Thematic issues

26. United Nations peacekeeping operations

Overview

During the period under review, the Security Council held five meetings in connection with the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations,” adopting one resolution. At the meetings, the Council discussed the issue of inter-mission cooperation and considered a multidimensional approach to peacekeeping, with a view to better coordinating it with peacebuilding processes. The Council also heard briefings by several force commanders of peacekeeping operations regarding the challenges they faced in the field.

Briefings on the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding

On 26 March 2012, in his briefing to the Council, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations pointed out that when the Security Council mandated missions, it was not only to stabilize the country and keep the peace, but also to contribute to the building of a sustainable peace. He stated that peacekeepers should not address the full spectrum of peacebuilding activities; rather, they were best suited to prioritizing those initiatives that advanced the peace process or political objectives of a mission. He said that it was not about expanding peacekeeping or adding new tasks to mandates, but about making the most of the tasks that peacekeepers were already being asked to perform. The Under-Secretary-General stressed that peacekeeping missions had a restricted time horizon and needed to synchronize their plans with actors who were better suited to undertaking long-term engagements. He concluded by affirming that transitions should not be about simply reducing numbers in a peacekeeping operation, but that it was through building confidence and maintaining clear communication between the host Government, key national stakeholders and the international community that a successful drawdown plan and an enduring peace would be secured.

The Under-Secretary-General for Field Support referred to the fundamental role of effective transitions in ensuring a sustainable peace, stating that delivering an effective response to the peacebuilding needs of post-conflict countries required the same agility and flexibility from field support systems that was required from other peacekeeping tasks. This was especially significant when considering the impact that large and multidimensional field missions had on the social and economic life of the host countries. Examples showed how joint planning with national counterparts had a positive impact throughout the drawdown phase. She also identified national capacity development as a priority for planning and executing peacebuilding tasks and effective transitions. In concluding, she noted that the Council played an enormous role in the process of transitioning to a sustainable peace, setting the direction not only through mandates but also building and maintaining the political support required for delivery.

Briefings by force commanders of United Nations peacekeeping operations

On 20 June 2012, on the initiative of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the Council was briefed at an open meeting by force commanders of United Nations peacekeeping operations. In his briefing, the Force Commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) highlighted the need for a system to support common military standards and for training in peacekeeping operations, especially when it came to the protection of civilians under imminent threat, which he called a fine balance between prompt and robust action required from a soldier in uniform and a person who cared and nurtured the vulnerable civilian community in his area of operational responsibility. Addressing the Council with respect to leading a composite force towards common operational goals, the Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) outlined the key challenges inherent in a composite and multinational

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879 Resolution 2086 (2013).
880 S/PV.6740, pp. 2-5.
881 Ibid., pp. 5-7.
882 S/PV.6789, pp. 2-3.
force such as UNIFIL, namely language, interoperability of material and equipment, integration of civilian and military components, multinationality within a single battalion and interoperability of maritime units. The Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) reviewed the challenges in dealing with a complex political environment in peacekeeping operations, with reference in particular to the intercommunal crisis that had taken place in Jonglei state, South Sudan, in December 2011 and January 2012. The Force Commander of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) focused his presentation on the contribution of the military component of the mission to the stabilization of Haiti as well as the support it provided to the country’s institutions.

In the debate that followed, Council members welcomed the presence of the force commanders, expressed appreciation for their assessments and noted that the initiative was a useful practice to inform the Council of the challenges the Blue Helmets faced in the field. Speakers shared the view that peacekeeping operations were an important tool for the maintenance of international peace and security, and in addition generally agreed on the need for missions to be assigned clear and realistic mandates by the Council and for the necessary resources to be provided in an effective fashion so that peacekeepers could carry out their tasks accordingly.

On 26 June 2013, Council members heard briefings by the force commanders of MONUSCO, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). The Force Commander of MONUSCO described how the use of both advanced and more basic military technology could offer benefits for peacekeeping. In the context of the more robust mandate set out by resolution 2098 (2013), he said that MONUSCO was preparing for the arrival of unarmed and unmanned aerial vehicles to be used for surveillance purposes, identifying movements of armed groups and helping to deter their hostile action. In his briefing, the Force Commander of UNMIL highlighted the need for in-mission assessment of predeployment training, and recommended the establishment of an evaluating mechanism within force headquarters that would assist the force leadership in sustaining mission-capable troops. Focusing on how planned inter-mission cooperation could impact mission crisis management capability, the Force Commander of UNOCI described how the existing framework of cooperation between UNMIL and UNOCI had optimized the use of available assets in the two geographically contiguous missions, and identified areas in which cooperation could be enhanced, as well as major challenges.

Following the briefings, Council members in general endorsed the idea that the increasing complexity of mandated peacekeeping tasks in the context of limited resources called for new approaches, such as the use of new technology and inter-mission cooperation, as long as they were used within the limits agreed and on a case-by-case basis. Overall, speakers were also supportive of in-mission assessment of predeployment training, as it was critical to efficiency and sustaining operational readiness.

**Peacekeeping and inter-mission cooperation**

In his briefing to the Council on 12 December 2012, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations emphasized that there was no official agreed definition for inter-mission cooperation and that the practical modalities had been defined on a case-by-case basis. He further noted that such cooperation had become increasingly attractive over the past few years, mainly owing to four factors, namely, a recurring lack of certain critical items of equipment, which prevented missions from implementing their mandates, especially in times of elections or security crises; the repeated appeal by the General Assembly and the Security Council for the enhancement of synergies among missions deployed in geographical proximity to each other; the need for a more rational use of resources pushed by the current global economic crisis; and finally, the fact that inter-mission cooperation was, by definition, a flexible tool. In closing, he said that rather than a tool of choice, inter-mission cooperation was a tool of necessity, to be used temporarily and on a limited scale, and that the consent of troop-contributing countries, host Governments and the Council would remain key enabling principles.

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883 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
884 Ibid., pp. 6.
885 Ibid., pp. 8.
886 S/PV.6987, pp. 2-3.
887 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
888 Ibid., pp. 4-6.
889 S/PV.6886, pp. 2-4.
At the same meeting, the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support stated that, from the perspective of mission support, inter-mission cooperation meant that troops, civilian personnel and assets could be redeployed to another mission on short notice, sustained while at a temporary site owing to a mission start-up or crisis and ultimately returned to their original location and intended use. With regard to the start-up of a mission, she noted that delays in establishing a field presence could have a negative effect on the mission’s chances to successfully implement its mandate. Support from the United Nations missions in the Middle East had been critical for the rapid build-up of the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS) in early 2012.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 4.}

During the debate, Council members generally praised the various examples of successful inter-mission cooperation arrangements, agreeing that increased temporary cooperation between missions operating in geographic proximity could make them more efficient and effective. Concerns were, nonetheless, also raised by some delegations: the United States representative stressed the need to ensure that one mission not be helped by hurting another and that troop-contributing countries not be committed to one task when they had signed up for another. In addition, it was important not to allow stop-gap measures to become substitutes for long-term planning and preparedness.\footnote{Ibid., p. 16.} In a similar vein, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed his concerns that strengthening one mission and weakening another meant altering its mandate, which required the consent of the Council.\footnote{Ibid., p. 18.}

**United Nations peacekeeping: a multi-dimensional approach**

On 21 January 2013, the Council held an open debate on a multidimensional approach to United Nations peacekeeping operations. During the debate, the Council adopted resolution 2086 (2013), by which it, inter alia, emphasized that peacekeeping activities should be conducted in a manner so as to facilitate post-conflict peacebuilding, and recognized the important role of multidimensional peacekeeping.

The Secretary-General stated that while peacekeeping operations were more varied and more complex than ever, peacekeeping remained a highly cost-effective investment in progress towards lasting stability, and that no international tool was as effective in combining political, security, rule of law and human rights efforts. He said, in addition, that the draft resolution rightly emphasized that national Governments had the primary responsibility for identifying peacebuilding priorities and that peacekeeping missions played a vital role on the fronts of inclusivity and institution-building, which were critical to preventing a relapse into conflict.\footnote{S/PV.6903, pp. 2-3.}

During the debate, nearly 60 speakers took the floor. They generally welcomed the increased focus on the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding as a consequence of the growing complexity of contemporary conflicts, with such an integrated approach leading to multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Several speakers emphasized the principle of national ownership as paramount from the very early stages of peacebuilding activities in order to allow a successful drawdown process of the peacekeeping mission and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace.\footnote{Ibid., p. 6 (Australia); p. 7 (Republic of Korea); p. 20 (Morocco); p. 22 (Luxembourg); p. 24 (Egypt, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement); p. 25 (New Zealand); pp. 27-28 (South Africa); p. 29 (Indonesia); p. 30 (European Union); p. 36 (Chile); p. 41 (Cuba); p. 47 (Sweden); p. 61 (Namibia); p. 65 (Montenegro); and p. 67 (Benin).} A number of speakers also highlighted the importance of the support from the Council, in coordination with the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries, to ensure a successful transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.\footnote{Ibid., p. 11 (Guatemala); pp. 14-15 (France); p. 20 (Morocco); p. 21 (Azerbaijan); p. 24 (Egypt, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement); p. 25 (South Africa); pp. 39-40p. 36 (Chile); p.42 (Cuba); p. 45 (Thailand); p. 53 (Uganda); p. 61 (Namibia); and pp. 62-63 (Zimbabwe).} The representative of the Russian Federation noted, however, that peacekeeping operations could not fully take upon themselves the responsibility for long-term peacebuilding and must coordinate their work with other actors. He also cautioned against the broadening interpretations of Council mandates by individual States and the Secretariat, especially when related to the norms of international humanitarian law for the protection of civilians in armed conflict.\footnote{Ibid., p. 17.}
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<sup>a</sup> Portugal was represented by its Minister of State and Foreign Affairs; and India by its Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs.

<sup>b</sup> Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, China, France, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Morocco, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Togo, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>c</sup> Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Chad, Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), El Salvador, Fiji, Germany, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Montenegro, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Philippines, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Zimbabwe.

<sup>d</sup> Pakistan was represented by its Foreign Secretary; Republic of Korea by its Deputy Minister for Multilateral and Global Affairs; and Australia by its Parliamentary Secretary for Defence.

<sup>e</sup> The representative of the Philippines did not make a statement.
27. Items relating to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Overview

From 2012 to 2013, the Security Council held nine meetings and adopted five resolutions\(^897\) related to the work of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.\(^898\) Throughout the period under review, the Council received semi-annual briefings by senior officials of the Tribunals and considered their completion strategies, as set out in resolution 1966 (2010), in which the Council requested the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to take all possible measures to expeditiously complete all their remaining work no later than 31 December 2014, to prepare their closure and to ensure a smooth transition to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals.

The Council also appointed the President and the Prosecutor of the Mechanism for a term of four years\(^899\) and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, authorized permanent and ad litem judges of both

Tribunals to serve beyond the expiry of their terms of office.\(^900\)

Briefings on the implementation of the completion strategies and establishment of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Arusha Branch

In the semi-annual briefings on 7 June and 5 December 2012, the Presidents and Prosecutors of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, respectively, provided the Council with their assessments of the implementation of the completion strategies, including management reforms aimed at accelerating the remaining trial and appeal proceedings and circumventing difficulties related to staff attrition and recruitment owing to the pending closure of the Tribunals.\(^901\) At the December briefing, the President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, speaking also as the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, and the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, speaking also as the Prosecutor of the Mechanism, updated the Council on the preparations for the commencement of the work of the Mechanism. The Arusha branch of the Mechanism had begun its operations on 1 July 2012 and, as set out

\(^{897}\) All resolutions except resolution 2038 (2012) were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter.

\(^{898}\) The present study covers the following items:

(a) International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;
(b) International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; and
(c) International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. For more information on the mandates of the Tribunals, see part IX, sect. IV.

\(^{899}\) See exchange of letters dated 23 and 27 February 2012 (S/2012/112 and S/2012/113, respectively) between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council; see also resolution 2038 (2012).

\(^{900}\) Resolutions 2054 (2012), 2080 (2012), 2081 (2012) and 2130 (2013). For more information on the action taken by the Council with regard to the terms of office of judges, see part IV, sect. I.D, “Practice in relation to provisions of the Charter involving recommendations by the Security Council to the General Assembly”.

\(^{901}\) S/PV.6782, pp. 3-6 (President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia); pp. 6-8 (President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); pp. 8-10 (Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia); and pp. 10-11 (Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); S/PV.6880, pp. 3-7 (President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and of the Mechanism); pp. 7-10 (President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); pp. 10-11 (Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia); and pp. 11-14 (Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and of the Mechanism).