Meetings: non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

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<td>All Council members&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>19 March 2019</td>
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<sup>a</sup> The representative of Indonesia spoke twice, once in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and once in his national capacity.

B. Non-proliferation

In 2019, the Council held three meetings, including one high-level meeting, under the item entitled “Non-proliferation” and did not adopt any decisions. All meetings took the form of briefings.<sup>647</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

Under this item, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations.

On 2 April 2019, the Council held a high-level meeting under the sub-item entitled “Supporting the Non-Proliferation Treaty ahead of the 2020 Review Conference”.<sup>648</sup> At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the Director General of IAEA. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs stressed that the potential consequences of a nuclear war would be global and affect all Member States and that it was therefore entirely appropriate that the Council discussed measures related to preventing such a catastrophic outcome, in particular the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was the one instrument that had perhaps played the greatest role in doing so. She further noted that there were four key elements to the success of the Treaty: the inclusion of verifiable non-proliferation obligations through safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities; the inclusion of legally binding disarmament commitments to pursue nuclear disarmament; the establishment of a strategic balance across the three pillars of the Treaty, namely, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and the Treaty’s near universality, which provided clear authority and ensured almost global subscription to its normative framework. She cautioned that the durability of the Treaty should not be taken for granted in an international environment defined by competition over cooperation and in which the acquisition of arms was prioritized over the pursuit of diplomacy. She encouraged all States to view the Review Conference as a golden opportunity to make the practical gains that would ensure the Treaty’s continued viability. The Director General of IAEA provided an overview of the activities of the Agency, including the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements with States parties to the Treaty, under which they must declare all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities. Despite encouraging developments in implementing the additional protocols to the Treaty, the Agency was faced with challenges, such as the steady increase in the amount of nuclear material and the number of nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, along with continuing pressure on its regular budget. He also reported on the nuclear programmes of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which remained at the top of the Agency’s agenda. IAEA continued to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The implementation in the Islamic Republic of Iran of its comprehensive safeguards agreement, the additional protocol and additional transparency measures under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action amounted to the most robust verification system in existence anywhere in the world. With regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, despite the lack of direct access, the Agency had continued to monitor the country’s nuclear programme and evaluate all safeguards information available to it, including open-source information and satellite imagery. He expressed hope that the ongoing international developments would lead to an agreement and to the implementation of concrete denuclearization measures, but stressed that any agreement on denuclearization must be accompanied by an effective and sustainable verification mechanism.

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647 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
648 See S/PV.8500.
On the Middle East, he recalled the previous work of the Agency concerning modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

The Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs provided briefings to the Council twice, on 26 June and 19 December 2019, in relation to the seventh and eighth reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Council resolution 2231 (2015). At both meetings, the representative of Belgium gave a briefing to the Council in his capacity as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) on the status of the Procurement Working Group’s decisions and on the implementation of the resolution.

At the briefing in June 2019, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs said that the Secretary-General regretted the decision of the United Nations not to extend waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran and not to fully renew waivers for non-proliferation projects in the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, since that could impede the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran and other Member States to implement certain provisions of the Plan. The Secretary-General also regretted the announcement made by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 8 May that it would not commit itself to respecting the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action limits on its enriched uranium stockpile and heavy water reserves, should other participants not fulfil its demands, especially in the areas of banking and oil. The Secretary-General encouraged the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue to implement all its nuclear-related commitments despite the considerable challenges it faced and to carefully consider and address the concerns expressed by Member States about its activities in relation to the restrictive measures contained in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The Head of the Delegation of the European Union, speaking on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, stated that the European Union was resolutely committed to the Plan and remained committed to providing tangible results and economic dividends to the Iranian people. While the Plan addressed nuclear non-proliferation aspects, a series of events outside the nuclear domain were increasingly worrying. The European Union had repeatedly urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to refrain from activities that could deepen mistrust, such as ballistic missile tests, which were inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). Following the briefings, most Council members spoke in support of the Plan. The representative of the United States stated that although the United States had made clear its willingness to engage in dialogue to negotiate a deal that would better serve international peace and security, it intended to do everything in its power to curb malign Iranian behaviour, including through updates to the sanctions regime established pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that, in the year since the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan, his country had exercised its policy of strategic patience in order to preserve the Plan, but the goodwill and maximum restraint of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the repeated promises by other participants to seek practical solutions, had yielded no concrete results.

At the briefing in December 2019, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs reported to the Council that since July 2019, under the monitoring of IAEA, the Islamic Republic of Iran had surpassed uranium enrichment level limits stipulated in the Plan, as well as limits on its stockpiles of heavy water and low-enriched uranium. She welcomed the initiatives of the other participants in the Plan that might contribute to the goals of facilitating legitimate business with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the preservation of the Plan, and reiterated the call for the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully consider and address the concerns expressed by Member States about its activities in relation to the restrictive measures set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). She expressed concern over the escalating tensions in the region, stating that the Secretary-General continued to call on Member States to exercise maximum restraint and prevent further escalation amid heightened tensions. The Head of the Delegation of the European Union stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had decided to embark on a worrisome path of decreasing its nuclear-related commitments, which the European Union deeply regretted. The European Union strongly urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to change its course of action.

Following the briefings, Council members expressed concern over steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran to reduce its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. Against the backdrop of the attack of 14 September on Aramco oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, the representative of the United States reiterated her country’s position, while also affirming that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to defy the

650 See S/PV.8564 and S/PV.8695.
651 See S/PV.8564.
652 See S/PV.8695.
Council’s call in resolution 2231 (2015) to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran affirmed that his country continued to be committed to the implementation of the Plan. However, after exercising strategic patience for a year, in the face of apparent continued inaction by the European participants in the Plan, and after witnessing that the promises made to his country had not been honoured, the Islamic Republic of Iran had been left with no other option than to act and take the necessary measures to rectify the imbalance created in the Plan. Recalling paragraphs 26 and 36 of the Plan, he stated that his country had ceased implementing only some voluntary measures which were not inconsistent with the safeguards-related obligations. He added that as soon as the full implementation of the Plan by other participants was guaranteed, the Islamic Republic of Iran would immediately reverse all its measures.

653 See resolution 2231 (2015), annex A, paras. 26 and 36.

Meetings: non-proliferation

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C. Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

During the period under review, the Council held two meetings under this item. One meeting was convened to adopt a decision and the second meeting took the form of a briefing.654 The Council adopted a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts in support of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). More information on the meetings, including speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

On 10 April 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2464 (2019), by which it extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) for a period of 12 months, until 24 April 2020.655 Following the adoption of the resolution, Council members made statements. While some expressed concerns about the continued evasion of sanctions measures and the need for the full implementation of existing measures,656 others raised concerns about the humanitarian impact of sanctions on civilians.657 The representative of the United Kingdom said that the inadequate provision of humanitarian assistance was due to the government policies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, not to sanctions, and called for the continuous monitoring of the effectiveness of the humanitarian exemptions process. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom underlined the critical role of the Panel in reporting and investigating sanctions violations, while others raised the need for the Panel to be guided by the principles of impartiality and objectivity and operate solely through the use of verified information on the basis of respectful cooperation with all Member States.658

On 11 December 2019, the Council heard a briefing by the Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific on the troubling developments in recent months related to the nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.659 The Assistant Secretary-General stated that the country had conducted over 10 missile launches to date, most recently on 7 December 2019. Meanwhile, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had suspended its diplomatic engagement, including working-level talks with the United States and intra-Korean contacts. He recalled the Secretary-General’s call for the parties

654 For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.
655 Resolution 2464 (2019), para. 1. For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.
656 See S/PV.8507 (United States, France and United Kingdom).
657 Ibid., (Russian Federation, Equatorial Guinea and China).
658 Ibid.
659 See S/PV.8682.