored that peacekeepers must protect civilians and be able to use force when civilians were threatened with physical violence and that operations must be equipped with the necessary tools in that regard. The representative of South Africa said that the protection of civilians must be at the heart of peacekeeping and that in some cases it might require the use of force, in accordance with the mission mandate and in compliance with the applicable legal framework.

Several speakers emphasized the importance of the principles of peacekeeping, including the non-use of force except in self-defence or in defence of the mandate. The representative of Kuwait further highlighted the need to adapt the principles of peacekeeping, such as the use of force in self-defence and in defence of the mandate, to the increase in threats that did not respect the United Nations flag and the protection it provided.

The representative of Argentina emphasized that the incorporation of mandates on the protection of civilians into peacekeeping operations had been one of the most important developments regarding peacekeeping missions of the century. In that regard, he reiterated that the issue should not be considered from a strictly military perspective, but rather as part of a broader political and humanitarian approach, centred on building a safe, protected environment. He added that it was crucial that all Member States continued moving towards a clear and common understanding of the modalities and implications of such activities, in particular in cases where it was necessary to use force to provide security to civilians threatened by physical violence.

The representative of the Russian Federation stated that it was crucial to respect the Charter of the United Nations and the core principles of peacekeeping – the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force, except in self-defence and to protect the mandate. He opined that the increasingly frequent proposals made of late to interpret those principles flexibly or revise them were pernicious, in particular with regard to so-called proactive and robust peacekeeping and giving peacekeepers the right to the “first use of force”. In his country’s view, if the neutral authority of peacekeepers was undermined, it could turn them into active participants in conflicts. The representative of Guatemala reaffirmed that the use of force must always be the last resort, especially when acting on behalf of the United Nations, and noted that while the reasons for developing mandates calling for more robust operations were understandable, such action should be considered carefully by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Echoing a similar view, the representative of Cuba said that her delegation was not convinced that the Council’s approval of operations involving the use of force beyond the basic principles could contribute to improving the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and the security of their military, police or civilian personnel.

Referring to the report authored by former United Nations Force Commander, Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, entitled “Improving security of United Nations peacekeepers”, the representatives of Georgia and Latvia both highlighted the need for changes in the peacekeeping arena with respect to operational behaviour and the use of force.

**Case 14**  
**Protection of civilians in armed conflict**

On 22 May 2018, at the initiative of Poland, which held the presidency for the month, the Council convened its 8264th meeting, held under the above-mentioned item. The representative of the United States stated that the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians called upon troop-contributing countries to empower military commanders of peacekeeping contingents to use force to protect...
civilians, on the basis that if commanders had to wait too long for such guidance, it might be too late to prevent an approaching attack. She emphasized that if properly implemented, the Kigali Principles would make peacekeeping missions more effective, improve civilian security and save lives.\textsuperscript{316} The representative of Rwanda noted that the Kigali Principles did not exclude the use of force and recalled that paragraph 3 of the Principles called for troop-contributing countries “to be prepared to use force to protect civilians, as necessary and consistent with the mandate”.\textsuperscript{317}

The representative of the Russian Federation reaffirmed the position that using any means of response to protect civilians, in particular those involving the use of force, was only possible when mandated by the Council and in strict accordance with the provisions of the Charter.\textsuperscript{318} The representative of Brazil stressed that, in the exceptional circumstances in which resolutions authorized it, the use of force should be limited to the mandate, as the notion that civilians were more effectively protected by military action was not supported by any real evidence. He also stated that it was crucial to develop an understanding of what force could and could not accomplish. He further called on the Council to demand enhanced reporting and monitor the implementation of such resolutions.\textsuperscript{319}

The representative of Germany said that the protection-of-civilians mandates that the Council assigned to missions needed to be more robust.\textsuperscript{320} By contrast, the representative of India affirmed that the Council’s membership needed to frame mandates with clarity and specificity. The growing number of instances of serious attacks on peacekeepers and the high level of casualties suffered by them pointed to the difficulties of being able to implement so-called robust mandates in situations involving rival warring groups mixed with civilian populations, putting at risk the credibility and the image of the neutral presence of the United Nations in situations of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{321} The representative of Argentina underlined that the authorization of robust mandates by the Council, as well as their implementation by peacekeeping operations, must not compromise the fulfilment of their core mandate to protect civilians, or distract them from their mission based on the fundamental principles governing peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{322}

\begin{verbatim}
317 Ibid., p. 56.
319 Ibid., p. 34.
320 Ibid., p. 38.
321 Ibid., p. 32.
322 Ibid., p. 29.
\end{verbatim}

V. Consideration of Articles 43 to 45 of the Charter

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member’s armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Note

Under Article 43 of the Charter all Member States undertake to make available to the Council, for the maintenance of international peace and security, armed forces, assistance and facilities in accordance with special agreements. Such agreements, to be entered into by the Council and Member States, were conceived to regulate the numbers and types of troops, their readiness and location and the nature of facilities to be provided.

No agreements under Article 43 were ever concluded, however, and in the absence of such agreements, there is therefore no practice in application of Article 43. The United Nations has developed practical arrangements to carry out military operations in the absence of such agreements. In that context, the Council authorizes peacekeeping forces (under the command and control of the Secretary-General and assembled pursuant to ad hoc agreements entered into by the United Nations and Member States), and national or regional forces (under national or regional command and control) to conduct military action. Peacekeeping operations, as well as their mandates, are covered in detail in part X of the present Supplement.

Articles 44 and 45 of the Charter make explicit reference to Article 43 and are therefore intimately linked. As with Article 43, there is no practice in application of Articles 44 and 45. This notwithstanding, the Council has developed, through its decisions, practice by which to (a) call on Member States to contribute armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, (b) consult with Member States contributing troops for United Nations peacekeeping activities and (c) call on Member States to contribute military air assets in the context of peacekeeping.

During the period under review, the Council continued to pay close attention to the challenges faced by peacekeeping operations in fulfilling their respective mandates. In that regard, the Council adopted several decisions urging Member States to deliver military assistance to the operations. The Council did not, however, engage in any constitutional discussion concerning Articles 43 and 45 during the reporting period. Throughout 2018, the Council also adopted decisions in which it emphasized, and held meetings in which it deliberated upon, the importance of consulting troop- and police-contributing countries on issues pertaining to the mandates of peacekeeping operations. Set out below is an overview of the practice of the Council in 2018 concerning the need for Member States to contribute to, support and assist peacekeeping operations, including the question of contributing military air assets (subsection A) and the need for consultation with troop- and police-contributing countries (subsection B).

A. Need for Member States to contribute, support and provide assistance, including military air assets, to peacekeeping operations

In 2018, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 43 or Article 45 in any of its decisions or discussions. Nevertheless, the Council adopted several resolutions calling upon Member States to provide military support, both personnel and equipment, including military air assets, to existing peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and Somalia. In addition, in resolution 2436 (2018), the Council urged all troop- and police-contributing countries to meet United Nations performance standards for personnel, training and equipping.\(^{323}\)

With respect to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the Council, in resolution 2448 (2018), reiterated its serious concern at the continuing lack of key capabilities for MINUSCA, stressed the need to fill the gaps, in particular in the field of military helicopters, and emphasized the utmost importance of improving logistics support to ensure the security and safety of MINUSCA personnel.\(^{324}\) The Council also reiterated the importance of current and future troop- and police-contributing countries providing troops and police with adequate capabilities, equipment and predeployment training in order to enhance the capacity of MINUSCA.\(^{325}\) While noting the progress of troop- and police-contributing countries in meeting the United Nations standards, the Council also called on them to immediately finalize the procurement and deployment of all required contingent-owned equipment.\(^{326}\)

In relation to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic People’s Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the Council, in resolution 2409 (2018), requested MONUSCO to continue to maximize force interoperability, flexibility,

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\(^{323}\) Resolution 2436 (2018), para. 3.

\(^{324}\) Resolution 2448 (2018), thirty-second preambular paragraph.

\(^{325}\) Ibid., para. 44.

\(^{326}\) Ibid., para. 47.
mobility and effectiveness in the implementation of the Mission’s mandate, including by deploying rapidly deployable units, specialized capabilities, including enhanced information-gathering assets and analysis, specialized infantry, and key enablers such as medical evacuation and air assets. The Council also highlighted that inadequate equipment, among other factors, could adversely affect effective mandate implementation.

Concerning the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the Council, in resolution 2423 (2018), reiterated its serious concern at the continuing lack of key capabilities for MINUSMA and stressed the need to fill the gaps, in particular in the field of military helicopters and mine-protected vehicles, and enable MINUSMA to implement its mandate in a complex security environment that included asymmetric threats. The Council welcomed the significant progress made in the deployment of a combat convoy battalion and a quick reaction force, as well as the recent pledges announced to fill troop and capacity gaps, and in that regard urged Member States that had made pledges to fully deploy those units within the announced time frame. The Council urged MINUSMA troop- and police-contributing countries to expedite the procurement and deployment of all necessary contingent-owned equipment, and further urged Member States to provide troops and police with adequate capabilities, predeployment and, where appropriate, in situ training and equipment, including enablers specific to the operating environment, in order for MINUSMA to fulfil its mandate.

With regard to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Council, in resolution 2431 (2018), recalled its request that the African Union generate the specialized units specified in the annex to resolution 2297 (2016) and reiterated the importance for all force enablers and multipliers to operate under the command of the Force Commander. The Council welcomed efforts to identify specific requirements in that regard and requested their generation without delay, and requested the African Union to provide regular updates on the force generation in its reports through the Secretary-General. The Council stressed

the critical need to source fully functioning and mission-appropriate contingent-owned equipment, including force enablers and multipliers, as provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution 2036 (2012), either from existing AMISOM troop-contributing countries or from other Member States, and urged the African Union to generate the remainder of the force enablers within the existing troop ceiling. The Council reiterated its call for new and existing donors to support AMISOM through the provision of additional funding for troop stipends, equipment and technical assistance and contributions to the United Nations trust fund for AMISOM, and underlined the African Union’s call for its member States to provide financial support to AMISOM.

During the period under review, in several discussions the Council touched upon the importance of providing peacekeeping operations with adequate troops and equipment, including military air assets. For example, at the 8218th meeting, held on 28 March 2019, under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands stated, in reference to MINUSMA, that rotation schemes for vital but scarce capabilities such as helicopters and medical facilities lowered the threshold for participation in missions, increased their sustainability and improved their quality. At the same meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom emphasized the need for a better match between the capacity of troops and the tasks that they were asked to perform, which in turn required Member States to deliver the capabilities that they had committed. Similarly, the representative of Estonia recalled the responsibility of Member States to provide adequate troops and capabilities to United Nations peacekeeping operations and noted with concern that in crisis areas with more than one mission, United Nations missions were less equipped and not as well trained as operations led by other actors. The representative of Slovakia stressed that it was a priority to continue addressing the difficulties in getting enough troops and equipment. The representatives of Kazakhstan and Fiji underlined the need to provide peacekeeping forces with adequate resources, with the latter adding that proper equipment was vital to support United Nations peacekeepers. The representatives of Djibouti and Ukraine also underscored the importance

327 Resolution 2409 (2018), para. 50.
328 Ibid., para. 51.
329 Resolution 2423 (2018), thirtieth preambular paragraph.
330 Ibid., fourteenth preambular paragraph.
331 Ibid., para. 56.
of the provision of adequate resources, including helicopters.\textsuperscript{341}

Further to the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali,\textsuperscript{342} the Council also considered the problem of capability gaps, including the aforementioned assets, within MINUSMA at meetings held under the item entitled “The situation in Mali” on 23 January and 11 April 2018. The reports focused on the persistent capability gaps, including for crucial assets such as helicopters, which were putting at stake the effort to project the robust posture mandated by the Council. At the 8163rd meeting, held on 23 January, the representative of France said that lasting solutions must be found quickly so as to adequately equip contingents with armoured vehicles, medium-term aerial capacities and armoured convoys.\textsuperscript{343} Similarly, the representative of the United States stressed the need to find an enduring solution for the most critical capability gaps of MINUSMA, such as those related to combat convoy battalions, helicopters and armoured personnel carriers.\textsuperscript{344} The representative of Côte d’Ivoire called for the operationalization of the Mission’s rapid reaction force as soon as possible and for the fulfilment of the Mission’s need for helicopters.\textsuperscript{345} The representative of the Netherlands stressed that the fact that MINUSMA was the peacekeeping mission with the highest number of victims among peacekeepers served to underscore the crucial importance of high-quality equipment and well-trained troops, and called upon Member States to provide capacity to the Mission.\textsuperscript{346} At the 8229th meeting, held on 11 April, the representative of the United Kingdom called on all Member States to ensure that the continued shortfall of troop numbers and equipment, including the need for further air cover, reconnaissance capability and armoured personnel carriers, was generously met.\textsuperscript{347} The representative of the Netherlands reiterated that the attacks on MINUSMA personnel served as a reminder to Member States of their responsibility to provide MINUSMA with the appropriate equipment, both in terms of troops and capacities.\textsuperscript{348}

### B. Recognition of the need to consult troop-and police-contributing countries

During the period under review, the Council continued to adopt decisions reaffirming or recognizing the importance of triangular cooperation and consultations among the Council, Member States and the Secretariat in connection with peacekeeping operations, as well as with other stakeholders such as donors, host countries and regional and subregional organizations.\textsuperscript{349}

Concerning the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), the Council reaffirmed in two of its decisions that troop- and police-contributing countries should have access to reports and information related to the current temporary configuration of UNDOF and reinforced that such information assisted the Council with evaluating, mandating and reviewing UNDOF and with effective consultation with troop- and police-contributing countries.\textsuperscript{350}

In 2018, no explicit references to Article 44 were made during discussions of the Council. This notwithstanding, the importance of consulting troop- and police-contributing countries on issues relating to the mandate of peacekeeping operations was addressed in varying degrees of depth and scope in meetings under the items entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” in connection with the working methods of the Council (see case 15), “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, specifically focusing on collective action to improve United Nations peacekeeping operations (see case 16), and “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, in considering the report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict\textsuperscript{351} and the input from troop- and police-contributing countries in the formulation of mandates.\textsuperscript{352}

#### Case 15

**Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)**

On 6 February 2018, at the initiative of Kuwait, which held the presidency for the month, the Council convened its 8175th meeting, held under the above-
mentioned item, concerning the working methods of the Council.\footnote{353 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 24 January 2018 from the representative of Kuwait addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/66).} At the meeting, various speakers addressed the importance of consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries in the context of peacekeeping operations. The representative of the United Kingdom stressed that the Council should work closely with troop- and police-contributing countries when considering peacekeeping deployments and mandates.\footnote{354 Ibid., p. 15.} The representative of Egypt considered it very important to develop close coordination between the Council and troop-contributing countries in the context of peacekeeping operations to ensure understanding between the Council and those countries in reviewing the mandates that troops had to implement on the ground and the means of overcoming the complex challenges they faced.\footnote{355 Ibid., p. 64.} The representative of China proposed that the Council weigh the views and concerns of troop-contributing countries during mission deployment and mandate adjustments, more actively engage troop-contributing countries, and enhance information-sharing mechanisms such as the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations and meetings with troop-contributing countries.\footnote{356 Ibid., p. 23.} The representative of Côte d’Ivoire stated that consultations among the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries enabled the views of those countries to be taken into account and made it possible to better prepare peacekeeping operations.\footnote{357 Ibid., p. 16.} Several speakers emphasized the need for meaningful participation by troop- and police-contributing countries to ensure an exchange of views that genuinely contributed to the review of the mandate.\footnote{358 Ibid., p. 25 (Brazil), pp. 47–48 (Indonesia) and p. 35 (Pakistan).} The representative of Italy said that giving due consideration to the views of troop- and police-contributing countries when renewing mandates was key to nurturing trust between those countries and Council members.\footnote{359 Ibid., p. 43.} The representative of Singapore asserted that the Council needed to deepen its coordination with troop- and police-contributing countries.\footnote{360 Ibid., p. 40.} The representative of France underscored the need for the Council to continue to improve the transparency of its work with regard to troop-contributing countries in the framework of discussions relating to peacekeeping.\footnote{361 Ibid., p. 9.} The representative of Guatemala, emphasizing the importance of holding consultations among the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries, said that the contribution of troops and police considerably increased the Council’s ability to take appropriate, effective and timely decisions in fulfilling its responsibilities.\footnote{362 Ibid., p. 50.} The representative of Slovakia asserted that the substantive engagement of the Council with troop-contributing countries should be improved to strengthen the basis for decision-making in the Council and the incentive for the general membership to support peacekeeping operations.\footnote{363 Ibid., p. 58.} The representative of Japan stated that troop-contributing countries might be able to contribute on mandate renewals. While co-penholding could be explored further in that regard, the way in which the negotiations were conducted was of greater significance. He said that penholders had the responsibility to explore the best possible outcome through an inclusive process, including by reaching out to troop-contributing countries.\footnote{364 Ibid., p. 24.} In addition, many participants offered specific proposals on the format of consultations between the Council and troop-contributing countries and the application of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507), dated 30 August 2017, also known as note 507.\footnote{365 Ibid., pp. 3–4 (Executive Director of the Security Council Report), p. 14 (Ethiopia), p. 20 (Netherlands), p. 26 (Hungary), p. 29 (Germany), p. 32 (South Africa), pp. 34–35 (Turkey), p. 35 (Pakistan), p. 45 (New Zealand), p. 47 (Belgium), p. 52 (Saudi Arabia), pp. 59–60 (Uruguay) and p. 61 (Costa Rica). For further information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.A.}

**Case 16**

**United Nations peacekeeping operations**

On 28 March 2018, at the initiative of the Netherlands, which held the presidency for the month, the Council convened its 8218th meeting, held under the above-mentioned item and the sub-item entitled “Collective action to improve United Nations peacekeeping operations”.\footnote{366 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 2 March 2018 from the representative of the Netherlands addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/184).} The Secretary-General briefed the Council on the challenges facing
peacekeeping operations and actions implemented on the peacekeeping front and submitted six specific requests for Member States, adding that triangular partnerships among the Council, troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat were a vital part of reinforcing support for peacekeeping.367

During the discussion that ensued, the representative of China stated that troop-contributing countries must be given more opportunities to participate in discussions concerning the development and adjustment of mandates, which would also help to improve mandates.368 The representative of Norway suggested that consultations about when and how to deploy an operation should involve all stakeholders, including troop- and police-contributing countries.369 The representative of Argentina asserted that missions should be planned sufficiently in advance and be based on priorities established from the beginning in consultation with troop- and police-contributing countries.370 Several speakers emphasized the need to take into account the perspectives of troop- and police-contributing countries regarding the design, review and/or renewal of mandates.371 The representative of Nepal stated further that it should be compulsory for penholders to consult with prospective troop- and police-contributing countries on mandates before they were finalized, to ensure that peacekeeping operations were designed and deployed solely to support an inclusive domestic process.372 The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania suggested that troop- and police-contributing countries should be consulted to ensure that the mandates were configured and realigned to clearly address the actual situation on the ground, with adequate force levels and capabilities commensurate with the proxy forces.373

The representative of France asserted that the development of evaluation, analysis and action tools and strategic reviews conducted by the Secretariat should include the participation of troop- and police-contributing countries and added that his country systematically consulted the contributors ahead of the renewal of mandates for which it was responsible and expressed its commitment to doing so even more regularly throughout the year.374

The representative of Thailand also underscored the importance of close consultations and communication among the Council, host countries and troop- and police-contributing countries in order to ensure that the mandate’s objectives were met and delivered effectively.375

Some speakers underlined more broadly the importance of triangular consultation and partnerships among the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries.376

VI. Role and composition of the Military Staff Committee in accordance with Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

368 Ibid., p. 25.
369 Ibid., p. 39.
370 Ibid., p. 44.
371 Ibid., p. 29 (Indonesia), p. 48 (Italy) and p. 57 (El Salvador).
372 Ibid., p. 58.
373 Ibid., p. 70.
374 Ibid., p. 17.
375 Ibid., p. 37.
376 Ibid., p. 57 (El Salvador), p. 60 (Jordan), p. 68 (Morocco), p. 75 (Cuba) and p. 80 (Viet Nam).
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

Note

Section VI covers the practice of the Council under Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter regarding the Military Staff Committee, including instances in which the Council considered the role of the Military Staff Committee in planning the application of armed force and in advising and assisting the Council on the military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security.

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly refer to either Article 46 or Article 47 in any of its decisions.

While Article 46 was not referred to in any of the Council’s discussions, at the 8362nd meeting, held on 26 September 2018 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the President of Equatorial Guinea recalled that disarmament, being one of the longest-standing objectives of the United Nations, was the subject of resolution 1 (1946), the first Council resolution adopted under Article 47 of the Charter. In addition, while the Military Staff Committee was not mentioned in any of the decisions of the Council, several speakers referred to it at the 8175th meeting of the Council, held on 6 February under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”. At that meeting, the representative of Sweden recalled that the elected Council members had requested that their representatives be invited to participate in the missions of the Military Staff Committee. The representative of Poland also mentioned that initiative of the elected members, noting that it was a way of enhancing the inclusiveness and effectiveness of the Military Staff Committee. The representative of the Netherlands stated that the role of the Military Staff Committee should be strengthened, especially when it came to the performance of missions in relation to the mandates.

As is customary, the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly issued during the reporting period made reference to the activities of the Military Staff Committee.

VII. Action required of Member States under Article 48 of the Charter

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Note

Section VII covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 48 of the Charter, regarding the obligation of all or some Member States to carry out the decisions of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Under Article 48 (2), Member States shall carry out the decisions directly, or through international organizations of which they are members. The section focuses on the types of obligations imposed on Member States pursuant to Article 48, and on the range of addressees designated by the Council to implement, or comply with, decisions adopted.

While Article 48 relates to requests to Member States to carry out action decided upon by the Council, during 2018, as in previous periods, the Council addressed some of its pleas to “actors” or “parties”, reflecting the intra-State and increasingly complex nature of many contemporary conflicts dealt with by the Council. In its requests to carry out actions, the Council also addressed “regional and subregional organizations”, signalling the importance of such entities in tackling disputes and situations before the Council. Additional information on the engagement of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security is provided in part VIII.

377 S/PV.8362, pp. 6–7.
378 S/PV.8175, p. 20.
379 Ibid., p. 12.
380 Ibid., p. 20.
381 See A/72/2, part IV.
During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly invoke Article 48 in any of its decisions. The Council, however, adopted resolutions and issued presidential statements in which it underlined the obligation of Member States and other entities concerned to comply with the measures imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter pursuant to Article 48. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions in which the Council required Member States to carry out action in relation to measures under Article 41. Subsection B covers decisions in which the Council required Member States to carry out action in relation to measures under Article 42. During 2018, no references to Article 48 were found in communications to the Council nor was there any discussion held in relation to the interpretation or application of that Article.

A. Decisions in which the Security Council required Member States to carry out action in relation to measures under Article 41 of the Charter

During the period under review and in relation to decisions adopted pursuant to Article 41 concerning sanctions, the Council frequently requested, or stressed the importance for, “all Member States” or “all States” to implement specific measures, including by taking “all necessary measures”. The Council also requested Member States to assist or cooperate with the relevant sanctions committees, panels of experts and/or monitoring groups, including by providing the bodies with relevant information, reporting to them on actions taken to implement the sanctions measures, ensuring the safety of their members and providing them with unhindered access to persons, documents and sites. In addition, in support of sanctions measures in connection with the situations in the Central African Republic and South Sudan, the Council authorized “all Member States” to seize, register and dispose of prohibited items.

During the reporting period, the Council continued to address Governments of individual States when making requests to comply with measures adopted in relation to Article 41. In that regard, with respect to the situation in Libya, the Council called upon the Government of National Accord to improve the implementation of the arms embargo; to improve further the monitoring and control of arms or related materiel supplied, sold or transferred to Libya; and to support the investigatory work of the Panel of Experts inside Libya, including by sharing information. The Council also called upon all States, including Libya and countries in the region, to provide unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites.

Concerning the situation in Somalia, the Council requested the Federal Government of Somalia to facilitate access for the Panel of Experts, upon request by the Panel of Experts submitted at least 10 days in advance, and to allow photographs of weapons and ammunition in the custody of the Federal Government and access to all logbooks of the Federal Government and distribution records, to cooperate with the Panel of Experts to facilitate interviews of suspected members of Al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh) held in the custody of the Federal Government, in order to assist the Panel with its investigations; and to share information with the Panel regarding Al-Shabaab activities. The Council also called upon the Federal Government of Somalia, in addition to “Member States”, to cooperate with the Panel of Experts in its investigations related to the export to Somalia of chemicals that might be used in the manufacture of explosive devices. The Council

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382 Under the item entitled “The situation in the Central African Republic”, see resolution 2399 (2018), twenty-third preambular paragraph and paras. 1, 9, 16 and 40; under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, see resolution 2433 (2018), para. 18 (Lebanon), and S/PRST/2018/5, tenth paragraph (Yemen); under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, see resolution 2428 (2018), paras. 4 and 7 (South Sudan); and under the item entitled “The situation in Somalia”, see resolution 2444 (2018), para. 41.

383 Under the item entitled “The situation in the Central African Republic”, see resolution 2399 (2018), paras. 15, 37, 38 and 40; under the item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, see resolution 2407 (2018), para. 5; under the item entitled “The situation in Libya”, see resolution 2441 (2018), paras. 12, 16 and 17; under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, see resolution 2402 (2018), paras. 8 and 10 (Yemen); under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, see resolutions 2406 (2018), para. 19, and 2428 (2018), para. 19 (South Sudan); and under the item entitled “The situation in Somalia”, see resolution 2444 (2018), paras. 29, 45 and 53.

384 Resolutions 2399 (2018), para. 2; and 2428 (2018), para. 9.

385 Resolution 2441 (2018), para. 10.

386 Ibid., para. 9.

387 Ibid., para. 16.

388 Ibid., para. 17.

389 Resolution 2444 (2018), para. 18.

390 Ibid., para. 34.

391 Ibid., para. 53.

392 Ibid., para. 29.
stressed that it was the primary responsibility of the Federal Government to notify the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia of any deliveries of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training to its security forces, pursuant to paragraphs 3–8 of resolution 2142 (2014).393 The Council further reiterated that the Federal Government and the Federal Member States of Somalia would take the necessary measures to prevent the export of charcoal from Somalia.394

With respect to the situation in South Sudan, the Council called upon “all Member States, in particular States neighbouring South Sudan”, to inspect all cargo to South Sudan in their territory if the State concerned had reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contained items of which the supply, sale, or transfer were prohibited.395 The Council further required “any Member State” undertaking such inspections to submit an initial written report to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan containing the grounds for and the results of the inspections, and, if any prohibited items were found, further required the Member State to submit to the Committee a subsequent written report containing relevant details.396 The Council also called upon “all Member States, especially those neighbouring South Sudan”, to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts, including by providing any information on illicit transfers of wealth from South Sudan into financial, property and business networks.397

As in previous years, the Council addressed requests to actors other than States to cooperate with the relevant committees and panels of experts on the implementation of specific measures adopted in relation to Article 41. In doing so, the Council used various formulas. For example, the Council addressed “all actors” with respect to the situation in Mali;398 “all parties” with regard to the situations in the Central African Republic,399 Libya400 and South Sudan;401 and “other interested parties” with respect to the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea402 and Libya.403 In addition, the Council also requested the cooperation of international, regional and subregional organizations, in accordance with Article 48 (2), with the respective panels of experts on the Central African Republic,404 South Sudan405 and Yemen.406

Regarding decisions adopted in accordance with Article 41 in connection with judicial measures, the Council called upon “all States” to cooperate with and render all necessary assistance to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals towards the relocation of acquitted and convicted persons who had completed serving their sentences,407 and to intensify cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to the Mechanism, in particular to achieve the arrest and surrender of all remaining fugitives indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.408 The Council called upon the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to fully cooperate with the Mechanism.409

With respect to the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council stressed the importance of the Government’s ongoing cooperation with the International Criminal Court, as well as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in holding accountable the perpetrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, including those committed in the context of the electoral process.410

Similarly, in connection with the situation in Mali, the Council urged the Malian authorities to continue to cooperate with the International Criminal Court.411 The Council also recalled the importance of assistance and cooperation “by all parties concerned” with the Court in matters within its jurisdiction.412

**B. Decisions in which the Security Council required Member States to carry out action in relation to measures under Article 42 of the Charter**

During the period under review, the Council urged, called upon and requested action by a particular Member State, a designated group of Member States

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393 Ibid., para. 22.
394 Ibid., para. 41.
396 Ibid., para. 10.
397 Ibid., para. 21.
398 Resolution 2423 (2018), twelfth preambular paragraph.
399 Resolution 2399 (2018), para. 15.
400 Resolution 2441 (2018), para. 17.
401 Resolution 2428 (2018), para. 21.
402 Resolution 2407 (2018), para. 5.
403 Resolution 2441 (2018), para. 16.
407 Resolution 2422 (2018), para. 3.
408 Ibid., para. 4.
409 Resolution 2443 (2018), para. 1.
410 Resolution 2409 (2018), seventeenth preambular paragraph and para. 11.
411 Resolution 2423 (2018), para. 61.
412 Ibid., twenty-second preambular paragraph.
and/or all Member States in relation to measures adopted under Article 42 of the Charter. For example, with respect to the situation in Mali, the Council urged Member States that had made pledges to fill in troop and capacity gaps in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to fully deploy those units within the announced time frame. With regard to the situation in Somalia, the Council stressed the critical need to source fully functioning and mission-appropriate contingent-owned equipment, including force enablers and multipliers, for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and reiterated its call on new and existing donors to support AMISOM through, inter alia, the provision of additional funding for troop stipends and equipment.

In 2018, the Council continued to call upon States and non-State actors to cooperate with peacekeeping operations to ensure the fulfilment of their respective Chapter VII mandates. In that regard, in relation to the situations in the Central African Republic and Mali, the Council urged “all parties” in the respective countries to cooperate fully with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and MINUSMA and to ensure their safety, security and freedom of movement, and called upon “Member States, especially those in the region”, to ensure the freedom of movement of personnel and equipment of MINUSCA and MINUSMA.

With respect to the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the Council urged “all parties” to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL and its access to the Blue Line was fully respected and unimpeded.

With regard to the situation in Abyei, the Council called upon “both parties”, namely South Sudan and the Sudan, to maintain standing clearance for all air and ground patrols of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in order to facilitate full freedom of movement for UNISFA and the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. The Council also called upon “all Member States, in particular Sudan and South Sudan”, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement of all UNISFA personnel and equipment.

In relation to the situation in Darfur, the Council called upon “all parties in Darfur” to remove all obstacles to the full and proper discharge of the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, including by ensuring its security and freedom of movement. Concerning the situation in South Sudan, the Council demanded that the Transitional Government of National Unity comply with the obligations of the Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan concerning the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and immediately cease obstructing the United Nations Mission in South Sudan in the performance of its mandate.

VIII. Mutual assistance pursuant to Article 49 of the Charter

Article 49

_The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council._

Note

Section VIII covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 49 of the Charter, concerning mutual assistance among Member States in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Council.

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly invoke Article 49 in any of its decisions. However, in its decisions in 2018, the Council called upon Member States to cooperate with each other or assist specific States in the implementation of measures imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter. This section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions in which the Council urged cooperation among Member States with respect
to measures under Article 41. Subsection B covers decisions in which the Council requested mutual assistance in relation to measures under Article 42.

In 2018, as in previous periods, there was no constitutional discussion in the Council relating to the interpretation or application of Article 49 of the Charter. No reference to Article 49 was found in the communications received by the Council.

A. Decisions in which the Security Council requested mutual assistance in the implementation of measures under Article 41 of the Charter

During the period under review, the Council called upon Member States to enhance their cooperation in implementing specific sanctions measures. The addressees of the Council’s calls for mutual assistance ranged from individual Member States, in particular concerned States, to “all Member States”, as well as regional and subregional organizations. The types of assistance requested of Member States varied greatly, from requests to share information and requests for the provision of technical assistance to requests for cooperation in carrying out inspections.

For example, in connection with the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council urged the Government to enhance cooperation and information-sharing with other States in taking “the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated by the Committee”. 425

Concerning the situation in Libya, the Council called upon all Member States to cooperate in efforts aimed at ensuring the implementation of the arms embargo 426 and urged Member States and regional organizations to provide assistance to the Government of National Accord, upon its request, to strengthen the infrastructure and mechanisms in place to secure arms and related materiel. 427

With respect to the situation in Somalia, the Council urged Member States to support improved weapons and ammunition management to improve the capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia to manage weapons and ammunition. 428

Concerning the situation in South Sudan, the Council decided that all Member States should cooperate in efforts to seize and dispose of items of which the supply, sale or transfer was prohibited. 429

B. Decisions in which the Security Council requested mutual assistance in the implementation of measures under Article 42 of the Charter

During the period under review, the Council also adopted several resolutions in which it requested cooperation among Member States in carrying out measures under Article 42 of the Charter authorizing the use of force. The types of assistance requested ranged from sharing information and capacity-building to deter various criminal acts to coordination among Member States to deter such acts.

For example, concerning the situation in Lebanon, the Council continued to call upon Member States to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable them to perform their duties in line with resolution 1701 (2006). 430

With respect to the situation in Libya and the question of migration, the Council reiterated the calls made in previous resolutions for “all flag States involved” to cooperate in efforts to inspect vessels suspected of being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya. 431 The Council also reiterated its calls for Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations, including the European Union, to cooperate with the Government of National Accord and with each other, including by sharing information to assist Libya, upon request, in building capacity to secure its borders and to prevent, investigate and prosecute acts of smuggling of migrants and human trafficking through its territory and in its territorial sea. 432

426 Resolution 2441 (2018), para. 10.
427 Ibid., para. 9.
428 Resolution 2444 (2018), para. 20.
429 Resolution 2428 (2018), para. 9.
430 Resolution 2433 (2018), twenty-fifth preambular paragraph.
431 Resolution 2437 (2018), para. 2. See also resolution 2240 (2015), para. 9.
432 Ibid. See also resolutions 2240 (2015), paras. 2 and 3; 2312 (2016), paras. 2 and 3; and 2380 (2017), paras. 2 and 3.
IX. Special economic problems of the nature described in Article 50 of the Charter

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Note

Section IX covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 50 of the Charter, regarding the right of States to consult the Council with a view to resolving economic problems arising from the implementation of preventive or enforcement measures, such as sanctions, imposed by the Council.

During the period under review, the Council continued its practice of imposing targeted instead of comprehensive economic sanctions, thereby minimizing the unintended adverse impact on third States. None of the Council-mandated sanctions committees received formal requests for assistance under Article 50.

The Council did not explicitly invoke Article 50 in any of its decisions during the reporting period. However, consistent with prior practice in connection with the situation in Somalia, on 6 November 2018, the Council requested that cooperating States take appropriate steps to ensure that the authorized activities they undertook in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia did not have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage to the ships of any third State.

While Article 50 was not explicitly mentioned at any meeting of the Council, some references made by Council members to the consequences of sanctions during meetings were of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 50.

For example, at the 8175th meeting of the Council, held under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” on 6 February 2018, the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia underscored the need to conduct periodic reviews to determine whether sanctions were effective and if they hurt local populations. The representative of Thailand stressed that sanctions should continue to be targeted in order to minimize unintended economic and social consequences, while the representative of Egypt commended the Council on the progress made towards more intelligent and effective sanctions that reduced the negative and unintended impact on civilians and countries not parties to the conflict.

At the 8185th meeting, held on 21 February 2018 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the Secretary-General emphasized the need to avoid unintended consequences of sanctions, including humanitarian ones. The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia further reiterated the need to ensure that sanctions had the least possible humanitarian impact on civilian populations, while the representative of France noted the remarkable progress of the Council with respect to the increasingly targeted nature of sanctions, which reduced their impact on civilians.

Lastly, at the 8363rd meeting, held on 27 September 2018 under the item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, the representative of the Netherlands highlighted the key role that a well-functioning Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) could play in taking action against sanctions violations and in minimizing their humanitarian impact. The representative of Equatorial Guinea was in favour of improving the mechanism of the Committee and seeking sanctions that caused fewer humanitarian crises and had a lesser impact on third countries. The representative of Sweden, while acknowledging that the responsibility for the dire humanitarian situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea fundamentally rested with the Government, pointed out that there were concerns about the indirect negative impact of sanctions and said that enhanced efforts were needed to ensure that the humanitarian exemptions were safeguarded.

435 S/PV.8175, p. 21.
436 Ibid., p. 54 (Thailand) and p. 64 (Egypt).
437 S/PV.8185, p. 4.
438 Ibid., p. 28 (Plurinational State of Bolivia) and p. 26 (France).
439 S/PV.8363, p. 7.
440 Ibid., p. 16.
441 Ibid., p. 17.
X. Right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Note

Section X deals with the practice of the Council in relation to Article 51 of the Charter, regarding the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” in the event of an armed attack against a Member State. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers the discussions of the Council of relevance to the interpretation and application of Article 51 and subsection B covers references to Article 51 and the right to self-defence in communications addressed to the Council. The Council did not refer to Article 51 or the right of self-defence in its decisions during the reporting period.

A. Discussions relating to Article 51

In 2018, Article 51 of the Charter was explicitly invoked 25 times during the Council’s deliberations. Moreover, the right of self-defence was discussed at numerous meetings of the Council in relation to a broad range of thematic and country- and region-specific items of its agenda.

Discussions on thematic items

On 6 February 2018, during a meeting held under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, five explicit invocations of Article 51 were made by the representatives of Brazil and Mexico. The representative of Brazil noted the increasing volume of communications from Member States invoking Article 51 to justify the use of military action for counter-terrorism purposes and stated that there was ample room for improvement regarding the content, timing and circulation of such communications. He added that proper follow-up to such communications was needed to ensure that the obligations under the Charter were met and suggested the creation of a special section listing all communications received under Article 51 on the Council’s website. The representative of Mexico also noted, and expressed concern in relation to, the continuous references to Article 51 by some States to address threats to international peace and security with military action, especially against non-State actors. He said his country was troubled that such a practice, coupled with the ambiguous language of recent Council resolutions, ran the risk of a de facto broadening of exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force, as set out in Article 2 (4) of the Charter. He called for the Council to review and modify its working methods in order to lend transparency to the way in which it responded to letters addressed to it that invoked the right of self-defence under Article 51.

Under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, three meetings were held in 2018 during which either Article 51 was invoked explicitly or the right of self-defence was addressed. Explicit references to Article 51 were made during two of the three meetings, all in relation to the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. First, during a meeting held on 13 April 2018 focused on the situation in the Middle East, the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia emphasized that the use of force was legal only in the exercise of the right to self-defence, in line with Article 51, or when approved by the Council. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that, if attacked, his country would have no other choice but to apply Article 51, which gave the country the legitimate right to defend itself. Second, the following day, on 14 April 2018, at an emergency meeting held in the wake of military strikes carried out in the Syrian Arab Republic by the United States, France and the United Kingdom, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic claimed that “in response to this terrible aggression”, his country had exercised its legitimate right in line with Article 51 to defend itself. Third, on 30 May 2018, at a meeting held under the same item concerning the deteriorating

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444 S/PV.8233, p. 21.
The situation in Gaza, the representative of the United States urged the Council members to exercise at least as much scrutiny when it came to the actions of the Hamas terrorist group as it did to the actions of the Israeli self-defence of citizens from such acts of terror. The representative of Ethiopia said that it was impossible to deny Israel the right to self-defence, a right that came with a responsibility to ensure proportionality under the circumstances of escalating violence. The representative of Peru condemned any attack against civilians while also recognizing the right of Israel to guarantee its own security and to deploy legitimate defence measures, in line with the principles of proportionality, precaution and legality. The representative of Equatorial Guinea similarly called upon the Israeli authorities to use proportionate force in their “legitimate self-defence”.

Under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, two meetings were held during which either Article 51 was invoked explicitly or the right of self-defence was addressed. On 17 May 2018, at a high-level meeting of the Council, many speakers engaged in extensive discussions on the right of self-defence and its limits in the context of upholding international law. In that connection, Article 51 was explicitly invoked 10 times during the course of the meeting (see case 17).

In addition, on 9 November 2018, at a meeting held under the same item and under the sub-item entitled “Strengthening multilateralism and the role of the United Nations”, three speakers explicitly referred to Article 51. The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia stressed that the use of force was lawful only when in exercise of self-defence in accordance with Article 51 or when approved by the Council. The representative of Liechtenstein similarly noted that the Charter had made the use of force illegal, with only two exceptions: self-defence in accordance with Article 51 and the authorization of the use of force by the Council. He lamented the recent “widening interpretation” of the notion of self-defence, without much discussion or consequence.

A similar note, the representative of Brazil emphasized the need not to lose sight of the fundamental notion that the prohibition on the use of force was the rule, thereby making self-defence and Chapter VII authorizations the exception. He voiced disagreement with interpretations that sought to expand the scope of the right to self-defence, in particular with regard to non-State actors, and called on the Council to follow up on notifications received under Article 51 to ensure that the obligations laid out in the Charter were being fulfilled. The representative of the Russian Federation also recalled the basic principles and norms of international relations, including the ban on the use of force in international relations without the permission of the Council or beyond the limits of self-defence.

Discussions on country- and region-specific items

During the period under review, several explicit references to Article 51, as well as references to the right of self-defence, were made with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the situations in the Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine.

Under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the Council engaged in two extensive discussions on the question of the right of Israel to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter (see case 18). In addition, during a meeting under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, held on 25 January 2018, the representative of Turkey made an explicit reference to Article 51 in connection with the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. He affirmed that Operation Olive Branch was being conducted in line with Article 51 and with full respect for the territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic.

On 24 February 2018, under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that according to Article 51, his country had the right to defend itself with all the legal tools available. He criticized the military presence of the United States in Syrian territories and reiterated that according to Article 51, his country had the right to defend itself.

On 26 November 2018, under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations...”
addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)”, the representative of Ukraine affirmed that his country was ready to use all available means in exercising the right to self-defence, as provided for in Article 51.\footnote{S/PV.8410, p. 12.}

Lastly, on 19 December 2018, at a meeting held under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, several speakers addressed the question of the right of Israel to self-defence in connection with alleged violations of the Blue Line in the form of illegal tunnels from Lebanon into Israel (see case 19).\footnote{S/PV.8432.}

**Case 17**

**Maintenance of international peace and security**

On 17 May 2018, at the initiative of Poland, which held the presidency for the month, the Council convened its 8262nd meeting, held under the above-mentioned item and the sub-item entitled “Upholding international law within the context of the maintenance of international peace and security”.\footnote{The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 3 May 2018 from the representative of Poland addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/417/Rev.1).} During the debate, the representative of Turkey emphasized that, in the context of maintaining international peace and security, the Charter underlined the prohibition of the use of force and the legitimate right to self-defence, enshrined in Article 51.\footnote{S/PV.8262, p. 81.} The representative of China, underscoring the importance of respect for the principles contained in the Charter, including the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, stressed that unilateral operations not authorized by the Council or not carried out in the exercise of the right of self-defence ran counter to the purposes and principles of the Charter.\footnote{Ibid., p. 20.}

Several speakers deliberated on the scope and limits of the right to self-defence under Article 51. The representative of the Russian Federation recalled that Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the Charter clearly stated that military force against a State was permitted only when sanctioned by the Council or for self-defence. He also criticized the military presence of the United States and the coalition that it led in the Syrian Arab Republic. The coalition partners justified themselves by making “awkward references to self-defence against terrorism” and “so-called geopolitical stabilization” and coming up with a legal formula of “illegal but legitimate”. He noted that “this international legal nihilism” had culminated in the aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 April.\footnote{Ibid., p. 27.} The representative of Brazil pointed out that Article 51 was an exception to Article 2 (4) and that since the latter mentioned States, the former must be interpreted in that light, meaning that self-defence must be a response to an armed attack undertaken by or attributable to a State. He referred to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which held that Article 51 of the Charter recognized the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of an armed attack by one State against another. He also made reference to the travaux préparatoires of the Charter of the United Nations, stressing that it was implausible to impute to the drafters the intention to make self-defence applicable outside inter-State conflicts. Lastly, he reaffirmed that Article 51 was restrictive and should not be rewritten or reinterpreted. The conditions for any reinterpretation of Article 51 were strict and could not be changed by the practice of a few States.\footnote{Ibid., p. 47.}

The representative of Mexico said that the justifications presented by some States for using force in legitimate self-defence showed the need to consider the limits imposed by Article 51 and the inherent right of self-defence, and added that a lack of rigour in interpreting Article 51 could lead to abuse, putting international peace and security at risk. He said that of particular concern was the authorization of the use of force against non-State actors, due to a lack of legal clarity in that regard.\footnote{Ibid., p. 44.} The representative of Cyprus expressed similar concerns about recent attempts to “open the door” of Article 51 to the threat of terrorism in response to armed attacks perpetrated by non-State actors, which he cautioned carried the potential to escalate violence and abusive invocations of self-defence.\footnote{Ibid., p. 80.}

The representative of Argentina expressed concern about the issue of notifications under Article 51 and called for the Council to ensure greater transparency on its follow-up to such communications.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 65–66.}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{S/PV.8410, p. 12.}
\item \footnote{S/PV.8432.}
\item \footnote{The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 3 May 2018 from the representative of Poland addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/417/Rev.1).}
\item \footnote{S/PV.8262, p. 81.}
\item \footnote{Ibid., p. 20.}
\item \footnote{Ibid., p. 27.}
\item \footnote{Ibid., p. 44.}
\item \footnote{Ibid., p. 47.}
\item \footnote{Ibid., p. 80.}
\item \footnote{Ibid., pp. 65–66.}
\end{itemize}
Case 18
The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

On 1 June 2018, the Council convened its 8274th meeting, held under the above-referenced item. At the meeting, the Council voted on two draft resolutions submitted by Kuwait (S/2018/516) and by the United States (S/2018/520), respectively. The representative of the United States said that Council members could choose to condemn the terrorists responsible for inciting violence in Gaza and against condemning a country for acting in self-defence. The representative of Kuwait expressed the view that Israel was an “occupying Power” and stated that “the right to self-defence should not apply to the aggressor and occupier”.

The representative of Peru reaffirmed the right of Israel to guarantee its security and legitimate defence. The representative of Poland, while recognizing the right of Israel to protect its border and defend its civilian population, called on Israel to respect the rights of Palestinian civilians to peaceful protests and to adhere to the principle of proportionality in the use of force when defending its legitimate security interests. The representative of Ethiopia stated that the right of Israel to self-defence carried with it the responsibility to ensure proportionality.

During a subsequent meeting held on 24 July 2018 under the same item, the representative of the United States stated that while very careful attention was paid to every step Israel took in self-defence, it was important not to lose sight of the very real damage that was being done to Israel by terrorist attacks coming from Gaza.

The representative of Peru, while strongly condemning the firing of rockets and incendiary devices that endangered the lives of civilians and caused material damage, emphasized that the legitimacy of the right to self-defence of Israel depended on its adherence to the principles of proportionality and precaution. The representative of Poland, while recognizing the right of Israel to protect its borders and defend its legitimate security interests, urged Israel to ensure the proportional use of force and to respect the right to peaceful protests. The representative of Argentina similarly urged Israel to take into account its obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law when exercising “its inalienable right to legitimate defence”.

Case 19
The situation in the Middle East

On 19 December 2018, the Council convened its 8432nd meeting, held under the above-mentioned item, during which the Council discussed alleged violations of the Blue Line in the form of illegal tunnels from Lebanon into Israel. At the meeting, the representative of the United States expressed strong support for the efforts of Israel to defend its sovereignty and unconditionally affirmed the country’s right to self-defence. The representatives of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Peru and Equatorial Guinea also recognized the right of Israel to defend itself. The representative of the Russian Federation, while acknowledging the right of Israel to defend its national security, including by preventing any illegal penetration of its territory by anyone, expressed hope that any action taken in that regard would not run counter to the provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) defining the rules of conduct of the parties in the area of the Blue Line, which he said was not an internationally recognized boundary.

The representative of Lebanon expressed concern over the words of the Prime Minister of Israel claiming the right of Israel to “pre-emptive self-defence”, and added that what was seen by the Prime Minister as self-defence was seen as a “threat in Beirut”. She said that the so-called Israeli right to “pre-emptive self-defence” had no international legal basis and was used to justify illegal aggressive acts and invasions. The representative of Israel reiterated that Israel had the full right, like any other nation in the world, to defend itself, its sovereignty and its people, and noted that Israel would continue Operation Northern Shield to protect itself and ensure the safety of its people.
B. References to Article 51 and the right of self-defence in communications addressed to the Security Council

In 2018, Article 51 was explicitly invoked in 10 communications from Member States addressed to the President of the Council or circulated as a document of the Council. Those communications concerned a variety of disputes and situations. The complete list of letters from Member States containing explicit references to Article 51 is given in table 13.

In addition, references to the principle of self-defence were found in other communications from several Member States, including the Syrian Arab Republic, declaring that it had exercised its legitimate right of self-defence in response to the military strikes carried out by the United States, France and the United Kingdom on 14 April in the Syrian Arab Republic; the Islamic Republic of Iran, claiming its right to self-defence in relation to “pre-emptive military attacks” purportedly carried out by Israel; the Islamic Republic of Iran, invoking the right to self-defence of the Syrian Arab Republic in response to an alleged “aggression” by Israel that included “launching rocket attacks and air strikes”; the Islamic Republic of Iran, indicating that the Iranian missile programme was an effective means for exercising “the right to self-defence in the event of any armed attack”; Lebanon, underscoring that Israel must “be stopped from using the pretext of ‘self-defence’ to launch devastating wars”; and Armenia, in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, claiming that Artsakh had “no other choice but to resort to self-defence”.

Article 51 of the Charter was also explicitly referenced in the sixth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and in the letter dated 11 December 2018 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Council, both of which recalled letters received by the Council from the Islamic Republic of Iran invoking its legitimate right to self-defence under Article 51. The remaining explicit references to Article 51 can be found in the letter from the representative of Kuwait transmitting a summary of the views and proposals put forward by participants in the open debate held on 6 February 2018 concerning the working methods of the Council.

Identical letters dated 14 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/150).

Identical letters dated 20 February 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1061).

Identical letters dated 12 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/1106).

Identical letters dated 20 January 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council.

Identical letters dated 5 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council.

S/2018/352

Identical letters dated 20 February 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council.

Identical letters dated 1 February 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council.

Identical letters dated 20 February 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council.

Identical letters dated 9 May 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/445).

Identical letters dated 20 January 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/150).

Identical letters dated 20 February 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/352).

Identical letters dated 20 January 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1061).

Identical letters dated 5 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council.

Identical letters dated 1 February 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council.

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Identical letters dated 20 February 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council.

Identical letters dated 20 January 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1061).

Identical letters dated 12 November 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/1106).

Identical letters dated 20 January 2018 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1018).

Identical letters dated 20 February 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2018/1106).

See S/2018/697 and S/2018/891, respectively, both of which are included in table 13.

Identical letters dated 5 April 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/399). See also S/PV.8175.

Table 13
Communications from Member States containing explicit references to Article 51 of the Charter, in 2018

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### Part VII. Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression (Chapter VII of the Charter)

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Part VIII
Regional arrangements
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Introductory note

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations provides the constitutional basis for the involvement of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security. While Article 52 encourages the engagement of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes prior to their referral to the Security Council, Article 53 allows the Council to utilize regional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority and with its explicit authorization. Article 54 stipulates that regional arrangements should inform the Council of their activities at all times.

During the period under review, the Council reaffirmed the importance of enhancing cooperation between the United Nations and regional arrangements, pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter, on conflict prevention and resolution.

1 Chapter VIII of the Charter refers to “regional arrangements or agencies”. For the purposes of the Repertoire, the term “regional arrangements” is understood to encompass regional and subregional organizations as well as other international organizations.
peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The Council acknowledged the progress made in the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, evidenced by the increasing number of joint missions, briefings, reports and declarations, and underlined the importance of developing an effective partnership underpinned by consultations between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held their twelfth annual joint consultative meeting in New York on 19 July 2018.\textsuperscript{2} Engagement with other organizations in addition to the African Union, such as the Organization of American States, the League of Arab States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, featured prominently in the discussions in the Council.

In 2018, the Council focused in its deliberations on the modalities for planning and mandating operations and the need for adherence to international human rights, international humanitarian law, and conduct and discipline compliance frameworks. In addition, the issue of ensuring predictable and sustainable funding for African Union-led peacekeeping operations was extensively debated in the meetings of the Council.

In connection with the pacific settlement of disputes, the Council continued to highlight in its decisions the crucial importance of the role played by regional and subregional arrangements in mediation and good offices to end conflicts and ensure successful peace negotiations. The Council highlighted the mediation efforts of regional and subregional arrangements in the resolution of political crises and the implementation of peace agreements in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali and Somalia, and sustainable peace and security in Afghanistan and the Central African Republic.

Concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations, the Council renewed the authorization of two existing missions, namely the African Union Mission in Somalia and EUFOR-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Kosovo Force of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continued to operate, no decisions being taken with respect to its mandate. The Council also commended the countries of West Africa and the Sahel for addressing the security challenges in the region through the deployment of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and called for its full operationalization. As in previous periods, the Council authorized enforcement action by regional and subregional organizations beyond the framework of peacekeeping operations in relation to Libya, Somalia and South Sudan, and continued to request reporting by regional organizations, in particular on mandate implementation of relevant regional peacekeeping operations and cooperation with the United Nations.

The practice of the Council under Chapter VIII of the Charter in 2018 is illustrated below in five sections. Each section covers both the decisions adopted by the Council and the discussions held during Council meetings. Section I examines the practice of the Council regarding cooperation with regional and subregional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security concerning items of a thematic nature. Section II deals with the recognition by the Council of the efforts of regional arrangements in the peaceful settlement of disputes, within the framework of Article 52 of the Charter. Section III covers the practice of the Council in connection with cooperation with regional organizations in the area of peacekeeping. Section IV describes the practice of the Council in authorizing enforcement actions by regional organizations outside the context of regional peacekeeping operations. Section V refers to reporting on the activities of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security.

\textsuperscript{2} See S/2018/736.
I. Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations under thematic items

Note

Section I examines the practice of the Council in 2018 in cooperating with regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, in connection with items of a thematic nature. The section is organized under two headings: (a) decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII; and (b) discussions on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII.

A. Decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII of the Charter

During the period under review, the Council explicitly referred to Chapter VIII of the Charter in two of its decisions on thematic issues.3 Under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the Council reiterated that cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations was critical to contributing to the prevention of the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, in line with Chapter VIII.4 The Council acknowledged the determined work to strengthen strategic cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, which could play an important role in conflict prevention. In that regard, the Council encouraged consideration of the need to support the pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements or by regional agencies in accordance with Chapter VIII.5 The Council encouraged the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to ensure better use of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy tools in cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.6

Under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the Council recalled resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) and underlined the importance of partnership and political and operational cooperation with regional and subregional arrangements and organizations, in particular the African Union, in accordance with Chapter VIII, in supporting peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities.7 Underlining the need for collective action to improve United Nations peacekeeping, the Council also recognized that peacekeeping operations could benefit from the collective engagement of the Council; Member States, including troop- and police-contributing countries, donors and host countries; the Secretariat; and regional and subregional organizations.8

In other decisions on various thematic issues, the Council, without explicit reference to Chapter VIII, recognized and referred to the role of regional and subregional arrangements. Under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, focusing on the regional partnership in Afghanistan and Central Asia, the Council stressed the importance of advancing regional, interregional and international cooperation to achieve long-term peace, stability and sustainable development in Afghanistan and Central Asia.9 Specifically, the Council welcomed the involvement of Afghanistan in the Central Asian regional mechanisms for cooperation on counterterrorism, including in implementing the Joint Plan of Action for the Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia.10 The Council also expressed support for the activities of the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan as a platform for cross-border economic dialogue.11

In connection with the item entitled “Children and armed conflict”, the Council requested the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to continue engaging with regional and subregional organizations and also called upon regional and subregional bodies, within their respective mandates and in close cooperation with the Governments of the countries concerned, to establish appropriate strategies and coordination mechanisms for information exchange and cooperation on child protection concerns, in particular on cross-border issues.12 The Council further encouraged regional and subregional organizations and arrangements to continue mainstreaming child protection into their advocacy, policies, programmes and mission planning.

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3 S/PRST/2018/1, seventeenth and twenty-third paragraphs; and S/PRST/2018/10, seventh paragraph.
4 S/PRST/2018/1, twenty-third paragraph.
5 Ibid., seventeenth paragraph.
6 Ibid., sixteenth paragraph.
7 S/PRST/2018/10, seventh paragraph.
8 Ibid., twenty-seventh paragraph.
9 S/PRST/2018/2, eighth paragraph.
10 Ibid., thirteenth paragraph.
11 Ibid., final paragraph.
12 Resolution 2427 (2018), paras. 5 and 10.
as well as to train personnel and include child protection staff in their peacekeeping and field operations and establish, within their secretariats, child protection mechanisms, including through appointing child protection focal points, as well as develop and expand regional and subregional initiatives to prevent violations and abuses against children affected by armed conflict. Recognizing the link between abductions, recruitment, sexual violence and trafficking, and the fact that children in situations of armed conflict could be especially vulnerable to trafficking in persons in armed conflict and to those forms of exploitation, the Council encouraged relevant parts of the United Nations system and international and regional bodies, within their respective mandates, to work to address the issue.

Under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, the Council strongly encouraged Member States and relevant regional, subregional and international organizations to enhance cooperation and strategies to prevent terrorists from benefiting from transnational organized crime, including by strengthening national, regional and global systems to collect, analyse and exchange information, including law enforcement and intelligence information. Noting that the nature and scope of the linkages between terrorism and transnational organized crime varied by context, the Council further encouraged Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations and forums, to continue conducting research to better understand the nature and scope of the links that might exist between terrorists and transnational organized criminals and enhance knowledge of and support initiatives to address, in the design and implementation of global, regional and national counter-terrorism strategies, the linkages between terrorism and transnational organized crime. The Council also recalled its previous resolutions and presidential statements underscoring the importance of developing effective partnerships between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations and forums, in accordance with the Charter and the relevant statutes of the regional and subregional organizations.

Regarding the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”, the Council welcomed the Peacebuilding Commission’s collaboration with regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union, and emphasized the importance of further engagement with relevant regional actors on regional and country-specific issues with the consent of the countries concerned. The Council also underscored the fact that the Commission represented a unique platform for convening key actors, such as Member States, including host States and concerned countries, relevant United Nations actors and regional organizations, with a view to enhancing coordination, advocacy and resource mobilization for peacebuilding activities.

B. Discussions on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII of the Charter

At a number of Council meetings held in 2018, speakers discussed the role of regional and subregional organizations under the items entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, “Maintenance of international peace and security”, “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”, “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, “United Nations peacekeeping operations” and “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”. In discussions held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, speakers referred to the importance of regional frameworks in Central Asia for the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan (see case 1). Under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council engaged in discussions on strengthening cooperation with the African Union, with a focus on the strategic partnership between the two organizations for peacekeeping and support operations (see case 2) and engagement with the Organization of American States in the context of the situation in Nicaragua (see case 3).

13 Ibid., para. 11.
14 Ibid., para. 39.
15 S/PRST/2018/9, second paragraph.
16 Ibid., third and seventh paragraphs.
17 Ibid., eighth paragraph.
18 S/PRST/2018/20, seventeenth paragraph.
19 Ibid., ninth paragraph. For more information on the Peacebuilding Commission, see part IX, sect. VII.
20 S/PV.8314, S/PV.8340 and S/PV.8414.
22 S/PV.8413.
23 S/PV.8264.
24 S/PV.8218 and S/PV.8349.
25 S/PV.8200.
Case 1
Maintenance of international peace and security

At its 8162nd meeting, on 19 January 2018, the Council held a ministerial-level debate under the sub-item entitled “Building regional partnership in Afghanistan and Central Asia as a model to link security and development”, during which the Council heard a briefing by the Secretary-General. The meeting was held at the initiative of Kazakhstan, which held the presidency for that month. During the meeting, the representatives of Kuwait and Ethiopia explicitly referred to Chapter VIII of the Charter.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, presiding over the Council, remarked that stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan would present an opportunity for Central Asian countries to reinvigorate regional cooperation. He expressed the hope that increased dialogue and connectivity would help to address challenges such as the threat of terrorism and recognized the importance of close coordination between Afghanistan and Central Asian States in combating the cultivation, production, trade and trafficking of illicit drugs. He further noted that long-term stability and prosperity in the region should be guided by the principle of an integrated approach based on three pillars, including a regional approach for the streamlining of efforts by regional organizations and frameworks, such as the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan and the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Programme.

During the debate, many representatives affirmed their support for ongoing efforts to boost regional economic cooperation and long-term stability. Others raised concerns about continued threats to stability and violence owing to widespread narcotics production and terrorism. In that regard, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait expressed concern regarding the continued threats to security and stability in Afghanistan owing to the presence of terrorist and extremist groups such as the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh). He also stated that the meeting reflected the provisions of Chapter VIII, which underscored the clear role of regional and subregional organizations in resolving conflicts through peaceful and diplomatic means.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland stressed the importance of regional cooperation to promote not only the economic and social development but also the peace and stability of Afghanistan. The location of Central Asia and Afghanistan presented a unique opportunity to enhance direct and multinational cooperation aimed at constructing transport and logistics infrastructure that would interconnect Europe and Asia. Pointing out that even the most ambitious agenda with regard to regional economic connectivity could fail owing to an unstable security situation, he emphasized that a secure, stable and prosperous Afghanistan was a prerequisite for peace and stability in the region.

Noting the unprecedented growth in Afghan narcotics production, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation stressed the importance of adopting practical measures to launch a process of national reconciliation and noted that a dialogue had been launched in conjunction with partners and like-minded stakeholders, reviving the work of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization-Afghanistan Contact Group. In addition, a partnership was being built between Afghanistan and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Highlighting the need for mutually beneficial cooperation based on a balance of interests, he noted that Central Asian countries must respect all their obligations within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. He added that both the Eurasian Economic Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States could contribute to the general efforts by opening broad and promising markets in Afghanistan.

The representative of France, noting the Council’s visit to Afghanistan earlier in January, underlined the high level of insecurity and violence in Afghanistan and the fragility of the humanitarian situation. Welcoming the presidential statement issued at the meeting (S/PRST/2018/2), which for the first time highlighted the special ties linking Afghanistan and Central Asia, he stated that it was essential that

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26 The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 2 January 2018 from the representative of Kazakhstan to the Secretary-General (S/2018/7).
27 S/PV.8162, p. 6 (Kuwait) and p. 23 (Ethiopia).
28 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
30 Ibid., p. 8 (Poland), p. 9 (Russian Federation), p. 18 (France), p. 27 (Tajikistan), p. 32 (Islamic Republic of Iran) and p. 36 (Turkey).
31 Ibid., pp. 6–7.
32 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
33 Ibid., pp. 9–10.
Afghanistan be able to benefit from its geographical location in the heart of Asia; hence, its increasing involvement in multiple projects to increase connectivity between Afghanistan and Central Asia must be encouraged.34

Several representatives of the countries of the Central Asian region discussed the situation on the ground, describing the ongoing regional initiatives and frameworks to enhance economic cooperation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan said that the region was currently facing pressing challenges: an expansion of international terrorism, an increase in extremism, transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, and the exacerbation of environmental issues, such as climate change and desertification. He said that the current situation required that the countries of the region take more robust action and make firm commitments by facilitating regional cooperation and partnerships. Noting the role of regional organizations, he called for the strengthening of cooperation between the relevant United Nations institutions and regional organizations, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.35

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan commended the efforts made within the framework of the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan, expressed support for initiatives aimed at establishing peace and achieving national reconciliation in Afghanistan, and said that the countries of Central Asia were ready to engage actively in the process of building peace and stability in Afghanistan. With regard to the production and export of Afghan opium, he noted that some important regional projects had been adopted as a result of the seventh ministerial-level Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, held in November 2017, and emphasized the importance of pursuing joint efforts to integrate the economy of Afghanistan with those of other countries in the region by expanding cooperation and improving regional infrastructure, trade, investment, transit and transport projects.36

Speaking on regional security initiatives such as the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation and the C5+Afghanistan cooperation framework, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan said that the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process, an Afghan-led initiative, would remain a key focus in work to increase cooperation between Afghanistan and Central Asian countries through various platforms, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In addition, he highlighted the tireless work of the Government of Afghanistan to advance economic cooperation through the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference and drew attention to the opportunity to transform the nexus of regional threats into a nexus of peace, security, economic growth and development for prosperity.37

Case 2
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 18 July 2018, the Council held its 8314th meeting, under the sub-item entitled “African Union”, with a particular focus on sustainable financing mechanisms for African Union-led peacekeeping operations. The Council heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union and the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security.38 During the meeting, several speakers explicitly referred to Chapter VIII of the Charter.39

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union noted the importance of framing the issue of predictable and sustainable financing for African Union peace support operations authorized by the Council within the context of a common political strategy, agreed to by the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and informed by joint analyses and assessments of conflict situations. She said that the Council should view its support for African Union peace support operations as a means by which it could exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security through effective collaboration with regional organizations, in accordance with Chapter VIII.40

34 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
37 Ibid., pp. 29–30.
38 S/PV.8314, pp. 2–6.
40 Ibid., p. 4.
Several speakers also stressed the need to provide Africa-led peacekeeping operations with sustainable and predictable funding. The representative of China noted that, as African Union peacekeeping operations faced difficulties in terms of human and financial resources, there was a need to actively explore innovative ways to resolve the funding issue. With respect to the African Union Military Observer Mission in Somalia in particular, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that the international community needed to step up and provide vital contributions to the Mission in the short and medium terms. The representative of France argued that, in order to enhance African peace operations, there was a need to move concretely and swiftly towards their predictable and sustainable financing. He also stated that, given the current situation, African peace enforcement operations, which would complement United Nations peacekeeping operations, should enjoy sound and predictable funding, including through mandatory contributions from the United Nations. The representative of Kazakhstan called upon the Council to consider practical steps to develop a mechanism to ensure the sustainable and predictable joint financing of African Union peace operations and said that conflict prevention should be prioritized.

The Deputy Foreign Minister of Sweden, welcoming the renewed momentum in the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, stated that the need for flexible, predictable and sustainable funding of African Union peace operations was clear and welcomed the access to assessed United Nations contributions for African Union-conducted peace operations. She also noted the progress in the development of the compliance framework and stressed the need to invest time and energy in United Nations-African Union cooperation in the area of conflict prevention and resolution. The representative of Equatorial Guinea, speaking also on behalf of Côte d’Ivoire and Ethiopia, highlighted the importance of improving operational cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in the areas of conflict prevention and mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In that regard, he recalled resolution 2378 (2017), in which the Council expressed its intention to give further consideration to practical steps that could be taken, and the conditions necessary, to establish a mechanism through which African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Council could be partly financed through United Nations assessed contributions. He further emphasized that the $47 million raised by African Union member States for the Peace Fund proved that those States were seriously committed to achieving the goal of 25 per cent self-funding. The three African members of the Council expected a similar commitment from the United Nations, in line with resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017).

The representative of the Netherlands said that the Secretary-General, in his report on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa, including on the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union (S/2018/678), rightly observed that regional interests and proximity to the parties could also complicate matters. On the provision of financial support for African Union peacekeeping, she called upon the Council to step up its efforts and added that sustainable, predictable and flexible financing would enhance the effectiveness of African Union peacekeeping. She further expressed support for the Secretary-General’s intention to explore financing options in greater technical detail with the General Assembly.

The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia voiced his support for the African Union’s request for a predictable and flexible budget and for economic support for peace and security operations. He also expressed regret that the Council had ignored the express request of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development that targeted sanctions and an arms embargo not be imposed at a time when headway was being made in the dialogue in South Sudan. He also noted that it was crucial to grant a greater leadership role to the African Union in decision-making on matters that concerned it.

The representative of the United States said that the United States would not consider additional financial support through the United Nations for any future African Union-led operations authorized by the Council under Chapter VIII until African Union peace organizations and operations demonstrably implemented benchmarks for financial transparency,
conduct and discipline, and human rights. While recognizing the progress that the African Union had made towards developing compliance frameworks for international humanitarian law and human rights, he urged the United Nations and the African Union to continue to prioritize the development and implementation of standards in order to achieve greater transparency and accountability in African Union peace support operations.\[^{50}\]

The representative of the Russian Federation stated that it was extremely important to maintain the current United Nations procedures for considering and approving the relevant budgetary applications to ensure transparency and accountability in the allocation and use of funds, and that strengthening cooperation between the two organizations would inevitably mean additional responsibilities for the regional actors, for which they must be fully prepared.\[^{51}\] The representative of Poland underlined the need to ensure the full compliance of African-led peace operations with United Nations rules and standards in terms of troop quality, training and equipment, as well as accountability, conduct and discipline.\[^{52}\]

**Case 3**

**Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security**

At its 8340th meeting, on 5 September 2018, the Council discussed the situation in Nicaragua for the first time, under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”.\[^{53}\] The Council heard briefings by the Chief of Staff to the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS) and a former Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defence of Nicaragua and civil society leader. The representatives of Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) also participated in the meeting. During the meeting, two Council members explicitly referred to Chapter VIII of the Charter.\[^{54}\] In addition, one explicit reference to Article 52\[^{55}\] and one explicit reference to Article 54 were made.\[^{56}\]

While Council members largely diverged in their opinions concerning the relevance of the meeting to the responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,\[^{57}\] several speakers concurred on the importance of the role of regional organizations, in particular OAS, in addressing the situation in Nicaragua and expressed support for or welcomed the efforts of OAS in Nicaragua.\[^{58}\] The representative of the Russian Federation said that his delegation was categorically opposed to discussing the situation in Nicaragua. He stated that the United States presidency of the Council had used a “regional rationale in order to shovel the Nicaraguan issue” onto the Council’s agenda and called upon Washington to “refrain from its efforts in the colonial tradition to influence the situation in Nicaragua”.\[^{59}\] The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia echoed that view, rejecting the holding of the meeting on the basis that Nicaragua did not constitute any kind of threat to the region or the world. He stated that it was “absurd” to draw attention to the internal situation of a Member State under the theme “regional and subregional cooperation” and added that the argument for addressing the situation in Nicaragua was not applicable under Article 54 of the Charter, by virtue of which regional bodies should keep the Council informed of activities undertaken or being contemplated under regional arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security.\[^{60}\]

The representative of Kuwait recalled the essential role that regional and subregional organizations played in dealing with regional issues before they escalated, in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter, which provided for them to deal with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.\[^{61}\] The representative of the United Kingdom said that it was right that the Council had been made aware by a regional organization of its worry that the situation in Nicaragua could begin to have effects throughout the region and stated that the Council should never reach a stage at which it could not hear from a regional organization about its

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50 Ibid., pp. 12–13.

51 Ibid., pp. 13–14.

52 Ibid., p. 16.

53 For more information on this item, see part I, sect. 38, and part II, sect. II, “Agenda”.

54 S/PV.8340, p. 9 (Peru) and p. 16 (Equatorial Guinea).

55 Ibid., p. 7 (Kuwait).

56 Ibid., p. 17 (Plurinational State of Bolivia).

57 For further details on the discussions relating to the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, see part V, sect. I.B.


59 Ibid., pp. 6–7.

60 Ibid., pp. 16–17.

61 Ibid., p. 7.
concerns about what was happening in territory for which it was responsible.\textsuperscript{62}

The representative of Kazakhstan stated that the situation in Nicaragua did not fall under the mandate of the Council since it did not constitute a threat to international peace and security. He suggested that the United Nations be involved only through the mediation efforts and good offices of the Secretary-General. He also emphasized that stronger engagement and respectful cooperation by regional organizations in resolving the situation would be a crucial step towards the normalization of the political situation in Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{63}

The representative of Equatorial Guinea recalled that Chapter VIII defined the mechanisms and means necessary for interaction between the Council and regional and subregional organizations. He stated that the situation in Nicaragua should be addressed not by including it in the programme of work of the Council but by encouraging the international community, in particular OAS and the Catholic Church, to continue its constructive mediation role so as to establish the necessary external conditions to facilitate consultations, dialogue and agreement to avert a deterioration of the situation, and by calling upon the Government of Nicaragua to open up to the international community and facilitate the establishment of the mechanisms necessary for a resolution of the political crisis.\textsuperscript{64}

The representative of Peru stated that the holding of the meeting was relevant under Chapter VIII, which provided that the Council must be kept fully informed of the activities undertaken by regional organizations for the maintenance of international peace and security, and noted that, despite the efforts of OAS, the Government of Nicaragua had thus far rejected the offer to engage in constructive dialogue and had limited its cooperation with various entities of the inter-American and United Nations systems.\textsuperscript{65}

The representative of France stated that the Council had a responsibility to support and assist conflict-prevention diplomacy without ideology and in full respect for the principles of the Charter.\textsuperscript{66} The representative of the Netherlands said that his delegation saw a key role for the Council to play in conflict prevention by addressing root causes, such as human rights violations, and that the engagement of local and regional actors was essential to addressing the current crisis.\textsuperscript{67} Noting that “one nation’s crisis becomes a region’s crisis – even a global crisis”, the representative of the United States expressed her country’s full support for the efforts of OAS and applauded the Council for adding its powerful voice to those calling for an end to tyranny in Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{68}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{62} Ibid., p. 8.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Ibid., p. 14.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p. 16.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 9.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Ibid., p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Ibid., pp. 18–19.
\end{itemize}

II. Recognition of the efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes

Note

Section II deals with recognition by the Council of the efforts of regional and subregional organizations in the pacific settlement of local disputes, within the framework of Article 52 of the Charter. The section is divided into two subsections: (a) decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes; and (b) discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes

During the period under review, in several of its decisions, the Council welcomed, commended and encouraged the engagement of regional and subregional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes, as described in further detail below. The Council did not explicitly refer to Article 52 in any of its decisions.

Regarding the situation in Afghanistan, the Council reiterated the importance of advancing regional and interregional cooperation to promote
long-term peace and security and welcomed joint efforts to enhance dialogue and collaboration and to advance shared goals of economic development across the region.\(^69\) The Council reaffirmed its support for the Afghan-led regional efforts within the framework of the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan and the summits of the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan.\(^70\) The Council also welcomed the ongoing efforts to build trust and cooperation, including by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia.\(^71\)

Concerning the situation in Burundi, the Council welcomed and expressed support for the renewed commitment by the African Union and the East African Community, expressed at the thirtieth African Union summit and the nineteenth East African Community summit, to a peaceful resolution of the political situation in Burundi through an inclusive dialogue on the basis of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi of 28 August 2000. The Council noted its deep concern over the slow progress of the political dialogue and called for all Burundian stakeholders to participate actively and unconditionally in the process. The Council also emphasized that it was crucial for all parties, especially the Government, to commit to the East African Community-led process and reach an agreement ahead of the 2020 elections.\(^72\) The Council called upon the United Nations, the African Union, the East African Community, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the guarantors of the Arusha Agreement to coordinate their efforts to assist Burundian stakeholders in settling outstanding issues in the implementation of the Arusha Agreement and noted with appreciation the readiness of the African Union to deploy the High-Level Committee of Heads of State on Burundi.\(^73\) Lastly, the Council reiterated its concern over the significant delays in the deployment of African Union human rights observers and military experts and expressed support for the African Union call for the rapid signing of the memorandum of understanding relating to their activities in Burundi.\(^74\)

In connection with the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council emphasized the importance of the role and high-level commitment of the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and neighbouring countries that were part of the panel of facilitators of the African initiative to promote lasting peace and stability in the Central African Republic.\(^75\) The Council reaffirmed its support for the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and the road map of the Initiative, which was adopted at the ministerial conference held in Libreville on 17 July 2017 by the Central African Republic authorities, the African Union, ECCAS and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.\(^76\) The Council also welcomed the high-level ministerial meeting held on 27 September 2018 and co-chaired by the Central African Republic, the United Nations, the African Union and ECCAS, and reiterated the need to strengthen coordination of all efforts and initiatives under the leadership of the African Union in support of the African Initiative.\(^77\) The Council called upon the African Union, ECCAS, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and neighbouring countries to step up their coordination and efforts for the next steps in the implementation of the Libreville road map.\(^78\)

Regarding the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council encouraged the continuation of efforts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to restore peace and security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and further encouraged the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to ensure continuous close cooperation with those and other international parties.\(^79\) The Council called for continued and close coordination between the United Nations, the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, SADC and other key regional actors to ensure the full

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\(^{69}\) Resolution 2405 (2018), tenth preambular paragraph.

\(^{70}\) Ibid., para. 40.

\(^{71}\) Ibid.

\(^{72}\) S/PRST/2018/7, second paragraph.

\(^{73}\) Ibid., fourth paragraph.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., fourteenth paragraph.

\(^{75}\) Resolution 2448 (2018), para. 5; and S/PRST/2018/14, fifth paragraph.

\(^{76}\) Resolution 2448 (2018), para. 2; and S/PRST/2018/14, fourth paragraph.

\(^{77}\) Resolution 2448 (2018), para. 4.

\(^{78}\) Ibid., para. 5.

\(^{79}\) Resolution 2409 (2018), eighteenth preambular paragraph.
implementation of the Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement signed in Kinshasa on 31 December 2016 and the successful conclusion of the electoral process.\(^{80}\) The Council welcomed the commitment of the United Nations, the African Union, SADC, the European Union and the International Organization of la Francophonie to support the electoral process and the establishment of a joint team of experts from those organizations, as well as the role of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.\(^{81}\) Lastly, on the issue of human rights, the Council urged the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to hold accountable those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights, including those committed in the context of the electoral process, and stressed the importance to that end of both regional cooperation and cooperation by the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the International Criminal Court, as well as cooperation with the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.\(^{82}\)

With respect to the situation in Guinea-Bissau, the Council commended the continued mediation efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to promote the implementation of the road map entitled “Agreement on the resolution of the political crisis in Guinea-Bissau” as the primary framework for a peaceful resolution of the political crisis.\(^{83}\) The Council encouraged international partners, in particular the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries to continue to work together towards the country’s stabilization, in accordance with the priority structural reforms established by the Government.\(^{84}\) In that regard, the Council encouraged ECOWAS and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries to take the necessary steps towards organizing a meeting of the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau, in consultation with the United Nations, the European Union and all stakeholders.\(^{85}\) The Council also encouraged ECOWAS to continue extending its political support to the authorities and political leaders of Guinea-Bissau through the use of good offices and mediation and to continue close coordination with the United Nations, the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries and the European Union.\(^{86}\) The Council further encouraged the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, the European Union and the United Nations to provide support to ECOWAS.\(^{87}\)

Concerning the situation in Mali, the Council encouraged regional partners to provide the necessary support for the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.\(^{88}\) Stressing the importance of inclusive, free, fair, transparent and credible elections in Mali, the Council called for the continuation of a constructive dialogue between the Government, the opposition and all relevant stakeholders on the modalities of the presidential elections, which was essential for the transparency and credibility of the electoral process. It also expressed support for the efforts currently deployed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali, in coordination with the High Representative of the African Union for Mali and the Sahel and Head of the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel and the ECOWAS representative, to support such dialogue.\(^{89}\) Regarding the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the Council also requested the Secretary-General to continue to ensure enhanced cooperation and information-sharing between MINUSMA, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and subregional organizations, including ECOWAS.\(^{90}\)

In connection with the item entitled “Peace consolidation in West Africa”, the Council expressed full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel and looked forward to ongoing activities undertaken by UNOWAS in the areas of conflict prevention, mediation and good offices, and subregional and regional cooperation to address root causes and cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security.\(^{91}\) The Council welcomed the peaceful general election held in Liberia on 10 October 2017 and the run-off presidential election on 26 December 2017, and expressed appreciation for the efforts of international and regional facilitators, including ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations. The Council also encouraged the continued engagement of the international community to assist the continued efforts

\(^{80}\) Ibid., para. 5.
\(^{81}\) Ibid., para. 9.
\(^{82}\) Ibid., para. 11.
\(^{83}\) Resolution 2404 (2018), ninth and tenth preambular paragraphs.
\(^{84}\) Ibid., seventh, eighth and tenth preambular paragraphs and paras. 12, 16 and 23.
\(^{85}\) Ibid., para. 13.
\(^{86}\) Ibid., paras. 12 and 24.
\(^{87}\) Ibid., para. 23.
\(^{88}\) Resolution 2423 (2018), para. 16.
\(^{89}\) Ibid., para. 23.
\(^{90}\) Ibid., para. 30.
\(^{91}\) S/PRST/2018/3, third paragraph.
of Liberia to achieve sustainable peace, including in support of the commitments made in the Liberia peacebuilding plan. The Council expressed its concern over the challenging security situation in West Africa and the Sahel. It also reiterated its concern over the situation in Guinea-Bissau, called upon all political leaders to uphold the provisions of the Conakry Agreement on the Implementation of the ECOWAS Road Map for the Resolution of the Political Crisis in Guinea-Bissau and commended the continued engagement of ECOWAS in helping efforts to resolve the political impasse. Regarding security in West Africa and the Sahel, the Council commended the efforts of the African Union and ECOWAS to strengthen border security and regional cooperation. The Council also looked forward to efforts to enhance ongoing activities undertaken by UNOWAS in the area of conflict prevention, including the development of comprehensive early warning analyses, mediation and good offices, and efforts to enhance subregional capacities to cooperate in that regard, in particular the cooperation between the African Union, ECCAS and ECOWAS on early warning systems. The Council welcomed the recent high-level United Nations-African Union mission to the Sahel and emphasized the need for an integrated gender perspective in the design and implementation of comprehensive strategies to address the root causes of the crisis. The Council also welcomed the efforts of UNOWAS and ECOWAS to work towards the systematic involvement of women in initiatives to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism. The Council expressed its concern at increased tensions between pastoralists and farmers in the region and encouraged ECOWAS and its member States, with the support of UNOWAS, to address those challenges in a coordinated and holistic manner. Stressing the need to strengthen collective engagement across the Sahel region, in line with existing frameworks, the Council welcomed the strengthened cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, in particular through the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, and took note of the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to reactivate the Nouakchott Process and the review of the African Union strategy for the Sahel.

With respect to the situation in Somalia, the Council made an explicit reference to Chapter VIII of the Charter in two of its decisions. It reiterated the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations under the Council’s authority consistent with Chapter VIII. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to work closely with the African Union in supporting the implementation of the resolution and encouraged close collaboration between the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia at all levels.

Concerning the situation in the Abyei Area, in decisions adopted in connection with the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, the Council commended the continued assistance provided to the parties by the African Union, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and encouraged the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan to continue coordinating efforts towards calling for the full implementation of the 2011 agreements, namely the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, the Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan on Border Security and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, and the Agreement on the Border Monitoring Support Mission between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of South Sudan. The Council expressed disappointment that the parties had taken few steps to implement the Agreement and requested them to update the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the steps outlined in the resolution. The Council also encouraged the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei to coordinate with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and the

92 Ibid., seventh paragraph.
93 Ibid., tenth paragraph.
94 Ibid., eighth paragraph.
95 Ibid., thirteenth paragraph.
96 Ibid., penultimate paragraph; and S/PRST/2018/16, fourth paragraph.
97 S/PRST/2018/16, twelfth paragraph.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., fifteenth paragraph.
100 Ibid., twentieth paragraph.
101 Resolution 2431 (2018), para. 32; and S/PRST/2018/13, ninth paragraph.
102 S/PRST/2018/13, ninth paragraph.
103 Resolution 2431 (2018), para. 25.
104 Resolution 2416 (2018), fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs and para. 8.
105 Ibid., para. 6.
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on reconciliation, community sensitization and political peace processes.  

In connection with the situation in Darfur, the Council emphasized the crucial role of the African Union in the stabilization of Darfur and the importance of the work of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel. The Council encouraged the Government of the Sudan, the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and the United Nations country team to engage with the African Union Commission in support of the political process, security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The Council also encouraged all parties to the conflict to engage constructively with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to implement the Panel’s road map in full. Concerning conflict-related sexual violence, the Council urged the Government of the Sudan, with the support of the United Nations, in particular the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and the African Union to develop a structured framework through which conflict-related sexual violence would be comprehensively addressed.

With respect to the conflict in South Sudan, the Council welcomed the commitment and efforts of IGAD, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, the African Union, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations to continue engaging with South Sudanese leaders to address the current crisis. The Council stressed that the IGAD high-level revitalization forum was a unique window of opportunity, but equally a last chance for the parties to achieve sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan, and called upon South Sudanese parties to demonstrate the political will to peacefully resolve the conflict. The Council also took note that the African Union, IGAD and the Council had demanded that parties that violated the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access must be held accountable. The Council also requested the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan to exercise his or her good offices to lead the United Nations system in South Sudan in assisting the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, the African Union, IGAD and other actors, as well as the parties, with implementation of the Agreement and to promote peace and reconciliation. On justice and impunity, the Council took note of the steps taken by the African Union towards the setting-up of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan and welcomed the African Union’s formal invitation for the United Nations to provide technical assistance in that regard. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to make technical assistance available to the African Union Commission in setting up the Court and establishing the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing.

With regard to the situation in Ukraine, the Council expressed its full support for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and called upon all the parties to facilitate its work, including safe and secure access throughout Ukraine to fulfil its mandate.

Table 1 sets out provisions of decisions referring to regional and subregional organizations in relation to the pacific settlement of disputes. The subjects are listed in alphabetical order.

106 Resolution 2445 (2018), para. 9.
107 Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 23.
108 Ibid., para. 31.
109 Ibid., para. 23.
110 Ibid., para. 31.
111 Ibid., para. 35.
112 Resolution 2406 (2018), sixth preambular paragraph.
113 Ibid., seventh preambular paragraph.
114 Ibid., eighth preambular paragraph.
115 Ibid., para. 13.
116 Ibid., para. 28.
117 S/PRST/2018/12, fourth paragraph.

Table 1
Decisions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements

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Part VIII. Regional arrangements

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B. Discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements

During the period under review, various Council members referred to the role of regional and subregional organizations in the pacific settlement of disputes. As described below (cases 4 and 5), Council discussions focused, respectively, on the complementary relationship between the United Nations and the African Union in the context of the political crisis in Burundi, and the United Nations and African Union support for the mediation role of IGAD in the conflict in South Sudan.

Case 4
The situation in Burundi

On 26 February 2018, the Council held its 8189th meeting, under the item entitled “The situation in Burundi”, focusing on the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi (S/2018/89), submitted pursuant to resolution 2303 (2016). The Council heard briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi and the representative of Switzerland, in his capacity as Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. The briefers congratulated the East African Community on its efforts and mediation initiatives, highlighting the East African Community-led dialogue process as an indispensable instrument to address the current situation in Burundi, and called upon national, regional and international interlocutors to continue to lend their support to the efforts undertaken by President Museveni and President Mkapa as part of that process.

The representative of Equatorial Guinea urged all parties in Burundi to participate actively in the political dialogue, noting that the mediation efforts of regional and subregional organizations, such as the African Union and the East African Community, coupled with the constructive role of the United Nations, should make up the bulwark of mechanisms for finding a lasting political solution. He voiced positive views on the initiatives of the East African Community-led inter-Burundian dialogue held in Arusha, affirming that political dialogue was the only way out of the situation, and reminded the Council members that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Burundi must be fully respected.

Expressing concern over the lack of direct and constructive talks between the Government and the opposition despite the progress made in inter-Burundian dialogue, the representative of Kazakhstan called upon the leadership of the subregion and guarantors of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi to redouble their efforts with regard to the revitalization of the East African Community-led mediation. He concluded by reiterating the importance of a regional approach in addressing the underlying causes of the situation in Burundi.

The representative of Côte d’Ivoire expressed regret that no significant progress had been made at the fourth session of the East African Community-led inter-Burundian dialogue, held in Uganda from 27 November to 8 December 2017. He appealed to the international community to further support the efforts

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118 S/PV.8189, p. 3 (Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi) and p. 5 (Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission).
119 Ibid., p. 5 (Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission).
120 Ibid., p. 6.
121 Ibid., pp. 6–7.
of the East African Community and the mediator and facilitator of the inter-Burundian dialogue to restore stability and national reconciliation in Burundi.\footnote{122}{Ibid., pp. 7–8.}

The representative of Ethiopia said that, in spite of the efforts of the facilitator, former President Benjamin Mkapa of the United Republic of Tanzania, the peace process remained deadlocked. He affirmed the clear need to reinvigorate the peace process, and said that the Council’s support for the East African Community-led dialogue remained important in order to create the necessary conditions for peaceful and democratic elections in 2020.\footnote{123}{Ibid., p. 9.}

On 21 November 2018, the Council held its 8408th meeting, focusing on the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi (S/2018/1028), submitted pursuant to resolution 2303 (2016). The Council heard briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi and the representative of Switzerland, in his capacity as Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. Informing the Council that the Government of Burundi and the majority party had not attended the fifth session of the inter-Burundian dialogue, the Special Envoy said that the East African Community, the United Nations and the African Union must re-evaluate their commitment to helping Burundi emerge from its crisis, especially in view of the elections scheduled for 2020, and noted that the Secretary-General welcomed the East African Community’s forthcoming summit.\footnote{124}{S/PV.8408, pp. 2–3.}

Several Council members voiced concern over the lack of progress in the East African Community-led political dialogue, as well as the Government’s absence from the last round of talks, and urged the Government to reconsider its view of the inter-Burundian dialogue as obsolete.\footnote{125}{Ibid., p. 6 (France), p. 9 (Netherlands), p. 11 (Ethiopia), p. 13 (Kazakhstan), p. 15 (Peru), p. 15 (United Kingdom), p. 16 (United States) and p. 17 (Sweden).} Some Council members also expressed support for the continued facilitation led by the East African Community\footnote{126}{Ibid., p. 6 (France), p. 8 (Plurinational State of Bolivia), p. 9 (Netherlands), p. 11 (Ethiopia), p. 12 (Côte d’Ivoire), p. 16 (United Kingdom) and p. 18 (United States).} and highlighted the significance of close coordination with the African Union\footnote{127}{Ibid., p. 10 (Poland), p. 13 (Kazakhstan), p. 14 (Kuwait) and p. 18 (Sweden).} and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.\footnote{128}{Ibid., p. 19 (China).}

Welcoming President Nkurunziza’s announcement that he would not stand for re-election in 2020, the representative of France noted that the recent situation nonetheless presented concerns and expressed regret that the Burundian authorities had not participated in the fifth session of the inter-Burundian dialogue, held in Arusha in October 2018. He also echoed the view of the Secretary-General that the Council should work closely with the East African Community and the African Union to help Burundi to hold fair, free and transparent elections in 2020 and reaffirmed that the Burundian issue should remain on the agenda of the Council.\footnote{129}{Ibid., pp. 6–7.}

The representative of the Russian Federation said that, overall, the internal political processes in Burundi were moving towards stabilization and that the issue of the presidential and parliamentary elections planned for 2020 was that country’s internal affair. With regard to the problems in advancing the inter-Burundian dialogue, he said that ascribing responsibility to one side alone was counterproductive and affirmed his country’s commitment to the principle of African solutions to African problems, calling upon the African community to continue its active mediation efforts. He concluded his statement by urging Council members to focus on more serious issues and added that the situation in Burundi was not such as to merit its being kept on the Council’s agenda.\footnote{130}{Ibid., pp. 7–8.}

The representative of the Netherlands described the outcome of the fifth session of the inter-Burundian dialogue as disappointing, despite the tireless efforts of the East African Community facilitator, and expressed regret at the Government’s absence from the dialogue.\footnote{131}{Ibid., p. 9.} The representative of Poland commended the efforts of the East African Community and the facilitator to enable the inter-Burundian dialogue and affirmed his delegation’s belief that the Arusha Agreement remained the main instrument for peace and stability in Burundi, encouraging the African Union, the East African Community and the guarantors of the Arusha Agreement to remain engaged in supporting Burundi.\footnote{132}{Ibid., p. 9.}

Echoing the concern expressed by other Council members over the current political impasse, the representative of Ethiopia said that there should be engagement between the Government of Burundi and the international community, based on a realistic strategy aimed at supporting strong institutions and creating a climate that was conducive to the conduct of
peaceful elections. He also urged the Council to explore new avenues for re-engagement with Burundi and called upon the Secretary-General to be fully engaged in cooperation with the East African Community and the African Union.  

The representative of Peru expressed the hope that the Government would reconsider its position that the dialogue had become obsolete, which had led to the Government’s absence from the latest meeting. The representative of the United Kingdom reaffirmed his delegation’s position that the East African Community-led inter-Burundian dialogue was the only viable option to guarantee open and inclusive elections in 2020. Echoing the concern of some Council members at the lack of progress, he encouraged the East African Community to redouble its efforts to remain engaged and continue to push for tangible inclusive dialogue.

The representative of China welcomed the efforts of regional and subregional organizations but noted that the ownership and leadership of Burundi in handling its own affairs should be fully respected and that the international community should respect the choice of the Government and the people of Burundi relating to the elections and the political process.

Case 5
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

On 13 July 2018, the Council held its 8310th meeting, under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, to discuss new sanctions on South Sudan and adopt resolution 2428 (2018). The representatives of the United States of America, Ethiopia and Equatorial Guinea spoke before the vote. As the penholder of the resolution, the representative of the United States disputed the claim that an arms embargo would undermine the peace process and said that peace in South Sudan would not come by letting the parties get their hands on more weapons.

Noting that the decision on sanctions would have serious implications for the peace process, the representative of Ethiopia said that, for the Council to take such action without synchronizing its position with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union would seriously undermine the peace process and would not reflect well on the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations. He added that it was the view of the African Union and IGAD that now was not the appropriate time for punitive measures and that the IGAD Council of Ministers had made it clear that pursuing such a course of action at the current stage would not be helpful. He called upon the Council members to heed the calls of the region.

The representative of Equatorial Guinea, explaining his decision to abstain in the voting, said that the Council’s imposition of sanctions at the current time would be counterproductive and would also reflect a clear lack of consideration for the States and regional organizations involved. He argued that regional actors, with the support of the Council, should exert pressure on the parties to establish a secure and lasting peace in South Sudan.

Following the adoption of the resolution, the representative of France said that the resolution was not intended to undermine the negotiations conducted by IGAD but rather to protect civilian populations by limiting the flow of weapons towards South Sudan. He also welcomed the commitment of IGAD and called upon the South Sudanese parties to finalize a peace agreement as soon as possible.

The representative of Poland stated that the measures adopted by the Council were an important means to advance the peace process and expressed his appreciation for the regional efforts of African leaders and their leadership of IGAD in elaborating a viable political solution to the conflict.

The representative of China said that the Council should play a constructive role and continue to lend all possible support to the mediation efforts of IGAD, the African Union and the countries of the region. He added that the Council must listen to the legitimate aspirations of regional organizations and countries in Africa and take a cautious stance when it came to imposing sanctions.

Explaining his decision to abstain, the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia said

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133 Ibid., pp. 10–11.
134 Ibid., p. 15.
135 Ibid., p. 16.
136 Ibid., p. 19.
137 S/PV.8310, p. 3.
138 Ibid., pp. 3–4.
139 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
140 The resolution received nine votes in favour (Côte d’Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States) and six abstentions (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation).
141 S/PV.8310, p. 5.
142 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
143 Ibid., p. 6.
that the only way to achieve stable and lasting peace in South Sudan was through a serious political process involving the parties to the conflict, which was exactly what IGAD and the African Union had been developing over the past year. He further said that the capacity of the region to resolve its conflicts must not be underestimated and insisted that Council measures should be agreed on in principle with the relevant regional organizations.\textsuperscript{144}

The representative of the Russian Federation said that, thanks to the efforts of IGAD, the format for contact between the politicians of South Sudan had been transformed into a fully fledged negotiation platform in less than a month. He expressed regret that the Council had taken a disappointing approach instead of listening to the regional position and expressed the hope that, despite the destructive step taken, the mediation efforts of IGAD would continue.\textsuperscript{145} The representative of Kazakhstan, explaining his decision to abstain, said that the resolution did not reflect the positions and concerns of the countries of the region and the relevant regional organizations, IGAD and the African Union. He called upon the Council to remain united in its support for the efforts of IGAD and the African Union, despite the adoption of the resolution, and to stand up for a greater role for regional organizations in the Council’s work.\textsuperscript{146}

The representative of Kuwait expressed the hope that the resolution just adopted would represent an opportunity for the various parties in South Sudan to pursue their talks.\textsuperscript{147} The representative of Sweden said that, along with other Council members, he shared a deep sense of frustration and that, as violence and mass atrocities continued, the international community could not stand idly by. He commended IGAD and the wider region for their efforts towards a political solution and said that the Council must carefully consider how best to support the regional effort.\textsuperscript{148}

At the 8356th meeting, on 18 September 2018, which was focused on the report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 4 June to 1 September 2018) (S/2018/831), submitted pursuant to resolution 2406 (2018), the Council heard briefings from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan, the IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan and the Governance and Peace Manager for Community Empowerment for Progress Organization. The briefers highlighted the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and the importance of supporting IGAD efforts in the peace process.\textsuperscript{149}

The representative of the United States acknowledged the Revitalized Agreement but expressed concerns about its sustainability in the light of past failures. In that connection, he urged IGAD and the African Union to intensify their involvement in monitoring progress on implementation and to hold the parties to account, and expressed support for the continued engagement of the region to facilitate the implementation of the Agreement.\textsuperscript{150}

The representative of Ethiopia highlighted the indispensable support and assistance of the African Union, the United Nations and IGAD throughout the protracted high-level revitalization forum process and said that it was necessary to maintain unity of purpose among the organizations. He expressed the hope that the Council would respond positively to the request from the IGAD summit to support the full deployment of the regional protection force and a review of its mandate so that it would be in a better position to support the implementation of the revised Peace Agreement.\textsuperscript{151}

The representative of the Netherlands expressed appreciation for the signing by IGAD of the Peace Agreement on 12 September and called upon all signatories to ensure that the Agreement was respected and implemented. He also stressed the important role that the region played in ensuring a political process with concrete results and stated that the targeted sanctions and arms embargo imposed by the Council were indicative of its resolve to end the violence and protect civilians.\textsuperscript{152}

The representative of Poland expressed concern that, despite the positive developments, the Agreement had yet to have an impact on the situation of the people of South Sudan. She nonetheless commended the role of IGAD, Ethiopia and the Sudan.\textsuperscript{153} The representative of Kazakhstan, hailing the Revitalized Agreement as a great example of the cherished notion of African solutions for African problems, commended

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., pp. 7–8.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., pp. 8–9.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., pp. 9–10.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., pp. 1–2.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., pp. 8–9.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., pp. 9–10.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., p. 11.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., p. 12.
the concerted work of IGAD and the African Union, as well as the mediation efforts of the leaders of Ethiopia, the Sudan and Uganda, which had helped to secure the peace deal, and urged the Council to remain united in support of IGAD, the African Union and the parties in South Sudan in implementing the provisions of the Agreement.154

The representative of Côte d’Ivoire, commending the tireless mediation efforts of the region’s leaders, said that it was essential for the authorities of South Sudan to receive technical and financial support from IGAD, the African Union, the United Nations and other partners, and that measures must be taken to restore trust among the parties and create a climate conducive to constructive dialogue.155 The representative of Sweden encouraged the region to maintain its active engagement and continue to play a proactive role and said that its involvement in monitoring the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and holding the parties to account would now be especially important. He emphasized the need for the Council to continue to support regional efforts, including those of IGAD and the African Union, in order to maintain the current momentum.156

The representative of China said that the international community should continue to fully support the good offices and efforts of regional organizations and countries and help to realize the full potential of regional organizations, such as IGAD, and countries as the main channel for mediation. He stressed that the Council, as the primary institution for the maintenance of international peace and security, should send out positive messages and play an important role in promoting the political peace process by working together.157 The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia emphasized that it was important for the Council to maintain unity with the African Union and IGAD and to coordinate its actions with those of the region.158

The representative of the Russian Federation expressed his delegation’s readiness to consider substantive proposals by IGAD regarding the regional protection force.159

III. Peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

Note

Section III describes the practice of the Council in connection with the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter in the area of peacekeeping. The section is divided into two subsections: (a) decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements; and (b) discussions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Council renewed the authorization of two peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, namely EUFOR-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina160 and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).161 The Council also welcomed the leadership demonstrated by countries in West Africa and the Sahel in spearheading initiatives to address security challenges in the region, including through the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel), and further welcomed the operationalization of support for the Joint Force through a technical agreement between the United Nations, the European Union and the G5 Sahel.162

The Council, in its decisions in 2018, also took note of the work of United Nations peace operations and called upon them to cooperate with several regionally led military and police training missions, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan,163 the European Union training mission in the Central African

154 Ibid., p. 13.
155 Ibid., p. 16.
156 Ibid., pp. 18–19.
157 Ibid., p. 19.
158 Ibid., pp. 20–21.
159 Ibid. pp. 21–22.
160 Resolution 2443 (2018), para. 3.
161 Resolutions 2415 (2018), para. 1; and 2431 (2018), para. 5.
162 See, for example, S/PRST/2018/3, thirteenth and fourteenth paragraphs; S/PRST/2018/16, fourteenth paragraph; and resolution 2423 (2018), eighteenth preambular paragraph and paras. 48 and 49.
163 See, for example, resolution 2405 (2018), para. 6 (f).
Republic, \(^{164}\) the European Union training mission in Mali, \(^{165}\) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Guinea-Bissau. \(^{166}\) The Kosovo Force of NATO, established by resolution 1244 (1999), continued to operate, and no decisions were taken with respect to its mandate.

Table 2 lists the decisions by which the Council authorized peacekeeping missions led by regional organizations during the reporting period.

**Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Decision and date</th>
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<th>Peacekeeping operations</th>
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<td>The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Resolution 2443 (2018)</td>
<td>paras. 3–6</td>
<td>EUFOR-Althea</td>
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<tr>
<td>The situation in Somalia</td>
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<td>Resolution 2431 (2018)</td>
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<td></td>
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**EUFOR-Althea**

During the period under review, the Council renewed the authorization of EUFOR-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina for a period of 12 months. \(^{167}\) The Council reiterated its authorization for Member States to take “all necessary measures” to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with annexes 1-A and 2 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, stressing that the parties would be held equally responsible for compliance with those annexes and would be subject to such enforcement action by EUFOR-Althea and the NATO presence as might be necessary. \(^{168}\) The Council also authorized Member States to take “all necessary measures”, at the request of either EUFOR-Althea or NATO Headquarters, in defence of EUFOR-Althea or the NATO presence respectively, and to assist both organizations in carrying out their missions. \(^{169}\)

**African Union Mission in Somalia**


By resolution 2431 (2018), the Council added further elements to the existing mandate of AMISOM, authorizing the Mission to pursue the following strategic objectives: enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, with the aim of Somali security institutions taking the lead by December 2021; reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, including through mitigating the threat posed by improvised explosive devices; and assist the Somali security forces in providing security for the political process at all levels, as well as stabilization coordinated with community recovery and extension of State authority and accountability, reconciliation and peacebuilding in Somalia. \(^{172}\)

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\(^{164}\) See, for example, resolutions 2399 (2018), eighth preambular paragraph; and 2448 (2018), paras. 18 and 40 (b) (i).

\(^{165}\) See, for example, resolution 2423 (2018), para. 54.

\(^{166}\) See, for example, resolution 2404 (2018), eighteenth preambular paragraph and para. 18.

\(^{167}\) Resolution 2443 (2018), paras. 3 and 4. For information on the establishment of EUFOR-Althea, see Repertoire, Supplement 2004–2007, chap. XII, part III.C.

\(^{168}\) Resolution 2443 (2018), para. 5.

\(^{169}\) Ibid., para. 6.

\(^{170}\) S/PRST/2018/13. For information on the establishment of AMISOM, see Repertoire, Supplement 2004–2007, chap. XII, part III.C.

\(^{171}\) Resolutions 2415 (2018), para. 1; and 2431 (2018), para. 5.

\(^{172}\) Resolution 2431 (2018), para. 7 (a)–(c).
While reiterating the priority tasks defined in resolution 2372 (2017), the Council also requested the African Union and the United Nations to conduct a joint operational readiness assessment of AMISOM, to be completed by 15 September 2018, in order to identify capacities and requirements within the authorized troop ceiling and provide the baseline for a revised concept of operations that provided clear target dates for the progressive transfer of security responsibility from AMISOM to Somali security institutions and forces.\(^{173}\)

The Council also welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General to conduct a technical assessment of AMISOM by 31 January 2019, working closely with the African Union to review the Mission’s reconfiguration in support of the transition plan.\(^{174}\) The Council expressed its intention to consider further uniformed personnel reductions, in line with the aim of having the Somali security institutions leading security responsibility by December 2021.\(^{175}\)

In reference to Chapter VIII of the Charter, the Council stressed the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Council and encouraged the Secretary-General, the African Union and partners to continue efforts to explore in earnest funding arrangements for AMISOM.\(^{176}\)

During the period under review, the Council reiterated its request that AMISOM support and assist the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states in implementing the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia and urged increased cooperation by the Federal Government of Somalia, federal member states and AMISOM to document and register all military equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates.\(^{177}\) The Council also called upon AMISOM to facilitate regular access for the Panel of Experts to charcoal-exporting ports and requested the Federal Government of Somalia, federal member States and AMISOM to share information with the Panel regarding Al-Shabaab activities.\(^{178}\) Underlining the continued importance of AMISOM forces carrying out their mandate in full compliance with the obligations of participating States under international law, the Council called upon AMISOM and the African Union to ensure monitoring of and prompt and thorough investigations concerning allegations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.\(^{179}\)

### Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel

In its decisions in 2018, the Council welcomed the leadership demonstrated by countries in West Africa and the Sahel in spearheading initiatives to address security challenges in the region, including through the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel, which was established in February 2017 by five Sahel States, namely Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger.\(^{180}\) The Council stressed that the efforts of the Joint Force to counter the activities of terrorist groups and other organized criminal groups would contribute to creating a more secure environment in the Sahel region and thus facilitate the fulfilment by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) of its mandate to stabilize Mali.\(^{181}\) The Council also recognized that MINUSMA and the Joint Force had the potential to be mutually beneficial instruments to restore peace and stability in Mali and in the Sahel region and underlined that they had the potential to constitute a positive interaction between a United Nations peacekeeping operation and an African operation.\(^{182}\) The Council encouraged ECOWAS and the G5 Sahel to identify areas of complementarity in preventing conflict and sustaining peace and recalled the important role of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel in providing technical assistance to the Permanent Secretariat of the G5 Sahel.\(^{183}\) In that connection, the Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to ensure adequate coordination, exchange of information and, when applicable, support between MINUSMA, the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Joint

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\(^{173}\) Ibid., para. 11. By resolution 2415 (2018) of 15 May 2018, the Council recalled its decision to authorize the African Union to reduce the level of uniformed AMISOM personnel to 20,626 by 30 October 2018 (para. 1). By resolution 2431 (2018) of 30 July 2018, the Council decided to extend the deadline for troop reduction to 28 February 2019, stressing that “there should be no further delay in the reduction of the level of uniformed AMISOM personnel” (para. 5).

\(^{174}\) Resolution 2431 (2018), para. 23.

\(^{175}\) Ibid., para. 24.

\(^{176}\) Ibid., para. 32.

\(^{177}\) Ibid., para. 16; and resolution 2444 (2018), paras. 27 and 42. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning Somalia and Eritrea, see part VII, sect. III.

\(^{178}\) Resolution 2444 (2018), paras. 42 and 53.

\(^{179}\) Resolution 2431 (2018), para. 17.

\(^{180}\) See, for example, S/PRST/2018/3, thirteenth paragraph; and S/PRST/2018/16, fourteenth paragraph.

\(^{181}\) Resolution 2423 (2018), para. 48.

\(^{182}\) Ibid., eighteenth preambular paragraph.

\(^{183}\) S/PRST/2018/16, fourteenth paragraph.
The Council welcomed the ongoing efforts of relevant partners to support the G5 Sahel in the establishment and implementation of a robust compliance framework to prevent, investigate, address and publicly report violations of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the Joint Force. The Council also welcomed the signing of a technical agreement between the United Nations, the European Union and the G5 Sahel with a view to providing specified operational and logistical support through MINUSMA to the Joint Force. In addition, the Council stressed that such support from MINUSMA, in accordance with the conditions set out in resolution 2391 (2017), had the potential to allow the Joint Force to enhance its ability to deliver on its mandate. The Council welcomed the operationalization of the support for the Joint Force through the technical agreement following the disbursement of a contribution from the European Union and called upon donors to further contribute without delay, in order to guarantee full implementation and functionality of the technical agreement.

The Council requested the Secretary-General to enhance the exchange of information between MINUSMA and the G5 Sahel through the provision of relevant intelligence. It also requested MINUSMA to ensure that its support to the Joint Force was provided in strict compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces and called upon the Joint Force to cooperate with the United Nations in implementing the policy, including by ensuring that the relevant monitoring and reporting mechanisms were in place and functional. The Council also recalled that adherence to the compliance framework referred to in resolution 2391 (2017) was essential to ensuring the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Joint Force and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council every three months on coordination, exchange of information and, when applicable, mutual operational and logistical support between MINUSMA, the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Joint Force, the French forces and the European Union missions in Mali.

Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan

In connection with the situation in Afghanistan, the Council decided that the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of UNAMA would continue to lead and coordinate international civilian efforts, with a particular focus, inter alia, on closely coordinating and cooperating with the Resolute Support Mission agreed upon between NATO and Afghanistan.

B. Discussions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Council discussed the role of regional peacekeeping operations such as EUFOR-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, AMISOM in Somalia, the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel and the NATO Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. As illustrated in the case studies on the situation in Somalia (see case 6) and peace and security in Africa (see case 7), Council members and other speakers focused their remarks regarding regional operations on, inter alia, the need for international and United Nations support and cooperation, respect for the principle of national ownership and the need for conditions-based transition processes.

Case 6

The situation in Somalia

At the 8321st meeting of the Council, held on 30 July 2018 in connection with the situation in Somalia, the Council adopted resolution 2431 (2018), by which it extended the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Following the adoption of the resolution, the representative of Ethiopia highlighted the important contribution of AMISOM and said that, in spite of the political and security gains made in recent years, much remained to be done in terms of post-conflict recovery and
peacebuilding. Detailed planning and implementation were required in order to put all phases of the transition plan into motion. He also stressed the need for cooperation and coordination between the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), AMISOM and the Somali national security forces at all levels, including through improved consultation with AMISOM in the management of the logistics support package. Welcoming the adoption of the resolution, the representative of Somalia noted that, while the situation had improved recently, UNSOS needed to provide an appropriate level of funding to fill the gaps in logistics and equipment for AMISOM, which was underfunded, understaffed and unequipped.

At the 8352nd meeting of the Council, held on 13 September 2018 in connection with the situation in Somalia, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), as well as the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of AMISOM, made statements on the political, security and humanitarian challenges in Somalia and underlined the importance of AMISOM and of providing it with predictable funding during the transition period. The Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) referred to the increasing political participation of women in Somalia and said that she expected that Council members would follow up on the implementation of the mandates of AMISOM and UNSOM, which included many references to gender equality.

Some Council members commented on the importance of providing predictable and sustainable funding for AMISOM. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that AMISOM needed to be reconfigured to support the practical requirements for transition. He said that, for that reason, it was necessary to ensure that the transition was sustainably financed. The representative of Ethiopia noted that the role of AMISOM, in close cooperation with the Somali national security forces, continued to be vital, and said that predictable support was important for AMISOM to be able to implement its mandate effectively. The representative of Sweden stated that the Council must continue to address the challenges to the efforts of AMISOM, including by ensuring adequate, predictable and sustainable funding. The representative of China called upon the United Nations and the international community to give positive consideration to providing stable, predictable and sustainable funding support to AMISOM and help the troop-contributing countries with capacity-building to combat terrorism and promote peace and stability in Somalia and the surrounding regions.

Expressing deep concern at the fragility of the situation in Somalia and the deterioration of the human rights situation, the representative of Côte d’Ivoire stated that the precarious security situation in Somalia justified the continued presence of AMISOM troops in the country and should lead the international community to provide financial and logistical support, first to AMISOM, to enable it to effectively implement its mandate and, second, to the Government of Somalia, to enable the effective implementation of the transition plan.

Recalling the Council’s decision to postpone reducing the AMISOM troop ceiling until February 2019, the representative of France emphasized that it remained important to continue the gradual, organized and conditions-based drawdown of AMISOM. She further highlighted the importance of abiding by the new deadlines pursuant to resolution 2431 (2018) and added that, while AMISOM must continue to be supported throughout the transition, the European Union could no longer continue to finance the bonuses of AMISOM soldiers alone; new partners should contribute to the financing of the Mission.

The representative of Kazakhstan said that the transfer of responsibilities from AMISOM to the national security forces should not create a security vacuum. He emphasized the critical importance of the swift implementation of the national security architecture and the transition plan, with the coordinated support of the international partners.

Case 7
Peace and security in Africa

On 15 November 2018, the Council held its 8402nd meeting, to consider the report of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (S/2018/1006), which was submitted to the Council pursuant to resolution 2391 (2017).
Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the Permanent Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel), the High Representative of the African Union for Mali and the Sahel, and the Deputy Secretary-General for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response at the European External Action Service.209

In their briefings, they voiced concerns about the security situation in the Sahel, given the increase in terrorist attacks, and called for the full operationalization of the Joint Force, echoing the prior calls by the Secretary-General to place the force under a Chapter VII mandate.210 Noting that only an operation with a regional mandate and more clearly defined roles and responsibilities among the Joint Force, national armies and international forces would be effective in combating terrorism and transnational crime in the Sahel, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations encouraged the States members of the G5 Sahel to agree on a common vision of the final status of the Joint Force.211 The Permanent Secretary of the G5 Sahel said that the financing received for the Joint Force was far from the amount pledged and called for a greater level of tangible solidarity on the part of the international community.212

The High Representative of the African Union for Mali and the Sahel reiterated the African Union’s strong commitment to the Joint Force and welcomed the Secretary-General’s emphasis on the overriding need to establish a support group for the Joint Force. The African Union reiterated its support for the call issued by the Heads of State of the G5 Sahel to endow the Joint Force with a mandate under Chapter VII and to enable it to enjoy direct United Nations financing.213 The Deputy Secretary-General for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response at the European External Action Service reaffirmed the European Union’s support for various political processes throughout the Sahel, in particular its support for the ongoing peace process in Mali, and noted that the European Union had established a coordination hub, which was being made available to the G5 Sahel and international donors to facilitate the identification of needs and to coordinate the financial support of donors to the Joint Force.214

The representative of France said that it was crucial for the G5 Sahel States to continue their mobilization in order to ensure that the Joint Force became fully operational as soon as possible and called for the implementation of the decision of the Heads of State of the G5 Sahel to relocate the headquarters of the Joint Force to Bamako. He called upon the international community and the Council to provide the G5 Sahel States with effective support that corresponded to the level of the challenges they faced, including the pledged financial contributions and additional resources to finance the technical support that would enable the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to provide logistical and operational support on the ground. He also expressed support for the Secretary-General’s recommendations for enhancing multilateral support for the Joint Force by providing a robust mandate and implementing a logistics package.215

The representative of the Russian Federation said that his delegation expected concrete plans for the continuation of joint operations to be announced in the near future and underlined the importance of speeding up the process of building military camps for the Joint Force.216

The representative of Kazakhstan said that the G5 Sahel countries needed predictable and long-term sustainable funding from the donor community and expressed support for the recommendations of the Secretary-General regarding the need to revise support measures and the funding mechanism. He also noted the importance of ensuring complementarity and strengthening the coordination between the Joint Force and all security forces in the region, including MINUSMA, Operation Barkhane and regional frameworks, in particular the African Union-led Nouakchott Process.217

The representative of the United Kingdom called upon the G5 Sahel countries to expedite their efforts to deploy all their outstanding troops and fully establish the police component in order to address the growing transborder threat. He also urged all partners to make good on the financial commitments that they had made to the Joint Force as soon as possible.218

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209 S/PV.8402, pp. 2–8.
210 Ibid., pp. 3–4 (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations), p. 5 (Permanent Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel) and p. 6 (African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel).
211 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
212 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
213 Ibid., pp. 6–7.
214 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
215 Ibid., p. 9.
216 Ibid., pp. 10–11.
217 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
218 Ibid., p. 13.
The representative of Côte d’Ivoire said that, according to the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/1006), while the progress made in building up the Joint Force was encouraging, it was still below expectations. He therefore urged the G5 Sahel States to continue their dialogue with international partners with a view to strengthening the coordination of the multifaceted support for the operationalization of the Joint Force. He also reaffirmed his belief that the Joint Force’s rapid deployment capabilities and familiarity with the social and cultural environment constituted its comparative advantages.219

The representatives of Ethiopia and the Plurinational State of Bolivia explicitly called for the Council to place the Joint Force under a Chapter VII mandate. The representative of Ethiopia said that it was important that the international community, including the Council, take concrete action, as requested by the President of Mali, Ibrahim Keïta, and other representatives from the region, to place the Joint Force under a Chapter VII mandate so as to ensure continuous support and funding. He also expressed support for the African Union’s work in reporting on the activities of the Joint Force.220 The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia said that the Joint Force was a great and exemplary demonstration of the coordinated efforts of the African Union and the United Nations. She added that the refusal of some Council members to provide the Joint Force with a Chapter VII mandate had made its deployment and operationalization even more difficult and that it was crucial that the Council take urgent and relevant steps in that regard.221

By contrast, the representative of the United States expressed the view that Chapter VII authorization was not needed to accomplish the Joint Force’s mission, as the G5 Sahel countries already had existing agreements in place for military operations in their respective territories. He further noted that security responses alone would not solve every problem and added that the technical agreement between the G5 Sahel, the United Nations and the European Union, which allowed for MINUSMA to be reimbursed for logistical support provided to the Joint Force within the territory of Mali, represented the full extent of any support role that the United Nations should play outside of continued coordination and technical assistance on a voluntary basis.222

The representative of Sweden said that, while the operational and logistical support provided by MINUSMA to the Joint Force was important, that support should not affect the capacity of MINUSMA to implement its own mandate.223

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220 Ibid., p. 15.
221 Ibid., p. 24.
222 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
223 Ibid., p. 16.

IV. Authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements

Note

Section IV concerns the practice of the Council in utilizing regional and subregional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority, as provided in Article 53 of the Charter. Given that the authorizations accorded by the Council to regional peacekeeping operations to use force in the implementation of their mandates are covered in section III above, this section focuses on the authorization of enforcement action by regional and other organizations outside the context of regional peacekeeping operations. Cooperation with regional arrangements in the implementation of measures adopted by the Council under Chapter VII not involving the use of force is also covered in this section. The section is divided into two subsections: (a) decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements; and (b) discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements and the implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements

During the reporting period, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 53 of the Charter in its decisions. The Council did, however, authorize the use of force by regional arrangements beyond the context of regional peacekeeping operations.

With respect to the situation in Libya and acting under Chapter VII, the Council extended for a further 12 months the authorizations to Member States “acting
nationally or through regional organizations” to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya suspected of carrying arms or related materiel to or from Libya in violation of previous Council resolutions and to use “all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” to carry out such inspections, as set out in resolution 2292 (2016). Also acting under Chapter VII, in connection with migrant smuggling, the Council renewed the authorizations, set out in paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution 2240 (2015), to Member States “acting nationally or through regional organizations” to inspect on the high seas off the coast of Libya vessels suspected of being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya and to seize those vessels that were confirmed as being used for those purposes, and authorized Member States to use “all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” in confronting migrant smugglers or human traffickers carrying out the aforementioned activities. In both cases, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it within 11 months of the adoption of the resolutions on their implementation. The Council also issued a presidential statement on 30 January 2018 in connection with the item entitled “Peace consolidation in West Africa”, reaffirming its condemnation of all instances of trafficking in persons and encouraging further cooperation between the European Union, the African Union and the United Nations aimed at saving and protecting the lives of migrants and refugees along routes, and in particular inside Libya.

In relation to the situation in Somalia, also acting under Chapter VII, the Council renewed its call upon States and regional organizations to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia by deploying naval vessels, arms and military aircraft, by providing basing and logistical support for counter-piracy forces, and by seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery. The Council also renewed for a period of 13 months the authorizations, as set out in resolution 2383 (2017), granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. The Council requested States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities to inform the Council and the Secretary-General within nine months of the progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the authorizations outlined above.

Concerning the situation in South Sudan and acting under Chapter VII, the Council decided to maintain the force levels of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), including its regional protection force established pursuant to resolution 2304 (2016). The Council decided that the mandate of UNMISS would include participating in and supporting the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism in the implementation of its ceasefire monitoring and verification mandate and actively participating in and supporting the work of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission. The Council also called upon all parties, including regional and subregional organizations, to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts, including by providing information on illicit transfers of wealth from South Sudan. The Council also invited the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission to share relevant information with the Council, including on its assessment of the parties’ adherence to the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access.

The Council adopted several decisions in which it either recognized or requested the support of regional and subregional organizations in the implementation of sanctions measures with respect to the Central African Republic. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council encouraged all Member States, in particular the States members of the Economic Community of Central African States and of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, to utilize the advance notification and exemption procedures established under the arms embargo to return arms and related materiel belonging to the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic. The Council also emphasized that it was important for the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) to hold

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224 Resolution 2420 (2018), para. 1. See also resolution 2292 (2016), paras. 3 and 4.
225 Resolution 2437 (2018), para. 2.
226 Resolutions 2420 (2018), para. 2; and 2437 (2018), para. 3. See also resolution 2240 (2015), paras. 17 and 18.
228 Resolution 2442 (2018), para. 12.
230 Resolution 2442 (2018), para. 32.
231 Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 6. For more information on the mandate of the regional protection force, see part X, sect. 1.
232 Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 7 (d) (ii) and (iii).
234 Ibid., para. 25.
regular consultations with concerned Member States and regional and subregional organizations in order to ensure full implementation of the arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze. Furthermore, the Council welcomed the measures taken by States members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to implement the Regional Initiative against Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, as endorsed in the Lusaka Declaration of 2010. The Council urged all parties, as well as regional and subregional organizations, to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic and the safety of its members and further urged the Central African Republic, its neighbouring States and other States members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to cooperate at the regional level to investigate and combat criminal networks and armed groups involved in the illegal exploitation and smuggling of natural resources, including gold and diamonds, and wildlife poaching and trafficking.

With respect to the situation in Guinea-Bissau, the Council expressed support for the efforts of the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) to ensure a swift resolution of the crisis and took note of its decision of 4 February 2018 to impose sanctions on those obstructing the implementation of the Conakry Agreement on the Implementation of the ECOWAS Road Map for the Resolution of the Political Crisis in Guinea-Bissau.

B. Discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements and the implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements

During the period under review, various Council members referred to the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements. As described below, Council discussions focused on the relationship between the United Nations and ECOWAS in the context of the political crisis and the imposition by ECOWAS of sanctions on Guinea-Bissau (see case 8) and the position of the African Union concerning the implementation of resolution 1593 (2005), by which the Council, acting under Chapter VII, referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (see case 9).

Case 8
The situation in Guinea-Bissau

On 14 February 2018, the Council held its 8182nd meeting, to consider the report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) (S/2018/110), submitted pursuant to resolution 2343 (2017). The Council heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau and Head of UNIOGBIS and the representative of Brazil, in his capacity as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. With regard to developments at the regional level, the Special Representative informed the Council that, on 4 February 2018, the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), pursuant to its decision of 27 January 2018, had imposed targeted sanctions on 19 individuals deemed to be obstructing the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. He further informed the Council that, under his leadership, the group of five regional and international partners comprised of representatives of the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, ECOWAS, the European Union and the United Nations had continued to harmonize efforts and messaging at opportune moments with the aim of creating a stable and enabling environment for dialogue among political leaders. He emphasized that it was important for the Council to continue to reaffirm the centrality of the Conakry Agreement and reiterate its full support for ECOWAS.

Expressing concern about the political impasse in Guinea-Bissau, the representative of Côte d’Ivoire said that the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS were a strong signal of its resolve to bring the country out of a crisis that had persisted too long. He said that the measures, which specifically involved the suspension of the participation in the activities of ECOWAS of all persons concerned, a travel ban, the denial of visas to those persons and their families and the freezing of their assets, must be applied with utmost rigour. He congratulated ECOWAS on taking the measures, looked forward to their effective endorsement by the African Union and invited the Council to fully support ECOWAS in the interests of peace and national cohesion in Guinea-Bissau. He also urged the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, the European Union and the United Nations to support the efforts of ECOWAS to effectively implement

236 Ibid., para. 25.
237 Ibid., para. 23.
238 Ibid., paras. 36 and 37.
239 Resolution 2404 (2018), para. 5.
240 S/PV.8182, pp. 2–3.
measures aimed at ensuring that the Conakry Agreement was upheld.\textsuperscript{241}

The representative of Ethiopia joined in commending the role of ECOWAS and remarked that the Council should reinforce the decision of ECOWAS and the African Union and convey a clear and united message to all the parties in that regard.\textsuperscript{242} The representative of the United States also applauded the efforts to hold those in power accountable and to compel them to do what was right for the people of Guinea-Bissau.\textsuperscript{243}

The representative of France called upon the Council to increase pressure on local actors, in particular the President of Guinea-Bissau, José Mário Vaz, and to direct the parties in Guinea-Bissau to shoulder their responsibilities. She added that sanctions had been adopted in 2012 through resolution 2048 (2012), and additional measures could be taken in conjunction with those taken by ECOWAS.\textsuperscript{244} The representative of the Netherlands said that her country supported and endorsed the mediation efforts of ECOWAS and its imposition of sanctions and called upon the Council to firmly support ECOWAS, as it should do in the case of any other regional organization in Africa that took the lead in maintaining peace and security in the region.\textsuperscript{245}

Regarding the possibility of imposing similar measures based on the provisions of resolution 2048 (2012), the representative of the Russian Federation said that the main aim of the resolution was to restore constitutional order, which in practical terms had been achieved several years previously.\textsuperscript{246} On the same issue, the representative of Guinea-Bissau said that sanctions were unlikely to defuse a crisis and could even be counterproductive.\textsuperscript{247}

At its 8194th meeting, on 28 February 2018, the Council discussed the mandate of UNIOGBIS and adopted resolution 2404 (2018). As the penholder, the representative of Côte d’Ivoire said that the text was balanced and reflected the realities on the ground, and that its crafting had enjoyed the full and comprehensive cooperation of all. He said that the Council welcomed the decision of ECOWAS of 4 February 2018 to impose sanctions on those obstructing the implementation of the Conakry Agreement and that it also commended international partners, including the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, for their concerted efforts.\textsuperscript{248}

The representative of Equatorial Guinea expressed the view that sanctions should not be the only way to unblock the current situation in the country and said that there must be pragmatic and direct involvement to help the political actors reach a compromise solution that would pave the way towards the preparations for the upcoming legislative elections. In that connection, he proposed that the Council members maintain close contact with the political actors of Guinea-Bissau with a view to finding a committed solution.\textsuperscript{249}

The representative of the United States said that the bold move by ECOWAS to impose targeted sanctions on those impeding the peace process was based on a desire to induce them to become part of the solution. She said that ECOWAS was proving to be an example for regional organizations everywhere in its willingness to take challenging steps, as it had done in the Gambia.\textsuperscript{250}

Stressing that the acknowledgment in resolution 2404 (2018) of instances of restrictions imposed by ECOWAS did not signify their approval by the Council, the representative of the Russian Federation said that the only legitimate international sanctions were those imposed by the Council, in line with Chapter VII of the Charter. He also objected to any attempt, through the Council, to introduce wording that would distort that fundamental principle in international law or use it to legitimize unilateral restrictions, regardless of any noble intentions that might be advanced. He said that unilateral sanctions, especially those imposed in addition to measures already agreed by the Council, were a path to nowhere and that they only served to further escalate crises instead of resolving them.\textsuperscript{251}

**Case 9**

**Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan**

The Council held its 8290th meeting on 20 June 2018, under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, focusing on the investigation by the International

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{242} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{243} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., p. 9.
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid., p. 15.
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid., pp. 18–19.
\textsuperscript{248} S/PV.8194, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., pp. 3–4.
\textsuperscript{250} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid., p. 4.
The representative of Equatorial Guinea said that his delegation shared the position of the African Union regarding the Court’s action concerning Darfur and stated that the Court had no jurisdiction to charge a President in full discharge of his duties. He joined in the repeated request of the African Union for the suspension of proceedings against the President of the Sudan and the withdrawal of the referral of the case.256

The representative of Kuwait said that his country, in its capacity as the Arab member of the Council, recalled the 514th resolution adopted at the twenty-second Arab Summit in Sirte in 2010, which represented the Arab position on the Court’s proceedings against the President of the Sudan: rejection of the politicization of the principles of international justice and their use to challenge the sovereignty, unity and stability of States under the guise of international criminal justice, and the underscoring of the need to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Sudan.257 He also noted that the decision of the Court had not gained the support of regional organizations to which the Sudan was a party, such as the League of Arab States, the African Union and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, all of which were organizations capable of international action, as set forth in Chapter VIII of the Charter.258

The representative of Kazakhstan said that, as an observer to the African Union, Kazakhstan underscored the critical role of the African Union in resolving the crisis in Darfur and its return to peace and justice. He suggested that the Court take into consideration the unified position of the African Union and establish dialogue with the Open-ended Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs on the International Criminal Court.259

Criminal Court of alleged crimes in the western Darfur region of the Sudan. During the meeting, the representative of Ethiopia recalled that the African Union had called for the suspension of the proceedings against the President of the Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir, and urged the Council to withdraw the referral of the case. Stating that the continuation of the case would only damage the Council’s credibility, he said that the level of intercommunal violence had once again plummeted, which had been confirmed by the joint strategic review of the African Union and the United Nations.252

The representative of Peru expressed renewed support for the work of the Office of the Prosecutor of the Court and expressed regret that some States parties to the Rome Statute had not lived up to their obligation to cooperate with the Court. He also welcomed the initiative of New Zealand of December 2016 to address the problem of non-compliance with the Court’s orders.253

The representative of China called upon the Council and the Court to fully respect the sovereignty of the Sudan, address the legitimate concerns of the African Union and the Government of the Sudan and fully respect the views of the African Union and the League of Arab States, which could not be ignored.254

The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia voiced support for the work of the Court and urged it to join in the efforts of the international community, in particular regional organizations, to strengthen political processes in the Sudan, in particular those related to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. He said that, as indicated in resolution 1593 (2005), cooperation and coordination between the Court and the African Union were crucial, and that the commitment of the African Union to fighting impunity was undeniable, as set out in its Constitutive Act. He called for the establishment of constructive dialogue between the African Union and the Court to facilitate the necessary work and strengthen trust.255

252 S/PV.8290, p. 7.
253 Ibid., p. 8.
254 Ibid., p. 9.
255 Ibid., p. 10.
256 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
258 S/PV.8290, p. 12.
V. Reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security

Note

Section V examines reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security within the framework of Article 54 of the Charter, under two headings: (a) decisions concerning reporting by regional arrangements; and (b) discussions concerning reporting by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning reporting by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 54 of the Charter in its decisions. The Council did, however, request reporting from regional organizations, in particular the African Union, either directly or through the Secretary-General, on issues such as cooperation on peace and security between the United Nations and the African Union, in particular with respect to peace support operations, such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) in Mali, and support for the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms in South Sudan, as described in further detail below.

With regard to the situation in Mali, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report on coordination, exchange of information and mutual operational and logistical support between the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Joint Force, the French forces and the European Union missions in Mali every three months after the adoption of resolution 2423 (2018) on 28 June 2018.260

With regard to Somalia, by resolution 2442 (2018), the Council requested States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities to inform the Council and the Secretary-General, nine months after the adoption of the resolution, of the progress of actions undertaken in the exercise of the authorizations provided in the resolution in relation to the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea.261 The Council also requested the African Union to keep the Council regularly informed of the implementation of the mandate of AMISOM, including its reconfiguration in support of the transition plan.262 In that regard, the Council requested the African Union to report to the Council, through the provision of oral updates and no fewer than three written reports, every 120 days, with the first written report to be submitted not later than 15 November 2018.263 The Council further requested that the first written report contain a reconfiguration plan detailing the modalities of the reduction in the level of uniformed personnel.264

In connection with the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, the Council, by resolution 2418 (2018), requested the Secretary-General, in coordination with the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism, to report by 30 June 2018 on whether any fighting had taken place since the adoption of the resolution on 31 May 2018 and on whether the parties had come to a viable political agreement.265 The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report, through his regular 90-day reports, on the technical assistance provided for the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan.266 The Council invited the African Union to share information on progress made in the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan and expressed its intention, upon receipt of the reports of the Secretary-General, to assess the work that had been done in the establishment of the Hybrid Court.267

On the situation in Darfur, the Council requested the Secretary-General and invited the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to provide detailed reporting in the regular 90-day reports on the progress made towards achieving the benchmarks and indicators identified in the report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur dated 12 October 2018 (S/2018/912).268

Table 3 lists decisions adopted during the period under review in connection with the obligation to keep the Council informed of activities undertaken by regional arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security.

260 Resolution 2423 (2018), para. 70 (iii).
261 Resolution 2442 (2018), para. 32. For more information on the authorization of enforcement action by regional organizations in Somalia, see sect. IV.A above.
262 Resolution 2431 (2018), para. 9.
263 Ibid.
264 Ibid.
265 Resolution 2418 (2018), para. 3.
266 Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 34.
267 Ibid.
268 S/PRST/2018/19, seventh paragraph.
### Table 3

**Decisions concerning reporting of activities by regional arrangements**

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### B. Discussions concerning reporting by regional arrangements

At the 8314th meeting of the Council, held on 18 July 2018 under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” and in connection with the African Union, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union welcomed, with regard to the conditions outlined in resolution 2378 (2017), the progress made by the African Union on the operationalization of the Peace Fund, the development of a compliance framework and the development of a reporting framework. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Sweden welcomed the agreement between the United Nations and the African Union on fiduciary reporting as an important and concrete step in the right direction. The representative of the United Kingdom, stating that the African Union’s knowledge of the region was invaluable, encouraged more interaction between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, including on reporting, so that the views of the African Union could be considered. The representative of Kazakhstan stressed that further technical work was needed for the United Nations and the African Union to develop the modalities for joint analysis, planning and assessment, as well as reporting to the relevant intergovernmental bodies.

At the Council’s 8407th meeting, held on 20 November 2018 under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”, the representative of Kazakhstan emphasized the need to capitalize on the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, as well as the framework on sustainable development, to improve the effectiveness of peace operations in Africa. He also noted that further technical work was needed to develop the modalities for joint analysis, planning and assessment, as well as reporting to the relevant intergovernmental bodies. The representative of Norway, speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries, said that the strategic partnership between the United Nations and the African Union must be further strengthened with regard to financing. The Nordic countries were in favour of a system that combined assessed contributions from the United Nations with African Union funding; such a system should be based on transparent financial reporting. The representative of Guatemala said that, through the African Union’s peace support operations, the ability of the United Nations, in particular the Council, to maintain international peace and security was strengthened, which highlighted the importance for both organizations of working more closely in the field of peace and security, including joint cooperation.

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269 S/PV.8314, p. 4.
270 Ibid., p. 6.
271 Ibid., p. 17.
272 Ibid., p. 19.
273 S/PV.8407, p. 10.
274 Ibid. p. 34.
operational evaluation and joint reporting, when appropriate.\textsuperscript{275} The representative of Rwanda, reiterating his country’s support for the United Nations-African Union partnership framework, said that Rwanda recognized the importance of close coordination and cooperation, based on strategic assessment, planning and reporting, to handle conflict in a timely manner.\textsuperscript{276} The representative of the Republic of Korea highlighted the need to provide predictable, flexible and sustainable financing for African Union-led peace operations and welcomed the progress that the African Union, in close cooperation with the United Nations, had made in developing compliance and reporting frameworks.\textsuperscript{277}

At the 8414th meeting, held on 6 December 2018, the representative of Poland said that the key areas that the Council should focus on when drafting the framework for the next phase of cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union were, inter alia, compliance, reporting, accountability and sustainability.\textsuperscript{278} The representative of Brazil, noting that, under exceptional circumstances, the Council could authorize and had authorized Member States and regional organizations to use force in order to achieve peace, emphasized the need to remain vigilant so as to avoid causing unnecessary harm to civilian populations, to monitor the situation and to require periodic reporting. In that connection, he welcomed initiatives such as resolution 2391 (2017), in which the Council called for the G5 Sahel States to uphold international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as well as to take into account a gender perspective in all operations of the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel.\textsuperscript{279}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{275} Ibid., p. 45.
\item \textsuperscript{276} Ibid., p. 49.
\item \textsuperscript{277} Ibid., p. 60.
\item \textsuperscript{278} S/PV.8414, p. 26.
\item \textsuperscript{279} Ibid., p. 62.
\end{itemize}
Part IX
Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: committees, tribunals and other bodies
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Introductory note

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Rule 28

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

The power of the Security Council to establish subsidiary organs is set out in Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure. Part IX of the present Supplement covers the practice of the Council relating to committees, working groups, investigative bodies, tribunals, ad hoc commissions, and special advisers, envoys and representatives, as well as the Peacebuilding Commission. It also includes instances of subsidiary organs that were proposed but not established. Field-based missions, including United Nations peacekeeping and political missions, are covered in part X. Field-based missions led by regional organizations are covered in part VIII. Each subsection below provides a summary of the major developments relating to each subsidiary organ during the period covered by this Supplement.
I. Committees

Note

Section I focuses on the decisions of the Security Council adopted during 2018 concerning the establishment of committees and the implementation of and changes to their mandates, as well as their termination. Subsection A covers standing committees and subsection B covers committees established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The description of each committee includes a description of the tasks of the committee as mandated by the Security Council in the context of the implementation of sanctions measures such as an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban. Information on measures mandated by the Security Council pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter is provided in part VII, section III. The committees are discussed within each subsection below in the order of their establishment.

The committees of the Security Council consist of all 15 members of the Council. Their meetings are held in private, unless a committee itself decides otherwise, and decisions are reached by consensus. The Bureau of each committee generally consists of a Chair and a Vice-Chair, who are elected by the Council on an annual basis. The Council has both standing committees that meet only when issues under their purview are being considered, and committees established on an ad hoc basis, in response to specific requirements of the Council, such as counter-terrorism or sanctions committees.

A. Standing committees

During 2018, the standing committees, namely, the Committee of Experts on Rules of Procedure, the Committee of Experts established by the Council at its 1506th meeting to study the question of associate membership, the Committee on the Admission of New Members and the Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters, continued to exist but did not meet.

B. Committees established under Chapter VII of the Charter

Subsection 1 deals with the committees and associated groups or panels of experts active during the period under review that oversaw specific sanctions measures in 2018. During this period, the Security Council terminated the Eritrea sanctions regime, modified the mandate and changed the name of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea to the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, and replaced the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group with the Panel of Experts on Somalia. As discussed in more detail below, while many of the mandates of the committees remained largely unchanged, the Council modified some aspects of the mandates of certain committees. For example, in 2018, the Council decided that the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan would consider sexual and gender-based violence as a separate criterion for listing individuals and entities.

Consequently, the Council requested that the Panels of Experts on Somalia, Libya and South Sudan include the necessary gender expertise, in line with paragraph 6 of resolution 2242 (2015). The Council expanded the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) to oversee the arms embargo imposed in paragraph 4 of resolution 2428 (2018).

Furthermore, for the first time since the inception of the sanctions regime in 2011, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) visited Libya on 1 and 2 November 2018. For information on the mandate and/or composition of the committees and the groups or panels of experts during previous periods, earlier Supplements should be consulted. For information concerning the sanctions measures relevant to each of the committees, see part VII, section III, of the present Supplement.


2 Resolutions 2444 (2018), para. 50 (Somalia); 2441 (2018), para. 11 (Libya); and 2428 (2018), para. 14 (e) (South Sudan).

3 Resolutions 2444 (2018), para. 12 (Somalia); 2441 (2018), para. 14 (Libya); and 2428 (2018), para. 20 (South Sudan).

4 S/PV.8394, p. 7.
Subsection 2 deals with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), which have broader mandates relating to terrorism and non-proliferation. Other subsidiary bodies, including the Office of the Ombudsperson, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and groups or panels of experts, are discussed together with the relevant committees. As in the case of the sanctions committees, earlier Supplements should be consulted for information on previous periods.

The committees carried out their mandate of, inter alia, listing and delisting individuals and entities, granting exemptions and processing notifications, monitoring and assessing implementation and reporting to the Council. In addition to reporting by means of written reports, Committee Chairs briefed the Council in closed consultations or open meetings. At public meetings during 2018, Chairs of subsidiary organs briefed the Council under various items, both thematic and country-specific.

As outlined in table 1, briefings under thematic items included a joint briefing by the Chairs of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the cooperation among those committees and the respective groups of experts. The briefing took place on 3 October 2018 under the item entitled “Briefings by the Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council”. Under the same item, on 17 December 2018, the Council heard briefings from the representatives of Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the Netherlands and Sweden in their capacities as outgoing Chairs of subsidiary organs.5

The Chairs of sanctions committees briefed the Council under country-specific items at varying intervals, with the number of briefings by each Chair ranging from one to five in 2018. The briefings included reports on visits to concerned States conducted by the Chairs of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009),6 the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015),7 the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan,8 the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011),9 the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau,10 the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic,11 the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015)12 and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali.13

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5 See S/PV.8428.
6 S/PV.8322, pp. 2–3; and S/PV.8428, pp. 3–4.
7 S/PV.8364, pp. 5–6.
8 S/PV.8287, pp. 2–3.
9 S/PV.8428, p. 10.
10 S/PV.8337, pp. 4–5.
11 S/PV.8378, pp. 7–9.
12 S/PV.8431, pp. 6–9.
13 S/PV.8229, p. 5; and S/PV.8428, p. 11.
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<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)</td>
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<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011)</td>
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<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa</td>
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<td>Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction</td>
<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)</td>
<td>S/PV.8230</td>
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<td>Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts</td>
<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001)</td>
<td>S/PV.8180</td>
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<td>Country-specific</td>
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<tr>
<td>The situation in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)</td>
<td>S/PV.8426</td>
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<tr>
<td>The situation in the Central African Republic</td>
<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013)</td>
<td>S/PV.8187</td>
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<td>The situation in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>S/PV.8378</td>
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<tr>
<td>The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)</td>
<td>S/PV.8318</td>
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<tr>
<td>The situation in Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012)</td>
<td>S/PV.8337</td>
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<td>The situation in Libya</td>
<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011)</td>
<td>S/PV.8159</td>
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<td>The situation in Mali</td>
<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017)</td>
<td>S/PV.8229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The situation in Somalia</td>
<td>Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)</td>
<td>S/PV.8322</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan</td>
<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)</td>
<td>S/PV.8202</td>
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<td>S/PV.8287</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Part IX. Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: committees, tribunals and other bodies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Briefing by the Chair</th>
<th>Meeting record and date</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S/PV.8366 3 October 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015)</td>
<td>S/PV.8249 8 May 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>S/PV.8431 18 December 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Became the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia on 14 November 2018 pursuant to resolution 2444 (2018).

1. **Committees overseeing specific sanctions measures**

In resolution 2444 (2018), the Council decided to terminate the Eritrea sanctions regime. The name of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea was changed to the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia. The mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea was terminated, and a new Panel of Experts on Somalia was established.¹⁴

During the period under review, the total number of active committees overseeing specific sanctions measures was 14. Table 2 provides an overview of the committees, including selected categories of the main mandatory measures that they oversaw during 2018.

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¹⁴ Resolution 2444 (2018), paras. 9, 10 and 11.

**Table 2**

Security Council committees responsible for oversight of specific sanctions measures, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)*</th>
<th>Arms embargo</th>
<th>Asset freeze</th>
<th>Travel ban</th>
<th>Non-proliferation measures/ restrictions on ballistic missiles</th>
<th>Financial restrictions</th>
<th>Petroleum related (including bunkering services)</th>
<th>Natural resources*</th>
<th>Other*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005)</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011)</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012)  
	Arms embargo  |  Asset freeze  |  Travel ban  |  Non-proliferation measures/ restrictions on ballistic missiles  |  Financial restrictions  |  Petroleum related (including bunkering services)  |  Natural resources  |  Other

Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013)  
	X  |  X  |  X

Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014)  
	X  |  X  |  X

Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015)  
	X  |  X  |  X

Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017)  
	X  |  X

|  
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a Refers to a variety of measures on natural resources, including charcoal, coal, iron, gold, titanium, copper, nickel, silver and zinc.

b Including measures relating to, inter alia, transport and aviation measures, trade restrictions and/or diplomatic restrictions.

c Became the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia on 14 November 2018 pursuant to resolution 2444 (2018).

### Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

During the period under review, further to the lifting of the measures imposed on Eritrea in November 2018, the Council decided to adjust the scope of the mandate of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) and to terminate the mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.\(^\text{15}\) Prior to the lifting of the measures in 2018, the Chair of the Committee visited Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia from 4 to 10 May 2018, marking the Chair’s first trip since 2010 to the Horn of Africa, as reported to the Council.\(^\text{16}\) The work of the Committee in 2018 prior to the termination of the Eritrea sanctions regime is described in more detail in its annual report.\(^\text{17}\)

On 6 November 2018, the Council, in its resolution 2442 (2018), called upon all States to cooperate fully with the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, including on information-sharing regarding possible violations of the arms embargo or charcoal ban.\(^\text{18}\) On 14 November 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2444 (2018). In that resolution, the Council recalled paragraphs 16 and 17 of its resolution 1907 (2009) and recognized that, during the course of its current and four previous mandates, the Monitoring Group had not found conclusive evidence that Eritrea supported Al-Shabaab. The Council decided to lift the measures imposed on Eritrea and to terminate the mandate of the Monitoring Group with effect from 16 December 2018.\(^\text{19}\)

### Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia

On 14 November 2018, by resolution 2444 (2018), the Council terminated the Eritrea sanctions regime, while reaffirming the arms embargo on Somalia as well as the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal.\(^\text{20}\) The Council renewed the exemptions to the arms embargo on Somalia set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014) until 15 November 2019, as well as the exemptions to the asset freeze.\(^\text{21}\) The name of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea was changed to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia.\(^\text{22}\) In addition, the Council established, with effect from the date of adoption of resolution 2444 (2018), until 15 December 2019, the Panel of Experts on Somalia and expressed its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate actions.

\(^\text{15}\) The name of the Committee was changed to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia.

\(^\text{16}\) S/PV.8322, p. 2.

\(^\text{17}\) See S/2018/1116.

\(^\text{18}\) Resolution 2442 (2018), para. 11.

\(^\text{19}\) Resolution 2444 (2018), paras. 1, 4 and 10.

\(^\text{20}\) Ibid., paras. 13 and 41.

\(^\text{21}\) Ibid., paras. 14 and 48.

\(^\text{22}\) Ibid., para. 9.
action regarding any extensions of the mandate of the Panel of Experts no later than 15 November 2019.23

Except for its scope, now covering Somalia exclusively, the mandate of the Committee remained largely unaltered and included the tasks set out in paragraph 11 of resolution 751 (1992), paragraph 11 of resolution 1844 (2008) and paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (2012). In essence, the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia was mandated to deliver on the same range of functions as the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, including monitoring the implementation of measures, gathering and analysing information on compliance, granting exemptions and taking action on alleged violations by, inter alia, designating individuals and entities. In addition, the Council requested the Committee to consider the recommendations contained in the reports of the Panel of Experts and to recommend to the Council ways to improve the implementation of and compliance with the measures in place in response to continuing violations.24

The Council also requested the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chair and/or Committee members to enhance the full and effective implementation of the measures set out in resolution 2444 (2018), with a view to encouraging States to comply fully with the resolution.25 Consistent with the changes to the scope of the Committee’s work, set out in resolution 2444 (2018), the Council also requested that the Committee amend its guidelines, its implementation assistance notices and its website.26

Similarly, as set out in resolution 2444 (2018), the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia mirrored that of the terminated Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. The Council decided that the mandate would include the tasks as set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014), paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (2012) and paragraph 29 of resolution 2444 (2018) as they related to Somalia.27 Those provisions concerned, inter alia, assisting in monitoring the implementation of measures, gathering and analysing information on compliance, assessing the impact and effectiveness of measures, providing information relevant to listings and/or violations, reporting and making recommendations and identifying areas where sanctions implementation capacities of regional States could be strengthened.

In addition, the Council decided that the Panel of Experts would continue the investigations started by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea related to the export to Somalia of chemicals that could be used as oxidisers in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices.28 The Council welcomed the reporting of the Panel of Experts on the illicit charcoal trade by Al-Shabaab, as well as its cooperation with the Combined Maritime Forces,29 and requested the Panel of Experts to continue to focus on the ongoing export of charcoal from Somalia and to propose further measures, taking account of human rights concerns,30 and to provide monthly updates to the Committee as well as a midterm report.31

Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities

During the period under review, the mandate of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities32 and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team33 remained unchanged. The Council addressed matters relating to the Committee under three different items, namely, (a) Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts; (b) Non-proliferation of weapons of mass

23 Ibid., para. 11. On 13 December 2018, the Secretary-General informed the President of the Security Council that he had appointed six experts and designated a Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on Somalia (see S/2018/1115).
24 Ibid., para. 55.
25 Ibid., para. 56.
26 Ibid., para. 9.
27 Ibid., para. 11.
28 Ibid., para. 29.
29 Ibid., paras. 33 and 43.
30 Ibid., para. 45.
31 Ibid., para. 54.
32 The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding upon requests for exemptions, designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban, and conducting periodic and specialized reviews of the entries on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list.
33 The mandate of the Monitoring Team included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures, assisting the Committee in regularly reviewing names on the sanctions list, assisting the Ombudsperson to the Committee in carrying out the mandate and providing periodic reports.
destruction; and (c) Maintenance of international peace and security.\textsuperscript{34} On 21 December 2018, in connection with the Council’s consideration of the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, the Council issued a presidential statement stating that it would continue to evaluate the implementation of the measures and make adjustments, as necessary, to support their full implementation with respect to “all individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list”.\textsuperscript{35} The work of the Committee in 2018 is described in more detail in its annual report.\textsuperscript{36}

On 24 May 2018, the Secretary-General appointed Daniel Kipfer Fasciati (Switzerland) as Ombudsperson, who took office on 18 July 2018.\textsuperscript{37} By resolution 2368 (2017), the Council had extended the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson until 17 December 2021.\textsuperscript{38}

**Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003)**

By resolution 1518 (2003), adopted on 24 November 2003, the Council established the Committee and mandated it to continue to identify individuals and entities whose funds, other financial assets and economic resources should be frozen and transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq, in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 23 of resolution 1483 (2003).\textsuperscript{39} During the reporting period, there were no modifications to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003). The work of the Committee in 2018 is described in more detail in its annual report.\textsuperscript{40}

**Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

In 2018, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo remained largely unchanged.\textsuperscript{41} The work of the Committee in 2018 is described in more detail in its annual report.\textsuperscript{42}

By resolution 2424 (2018), the Council extended the mandate of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) until 1 August 2019 and expressed its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 1 July 2019.\textsuperscript{43} By resolution 2409 (2018), the Council renewed the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, expressed its full support to the Group of Experts and mandated the Mission to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo in cooperation with the Group of Experts, to observe flows in violation of the measures imposed in paragraph 1 of Council resolution 2293 (2016) and to exchange relevant information with the Group of Experts.\textsuperscript{44}

**Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan**

In 2018, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan remained largely unchanged.\textsuperscript{45} On 13 July 2018, by resolution 2429 (2018), the Council expressed its intention to consider imposing additional measures against any party that impeded the peace process.\textsuperscript{46} The work of the Committee in 2018 is described in more detail in its annual report.\textsuperscript{47}

On 8 February 2018, by resolution 2400 (2018), the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) until 12 March 2019 and expressed its

\textsuperscript{34} For more information, see part I, sects. 31, 34.A and 37, concerning those items.

\textsuperscript{35} S/PRST/2018/21.

\textsuperscript{36} S/2018/1112.


\textsuperscript{38} Resolution 2368 (2017), para. 60.

\textsuperscript{39} For background information, see Repertoire, Supplement 2000–2003, chap. V, part I.B.2.

\textsuperscript{40} S/2018/1127.

\textsuperscript{41} The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding upon requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze, transport and customs controls and a travel ban.

\textsuperscript{42} See S/2018/1135.

\textsuperscript{43} Resolution 2424 (2018), para. 3. The mandate of the Group of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

\textsuperscript{44} Resolution 2409 (2018), paras. 37 (iii) and 46.

\textsuperscript{45} The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding on requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban.

\textsuperscript{46} Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 31.

\textsuperscript{47} See S/2018/1122.
intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 24 February 2019.\textsuperscript{48}

**Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005)**

During the period under review, no changes were made to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005) to register and oversee the travel ban and asset freeze on individuals designated by the International Independent Investigation Commission or by the Government of Lebanon as suspected of involvement in the terrorist bombing in Beirut on 14 February 2005 that killed the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri, and 22 others.\textsuperscript{49} The Committee held no meetings during 2018. As at 31 December 2018, no individuals had been registered.

**Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)**

During the period under review, there were no modifications to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006).\textsuperscript{50} The work of the Committee in 2018, including the adoption of Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7 to provide Member States with additional guidance for obtaining exemptions to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, is described in more detail in its annual report.\textsuperscript{51}

By resolution 2407 (2018), the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) until 24 April 2019 and expressed its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 24 March 2019.\textsuperscript{52} The Council urged all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts.\textsuperscript{53}

**Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya**

During the period under review, the Council adopted resolution 2441 (2018) relating to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya.\textsuperscript{54} In the resolution, the Council urged all States, relevant United Nations bodies, including the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, and other interested parties to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011), in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) as well as subsequent relevant resolutions.\textsuperscript{55} On 1 and 2 November 2018, the Chair of the Committee conducted the first visit to Libya since the inception of the sanctions regime in 2011.\textsuperscript{56} The work of the Committee in 2018, including the designation of eight individuals, is described in more detail in its annual report.\textsuperscript{57}

In resolution 2441 (2018), the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 15 February 2020 and decided that the Panel’s mandated tasks as defined in resolution 2213 (2015) would also apply with respect to the measures updated in resolution 2441 (2018).\textsuperscript{58} The Council also affirmed its readiness

\textsuperscript{48} Resolution 2400 (2018), para. 2. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

\textsuperscript{49} For further information, see Repertoire, Supplement 2004–2007, chap. V, part I.B.

\textsuperscript{50} The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding upon requests for exemptions and designating individuals, entities and vessels subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an embargo relating to nuclear, ballistic missile and other weapons of mass destruction programmes, sectoral bans on coal, minerals and fuel, a ban on the export of luxury goods, a travel ban, an asset freeze, a ban on the provision of financial services and a ban on specialized teaching and training in disciplines that could contribute to prohibited activities and programmes.


\textsuperscript{52} Resolution 2407 (2018), para. 1. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., para. 5.

\textsuperscript{54} In 2018, the Council also adopted resolution 2420 (2018), which did not directly affect the mandate of the Committee. The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding upon requests for exemptions and designating individuals, entities and vessels subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, a travel ban, an asset freeze and business restrictions, and measures in relation to attempts to illicitly export petroleum.

\textsuperscript{55} Resolution 2441 (2018), para. 16.

\textsuperscript{56} S/PV.8394, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{57} See S/2018/1176.

\textsuperscript{58} Resolution 2441 (2018), para. 14. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, making recommendations on actions that the Council, the Committee, the Government of Libya or other States may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures and providing periodic reports.
to review the mandate of the Panel, as may be needed at any time in the light of developments in Libya.\textsuperscript{59}

**Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)**

In 2018, there were no changes to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011).\textsuperscript{60} The work of the Committee in 2018 is described in its annual report.\textsuperscript{61}

**Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau**

In resolution 2404 (2018), the Council decided to review the sanctions measures imposed on Guinea-Bissau within seven months of the adoption of the resolution;\textsuperscript{62} however, no changes were made in 2018 to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau. In that regard, the Committee continued to oversee the implementation of the travel ban imposed against 11 members of the military who led the coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau on 12 April 2012, to designate individuals who met the listing criteria contained in resolution 2048 (2012) and to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions from the sanctions measures. The Chair of the Committee visited Guinea and Guinea-Bissau from 25 to 29 June 2018, with the purpose of acquiring first-hand information on the implementation of the sanctions measures.\textsuperscript{63} The work of the Committee in 2018 is described in more detail in its annual report.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., para. 18.

\textsuperscript{60} The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding upon requests for exemptions, designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban, and conducting periodic and specialized reviews of the entries on the Committee’s sanctions list. The Committee was supported by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.

\textsuperscript{61} See S/2018/1118.

\textsuperscript{62} Resolution 2404 (2018), para. 27. In the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the progress made with regard to the stabilization and restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau, as well as recommendations on the continuation of the sanctions regime imposed by the Council further to resolution 2048 (2012). The Secretary-General submitted his report to the Council on 28 August 2018 (S/2018/791).

\textsuperscript{63} S/PV.8337, pp. 4–5. For more information on the situation in Guinea-Bissau, see part I, sect. 8, “The situation in Guinea-Bissau”.

\textsuperscript{64} See S/2018/1140.

**Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic**

During the period under review, the Council adopted one resolution relating to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) and the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic.\textsuperscript{65} By resolution 2399 (2018), the Council extended the sanctions measures imposed in resolutions 2127 (2013) and 2134 (2014) in connection with the Central African Republic and decided, for the first time, that individuals and entities who committed incitement to violence, in particular on an ethnic or religious basis, could meet the criteria for designation by the Committee.\textsuperscript{66} The Chair of the Committee visited the Central African Republic from 2 to 5 October 2018.\textsuperscript{67} The work of the Committee in 2018 is described in more detail in its annual report.\textsuperscript{68}

Also by resolution 2399 (2018), the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 28 February 2019 and expressed its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 31 January 2019.\textsuperscript{69} In addition to its previously mandated tasks, the Council requested that the Panel of Experts collect data on perpetrators and acts of incitement to violence, especially on religious or ethnic grounds, and to include a gender perspective throughout its investigation and reporting.\textsuperscript{70}

By resolution 2448 (2018), the Council authorized the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic to assist the Committee and the Panel of Experts and to monitor the implementation of the sanctions measures in the Central African Republic. The Council also mandated the Mission to support the Panel of Experts in the collection of information on

\textsuperscript{65} The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding upon requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban.

\textsuperscript{66} Resolution 2399 (2018), paras. 1, 9, 16 and 22.

\textsuperscript{67} S/PV.8378, p. 7.


\textsuperscript{69} Resolution 2399 (2018), para. 31. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., paras. 32 (g) and 35.
acts of incitement to violence, in particular on religious or ethnic grounds.\textsuperscript{71}

**Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014)**

In 2018, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014), relating to Yemen, remained largely unchanged.\textsuperscript{72} By resolution 2402 (2018), the Council reaffirmed the arms embargo as set out in resolution 2216 (2015) and renewed the asset freeze and travel ban imposed by the Council in resolutions 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015) until 26 February 2019.\textsuperscript{73} The work of the Committee in 2018 is described in more detail in its annual report.\textsuperscript{74}

The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Yemen until 28 March 2019 and expressed its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 28 February 2019.\textsuperscript{75}

**Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan**

During the period under review, the Council adopted two resolutions affecting the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan\textsuperscript{76} and the Panel of Experts on South Sudan,\textsuperscript{77} namely, resolutions 2418 (2018) of 31 May 2018 and 2428 (2018) of 13 July 2018. By resolution 2418 (2018), the Council provided for a technical roll-over of the travel and financial measures imposed in resolution 2206 (2015) for a period of one and a half months and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 14 August 2018.\textsuperscript{78} The Council requested the Secretary-General, in coordination with the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism, to report on violations of the cessation of hostilities agreement and on whether the parties had reached a viable political agreement, and decided that, in the absence of such progress, it would consider applying targeted measures to six individuals identified in the annex to the resolution and/or an arms embargo.\textsuperscript{79}

By resolution 2428 (2018), the Council renewed the asset freeze and travel ban and imposed an arms embargo on South Sudan.\textsuperscript{80} The Council also decided to impose the asset freeze and the travel ban on two designated individuals.\textsuperscript{81} The Chair of the Committee conducted a visit to South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya from 16 to 26 June 2018.\textsuperscript{82} The work of the Committee in 2018 is described in more detail in its annual report.\textsuperscript{83}

By the same resolution, the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 1 July 2019 and broadened it to include assisting the Committee by providing it with information on individuals and entities engaged in planning acts of violence and planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence.\textsuperscript{84} The Council also decided that the Panel should gather, examine and analyse information on armed groups or criminal networks engaging in the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources and, in the context of the diversion of public resources and reports of financial impropriety involving the Transitional Government of National Unity, on individuals engaged in actions or policies that had the purpose or effect of expanding or extending the conflict in South Sudan.\textsuperscript{85} The Panel’s mandate to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the supply, sale or transfer of arms was broadened to include the financing modalities of such activities.\textsuperscript{86} The Council reiterated its previous request to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the Committee, and invited the United Nations High

\textsuperscript{71} Resolution 2448 (2018), paras. 41 (b), (c) and (d).

\textsuperscript{72} The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding upon requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban.

\textsuperscript{73} Resolution 2402 (2018), para. 2.

\textsuperscript{74} See S/2018/1125.

\textsuperscript{75} Resolution 2402 (2018), para. 5.

\textsuperscript{76} The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding upon requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban.

\textsuperscript{77} The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering, examining and analysing information on compliance and, as of 2018, information regarding the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel and related military or other assistance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

\textsuperscript{78} Resolution 2418 (2018), paras. 1 and 2.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., para. 3.

\textsuperscript{80} Resolution 2428 (2018), paras. 4–6, 12 and 13.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., para. 17.

\textsuperscript{82} S/PV.8431, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{83} See S/2018/1123.

\textsuperscript{84} Resolution 2428 (2018), paras. 14 (d) and (e) and 19 (a).

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., paras. 14 (j), 15 and 19 (a) and (d).

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., para. 19 (c).
Commissioner for Human Rights to share relevant information with the Committee, as appropriate.\(^{87}\)

**Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali**

During the period under review, the mandates of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017)\(^{88}\) and the Panel of Experts on Mali\(^{89}\) remained unchanged.

By resolution 2432 (2018), the Council renewed the sanctions measures imposed in resolution 2374 (2017).\(^{90}\) In that regard, the Council reaffirmed that the Committee was mandated to designate those individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and to consider requests for exemptions.\(^{91}\) On 20 December 2018, the Committee approved the addition of three individuals to its sanctions list. The Chair of the Committee conducted a visit to Mali on 26 and 27 March 2018.\(^{92}\) The work of the Committee in 2018, including the Chair’s second visit to Mali, is described in more detail in its annual report.\(^{93}\)

By the same resolution, the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) until 30 September 2019 and expressed its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action no later than 31 August 2019.\(^{94}\)

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2. Other committees

During the period under review, both the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate established by resolution 1535 (2004) to support the Counter-Terrorism Committee remained active. In 2018, the Council did not adopt any resolution relating to the Counter-Terrorism Committee. The Council issued two presidential statements concerning the Committee and its Executive Directorate, on 19 January and 8 May 2018.\(^{95}\) The focus of the Council’s decisions during the period under review concerned broadly the nexus between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, and the Council encouraged the Committee and its Executive Directorate to coordinate with other entities. The briefings of the Chair of the Committee were also focused on the implementation of resolution 2341 (2017) concerning the protection of critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks, as well as on returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters and their family members.\(^{96}\)

The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) continued to meet during the period under review. The Council did not adopt any resolution relating to the Committee.

**Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism**

In a presidential statement of 19 January 2018, the Council took note of the efforts of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate to assess and monitor implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 2178 (2014), 2396 (2017) and other relevant resolutions on terrorism by Afghanistan and countries of the region, and acknowledged recommendations provided by the Committee, including on technical assistance.\(^{97}\)

In a presidential statement of 8 May 2018, the Council encouraged the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to leverage its Global Counter-Terrorism Research Network to better understand the nature and scope of the links that might exist between terrorists and transnational organized criminals.\(^{98}\) It also invited the Executive Directorate to enhance cooperation with the Financial Action Task Force and Task Force-style regional bodies.\(^{99}\) The Council welcomed the open briefing by the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the nexus between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, and requested the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) to hold a special joint meeting within 12 months on addressing the issue of the nexus between international terrorism and transnational organized crime.\(^{100}\) Also on 8 May 2018,

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\(^{87}\) Ibid., para. 22.

\(^{88}\) The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding upon requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an asset freeze and a travel ban.

\(^{89}\) The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

\(^{90}\) Resolution 2432 (2018), para. 1.

\(^{91}\) Ibid., para. 2.

\(^{92}\) S/PV.8229, p. 5.


\(^{94}\) Resolution 2432 (2018), para. 3.


\(^{96}\) S/PV.8180, p. 2; and S/PV.8364, pp. 6–8.

\(^{97}\) S/PRST/2018/2, seventh paragraph.

\(^{98}\) S/PRST/2018/9, third paragraph.

\(^{99}\) Ibid., tenth paragraph.

\(^{100}\) Ibid., fourteenth paragraph.
the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee transmitted the joint report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Office of Counter-Terrorism, pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 2395 (2017).101 As requested in paragraph 44 of resolution 2396 (2017), the Committee reviewed the guiding principles on foreign terrorist fighters (Madrid Guiding Principles), adopted in 2015, in the light of the evolving threat of foreign terrorist fighters, and adopted the addendum to the Madrid Guiding Principles on 27 December 2018.102

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)

During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any resolution relating to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). The Chair of the Committee, however, briefed the Council on various occasions on the work of the Committee in its task of overseeing the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).103 The Chair also briefed the Council on the Committee’s outreach activities, including the engagement with international and regional organizations with mandates directly related to the resolution.104


II. Working groups

Note

During the period under review, working groups of the Security Council continued to meet. As in the case of the committees, the working groups were composed of all 15 members of the Council and meetings were held in private, unless otherwise decided. Decisions were reached by consensus. In 2018, five of the six existing working groups of the Council held regular meetings.106

Table 3 provides information on the establishment, mandate, key provisions, and chairmanship and vice-chairmanship of the informal and ad hoc working groups of the Council in 2018.

103 S/PV.8230, p. 2.
104 S/PV.8364, pp. 8–10.
106 The Working Group established pursuant to resolution 1566 (2004) did not meet during the period under review.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations</th>
<th>Establishment</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Chair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Established on 31 January 2001 (S/PRST/2001/3)</td>
<td>To address both generic peacekeeping issues relevant to the responsibilities of the Council, and technical aspects of individual peacekeeping operations, without prejudice to the competence of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Where appropriate, to seek the views of the troop-contributing countries, including through meetings between the Working Group and the troop-contributing countries, so that their views are taken into account by the Council</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa | Established in March 2002 (S/2002/207) | To monitor the implementation of recommendations contained in the presidential statement S/PRST/2002/2 and previous presidential statements and resolutions regarding conflict prevention and resolution in Africa To propose recommendations on the enhancement of cooperation between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council as well as with other United Nations agencies dealing with Africa | Ethiopia |
### Establishment of Working Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Chair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working Group established pursuant to resolution <strong>1566 (2004)</strong></td>
<td>To consider and submit recommendations to the Council on practical measures to be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution <strong>1267 (1999)</strong> concerning Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, including more effective procedures considered to be appropriate for bringing them to justice through prosecution or extradition, freezing their financial assets, preventing their movement through the territories of Member States, and preventing supply to them of all types of arms and related material, and on the procedures for implementing these measures.</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict</td>
<td>To review the reports of the monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict. To review progress in the development and implementation of the action plans called for in resolutions <strong>1539 (2004)</strong> and <strong>1612 (2005)</strong>. To consider other relevant information presented to it. To make recommendations to the Council on possible measures to promote the protection of children affected by armed conflict, including through recommendations on appropriate mandates for peacekeeping missions and recommendations with respect to the parties to the conflict. To address requests, as appropriate, to other bodies within the United Nations system for action to support implementation of resolution <strong>1612 (2005)</strong> in accordance with their respective mandates.</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions</td>
<td>To deal with issues related to documentation and other procedural questions.</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Working Group on International Tribunals</td>
<td>To deal with a specific issue pertaining to the statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and subsequently mandated to deal with other (legal) issues pertaining to the Tribunals.</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*b See S/PV.4161.
III. Investigative bodies

Note

During the period under review, the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant became operational, following the acceptance by the Government of Iraq and the approval by the Council of the terms of reference for the activities of the Investigative Team. In addition, a Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team was appointed by the Secretary-General, and the initial elements of the Investigative Team were deployed to Baghdad in October 2018.107

United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

Further to the acceptance by the Government of Iraq of the terms of reference for the activities of the Investigative Team, on 13 February 2018 the Council approved the terms of reference, which included details on the structure, composition and overall working methods of the Investigative Team.108

Following the Secretary-General’s appointment of the Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team on 13 July 2018, the Investigative Team formally commenced its activities on 20 August 2018, and the initial elements of the Investigative Team were deployed to Baghdad on 29 October 2018.109 On 15 November 2018, the Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team presented the first report on the activities of the Team and briefed the Council on 4 December 2018.110

Note

In a note by the President of 2 February 2018,111 the Council agreed that issues pertaining to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals would be considered under an item entitled “International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals”,112 under which would be subsumed the earlier consideration by the Council of issues pertaining to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.113 During the period under review, the Council adopted one presidential statement and one resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter concerning, inter alia, the reappointment of the Prosecutor of the Mechanism, as well as other aspects regarding the management, reporting and completion of functions of the Tribunal.

IV. Tribunals

Developments in 2018

By an exchange of letters dated 1 and 6 March 2018 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a judge to fill a vacancy following the resignation of one of the judges of the Mechanism with effect from 11 March 2018.114

On 19 March 2018, the Council issued a presidential statement by which it recalled its decision that the Mechanism should operate for an initial period of four years starting from 1 July 2012, and its decision

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107 For background information on the mandate of the Investigative Team, see Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017, part IX, sect. III.
110 S/PV.8412, pp. 2–6.
112 By resolution 1966 (2010), the Council established the Mechanism to carry out the residual functions of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) after the completion of their mandates. For more information on the activities of the Council during 2018 in connection with the Mechanism, see part I, sect. 27, “International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals”.
to review the progress of the work of the Mechanism, including in completing its functions, before the end of that initial period and every two years thereafter. In that connection, the Council also recalled its further decision that the Mechanism should continue to operate for subsequent periods of two years following each such review, unless the Council decided otherwise, and that the Mechanism should be a small, temporary and efficient structure, whose functions and size would diminish over time, with a small number of staff commensurate with its reduced functions.\footnote{S/PRST/2018/6, second and third paragraphs.}

By resolution \textit{2422 (2018)}, adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council appointed the Prosecutor of the Mechanism with effect from 1 July 2018 until 30 June 2020.\footnote{Resolution 2422 (2018), para. 1. For more information on the appointment mechanism, see part IV, sect. I.D.} In the resolution, the Council emphasized that, in view of the substantially reduced nature of the residual functions, the Mechanism was established to be a small, temporary and efficient structure, whose functions and size would diminish over time, with a small number of staff commensurate with its reduced functions, and urged the Mechanism to continue to be guided in its activities by those elements.\footnote{Ibid., para. 5.}

\section{V. Ad hoc commissions}

\textbf{Note}

No new commissions were created during 2018. The United Nations Compensation Commission, established pursuant to resolutions \textit{687 (1991)} and \textit{692 (1991)} to process claims and pay compensation for losses and damage suffered as a direct result of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 and 1991, continued to function, without any changes to its mandate.

\section{VI. Special advisers, envoys and representatives}

\textbf{Note}

Section VI provides a list of special advisers, envoys and representatives in whose appointment the Security Council has been involved and whose mandates relate to the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Special Representatives appointed as heads of peacekeeping or special political missions are covered in part X and those authorized by the General Assembly are covered in part IV. Previous Supplements should be consulted for information concerning special advisers, envoys and representatives whose functions ceased.

During the period under review, the following envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General continued to exercise their functions: the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution \textit{1559 (2004)}, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi. The remit of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan was expanded to cover the Horn of Africa.\footnote{See S/2018/955.} In addition, on 13 July 2018, the Secretary-General appointed the Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.\footnote{See S/2018/773. For more information, see sect. III above.}

Table 4 lists decisions of the Council acknowledging the appointment of personal and special envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General, their mandate and any developments that occurred during the period under review.
### Table 4

**Developments relating to special advisers, envoys and representatives, 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment/appointment</th>
<th>Decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution 2440 (2018), second, third, fourth, fifth, twelfth and fourteenth preambular paragraphs and paras. 3 and 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/1997/320 17 April 1997</td>
<td>There were no developments in 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2004/567 12 July 2004</td>
<td>Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 7 (c) (iii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2004/568 13 July 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2004/36 19 October 2004</td>
<td>There were no developments in 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2004/974 14 December 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2004/975 16 December 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2007/721 31 August 2007</td>
<td>There were no developments in 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution 2409 (2018), twenty-fourth preambular paragraph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution 2429 (2018), eighteenth preambular paragraph and para. 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2011/474 27 July 2011</td>
<td>There were no developments in 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2011/475 29 July 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Establishment/appointment  Decisions

**Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa**

S/2018/955  Resolution 2445 (2018), fifth preambular paragraph and paras. 7, 9 and 32
24 October 2018

S/2018/979
31 October 2018

**Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen**

S/2012/469  There were no developments in 2018
18 June 2012

S/2012/470
21 June 2012

**Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel**

S/2012/750  There were no developments in 2018
5 October 2012

S/2012/751
9 October 2012

**Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region**

S/2013/166  Resolution 2409 (2018), paras. 36 (ii) (a) and 62
15 March 2013

S/PRST/2018/17, seventh paragraph

S/2013/167
18 March 2013

**Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi**

S/2017/396  S/PRST/2018/7, sixteenth paragraph
3 May 2017

S/PRST/2018/17, seventh paragraph

S/2017/397
4 May 2017

**Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant**

Resolution 2379 (2017)  There were no further developments in 2018
21 September 2017

S/2018/118
9 February 2018

S/2018/119
13 February 2018
VII. Peacebuilding Commission

Note

The Peacebuilding Commission was established by the Council in resolution 1645 (2005) of 20 December 2005. During the period under review, the Commission addressed an increased number of country-specific, regional and thematic issues to help to sustain attention to and enhance coherence in peacebuilding and sustaining peace. In 2018, the situations in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone remained on the agenda of the Commission. Furthermore, the Commission continued to sustain international attention to efforts in peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the Gambia, following up on its engagement since 2017.

Appointments to the Organizational Committee

In 2018, Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and Côte d’Ivoire were the two elected members of the Council that were selected to participate in the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Developments in 2018

In 2018, consistent with past practice, the Council invited the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Chairs of its country-specific configurations to provide briefings on their activities, and on the situations on the agenda of the Commission.

At meetings of the Council concerning the situation in Burundi, the Chair of the Burundi configuration briefed the Council three times, addressing humanitarian, socioeconomic and political questions in particular, as well as aspects concerning security and human rights. The Chair of the Central African Republic configuration briefed the Council once, reporting on the work and initiatives to bring a long-term focus to stabilization, reconciliation and development efforts in the country, including the assistance provided for the establishment of the Special Criminal Court. The Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration briefed the Council on four occasions, reporting on the support provided to the justice sector and to national reconciliation efforts, the implementation of the Peacebuilding Fund’s portfolio for Guinea-Bissau and the engagement with regional and international partners to assist in resolving the political impasse in the country, as well as on the implementation of the Conakry Agreement and the preparations for elections. The representative of the Chair of the Liberia configuration briefed the Council once, elaborating on the need to address the remaining root causes of the conflict and the key structural reforms set out in the peacebuilding plan. The Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission briefed the Council at a meeting held under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” concerning the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, an integrated response to peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the Sahel.

In 2018, the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission briefed the Council also under thematic items, namely the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”, and in a meeting on youth and peace and security. The Chair and Vice-Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission continued the practice of briefing Council members in

120 By resolution 1645 (2005), the Council, acting concurrently with the General Assembly, decided that the main purposes of the Peacebuilding Commission would be to, inter alia, bring together all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding to marshal the resources and advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery, to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict, and to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations. For more information, see part I, sect. 35, “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”.
122 Ibid., para. 8.
124 The practice of inviting the Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission to participate in formal Council meetings was established in the note by the President of 26 July 2010 (S/2010/507, para. 61) and was reaffirmed in the note by the President of 30 August 2017 (S/2017/507, para. 95).
125 See S/PV.8189, S/PV.8268 and S/PV.8408. For more information, see part I, sect. 4, “The situation in Burundi”.
126 See S/PV.8187. For more information, see part I, sect. 7, “The situation in the Central African Republic”.
127 See S/PV.8182, S/PV.8261, S/PV.8337 and S/PV.8438. For more information, see part I, sect. 8, “The situation in Guinea-Bissau”.
128 See S/PV.8239. For more information, see part I, sect. 2, “The situation in Liberia”.
129 See S/PV.8435.
130 See S/PV.8301 and S/PV.8243.
131 See S/PV.8241.
the context of an annual informal interactive dialogue on peacebuilding.\footnote{For further information on informal interactive dialogues, see part II, sect. I.C.}

Following the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, held on 24 and 25 April 2018, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2413 (2018), in parallel with the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 72/276. The Council welcomed the presentation of the report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding and sustaining peace,\footnote{S/2018/43.} and took note of the decision of the General Assembly to invite the relevant United Nations bodies and organs, including the Peacebuilding Commission, to further advance, explore and consider implementation of the recommendations and options contained in the report of the Secretary-General.\footnote{Resolution 2413 (2018), paras. 1 and 2.} It also took note of the decision of the General Assembly to request the Secretary-General to present, during the seventy-third session of the Assembly, an interim report further elaborating on his recommendations and options, as well as a detailed report during the seventy-fourth session of the Assembly in connection with the next comprehensive review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture.\footnote{Ibid., paras. 3 and 4.} On 18 December 2018, the Council issued a presidential statement in which it recognized that effective peacebuilding must involve the entire United Nations system, acknowledged the progress achieved by the Peacebuilding Commission and underscored that the Commission had an important role to play as a dedicated intergovernmental advisory body to bring coherence to international peacebuilding efforts.\footnote{S/PRST/2018/20, eighth and ninth paragraphs.} The Council noted the importance of the informal interactive dialogues between the Council and the Peacebuilding Commission as a useful venue for exercising the advisory role of the Commission, and encouraged the Commission to present concise, targeted, context-specific and applicable recommendations to the Council in countries considered by both bodies.\footnote{Ibid., eleventh and twelfth paragraphs.} The Council emphasized the need to further harness the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in advancing and supporting an integrated and coherent approach with respect to multidimensional peacekeeping mandates, and acknowledged the role of the Commission in advising the Council during transitions related to the withdrawal of peacekeeping operations and special political missions.\footnote{Ibid., thirteenth and fifteenth paragraphs.} The Council emphasized the importance of further engagement with regional and subregional organizations, and recommended further exploring ways to achieve closer cooperation between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund that could, inter alia, allow the Commission to distil good practices in peacebuilding.\footnote{Resolution 2419 (2018), para. 15.}

The Council referred to the Peacebuilding Commission and to its mandate in several other decisions adopted under both thematic and country-specific items. Under thematic items, the Council emphasized the need for engaging and collaborating with regional actors on policy-related and country-specific issues in the advice given by the Peacebuilding Commission, and acknowledged the significant role of the Commission and United Nations integrated peacebuilding offices in supporting national efforts to build and sustain peace, as well as addressing cross-border threats.\footnote{Ibid., seventeenth and twenty-first paragraphs.} The Council also emphasized the importance of drawing upon the advice of the Peacebuilding Commission with regard to major agreements between the United Nations and other stakeholders relating to United Nations mission mandates and transitions.\footnote{S/PRST/2018/10, twelfth paragraph.} In connection with children and armed conflict, the Council called upon the Peacebuilding Commission to integrate child protection provisions, as well as provisions on the rights and well-being of children, into all peace negotiations, ceasefire and peace agreements, and in provisions for ceasefire monitoring.\footnote{Resolution 2427 (2018), para. 22.} The Council also called upon the Peacebuilding Commission to ensure that the views of children were taken into account in programming activities throughout the conflict cycle, and that the protection, rights, well-being and empowerment of children affected by armed conflict were fully incorporated and prioritized in all post-conflict recovery and reconstruction planning, programmes and strategies, as well as in efforts on peacebuilding and sustaining peace.\footnote{Ibid., para. 23.} In addressing youth and peace and security, the Council recommended that the Commission include in its discussions and advice ways to engage youth meaningfully in national efforts to build and sustain peace.\footnote{Resolution 2413 (2018), para. 22.}

Under country- and region-specific items, the Council welcomed the peaceful elections held in Liberia in 2017 and encouraged continued engagement to assist the country’s efforts to achieve sustainable peace. The Council acknowledged the importance of maintaining international attention on Liberia after the withdrawal of
the United Nations Mission in Liberia in March 2018, as well as during the transition period to follow, and stressed the important role of the Peacebuilding Commission in that regard. The Council further emphasized the importance of the convening role of the Peacebuilding Commission in sustaining peace and peacebuilding efforts, and in mobilizing deeper commitment and partnership between the United Nations system, the countries of the Sahel and other regional and international partners, including international financial institutions. In connection with the situation in Guinea-Bissau, the Council affirmed that the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau, in close cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission, would support the Government of Guinea-Bissau in the mobilization, harmonization and coordination of international assistance to ensure lasting peace and stability in the country.

The Council recognized the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in enhancing efforts towards the country’s stabilization with a view to supporting its long-term peacebuilding priorities. With regard to the situation in Burundi, the Council welcomed the active engagement of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission as a viable platform for dialogue between Burundi and its partners, using a holistic approach to address the political and socioeconomic situation. In connection with the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council stressed the valuable role of the Peacebuilding Commission in bringing strategic advice, providing observations and fostering a more coherent, coordinated and integrated approach to peacebuilding efforts, and encouraged continued coordination with the Commission in support of the country’s long-term peacebuilding needs.

VIII. Subsidiary organs of the Security Council proposed but not established

Note

In 2018, there was one instance of a subsidiary organ of the Council being proposed but not established. Following the termination of the mandate of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, the Council considered establishing a new structure to investigate instances of use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. On 10 April 2018, two draft resolutions, in which the establishment of the United Nations Independent Mechanism of Investigation to investigate an alleged chemical weapons attack in Duma, Syrian Arab Republic, was proposed, and a third draft resolution focused on the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons fact-finding mission at the site of the alleged incident, were considered by the Council. None of the three draft resolutions were adopted, as illustrated in the case study below.

The situation in the Middle East

Following the meeting held under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security” on 9 April 2018 to hear the briefings of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and the Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs on the chemical weapons attack of 7 April 2018 in Duma, Syrian Arab Republic, the Council met again on 10 April 2018, this time under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, to consider three draft resolutions on the issue, all of which the Council failed to adopt.

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147 S/PRST/2018/3, sixteenth paragraph.
148 Resolution 2404 (2018), para. 4 (e).
149 Ibid., para. 16.
150 S/PRST/2018/7, sixteenth paragraph.
151 Resolution 2448 (2018), para. 25.
152 On 17 November 2017, after various attempts to renew the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, the Council failed to adopt a draft resolution by which it would have extended the mandate. As a result, the mandate of the Mechanism expired, and its operations were terminated. For more information on the establishment and termination of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, see Repertoire, Supplements 2014–2015 and 2016–2017, part IX, sect. III.
155 S/PV.8225, pp. 2 and 4.
156 See S/PV.8228.
The first draft resolution put to a vote was sponsored by 26 Member States.\footnote{S/2018/321.} By the draft resolution, the Council would have established the United Nations Independent Mechanism of Investigation for a period of one year with the possibility of further extension and update if deemed necessary.\footnote{Ibid., para. 7.} The Council would have requested the Secretary-General, in coordination with the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to submit to the Council, for its authorization, within 30 days of the adoption of the draft resolution, recommendations, including elements of the terms of reference, regarding the establishment and operation of the independent mechanism, based on the principles of impartiality, independence and professionalism, to identify, to the greatest extent feasible, individuals, entities, groups or governments that were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemical weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic.\footnote{Ibid., para. 8.} The Council would also have requested the Secretary-General, in coordination with the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to undertake measures and arrangements necessary for the speedy establishment and full functioning of the independent mechanism, including the recruitment of impartial and experienced staff with relevant skills and expertise in accordance with the terms of reference.\footnote{Ibid., para. 9.} The Council would have underlined that it would thoroughly assess how to take action following the conclusions of the independent mechanism, and would have reaffirmed its decision in response to violations of resolution 2118 (2013) to impose measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.\footnote{Ibid., para. 19.}

Speaking before the vote, the representative of France stated that his country would do all it could to prevent impunity for the use of chemical weapons, because to allow the normalization of the use of chemical weapons without responding would be “to let the genie of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction out of the bottle”. He added that the demise of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in November 2017 had sent a dangerous signal of impunity and had deprived the Council of an essential “deterrent tool”.\footnote{S/PV.8228, pp. 2–3.} The representative of the United States of America said that, as pen holder of the draft resolution, the United States had done everything possible to work towards Council unity on the text.\footnote{S/PV.8228, pp. 6–7 (Côte d’Ivoire) and p. 7 (Poland).} The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the text of the draft resolution was nothing more than an attempt to resurrect, unchanged, the former Joint Investigative Mechanism, established to investigate cases of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. He further stated that the draft resolution represented an identical reproduction of all of the former Mechanism’s flawed working methods, and that the new independent mechanism would conduct investigations as it saw fit, with no reference to the standards of the Chemical Weapons Convention.\footnote{Ibid., p. 6.} The Council failed to adopt the draft resolution, owing to the negative vote of the Russian Federation, a permanent member of the Council.\footnote{S/2018/175.}

After the vote, the representatives of Côte d’Ivoire and Poland stated that the draft resolution presented by the United States would have ensured the independence and impartiality of the proposed mechanism.\footnote{Ibid., p. 3.} The representative of China said that while his country supported the carrying out of a comprehensive, objective and impartial investigation into the use of chemical weapons in Syrian Arab Republic, the draft resolution did not take full consideration of some of the major concerns of certain Council members on improving the mechanism’s working methods and ensuring an objective and impartial investigation.\footnote{Ibid., p. 4.}

The Council then considered the draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation.\footnote{The draft resolution received 12 votes in favour (Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America), 2 against (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Russian Federation) and 1 abstention (China). See S/PV.8228.} By the draft resolution, the Council would have established the United Nations Independent Mechanism of Investigation for a period of one year from the date on which the Council approved its terms of reference, with the possibility of further extension and update by the Council if deemed necessary. The Council would have urged the independent mechanism to fully ensure a truly impartial, independent, professional and credible way to conduct its investigations on the basis of credible, verified and corroborated evidence, collected in the course of on-site visits, and would...
have underlined that the Council would thoroughly assess the conclusions of the independent mechanism.\textsuperscript{169} The Council would have requested the Secretary-General, in coordination with the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to submit to the Council, for its authorization, within 30 days of the adoption of the draft resolution, recommendations, including elements of the terms of reference, regarding the establishment and operation of the independent mechanism to identify beyond reasonable doubt facts which could lead to the attribution by the Council of the involvement in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic.\textsuperscript{170} The Council would also have requested the Secretary-General, in coordination with the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to undertake the recruitment of impartial and experienced staff with relevant skills and expertise in accordance with the terms of reference and in coordination with relevant States, to be endorsed by the Council.\textsuperscript{171} Speaking before the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation called upon the Council members to vote in favour of the draft resolution, affirming that they now had a real opportunity to create a “genuinely independent and impartial working mechanism” to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.\textsuperscript{172} The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes.\textsuperscript{173}

Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland noted that the draft resolution was unacceptable because it sought to assert that sovereign States were above international law and international norms.\textsuperscript{174} Also speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States stressed that there were two key differences between the draft resolutions presented by the United States and the Russian Federation. According to the representative of the United States, first, the Russian Federation wanted to give itself the opportunity “to approve the investigators who were chosen for the task” and second, it wanted the Security Council “to assess the findings of any investigation before any report was released”.\textsuperscript{175} The representative of China, who voted in favour of the draft resolution, stated that the new investigative mechanism would have been able to function with greater professionalism and to reach a truly credible conclusion, and expressed regret that the draft resolution was not adopted.\textsuperscript{176} The representative of Equatorial Guinea expressed frustration that the Council was not able to adopt either of the draft resolutions and explained that his country had voted in favour of both draft resolutions in the hope of having a new monitoring mechanism to attribute responsibility so as to protect people from the terrible and harmful effects of such chemical weapons.\textsuperscript{177} The representative of Ethiopia expressed regret that the Council could not adopt a resolution to establish a new mechanism, and added that establishing such a tool would have sent a quick and unified message regarding the resolve of the Council not to tolerate impunity.\textsuperscript{178}

Subsequently, a third draft resolution, also submitted by the Russian Federation, was put to a vote.\textsuperscript{179} By the draft resolution, the Council would have reiterated its condemnation in the strongest terms of any use of any toxic chemical as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic, and would have expressed alarm at the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Duma.\textsuperscript{180} The Council would have welcomed the decision of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to send its fact-finding mission experts for investigation in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention to the site of the alleged incident in Duma and adjacent areas, would have requested the fact-finding mission to report the results of its investigation to the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as soon as possible, and would have requested the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to keep the Council informed of the progress of the investigation.\textsuperscript{181} By the draft resolution, the Council would also have requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution, and on compliance by all relevant parties in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{169} Ibid., para. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{170} Ibid., para. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{171} Ibid., para. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{172} S/PV.8228, p. 8.
\item \textsuperscript{173} The draft resolution received 6 votes in favour (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation), 7 against (France, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America) and 2 abstentions (Côte d’Ivoire, Kuwait). See S/PV.8228.
\item \textsuperscript{174} S/PV.8228, p. 9.
\item \textsuperscript{175} Ibid., p. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Ibid. pp. 10–11.
\item \textsuperscript{179} S/2018/322.
\item \textsuperscript{180} Ibid., paras. 1 and 2.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Ibid., para. 3.
\end{itemize}
the Syrian Arab Republic, within 15 days of its adoption.

Speaking before the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation emphasized the need to adopt the draft resolution in support of the mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The meeting was then suspended so that Council members could move to consultations. Following consultations, the draft resolution was put to a vote and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. After the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom explained that her country did not vote for the draft resolution because it would not have established responsibility for the use of chemical weapons. The representative of Ethiopia, explaining his country’s vote in favour of the draft resolution, stated that even if, “undoubtedly, it would not have made achieving attribution possible, finding out whether chemical weapons were in fact used would have been a great achievement”. Other Council members who had either abstained or voted against the draft resolution explained that they had done so because the draft resolution did not provide for the establishment of an independent and impartial investigative mechanism. The representative of the Netherlands stated that his country had serious hesitations about the text of the draft resolution, because the text made it insufficiently clear that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic already had the mandate for on-site visits, as States had to comply with it, and the Netherlands did not want to set a precedent that Council authorization was needed for a fact-finding mission to do its work.

In a letter dated 11 April 2018 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General referred to the deliberations that took place in the Council on 10 April 2018. He expressed his deep disappointment that the Council was unable to agree on a dedicated mechanism to attribute responsibility for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and appealed to the Council to fulfil its duties and to not give up on efforts to agree upon a dedicated, impartial, objective and independent mechanism for attributing responsibility with regard to the use of chemical weapons.

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182 Ibid., para. 7.
184 The draft resolution received 5 votes in favour (Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation), 4 against (France, Poland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America) and 6 abstentions (Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden).
186 Ibid., p. 16.
187 Ibid., p. 15 (Poland), p. 16 (United States), p. 17 (Kuwait), pp. 17–18 (France) and pp. 18–19 (Peru).
188 Ibid., p. 18.
Part X

Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and special political missions
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Introductory note

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Rule 28

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

The powers of the Security Council to establish subsidiary organs are set out in Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and reflected in rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure. Part X of the present Supplement covers decisions of the Council relating to field-based subsidiary organs that the Council established for the performance of its functions under the Charter and that were active during 2018. These field-based subsidiary organs, referred to herein as peace operations, can be divided into two categories: peacekeeping operations (covered in section I); and special political missions (covered in section II).

Other subsidiary organs, such as committees, working groups, investigative bodies, tribunals, ad hoc commissions, special advisers, envoys, representatives and coordinators, and the Peacebuilding Commission, are covered in part IX. Peace operations led by regional organizations are covered in part VIII, which deals with the Council’s cooperation with regional organizations.

Peace operations covered in part X are presented by region and in the order in which they were established. Successor operations are listed immediately after their predecessors. The introduction to each main section includes overview tables identifying the mandates assigned to each operation (tables 1, 2, 4 and 5) and provides an analysis of the key trends and developments during the reporting period. The mandates of the operations are presented in those tables according to 21 categories of mandated tasks, which are based exclusively on the language of the decisions of the Council and do not necessarily reflect the specific structure or activities of the mission. The categories are provided only as a convenience for readers and do not reflect any practice or position of the Council.

Subsections provide a summary of major developments concerning the mandate and composition of each operation, reflecting the decisions of the Council adopted during the period under review. For information on the mandate and composition of missions in the past, see previous Supplements to the Repertoire.
I. Peacekeeping operations

Note

Section I focuses on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of peacekeeping operations, as well as changes to their mandates and composition.

Overview of peacekeeping operations during 2018

During the period under review, the Council oversaw 15 peacekeeping operations.\(^1\) Eight of the operations were in Africa, one in the Americas, one in Asia, two in Europe and three in the Middle East. The Council did not establish any new peacekeeping operations in 2018 and one completed its mandate.

Terminations and extensions of mandates


The mandates of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) remained open-ended and no decision was required to extend them.

Mandates of peacekeeping operations, including the authorization of the use of force

In 2018, the Council continued to highlight the need to tailor peacekeeping mandates to conditions on the ground and acknowledged and/or endorsed the recommendations of seven reviews of operations conducted by the Secretariat in 2017 and 2018 concerning the mandates of MINURSO, UNAMID, MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSMA, MINUSCA and UNFICYP.\(^2\) The Council also expressed its intention to continue revising as appropriate the configuration and mandate of UNISFA in the light of the recommendations of the Secretary-General further to the independent review of that mission.\(^3\) Six of the strategic reviews were independent in nature, with the participation of external non-United Nations experts.\(^4\) The Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a new strategic review of UNAMID and a strategic assessment of MINUJUSTH in the context of the planned drawdown and exit of both operations and acknowledged the benchmarks developed for that purpose.\(^5\)

The Council reauthorized the use of force by MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSMA and MINUSCA.\(^6\)

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\(^1\) For Council decisions and deliberations relating to the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, see part I, sect. 26. For Council discussions concerning individual peacekeeping operations, see the respective country-specific studies in part I.


\(^3\) Resolution 2445 (2018), para. 6.


\(^5\) In connection with UNAMID, S/PRST/2018/4, tenth paragraph; resolution 2429 (2018), para. 7; and S/PRST/2018/19, sixth paragraph. In connection with MINUJUSTH, resolution 2410 (2018), fifteenth preambular paragraph and para. 9.

\(^6\) In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2409 (2018), para. 35; in connection with UNMISS, resolution 2406 (2018), paras. 7 and 9; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2423 (2018), para. 32; and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2448 (2018), para. 32.
UNAMID, UNISFA, MINUJUSTH and UNIFIL were reauthorized to take all necessary action in fulfilling only certain elements of their mandates such as protecting civilians and United Nations personnel and equipment, ensuring their freedom of movement and that of humanitarian workers, protecting mission areas of responsibility, and supporting and developing national police forces.\(^7\)

For peacekeeping operations, the most common tasks mandated by the Council were those related to the provision of good offices and support to peace processes and the implementation of peace agreements, as well as the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring and reporting, and the protection of United Nations personnel and property and humanitarian workers. The mandates of more long-standing missions such as MINURSO, UNMOGIP, UNTSO and UNDOF remained relatively narrowly focused on the monitoring of ceasefires.

In modifying mandates, the Council placed particular emphasis on strengthening the good offices and political support role of peacekeeping operations and requesting the implementation of a more comprehensive and integrated approach to the protection of civilians; defined new language regarding the provision of operational and logistical support to national military and police forces; and requested the inclusion of gender and children and armed conflict considerations throughout mission activities.

Specifically, the Council strengthened the good offices role of MONUSCO, UNMISS and MINUSCA in support of ongoing peace processes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and the Central African Republic in coordination with other international, regional and local actors.\(^8\) The Council further requested MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the protection of civilians, including by focusing on the physical protection of certain vulnerable groups, strengthened local community engagement and empowerment, early warning, public information, intra-mission coordination mechanisms and cooperation with United Nations country teams.\(^9\)

MINUSMA and MINUSCA were also specifically tasked with mitigating the risk to civilians in the context of military and police operations, including those in support of national security forces.\(^10\) Moreover, as part of their efforts to support the extension of State authority in Mali and the Central African Republic, the two missions were requested to provide operational and logistical support for the progressive redeployment of national military and police forces.\(^11\)

In terms of cross-cutting issues, UNAMID and UNIFIL were tasked with ensuring that gender considerations were fully taken into account at all stages of mandate implementation and helping to enhance the capacity of women to participate in political processes.\(^12\) MONUSCO and MINUSMA were requested to pay particular attention to the needs of women and children in the implementation of their respective tasks related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform.\(^13\) As part of their protection of civilians tasks, UNMISS was mandated to coordinate with and raise awareness among security and government institutions on issues of sexual and gender-based violence, and children and armed conflict,\(^14\) while the UNAMID police component was requested to focus on, inter alia, conducting community-oriented policing, including on sexual and gender-based violence and child protection.\(^15\) More broadly, in relation to the situation in the Abyei Area, the Council reiterated its request to the Secretary-General to ensure that effective human rights monitoring was carried out, including of any sexual and gender-based violence and violations and

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\(^8\) In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2409 (2018), para. 36 (ii) (a); in connection with UNMISS, resolution 2406 (2018), para. 7 (d) (i); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2448 (2018), para. 39 (b) (i).

\(^9\) In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2409 (2018), paras. 36 (i) (c), 44, 47 and 50; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2423 (2018), para. 38 (d) (i) and (ii); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2448 (2018), para. 39 (a) (ii) and (iv).

\(^10\) In connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2423 (2018), para. 38 (d) (ii); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2448 (2018), para. 39 (a) (i).

\(^11\) In connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2423 (2018), para. 38 (a) (ii) and (b); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2448 (2018), para. 40 (a) (v).

\(^12\) In connection with UNAMID, resolution 2429 (2018), para. 27; and, in connection with UNIFIL, resolution 2433 (2018), para. 24.

\(^13\) In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2409 (2018), para. 37 (i) (d) and (ii) (b); and, in connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2423 (2018), para. 38 (a) (ii).

\(^14\) Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 7 (a) (vii).

\(^15\) Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 19.
abuses of human rights committed against women and children.16

Beyond gender and children and armed conflict, the Council tasked MINUSMA, in coordination with relevant partners, to enhance its awareness of the financial sources of conflicts in Mali, including the trafficking of persons, arms, drugs and natural resources and the smuggling of migrants.17 Furthermore, in connection with UNAMID, the Council requested the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan to consider the adverse implications of climate change in their programmes in Darfur, including by undertaking risk assessments and risk management strategies, and further requested the Secretary-General to provide information of such assessments in mandated reporting.18

In the context of ongoing efforts by the Secretariat and relevant stakeholders to enhance the performance of peacekeeping operations, the Council paid significant attention to measuring effectiveness, the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, and the safety and security of personnel in peacekeeping operations.19 In that regard, the Council welcomed the initiatives of the Secretary-General to standardize a “culture of performance” in missions and expressed support for the development of a comprehensive and integrated policy framework that would facilitate the effective and full implementation of mandates.20

Moreover, the Secretary-General was requested to implement such frameworks with respect to MINURSO, UNAMID, UNISFA, MINUSMA, UNFICYP and UNIFIL.21 The Council also specifically requested UNAMID, in line with the zero tolerance policy of the Secretary-General, to conduct investigations into sexual exploitation and abuse as expeditiously as possible.22 In addition, the Council, taking note of the report entitled “Improving security of United Nations peacekeepers”, welcomed the action plan developed by MINUSMA in that regard and encouraged its swift and continued implementation.23

Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the mandates of peacekeeping operations in 2018, showing the wide range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; and (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and reiterated by the Council during the period under review. The tables also include the tasks of peacekeeping operations with open-ended mandates adopted in decisions of previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the operations concerned.

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17 Resolution 2423 (2018), para. 31.
18 Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 47.
19 For more information on discussions in the Council and decisions regarding enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, see part I, sect. 26, “United Nations peacekeeping operations.”
22 Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 36.

Table 1
Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2018: Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>MINURSO</th>
<th>UNMIL</th>
<th>UNAMID</th>
<th>MONUSCO</th>
<th>UNISFA</th>
<th>UNMISS</th>
<th>MINUSMA</th>
<th>MINUSCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorization of the use of force</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefire monitoring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-military coordination</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2
**Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2018: Americas, Asia, Europe and Middle East**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>MINUJUSTH</th>
<th>UNMOGIP</th>
<th>UNFICYP</th>
<th>UNMIK</th>
<th>UNTSO</th>
<th>UNDOF</th>
<th>UNIFIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authorization of the use of force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil-military coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ceasefire monitoring</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


* By resolution 2333 (2016), the Council extended the mandate of UNMIL for a final period until 30 March 2018, as set out in the table.
### Table 3

#### Changes in composition of peacekeeping operations, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Changes in composition</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>The military component was reduced from 8,735 to up to 4,050 personnel until 30 June 2019</td>
<td>2429 (2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>The military component was reduced from 4,791 to 4,500 personnel until 15 November 2018</td>
<td>2416 (2018)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The military component was further reduced from 4,500 to 4,140 personnel until 15 May 2019 and by an additional 295 troops to 3,845 following the commencement of the deployment of increased police personnel.

The police component was increased from 50 to 345 personnel, including 185 individual police officers and one formed police unit.

MINUJUSTH

The police component was decreased from seven formed police units (or 980 personnel) and 295 individual police officers to five formed police units and 295 individual police officers from 15 October 2018 to 15 April 2019.

### Africa

**United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara**

The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established by the Council on 29 April 1991, by resolution 690 (1991), in accordance with the settlement proposals accepted by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), with the mandate to monitor the ceasefire, provide security for the repatriation of refugees, and support the organization of a free and fair referendum.24

In 2018, by resolutions 2414 (2018) of 27 April 2018 and 2440 (2018) of 31 October 2018, the Council extended the mandate of MINURSO twice for periods of six months, departing from the previous practice of one year, the second time until 30 April 2019.25 Both resolutions were adopted with 12 votes in favour and three abstentions.26

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24 For more information on the history of the mandate of MINURSO, see previous Supplements.
26 China, Ethiopia and the Russian Federation abstained in the vote on resolution 2414 (2018), expressing concern regarding the conduct of the negotiations process and the non-inclusion of suggested language regarding the political process. See S/PV.8246, p. 3 (Ethiopia), pp. 3–4 (Russian Federation) and p. 6 (China). The Plurinational State of Bolivia, Ethiopia and the Russian Federation abstained in the vote on resolution 2440 (2018), expressing similar concerns. See S/PV.8387, p. 5 (Russian Federation), pp. 5–6 (Ethiopia) and pp. 8–9 (Bolivia (Plurinational State of)). See also part I, sect. 1, “The situation concerning Western Sahara”.

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27 Resolution 2414 (2018), para. 2.
28 Ibid., para. 16.
should include a briefing within three months of the renewal of the Mission’s mandate and again prior to its expiration.\textsuperscript{31}

The Council did not modify the composition of MINURSO during the period under review. By resolution 2414 (2018), the Secretary-General was requested to seek to increase the number of women in MINURSO, as well as to ensure their meaningful participation in all aspects of operations.\textsuperscript{32}

**United Nations Mission in Liberia**

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, by resolution 1509 (2003) of 19 September 2003 to, inter alia, support the implementation of the Liberian ceasefire agreement and the peace process, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and equipment, contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights, facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and assist in the security sector reform efforts of the Liberian Government. On 30 March 2018, in accordance with the drawdown process defined in resolution 2333 (2016), UNMIL completed its mandate.\textsuperscript{33} In his final progress report on UNMIL of 13 April 2018, the Secretary-General reported on the completion of the drawdown.\textsuperscript{34}

On 19 April 2018, following the completion of the Liberian legislative and presidential elections in 2017, the Council issued a presidential statement commending the assistance provided by UNMIL to the election process and expressing its appreciation for the Mission’s important contribution to promoting peace, stability and development throughout its 14 years of operation.\textsuperscript{35} The Council requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study of the role of UNMIL in the resolution of conflicts and challenges in Liberia through the contribution of good offices, political mediation and the sanctions regime, as well as other relevant factors, which had allowed for the successful completion of the Mission’s mandate and its transition to the United Nations country team.\textsuperscript{36}

**African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur**

The Council established the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) by resolution 1769 (2007) of 31 July 2007 and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, authorized UNAMID to take the necessary action to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of its own personnel and humanitarian workers.\textsuperscript{37}

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions 2425 (2018) of 29 June 2018 and 2429 (2018) of 13 July 2018 and issued two presidential statements concerning UNAMID.\textsuperscript{38} The Council provided for a two-week technical rollover of the Mission’s mandate and subsequently extended it for 11.5 months until 30 June 2019.\textsuperscript{39}

The Council welcomed the improvements in the security situation in Darfur and reiterated its concerns regarding the outstanding challenges, in particular those related to the necessary conditions for the return of displaced persons. The Council oversaw the completion of the second phase of the reconfiguration of UNAMID, which had commenced in 2017, and authorized a further one in 2018.\textsuperscript{40}

In the presidential statement of 31 January 2018, the Council commended UNAMID for the successful conclusion of phase one of the reconfiguration authorized by resolution 2363 (2017).\textsuperscript{41} The Council requested UNAMID and the United Nations country team to monitor closely the impact of the reconfiguration on the situation on the ground and to report any adverse effects to the Council in a timely manner.\textsuperscript{42} The Council also expressed support for the recommendation made by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General, further to their joint assessment, to conduct a further

\textsuperscript{31} Resolution 2440 (2018), para. 11.

\textsuperscript{32} Resolution 2414 (2018), para. 15.

\textsuperscript{33} For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMIL, see previous Supplements (2003–2015) and for information on the final drawdown of the Mission, see Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017.

\textsuperscript{34} S/2018/344.

\textsuperscript{35} S/PRST/2018/8, second and third paragraphs. See also part I, sect. 2, “The situation in Liberia”.

\textsuperscript{36} S/PRST/2018/8, fourth paragraph.

\textsuperscript{37} For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMID, see previous Supplements (2007–2017).


\textsuperscript{39} Resolutions 2425 (2018), para. 1 (providing for a technical rollover of the Mission’s mandate for 14 days until 13 July 2018), and 2429 (2018), para. 1 (extending the mandate for 11.5 months until 30 June 2019).

\textsuperscript{40} See part I, sect. 10, “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”.

\textsuperscript{41} S/PRST/2018/4, fifth paragraph.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
review of UNAMID to consider a new mission concept with adjusted priorities.\(^43\)

On 13 July 2018, by resolution 2429 (2018), the Council took note of the special report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the recommendations contained therein regarding a new mission concept for UNAMID and a transition concept in collaboration with the United Nations country team over a two-year timeframe with a view towards the exit of UNAMID on 30 June 2020, provided that there was no significant change in the security situation and that key indicators were fulfilled.\(^44\) The Council also requested the Mission to consolidate the “whole-of-system” approach to Darfur focused on peacekeeping and providing sustainable solutions to the drivers of conflict with the Mission’s current “two-pronged” approach, in order to prevent relapse and enable the Government of the Sudan, the United Nations country team, civil society and international actors to prepare for the Mission’s eventual exit.\(^45\)

Further to the recommendations of the strategic review, the Council redefined the strategic priorities of UNAMID to include the protection of civilians, monitoring and reporting on human rights, sexual and gender-based violence and grave violations against children, the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel; mediation between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur; and support for the mediation of intercommunal or other local conflict that could undermine the security situation, including through measures to address its root causes, in conjunction with the Government, the United Nations country team and civil society.\(^46\)

In pursuit of those priorities, the Council decided that UNAMID would retain its existing mandated tasks as outlined in resolution 2363 (2017) and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, reauthorized it to take the necessary action to implement the tasks enumerated in paragraph 15 (a) of resolution 1769 (2007), including, inter alia, protecting civilians and mission personnel and equipment and ensuring the security and freedom of movement of mission personnel and humanitarian workers. The Council urged UNAMID to deter any threats against itself and its mandate.\(^47\) The Council also refocused the Mission’s mandate related to the work of its police component and added additional tasks.

Specifically, resolution 2429 (2018) provided that the police component would focus on supporting the physical protection of civilians and facilitating humanitarian assistance; creating a protective environment by coordinating the development and training of government police; and conducting community-oriented policing initiatives, in conjunction with the United Nations country team, including on sexual and gender-based violence and child protection, pursued through engagement in the state liaison offices and at the central level.\(^48\)

In terms of additional tasks, UNAMID was requested to ensure that the necessary gender analysis and expertise was included throughout all stages of mission planning, mandate development, implementation, review and drawdown.\(^49\) The Mission was further requested to take the necessary steps to conduct investigations into sexual exploitation and abuse as expeditiously as possible and to closely support and monitor the commitment of the parties to combating sexual violence, in accordance with resolution 2106 (2013), including through women protection advisers.\(^50\) In connection with the Mission’s exit from Darfur, the Council called upon UNAMID to work closely with the United Nations country team to identify ways to address gaps in capabilities and to coordinate in the transfer of their responsibilities.\(^51\) As part of the transition, and specifically in the context of mine clearance, UNAMID was also requested to cooperate with the Government, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United Nations Development Programme and the International Committee of the Red Cross.\(^52\)

In accordance with the recommendations of the strategic review, by resolution 2429 (2018), the Council decreased the authorized troop ceiling of UNAMID from 8,735 to up to 4,050 personnel over the course of the current mandate, unless the Council decided to adjust the scope and pace of the reduction.\(^53\) The Council also decided to maintain police levels not

\(^{43}\) Ibid., tenth paragraph.  
\(^{45}\) Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 3.  
\(^{46}\) Ibid., para. 11.  
\(^{47}\) Resolution 2429 (2018), paras. 15–16. See resolutions 1769 (2007), para. 15 (a) (i) and (ii), and 2363 (2017), para. 15.  
\(^{48}\) Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 19.  
\(^{49}\) Ibid., para. 27.  
\(^{50}\) Ibid., paras. 35–36.  
\(^{51}\) Ibid., para. 55.  
\(^{52}\) Ibid., para. 49.  
\(^{53}\) Ibid., para. 5.
exceeding 2,500 personnel, including individual police officers and members of formed police units.54

Lastly, the Council requested the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, in consultation with UNAMID, to provide through a strategic review by 1 May 2019 an assessment on, inter alia, the progress made in implementing the reconfiguration and its impact.55 The Secretary-General was also requested to provide a clearly benchmarked exit strategy for UNAMID.56 In the presidential statement of 11 December 2018, the Council took note of the report of the Secretary-General of 12 October 2018,57 including the proposed benchmarks and indicators of achievement, and acknowledged that progress towards their achievement would contribute towards the successful transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in Darfur.58 In that regard, the Council requested UNAMID and the United Nations country team to ensure robust monitoring of progress against the benchmarks and encouraged them to ensure that their integrated transition activities supported efforts to make progress towards the achievement of the benchmarks and the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the development plans of the Government of the Sudan.59

**United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was established by the Council on 28 May 2010 by resolution 1925 (2010), under Chapter VII of the Charter, to succeed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.60 MONUSCO was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its protection mandate as set out in the resolution and tasked with, inter alia, ensuring the effective protection of civilians and supporting Government stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.

During 2018, by resolution 2409 (2018) of 27 March 2018, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, extended the mandate of MONUSCO, consistent with previous practice, for a period of one year until 31 March 2019.61

By the same resolution, against the backdrop of the presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections scheduled for December 2018, the Council took note of the strategic review presented by the Secretary-General (S/2017/826) and endorsed its recommendations relating to proposed adjustments to MONUSCO in the pre-election phase.62 In accordance with the recommendations, the Council reiterated the Mission’s strategic priorities as defined by resolution 2348 (2017), namely, protecting civilians and supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement of 31 December 2016 and the electoral process.63 The Council stressed that the mandate of MONUSCO should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks.64 Within the framework of the strategic priorities, the Council reiterated the Mission’s existing priority tasks relating to the protection of civilians, the implementation of the Agreement and the protection of United Nations personnel and equipment, and further elaborated some elements in that regard.65

In connection with the protection of civilians, the Council requested MONUSCO to take a comprehensive approach to physical protection, adding the protection of peaceful demonstrators to the Mission’s existing tasks, and to focus on violence between ethnic or religious rival groups or communities in identified territories.66 The Council requested MONUSCO to continue to strengthen local community engagement and empowerment, as well as to bolster its protection mandate through early warning and response, including prevention, and by ensuring the mobility of the Mission.67 The Council also requested the Mission to continue to ensure the effectiveness of the monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict.68

The Council broadened the authorization given to the Intervention Brigade to neutralize armed groups in the east of the country to include the whole of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, under the direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander.69

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54 Ibid., para. 6.
55 Ibid., para. 7 (i)–(vi).
56 Ibid., para. 53.
58 S/PRST/2018/19, sixth paragraph.
59 Ibid., seventh and eleventh paragraphs.
60 For more information on the history of the mandate of MONUSCO, see previous Supplements (2010–2017).
61 Resolution 2409 (2018), para. 29.
62 Ibid., para. 57. See also part I, sect. 6, “The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo”.
63 Resolution 2409 (2018), para. 31 (a) and (b).
64 Ibid., para. 32.
65 Ibid., para. 36 (i)–(iii).
66 Ibid., para. 36 (i) (a).
67 Ibid., para. 36 (i) (c).
68 Ibid., para. 36 (i) (b).
69 Ibid., para. 36 (i) (d).
Council further called on MONUSCO to streamline overall command and control in order to increase efficiencies and improve coordination with the police component. MONUSCO was also requested to leverage United Nations police investigation capacities and expertise in order to arrest and bring to justice all those allegedly responsible for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and violations or abuses of human rights.

With respect to the second strategic priority, the Council strengthened the Mission’s role in supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive and Inclusive Political Agreement and the electoral process by tasking MONUSCO to provide good offices and engage with interlocutors across the political spectrum and to use an integrated approach throughout the United Nations, making full use of the existing capacities of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, the United Nations Office to the African Union and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa. In addition, MONUSCO was tasked with providing expertise and advice in relation to elections security to the Congolese National Police in order to coordinate planning and security support.

Beyond the strategic priority tasks, the Council reauthorized MONUSCO to pursue its existing tasks relating to supporting the sanctions regime and the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and added new language on tasks relating to stabilization, demilitarization, demobilization and reintegration, encouraging inclusive security sector reform, with a focus on women, children and vulnerable persons, support for joint army operations in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, and the provision of gender and women protection advisers as part of support for stabilization efforts.

MONUSCO was further requested to strengthen its collaboration with humanitarian actors and streamline coordination mechanisms with humanitarian agencies to ensure information-sharing on protection risks to the population. Lastly, the Council requested that mechanisms for intra-mission coordination be strengthened to enable “whole-of-mission” efforts, in particular on priority issues such as the protection of civilians, and encouraged MONUSCO and the United Nations system in-country to strengthen integration through, inter alia, shared information and joint operational activities, based on coordinated knowledge management.

The Council did not modify the composition of MONUSCO during the reporting period. Further to resolution 2409 (2018), by a letter dated 18 July 2018, the Secretary-General provided the Council with options for the temporary reinforcement of MONUSCO in the event of a deterioration of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the run-up to and in the aftermath of the elections.

### United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

The Council established the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) by resolution 1990 (2011) of 27 June 2011, taking into account the Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, of 20 June 2011. The Council mandated UNISFA to, inter alia, monitor and verify the redeployment of any Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army or its successor from the Abyei Area, participate in relevant bodies as stipulated in the Agreement, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service. By the same resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized UNISFA to take the actions necessary, inter alia, to protect United Nations and humanitarian personnel and property, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, and ensure security in the Area. By resolution 2024 (2011) of 14 December 2011, the Council expanded the mandate of UNISFA to include assisting the Sudan and South Sudan in ensuring the observance of their agreement on border security and supporting the operational
activities of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.\textsuperscript{83}


While largely maintaining the mandate of UNISFA during the period under review, the Council drew attention to specific aspects of it. In connection with the UNISFA mandate to support the border security agreement, by resolution 2412 (2018), the Council decided that the mission’s support to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism would remain conditioned on the ability of the Sudan and South Sudan to demonstrate measurable progress on several conditions, including maintaining standing clearance for UNISFA air and ground patrols, operationalizing four Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism team sites, convening meetings of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, withdrawing from the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, opening additional border crossings and discussing border demarcation.\textsuperscript{86} By resolution 2438 (2018), the Council updated that set of conditions.\textsuperscript{87}

In relation to the Abyei Area and in the context of the efforts of UNISFA to strengthen the community protection committees, by resolution 2416 (2018), the Council highlighted the need for the mission to ensure the humane and dignified treatment of suspects and other detainees.\textsuperscript{88} Furthermore, in reiterating its request to the Secretary-General to ensure that human rights monitoring was carried out in Abyei, the Council added that such monitoring should include any sexual and gender-based violence and violations of human rights committed against women and children.\textsuperscript{89} The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report no later than 15 August 2018 on detailed recommendations on the reconfiguration of the UNISFA mandate in order to create the space for a viable political process that would also serve as an exit strategy.\textsuperscript{90} In relation to the mission’s cooperation with other United Nations entities, by resolution 2429 (2018), the Council reiterated its request for close coordination among UNISFA, UNAMID, UNMISS, MINUSCA and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).\textsuperscript{91} By resolution 2445 (2018), the Council emphasized the change in threat in the Abyei Area as characterized by the letter dated 20 August 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council (S/2018/778).\textsuperscript{92} The Council once again underscored that “all necessary means” included the use of force when required, in order to protect civilians under threat of physical violence.\textsuperscript{93} In the context of the engagement of UNISFA with local communities, the Council invited the mission to coordinate with the Juba-appointed administration in Abyei and the Misseriya administration in Muglad, using appropriate civilian expertise, to maintain stability, foster intercommunal reconciliation and facilitate the return of displaced persons and the delivery of services.\textsuperscript{94}

During 2018, the Council twice reduced the authorized troop ceiling of UNISFA. By resolution 2416 (2018), the Council decreased troops from 4,791 to 4,500 until 15 November 2018.\textsuperscript{95} By resolution 2445 (2018), the Council reduced the authorized troop ceiling further to 4,140 until 15 May 2019 and decided to reduce it by another 295 troops following the commencement of the deployment of increased police personnel.\textsuperscript{96} The Council increased the authorized police ceiling from 50 to 345 personnel, including 185 individual police officers and one formed police unit, and expressed its intention to reduce the police ceiling as the Abyei Police Service was gradually established and effectively providing rule of law throughout the Abyei Area.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{83} For more information on the history of the mandate of UNISFA, see previous Supplements.
\textsuperscript{84} Resolutions 2412 (2018), para. 1, and 2438 (2018), para. 1 (extending the mandate in support of the border security agreement); and resolutions 2416 (2018), para. 1, and 2445 (2018), para. 1 (extending the mandate in the Abyei Area).
\textsuperscript{85} Resolution 2411 (2018), para. 1.
\textsuperscript{86} Resolution 2412 (2018), para. 3.
\textsuperscript{87} Resolution 2438 (2018), para. 3.
\textsuperscript{88} Resolution 2416 (2018), para. 18.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., para. 26.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., para. 33.
\textsuperscript{91} Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 28.
\textsuperscript{92} Resolution 2445 (2018), eighth preambular paragraph.
\textsuperscript{93} For further information, see part I, sect. 10, “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”.
\textsuperscript{94} Resolution 2445 (2018), para. 11.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., para. 16.
\textsuperscript{96} Resolution 2416 (2018), para. 3.
\textsuperscript{97} Resolution 2445 (2018), para. 3.
Furthermore, depending on the parties’ ability to fulfill the conditions set by the Council in relation to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and the border, by resolutions 2412 (2018) and 2438 (2018), the Council reiterated its intention to further reduce the authorized ceiling by another 541 troops unless the mandate of UNISFA to support the Mechanism was extended beyond 15 October 2018 and 15 April 2019, respectively.98

**United Nations Mission in South Sudan**

By resolution 1996 (2011) of 8 July 2011, the Council established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) under Chapter VII of the Charter, with a mandate to support peace consolidation and foster longer-term State-building and economic development; support the Government of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution and to protect civilians; and support the Government, in cooperation with the United Nations country team and other international partners, in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish the rule of law and to strengthen the security and justice sectors. UNMISS was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its protection of civilians mandate.99


By resolution 2406 (2018), in the context of continued fighting across the country and the lack of progress in the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan of 2015, the Council took note of the recommendations of the Secretary-General, based on the independent review of UNMISS, on how to adapt the Mission to the situation on the ground and to increase its efficiency, as requested by the Council in resolutions 2304 (2016) and 2327 (2016).101 The Council reiterated the Mission’s mandate to protect civilians, create the conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, monitor and investigate human rights, and support the implementation of the 2015 Agreement.102 The Council further reauthorized UNMISS to use all necessary means to implement its mandate.103

In accordance with the strategic review recommendations and within the framework of the priorities, the Council made several modifications to the mandate tasks of UNMISS to protect civilians and support the political process. The Mission’s cooperation with South Sudanese police services, security and government institutions and civil society actors in relevant protection-focused activities would specifically focus on raising awareness of sexual and gender-based violence and children and armed conflict and providing technical assistance or advice on international humanitarian law and the investigation and prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence, conflict-related sexual violence and other serious human rights violations.104

On the political process, the Council requested UNMISS to use its good offices to support the peace process, in particular the Intergovernmental Authority on Development high-level revitalization forum for the 2015 Agreement, and further elaborated that the Mission’s support to the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism should include the monitoring and reporting of violations and overall effectiveness in identifying those responsible for violations.105 In addition, the Council removed the previous tasks of UNMISS related to the planning and establishment of transitional security arrangements, support for the constitution-making process, the development of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategy and security sector reform activities, advising and assisting the National Elections Commission, and supporting the establishment and operationalization of the Joint Integrated Police.106

The Council decided that UNMISS would continue to include a regional protection force, reiterated the force’s existing tasks, expanded the force’s responsibility to provide a secure environment in and around Juba and in other parts of South Sudan as necessary, and authorized the force to use all

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99 For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMISS, see previous Supplements (2010–2017).
100 Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 5. See part I, sect. 10, “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”.
102 Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 7 (a)–(d).
103 Ibid., paras. 7 and 12.
104 Ibid., para. 7 (a) (vii).
105 Ibid., para. 7 (d) (i) and (ii).
106 See resolution 2327 (2016), para. 7 (d) (i)–(iv), (vii) and (viii).
necessary means to accomplish its mandate. The Council also reiterated the Mission’s other existing tasks related to international coordination on the peace process, gender mainstreaming, the protection of civilians and security monitoring, support to security forces, and ensuring the security of its own air operations.

While maintaining the Mission’s existing troop and police levels, the Council took note of the Secretary-General’s intention to conduct a military and police capability study, noting in particular the relevance of reviewing the current model for providing security to the protection of civilians sites, and expressed its readiness to consider making the necessary adjustments on that basis to UNMISS, including the regional protection force.

Lastly, by resolution 2428 (2018), the Council reiterated the mandate of UNMISS to assist the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan and encouraged the timely exchange of information among them. By resolution 2429 (2018), the Council reiterated its request for close coordination among UNMISS, UNAMID, UNISFA, MINUSCA and UNSMIL.

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

The Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by resolution 2100 (2013) of 25 April 2013, under Chapter VII of the Charter. MINUSMA was authorized to use all necessary means to stabilize population centres and support the re-establishment of State authority, support the implementation of a transitional road map, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property, assist the Malian authorities in promoting and protecting human rights, and support humanitarian assistance, national and international justice, and cultural preservation.


In the context of delays in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015, deteriorating security and humanitarian situations, in particular in the centre of the country, and preparations for the presidential elections scheduled for July and August 2018, the Council revisited the mandate of MINUSMA further to the outcome of the independent strategic review conducted in the first half of 2018. By resolution 2423 (2018), the Council decided that the strategic priority of MINUSMA remained supporting the implementation of the 2015 Agreement, with a new focus on the definition of institutional architecture, the reform of the security sector and national reconciliation measures. The Council requested MINUSMA to reprioritize its resources and efforts to focus on political tasks and reiterated that the Mission’s mandate should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks. The Council reauthorized MINUSMA to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate and reiterated its request for the Mission to continue to carry out its mandate with a proactive and robust posture, to anticipate, deter and respond to threats against civilians, and to protect United Nations personnel, installations and equipment.

The Council reiterated existing priority tasks of MINUSMA and further elaborated on some of their elements. In addition, the Council defined, as a new

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107 Resolution 2406 (2018), para. 9.
109 Ibid., para. 18.
110 Ibid., para. 22.
111 Ibid., paras. 6 and 12. For more information about the composition of UNMISS prior to the reporting period, see previous Supplements (2010–2017).
113 Resolution 2428 (2018), para. 24. For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan, see part IX, sects. I and III.
114 Ibid., para. 4.
115 Ibid., para. 39 (a) and (c)–(f).
priority task, the Mission’s support for the restoration of State authority in the centre of the country through logistical and operational support for the Malian Defence and Security Forces.\textsuperscript{127} Regarding the 2015 Agreement, the Council specified that the Mission’s support, monitoring and supervision of the ceasefire would include the continued implementation of control measures on the movement and armament of signatory armed groups.\textsuperscript{128} The Council refocused the operational and logistical support of MINUSMA to the redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces under that priority to the north of Mali.\textsuperscript{129} The resolution specified that the Mission’s disarmament, demobilization and reintegration work with armed groups would include a community violence reduction programme.\textsuperscript{130} The Mission’s tasks in support of the implementation of the reconciliation and justice measures in the Agreement were modified to include supporting the operations of the International Commission of Inquiry on Mali, the work of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission and the effectiveness of justice and corrections officials in the north and centre of the country and associated interim authorities, as well as providing support to Malian judicial institutions.\textsuperscript{131} Stressing the need for the upcoming elections in 2018 to be inclusive, free, fair, transparent, credible and peaceful, the Council requested the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali to use his good offices to support their preparation, conduct and conclusion.\textsuperscript{132}

The Council elaborated on the mandate of MINUSMA to protect civilians under threat of physical violence, noting that such tasks would include public information, community outreach, dialogue and direct engagement.\textsuperscript{133} The Council specified that, while MINUSMA should continue to take “robust and active steps” to protect civilians, the Mission’s activities aimed at stabilizing key population centres and other areas where civilians were at risk, notably in the centre and north of Mali, should also focus on mitigating the risk to civilians before, during and after military operations, as well as on enhancing early warning and documentation of the impact of conflict and violence on civilians, and strengthening community engagement and protection mechanisms.\textsuperscript{134} The Council also reiterated as “other tasks” the existing work of MINUSMA on supporting stabilization projects, weapons and ammunition management, and cooperation with the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali,\textsuperscript{135} and excluded the task to support cultural preservation.\textsuperscript{136} The Council reiterated its request to MINUSMA to improve operational, planning and intelligence coordination among its civilian, military and police components, including through the establishment of intra-mission dedicated coordination mechanisms.\textsuperscript{137} MINUSMA was also mandated, in coordination with relevant partners, including the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to enhance its awareness of the financial sources of conflicts in Mali and the implications for regional security.\textsuperscript{138}

The Council reiterated its request to the Secretary-General to ensure adequate cooperation and coordination and, when applicable, support, among MINUSMA, the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the French forces and the European Union missions in Mali, and further requested the Mission to strengthen communication with all Malian stakeholders and local populations, with the objective of enhancing awareness and understanding of the nature, impact and specificities of the Mission’s mandate and activities.\textsuperscript{139} With respect to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Mission was requested to ensure that its support was provided in strict compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces.\textsuperscript{140} The Council also urged the Mission and the Government to redouble their efforts towards ensuring the implementation of the memorandum of understanding on support for the redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces.\textsuperscript{141} Lastly, while taking note of the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., para. 38 (b).
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., para. 38 (a) (ii).
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., para. 38 (a) (iii). See letter dated 19 January 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council (S/2018/57). For more information on the International Commission of Inquiry on Mali, see part VI, sect. II, “Investigation of disputes and fact-finding.”
\textsuperscript{132} Resolution 2423 (2018), paras. 19 and 22.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., para. 38 (d) (i).
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., para. 38 (d) (ii).
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., para. 39 (a)–(c). For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali, see part IX, sect. I, and part VII, sect. III.
\textsuperscript{136} Resolution 2364 (2017), para. 22 (c).
\textsuperscript{137} Resolution 2423 (2018), para. 28.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., para. 31.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., para. 41.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., para. 52.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., para. 46.
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report entitled “Improving security of United Nations peacekeepers”, the Council welcomed the action plan developed by MINUSMA to improve the security of its personnel and encouraged its swift and continued implementation.\(^{142}\)

By resolution 2432 (2018), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council reiterated the task of MINUSMA to assist the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali.\(^{143}\)

The Council did not make any changes to the configuration of MINUSMA during the reporting period.\(^{144}\)

**United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic**

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was established by the Council on 10 April 2014 by resolution 2149 (2014), under Chapter VII of the Charter. MINUSCA was authorized to take all necessary means to, inter alia, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property; support the implementation of the transition process; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; promote and protect human rights; support justice and the rule of law; and support the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation strategies.\(^{145}\)

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions 2429 (2018) of 13 July 2018, 2446 (2018) of 15 November 2018 and 2448 (2018) of 13 December 2018 concerning MINUSCA. By resolution 2429 (2018), the Council reiterated its request for close coordination among missions in the region, namely MINUSCA, UNAMID, UNISFA, UNMISS and UNSMIL.\(^{146}\) In addition, the Council authorized a one-month technical rollover of the Mission’s mandate by resolution 2446 (2018)\(^{147}\) and subsequently extended it for a period of 11 months until 15 November 2019 by resolution 2448 (2018).\(^{148}\)

By resolution 2448 (2018), the Council took note of the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic (S/2018/922), which built on the findings and recommendations of the independent strategic review of MINUSCA conducted between June and September 2018,\(^{149}\) and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, reiterated the Mission’s existing strategic objective to support the creation of the political, security and institutional conditions conducive to the sustainable reduction of armed groups through a comprehensive approach and proactive and robust posture.\(^{150}\) The Council further recalled that the mandate of MINUSCA should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks and in a phased manner,\(^{151}\) and reauthorized the Mission to take all necessary means to carry out its mandate.\(^{152}\)

The Council reiterated the Mission’s existing “priority tasks”, namely protecting civilians, providing good offices and support for the peace process, facilitating the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and protecting United Nations personnel and property, and made several modifications within that framework.\(^{153}\) As part of its task to anticipate, deter and effectively respond to threats to civilians through a comprehensive approach, the Mission was requested to enhance its interaction with civilians, strengthen its early warning mechanism, increase its efforts to monitor and document human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, and strengthen local community engagement and empowerment.\(^{154}\) MINUSCA was further requested to mitigate the risk to civilians in military or police operations and to work with the authorities of the Central African Republic to identify and report threats and attacks against civilians, implement existing prevention and response plans and

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\(^{142}\) Ibid., para. 59.

\(^{143}\) Resolution 2432 (2018), para. 3.

\(^{144}\) For more information about the composition of MINUSMA prior to the reporting period, see previous Supplements (2012–2017).

\(^{145}\) For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSCA, see previous Supplements (2014–2017).

\(^{146}\) Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 28.

\(^{147}\) Resolution 2446 (2018), para. 1.

\(^{148}\) Resolution 2448 (2018), para. 34. China and the Russian Federation abstained in the vote on the resolution. In their statements after the vote, the Russian Federation expressed concern about the conduct of the negotiations processes on the draft resolution, while China underlined the need to recognize the efforts of the relevant parties in the international community to achieve peace in the Central African Republic (S/PV.8422, pp. 4–6 (Russian Federation) and p. 6 (China)). See also part I, sect. 7, “The situation in the Central African Republic”.

\(^{149}\) Resolution 2448 (2018), thirty-fourth preambular paragraph.

\(^{150}\) Ibid., para. 36.

\(^{151}\) Ibid., para. 37.

\(^{152}\) Ibid., para. 38.

\(^{153}\) Ibid., para. 39.

\(^{154}\) Ibid., para. 39 (a) (ii).
strengthen civil-military cooperation, including joint planning.\textsuperscript{155} Reiterating that the Mission should fully implement its new protection of civilians strategy adopted in April 2018, the Council also tasked MINUSCA to develop a comprehensive protection of civilians strategy involving national authorities and the United Nations country team “in coherence with its political strategy”.\textsuperscript{156}

MINUSCA was mandated to reinforce its role in the peace process through its participation in the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation and the participation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic in the Panel of Facilitators of the African Initiative, and a stronger convening and coordinating role of international support to the African Initiative.\textsuperscript{157} Furthermore, MINUSCA was requested to collaborate with the African Initiative to ensure that the Mission’s political and security strategies promoted a more coherent peace process that connected local and national peace efforts with ongoing efforts to advance disarmament, demobilization and reintegation, security sector reform, the fight against impunity and the restoration of State authority, and that the efforts of the African Initiative were informed by political, security, human rights, humanitarian and protection developments.\textsuperscript{158} Taking note of the upcoming presidential, legislative and local elections in 2020 and 2021,\textsuperscript{159} the Council also mandated MINUSCA to provide good offices and technical expertise in support of an inclusive and transparent electoral process as a full part of the political process.\textsuperscript{160} The Mission’s assistance to the authorities to ensure an inclusive peace process was broadened to include young people and internally displaced persons and refugees.\textsuperscript{161} The Council also specified that the technical expertise provided by MINUSCA to the Government in its regional engagement should include the assessment of opportunities to resolve issues of common and bilateral interest, in order to improve the anticipation and prevention of possible risks to regional stability.\textsuperscript{162}

The Council also reiterated the Mission’s remaining tasks related to support for the extension of State authority; security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation; the promotion and protection of human rights; and support for national and international justice, the fight against impunity and the rule of law, and made modifications to some of them.\textsuperscript{163} Specifically, the Council elaborated on the task of MINUSCA to support the deployment of security forces, including by providing enhanced planning and technical assistance to the national military and police forces\textsuperscript{164} and limited logistical support for their redeployment, in accordance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, without exacerbating the risks to the stabilization of the country, civilians, the political process, United Nations peacekeepers or the impartiality of the Mission.\textsuperscript{165} With regard to the Mission’s task to provide strategic and technical advice to the authorities of the Central African Republic on the implementation of the national strategy on security sector reform, MINUSCA was requested to coordinate closely with the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic and other international partners, including France, the Russian Federation and the United States of America.\textsuperscript{166}

Reiterating the additional role of MINUSCA in support of the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, the Council added that the Mission should support the Panel in collecting information about acts of incitement to violence, in particular on an ethnic or religious basis, that undermined the peace, stability or security of the country.\textsuperscript{167} Lastly, the Council also reiterated the remaining existing tasks of MINUSCA relating to the environmental impact of its operations, child protection, gender mainstreaming, and weapons and ammunition management.\textsuperscript{168}

The Council also decided to maintain the existing military and police configuration of MINUSCA.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., para. 39 (a) (iv).
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., para. 39 (b) (i).
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., para. 39 (b) (ii).
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., fourteenth preambular paragraph.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., para. 39 (b) (iv).
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., para. 39 (b) (iii).
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., para. 39 (b) (vi).
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., para. 40 (a)–(e).
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., para. 40 (a) (iv).
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., para. 40 (a) (v).
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., para. 40 (b) (i). For information on the mandate of the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic, see part VIII, sect. III.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., para. 41 (d). For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, see part IX, sect. I.
\textsuperscript{168} Resolution 2448 (2018), paras. 54 and 56–61.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., para. 35. For more information about the composition of MINUSCA prior to the reporting period, see previous Supplements (2014–2017).
United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

The Council established the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, by resolution 2350 (2017) of 13 April 2017, subsequent to the closure of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. MINUJUSTH was mandated to assist the Government of Haiti in strengthening rule of law institutions, supporting and developing the Haitian National Police, and engaging in human rights monitoring, reporting and analysis. The Mission was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate in support of the Haitian National Police and in protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.170

During 2018, by resolution 2410 (2018) of 10 April 2018, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of MINUJUSTH for a period of one year until 15 April 2019.171 The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and 2 abstentions.172

The Council reiterated the existing mandate of MINUJUSTH.173 The authorization to MINUJUSTH to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to support and develop the Haitian National Police was also renewed.174 The Council further authorized MINUJUSTH to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, as needed.175

170 For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUJUSTH, see Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017.
172 China and the Russian Federation abstained in the vote on the draft resolution. In their statements after the vote, China stated that MINUJUSTH should focus on helping Haiti to address peace and security challenges, rather than human rights, while the Russian Federation questioned the adoption of the draft resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter (see S/PV.8226, pp. 2–3 (Russian Federation) and p. 4 (China)). See also part I, sect. 15, “The question concerning Haiti”.
175 Resolution 2410 (2018), para. 15.

The Council further elaborated on the Mission’s human rights and rule of law mandates. Underscoring respect for human rights by the Haitian National Police and the judiciary as essential elements of stability in Haiti, the Council called on MINUJUSTH to provide monitoring and support in that regard.176 The Council further specified that the good offices role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti should include close coordination with the Government for the development of a political strategy aimed at addressing political challenges to progress towards the rule of law and creating momentum for systematic progress.177

In terms of the Mission’s configuration, the Council decided to maintain seven formed police units and 295 individual police officers until 15 October 2018 and to decrease the police component to five formed police units between that date and 15 April 2019.178

The Council welcomed the benchmarked exit strategy submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2350 (2017)179 and requested him to develop specific dates and indicators for achieving the benchmarks, with the goal of transitioning tasks to the Government, in coordination with the United Nations country team, and to report to the Council in that regard.180 The Council also requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic assessment mission to Haiti by 1 February 2019 and, on that basis, to present to the Council recommendations on the future United Nations role in Haiti, including any recommendations for drawdown and exit.181 The Council affirmed its intention to consider the withdrawal of MINUJUSTH and transition to a non-peacekeeping United Nations presence in Haiti beginning no sooner than 15 October 2019, taking into account the security conditions on the ground and the overall capacity of Haiti to ensure stability.182

176 Ibid., para. 11.
177 Ibid., para. 12.
178 Ibid., para. 3.
179 Ibid., fifteenth preambular paragraph.
180 Ibid., paras. 5–6.
181 Ibid., para. 9.
182 Ibid., para. 10.
Asia

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

The Council established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) by resolution 47 (1948) of 21 April 1948. The first team of military observers, who eventually formed the nucleus of UNMOGIP, was deployed in January 1949 to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan established by resolution 39 (1948). Following the termination of the Commission, the Council, by resolution 91 (1951), decided that UNMOGIP would continue to supervise the ceasefire in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the renewed hostilities in 1971, the task of UNMOGIP has been to monitor developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. During 2018, the Council did not discuss UNMOGIP or make changes to its composition or mandate, which remained open-ended.\textsuperscript{183}

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United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

The Council established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) by resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964. UNFICYP was mandated to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.\textsuperscript{184}

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions 2398 (2018) of 30 January 2018 and 2430 (2018) of 26 July 2018 concerning UNFICYP. In accordance with previous practice, the Council extended the mandate of the mission twice, for a period of six months each time, the second time until 31 January 2019.\textsuperscript{185}

The Council did not modify the mandate of UNFICYP during the period under review. By resolution 2398 (2018), the Council welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on the strategic review of UNFICYP (S/2017/1008) and endorsed its recommendations.\textsuperscript{186} Accordingly, the Council expressed support for the need to improve the mission’s capacity for liaison and engagement with the sides across all components, including people-to-people contacts, to keep stability and calm, and thereby contribute effectively to conditions conducive to progress in a settlement process.\textsuperscript{187}

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Europe

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

The Council also endorsed the recommendation of the Secretary-General to reduce the mission’s actual strength from 888 to 802 military personnel, while maintaining an authorized strength of 860.\textsuperscript{188} By resolution 2430 (2018), the Council requested the Secretary-General to increase the number of women in UNFICYP and to ensure their meaningful participation in all aspects of operations.\textsuperscript{189}

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\textsuperscript{183} For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMOGIP, see Repertoire, Supplement 1946–1951, and subsequent Supplements (1952–2017).

\textsuperscript{184} For more information on the history of the mandate of UNFICYP, see previous Supplements (1964–2017).

\textsuperscript{185} Resolutions 2398 (2018), para. 9. and 2430 (2018), para. 11. See also part I, sect. 19, “The situation in Cyprus”.

\textsuperscript{186} Resolution 2398 (2018), para. 10. See also S/2017/1008, para. 57.

\textsuperscript{187} Resolution 2398 (2018), para. 11.
Middle East

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established by the Council on 29 May 1948, by resolution 50 (1948), to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine, following the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. UNTSO military observers have since remained in the Middle East and have continued to assist and cooperate with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in monitoring ceasefire and supervising armistice agreements. During 2018, the Council did not adopt any decisions concerning UNTSO or make changes to its composition or to its mandate, which remained open-ended.

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by the Council on 31 May 1974, by resolution 350 (1974), following the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, in the Golan Heights. Since then, UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, and to supervise the implementation of the Agreement and the areas of separation and limitation.

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions 2426 (2018) of 29 June 2018 and 2450 (2018) of 21 December 2018 concerning UNDOF. Consistent with prior practice, the Council extended the mandate of the mission twice, for a period of six months each time, the second time until 30 June 2019. The Council made no changes to the mandate or the composition of UNDOF during the reporting period.

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by the Council on 19 March 1978, by resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.

By resolution 2433 (2018) of 30 August 2018, the Council extended the mandate of UNIFIL for a period of one year, until 31 August 2019. The resolution was adopted further to the letter dated 30 July 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council (S/2018/750) on the renewal of the mandate of the mission.

The Council stressed the need to improve the management of the mission’s civilian resources, including through fostering enhanced cooperation with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, with the goal of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of both missions. In that regard, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide recommendations on the matter by 31 December 2018.

While reiterating language used in prior resolutions with regard to some core aspects of the mission’s mandate, such as security monitoring and patrolling and supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces, the resolution also included new language requesting UNIFIL to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate, and to assist the Lebanese authorities in ensuring the full and effective participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels of decision-making. The Council further requested enhanced reporting by UNIFIL on that issue.

The Council also called for the Government of Lebanon to develop a plan to increase its naval capabilities, with the goal of ultimately decreasing the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force and transitioning its responsibilities to the Lebanese Armed Forces. In that

193 For more information on the history of the mandate of UNDOF, see previous Supplements (1972–2017).
195 For more information on the history of the mandate of UNIFIL, see previous Supplements (1975–2017).
196 Resolution 2433 (2018), para. 1.
197 Ibid., third preambular paragraph.
198 Ibid., para. 12. See also S/2018/1182.
200 Ibid., para. 24.
regard, the Council requested that the Secretary-
General present to the Council an assessment with
recommendations within six months.201

The Council encouraged the intention of the
Government of Lebanon to deploy a model regiment
and an offshore patrol vessel in the mission’s area of
operations to advance the implementation of resolution
1701 (2006) and the authority of the State, and called
upon the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL to
strengthen their coordinated actions.202

The composition of UNIFIL was not modified
during the period under review.

201 Ibid., para. 7.

II. Special political missions

Note

Section II focuses on the decisions adopted by the
Security Council during the period under review
concerning the establishment and termination of
special political missions,203 as well as the changes to
their mandates.204

Overview of special political missions
during 2018

During the period under review, the Council
oversaw ten special political missions. Five were based
in Africa, one in the Americas, two in Asia and two in
the Middle East. Their size varied from relatively small
missions such as the United Nations Regional Centre
for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia to larger
assistance missions deployed in highly complex and
volatile security environments such as the United
Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
(UNSOM), the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

203 Special political missions described in the present part
include regional offices and offices in support of political
processes. Other types of special political missions, such
as special and personal envoys, advisers or
representatives of the Secretary-General, sanctions
monitoring teams, groups and panels and other entities
and mechanisms, are covered in other parts of the present
Supplement.

204 For information on the envoys, advisers and
representatives of the Secretary-General whose mandates
relate to the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security, other than those
appointed as heads of peacekeeping or special political
missions, see part IX, sect. VI.

205 In connection with UNAMA, resolution 2405 (2018),
para. 3; and, in connection with UNAMI, resolution 2421
(2018), para. 5.

206 In connection with UNOCA, resolution 2404 (2018),
para. 28; and, in connection with UNOCA,
S/PRST/2018/17, fifth paragraph.

Newly established special political missions and
terminations and extensions of mandates

The Council did not establish any new special
political missions or terminate the mandates of any
existing special political missions during the period
under review. The Council extended the mandates of
the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in
Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), the United Nations
Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA),
UNSMIL, UNSOM, UNAMA and UNAMI. The
United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
(UNOWAS) had initially been established in 2016 for a
three-year period until 31 December 2019, while the
mandates of the United Nations Regional Centre for
Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia and the Office
of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon
remained open-ended.

Mandates of special political missions

During 2018, the Council welcomed the findings
and recommendations of two strategic reviews
conducted in 2017 concerning UNAMA and UNAMI,
with the latter having been conducted by independent
non-United Nations experts.205 The Council also
requested the Secretary-General to conduct an
assessment of UNIOGBIS, including options for a
possible reconfiguration of the United Nations
presence in Guinea-Bissau, and a strategic review of
UNOCA to provide recommendations on possible areas
of improvement, including the coherence of United
Nations activities in the subregion.206

For most special political missions, the Council
prioritized mandate tasks related to the provision of

202 Ibid., para. 8.
good offices and mediation support for the implementation of peace agreements, inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation, promoting and providing capacity-building support for good governance and the strengthening of national institutions, supporting political transitions consisting of elections and constitutional review processes, and the resolution of related political and institutional crises, as well as monitoring and reporting on human rights violations and abuses and providing related capacity-building support. Regional offices, such as UNOCA and UNOWAS, continued to support the strengthening of subregional capacities in conflict prevention, early warning and women, peace and security issues, as well as addressing cross-border and transnational security threats such as terrorism and maritime security. Larger political missions, such as UNSOM, UNAMID and UNAMA, continued to coordinate international humanitarian and capacity-building efforts in the countries of their deployment.

During the period under review, the Council made modifications to the mandates of 7 out of the 10 special political missions, namely UNIOGBIS, UNOCA, UNSMIL, UNSOM, UNOWAS, UNAMA and UNAMI. In modifying their mandates, the Council placed particular emphasis on ensuring that missions fully took into account gender considerations throughout their activities. For example, in redefining the mandate of UNOCA, the Council requested the Office to give due attention to human rights and gender perspectives in the implementation of its good offices role, while UNAMI was tasked with approaching gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue. In connection with UNAMID and UNAMI, were requested to assist the Governments of Afghanistan and Iraq in ensuring the inclusion and political participation of women at all levels. Similarly, the Council requested UNSMIL to assist the Government of Libya in protecting women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, and welcomed the efforts of UNOWAS to work towards the systematic involvement of women in initiatives to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism.

In the context of delays in the implementation of political agreements and planned elections in Guinea-Bissau and Libya, the Council strengthened the political mandates of UNIOGBIS and UNSMIL. Specifically, the Council requested UNIOGBIS to use the good offices and political support of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau to support the full implementation of the 2016 Conakry Agreement on the Implementation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Road Map for the Resolution of the Political Crisis in Guinea-Bissau and the electoral and constitutional review processes, while UNSMIL was requested to exercise good offices to support an inclusive political process and security and economic dialogue within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement and the United Nations Action Plan for Libya.

Building on their existing mandates to monitor, analyse and support the addressing of a wide range of cross-border and transnational issues, the Council further tasked UNOCA and UNOWAS to support efforts to address the impact of emerging security threats, such as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, issues related to transhumance and conflict between farmers and pastoralists, as well as the regional dimension of security crises. Furthermore, recognizing the adverse effects of climate change and ecological change and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of Central Africa, West Africa and the Sahel, the Council requested UNOCA and UNOWAS to take such information into consideration in their activities.

Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the mandates of special political missions in 2018, showing the range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and specifically reiterated by the Council during the period under review; and (c) tasks of missions with open-ended or multi-year mandates adopted in previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the field missions concerned.

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207 In connection with UNOCA, S/2018/789, annex, objectives 1 and 2; and, in connection with UNAMI, resolution 2421 (2018), para. 2 (e).
208 In connection with UNAMID, resolution 2405 (2018), para. 39; and, in connection with UNAMI, resolution 2421 (2018), para. 2 (e).
209 In connection with UNSMIL, resolution 2434 (2018), para. 4; and, in connection with UNOWAS, S/PRST/2018/16, twelfth paragraph.
210 In connection with UNIOGBIS, resolution 2404 (2018), para. 3 (a)–(c); and, in connection with UNSMIL, resolution 2434 (2018), para. 1 (i) and (ii).
211 In connection with UNOCA, S/2018/789, annex, objective 2 (a); and, in connection with UNOWAS, S/PRST/2018/16, thirteenth paragraph.
212 In connection with UNOCA, S/PRST/2018/17, ninth paragraph; and, in connection with UNOWAS, S/PRST/2018/16, nineteenth paragraph.
### Table 4

**Mandates of special political missions, 2018: Africa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>UNIOGBIS</th>
<th>UNOCA</th>
<th>UNSMIL</th>
<th>UNSOM</th>
<th>UNOWA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-military coordination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demilitarization and arms management</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral assistance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International cooperation and coordination</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime security</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political process</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law/judicial matters</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security sector reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support to police</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support to sanctions regimes</td>
<td></td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support to State institutions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Abbreviations:** UNIOGBIS, United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau; UNOCA, United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa; UNSMIL, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNSOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia; UNOWAS, United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel.

### Table 5

**Mandates of special political missions, 2018: Americas, Asia and Middle East**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</th>
<th>UNAMA</th>
<th>UNRCCA</th>
<th>UNAMI</th>
<th>UNSCOL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefire monitoring</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian-military coordination</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demilitarization and arms management</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral assistance</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian support</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International cooperation and coordination</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political process</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of civilians</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Africa

United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) was established by the Council by resolution 1876 (2009) of 26 June 2009 to succeed the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau. UNIOGBIS was mandated to, inter alia, assist the work of the Peacebuilding Commission in Guinea-Bissau, strengthen the capacities of national institutions to maintain constitutional order, public security and the full respect for the rule of law, support an inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation process, provide strategic and technical support in security sector reform, undertake human rights promotion, protection and monitoring, and enhance cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.213

During 2018, by resolution 2404 (2018) of 28 February 2018 and in accordance with previous practice, the Council extended the mandate of UNIOGBIS for 12 months, until 28 February 2019.214 The Council redefined the priorities of UNIOGBIS in the context of the protracted political and institutional crisis in Guinea-Bissau, delays in the implementation of the 2016 Conakry Agreement on the Implementation of the ECOWAS Road Map for the Resolution of the Political Crisis in Guinea-Bissau, the holding of legislative and presidential elections in 2018 and 2019, and the constitutional review process.215 In addition to retaining the priorities provided for in resolution 2343 (2017),216 the Office was requested to support the electoral process and the full implementation of the Conakry Agreement, through the use of good offices, to ensure inclusive, free and credible legislative elections in 2018.217

Beyond the priority areas and with a view to upcoming elections, the Council requested UNIOGBIS and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau to support the Government, in close cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission, in the mobilization, harmonization and coordination of international assistance from the African Union, ECOWAS, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries and the European Union.218 The Council reiterated the Office’s other tasks related to the strengthening of democratic institutions and the capacity of State organs, assisting the national authorities in the promotion and protection of human rights, providing advice and support to combat drug trafficking and organized crime, incorporating a gender perspective into peacebuilding and supporting the timely conduct of elections and the strengthening of democracy and good governance.219

The resolution did not reiterate, however, language relating to the Office’s strategic and technical advice and support to national authorities in connection with the national security sector reform, rule of law strategies and the development of civilian and military justice systems.220

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213 For more information on the history of the mandate of UNIOGBIS, see previous Supplements (2008–2017).
214 Resolution 2404 (2018), para. 1.
215 See part I, sect. 8, “The situation in Guinea-Bissau”.
216 Resolution 2343 (2017), para. 2.
217 Resolution 2404 (2018), para. 3 (a) and (b).
218 Ibid., para. 4 (e).
219 Ibid., paras. 4 (a)–(d) and 8.
220 See resolution 2343 (2017), para. 2 (c).
Lastly, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide an assessment of UNIOGBIS within nine months, including options for a possible reconfiguration of the United Nations presence in the country and a reprioritization of tasks.221

United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) was established by an exchange of letters dated 11 December 2009 and 30 August 2010 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.222 The functions of UNOCA included cooperating with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and other regional partners in the promotion of peace and stability in the broader subregion, to carry out good offices roles in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, to strengthen the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs to advise the Secretary-General on matters relating to peace and security in the region, to promote an integrated subregional approach and facilitate coordination and information exchange among United Nations organizations and partners in the subregion, and to report to Headquarters on developments of subregional significance.223

During 2018, the Council issued two presidential statements concerning UNOCA, on 30 January and 10 August 2018.224 The Council also extended the mandate of UNOCA for three years, until 31 August 2021, by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council dated 24 and 28 August 2018, respectively.225

The Council modified the mandate of UNOCA during the period under review. In the presidential statement of 10 August 2018, the Council, while welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of UNOCA (S/2018/521), which included recommendations on the mandate renewal of UNOCA,226 noted that the priorities of the Office would include performing good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General; assisting the countries of the subregion in consolidating peace and resolving electoral tensions from the 2015–2018 period and assisting countries facing related institutional crises related to electoral processes; working with ECCAS to lay the groundwork for the structural prevention of election-related violence; enhancing the capacities of the ECCAS secretariat in conflict prevention, early warning, women, peace and security, mediation and other areas; and working with UNOWAS to address transregional issues, such as maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, conflict between farmers and herders and combating Boko Haram.227 The Council encouraged UNOCA to fully take into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue in its activities and to continue to support ECCAS in its adoption and implementation of the regional action plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000).228 Recognizing the adverse effects of climate and ecological change and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of the Central African region, the Council stressed the need for long-term strategies by Governments and the United Nations, based on risk assessments, to support stabilization and build resilience, and requested that such information be taken into consideration by UNOCA in its activities.229

By the exchange of letters dated 24 and 28 August 2018, the Council reiterated the existing four objectives of UNOCA, as defined in 2015,230 and made some further modifications with respect to its mandate, tasking UNOCA with monitoring political developments in Central Africa, carrying out good offices and enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation; supporting United Nations efforts in the subregion as well as regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security; enhancing the coherence and coordination of the work of the United Nations in the subregion on peace and security; and advising the Secretary-General and United Nations entities in the region on significant developments in Central Africa.231

Within that framework, the Council requested UNOCA to give due attention to human rights and gender perspectives in the implementation of its good

223 For more information on the history of the mandate of UNOCA, see previous Supplements (2008–2017).
228 Ibid., eighth paragraph.
229 Ibid., ninth paragraph.
offices role and in supporting United Nations and regional and subregional initiatives. Furthermore, as part of the latter objective, the Council specified that UNOCA would promote and support efforts to address the impact of emerging security threats, including Boko Haram, maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and other cross-border threats, such as issues related to transhumance, as well as the regional dimension of security crises in some States of the subregion. The Office was also tasked with supporting the African Union-led African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation.

During the period under review, the Council highlighted the importance of cooperation between UNOCA and United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions in the region. In that regard, the Council encouraged further cooperation, mutual prioritization and the clear division of tasks between UNOCA and UNOWAS, MINUSCA, MONUSCO, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi. The Council welcomed the support provided by UNOCA and UNOWAS for the development of a joint strategy to address the root causes of the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin region.

Lastly, by the presidential statement of 10 August 2018, the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review of the scope of the mandate and activities of UNOCA and to present recommendations to the Council by 1 August 2019 for areas of improvement, including the coherence of United Nations activities in countries under the Office’s mandate, or new or refocused priorities.

**United Nations Support Mission in Libya**

By resolution 2009 (2011) of 16 September 2011, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), with a mandate to support Libyan national efforts to restore public security and order and promote the rule of law, undertake inclusive political dialogue and promote national reconciliation, extend State authority, promote and protect human rights and support transitional justice, initiate economic recovery, and coordinate international support.


By resolution 2434 (2018), the Council reiterated its strong support for the ongoing efforts of UNSMIL and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and reaffirmed its endorsement of the United Nations Action Plan for Libya and the Libyan Political Agreement. In that context, the Council broadened and elaborated on the existing mandate of UNSMIL, as defined in resolution 2376 (2017). Specifically, the Council decided that UNSMIL would exercise mediation and good offices to support an inclusive political process and security and economic dialogue within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement and the United Nations Action Plan for Libya; continued implementation of the Agreement; consolidation of the governance, security and economic arrangements of the Government of National Accord, including support for economic reform in collaboration with international financial institutions; and subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process, including the constitutional process and the organization of elections.

Beyond those tasks, the Council reiterated, within operational and security constraints, the Mission’s tasks to support key Libyan institutions; support, upon request, the provision of essential services and the delivery of humanitarian assistance; support the securing of uncontrolled arms and related materiel and counter their proliferation; and coordinate international assistance and provide advice and assistance to the efforts led by the Government of National Accord to stabilize post-conflict zones, including those liberated from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh).

232 Ibid., objectives 1 and 2.
233 Ibid., objective 2 (a).
234 Ibid., objective 2 (b).
236 S/PRST/2018/17, thirteenth paragraph.
237 Ibid., fifth paragraph.
238 For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSMIL, see previous Supplements (2010–2017).
239 Resolution 2434 (2018), para. 1.
240 Ibid., fourth and seventh preambular paragraphs. See part I, sect. 13, “The situation in Libya”.
241 See resolution 2376 (2017), paras. 1–3.
242 Resolution 2434 (2018), para. 1.
243 Ibid., para. 2.
Furthermore, while reiterating its request to the Mission to fully take into account a gender perspective throughout its mandate and to assist the Government in ensuring the full and effective participation of women in political processes, the Council also tasked the Mission with assisting the Government in the protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, in line with resolution 1325 (2000). The Council welcomed the progress made by UNSMIL in re-establishing a presence in Tripoli and its plans to re-establish a presence in Benghazi and other parts of Libya through a phased return, as security conditions allowed. The Council requested the Secretary-General to reassess a series of detailed objectives for the implementation of the Mission’s mandated tasks, to include a particular focus on the steps required to set the constitutional basis for elections and to advance the political process from its current trajectory, and to report on progress towards those objectives in his regular reporting.

By resolution 2441 (2018), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council reiterated the mandate of UNSMIL to cooperate fully with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and its Panel of Experts. By resolution 2429 (2018), the Council reiterated the need for close coordination among UNSMIL, UNAMID, UNISFA, UNMISS and MINUSCA.

**United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia**

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was established by the Council by resolution 2102 (2013) of 2 May 2013. Its mandate was, inter alia, to provide good offices functions to support the Federal Government of Somalia in the peace and reconciliation process and to provide strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and State-building; to assist in the coordination of international donor support, in particular on security sector assistance and maritime security; to help to build the capacity of the Federal Government to promote respect for human rights, women’s empowerment, child protection and the prevention of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence; and to monitor, help to investigate and report on abuses or violations of human rights.

During 2018, the Council adopted resolutions 2408 (2018) of 27 March 2018 and 2431 (2018) of 30 July 2018 concerning UNSOM. The Council extended the mandate of UNSOM for a period of one year, until 31 March 2019. The Council renewed the existing mandate of UNSOM as defined in resolution 2358 (2017), adding new language to some of the Mission’s tasks, Specifically, while reiterating the request to UNSOM to implement its mandate at the national and regional level, the Council specified that that should include further strengthening and maintaining its presence in all federal member states, including in Galmudug and its administrative capital Dhuusamarreeb. In addition, reiterating the Mission’s task to provide strategic policy advice on the Government-led inclusive political process, reconciliation, peacebuilding and State-building, the Council specified that that should also include the review of the Provisional Federal Constitution, preparations for the 2020/2021 elections, security sector reform and the implementation of the transition plan.

Underscoring the importance of the Mission’s support to the Government-led inclusive political process, including the provision of good offices functions, the Council added that that should focus on strengthening the rule of law and the implementation of the new policing model in line with the comprehensive approach to security. Furthermore, with respect to the elections, the Council further underscored the importance of the Mission’s support, with a focus on the National Independent Electoral Commission at national and subnational level to fulfil its constitutional mandate, in line with the Somali-led Operational Strategic Plan for 2017–2021, the goal of nationwide voter registration by 2019, and coordination of international electoral support to Somalia.

With regard to security sector reform, the Council requested UNSOM to provide strategic advice to accelerate the implementation of the comprehensive approach to security, including facilitating more

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244 Ibid., para. 4.
245 Ibid., para. 5.
246 Ibid., para. 3.
247 Resolution 2441 (2018), para. 16.
248 Resolution 2429 (2018), para. 28.
249 For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSOM, see previous Supplements (2012–2017).
250 Resolution 2408 (2018), para. 1.
251 Resolution 2408 (2018), paras. 1–2. See also resolution 2158 (2014), para. 1.
252 Resolution 2408 (2018), para. 2.
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid., para. 3.
255 Ibid., para. 4.
effective coordination of international partners’ efforts to support the Security Pact, the priorities of the transition plan, the implementation of the national security architecture and the New Partnership for Somalia.\textsuperscript{256} The Council requested the Mission to continue to assist the Federal Government in coordinating international donor support to the security sector in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, including through coordination and advice to the comprehensive approach to security structure.\textsuperscript{257} In addition, the Council requested UNSOM to continue to support the Government’s efforts to implement the national strategy and action plan for preventing and countering violent extremism, in order to strengthen the country’s capacity to prevent and counter terrorism, consistent with its international obligations, Council resolutions and the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.\textsuperscript{258} The Council underlined the importance of strengthening the relationship between UNSOM, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and the United Nations country team, including through the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum.\textsuperscript{259} The Council also requested UNSOM to continue to work with partners to provide support and strategic policy advice in order for the Federal Government to fulfil its commitments to sound, transparent and accountable financial management, with a view to, inter alia, laying the foundations for inclusive and transparent elections.\textsuperscript{260}

By resolution 2431 (2018), while extending its authorization for the deployment of AMISOM under Chapter VII of the Charter,\textsuperscript{261} the Council encouraged continued close collaboration between UNSOM, UNSOS and AMISOM in order to strengthen joint senior leadership decision-making, ensure the alignment of operational efforts with a common set of strategic priorities, and enhance coordination efforts on the ground within the comprehensive approach to security mechanism.\textsuperscript{262} The Council further reiterated the Mission’s task to support the federal policing model and to work with AMISOM to ensure that women and girls were protected from sexual and gender-based violence, including sexual exploitation and abuse.\textsuperscript{263}

\textbf{United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel}

The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) was established by an exchange of letters dated 14 and 28 January 2016 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, merging the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel with the United Nations Office for West Africa. The Council mandated UNOWAS to, inter alia, monitor political developments in West Africa and the Sahel and carry out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General to assist in peacebuilding, sustaining peace efforts and enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation; enhance subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security; support the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and the coordination of international and regional engagements; and promote good governance, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and the mainstreaming of gender into conflict prevention and management initiatives.\textsuperscript{264}

In 2018, the Council adopted three presidential statements in connection with UNOWAS, on 30 January, 19 April and 10 August 2018.\textsuperscript{265} The Council did not renew the mandate of the Office during the period under review.\textsuperscript{266} The Council modified the mandate of UNOWAS in relation to several areas. By the presidential statement of 30 January 2018, the Council reiterated its full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel, looked forward to ongoing activities undertaken by UNOWAS in the areas of conflict prevention, mediation and good offices, subregional and regional cooperation to address root causes and strengthening institutional capacity, and underlined the need for sustained support and adequate resources.\textsuperscript{267} The Council encouraged further cooperation, mutual prioritization and the clear division of tasks between UNOWAS and UNOCA with a view to strengthening the capacity of regional and subregional organizations to address cross-border threats, commended the engagement and assistance of UNOWAS to regional and subregional organizations to promote peace and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{256} Ibid., para. 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{257} Ibid., para. 20.
  \item \textsuperscript{258} Ibid., para. 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{259} Ibid., para. 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{260} Ibid., para. 21.
  \item \textsuperscript{261} Resolution 2431 (2018), para. 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{262} Ibid., para. 25.
  \item \textsuperscript{263} Ibid., paras. 42 and 44.
  \item \textsuperscript{264} For more information on the initial mandate of UNOWAS, see Repertoire, Supplément 2016–2017.
  \item \textsuperscript{266} The mandate of UNOWAS was renewed for a three-year period, from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2019, by an exchange of letters dated 27 and 29 December 2016 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council (S/2016/1128 and S/2016/1129).
  \item \textsuperscript{267} S/PRST/2018/3, third paragraph.
\end{itemize}
stability in the region, and recognized the role of the Office in contributing to strategic and integrated analysis of the opportunities, risks and challenges in support of efforts by national and local actors to sustain peace.\(^{268}\) The Council also recognized the important role of UNOWAS in providing technical assistance to the permanent secretariat of the Group of Five for the Sahel and encouraged enhanced cooperation and information-sharing.\(^{269}\)

By the presidential statement issued on 19 April 2018, and further to the completion of the mandate of UNMIL on 30 March 2018, the Council broadened the mandate of UNOWAS and requested the Office to make available its good offices, as necessary, to the Government of Liberia and the United Nations Resident Coordinator.\(^{270}\)

\(^{268}\) Ibid., twenty-third and twenty-fourth paragraphs.
\(^{269}\) Ibid., fourteenth paragraph.
\(^{270}\) S/PRST/2018/8, seventh paragraph.

### Americas

**United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia**

The Council established the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia by resolution 2366 (2017) of 10 July 2017 after the completion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia. The Verification Mission was mandated to, inter alia, verify the implementation of the process of political, economic and social reintegration of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) and of the personal and collective security guarantees provided under the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace between the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP, signed on 24 November 2016.\(^{271}\)

\(^{271}\) For more information on the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, see Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017.

By the presidential statement issued on 10 August 2018, the Council recognized the adverse effects of climate and ecological change and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel, stressed the need for long-term strategies by Governments and the United Nations, based on risk assessments, to support stabilization and build resilience, and requested that such information be taken into consideration by UNOWAS in its activities.\(^{272}\) The Council also welcomed the efforts by UNOWAS and ECOWAS to work towards the systematic involvement of women in initiatives to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism and requested that those issues continue to be integrated into regular reporting by UNOWAS.\(^{272}\)

\(^{272}\) S/PRST/2018/16, nineteenth paragraph.

\(^{273}\) Ibid., twelfth paragraph.

### Asia

**United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan**

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established by the Council by resolution 1401 (2002) of 28 March 2002 and was mandated to fulfil the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations under the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001.\(^{276}\)

\(^{276}\) For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMA, see previous Supplements (2000–2017).
During 2018, by resolution 2405 (2018) of 8 March 2018, the Council extended the mandate of UNAMA, in accordance with previous practice, for one year until 17 March 2019.\(^\text{277}\)

By the resolution, the Council welcomed the findings of the strategic review of UNAMA, which had been conducted in 2017 further to resolution 2344 (2017).\(^\text{278}\) The Council called for the implementation of the recommendations of the review, including with a view to aligning the Mission’s substantive functions in support of peace efforts with the Secretary-General’s emphasis on integrating conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding into the three pillars of work of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including in support of an intra-Afghan dialogue.\(^\text{279}\)

The Council reiterated the priorities of UNAMA, as defined in previous resolutions, namely to provide outreach and good offices support to the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process; to promote more coherent support by the international community of development and governance priorities; to support regional cooperation; to monitor the situation of civilians, promote accountability and assist in ensuring respect for human rights; and to closely cooperate and coordinate with the non-combat Resolve Support Mission led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the NATO Senior Civilian Representative.\(^\text{280}\) While also reiterating the Mission’s electoral assistance mandate, the Council specified that that would include the organization of future elections, including the parliamentary and district council elections in 2018 and the presidential elections in 2019.\(^\text{281}\)

UNAMA was also requested to implement its remaining “priority tasks”, as defined previously, namely supporting the implementation of the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation, the efforts of the Government of Afghanistan to improve governance and the rule of law, the facilitation and delivery of humanitarian assistance, and efforts to strengthen the protection of children.\(^\text{282}\) Lastly, the Council encouraged the Government to identify further opportunities to support the participation of women in the peace process and requested the support of UNAMA in that regard.\(^\text{283}\)

**United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia**

The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia was authorized by the Council through an exchange of letters dated 7 and 15 May 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,\(^\text{284}\) at the initiative of the Governments of the region. With a view to strengthening the United Nations capacity for conflict prevention in Central Asia, the Centre was assigned a number of tasks, including liaising with the Governments of the region on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitoring and analysing the situation on the ground; and maintaining contact with regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Centre was established with an open-ended mandate. During the period under review, the Council made no changes to its mandate.

\(^{277}\) Resolution 2405 (2018), para. 4. See part I, sect. 17, “The situation in Afghanistan”.


\(^{279}\) Resolution 2405 (2018), para. 3.

\(^{280}\) Ibid., paras. 6 (a) and (c)–(f).

\(^{281}\) Ibid., paras. 6 (b) and 14.

\(^{282}\) Ibid., paras. 7 (a)–(c) and 33.

\(^{283}\) Ibid., para. 39.


**Middle East**

**United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq**

The Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 14 August 2003 by resolution 1500 (2003) to support the Secretary-General in the fulfilment of his mandate under resolution 1483 (2003), in accordance with the structure and responsibilities set out in his report of 17 July 2003.\(^\text{285}\) Those responsibilities included coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance; promoting the return of refugees and displaced persons, economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable

\(^{285}\) S/2003/715.
development; and supporting efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions.\(^{286}\)

During 2018, by resolution 2421 (2018) of 14 June 2018, the Council, departing from the previous practice of 12 months, extended the mandate of UNAMI for 10 months, until 31 May 2019.\(^{287}\)

By the same resolution, the Council welcomed the results of the independent external assessment of UNAMI, which had been conducted in 2017 further to resolution 2367 (2017),\(^{288}\) and revisited the Mission’s priorities for the first time since 2007.\(^{289}\) Taking into account the views of the Government of Iraq,\(^{290}\) the Council decided that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and Head of UNAMI would prioritize the provision of advice, support and assistance to the Government and people of Iraq on advancing inclusive, political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation.\(^{291}\) In addition, the Council further decided that the Special Representative and UNAMI would advise, support and assist the Iraqi authorities in a variety of areas, including the development of processes for holding elections and referendums; constitutional review and implementation; facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation; and security sector reform efforts and planning, funding and implementing reintegration programmes for former members of armed groups.\(^{292}\) Lastly, the Council also decided that the Special Representative and UNAMI would promote, support and facilitate, in coordination with the Government, the delivery of humanitarian assistance; the implementation of programmes to improve services for the people of Iraq; efforts with respect to economic reform, capacity-building and setting conditions for sustainable development; the contributions of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes; and accountability and the protection of human rights, judicial and legal reform, and the work of the investigative team established by resolution 2379 (2017).\(^{293}\) Moreover, the Council decided that the Special Representative and UNAMI would approach gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue throughout the Mission’s mandate and advise and assist the Government in ensuring women’s participation, involvement and representation at all levels, and would also support the efforts of the Government and the United Nations country team to strengthen child protection, including the rehabilitation and reintegration of children.\(^{294}\)

**Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon**

The establishment of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon was authorized by the Council by means of an exchange of letters dated 8 and 13 February 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.\(^{295}\) The Office was established with an open-ended mandate. The position of Special Coordinator was created to replace the position of Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon, which had been created in 2000.\(^{296}\) During the period under review, the Council made no changes to the mandate of the Office.\(^{297}\)

\(^{286}\) Resolution 1483 (2003), para. 8 (a)–(i). For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMI, see previous Supplements (2000–2017).

\(^{287}\) Resolution 2421 (2018), para 1. In its statement after the vote on the resolution, the United States, as penholder, explained that the ten-month extension was done on a one-time basis so as to better align mandate renewals with the budget cycle, in keeping with the findings of the independent external assessment of UNAMI (S/PV.8285, p. 2). See part I, sect. 25, “The situation concerning Iraq”.

\(^{288}\) Resolution 2421 (2018), para 5.

\(^{289}\) For further information on the mandate priorities in 2007, see Repertoire, Supplement 2004–2007, chap. V, part I. F.


\(^{291}\) Resolution 2421 (2018), para. 2 (a).

\(^{292}\) Ibid., para. 2 (b).

\(^{293}\) Ibid., para. 2 (c) and (d). For information on the mandate of the investigative team established by resolution 2379 (2017), see part VI, sect. II, and part IX, sect. III.

\(^{294}\) Resolution 2421 (2018), para. 2 (e) and (f).


\(^{296}\) S/2000/718.

\(^{297}\) For more information on the history of the mandate of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, see previous Supplements (2004–2017). See also part I, sect. 23, “The situation in the Middle East”, and sect. 24, “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.

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The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council and its supplements are published by the United Nations Secretariat as a guide to the proceedings of the Security Council from its first meeting in 1946 onwards. The Repertoire is designed to assist government officials, practitioners of international law, academics and all those interested in the work of the United Nations to follow the evolving practice of the Council and gain a better understanding of the framework within which it operates. The publication presents, as comprehensively as possible, new trends in the Council’s application of the Charter of the United Nations and its own provisional rules of procedure. The Repertoire is the only such official record and is based solely on the deliberations of the Council, its decisions and other official documentation before the Council. The current Supplement, twenty-first in the series of Supplements to the Repertoire, covers the year 2018. This is the first Supplement in the history of the publication that covers a one-year period aiming at making available to the United Nations membership the most recent information on the work of the Council.

As further detailed in this Supplement, the application of the Charter by the Council and its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security further evolved during the year 2018. Amidst a fraying consensus, the Council continued to concentrate most of its work on existing conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. In connection with the conflict in Yemen, the Council authorized the Secretary-General to establish and deploy an advance team to monitor and support the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement. The use of chemical weapons beyond the Syrian Arab Republic, in Salisbury (United Kingdom), was brought to the attention of the Council. Initiatives to enhance accountability for the use of these weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic were proposed—albeit unsuccessfully. In 2018, the United Nations Mission in Liberia completed its mandate after more than 14 years of operations and the Council terminated the sanctions measures concerning Eritrea, further to the signature of the peace agreement with Ethiopia.