

- ISS provides training to law enforcement and security agencies; and mentors explosives and CBRN investigators – supported by the International Association for Bomb Technicians and Investigators (IABTI)
- This evidence come directly from law enforcement/security personnel (first responders, CT investigators, specialised units). Post-training closed platform.
- Data from 18 countries: East Africa, the Horn, West Africa, the Sahel Many have dealt with attacks on civilian targets such as airports, hotels, cafes as well as softer targets such as community market places; roadside attacks
- Data was initially intended to help towards development of training programmes, but we are documenting this to share with governments, and might be able to publish some of it in 2018
- A main question for ISS: why are there so few prosecutions?

## **Intelligence: Challenge of gathering, analysis, management of information and sharing as necessary.**

- Not always evident to personnel about how threat assessments are done, or what directs proactive security planning.
- Intelligence-gathering and analysis sometimes disconnected from CT agencies - undertaken by separate agencies (they are passive recipients of information)
- The indicate that there is little localized assessment and planning about these measures – little decentralized decision-making
- Frustration over “weak” systems and procedures for intelligence-gathering
- That intelligence about threats/impending attacks often provided by other governments operating in the country/region
- Frustration over limitations in capabilities to use informers, infiltration measures and electronic surveillance
- Limited structured sharing of information across relevant government agencies and across governments – this remains a problem notwithstanding coordination structures
- Failures of acting on available intelligence have been documented in government reviews

## Securing Sites: Procedural Measures for Security and Capacity for Implementation

- Management and maintenance of security regimes is a continuing challenge – even for targets such as airports
- Consistency of implementation of security measures is questioned, often due to limited institutional capacity to implement established protocols
- Weaknesses believed to be management level
- Senior security official responsible for airport security – views on basic security protocols e.g. rotation of staff, differ vastly from those that are implemented

## Training and Equipping:

- Notwithstanding significant and ongoing investment by countries and international actors in equipping and training security and law enforcement personnel
- Specialised capacity relating to explosives, investigate incidents involving explosives (as well as CBRN materials) – very limited generally
- Personnel like being in international training (nice venues, food, per diems, etc.)
- Complaints:
  - ✓ Trainers have limited understanding of local context; they are intent on exporting measures from their own countries rather than engaging with local realities
  - ✓ Little coherence of methodologies used by training providers (different providers do different things) – ongoing complaints it is not practical enough
  - ✓ Accounts continue of: equipment dumping of old or sub-standard equipment; equipment that local staff are not capable of using and maintaining
  - ✓ Training disconnected from their own career development, no competency assessments done at training, little attention to them as individuals
  - ✓ Training provision is not planned to be ongoing, or connected to other courses – this is dangerous- bomb techs need ongoing upgrading of training
  - ✓ Training content – limited mainstreaming of human rights requirements

## **Corruption: Continues to be a facilitating factor**

- Multiple stories of how various forms of corruption have facilitated vulnerabilities to attacks
- Examples of attacks being facilitated by bribery of officials at security checkpoints to get explosives – multiple test runs done, checkpoints surveyed in advance
- Stacks of official passports found in possession of civilians in transit in a third country
- View expressed that the private sector – e.g. mining interests, drive decisions about the application of security resources.

Bomb Data Centres being implemented at the national level in the Horn of Africa – several countries have already committed. This will enable the standardized documentation of incidents, devices used etc. Has the potential for sharing regionally; support planning efforts if done well.

Regional Intergovernmental Institutions (e.g. East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation - (EAPCCO)) taking up leadership role to engage states in greater cooperation – on multiple levels: standardized training and competency assessments; intelligence cooperation; joint field training exercises.

Increasing evidence of more practical approaches to training; greater cooperation amongst training service providers; transnational cooperation on training; etc.