I. Introduction

1. The establishment of the Government of National Accord (GNA) following the December 2015 signing of the Libyan Political Agreement, marked an important step forward in the political transition in Libya. However, implementation of the agreement continues to face challenges.

2. Political and security instability in Libya risks undermining work towards political reconciliation and countering terrorism. The creation of unified state institutions, including unified national security forces under appropriate civilian control, remains essential in this respect. Despite progress in the fight against terrorist groups, notably against ISIL in Sirte, and in Benghazi, the terrorist threat in Libya remains concerning. After their defeat in Sirte by forces aligned with the GNA, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh) has dispersed in Libya, including to towns favoured by or vulnerable to extremist movements. The alleged defection of some Ansar Al Sharia members to ISIL – subsequent to the May 2017 disbandment of AAS - is a development of concern. In the south, Al-Qaida-affiliated groups such as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Mourabitoun and Ansar Eddin have established ties with nomadic and marginalized communities and local armed groups. In the absence of a unified national border and security structure, the March 2017 merger of these groups could strengthen Al-Qaida’s presence in the region. Al-Qaida affiliates share with some Libyan armed groups a common interest in weak State control. The latter, in particular, derive the majority of their income from cross-border trafficking.

3. The country’s porous borders also facilitate criminality, including smuggling, people trafficking and the unchallenged travel of Libyan and foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). Libya remains a permissive operational destination for FTFs (notably from African States) and continues to be used as a platform for attacks against the Sahel region (e.g., through the flow of arms and fighters to Mali) and as a support hub for ISIL in North Africa.

4. The deterioration of the security situation since the beginning of the armed conflict in 2011 has limited engagement between the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Libyan Government. The Committee has thus been unable to update its 2009 assessment of Libya's capacity to effectively Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) or to consider its implementation of resolution 2178 (2014). The Committee believes that the threat of terrorism, including Daesh, continues to affect Libya and the region. The Joint Open Briefing of the Counter Terrorism Committee, the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, and the Libya Sanctions Committee will provide an opportunity to address this issue with the wider UN membership and
support common efforts to deprive terrorist groups of their finances, fighters, and avenues of recruitment and influence.

II. Objective

5. The objective of the joint open briefing would be to assess current threats and challenges, as well as discuss the assistance provided to Libya by the United Nations and other international organizations.

III. Format of discussions

6. The proposed briefing would consist of opening statements by the three Committee Chairs, as well as three substantive sessions, arranged in “presentation/question-and-answer” format to encourage interactive discussion) (draft agenda attached for the Committee’s consideration).

7. The three Committee Chairs would act as moderators.

8. The briefing would be open to the wider United Nations membership, as well as to other relevant United Nations entities and international and regional organizations. Participants would be encouraged to raise issues and questions. As there would not be sufficient time to hear written statements, participating delegations would be requested to submit statements to the Committee/CTED and/or the two other Committees, for inclusion on their respective websites. The Committee/CTED and the other two Committees would circulate an annotated agenda, meeting documentation, and other logistical information, which would also be posted on the websites of the three Committees.

IV. Date and venue

9. It is proposed that the briefing be held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 27 June 2017, in Conference Room 4, from 10.00 a.m. to 1.00 p.m.

V. Outcomes

10. The outcomes of the briefing would include a joint Chairs’ summary of the presentations and discussions, to be posted on the three Committees’ respective websites.