Regional risk assessment (RRA) on terrorism financing

December 2016

AUSTRAC



Overview

Background to the RRA

Methodology
Key findings
Reflections and lessons learned





Background to the RRA


- Key outcome of 2015 CTF Summit
- Commitment to regional collaboration
- A world first in regional TF assessments





In-scope region

- Australia
- Indonesia
- Malaysia
- Philippines
- Singapore
- Thailand







Methodology

How the RRA was conducted




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Risk framework








Information collection tools











Sample: TF assessment package

Section 2: Measuring 'Threat'

RISK FACTOR	THREAT SCORE 1 -3 = Low 4-6 = Medium 7-9 = High	DESCRIPTION (please provide description of your answer)	
TERRORISM FINANCING CHANNEL RAISING FUNDS			
LEGALLY			
Charities and non-profit organisations	Low Medium High 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □	High potential for misuse, but limited examples uncovered to date.	
Legitimate and front businesses	Low Medium High 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9 □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □	Some vulnerability, but not a particularly prominent issue.	
Wealthy private donor	Low Medium High 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9 	Not observed, but possible.	
		See handou	



	RAISING FUNDS	LEGALLY: Self-funding from legitimate income	7.8
		ILLEGALLY: Other criminal activity	5.2
	MOVING FUNDS	CASH: By carrying cash or similar instruments, and cash smuggling	7.2
		BANKING: The banking system	5.8
		NON BANKING: Alternative remittance and money service businesses	4.8
		GOODS & SERVICES: Through vehicle dealers & others	4.8
	USING FUNDS	DIRECT: Personnel mobility (vehicle)	7.2
		INDIRECT: Propaganda, radicalization, meetings	6.5
VULNERABILITY		Recommendation No. 8 (NPO)	6.6
		Quality and scope of border controls and comprehensiveness of customs regime on cash and BNI	5.0

Validation of results









Key findings



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Global security environment

- The rise of ISIL
- Other transnational terrorist groups
- Domestic conflicts
- Cross-border movement of extremists/foreign
 fighters





Key features of TF landscape

Geographic and structural features	Broad TF behaviours
 The reality of geography Cash-intensive and informal economies Financial and transit hubs 	 Continued use of established methods TF flows into, across and out of the region



MORE EFFECTIVE

Minor or moderate improvements needed*

Understanding national terrorism financing risks (FATF Recommendation 1) I countries have conducted nationa or thematic risk assessments

Understanding of terrorism financing risks varies in quality and depth.

Domestic cooperation (FATF Recommendation 2)

Successful terrorism disruption indicates generally good levels of cooperation.

In some countries cooperation between different arms of government, including military and police, could be improved.

Staffing and resources could be enhanced to improve operational capability.

> Cross-border movement of money controls and monitoring (FATF Recommendation 32)

Gaps in monitoring border channels.

Small amounts intended for terrorism financing (amounts below cash reporting thresholds) can be moved without the requirement to be reported.

Limited typologies and indicators makes it difficult to proactively identify suspected terrorism financing, in the absence of other intelligence.

LESS EFFECTIVE

Major or fundamental improvements needed* Implementation of international conventions (FATF Recommendation 36) All countries have ratified relevant conventions and largely implemented them.

Comprehensive terrorism financing offences (FATF Recommendation 5) All countries have criminalised terrorism financing but the scope of offences varies. Most, but not all, elements of the FATF standards are covered in some countries.

NPO regulation and oversight (FATF Recommendation 8) Understanding of higher risk NPOs is fragmented. Regulation and oversight is uneven. Multiple regulators for different NPO categories can hinder coordination. Outreach to vulnerable NPOs needs to be improved. International cooperation, particularly in South-East Asia and Australia (FATF Recommendations 37 & 40) Sound high-level international cooperation Formal exchange agreements in place but information sharing is uneven. Scope for closer operational cooperation,

particularly through analyst exchange programs.

Targeted financial sanctions (FATF Recommendation 6) nctions frameworks and lists of designate institutions are generally in place. Listing of entities varies. In some countries manual and legal processes hamper the automatic freezing of terrorist assets.

Alternative remittance and money service businesses regulation oversight (FATF Recommendations 14 & 16³) Regulation and oversight varies

Illegal, underground remitters operate to varying degrees in each country.

Weak understanding of tenorism financing risk within the remitter sector limits transaction reporting quality and reporting tends to be low. Quality and use of financial intelligence to detect, investigate and disrupt terrorism financing (FATF Recommendation 29)⁷

Actionable terrorism financing intelligence is shared between FIUs and operational authorities.

Routine use of financial intelligence to follow terrorism financing money trails by operational and investigating authorities can be improved in some countries. Sharing of security intelligence with FIUs generally can be enhanced in many countries.

> Quality and number of terrorism financing STRs (FATF Recommendation 20)

> > Low reporting numbers.

Poor quality. argely reactive to law enforcement reques or media reports.

Limited indicators for terrorism financing self-funding restricts reporting institutions from proactively identifying suspicious activity.

CTF capabilities and challenges



Key TF risks – raising funds

- Self-funding from legitimate sources
- Non-profit organisations (NPOs)
- Online funding
- Criminal activity





Self-funding



Highest risk method for raising funds

- FIUs should provide the critical bridge
- Improved guidance on customer risk profiles
- Regional 'pooling' of knowledge









High risk, but clearer picture needed

- Targeted country NPO risk assessments
- Implement revised FATF Rec 8 fully
- Greater collaboration





Online funding



Use is minimal, but vulnerability is high

- Dedicated 'cyber operations teams'
- Using social media as a detection tool





Criminal activity



Key source of funds for some groups

- Multi-agency and cross-border task forces
- Parallel CT and TF investigations





Key TF risks - moving funds

- Cross-border movement of funds/value
- Banking system
- Alternative remittance and money service businesses





Cross-border movement



Proven method which will persist

- Stronger intelligence collaboration
- Rectify reporting/monitoring gaps





Banking system



Still exploited despite AML/CTF frameworks

- Continue to build trusted relationships
- Ensure transaction monitoring is updated
- Collaborate on CTF training initiatives





Alternative remittance and money service businesses



Known misuse is lower than inherent vulnerability, role in regional economies and risk

Response opportunities

• Identify indicators of high-risk services





Key TF risks - using funds

<u>Organisational funding</u> most likely for widow/family and propaganda

Organisational

Likely use of terrorism financing	Australia	Indonesia	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore	Thailand
	Country risk rating					
Widow and family charity						
Propaganda, radicalisation, meetings	Negligible					
Salary						
Terrorist network maintenance	Negligible					





Key TF risks - using funds

Higher likelihood and risk of <u>operational</u> funding

Operational

Likely use of terrorism financing	Australia	Indonesia	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore	Thailand
	Country risk rating					
Personnel mobility/travel						
Weapon and explosive materials						
Training personnel						





- Uptake of new payment methods
 Stored value cards
 Online payment platforms
- Increased TF into the region





Priority actions



Address highest priority risks:

- self-funding from legitimate sources
- at-risk NPOs
- cross-border movement of funds/value
- external funding into the region





Reflections & lessons learned

- Clear and agreed Terms of Reference
- Start early
- Regular project team meetings
- Know your environment
- Essential vs desired information requirements
- Simple collection tools



Thank you