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Regional arrangements

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Introductory note

Article 52

- 1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.*
- 2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.*
- 3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.*
- 4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.*

Article 53

- 1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.*
- 2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.*

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations provides the constitutional basis for the involvement of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security.¹ While Article 52 encourages the engagement of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes prior to their referral to the Security Council, Article 53 allows the Council to utilize regional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority and with its explicit authorization. Article 54 stipulates that regional arrangements should inform the Council of their activities at all times.

During the period under review, the Council underlined the importance of strengthening cooperation between the United Nations and regional arrangements in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, conflict prevention and mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter. The Council reaffirmed the progress made in the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union and further encouraged its collaboration on issues of peace and security in Africa, building on the annual joint consultations between the Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held their fifth joint informal seminar and fourteenth annual joint consultative meeting, which was conducted via videoconference on 29 and 30 September 2020.² In addition to the African Union and the European Union, engagement with other organizations such as the League of Arab States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the International Organization of la Francophonie featured prominently in the discussions at the Council.

As described in further detail in Section II of this Supplement, during the year 2020, the work of the Council was significantly impacted by the COVID-19

¹ Chapter VIII of the Charter refers to “regional arrangements or agencies”. For the purposes of the *Repertoire*, the term “regional arrangements” is understood to encompass regional and subregional organizations as well as other international organizations.

² See [A/75/2](#). For information on prior practice concerning the informal joint meetings of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2008–2019*, part II, sect. I. C.

pandemic. Faced with the absence of meetings in the Security Council Chamber, Council members initiated the practice of holding videoconferences and as of 14 July 2020, the Council developed a hybrid model, alternating meetings in-person with videoconferences. Therefore, Part VIII of this Supplement features discussions of constitutional relevance to Chapter VIII of the Charter held in the context of both meetings and videoconferences.

In 2020, Council members considered ways to further enhance the cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in conflict prevention and mediation, collectively address emerging threats such as the risks of climate security issues and promote collective security mechanisms in the Persian Gulf. In addition, participants at meetings and videoconferences continued to discuss the modalities of ensuring predictable and sustainable funding for peacekeeping operations led by the African Union and African subregional organizations.

In connection with the pacific settlement of disputes, the Council continued to highlight in its decisions the important role played by regional and subregional arrangements, particularly that of subregional economic communities including ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC to promote reconciliation, mediation and good offices to end conflicts and ensure successful peace processes. The Council underlined the mediation efforts of regional and subregional arrangements in connection with political crises and the implementation of peace agreements in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, the Central African region, and West Africa and the Sahel.

Concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations, the Council renewed the authorization of two existing missions, namely the African Union Mission in Somalia and the European Union Force-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina,³ while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Force in Kosovo continued to operate without any decisions taken with respect to its mandate. The Council supported the continued efforts of the African Union to enhance its peacekeeping role and that of African subregional organizations, and underlined the importance of progress in the increased autonomy of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. As in previous periods, the Council authorized enforcement action

³ Resolutions [2549 \(2020\)](#), para. 3 and [2520 \(2020\)](#), para. 9.

by regional and subregional organizations beyond the framework of peacekeeping operations, such as in relation to Libya, Somalia and South Sudan, and it continued to request reporting by regional organizations, particularly on mandate implementation of relevant regional peacekeeping operations and cooperation with the United Nations.

The practice of the Council under Chapter VIII of the Charter in 2020 is illustrated below in five sections. Each section covers both the decisions adopted by the Council and the discussions held during Council meetings and videoconferences. Section I examines the practice of the Council regarding cooperation with regional and subregional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security concerning items of a thematic nature. Section II deals with the recognition by the Council of the efforts of regional arrangements in the peaceful settlement of disputes, within the framework of Article 52 of the Charter. Section III covers the practice of the Council relating to its cooperation with regional organizations in the area of peacekeeping. Section IV describes the practice of the Council in authorizing enforcement action by regional organizations outside the context of regional peacekeeping operations. Section V refers to the reporting on the activities of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security.

I. Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations under thematic items

Note

Section I examines the practice of the Security Council in 2020 in cooperating with regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, in connection with items of a thematic nature. The section is divided in two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII of the Charter and subsection B covers discussions on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

A. Decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII of the Charter

During the period under review, the Security Council explicitly referred to Chapter VIII of the Charter in three of its decisions on thematic issues, under the items entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” and “Maintenance of international peace and security”. The text of these provisions is included in table 1 below.

Table 1: Decisions in 2020 explicitly referring to Chapter VIII

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>	<i>Provision</i>
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security		
S/PRST/2020/11 4 December 2020	Second paragraph	The Security Council reiterates its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, and recalls that cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations can improve collective security.
Maintenance of international peace and security		
S/PRST/2020/1 9 January 2020	Sixth paragraph	The Security Council underlines the importance of the role of regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements and of cooperation with them, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, with regard to maintaining

	international peace and security, contributing to international efforts to uphold the Charter. The Council welcomes the contribution by regional and sub-regional organizations in promoting and undertaking activities in accordance with the Charter. In this connection, the Council urges them to further strengthen awareness of the Charter and uphold the Charter in all their activities relating to international peace and security. The Council invites regional and sub-regional organizations to consider providing assistance to Member States, upon their request, in their efforts to uphold the Charter in their undertakings, and strengthening their cooperation with the United Nations and other organizations in solidifying Member States' adherence to the Charter, including through promoting partnership, dialogue and exchange of views.
Resolution 2553 (2020) 3 December 2020	para. 21 Underlines the importance of partnerships and cooperation with regional and subregional arrangements and organizations, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, and in supporting security sector reform, as well as fostering greater regional engagement

Without making any explicit reference to Chapter VIII of the Charter, the Council recognized and referred to the role of regional and subregional arrangements in other decisions adopted under various thematic items. Under the item entitled “Children and armed conflict”, the Council issued a presidential statement on 11 February 2020, by which it, *inter alia*, encouraged the Secretary-General, including through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, to broadly disseminate the practical guidance to UN entities, Member States, regional and subregional organizations, as well as other relevant actors involved in peace and mediation processes and to promote the use of the practical guidance in UN-supported, -sponsored, and -facilitated peace and mediation processes.⁴ By the same presidential statement, the Council encouraged United Nations entities, Member States as well as regional and subregional organizations involved in peace and mediation to strengthen cooperation and collaboration to promote the integration of child protection issues in peace processes, and also urged Member States, United Nations entities, regional and sub-regional organizations and other parties concerned to ensure that child protection provisions relating to the release and reintegration of children formerly associated with armed forces or armed groups, were integrated into all peace negotiations, ceasefire and peace agreements, and in provisions for ceasefire monitoring.⁵ Under the same agenda item, the Council issued a presidential statement

⁴ [S/PRST/2020/3](#), tenth paragraph.

⁵ *Ibid.*, twelfth and sixteenth paragraphs.

on 10 September 2020, by which it, *inter alia*, expressed concern at regional and cross-border violations and abuses against children affected by armed conflict, called on Member States, United Nations peacekeeping, peacebuilding and political missions and United Nations country teams, regional and subregional bodies, within their respective mandates and in close cooperation with the Governments of the countries concerned, to continue efforts to establish and implement appropriate strategies and coordination mechanisms for information exchange and cooperation on child protection concerns.⁶

In connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council adopted a presidential statement on 4 December 2020 in which it made several references to the important role of the African Union, and *inter alia* continued to encourage the United Nations and the African Union to strengthen their efforts to coordinate their engagement in a mutually supportive manner.⁷ The Council also expressed its willingness to continue its cooperation and collaboration with the African Union Peace and Security Council on issues of peace and security in Africa, and encouraged the United Nations and the African Union to continue making use of their annual consultations to encourage the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda as it related to their specific contexts.⁸

Under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the Council adopted resolution [2532 \(2020\)](#) on 1 July 2020, by which it, *inter alia*, recognized efforts and measures proposed by the Secretary-General concerning the response to the potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic to conflict-affected countries, and underscored that combating the pandemic required greater national, regional and international cooperation.⁹ By resolution [2535 \(2020\)](#) adopted on 14 July 2020, which focused on the participation of youth in building sustainable peace, the Council, *inter alia*, acknowledged the on-going work of national governments and regional and international organizations to engage youth in building and maintaining peace¹⁰ and encouraged Member States, regional and subregional organizations to

⁶ [S/PRST/2020/8](#), twenty first paragraph.

⁷ [S/PRST/2020/11](#), first, third, fifth, sixth and eleventh paragraphs.

⁸ *Ibid.*, fifteenth and sixteenth paragraphs.

⁹ Resolution [2532 \(2020\)](#), eighth preambular paragraph.

¹⁰ Resolution [2535 \(2020\)](#), nineteenth preambular paragraph.

develop and implement policies and programmes for youth and to facilitate their constructive engagement, including through dedicated local, national and regional roadmaps on youth, peace and security with sufficient resources.¹¹ The Council also called on Member States, regional organizations and the United Nations system, including peacekeeping and special political missions, to coordinate and increase their engagement in the implementation of resolutions [2250 \(2015\)](#), [2419 \(2018\)](#) and [2535 \(2020\)](#) through inclusive partnership with young people, and ensure dedicated capacities with regard to youth, peace and security.¹²

In connection with the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the Council adopted resolution [2518 \(2020\)](#) on 30 March 2020, by which it, *inter alia*, reaffirmed its determination to take effective steps to further enhance the partnership between the United Nations and regional as well as subregional organizations in relation to safety and security of peacekeepers. It further encouraged partnerships to support the African Union’s efforts to continue to develop policy, guidance and training to ensure the safety and security of its peacekeepers.¹³ By resolution [2538 \(2020\)](#), adopted on 28 August 2020, the Council, *inter alia*, called upon Member States, the United Nations Secretariat and regional organisations to strengthen their collective efforts to promote the full, effective, and meaningful participation of uniformed and civilian women in peacekeeping operations at all levels and in all positions, including in senior leadership positions.¹⁴ The Council also encouraged Member States to develop strategies and measures to increase the deployment of uniformed women to peacekeeping operations, including by supporting the capacities of regional organisations in training uniformed women.¹⁵ The Council also encouraged cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in advancing greater participation and the role of women in peacekeeping operations.¹⁶

¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 14.

¹² *Ibid.*, para. 16.

¹³ Resolution [2518 \(2020\)](#), para. 7.

¹⁴ Resolution [2538 \(2020\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 2 (f).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

B. Discussion on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII of the Charter

In 2020, at meetings and open videoconferences, Council members and other participants discussed the role of regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security in connection with a wide variety of items, including “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”;¹⁷ “Maintenance of international peace and security”;¹⁸ “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”;¹⁹ “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”;²⁰ “United Nations peacekeeping operations”;²¹ “Briefings by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”;²² “Briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees”;²³ “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”;²⁴ “The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security”;²⁵ “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”;²⁶ and “Women and peace and security”.²⁷ Discussions held in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” highlighted the importance of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations (case 1), enhancing the cooperation with regional and subregional organizations to effectively reduce the humanitarian risks of climate security issues (case 4) and promoting the collaboration with regional actors for a collective security mechanism to reduce tensions in the Persian Gulf (case 5). Under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, participants exchanged views on the importance of promoting closer ties between the

¹⁷ See [S/PV.8711](#), [S/2020/489](#), [S/2020/893](#) and [S/2020/1179](#).

¹⁸ See [S/PV.8699](#), [S/2020/346](#), [S/2020/751](#), [S/2020/897](#), [S/2020/929](#), [S/2020/953](#), [S/2020/1037](#), and [S/2020/1176](#).

¹⁹ See [S/PV.8723](#), [S/2020/799](#) and [S/2020/1090](#).

²⁰ See [S/2020/340](#), [S/2020/465](#) and [S/2020/930](#).

²¹ See [S/2020/514](#), [S/2020/674](#), [S/2020/911](#) and [S/2020/1092](#).

²² See [S/PV.8714](#).

²³ See [S/2020/560](#).

²⁴ See [S/2020/418](#).

²⁵ See [S/2020/1286](#).

²⁶ See [S/2020/791](#) and [S/2020/836](#).

²⁷ See [S/2020/727](#) and [S/2020/1084](#).

Security Council and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (case 2), the important role of the International Organization of la Francophonie in peacekeeping and peacebuilding (case 3) and on enhancing the Council's cooperation with the African Union (case 6).

Case 1

Maintenance of international peace and security

At its 8699th meeting on 9 January 2020 at the initiative of Viet Nam which held the Presidency for the month,²⁸ the Council held a ministerial-level debate under the above-referenced item, and the sub-item entitled “Upholding the Charter of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security”. During the meeting, the Council heard briefings from the Secretary-General and the Chair of the Elders. During the meeting, several speakers explicitly invoked Chapter VIII of the Charter.²⁹ In his briefing, the Secretary-General described the Charter as visionary in imagining a world in which the United Nations worked dynamically with regional organizations to maintain international peace and security. While Chapter VIII predated most of the regional partners, it set a framework for cooperation and division of labour. The United Nations was investing in regional partnerships in crucial new ways, and the Secretary-General had placed a significant emphasis on a strategic partnership with the African Union, including through its Silencing the Guns initiative and its Agenda 2063. The European Union continued to provide strong support across the agenda of the United Nations, which was also working to strengthening ties with all other regional organizations, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).³⁰

The representative of South Africa said that the Charter was explicit on the role of regional organizations, as reflected in Chapter VIII, making provisions for regional arrangements to address matters relating to the maintenance of international

²⁸A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 31 December 2019 ([S/2020/1](#)).

²⁹ See [S/PV.8699](#), Secretary-General, South Africa, Indonesia, Tunisia, Singapore, Egypt and Romania; [S/PV.8699\(Resumption 1\)](#), Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.8699\(Resumption 2\)](#), Angola and Senegal.

³⁰ See [S/PV.8699](#).

peace and security. Today, Chapter VIII was even more relevant in terms of regional organizations, particularly the African Union and regional economic communities on the African continent, as they had established peace and security mechanisms, including those dealing with mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. He also called for continued efforts to strengthen cooperation and coordination with regional arrangements to ensure that the efforts were complementary and mutually reinforcing.³¹

Several other speakers explicitly referred to Chapter VIII of the Charter. The representative of Indonesia said that in line with Chapter VIII, his delegation recognized the important role of regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam emphasized the need to enhance the role of regional organizations and expand their collaboration with the United Nations and the Council in the maintenance of peace and security in their respective regions and beyond. He explained that the United Nations Charter was the source of inspiration for the Charter of ASEAN, which had become the legal framework of a stronger, more cohesive ASEAN community. In this regard he added that ASEAN had affirmed its central, indispensable role in the regional security architecture and in addressing regional challenges and maintaining regional and international peace and security.

Several Council members emphasized the importance of regional organizations in conflict prevention and mediation. The representative of Tunisia, noting the particular importance of preventive and proactive work for maintaining peace and security, called upon the Council to address crises in their initial phases while benefitting fully from Chapter VIII of the Charter by encouraging regional organizations to play their role in preventing conflicts and settling crises. The representative of Kuwait emphasized that the Council must give more attention to precautionary measures aimed at preventing disputes by addressing them at an early stage and highlighted the constructive role of regional and subregional organizations in maintaining peace and security at the regional and international levels in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, calling for greater cooperation between the Council and regional organizations.³²

³¹ Ibid.

³² See [S/PV.8699\(Resumption 1\)](#).

The representative of Angola said that Chapter VIII of the Charter recognized the value of regional arrangements and agencies as a first resort to the pacific settlement of local disputes. Regional perspectives were critical to understanding the challenges faced, while regional capacity-building was crucial for rapid deployment. She further emphasized that regional ownership was essential for effective solutions to take root.³³ The representative of Senegal said that in view of the significant regional dimensions of most conflicts and the essential role that neighbouring States must play in any peace process, his delegation believed it was appropriate to place the regional organizations at the heart of peace efforts, in accordance with Article 52(1) of Chapter VIII of the Charter.³⁴

Participants at the meeting focused also on the need to strengthen cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations. Underlining the complementary roles of the regional and subregional organizations in maintaining peace and security in recent years, the representative of Singapore noted that the efforts of regional organizations could complement the actions of the Council, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. He welcomed the increasing number of meetings that the Council had with regional organizations in the past months and looked forward to the meeting on cooperation with ASEAN.³⁵ The representative of Egypt opined that the relations between the Council and regional organizations must be strengthened in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. He recalled that during its presidency of the African Union, Egypt had worked to enhance the relationship between the African Union and the United Nations regarding peace and security while building on the comparative advantages of each of them.³⁶

The representative of Romania affirmed that Chapter VIII of the Charter provided the basis for the involvement of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. In this regard, he recalled that, during its non-permanent membership of the Council in 2005, Romania had promoted the very first resolution on cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations. The representative of the United Arab Emirates noted that regional and subregional organizations could play a greater role in addressing regional tensions and achieving

³³ See [S/PV.8699\(Resumption 2\)](#).

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ See [S/PV.8699](#).

³⁶ *Ibid.*

security and stability. In this regard, she called on the Council to strengthen coordination with the League of Arab States and the African Union to address the sensitive security situation in the region. She argued further that Chapter VIII of the Charter included a framework to build on the comparative advantages at the regional, subregional and international levels in dealing with complex crises.³⁷

Case 2

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

At its 8711th meeting, on 30 January 2020, at the initiative of Viet Nam which held the Presidency for the month,³⁸ the Security Council held a briefing under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations”. At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Several Council members made explicit references to Chapter VIII as the framework provided for the Council’s partnerships with regional arrangements, expressing support for further strengthening cooperation between the United Nations and ASEAN.³⁹

Speakers highlighted the contributions and comparative advantages of regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security. The representative of Tunisia, speaking on behalf of the African members of the Council, namely, the Niger, South Africa and Tunisia, highlighted the importance of regular engagement between the Council and regional organizations on ways to encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes and maintain peace and security in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. He further emphasized that on several occasions, regional and subregional arrangements had proved to be highly knowledgeable and efficient in

³⁷ See [S/PV.8699\(Resumption 1\)](#).

³⁸ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 10 January 2020 ([S/2020/30](#)).

³⁹ See [S/PV.8711](#), United States, Tunisia, France, Estonia, China and Viet Nam.

dealing with local issues. Their understanding of local dynamics and deep insight into the history of events sometimes made all the difference. Through stronger cooperation, the United Nations and regional organizations could leverage their respective comparative advantages in seeking effective solutions to the increasingly complex peace and security challenges all over the world. The representative of Tunisia further noted that greater consultation in the decision-making of the Council with regional organizations such as ASEAN, the League of Arab States, the European Union and the African Union was essential for achieving strategic convergence and coherence with a view to addressing complex peace and security challenges. He noted that cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations was still far from delivering on its promises, and that greatly enhanced efforts were needed if the Council was to fully utilize this tool, under Chapter VIII. He advocated on the need to reflect more on such issues as how to strengthen coordination and coherence between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations regarding peace and security matters, how to develop a joint decision-making framework to make their joint action more effective and, most importantly, how to support peace efforts initiated by regional organizations through secure, sustainable and predictable resources. In that regard, he echoed the African Union request to endorse access to United Nations assessed contributions to fund its peace-support operations, which were undertaken on behalf of the United Nations and, in particular, the Council.⁴⁰ The representative of Indonesia highlighted the contributions of ASEAN to peace and security and to emerging non-traditional security challenges. He also highlighted ASEAN's contribution within the framework of the women and peace and security agenda. In that connection, he mentioned that ASEAN had established the ASEAN Women for Peace Registry, a pool of ASEAN women experts that sought to promote gender perspectives in peace and reconciliation processes in ASEAN. He also referred to his country's work to establish the South-East Asian network of women peace negotiators and mediators; the two forums to be part of the Global Alliance of Regional Women Mediator Networks.

The representative of Germany said that it had become increasingly clear that regional partnerships were important, and that the ASEAN-United Nations

⁴⁰ Ibid.

partnership was also very important and could still be strengthened, from security to climate change to disaster management, as noted by the representative of Indonesia. He recalled the adoption, during the German presidency in 2019, of resolution 2467 (2019) on sexual violence in conflict and accountability for perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence, expressed his strong support for the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, and encouraged ASEAN member States to seek further avenues, by way of regional cooperation, to effectively address such events in their region and to prevent their recurrence.

The representative of France recalled that the United Nations coordination with regional organizations was a key tool in accomplishing the Organization's mission of fostering peace and security. In this regard, she referred to that partnership as part of the framework provided for in Chapter VIII and without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and added that the proximity and awareness of local situations bestowed full legitimacy on subregional and regional organizations to be stakeholders in the resolution of crises close to them. Recalling Chapter VIII of the Charter, the representative of Estonia expressed support for the deepening of United Nations cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in order to ensure more effective conflict prevention and mitigation. He also commended ASEAN's work on addressing emerging non-traditional security issues, such as climate change and recognized its interest in promoting cybersecurity. The representative of China also expressed support in deepening the United Nations' cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in line with Chapter VIII with a view to consolidating and strengthening collective security mechanisms and jointly safeguarding international peace and security.

The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines noted that regional and subregional organizations acted as conduits that linked the global governance structure to the local and contextual realities. She added that threats to international peace and security that were transnational in character, including climate change, cross-border terrorism and mass human displacement necessitated collective action for just and equitable outcomes and the sharing of such burdens on a regional basis was the only feasible option for small States like Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The representative of the Dominican Republic said that close cooperation between the

United Nations and regional organizations such as ASEAN made possible a stronger and more effective multilateral international system based on diversity, mutual cooperation and shared international principles. He referred to various examples of cooperation between ASEAN and the United Nations in the area of climate change, food security and on shared strategies for peace in Myanmar. With regard to the climate crisis, he added that there was a need to continue fostering complementary regional and multilateral strategies to avert greater adverse effects and joint action was the only way to do so. Commending ASEAN for its work in the area of preventive diplomacy, the representative of Belgium underlined that regional organizations were often the best placed to understand and overcome the specific challenges of their respective regions. He also highlighted the contribution of ASEAN countries to peace and stability beyond their borders through the provision of peacekeepers to United Nations missions. The training work carried out at the regional level, in accordance with the ASEAN-United Nations plan of action for 2016-2020, was of paramount importance in that regard. He looked forward to the new ASEAN-United Nations plan of action which envisaged, among the many areas of activity, climate change, transnational organized crime and human rights. He expressed support for the engagement of the United Nations with the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and its Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children. He also addressed two specific issues in which ASEAN could play a positive and decisive role, namely, the resolution of disputes concerning the South China Sea and in resolving the crisis in Rakhine state in Myanmar. Several members took note of the negotiations and efforts of the ASEAN member States and China on a code of conduct for the South China Sea, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.⁴¹ The representative of China underlined that China and ASEAN members were jointly committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea. Other Council members expressed support for the continued collaboration between the United Nations and ASEAN in resolving the situation in Myanmar, including by mediation and shared strategies for peace.⁴²

⁴¹ Ibid., United States, Belgium, United Kingdom, and Estonia.

⁴² Ibid, Germany, Belgium, France, Dominican Republic and United Kingdom.

However, the representative of the Russian Federation considered that territorial disputes in South China Sea needed to be resolved between the States or the parties in question on a bilateral basis; it was unacceptable to impose a particular vision of the resolution and settlement of disputes and of thorny issues on the basis of narrow national interests, especially if this was being done by States that were located thousands of kilometres from the region. He nevertheless welcomed the mediating role played by ASEAN and China in resolving the situation in Myanmar and shared Viet Nam's focus on increasing ASEAN's contribution to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region.

The representative of the United Kingdom noted that since the establishment of ASEAN, the organization had played a key role in maintaining peace and security in South-East Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region, adding that ASEAN had also made a tangible and valuable contribution to global peace and security on three areas of particular relevance to the Council's work, namely, peacekeeping; women, peace and security; and climate change. The representative of Viet Nam emphasized the importance of, and continued support for, the centrality of ASEAN in the regional architecture and the central role of the United Nations in the global multilateral system adding that it was necessary to strengthen cooperation between the United Nations and ASEAN in the various areas agreed upon, including the peaceful settlement of disputes, preventive diplomacy, disarmament and non-proliferation, maritime cooperation, maritime security and disaster management. As the Chair of ASEAN in 2020 and a non-permanent member of the Council, he called on the support of the Council to achieve the three priorities set for 2020 concerning peacekeeping operations, women and peace and security and on implementing the Complementarities Roadmap 2020-2025 between the United Nations 2030 Agenda and the ASEAN Community Vision 2025.

Case 3

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 8 September 2020, at the initiative of the Niger which held the Presidency for the month,⁴³ Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations”, focused on the role of the International Organization of la Francophonie. During the videoconference, Council members heard briefings by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, the Secretary-General of the International Organization of la Francophonie and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia, in his capacity as Chair of the Ministerial Conference of la Francophonie. In addition to Council members, statements were also delivered at the videoconference by eight Member States.⁴⁴

In her briefing, the Secretary-General of the International Organization of la Francophonie noted that as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Francophonie was in fact transnational, bringing together 88 States and Governments, including 54 full members from five continents, united by a common language and common values. In her statement, she emphasized that the actions of the Francophonie in support of international peace and security consisted of three main areas, namely, peacekeeping, crisis prevention and management and supporting democratic processes of its member States, including through supporting electoral processes. In this regard, she underlined that the Francophonie was the first international organization to volunteer to formally assume the role of champion of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. She also made reference to the Francophonie’s work on capacity-building for French-speaking troops as well as to the mobilization in the Central African Republic to support the peace process, the tripartite visit with the African Union and the Commonwealth to Cameroon to spur and support Cameroonian partners in the search for a solution to the crisis in the North-West and South-West regions of the country, and to the efforts to end the crisis and restore constitutional and democratic order to Mali.⁴⁵ The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia, in his capacity as Chair of the Ministerial Conference of la Francophonie, recalled the numerous partnerships

⁴³ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 1 September 2020 ([S/2020/880](#)).

⁴⁴ See [S/2020/893](#), Canada, Côte d’Ivoire, Ireland, Romania, Senegal, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

between the United Nations and the Francophonie based on shared values, a common will to work to strengthen international peace and security, and a joint determination to fight against the scourge of terrorism and in favour of the prevention of genocide and crimes against humanity. Against the backdrop of the negative consequences of the COVID-19 crisis particularly on developing countries and on the most vulnerable, he said that the United Nations and la Francophonie must strongly affirm their willingness to promote peace, cooperation, solidarity and the values of living together in harmony. In this connection, he noted the strong support of the Francophonie to the Secretary-General's call for a global ceasefire and resolution [2532 \(2020\)](#), demanding a cessation of hostilities during the COVID-19 crisis.

Other speakers also made explicit references to Chapter VIII of the Charter, underscoring the value of the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in the area of peace and security.⁴⁶ The representative of the Niger noted that Chapter VIII of the Charter enshrined the principle of subsidiarity and the comparative advantages of partner organizations. Within this framework, he said that the cooperation between the United Nations and the Francophonie was carried out, in particular on the importance of early-warning and conflict prevention mechanisms, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and support for networks of women and youth involved in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.⁴⁷ The representative of South Africa, as a member of the African Union and of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), recognized the positive and complementary relations between the United Nations and regional organizations. He also stressed the importance of the principles of subsidiarity and comparative advantage in the resolution of conflicts, which entrusted regional and subregional organizations to take the lead in finding a solution to a conflict situation owing to their geopolitical situation and/or familiarity with the crisis. The representative of South Africa also underlined that the Council remained the only international body with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, which must work closely with regional organizations whose activities included the promotion of peace and security. Cooperation among regional organizations was equally important, primarily in instances where there was

⁴⁶ Ibid., Niger, South Africa and United Arab Emirates.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

overlapping membership, and he encouraged closer cooperation and coordination between the Francophonie and other regional organizations, such as the African Union, subregional organizations such as SADC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and other similar organizations, such as the Commonwealth. The representative of the United Arab Emirates made three recommendations. Firstly, the Council should strengthen its cooperation with regional organizations in preventive diplomacy in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, noting the successful role played by ECOWAS in the Gambia. Secondly, she encouraged continued progress in enhancing consultation and coordination between the United Nations and regional organizations on peacekeeping, welcoming the collaboration between the Department of Peace Operations, the Department of Operational Support and the Francophonie in promoting multilingualism in field operations. Thirdly, she expressed her delegation's belief that regional organizations should step up their efforts aimed at mainstreaming and highlighting the positive work of young people on issues of peace and security.

Regarding peacekeeping, many participants supported the partnership between the Francophonie and the United Nations, noting the importance of multilingualism as a fundamental tool in developing peacekeeping operations.⁴⁸ The representative of Estonia acknowledged that the access and ability of peacekeepers to communicate with the local population in the francophone countries was a powerful tool for building trust and, through that, the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping.⁴⁹ The representative of the United Kingdom echoed the view that language skills facilitated engagement with the local population, led to better situational awareness and helped peacekeepers deliver on mandated responsibilities, such as the protection of civilians, while ensuring their own safety and security.

Speakers noted the important collaboration between the Francophonie and the United Nations in the field of conflict prevention, peace processes and electoral support.⁵⁰ Given that thematic issues important to the Francophonie, such as the

⁴⁸ Ibid., Dominican Republic, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Indonesia, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam, Ireland, Romania, Senegal, Switzerland, and United Arab Emirates.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Indonesia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, Ukraine, and United Arab Emirates.

prevention of violence, conflict resolution, democratic transition, transitional justice and the role of women, and that many countries in the French-speaking world were considered by the Council, the representative of Belgium suggested that it could be appropriate to explore ways to further strengthen such cooperation through joint actions, such as setting up joint field missions or missions involving special envoys of the two organizations. Citing the meaningful actions of the Francophonie regarding the situations in Mali and Guinea, the representative of France highlighted that the Francophonie could play an opportune role, in cooperation with the United Nations, in the long-term support for the electoral process in Mali and that for Guinea. In the field of conflict prevention, the representative of Indonesia said that the Francophonie's diverse experience was a great asset for all United Nations members in their collective effort to promote international peace and security and called for the broadening of the United Nations cooperation with other regional cooperation bodies, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines shared the view that regional and subregional organizations occupied a critical space in the multilateral system as intermediaries that linked the international community to the local and contextual realities found within States. In this regard and among other proposals, she encouraged the Francophonie to strengthen the institutional relationships with regional and subregional organizations, such as the African Union, ECOWAS, and the Group of Five for the Sahel, which were at the forefront of the international community's efforts to promote lasting peace and security on the African continent, and to increase cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission in Francophone countries to bolster the United Nations sustaining peace agenda.

Member States made specific proposals for further developing the role of the Francophonie in connection with international peace and security. The representative of the United Kingdom encouraged the Francophonie, along with the United Nations, the African Union, ECCAS and the Commonwealth, to continue to support efforts to end violence and restore peace in Cameroon's North-West and South-West regions. The representative of Viet Nam said that the United Nations and the Francophonie should make concerted efforts to promote multilateralism and find peaceful solutions to conflicts on the basis of international law, and contribute to the alleviation of hotspots on the Council's agenda. In this connection, he suggested that the

Francophonie may consider creating a network of francophone members in West Africa and the Sahel to share experience and best practices in the implementation of United Nations programmes such as the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel and the recent Support Plan for the Sahel and the United Nations. He also suggested for the Francophonie and the United Nations to enhance triangular cooperation with the African Union and other regional organizations. The representative of Canada highlighted the importance of strengthening collaboration between the Francophonie and the United Nations to ensure the inclusion of women and youth in conflict prevention and resolution and peacebuilding.

Case 4

Maintenance of international peace and security

On 17 September 2020, at the initiative of the Niger which held the Presidency for the month,⁵¹ Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” focused on the humanitarian effects of environmental degradation and peace and security. At the videoconference, Council members heard briefings from the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, a civil society representative and the representative of Canada in her capacity as the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission. Representatives of all Council members delivered their statements during the videoconference,⁵² while the representatives of 19 non-Council members and the European Union submitted their statements in writing.⁵³ In his briefing, the President of the ICRC stated that it was starkly evident that people affected by conflict were also disproportionately impacted by climate shocks and added that while many would agree in general terms on the linkages between peace, security and climate and environment, the “how” of the response still needed more critical analysis and sharing of experiences.⁵⁴ The Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission brought to the Council’s attention some of the Commission’s observations and recommendations in the context of different regions on its agenda, including the Lake Chad basin, the Sahel and the Pacific islands. She noted that environmental and climate-related challenges were considered as factors that could have a negative impact on peacebuilding and sustaining peace efforts, and addressing these challenges in country-specific or regional contexts could therefore also contribute to these efforts aimed at peacebuilding and sustaining peace. In particular, she noted that many Governments in the Pacific region had requested additional support from the

⁵¹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 1 September 2020 ([S/2020/882](#)).

⁵² Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and United Kingdom were represented at the ministerial level. For information on high-level meetings, see part II, section II.

⁵³ The following countries submitted written statements: Brazil, Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mexico, Namibia, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, and Ukraine.

⁵⁴ See [S/2020/929](#).

international community in order to address these issues. For regions such as the Lake Chad basin, a collective and coordinated effort by Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions, civil society and, where relevant, the private sector was required to fully realize the African Union-Lake Chad Basin Commission strategy for the stabilization, recovery and resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas.⁵⁵

During the videoconference, several speakers highlighted the importance of regional organizations in addressing the challenges relating to climate and security.⁵⁶ The representative of Indonesia noted the adverse impacts of environmental degradation and climate change, which affected people and livelihoods, had become an aggravating factor that not only could prolong conflicts, but also threatened to reverse economic growth and development. Against this backdrop, he outlined three main points: the need for enhanced partnership, cooperation and information-sharing, the importance of mainstreaming environmental degradation and climate change throughout the peace continuum, and the crucial role of regional organizations. In this regard, he recognized the efforts of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, as well as the leadership of countries in West Africa and the Sahel, in spearheading initiatives to address the security challenges in the region.⁵⁷ Recognizing that climate change represented an existential threat to humankind and all other species, the representative of South Africa encouraged the Council to support the lead United Nations organizations and processes, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity and other multilateral environmental agreements, as well as the work of relevant regional organizations, such as the African Union to ensure that it obtained information on the potential impact of climate or environment-related security risks in conflict settings. The representative of Viet Nam said that the Council's response to climate change needed to be coordinated with other parts of the United Nations systems and all its partners and highlighted the strengthening of cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in building regional resilience and adaptation capabilities. He referred to the strengthening of human and

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid., Indonesia, South Africa, Viet Nam, Denmark, Ethiopia, Portugal, and Senegal.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

institutional capacity in implementing climate change adaptation and mitigation by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), adding that the cooperation between the United Nations and ASEAN in that regard could be further explored.

The representative of Denmark, who submitted his statement on behalf of the Nordic countries, namely, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, called for urgent action to address climate-related security risks in a coherent and interlinked manner. He noted that a prerequisite for effective climate-sensitive conflict prevention and response was context-specific analyses. In this regard, he observed that the United Nations must collaborate with Governments, regional organizations, climate actors, including meteorological services, and civil society to improve early-warning tools and conflict-forecasting models that would systematically integrate climate information into conflict analyses and operational plans. The representative of Ethiopia noted that the health and future of the environment depended on the collective and coordinated efforts of Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations, adding that regional efforts to combat desertification and drought such as the African Union-led Great Green Wall initiative should be encouraged and supported. The representative of Portugal said that better coordination among United Nations agencies on the ground, other international and regional organizations, host Governments and civil society was needed to respond pre-emptively to climate risks and to build resilience. Similarly, the representative of Senegal submitted that the establishment of an analytical and early-warning tool should also be considered to centralize data from the United Nations, regional organizations and States and various other partners on the effects of climate change and biodiversity degradation on peace and security. He also suggested that such a tool could even be used by the Secretary-General to submit an annual report to the General Assembly and the Council that took stock of the situation and made useful recommendations on the issue.

Case 5

Maintenance of international peace and security

On 20 October 2020, at the initiative of the Russian Federation which held the Presidency for the month,⁵⁸ Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” focused on a comprehensive review of the situation in the Persian Gulf region.⁵⁹ Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the President and Chief Executive Officer of International Crisis Group, the President of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. In addition, representatives of all Council members delivered their statements during the videoconference,⁶⁰ as well as the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq and Qatar, which also submitted written statements.⁶¹ In his briefing, the Secretary-General described the situation in Yemen as a localized conflict that had become regionalized over time, and that looking at the wider Persian Gulf region, it was clear that tensions were running high and confidence was low. Consistent with the Charter and his own good offices role, he stood ready to convene any form of regional dialogue that could garner the necessary consensus of all the relevant parties. He also expressed his full support for the efforts to promote dialogue and resolve tensions between members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.⁶² The President of the International Crisis Group said that many reasons lay behind the intense polarization that had infected the Gulf region, but making matters worse was the absence of any institutional mechanism for parties to air their grievances, nor any single regional organization that embraced all Gulf actors that could serve as a framework for confidence-building and de-escalation measures. The President of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences recalled the Helsinki process and the success achieved by opposing blocs of States that had managed to agree and develop an effective system of confidence-building measures to create the still-functioning Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). He added that it was no coincidence that a number of politicians and experts spoke figuratively

⁵⁸ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 14 October 2020 ([S/2020/1013](#)).

⁵⁹ See [S/2020/1037](#).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, China, Niger, Russian Federation, South Africa, and Viet Nam were represented at the ministerial level. For information on high-level meetings, see part II.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq and Qatar were represented at the ministerial level.

⁶² *Ibid.*

about the creation of an OSCE for the Persian Gulf. He also noted that discussions had been held on various approaches to possible first steps towards the creation of a collective security system in the subregion. The Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council said that the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations had been incorporated into the statute of his organization. The Gulf Cooperation Council had engaged proactively with the international community and cooperated in the pursuit of just causes, also extending the hand of cooperation to all peace-loving countries, United Nations agencies and other international groups and organizations to promote the principles of tolerance and coexistence among nations and peoples, achieve stability and well-being for all, and reinforce regional and global peace and security. In his briefing, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States acknowledged that building a system of collective security in the Arabian Gulf region was an ambitious goal that remained distant, adding that the most important barrier to the establishment of such a system was the lack of understanding of its security concerns.

During the videoconference, Council members and participants exchanged views on the growing tensions in the Persian Gulf and the collective security arrangement in the region that could help to diffuse those tensions. Several speakers highlighted the importance of regional cooperation and arrangements such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States.⁶³ The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation argued that his country's concept of collective security in the Persian Gulf was aimed at creating a reliable structure for regional security, with the participation of the coastal countries of the Gulf and including the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Arab neighbours. He also proposed to involve the five permanent members of the Council, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and other influential and interested parties in practical steps to implement the creation of a reliable structure for regional security.⁶⁴

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, African Integration and Nigeriens Living Abroad of the Niger stated that despite certain episodes of violence in the region, Niger affirmed that the Persian Gulf should be equipped with an

⁶³ Ibid., China, Niger, Russian Federation, South Africa, Viet Nam, Belgium, Dominican Republic, Estonia, and Qatar.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

inclusive mechanism for cooperation and dispute settlement, with a strong involvement on the part of the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the United Nations. He added that the Council could support such a regional initiative, which would constitute a strong signal of recognition of the key role that regional organizations play in the peaceful settlement of conflict.

The State Councilor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of China stated that the United Nations should be allowed to fully carry out good offices and encourage dialogue, and mediation efforts by the Gulf Cooperation Council and other regional organizations should be supported. The Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa noted that the Council should support any initiative by States in the Gulf region to work collectively to address the security situation and instability in the region, and affirmed that, based on South Africa's own experience, regional and intergovernmental organizations remained critical partners in resolving conflict and should remain impartial in the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Similarly, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam stated that the changing regional political landscape made the time ripe for further exploration and to turn the idea of a collective security arrangement in the Persian Gulf into concrete action. Such a mechanism should be customized to regional circumstances and anchored in the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. He further underlined the importance of strengthening the collaboration between regional and subregional organizations in the Gulf and the Middle East and the United Nations and the Council, in conflict prevention, mediation and preventive diplomacy in line with Chapter VIII of the Charter,. He noted that the role of regional organizations was indispensable for a comprehensive security approach as vividly drawn from the experience in which the Association of Southeast Asian Nations played a central role in its regional security architecture and helped to transform South-East Asia from a region of hostilities into a cohesive, integrated and people-centred community.

The representative of Belgium encouraged all regional approaches based on dialogue, cooperation and integration and highlighted the importance of regional ownership in implementing the collective security for the Gulf region or the wider Middle East. In this connection, he believed that the European Union and other actors had a historical experience of regional integration and cooperation could be a source

of inspiration; and the OSCE had also built up a remarkable inventory of confidence- and security-building measures. Similarly, the representative of Estonia underlined the importance of ensuring that the initiatives for security and stability of the Middle East would come from the region itself, noting that only a broader regional security dialogue among the countries of the region could lead to a long-term solution and enable the full potential of the societies in the region.

The representative of Qatar said that sustainable peace in the region could only be achieved by an approach to crisis resolution that operated within collective frameworks. Qatar was a strong supporter of the Gulf Cooperation Council as a model subregional framework for cooperation and coordination, and disputes and conflicts between its members were settled under its aegis, which was one of the reasons it was originally established. In connection with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the representative of the Dominican Republic hoped that parties would refrain from taking any action that might further undermine it, as failure to do so would have detrimental effects on non-proliferation, security and stability in the region, as the JCPOA was the only mechanism to guarantee the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. While addressing and resolving these aspects was the responsibility of the States of the region, the collaboration and assistance of the international community, the United Nations and regional organizations were paramount.

Case 6

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 4 December 2020, at the initiative of South Africa which held the Presidency for the month,⁶⁵ Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the above referenced item with a special focus on the further strengthening the Council's cooperation with the African Union.⁶⁶ At the videoconference, Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. In addition, representatives of all

⁶⁵ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 25 November 2020 ([S/2020/1146](#)).

⁶⁶ See [S/2020/1179](#).

Council members delivered their statements during the videoconference,⁶⁷ as well as the representative of Somalia.⁶⁸

In his briefing, the Secretary-General said that the cooperation between the United Nations, the African Union and the African regional economic communities and other regional mechanisms, such as the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) had never been stronger, and the joint work had gained in depth and scope. He commended the African Union and its members for establishing a strong partnership between the World Health Organization and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention since the beginning of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.⁶⁹ The Chairperson of the African Union Commission noted the African Union's deepening cooperation with the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms, particularly with respect to consolidating its activities to maintain regional peace and security and continuing to make joint efforts to ensure that the Silencing the Guns in Africa initiative worked. He underlined the importance of enhancing strategic partnerships with the European Union and reinforcing cooperation with other key member-driven organizations, including the League of Arab States in order to strengthen strategic cooperation and better address shared threats.

Several speakers explicitly invoked Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,⁷⁰ while others affirmed the importance of the United Nations assessed contributions for peace support operations led by the African Union and authorized by the Council such as the African Union Mission in Somalia and the Joint Force of the

⁶⁷ Ibid., Niger was represented by its President; South Africa was represented by its President; and Tunisia was represented by its President. Belgium was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, European Affairs and Foreign Trade; China was represented by its Special Representative of President Xi Jinping, State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Estonia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Germany was represented by its Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs; Indonesia was represented by its Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Multilateral Affairs; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was represented by its Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, National Security, Legal Affairs and Information; United Kingdom was represented by its Minister for Africa; and Viet Nam was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. For information on high-level meetings, see part II, section II.

⁶⁸ Ibid., Somalia was represented by its President.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid., Chairperson of the African Union Commission, South Africa, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Belgium, France and, Russian Federation.

Group of Five for the Sahel.⁷¹ The President of South Africa recalled that the United Nations and the African Union had deepened their relationship, with partnership agreements on peace and security, development and capacity-building, adding that the most advanced cooperation between the two organizations was on peace and security, as provided for in Chapter VIII of the Charter. Africa was taking responsibility for the complex challenges to its peace, security and development, working with the United Nations and other international partners in supporting African-led solutions to problems on the continent. He affirmed that while the United Nations, through the Council, had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it was necessary to acknowledge the important role played by regional organizations, such as the African Union, to address threats to peace and security. In this regard, he said that the African Union had recognized the nexus between peace and development, indicating that it had also aligned the African Peace and Security Architecture with Agenda 2063, the blueprint for Africa's development. The President of South Africa further called on expediting deliberations to ensure that peace support operations led by the African Union and authorized by the Council were financed through United Nations assessed contribution and underlined the need to strengthen the strategic cooperation between the Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council.⁷²

The President of the Niger welcomed the outcomes of the fourteenth annual joint consultative meeting between the members of the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, presided over by the Niger in September 2020, as well as the report of the Secretary-General on cooperation between the two bodies through the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security⁷³. He highlighted the importance of operational collaboration between regional organizations and the United Nations for the establishment of development agencies focused on the primary goal of tackling the root causes of security problems in crisis-affected areas, adding that security issues should not only be resolved but also prevented. He also proposed strengthening

⁷¹ Ibid., South Africa, Niger, Tunisia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, China, United Kingdom, and France.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ See [S/2020/860](https://www.un.org/press/docs/2020/20200820.sgsm20200820.html) for the report of the Secretary-General on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa.

cooperation between the two Councils by emphasizing the coordination of their agendas and goals through an increase in the number of regularly scheduled meetings, and advocated that African countries should play a central role in the discussions and decision-making process of the Council, as African issues constituted the majority of the subjects it dealt with.⁷⁴ Similarly, the President of Tunisia called for greater collaboration between the Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on joint assessments of conflict situations, formulating early and joint response plans, strengthening coordination and integration in mediation efforts to ensure that the parties to the conflict attained the results they sought, further developing the partnership in peacekeeping operations and managing the transitions between United Nations missions and African Union missions. He also said that for crisis responses, intervention by the African Union and subregional groups must be given priority as illustrated by the recent intervention by the ECOWAS to resolve the crisis in Mali.⁷⁵

The Special Representative of President Xi Jinping, State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of China said that the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council must build on their annual consultative meeting mechanism to enhance their level of cooperation, and called on the Council to assume its responsibility to help Africa improve its independent capabilities in peacekeeping, stability and counter-terrorism, accelerate the establishment of the African Standby Force, a rapid response force and an early-warning mechanism, and to support sustainable and predictable financing for the African Union's peace and security operations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, European Affairs and Foreign Trade of Belgium welcomed the enhanced role of the African Union in promoting a positive regional dynamic and supporting United Nations efforts. She hoped that the African Union would also be closely involved in the further implementation of the new United Nations Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework. While new conflicts on the African continent deserved an initial response from the African Union or its subregional organizations, the principle of subsidiarity should not imply inaction. She emphasized that greater synergy between the African Union and subregional organizations, as well as the optimum complementarity between the African Union and the Council, was essential to accelerating progress towards common objectives.

⁷⁴ See [S/2020/1179](#).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam opined that the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union could be further strengthened by supporting the African Union's coordination efforts on regional issues, strengthening strategic cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union at both the institutional and operational levels, and by expanding interregional cooperation to help Africa and other parts of the world cope with global problems that affected all nations alike. He said that it would be of significant benefit to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union, for instance, to explore more opportunities for sharing experiences and best practices in addressing common challenges and realizing regional goals. The Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany added that the African Union and the United Nations were natural partners in the fight against climate change as droughts, hunger and displacement which were catalysts for conflict in Africa.

The representative of France said that the Council must support the African Union's commitment to prevention and resolution of crises on the continent, a principle that was at the heart of Chapter VIII of the Charter. The partnership between the United Nations and the African Union was also of strategic importance in security matters as the African contribution to peacekeeping was invaluable. He also expressed support for the development of sustainable and predictable financing for African peace operations, including through United Nations-assessed contributions. Several Council members emphasized the importance of further enhancing the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in relation to the women and peace and security agenda, including the participation of women in peacekeeping operations.⁷⁶ The representative of the Russian Federation said that it was important that Africans were increasingly taking the initiative in dealing with peace and security issues on their continent, and that United Nations cooperation with African regional organizations should be based on the understanding that regional actors should be the ones to take the lead in defining the paths to settling disputes on the African continent, based on Chapter VIII of the Charter.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Ibid., Niger, Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Indonesia, Dominican Republic, France, and United States.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

II. Recognition of the efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes

Note

Section II deals with recognition by the Security Council of the efforts by regional and subregional organizations in the pacific settlement of local disputes, within the framework of Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes, and section B covers discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes

During the period under review, in several of its decisions, the Security Council welcomed, commended or encouraged the engagement of regional and subregional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes. The Council, however, did not explicitly refer to Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations in any of its decisions. The Council appealed to regional organizations to support peace processes,⁷⁸ to provide political support to the strengthening of State institutions,⁷⁹ to sustain and promote peace, stability and development,⁸⁰ to support United Nations efforts to foster intra-national reconciliation,⁸¹ and to continue further mediation

⁷⁸ See for example in relation to the situation in the Central African Republic, resolution [2552 \(2020\)](#), sixth preambular paragraph.

⁷⁹ See for example in relation to the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, resolution [2556 \(2020\)](#), para. 3.

⁸⁰ See for example in relation to the situation in Guinea-Bissau, resolution [2512 \(2020\)](#), ninth preambular paragraph.

⁸¹ See for example in relation to the situation in Libya, resolution [2510 \(2020\)](#), sixth preambular paragraph and resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#), twenty-fifth preambular paragraph.

efforts.⁸² The Council did so in relation to a wide variety of items on its agenda, as featured in more detail in table 2 below.

The list of items below is organized in alphabetical order.

Table 2

Decisions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements

Item	Decision and date	Paragraphs	Regional organizations mentioned
The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2552 (2020) , 12 November 2020	Sixth preambular paragraph and para. 5	African Union, Economic Community of Central African States
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2556 (2020) , 18 December 2020	paras. 3, 6, 14, 16 and 26	African Union, Southern African Development Community, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
The situation in Libya	Resolution 2510 (2020) , 12 February 2020	Sixth preambular paragraph	African Union, League of Arab States, European Union
	Resolution 2542 (2020) , 15 September 2020	Twenty-fifth preambular paragraph and para. 1(vi)	African Union, League of Arab States, European Union
The situation in Guinea-Bissau	Resolution 2512 (2020) , 28 February 2020	Fifth, sixth, and ninth preambular paragraphs and paras. 2(a) and 16	African Union, Economic Community of West African States, Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), European Union
The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2520 (2020) , 29 May 2020	Fifth preambular paragraph and para. 25	African Union, European Union
The situation in Mali	Resolution 2541 (2020) , 31 August 2020 S/PRST/2020/10 , 15 October 2020	Fourth preambular paragraph Second and third paragraphs	African Union, Economic Community of West African States

⁸² See for example in relation to the situation in Mali, [S/PRST/2020/10](#), second paragraph; and in relation to the reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan, resolution [2519 \(2020\)](#), fourth preambular paragraph and [2550 \(2020\)](#), fifth preambular paragraph and para. 10.

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2514 (2020) , 12 March 2020	Fourth, fifth, twenty-second and twenty-third preambular paragraphs and paras. 11, 17 and 36	African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development
	Resolution 2519 (2020) , 14 May 2020	Fourth preambular paragraph	African Union
	Resolution 2521 (2020) , 29 May 2020	Third preambular paragraph	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
	Resolution 2524 (2020) , 3 June 2020	para. 13	African Union
	Resolution 2525 (2020) , 3 June 2020	Fourth preambular paragraph	African Union
	Resolution 2550 (2020) , 12 November 2020	Fifth preambular paragraph, para. 10	African Union
Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2020/2 , 11 February 2020	Eleventh paragraph	African Union, Economic Community of West African States
	S/PRST/2020/7 , 28 July 2020	Ninth, tenth and thirteenth paragraphs	African Union, Economic Community of West African States
Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2020/5 , 11 March 2020	Fifth, twenty third and twenty fifth paragraphs	African Union

B. Discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the discussions among Council members highlighted the mediation efforts of the African Union, the European Union and the League of Arab States in Libya, with many Council members reiterating their support for the cooperation between the United Nations and these regional organizations to continue mediation efforts and find a lasting and peaceful solution to the crisis in Libya.⁸³ Council members also discussed the cooperation between the United Nations and subregional economic institutions such as the Economic Community of Central African States with regard to institutional reform and conflict prevention in the Central African region.⁸⁴ In addition, various Council members referred to the role of regional and subregional organizations in the pacific settlement of disputes in connection with the role of the African Union relating to the construction of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the trilateral discussions between Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan, as illustrated in case 7.

Case 7

Peace and security in Africa

On 29 June 2020, Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”. At the videoconference, Council members heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. In addition, all Council members delivered statements, as well as the representatives of Egypt and Ethiopia.⁸⁵ In her briefing, the Under-Secretary-General explained that the Blue Nile was an important transboundary water resource critical for the livelihoods and development of the people of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Republic of the Sudan. She further explained that construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a major hydropower project located on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, began in April 2011. Various initiatives were undertaken by the Blue Nile riparian countries, who recognized the need for

⁸³ See [S/2020/371](#), China and Niger; [S/2020/421](#), China, France, Indonesia, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa, Tunisia, and Viet Nam; [S/2020/879](#), China, Indonesia, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Viet Nam; and [S/2020/1108](#), China, France and Niger.

⁸⁴ See [S/2020/542](#) and [S/2020/1188](#).

⁸⁵ See [S/2020/636](#), Germany also spoke on behalf of Belgium. Egypt was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

cooperation on the Renaissance Dam to fully realize its benefits and mitigate its potential negative effects on the downstream countries. She also reported on the most recent initiatives since 2018 which had led to the trilateral negotiations and the agreement to appoint observers to the talks, including the Republic of South Africa, the United States and the European Union, whose representatives had been observers to the recent meetings. She reported that further to inconclusive negotiations in February 2020, the Bureau of the African Union Heads of State had convened on 26 June 2020 with South Africa as Chair of the African Union, and had agreed to a process led by the African Union aimed at resolving outstanding issues. She commended the parties for their determination to negotiate an agreement, and applauded the African Union's efforts to facilitate a process to that end.⁸⁶

Many speakers welcomed the peaceful settlement led by the African Union and the parties' subsequent commitment to finding a peaceful negotiated solution to outstanding issues.⁸⁷ The representative of the Dominican Republic noted that resolving outstanding key issues like water sharing, drought mitigation and dispute resolution mechanism would set an excellent regional and international precedent for future disputes on these issues. The representative of Estonia hoped that the parties could reach an agreement over the coming weeks, as envisioned by the African Union process. The representative of France said that the African Union had a major role to play in facilitating and supporting those negotiations, and in that regard, the discussions held between the parties were a step in the right direction and must continue in a constructive spirit in order to reach an agreement.

The representative of Indonesia noted that settling the issue in the regional context was always one of the best options and welcomed the fact that all parties had renewed their commitment to finding a peaceful, negotiated solution to all the outstanding issues as well as to establish a tripartite committee. The representative of the Niger welcomed the appeal made to the Council by the Extraordinary Meeting of the Bureau of the African Union Assembly to take note of the fact that the African Union was seized of the issue, a point that was also raised by the representative of South Africa. The representative of the Niger further said that the Council could

⁸⁶ See [S/2020/636](#).

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Niger, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, and Viet Nam.

support this regional initiative, as it would send a strong signal of recognition of the essential role played by regional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes of this nature. He further added that regional organizations such as the African Union had a better understanding of regional dynamics and could detect the early warning signs of impending conflict, and through that knowledge, promote dialogue and reconciliation among the parties. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was encouraged by the parties' determination, as demonstrated at the 26 June 2020 meeting of the Extraordinary African Union Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, to continue their trilateral negotiations, in good faith and in the spirit of solidarity, towards an agreement that was reasonable, equitable and amicable, and urged them to take the requisite bold political steps to conclude those negotiations. Similarly, the representative of South Africa noted that the meeting of the Extraordinary African Union Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government was characterized by a positive and constructive spirit, with all parties showing the willingness to find a mutually accepted agreement on all outstanding issues. The representative of Viet Nam welcomed the important role of the African Union in promoting negotiations and mediating among the three parties, and emphasized the need to promote best practices on transboundary watercourses, including, among others, the exchange of data and information, notification, consultations and negotiations to address any concerns, and the full implementation of legal frameworks among the countries concerned.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt stated that it was incumbent on the Council to take note of and welcome the outcomes of the meeting of the African Union Bureau and to call upon the three countries to comply with their commitments and pledges. He added that filling the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam unilaterally, without an agreement with Egypt and the Sudan, would jeopardize the interests of downstream communities, cause disastrous socioeconomic effects, expose millions to greater economic vulnerability leading to increasing rates of crime and illegal migration, reduce water quality, disrupt the riparian ecosystem, damage diversity and aggravate the dangers of climate change – all of which represented a serious threat to international peace and security. He called on the Council to encourage the parties to negotiate in good faith to reach an agreement on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance

Dam, and to refrain from any unilateral measures until such an agreement was reached.

The representative of Ethiopia, however, said that he did not believe the issue being discussed had a legitimate place in the Security Council. He noted that the Agreement on Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam provided for dispute-resolution mechanisms, and furthermore, the African Union had the necessary goodwill and expertise to help the three countries in bridging their differences and reach a mutually acceptable solution. He considered it lamentable that the principle of complementarity and subsidiarity between the United Nations and regional organizations had been ignored when the issue related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was unjustifiably brought to its attention, contravening Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, which stipulated that parties to any dispute, among others, shall first “resort to regional agencies or arrangements”. The involvement of the Council on the issue risked hardening positions and making compromise even more difficult. Instead of pronouncing itself on this matter, the Council should defer to the African Union and encourage the three countries to return to the tripartite negotiations as the only means of finding an amicable solution to the remaining outstanding issues.

III. Peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

Note

Section III describes the practice of the Security Council in connection with the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations in the area of peacekeeping. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, and subsection B covers discussions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

During 2020, the Council renewed the authorization of two peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, namely, the European Union Force-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea),⁸⁸ and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).⁸⁹ The NATO Force in Kosovo, established by resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#), continued to operate, and no decisions were taken with respect to its mandate.⁹⁰ The Council also commended the efforts of African Member States and subregional organizations in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism, notably with the deployment of AMISOM, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (Joint Force).⁹¹

The Council also commended the continued efforts of the African Union to enhance its peacekeeping role and that of African subregional organizations, to prevent, mediate and settle conflicts on the African continent, paying tribute in that regard to the courage and sacrifice of those serving in African-led peace operations.⁹²

⁸⁸ Resolution [2549 \(2020\)](#), para. 3.

⁸⁹ Resolution [2520 \(2020\)](#), para. 9.

⁹⁰ For more information on the international security presence in Kosovo, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1996-1999*, chapter VIII, sect. F.

⁹¹ [S/PRST/2020/11](#), eighth paragraph.

⁹² *Ibid.*, sixth paragraph.

The Council further commended the efforts of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), including through the MNJTF and the Joint Force, in spearheading initiatives to address security challenges in West Africa and the Sahel region, and encouraged Member States to support those efforts by providing the necessary assistance and resources.⁹³ The Council also welcomed the increased engagement from the African Union and ECOWAS and, in this regard, also welcomed the initiative to deploy an African Union-led force in the Sahel.⁹⁴

The Council encouraged partnerships to support the efforts of the African Union to continue to develop policy, guidance and training to ensure the safety and security of its peacekeepers.⁹⁵ The Council also acknowledged the need for more support to enhance African Union peace operations and encouraged further dialogue between the United Nations and the African Union to achieve this.⁹⁶

Furthermore, in its decisions in 2020, the Council called on United Nations peace operations to cooperate with several regionally led military and police training missions, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan,⁹⁷ the European Union training mission in the Central African Republic,⁹⁸ the European Union training mission in Mali⁹⁹ and the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau.¹⁰⁰

Table 3 lists the decisions by which the Council authorized peacekeeping missions led by regional organizations in 2020.

⁹³ [S/PRST/2020/2](#), eleventh paragraph. See also [S/PRST/2020/5](#), twenty-third paragraph and [S/PRST/2020/7](#), tenth paragraph.

⁹⁴ Resolution [2531 \(2020\)](#), ninth preambular paragraph. See also [S/PRST/2020/7](#), tenth paragraph.

⁹⁵ Resolution [2518\(2020\)](#), para. 7.

⁹⁶ [S/PRST/2020/11](#), tenth paragraph.

⁹⁷ See for example, resolution [2543 \(2020\)](#), para. 6 (k).

⁹⁸ See for example, resolution [2552 \(2020\)](#), eleventh preambular paragraph.

⁹⁹ See for example, resolution [2531 \(2020\)](#), para. 42.

¹⁰⁰ See for example, resolution [2512 \(2020\)](#), para. 16.

Table 3

Decisions by which the Security Council authorized peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Peacekeeping operations</i>
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Resolution 2549 (2020) 5 November 2020	paras. 3, 5 and 6	European Union Force-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2520 (2020) 29 May 2020	paras. 9-12	African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
	Resolution 2540 (2020) 28 August 2020	para. 2	AMISOM
	Resolution 2551 (2020) 12 November 2020	paras. 8, 20, 24	AMISOM

Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan

In relation to the situation in Afghanistan, the Council authorized the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to closely coordinate and cooperate, where relevant, with the non-combat Resolute Support Mission agreed upon between NATO and Afghanistan.¹⁰¹

European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic

Concerning the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council welcomed the work carried out by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA).¹⁰² The Council also decided that the mandate of MINUSCA include providing enhanced planning and technical assistance and limited logistical support for the progressive redeployment of a limited number of Central African Armed Forces units trained or certified by EUTM-RCA.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Resolution [2543 \(2020\)](#), para. 6 (k).

¹⁰² Resolution [2552 \(2020\)](#), eleventh preambular paragraph.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, para. 32 (a) (iv).

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

Concerning the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the Council underlined the importance of the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union.¹⁰⁴ In addition, the Council supported the call by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union for extreme caution in the withdrawal of UNAMID.¹⁰⁵ The Council also underlined that a continued strategic and political partnership between the United Nations and the African Union in Sudan remained critical, including through UNAMID, and encouraged the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), UNAMID and the African Union to ensure coherence, coordination and complementarity of their support for the Sudan.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, the Council requested the Secretary-General to continue transition planning and management in order to ensure that the eventual transition from UNAMID to UNITAMS was phased, sequenced and efficient and further requested, in this regard, that UNITAMS and UNAMID establish a coordination mechanism to determine the modalities and timelines for the transition of responsibilities.¹⁰⁷ UNAMID was terminated effective 31 December 2020.¹⁰⁸

European Union Force-Althea

During the period under review, the Council welcomed the readiness of the European Union to maintain the European Union force (EUFOR-Althea) in Bosnia and Herzegovina from November 2020,¹⁰⁹ and also renewed its authorization of the Mission for a period of 12 months.¹¹⁰ The Council reiterated its authorization to Member States to take “all necessary measures” to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with annexes 1-A and 2 of the Agreement for Peace, stressing that the parties would be held equally responsible for compliance with those annexes and would be subject to such enforcement action by EUFOR-Althea and the NATO

¹⁰⁴ Resolution [2559 \(2020\)](#), fifth preambular paragraph.

¹⁰⁵ Resolution [2525 \(2020\)](#), fourth preambular paragraph.

¹⁰⁶ Resolution [2524 \(2020\)](#), para. 13.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 14.

¹⁰⁸ Resolution [2559 \(2020\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁰⁹ Resolution [2549 \(2020\)](#), para. 2. See also eleventh preambular paragraph

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 3. For information on the establishment of EUFOR-Althea, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2004-2007*, chap. XII, part III.C.

presence as might be necessary.¹¹¹ The Council also authorized Member States to take “all necessary measures”, at the request of either EUFOR-Althea or the NATO Headquarters, in defence of EUFOR-Althea or the NATO presence respectively, and to assist both organizations in carrying out their missions. In addition, the Council recognized the right of EUFOR-Althea and the NATO presence to “take all necessary measures” to defend themselves from attack or threat of attack.¹¹²

African Union Mission in Somalia

In 2020, the Council adopted resolutions [2520 \(2020\)](#) of 29 May, [2540 \(2020\)](#) of 28 August, and [2551 \(2020\)](#) of 12 November, in connection with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In its decisions, the Council renewed once the authorization of the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 28 February 2021, which was initially authorized in 2007.¹¹³

By resolution [2520 \(2020\)](#), the Council maintained the force levels of AMISOM, with a view to supporting security preparations for the elections which were scheduled to be held at the end of 2020 or early 2021, conducting tasks in line with the updated Somali-led Transition Plan, and transferring security responsibilities to Somali security forces.¹¹⁴ In addition, the Council authorized AMISOM to “take all necessary measures” to carry out its mandate.¹¹⁵

Concerning its mandate, the Council maintained the primary strategic objectives of AMISOM within the context of the Transition Plan, which set out the progressive transfer of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security institutions and forces.¹¹⁶ The Council underlined its intention to assess security support needed to prepare Somalia towards taking the leading role for its security by the end of 2021 and post-2021, and take decisions on the reconfiguration of AMISON on the basis of, inter alia, information shared by the African Union, the Federal Government of Somalia (Federal Government), the European Union and relevant

¹¹¹ Resolution [2549 \(2020\)](#), para. 5.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, para. 6.

¹¹³ Resolution [2520 \(2020\)](#), para. 9. For information on the establishment of AMISOM, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2004-2007*, chap. XII, part III. C.

¹¹⁴ Resolution [2520 \(2020\)](#), para. 9.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 10.

¹¹⁶ Resolution [2520 \(2020\)](#), paras. 11 and 12. See also resolution [2472 \(2019\)](#), para. 9.

international partners.¹¹⁷ The Council reiterated the importance of AMISOM and the Somali security forces working jointly with the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) on the delivery of logistics support, including ensuring convoy and airfield security, protection of civilians and protecting main supply routes.¹¹⁸ In addition, the Council requested the African Union and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) to provide additional support to AMISOM in its provision of combat mentoring support to the Somali National Army, and underlined the importance of deploying the Somali National Army forces for delivery of the tasks set out in the updated Transition Plan.¹¹⁹

Concerning security, the Council welcomed the progress made over the last year, including the recovering of additional territory from Al Shabaab, the training of Somali security forces, and the finalization of the Somali-African Union-United Nations Joint Threat Assessment.¹²⁰ In this regard, the Council called on the Federal Government, the Federal Member States, AMISOM and the United Nations to deepen cooperation to take a comprehensive approach to security which was collaborative, gender-responsive and stabilizing.¹²¹

In addition, the Council called on AMISOM, the United Nations and the African Union to increase comprehensive joint planning, coordination, information sharing and strategic communications, and for the Federal Government, AMISOM and UNSOS to undertake inclusive and integrated planning on transition locations, joint operations, and stabilization activities in line with the tasks in an updated Somali-led Transition plan.¹²²

Concerning logistical and financial support, the Council urged the African Union to finalize its equipment review by September 2020 with support of the United Nations to, inter alia, strengthen the operational capabilities of AMISOM.¹²³ In reference to Chapter VIII of the Charter, the Council also underlined the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Council, and encouraged the

¹¹⁷ Resolution [2520 \(2020\)](#), para. 5.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 21.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 8.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, sixth preambular paragraph.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

¹²² *Ibid.*, para. 6 (a) and (c).

¹²³ *Ibid.*, para. 15.

Secretary-General, the African Union and Member States to continue efforts to explore in earnest funding arrangements for AMISOM, in order to establish secure future funding arrangements for the Mission.¹²⁴

By resolution [2540 \(2020\)](#), the Council welcomed the strong relationship between UNSOM, UNSOS, the United Nations Country Team and AMISOM and underlined the importance of all entities continuing to strengthen the relationship at all levels.¹²⁵ Finally, by resolution [2551 \(2020\)](#), the Council reaffirmed that the Federal Government, in cooperation with the Federal Member States and AMISOM, shall document and register all weapons and military equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates, including, inter alia, facilitating inspection by the Panel of Experts of all military items before their redistribution or destruction. The Council also reiterated its request that AMISOM support and assist the Federal Government and the Federal Member States in implementing the total ban on charcoal exports from Somalia and called upon AMISOM to facilitate regular access for the Panel of Experts to charcoal exporting ports.¹²⁶

Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel

In 2020, the Council reaffirmed the importance of continuing the fight against terrorism and expressed its support for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (Joint Force), which was established in February 2017 by the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) consisting of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger. The Council also welcomed international and regional support to the Joint Force.¹²⁷ The Council further welcomed the Pau Summit of 13 January 2020 and the creation of a Coalition for the Sahel, whose aim included, inter alia, strengthening the military capabilities of the Sahelian States.¹²⁸ In addition, the Council encouraged the G5 Sahel to ensure that the Joint Force continued to scale up its level of operation, and also underlined the importance of progress in the operationalization of the G5

¹²⁴ Ibid., para. 25.

¹²⁵ Resolution [2540 \(2020\)](#), para. 3.

¹²⁶ Resolution [2551 \(2020\)](#), paras. 8 and 24. See also resolution [2520 \(2020\)](#), para. 12 (i).

¹²⁷ [S/PRST/2020/10](#), seventh paragraph. For more information on the deployment of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016-2017*, part VIII, sect. III.

¹²⁸ Resolution [2531 \(2020\)](#), ninth preambular paragraph. See also [S/PRST/2020/7](#), tenth paragraph.

Sahel police component and encouraged support for it, including through the training of the component's Specialized Investigative Units. The Council welcomed the increased autonomy of both the G5 Sahel Executive Secretariat and the Joint Force as steps towards self-sufficiency.¹²⁹ The Council also stressed that operational and logistical support from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), as per the conditions set by resolution [2391 \(2017\)](#), was a temporary measure, and called on the regional force to continue developing its own capacity to support itself.¹³⁰ In addition, the Council expressed support for the use of life support consumables provided by MINUSMA to the Joint Force based both on resolution [2391 \(2017\)](#) and on the technical agreement between the United Nations, the European Union and the G5 Sahel, stressing that the support of MINUSMA to the Joint Force continued to be subject to full financial reimbursement to the United Nations through the European Union-coordinated financing mechanism. The Council requested the Secretary-General to include in its April 2021 report on the Joint Force an assessment of the implementation of paragraph 13 of resolution [2391 \(2017\)](#), including on the prospects of the regional force improving its autonomy and setting-up its own procurement system.¹³¹

The Council further requested the Secretary-General to continue ensuring close coordination and information sharing between MINUSMA, the Joint Force, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, as well as subregional organizations, including ECOWAS and the G5 Sahel.¹³²

B. Discussions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Council discussed the role of regional peacekeeping operations such as European Union Force-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina,¹³³ the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM),¹³⁴ and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (Joint Force).¹³⁵ With regard to the Joint

¹²⁹ Resolution [2531 \(2020\)](#), para. 36.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 37.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, para. 38.

¹³² *Ibid.*, paras. 26, 30 and 39.

¹³³ See [S/2020/379](#) and [S/2020/1103](#).

¹³⁴ See [S/PV.8731](#), [S/2020/436](#), [S/PV.8755](#) and [S/2020/1136](#).

¹³⁵ See [S/2020/286](#), [S/2020/515](#), [S/2020/541](#), [S/2020/1126](#), and [S/PV.8765](#).

Force, Council deliberations focused on the importance of its role in combatting terrorism in Africa and on the need to provide it with the necessary support, including financially, as illustrated in case 8.

Case 8

Peace and security in Africa

At its 8743rd meeting held on 11 March 2020 at the initiative of China, which held the Presidency for the month,¹³⁶ the Council convened an open debate under the above-referenced item and in connection with the subitem “Countering terrorism and extremism in Africa”. At the meeting, the briefers, Council members and other Member States underlined the importance of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (Joint Force) for combatting terrorism in Africa and the need to provide support to it against the backdrop of the Pau Summit of 13 January 2020, which had brought together the Heads of State of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) and their main multilateral partners, namely, the United Nations, the African Union, and the International Organization of la Francophonie.¹³⁷

Further, on 16 November 2020, Council members held an open videoconference in connection with the same item to consider the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Joint Force submitted pursuant to Council resolution [2391 \(2017\)](#).¹³⁸ Council members were briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, the Managing Director for Africa at the European External Action Service on behalf of the European Union, and the Permanent Representative of Canada, in his capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission. In addition to the 12 Council members who spoke, a statement was made by the representative of Mali.

In his remarks, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations underscored that the Joint Force remained a vital part of the security responses addressing extremist armed groups in the Sahel. He also reported that the Joint Force had continued to rise in its operational strengths and that its units had increasingly

¹³⁶ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 26 February 2020 ([S/2020/161](#)).

¹³⁷ See [S/PV.8743](#), Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Indonesia, Egypt, Cote d’Ivoire and Togo.

¹³⁸ See [S/2020/1074](#).

acquired practical experience and efficiency in their operations. Going forward, the Under-Secretary-General observed that strengthening the police component of the Joint Force would be an important step in improving, inter alia, the oversight of military operations. In addition, he stated that the responsive operational and logistic support of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) remained critical to the operations of the Joint Force. The Under-Secretary-General added that further to the Council's authorization of MINUSMA to engage commercial contractors to deliver life-support consumables to Joint Force contingents operating outside Mali, the Mission had begun to make appropriate arrangements to implement such support. The Under-Secretary-General emphasized that the issue of predictability of funding remained of concern and that the United Nations, together with the G5 Sahel and other partners continued to call for more predictable funding.¹³⁹

The African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security reported that the Peace and Security Council of the African Union had renewed the mandate of the Joint Force for 12 months from 13 July 2020, and underscored that the African Union was grateful to the efforts of the international community in supporting the endeavours of the regional force. He further said that the African Union welcomed the extension of the mandate of MINUSMA, which continued to provide logistical support to the Joint Force. The Commissioner also underlined the position of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union that it was of utmost importance for the United Nations to consider taking the necessary steps that would guarantee sustainable and predictable funding for the Joint Force from the United Nations assessed contribution.¹⁴⁰

The Managing Director for Africa at the European External Action Service recalled the European Union's support for MINUSMA in support of the Joint Force, while noting the challenges faced in providing supplies to its troops. He reaffirmed that the European Union was doing everything to ensure the sustainability of the support for the Joint Force, noting that the European Union's financial support for the Joint Force had resulted in the delivery of 46 armoured personnel carriers equipped with radios.

¹³⁹ See [S/2020/1126](#).

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

Council members welcomed the progress in the operationalization of the Joint Force,¹⁴¹ and its progress in the fight against terrorism during the reporting period.¹⁴² Some Council members also welcomed the establishment of a joint coordination mechanism between the Joint Force, MINUSMA and other military presences in the region.¹⁴³ Other Council members expressed support for the assistance provided to the Joint Force by MINUSMA in line with resolution [2531 \(2020\)](#),¹⁴⁴ and also took note of the formation of the Coalition for the Sahel.¹⁴⁵ The representative of China said that his country was actively implementing initiatives in assistance to the Joint Force for security and counter-terrorism operations. He further underlined that the presidential statement on counter-terrorism in Africa ([S/PRST/2020/5](#)) must be effectively implemented, and hoped that the Council would give priority to the needs of the G5 Sahel and offer more sustainable and predictable financial support to the Joint Force.

The representative of the Dominican Republic stated that it was encouraging to hear about the implementation of several needed regional and international security initiatives launched to support the Joint Force and counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel region, as well as efforts by the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel to increase troop numbers. He also emphasized that challenges remained and should be promptly addressed to pave the way for the full operationalization of the Joint Force, which demanded greater coordination at the tripartite level between the European Union, the Joint Force and MINUSMA to tackle shortcomings in the support model of MINUSMA. The representative of Estonia commended the Joint Force for its efforts and encouraged it to continue taking ownership of making peace a reality in the Sahel. He also underlined that the role of the African Union and ECOWAS in coordinating and mobilizing the joint counter-terrorist operations was crucial. The representative of Germany encouraged the continued ownership and efforts by the Joint Force, especially with a view to developing its logistical capacities and increased efficiency. He particularly welcomed the ongoing and future support from bilateral partners and

¹⁴¹ Ibid., Belgium, Dominican Republic, Germany, Niger, Russian Federation and United Kingdom.

¹⁴² Ibid., China, France, Germany, Russian Federation and Viet Nam.

¹⁴³ Ibid., Russian Federation and Niger.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., Belgium, Niger, Russian Federation and United States.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., Dominican Republic, France and Germany.

the African Union, and stated that Germany was ready to consider ways to increase United Nations support for the regional force. In addition, he encouraged MINUSMA to make full use of available funds, such as European Union funding, in its support for the Joint Force.

The representative of the Niger, speaking also on behalf of South Africa, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, welcomed the improvement of the situation in the Liptako-Gourma region as a result of the ongoing operations by the Joint Force. He added that the operations of the Joint Force carried out in the past 10 months had made it possible to, inter alia, “neutralize” and arrest terrorists, arrest traffickers, seize, recover or destroy motorcycles and vehicles, and destroy several logistics depots or sites for manufacturing improvised explosive devices. He further stated that the restructuring of the Executive Secretariat of the G5 Sahel had made it more operational, enabling it to provide more effective support to the Joint Force. He stressed that the mode of MINUSMA’s support for the Joint Force was neither adequate nor sufficient in the context of the fight against terrorism, and that the recommendations of the assessments relating to support for the regional force would have to be ultimately implemented if it was eventually to become self-sustaining.

The representative of the Russian Federation stressed that the full-fledged functioning of the Joint Force depended on two important factors, namely, ensuring stable and predictable funding and providing appropriate transport and logistical support.

The representative of the United Kingdom said that his country would welcome more detail on the measures of success of the Joint Force beyond operational reporting, including an update on how the Joint Force was working with the United Nations country team to create an enabling environment for development and for monitoring the return of national armed forces and local authorities.

The representative of the United States said that his country agreed that the Joint Force and its civilian component were key to addressing some of the root causes of the conflict. He added that the United States, like others, remained committed to bilaterally supporting the Joint Force with equipment, training, supplies and advisers, and encouraged other partners to both honour their pledges to the regional force and to consider additional bilateral support to individual G5 countries. He also reiterated that United Nations assessed contributions were not a viable source of funding,

underscoring that the United States expected to see the Joint Force fully leverage the support mechanism of MINUSMA in the near term.

The representative of Viet Nam, speaking also on behalf of Indonesia, said that the Joint Force had played an important role in maintaining peace, security and stability in the Sahel region and reaffirmed his country's support for the regional force. He also commended the significant support that had been given to MINUSMA, which had enabled the Joint Force to implement its tasks more effectively, adding that it was essential that the regional force continued to receive sustainable support so that it could provide better protection for its soldiers, security forces and civilians, and fulfil its mandates. The representative of Mali called for more financial support to the Joint Force and reiterated the call of the G5 Sahel for a robust mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter and for predictable and sustainable funding, including through the United Nations.

IV. Authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements

Note

Section IV concerns the practice of the Security Council in utilizing regional and subregional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority, as provided for in Article 53 of the Charter. This section focuses on the authorization of enforcement action by regional and other organizations outside the context of regional peacekeeping operations. Authorizations to use force accorded by the Council to regional peacekeeping operations are covered in section III above. Cooperation with regional arrangements in the implementation of measures adopted by the Council under Chapter VII, not involving the use of force, is also covered in this section. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements and subsection B covers discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action and implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements

In 2020, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 53 of the Charter in its decisions. The Council did, however, authorize the use of force by regional arrangements beyond the context of regional peacekeeping operations.

Concerning the situation in Libya, the Council welcomed the measures that had been taken to implement resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), encouraged the continuation of these measures and, in this regard, also took note of the deployment of Operation European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI.¹⁴⁶ Acting under Chapter VII, the Council renewed its authorization for a period of 12 months for Member States “acting nationally or through regional organizations” to inspect vessels on high seas off the Libyan coast suspected of carrying arms and or related material to or from Libya in violation of previous Council resolutions, and use “all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” for those inspections as set out

¹⁴⁶ Resolution [2546 \(2020\)](#), fifth preambular paragraph.

in resolution [2473 \(2019\)](#).¹⁴⁷ Also acting under Chapter VII, the Council renewed the authorization to Member States “acting nationally or through regional organizations” set out in paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#) to inspect on the high seas off the coast of Libya vessels believed to be used for migrant smuggling and human trafficking from Libya, seize those that were confirmed as being used for those purposes and authorized Member States to use “all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” in confronting migrant smugglers or human traffickers in carrying out the aforementioned activities.¹⁴⁸ In both cases, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the measures within 11 months of the adoption of the resolutions.¹⁴⁹

Concerning the situation in Somalia, the Council commended the efforts of the European Union Naval Forces Operation Atalanta and the counter-piracy activities of the African Union onshore in Somalia to suppress piracy and to protect ships transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia. Acting under Chapter VII, the Council renewed for a further period of 12 months the authorizations as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution [2500 \(2019\)](#) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.¹⁵⁰

Acting under Chapter VII, the Council adopted several decisions not involving the use of force, such as sanctions measures, requesting the support of regional and subregional organizations in their implementation, or calling on the cooperation of regional and subregional organizations with the various sanctions committees and panels of experts, as outlined in table 4 below.

In addition, in connection with the situation in South Sudan and acting under Chapter VII, the Council took note of the steps taken by the African Union towards the setting up of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, and welcomed the formal invitation of the African Union for the United Nations to provide technical assistance towards setting up the Court. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to continue to make available technical assistance to the Commission of the African

¹⁴⁷ Resolution [2526 \(2020\)](#), para. 1. See also resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#), paras. 3 and 4.

¹⁴⁸ Resolution [2546 \(2020\)](#), para. 2.

¹⁴⁹ Resolutions [2526 \(2020\)](#), para. 2 and [2546 \(2020\)](#), para. 3. See also resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), paras. 17 and 18.

¹⁵⁰ Resolution [2554 \(2020\)](#), ninth preambular paragraph and para. 14.

Union and to the Government of South Sudan in setting up the Court and the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing and the Compensation and Reparation Authority. The Council further took note of the 8 February 2018 African Union Peace and Security Council communiqué and, in this regard, called upon the Government of South Sudan to sign without further delay the Memorandum of Understanding with the African Union to establish the Court.¹⁵¹

Table 4

Decisions by which the Security Council requested the cooperation of regional arrangements in the implementation of enforcement action

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2514 (2020) 12 March 2020	Thirteenth preambular para and para. 24.
	Resolution 2521 (2020) 29 May 2020	para. 20.
The situation in the Middle East (Yemen)	Resolution 2511 (2020) 25 February 2020	para. 10.

B. Discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action and implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements

In 2020, under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan” and following established practice, Council members held two biannual briefings by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on the investigation by International Criminal Court (ICC) into alleged crimes in Darfur.¹⁵² In the context of those briefings, the representative of China discussed issues related to the implementation of resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#) by which the Council, acting under Chapter VII, had referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC. In this regard, the representative of China noted that the ICC needed to attach importance to legitimate

¹⁵¹ Resolution [2514 \(2020\)](#), paras. 36 and 37. See also resolution [2521 \(2020\)](#), sixth preambular paragraph.

¹⁵² See [S/2020/538](#) and [S/2020/1192](#).

appeals of the Sudanese Government and the African Union regarding its engagement on Darfur.¹⁵³

Also, under the item entitled “The situation in Mali”, Council members discussed the decision by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union to impose various sanctions measures on Mali following the coup de force of 18 August 2020, including the closure of borders, an air embargo and the suspension of financial transactions by ECOWAS. In addition, they discussed the lifting of the sanctions measures.¹⁵⁴

In relation to Libya, discussions in the Council also focused on the launch of Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI on 1 April 2020 by the European Union to support the implementation of the United Nations arms embargo on Libya, in line with resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#), with several speakers expressing support for the Operation.¹⁵⁵ In addition, the representative of Libya stressed that resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#) stipulated that implementation should be done in coordination with the Libyan Government, emphasizing that any international operation carried out without proper coordination with the Government was considered illegal and not founded on relevant Council resolutions, and in that regard Libya had announced its rejection of EUNAVFOR MED IRINI in its current form.¹⁵⁶ The representative of the Russian Federation emphasized that the Operation should fully comply with international law as well as with the framework established by resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#), and that any modifications to its activities beyond the scope of resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#) would require the consent of the Council.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ See [S/PV.8765](#), Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, Estonia, Niger (also on behalf of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa, and Tunisia), China, Viet Nam, France, Dominican Republic, Russian Federation, and Mali.

¹⁵⁵ See [S/2020/421](#), Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, Dominican Republic, France, Niger, and Libya; [S/2020/489](#), High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Belgium, France, Niger (also on behalf of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa and Tunisia), Russian Federation, and United Kingdom; [S/2020/509](#), Germany, Russian Federation and United States; and [S/2020/879](#), Belgium, Estonia, Germany, and Niger.

¹⁵⁶ See [S/2020/421](#).

¹⁵⁷ See [S/2020/509](#).

V. Reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security

Note

Section V examines the reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security within the framework of Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, and is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning reporting by regional arrangements and subsection B covers discussions concerning reporting by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning the reporting by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Security Council made no explicit reference to Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations in its decisions. The Council did, however, request reporting from regional organizations, particularly the African Union, either directly or through the Secretary-General, on issues such as cooperation on peace and security between the United Nations and the African Union, and particularly with respect to peace support operations, such as the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (Joint Force), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and support for the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms in South Sudan, as described in further detail below.

With regard to the situation in Mali, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report on the coordination, exchange of information and mutual operational and logistical support between the Joint Force, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the French Forces and the European Union missions in Mali every three months after the adoption of resolution [2531 \(2020\)](#) on 29 June 2020.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁸ Resolution [2531 \(2020\)](#), para. 62 (ii).

On Somalia, by resolution [2520 \(2020\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed on the implementation of the resolution, in his regular reports requested in resolution [2461 \(2019\)](#). The Council further requested the Secretary-General to assess in his regular reports the progress achieved on the priority measures, implementation of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, and the support of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia to AMISOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and the Somali security forces.¹⁵⁹ The Council also requested the African Union to keep the Council informed every 90 days on the implementation of AMISOM's mandate. In that regard, the Council requested the African Union to report to the Council through the provision of no fewer than three written reports, with the first report no later than 15 August 2020. The Council further requested specific reporting on progress on joint operations in support of the Transition Plan, including the use and effectiveness of coordination mechanisms, proposals for revised tasks per the reconfiguration of AMISOM, and accountability measures taken to address underperformance, including command and control, and conduct and discipline, measures taken to protect civilians, equipment review outcomes and use of force assets, and staffing of the civilian component, and encouraged timely reporting to allow for the Council to take into account the African Union's perspectives on the situation in Somalia.¹⁶⁰ Concerning the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia, by resolution [2554 \(2020\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it within 11 months of the adoption of the resolution, on the situation with regard to piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, including the assessment of National Coast Guard capabilities as well as voluntary reports by cooperating States and regional organizations.¹⁶¹

In connection with the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", the Council invited the African Union to share information on progress made in the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, with the Secretary-General to inform his report, and expressed the Council's intention upon receipt of the Secretary-General's reports to assess the work that had been done in the

¹⁵⁹ Resolution [2520 \(2020\)](#), para. 37. For more information on the authorization of enforcement action by regional organizations in Somalia, see sect. IV.A.

¹⁶⁰ Resolution [2520 \(2020\)](#), para. 36.

¹⁶¹ Resolution [2554 \(2020\)](#), para. 29.

establishment of the Hybrid Court in line with international standards.¹⁶² On the situation in Darfur, the Council requested the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to provide with a Special Report no later than 31 October 2020, including an assessment of the situation on the ground and recommendations on the appropriate course of action regarding the drawdown of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), taking into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁶³ By resolution [2559 \(2020\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed about all relevant developments in relation with the drawdown and withdrawal of UNAMID as an annex to the regular reporting requested on the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan in resolution [2524 \(2020\)](#), and an oral briefing by 31 July 2021 on the completion of UNAMID’s drawdown and closure.¹⁶⁴ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide it with an assessment on lessons learned from the experience of UNAMID no later than 31 October 2021.¹⁶⁵

Table 5

Decisions concerning the reporting of activities by regional arrangements

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decisions</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Reporting from</i>
The situation in Mali	Resolution 2531 (2020) 29 June 2020	para. 62 (iii)	Secretary-General
The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2520 (2020) 29 May 2020	para. 36	African Union
	Resolution 2520 (2020) 29 May 2020	para. 37	Secretary-General
	Resolution 2554 (2020) 4 December 2020	para. 29	Secretary-General, voluntary reporting by cooperating States and regional organizations
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2514 (2020) 2 March 2020	para. 42	Secretary-General, African Union
	Resolution 2525 (2020) 3 June 2020	para. 11	Secretary-General, Chairperson of the African Union Commission

¹⁶² Resolution [2514 \(2020\)](#), para. 42.

¹⁶³ Resolution [2525 \(2020\)](#), para. 11.

¹⁶⁴ Resolution [2559 \(2020\)](#), para. 14.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

B. Discussion concerning the reporting by regional arrangements

During the period under review, Article 54 of the Charter was explicitly referenced once in the context of discussions of the Security Council. During the 8714th meeting held on 6 February 2020, the representative of South Africa said that Article 54 of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, under which the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was briefing the Council, envisaged a strong cooperation between the Council and regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, as every regional organization faced a unique set of peace and security challenges that were determined by the regions in which they operated and the manner in which such threats were addressed. He further noted that the efforts of regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security and the Council’s Charter-mandated responsibilities complemented each other.¹⁶⁶

In addition, of relevance for the application and interpretation of Article 54 of the Charter were some of the references made in 2020 by Council members to the reporting by regional organizations. For example, during an open videoconference held on 28 April 2020, under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, the representative of Germany, encouraged regional actors to actively engage the parties on the question of Abyei, and requested more detailed reporting in the Secretary-General’s reports on the engagement of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and of the Special Envoy.¹⁶⁷ During an open videoconference held on 10 June 2020 under the same item, the representative of France acknowledged the importance of renewing the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, which continued to play a major role in protecting civilians in Darfur and reporting on human rights violations.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ See [S/PV.8714](#).

¹⁶⁷ See [S/2020/351](#).

¹⁶⁸ See [S/2020/538](#).