Chair’s statement

1718 Committee Open briefing

New York, 12 April 2022

INTRODUCTION

Excellencies, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and gentlemen,

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), its Panel of Experts, and the Secretariat, it is my pleasure to welcome you to this open briefing on Security Council sanctions regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The 1718 sanctions regime remains the most comprehensive sanctions regime to date. We are aware that the regime asks a lot from Member States and can pose various implementation challenges. The Committee stands ready to assist in carrying out their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and to offer guidance to Member States when requested. In this regard, with the support of the Secretariat, it also makes sure to keep the 1718 Committee website up to date, including the webpage on Implementation Assistance Notices, where various provisions of the regime are clarified in guidelines to Member States.

With this briefing, we intend to inform Member States about the scope of the sanctions regime, the mandate and activities of the Committee, and the main findings and recommendations of the Panel of Expert’s most recent final report, dated 1 March 2022 which has now been published and available on the 1718 Committee website as Security Council document S/2022/132.

As Chair of the 1718 Committee, I wish to touch upon three points in my opening remarks:

1. Member States’ obligations to submit national implementation reports,
2. The need for effective implementation of the sanctions measures, and
3. The Committee’s efforts in facilitating the work of humanitarian organizations in the DPRK, in particular through its humanitarian exemption mechanism.

The Coordinator of the Panel of Experts will subsequently elaborate in more detail on the main features of the DPRK sanctions regime, in line with the Panel’s most recent findings and recommendations. I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate my great appreciation to the Panel of Experts for their work, which is crucial to the success of the Committee. Its reports continue to offer invaluable insights and I strongly advise all to read them and to positively consider all recommendations addressed to Member States, including those contained in annex 93 of the Panel’s latest report. I also would like to thank those Member States, entities, and individuals who have responded to requests for information by the Panel.

While the Coordinator will be presenting on behalf of the Panel, we do have most of the other experts with us today. Following the Coordinator’s presentation, I will open the floor for questions and answers, and encourage Member States to make full use of this opportunity to
engage in an interactive discussion with the Panel of Experts, as well as myself as Chair and other members of the 1718 Committee

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION REPORTS

Ladies and gentlemen,

With regard to national implementation reports, you may recall that various resolutions require that Member States shall report within 90 days of their adoption on the concrete measures undertaken to effectively implement the 1718 sanctions regime. In addition to those longstanding requests, resolution 2397 (2017) introduced the requirement for two types of implementation reports to be submitted by Member States; one on the implementation of the resolution as a whole, and another on the obligation to repatriate DPRK nationals who are gaining income in other Member States.

A full list of all reporting requirements can be found on the 1718 Committee website. Under the tab ‘implementation reports’, you will find a table with all submission deadlines. Should there be any doubt as to whether your Government has fulfilled all reporting obligations, the table also reflects which reports have been received by Member States to date. Implementation Assistance Notice No. 2, also available on the Committee’s website, contains an optional checklist template, which can be helpful in providing the required information.

While the Committee continues to receive implementation reports, a large number of Member States are yet to submit their reports. I would like to remind Member States that reporting on the incorporation of sanctions into domestic legislation is an obligation under the relevant Security Council resolutions, and call on Member States who have not yet done so, to report to the Committee promptly. Implementation reports play a crucial role in helping the Committee and its Panel of Experts assist Member States in the comprehensive implementation of the resolutions.

Finally, my team, as well as the Panel of Experts, and the Committee’s Secretariat, stand ready to assist Member States with the preparation and submission of their implementation reports. Please do reach out to us with any questions.

EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION

Dear colleagues,

On effective implementation, I would like to stress that it is of utmost importance that the resolutions are fully implemented in order to ensure that the Security Council’s measures are effective. To ensure full compliance, all Member States are urged to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel, and to supply, on a confidential basis if necessary, any information at their disposal on the implementation of the sanctions, including on any sanctions violation.

In order to foster a better understanding of the DPRK sanctions regime, the 1718 Committee also continues to provide advice and guidance to Member States, international organizations and NGOs on how to proceed when implementing sanctions. Requests for guidance can be submitted to the Committee Chair and the Secretariat, after which these will be brought to the attention of the Committee.
The ultimate goal of the sanctions regime is to facilitate the achievement of a peaceful and comprehensive solution to the situation in the DPRK through dialogue. The resolutions reaffirm the Council’s support to the Six Party Talks and call for their resumption. They also reiterate the goal of the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and the return of the DPRK to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

### HUMANITARIAN EXEMPTION MECHANISM

Colleagues,

When sanctions were imposed, the Security Council reaffirmed that the measures are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK. As such, as detailed in paragraph 25 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Council decided that the 1718 Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, grant exemptions on humanitarian grounds. Over the years, the humanitarian exemption mechanism has become one of the key areas of work for the Committee. Since 2018, the Committee has approved the vast majority of humanitarian requests received, a total of 88, while approving numerous extensions and adjustments.

Since the mechanism’s introduction, the Committee has focused on streamlining the process for obtaining humanitarian exemptions to facilitate the work of humanitarian actors and the delivery of aid to the DPRK. The Committee has also made adjustments to its internal procedures to allow for the expeditious delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance to benefit the vulnerable population of the DPRK. Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7 (IAN No. 7) provides up-to-date information on the mechanism to obtain humanitarian exemptions, including the recommended format of exemption requests, information on routing to the 1718 Committee, and the approval process.

In view of the ongoing global pandemic, the Committee continues to use an expedited decision-making procedure of two working days to approve exemptions from organizations that are aimed at mitigating the risk of the spread of the COVID-19 outbreak in the DPRK and to enable effective prevention and response measures to the virus. The Committee has approved a total of 14 COVID-related exemption requests under the expedited procedure. This expedited procedure has also been used for extension and amendment requests for previously approved exemption requests, as well as urgent requests for onset emergencies such as pandemic outbreaks and natural disasters.

The Committee has also approved, on an exceptional basis, a number of requests for longer exemption timeframes to allow for the import of essential items.

All relevant information regarding the humanitarian exemption mechanism, as well as letters of approval, can be found on the [1718 Committee website](https://www.1718committee.org). Should any Member State have any questions while preparing exemption requests, my team as well as the Secretariat stand ready to provide further clarifications.
Dear colleagues,

In closing, on behalf of the 1718 Committee, I thank you for your kind attention. I now give the floor to the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts. Following his presentation, I plan to open up the floor for you to pose any questions that you may have regarding the DPRK sanctions regime and the implementation of Member State obligations, as well as the work of the 1718 Committee and the Panel of Experts.

Mr. Coordinator, the floor is yours.
The UN DPRK sanctions regime and the Panel’s 2022 Final Report (S/2022/132)

Coordinator
UN DPRK Panel of Experts
12 April 2022
Eight experts on DPRK and sanctions implementation, each employed by the UN as an independent authority with a specific portfolio.

Those portfolios are: finance/economics; missiles and other technologies; conventional arms and other WMD; non-proliferation, procurement and trade; non-proliferation and regional security; nuclear issues; customs and export controls; maritime issues.

One expert is appointed as a coordinator.

We are appointed on an annual basis, but our contracts can be renewed for up to five years.
Panel of Experts

What do we do?

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/work_mandate

• **To provide assistance to the 1718 Committee** in carrying out its mandate and functions;

• **To investigate**: we gather, examine and analyze information from States, relevant UN bodies and other interested parties, in particular on incidents of non-compliance with the UN sanctions regime;

• **To report**: to write mid-term and final reports, based on our investigations, in August and February each year; and

• **To make recommendations**: our reports include recommendations on actions the Council, Committee or Member States may consider to improve implementation of the sanctions regime. This includes recommendations to designate individuals or entities.
- There are ten DPRK sanctions resolutions, all of them unanimously agreed by the Security Council. All of them on the Committee’s website.

- This adds up to a complex and comprehensive series of sanctions measures.

- Detail best understood through the resolutions themselves, and the Committee’s Implementation Assistance notices at:

  https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/implementation-notices
The DPRK sanctions regime comprises:

- an arms and related materiel embargo;

- a nuclear, ballistic missiles and other WMD programmes-related embargo;

- Sectoral sanctions, banning the export/import of coal, minerals, fuel, food and agricultural products, earth, stone, wood, industrial machinery, transportation vehicles, seafood, fishing licenses in DPRK waters, textiles and luxury goods;

- bans, limits and places restrictions on the DPRK’s access to energy sources such as crude oil and refined petroleum products;

- financial sanctions, including a ban on the provision of financial services that could contribute to prohibited programmes or the evasion of sanctions, and the opening of DPRK banking subsidiaries;
The DPRK sanctions regime

- interdiction, inspection and transportation-related measures;
- a travel ban and/or assets freeze on designated individuals and entities;
- a ban on specialized teaching and training and the suspension of scientific and technical cooperation;
- a ban on providing work authorizations for DPRK nationals and a requirement to repatriate DPRK nationals earning income overseas;
- a ban on the supply, sale or transfer of new helicopters and new and used vessels;
- a ban on procuring statues from the DPRK;
- sanctions provisions targeted at proliferation networks, including restrictions on the activities of DPRK diplomats overseas.
• The Panel investigates breaches of all of these sanctions measures.

• Investigations are the primary focus of the Panel; if we learn there may have been a breach of the sanctions regime, an individual expert will investigate with the help of information gathered from a wide range of sources.

• We are grateful to MSs for the information they provide as lead material.

• Requests for Information.

• Evidentiary standards.

• Confidential process. But Panel reports are public, here:

• https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/reports
2022 Final Report Overview

First SRBM from right side of railcar

Second SRBM from left side

11 Oct. 2021

Two railway-borne SRBMs launch tests:
- 15 Sep. 2021,
  located at 39°16’31” N
  128°48’17” E
- 14 Jan. 2022, from
  Uiju area (S-W corner:
  40°13’10” N, 124°54’02” E, S-E corner:
  40°12’66” N, 124°53’57” E)

28 Sep. 2021

Possible hypersonic a
“Hwasong-8”
launch test on 28 September 2021

“Self-Defence
2021” on 11 October 2021
at “Three
revolution
Exhibition”
39°04’49” N
125°45’23” E

11 Jan. 2022

Possible hypersonic
launch test on 5 and 11
January 2022

17 Oct. 2021 UTC
18 Oct. 2021 UTC
20 Oct. 2021 UTC

2 support vessels

Submersible test stand barge has moved

Corae/Sinpo-B-class experimental ballistic missile submarine
called “2.2 Tongun” (visible hidden under the canopy)

short range SLBM launch test from a
submarine (possible from a submersible
missile test stand barge) on 19 October 2021

19 Oct. 2021
Period was dominated by a series of launches of ballistic missiles and missiles employing ballistic and guidance technology, as well as other related weaponry.

Report covers the launches from September until 17 January. We could not include analysis of the Hwasong-12 IRBM test on 29 January or the 27 January KN23 launches.

Mix of new technologies (including HGVs and MARV), and operational testing demonstrating increased mobility (rail and submarine-based) and continued parallel development of multiple programmes (liquid/solid; ballistic/cruise; short/medium range).

Coherence and increased resilience of missile programme demonstrated.

All of it prefigured in January 2021 speech. Amplified and advertised by the artful “Self-Defence Expo” in October.
• Compared to BM programme, nuclear programme was relatively quiet.
• Intermittent discharge of cooling water from the 5MW (e) reactor, indicating likely operation of the reactor.
• Activity at centrifuge enrichment facility suggests DPRK may continue to produce fissile materials.
• The uranium mine and concentration plant are still operating and undergoing improvements.
• Construction and maintenance activities continue.
Panel identified 16 papers jointly published by DPRK scientists and academics at a number of Chinese universities between 2017-19.

7 DPRK scientists are concurrently affiliated at both DPRK and Chinese technology universities.

WMD-related procurement activity by a Moscow-based DPRK diplomat and by two China-based DPRK nationals.
Both coal exports and imports of refined petroleum products picked up substantially in the second half of 2021. Although the refined petroleum cap may have been breached by the end of the year, DPRK imported substantially less oil and oil products in 2021 than in previous years.

Direct deliveries by foreign tankers to DPRK stopped. Instead, these vessels conduct STS transfers with DPRK tankers in DPRK EEZ, having obtained cargo by STS transfers, often conducted in the Taiwan Strait or nearby.

Elaborate deception practices by shipping companies and their vessels continued, including through the use of identified shipyards. DPRK continued to enlarge its fleet through acquisition of former foreign-flagged vessels.
2022 Final Report Overview

Sectoral and maritime sanctions
The Panel’s finance expert left in September and has not yet been replaced. Investigations into overseas banking representatives, joint ventures and the huge networks facilitating maritime oil supply have been paused. The report contains only responses received to RFIs.

Limited investigations into RGB’s continuing cyber programme, targeting defence and related industries around the globe. Intellectual property, as well as the cryptocurrency industry, are the targets of spear-phishing campaigns. Huge sums of cryptocurrency continue to be stolen by DPRK hackers.
DPRK’s recorded foreign trade plummeted, and the import of luxury goods fell dramatically. Varying interpretation of resolutions, and KR/KP coding issues continue to affect monitoring of the statistics.

IT workers and other workers continue to work overseas, some of them continuing to build statues in Africa. The COVID-19 blockade means that repatriation of such workers, long after the December 2019 deadline, is not possible.

KOMID and similar overseas organisations continued their activity. The report mentions the activity of individual DPRK intelligence officers who appear to play an important role overseas in a range of sanctions-breaking activity.
Humanitarian situation in DPRK declining, and the “food crisis” has become one of the DPRK government’s principal priorities. COVID-19 border closure and the almost complete cessation of consumer imports are major contributors to the current woeful humanitarian situation.

UN sanctions are likely to continue to have some unintended effects on the humanitarian situation, but objective empirical information on the subject is scant.

Survey of NGOs and UN humanitarian organisations noted little or no improvement in their ability to conduct their work. All were complimentary about the work of the Committee in timely clearance of exemptions.

Intensely political subject and cause of considerable debate, particularly in the absence of a full complement of experts.
• 30 recommendations to the Security Council, 1718 Committee, Member States and others, particularly in the maritime community (See Annex 93)

• Recommendations to the Committee:

  • Designation of a DPRK national working at the DPRK Embassy in Moscow has been involved in procurement of items related to WMD programmes.
  • Designation of a number of vessels, some of them familiar. The evidential case against these vessels is overwhelming, and in many cases this is not the first time we’ve recommended designation.
  • Consideration of direct contact with humanitarian NGOs involved in DPRK.
For more information:

Visit the webpage of the 1718 Committee

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718

Contact the Panel of Experts

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