In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1822 (2008) and subsequent related resolutions, the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee makes accessible a narrative summary of reasons for the listing for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List.
Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi was listed on 6 October 2001 pursuant to paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 1333 (2000) as being associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of”, “supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to” or “otherwise supporting acts or activities of” Usama bin Laden, Al-Qaida (QDe.004) and the Taliban.
Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi was one of Al-Qaida’s (QDe.004) highest ranking and experienced members at the time of his capture in April 2007. He had been one of the organization’s key paramilitary commanders in Afghanistan from the late 1990s and, between 2002 and 2004, was in charge of cross-border attacks in Afghanistan against the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). He also directed plots to assassinate opponents of Al-Qaida, including Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and a United Nations official. Al-Baqi tried to return to his native country, Iraq, to manage Al-Qaida’s affairs and possibly focus on operations outside Iraq against Western targets. Al-Baqi also met Al-Qaida members in Iran and believed that they should be doing more, including supporting Al-Qaida efforts in Iraq and causing problems within Iran. Al-Baqi provided leadership and reconnaissance support during a rocket attack in the fall of 2003 against United States military forces in Afghanistan.
Al-Baqi was a former member of the Iraqi military who spent more than 15 years in Afghanistan. Before 11 September 2001, he was a member of Al-Qaida’s ruling shura council as well as the group’s military committee, which oversaw terrorist and guerrilla operations and paramilitary training. Al-Baqi had been a member of Al-Qaida since late 1990s, working as an instructor in one of Al-Qaida’s training camps in Afghanistan. Al-Baqi was known and trusted by Usama bin Laden (deceased) and Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri (QDi.006) and was in direct communication with both leaders, at one point serving as Al-Zawahiri’s caretaker. Al-Baqi also interacted with other senior Al-Qaida planners and decision makers, such as Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Abu Faraj al-Libi, listed as Ali Mohamed Abdul Aziz al Zar’ani al Fakhiri (deceased), and Hamza Rabi’a and Muhsin Moussa Matwalli Atwah Dewedar (deceased), prior to their deaths. Al-Baqi associated with leaders of other extremist groups allied with Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including the Taliban. Al-Baqi worked directly with the Taliban to determine responsibilities and lines of communication between Taliban and Al-Qaida leaders in Afghanistan, specifically with regard to attacks on multinational forces.