Excellences, Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of CTED, I wish to express my gratitude to ICAO for inviting me here today.

I also wish to thank ICAO and all of you who took part in the recent special meeting of the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, on terrorist threats to civil aviation.

Allow me to begin by briefly describing the role and mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, or CTC, and its Executive Directorate, or CTED), and how we cooperate with ICAO.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks against the United States, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1373 (2001), a far-reaching resolution which charted the way forward in the fight against terrorism.

The resolution established the CTC, which consists of all 15 members of the Security Council, to monitor the implementation of its provisions. The Committee is supported in its work by CTED, which implements the Committee’s policy decisions and conducts expert assessment visits to Member
The purpose of the country visits is to work with Member States to assess their overall national counter-terrorism efforts; their strengths, weaknesses and technical assistance needs; good practices employed in the implementation of resolutions; and terrorism trends and challenges.

The visiting teams are led by CTED and include experts from a number of international, regional and subregional organizations, including ICAO.

The visits include consultations with the host Government and, where possible, on-site visits to relevant locations or facilities, such as airports and external border checkpoints.

The expert teams compile their observations into a report for the CTC; make recommendations for action; and identify Member States’ technical assistance needs.

Resolution 1373 - and many subsequent Council resolutions on terrorism - address many issues of relevance to civil aviation.

To mention just a few:

- Resolution 1624 calls upon all States to cooperate to strengthen the security of their international borders by combating fraudulent documents and enhancing screening measures.
- Effective border management is of particular importance in the context of resolution 2178, on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, or FTFs.
- Resolution 2322 calls upon States to share biometric and biographic information and encourages States to consider extending access to the
INTERPOL I-24/7 at strategic locations such as airports.

- Resolution 2309 expresses concern that terrorist groups continue to view civil aviation as an attractive target and identifies a number of steps for Member States to take in order to strengthen implementation of the ICAO standards.

Whenever possible, ICAO takes part in our country visits and plays a critical role in the evaluation of States’ implementation efforts.

During the visits, CTED supports and promotes ICAO’s standards, recommended practices and guidance materials. CTED also supports the ICAO TRIP Strategy and works with ICAO to promote the Strategy’s implementation in all regions and subregions.

The visits and the recommendations are thus in full compliance with ICAO’s work and audits.

CTC’s recommendations on aviation security can be shared with ICAO in order to identify areas in which it might provide technical assistance (e.g., with respect to travel-document security).

Many States, of course, struggle to effectively implement even basic aviation-security measures.

And ICAO’s audits can reveal priority needs in a particular Member State, as well as where CTC and CTED might provide political support for ICAO’s efforts.

In light of new and emerging terrorist threats and new technological developments, States must first and foremost be encouraged and supported to continue strengthening implementation of good aviation practices - in particular
those set forth in paragraph 6 of resolution 2309, including enhancing screening and security checks, ensuring appropriate resources and effective quality controls, and promoting effective security culture.

It is imperative that States and relevant entities increase the level of technical assistance delivered to States in need.

New, updated and revised guidance materials developed by ICAO should be fully utilized in order to better address the evolving terrorist threat to civil aviation, including through updates to threat and risk assessment methodologies.

It cannot be over-stressed that gaps in basic security measures create aviation-security vulnerabilities that can easily be exploited and circumvented by terrorists.

Because the terrorist threat to civil aviation is constantly evolving, States should assess the risk at the national and airport-specific levels with a view to putting into place appropriate security measures.

In order to ensure that proper mitigation measures are implemented, staff conducting risk assessments at the airport-specific level should be made aware of the need to strengthen their understanding of the relevant threat – which may vary from State to State and from airport to airport.

Failure to understand the security risks and subsequently failure to put in place appropriate mitigation measures can lead to significant security gaps.

Appropriate and necessary facilities and equipment must also be put in place. This may include Explosives Trace Detection equipment, X-ray machines, document-verification tools with passport readers, and fraud-protection instruments.
States also need to strengthen their capacity to identify low and high-risk passengers, taking into account the need to facilitate travel.

In order to establish coordinated civil-aviation security strategies, policies and programmes, States need to treat civil-aviation security in a holistic manner, including by promoting cooperation among appropriate State-level authorities and industry.

During the CTC’s recent special meeting, participants highlighted the urgent need for States to strengthen efforts to introduce or strengthen API and/or PNR systems as a means to identify individual terrorists and FTFs. The low level of implementation of API systems creates a worrying security gap.

Participants also noted the importance of enhancing protection of airport landside areas, taking into account the allocation of responsibility to, and cooperation among, various law enforcement agencies and other actors.

In this regard, the new ICAO SARPs and guidance material for protecting landside areas should be taken into the consideration.

Meeting participants also addressed concern at the misuse of information and communications technologies for terrorist purposes, the potential vulnerability of entry points in aircraft and airport IT systems, and the risks posed by the use of sophisticated improvised explosive devices.

Effective border security is the first line of defence against the movement of terrorists across borders. Ensuring border security requires effective controls on the movement of people and goods across borders, as well as measures to prevent unlawful interference into civil aviation.
Maintaining secure air borders is extremely challenging for many Member States. Other challenges derive from lack of financial and human resources, lack of equipment and specialized skills, and lack of intra-State and inter-State cooperation.

CTED and ICAO are currently drafting an agreement aimed at further defining and strengthening their cooperation. This is a very positive development, which also responds to the provisions of resolution 2309 on strengthening inter-agency cooperation.

In conclusion, let me reassure you that CTED will continue to intensify its efforts to strengthen the security of civil aviation, including through cooperation with ICAO in facilitating the delivery of technical assistance to assist States, in accordance with the ICAO standards and with resolution 2309.

Thank you.