United Nations Security Council unanimously adopts resolution on international judicial cooperation in countering terrorism

The transnational nature of terrorism requires a coordinated response for all States and actors of the international community. Cooperation in judicial matters is an indispensable requirement in order to overcome challenges pertaining to the investigation and prosecution of terrorist acts, particularly when the various elements of a case are spread beyond the jurisdictions of several States.

These were some of the conclusions of the 12 December 2016 high-level, open briefing of the United Nations Security Council on international judicial cooperation in countering terrorism.

Resolution 2322 (2016), unanimously adopted by the Council under the presidency of Spain, reinforces mechanisms for mutual legal assistance, and includes references to new information and communication technologies (ICT) including the Internet, to facilitate the process of gathering and sharing of evidence with judicial authorities. The resolution also has a special focus on cooperation in terms of obtaining and preserving e-evidence, and reinforcing a network of so-called Central Authorities.

In addition, the resolution seeks to strengthen police-to-police cooperation in several areas,
preventing exploitation of the Internet and social media for terrorist purposes

UNAMI / CTED organize joint meeting on Iraqi counter-terrorism technical assistance needs

Security Council open debate highlights rapidly growing ‘asymmetrical threats’ to United Nations peace operations

Briefing by Deputy Head of National Anti-terrorism Committee Central Office of the Russian Federation

Paris Prosecutor François Molins and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swartz brief the UN Counter-terrorism Committee

Third report of the Secretary-General states that the threat posed by Da’esh is still significant

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including through the reinforcement of the INTERPOL 24/7 communication network, as well as the development of regional networks of focal points such as the one approved by the Council of Europe in its Additional Protocol, which has been operative since late November 2016.

This resolution is significant for the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate (CTED) in their work to promote international cooperation at all levels, including by investigators, prosecutors, and judges, in order to prevent, investigate, and prosecute terrorist acts.

“Our policies and methods must reach beyond the parameters of traditional security by taking a larger perspective, based on international cooperation not only between Member States but also with specialized and regional organizations, as well as on partnerships with civil society, academia, and the private sector,” Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director of CTED Mr. Jean-Paul Laborde stated in his remarks to the Security Council on 12 December 2016.


Joint special meeting on terrorist financing assessed risks and identified way forward

A growing number of United Nations Member States are assessing specific terrorist financing risks and the vulnerability of their financial and economic sectors to terrorist financing. Also Member States that are not at high risk in terms of terrorism more broadly may still present a risk regarding the financing of terrorism. While terrorist entities and individuals are still relying on traditional forms of terrorist financing such as cash or money remitters, these
groups are also utilizing the Internet and other forms of information and communication technologies to access, raise, and move funds.

These were some of the key themes raised in a joint special meeting of the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, together with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), organized at the United Nations on 12 and 13 December 2016. Several tools already exist to counter terrorist financing, such as asset freezing requirements or information sharing mechanisms. The main challenge consists of implementing these tools effectively. The joint special meeting - held under the mandate of Security Council resolution 2253 (2015) on efforts to suppress terrorist financing, which expanded the sanctions framework to include ISIL (Da'esh) - provided an important forum for Member States and other actors to share practices and lessons learned that can guide the way forward in this area.

CTED, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the Government of Spain hold side event on international counter-terrorism cooperation

On the margins of a high-level open debate of the Security Council on international judicial cooperation to counter terrorism on 12 December 2016, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations organized a side event on the same theme.

Speakers welcomed the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2322 (2016) as an important tool for Member States to strengthen police-to-police cooperation, designate Central Authorities for mutual legal assistance and extradition, and transfer
terrorism-related requests electronically. The resolution also calls for greater information-sharing regarding foreign terrorist fighters and other terrorists and terrorist organizations, as well as biometric and biographic information.

A representative of the Council of Europe discussed the recent establishment of a network of counter-terrorism focal points, made possible by the adoption of an Additional Protocol. The latter also allows, for example, border guards who encounter suspicious travellers to communicate directly with their designated focal point, thereby speeding up coordination between Member States.

Judge Najat Abou Chakra from Lebanon highlighted challenges in international judicial cooperation, such as the high volume of terrorism-related requests for judicial authorities and outdated procedures. Judge Chakra added that “different judicial systems should not stop us from international cooperation.”

The event was as an opportunity to share good practices and lessons learned, as well as discuss future collaboration between Member States, international and regional organizations, United Nations entities, and judicial authorities, in the field of international judicial cooperation to counter terrorism.

More information about the event is available at https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/blog/event/side-event-on-enhancing-counter-terrorism-international-cooperation-247/. A webcast of the meeting can be found here.

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United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee holds special meeting on preventing exploitation of the Internet and social media for terrorist purposes

Exploitation of the Internet and social media for terrorist purposes can only be defeated through sustained and comprehensive action involving the active participation and collaboration of Member States, international and regional organizations, civil society, and the private sector. This was a common theme expressed by a number of participants in a special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, held at the United Nations in New York on 1 December 2016.
Assistant Secretary-General Atefeh Riazi with the Office of Information and Communications Technology of the United Nations led the first session of the CTED-organized technical sessions.

“We must work together to promote dialogue among all stakeholders in order to find effective ways to prevent the exploitation of information and communication technologies for terrorist purposes,” H.E. Amr Abdellatif Aboulatta, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations, said in his closing statement. Ambassador Aboulatta is Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council.

The meeting - Preventing the exploitation of information and communication technologies (ICT) for terrorist purposes, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms - was held against the backdrop of the significant and growing threat posed to Member States by the exploitation of ICT, in particular the Internet and social media, for terrorist purposes. In a number of resolutions, the Security Council has recognized this threat and called upon Member States to take the measures needed to deliver an effective response. The formal meeting was preceded by technical sessions on the same theme organized by the Executive Directorate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTED) on 30 November and 1 December 2016.
The special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee was led by Chair Amr Abdellatif Aboulatta, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations.

Representatives of the private sector underscored their commitment to preventing the exploitation of ICT for terrorist purposes. Maryam Mujica, Public Policy Team Manager for Twitter, highlighted that the company “has suspended over 360,000 accounts for threatening or promoting terrorist acts” since mid-2015.

Participants in the special meeting and the accompanying technical sessions included Member States, international and regional organizations, United Nations entities, the private sector, academia, faith-based leaders, and civil society representatives. Having relevant actors from various sectors gathered in the same room provided an opportunity for dialogue and for a frank discussion about challenges and ways forward.

UNAMI / CTED organize joint meeting on Iraqi counter-terrorism technical assistance needs

On 25 October 2016, a joint meeting of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) was held in Baghdad. The purpose was to enhance the collective efforts of the international community in support of Iraq’s counter-terrorism efforts within the framework of the priority technical assistance needs identified following the Counter-Terrorism Committee visit to Iraq in 2015.

“Iraq remains in dire need of bilateral and multilateral counter-terrorism assistance: it needs all the help we can give it both now and in the longer term,” Head of UNAMI and Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Kubis said in his statement, delivered at the meeting by UNAMI’s Joint Analysis Unit Head, Mr. Namik
Based on CTED’s dialogue and partnership with Iraqi counter-terrorism officials, the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee has identified 16 technical assistance needs. These needs, drawn up in accordance with the international best codes and practices of partner organizations, inter alia address the use of special investigation techniques, financial investigations, the freezing of terrorist assets, border management, intelligence analysis, use of INTERPOL tools, and issuance of secure travel documents.

In the joint meeting, CTED experts Ahmed Seif El-Dawla, Chief of Section, and Nicole El-Khoury, Legal Officer, presented priority key findings of the Counter-Terrorism Committee’s most recent visit to Iraq, as well as subsequent developments related to the facilitation of technical assistance needs. Both Iraqi authorities and CTED stressed the importance of keeping technical assistance priorities abreast of the latest trends in terms of the threat posed by Da’esh and other terrorist organizations in the region. Iraqi authorities, who had already endorsed the findings of the Committee, expressed their wish for continuous engagement with the donor community and partners as a means to advance the required support for the 16 areas. They also presented tailor-made projects within the framework of the 16 identified technical assistance needs.

“The people of Iraq have suffered long years of unspeakable horror and injustice [...] There is a need for immediate action to consolidate and build upon the gains acquired through military operations and to facilitate Iraq’s development of the legal, institutional, and operational infrastructures required to counter terrorism effectively — whether in the legal sector, the judiciary, through law enforcement, the financial sector, border management, or countering violent extremism — in accordance with the relevant international codes and standards,” Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director of CTED, Mr. Jean-Paul Laborde, said in a video message for the joint meeting.
SRSG Kubis concluded: “We are confident that today’s meeting and deliberations will be a significant contribution to moving this discussion to the next stage, which is focused on concrete funding and tangible support along the priority technical assistance needs highlighted today.”

Security Council open debate highlights rapidly growing ‘asymmetrical threats’ to United Nations peace operations

On 7 November 2016, the United Nations Security Council held an open debate on “peace operations facing asymmetrical threats,” which attracted some 60 participants including representatives of Member States, United Nations entities, and international and regional organizations.

Jean-Paul Laborde, Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, emphasized that the close relationship linking local and regional terrorism with violent extremism and organized crime threatened international peace and security.

An estimated two thirds of peacekeepers were operating in areas where terrorism and violent extremism were present, Mr. Laborde said, adding that asymmetrical threats posed risks for both peacekeepers and civilians. Executive Director Laborde described the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and United Nations peace operations as partners within the Council, with distinct but mutually reinforcing mandates.

CTED’s mandate is to undertake independent evaluations of the counter-terrorism capacity of
Member States, he explained, highlighting the close interaction between the Executive Directorate and other relevant actors. Stressing that the mandates of CTED and peace operations must be expanded into a “one UN” approach, Mr. Laborde also underscored the importance of enhancing institutional cooperation.

Executive Director Laborde called for increased coordination between United Nations entities, international and regional organizations, and bilateral assistance in order to implement recommendations and technical assistance priorities identified by the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate on the ground.

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**Briefing by Deputy Head of National Anti-terrorism Committee Central Office of the Russian Federation**

On 10 November 2016, Mr. Yevgeny Ilyin, First Deputy Head of the National Anti-terrorism Committee Central Office of the Russian Federation, briefed the Counter-Terrorism Committee.

“Over recent years, terrorism has been experiencing a profound and rapid transformation in terms of its organizational principles and ideology,” Mr. Ilyin said, outlining the measures currently being implemented by the Russian Federation in countering terrorist propaganda and beliefs.

These measures include the promotion of interethnic and interreligious dialogue; engagement with youth through education and cultural projects; and coordination between federal and state agencies and local actors. A concrete example of how the Russian Federation engages
with youth is through the introduction of counter-narratives to violent extremism and propaganda into the school curriculum, which is done through the Ministry of Education. The First Deputy Head also underscored the importance of regional cooperation between civil society organizations in local communities and Government entities.

The briefing was followed by an interactive discussion, which offered Member States the chance to exchange ideas and provide practical guidance on how to develop these efforts further.

Paris Prosecutor François Molins and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swartz brief the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee


Paris Prosecutor François Molins of France, UN CTED Executive Director Jean-Paul Laborde, and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swartz of the United States.

Since terrorism is a global threat to peace and security requiring a global response, Messieurs Molins and Swartz underscored the importance of international cooperation in mutual legal assistance matters. Both speakers provided concrete examples of good practices in this area, such as information sharing as foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) cross national borders, law enforcement and prosecutorial liaisons at embassies, and more formally through mutual legal assistance treaties. Coordination with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) was recommended by both speakers. Mr. Emmanuel Roux, Special Representative of INTERPOL to the United Nations and present at the briefing, called on Member States to utilize the INTERPOL FTF database as it already exists, allowing Member States to gain time in the search for information about foreign terrorist fighters.

In addition, Messieurs Molins and Swartz spoke about challenges both France and the U.S. face in countering terrorism, including the collection of electronic evidence in terrorism cases. Both speakers called for more public-private cooperation, since Internet providers are important partners in addressing this challenge.
Delegates mentioned the upcoming Counter-Terrorism Committee special meeting on 1 December on “Preventing the exploitation of information and communication technologies (ICT) for terrorist purposes, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms,” whose participants will include, inter alia, representatives from the private sector, faith-based leaders, and international and regional organizations.

Delegates also underscored the importance of the various United Nations conventions and resolutions that provide a framework for international judicial cooperation. Mr. Molins and Mr. Swartz noted the important role the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) plays in convening regional workshops, and called on Member States to continue their cooperation in countering the global threat of terrorism.

Third report of the Secretary-General states that the threat posed by Da’esh is still significant

“The threat posed by ISIL continues to be significant and to diversify,” according to the United Nations Secretary-General’s third report on the threat posed by Da’esh/ISIL to international peace and security, and on the efforts of the UN in support of its Member States to counter this threat. The report (S/2016/830), presented to the Security Council on 13 October 2016, follows resolution 2253 (2015), which requests the Secretary-General to provide strategic-level reports every four months demonstrating the gravity of the threat posed to international peace and security by Da’esh/ISIL and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities.
The Secretary-General's third report on the threat posed by Da’esh/ISIL being presented to the Security Council.

The report includes an assessment of the threat of foreign terrorist fighters, and the sources of financing of these groups through illicit trade in oil, antiquities, and other natural resources, as well as their planning and facilitation of attacks, and reflects the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering this threat. “Increasingly complex and nearly simultaneous attacks in different countries - committed through large-scale operations and individual or small terrorist cells, either directed or inspired by ISIL - have a significant impact and present particular problems to UN Member States in terms of the security response,” Mr. Feltman told Security Council members.

The report considers the presence and influence of Da’esh/ISIL outside Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, including in Yemen, East Africa, and South and South-East Asia. Taking a regional approach, the report highlights the efforts and progress of Member States of South and South-East Asia to implement counter-terrorism measures in a number of thematic areas. It also considers how Member States are dealing with the issue of foreign terrorist fighters who return to their home States. The use of information and communications technology by Da’esh/ISIL, the issue of conflict-related sexual violence, and the range of technical assistance and capacity-building efforts undertaken by the United Nations and its partners are also addressed.

S/2016/830 was prepared with the input of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) in close collaboration with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team assisting the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), and 2253 (2015), as well as other relevant United Nations actors.

The Secretary-General’s reports are an important tool for Member States and United Nations bodies in their efforts to address the threat posed by Da’esh/ISIL and associated entities to international peace and security. The past two reports were dated 29 January 2016 and 31 May 2016.
Academia is an important partner of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate (CTED) in their efforts to analyze the drivers of terrorism and violent extremism and make recommendations to Member States on ways to address emerging trends and challenges in these areas. Most of the contributions highlighted below have been published by members of the CTED Global Counter-Terrorism Research Network.

All information provided is for information purposes only and does not constitute the views or opinions of CTED.

A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism
Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2016

- To date, CVE has been ad hoc and undervalued compared to the military, law enforcement, and intelligence aspects of the fight. We must significantly increase the resources and attention dedicated to challenging extremists’ narratives and creating new pathways for those vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment.
- **Take a global approach.** The threat of violent extremism can be found throughout the world. ISIS is the most recent and brutal manifestation of the problem—but certainly not the last if we do not change course. Even as it focuses on destroying ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the international community must keep pressure on other terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, Boko Haram, Hezbollah, and al Shabaab, which continue to execute devastating attacks. However, combating existing terrorist organizations is not sufficient. We must address the spread of extremist ideologies to Africa, Europe, South and Southeast Asia, the Caucuses, Russia, and elsewhere to prevent terrorist groups from regenerating in new forms.
- **Forge dynamic partnerships.** The nature of the enemy—decentralized, globalized, committed, and crowdsourced—requires intensive and adaptable partnerships between and among governments, the private sector, and civil society. This demands more than sporadic engagements and pilot programs, which have dominated the last decade and a half. Instead, it requires harnessing the talent, expertise, and ingenuity that exist outside of government.
- **Embrace experimentation.** Although we have learned a great deal about how and why extremist ideologies are appealing, terrorists’ tactics are constantly evolving. Therefore, rather than searching for a single solution, we must flood the zone with alternative narratives and ideas, allowing the strongest to win. Programs will not always be successful, but we must encourage calculated risk-taking and innovation, and make a more concerted effort to learn from practitioners’ successes and failures.
Such an approach requires careful monitoring to ensure that the process is not captured by proponents of the very ideologies that we are trying to defeat.

- **Avoid reactions that play into violent extremists’ hands.** Terrorism thrives on a disproportionate response to perceived and real threats. ISIS, for example, has an explicit aim of creating rifts between governments and their people, as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims in Western countries. Attacks provoke fear and often lead to a rise in anti-Muslim sentiment, which terrorist recruiters then exploit. A former al Qaeda recruiter in the United States explained, “radicals and recruiters love Islamophobia. It drives recruitment.”

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**ISIS’s New Threat: Possible Use of WMDs**

*International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism, October, 2016*

- Days before the coalition forces began their Mosul operations, ISIS openly threatened on a Turkish Telegram account to make use of WMDs, mainly chemical weapons as a last resort. It was indicated in the message that ISIS has not deployed its WMDs so far, including long-range missiles. However, they threatened that if circumstances forced them to use such weapons, they would not hesitate to hit Baghdad, Erbil or Sulaymaniyah.

- As much as the Telegram threat appears to be pure propaganda, we must not forget that ISIS is believed to have used mustard gas against the Kurdish forces in Iraq in August 2015, which is the first known such case. Furthermore, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has also reached their conclusion, based on testing, that mustard gas was used in Aleppo in August 2015, most probably also by ISIS. Additionally, ISIS also used chlorine gas as chemical weapon against the Peshmerga forces in January 2015. Similarly, in March 2016, ISIS launched mustard gas attack on the town of Taza in Kirkuk province wounding about 50 civilians. More recently, on July 22, 2016, ISIS also attacked the Peshmerga forces with chlorine carrying mortars at the outposts of Tal Afar wounding three soldiers.

- Incidentally, as coalition forces advanced towards Mosul in October, 2016, there were several handmade ISIS rockets designed to carry mustard gas fired by ISIS against Tazehurmati and Dibis regions in Kirkuk wounding around 400 people and killing a child.

- In March 2016, American Special Forces captured a suspect named Suleyman Davut Aferi in Talafer. This person was believed to be in charge of ISIS’s chemical weapons program. Based on the information received from Aferi, the Pentagon bombed ISIS’s chemical weapons factory in Mosul in September 2016. ISIS denied this claim, immediately releasing a statement that the coalition forces targeted the only medicine factory in Mosul. However, even if ISIS had a facility to produce chemical weapons, there still needs to be ample amounts of chemical materials present to produce agents.

- Furthermore, Jabhat-al Nusra has also deployed homemade mustard gas in August 2013 in Guta region in Syria. It is quite possible that ISIS might have copied Jabhat-al Nusra’s path in producing sarin or mustard gas or simply captured what they had as it happened several times in Syria, with groups seizing each other’s weapons as war booties.
Consequently, while the likelihood of ISIS's having professional military grade chemical weapons is low, it is obvious that ISIS has managed to produce different chemical weapons over the past years and successfully used those agents with its handmade missiles. Therefore, it would be very naive not to take the threats ISIS pushes through the social media platforms seriously while also acknowledging severe limitations they face in production and deployment of chemical weapons.

Foreign Fighters in Their Own Words: Using YouTube as a Source
The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague (ICCT), October, 2016

- Academic literature on foreign fighting in the context of the current conflict in Syria/Iraq is still evolving. Methodological approaches vary from interviewing family members of fighters in Syria, data or document studies to the use of social media, such as scanning Facebook accounts for useful information. However, one valuable resource that has not been widely exploited is YouTube video material posted of and by foreign fighters.
- In analysing 37 YouTube videos, data suggests that most of the foreign fighters are male, with an average age of 26. Only a few are older than 30 and, in total, three women appear in the videos. The largest diversity among foreign fighters can be found in their educational and working backgrounds, as different jobs and activities were mentioned: one fighter was a former model who joined the YPG; another was a notorious drug dealer and gangster.
- Seven people had a military background and were employed in the defence forces of their country while others were living an ordinary life with their spouse and children. What stood out was the sequence of fighters in videos concerning chronological order: Western fighters who appeared in recent videos more often had joined the YPG as a response to other groups fighting, like, for example, IS.
- Most of the fighters joined the Syrian civil war for ideological or religious reasons, and they often had more than one reason for taking part in the war. Ideological reasons (such as helping the oppressed Syrian people) were mentioned as a reason thirty times, and religion was for twenty three fighters a reason to take part in the war.
- Others expressed that they travelled to Syria to fight against IS; all these people joined the YPG. Their goal was to help and defend the Kurdish people against the violence of IS and other groups.
- It seems that the future does not concern most of the foreign fighters and that they are living solely for their current goal, or otherwise have no intention to carry out attacks in their home countries. Out of fifty, only fourteen fighters said something about future plans. Five persons had the intention to stay in Syria, and one person explicitly stated to go home after the fight. However, it could also be that they try to deceive the viewer by lying, perhaps in order to prevent getting attention from security agencies. Yet, other fighters clearly stated that “we are coming for you”, possibly indicating a future attack.
- YouTube and other social media platforms can be used to gain knowledge of the world of foreign fighters. First of all, social media research provides additional insights that might not have been discovered otherwise. As interviews with subjects in Syria and Iraq
are difficult, social media research is a way to retrieve important, primary source information.

- Secondly, the Syrian civil war is a quick and fast changing environment. By using YouTube as a source of information, quick changes can be observed almost at the same time, making YouTube or social media in general a quick and practical way to retrieve information in ‘real time’.

- Thirdly, fighters talk in the videos about their future plans. This may shed light on the future whereabouts of a foreign fighter as well as his or her future intentions when it comes to violent behaviour in their home country. The information found on YouTube can help fill the gap between theoretical knowledge and conducting empirical research in Syria itself, which is also useful for policymakers. As this information is available, why not use it?

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**Assessing Terrorist Finance: A Regional Approach**

*RUSI, September 2016*

- For fifteen years, efforts to tackle terrorist finance have been long on words and short on action. The recently published 2016 Regional Risk Assessment on Terrorism Financing 2016 for Southeast Asia and Australia suggests that at last global edicts are being operationalised locally.

- Fifteen years of CTF-related talk and review may have driven up legal standards, but have been less successful at developing a precise understanding of the risks entailed. This has resulted in limited practical and effective action against terrorist financing.

- AML/CTF is presented as if this were a single six-letter risk rather than two challenges sharing some similarities but a great many differences. The work undertaken by the informal international *Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units* to analyse the financing of foreign terrorist fighters is a notable exception. It is this conflation of risks and lack of CTF-specific strategies that have certainly led to the concern expressed by the UN in Resolution 2253, a concern which must be addressed if the CTF narrative is to remain both theoretically and practically relevant.

- Yet perhaps this state of affairs is about to change, not because of activities led by FATF, the UN or any other global body, but by regional collaboration at an operational level. In early August this year and under the leadership of the Australian (AUSTRAC) and Indonesian (PPATK) financial intelligence units, a regional risk assessment (RRA) on terrorist financing was unveiled.

- Based on the input of six countries across the region, the assessment seeks ‘to develop a deeper, shared understanding of the drivers behind terrorism financing in the region’. The assessment focuses on identifying those terrorist financing methods that currently present the highest regional risk, along with those that are forecast to pose an increased risk over the next three to five years, spanning not just individual domestic risks but those that connect countries or are intra-regional.

- The assessment also identifies priorities for which regional cooperation is required to strengthen the overall response. Lastly, in contrast to many of the CTF-related initiatives that are centrally directed by the UN or FATF, this assessment seeks to inform and refine global policy by contributing genuine analysis focused on terrorist finance to ensure that the top-down policies reflect the reality on the ground.
While this initiative in South East Asia is to be welcomed, there are other regions with far greater vulnerability to terrorist financing weaknesses that need to be addressed urgently in a similarly focused effort. The Middle East and both East and West Africa would benefit from replicating the Australian- and Indonesian-led model.

Bodies such as FATF and the UN need to encourage greater focus on implementing policies with the help of countries such as Australia, the UK and France. They have a vested interest in strengthening the understanding and capacity of ‘upstream’ countries where effectiveness and implementation remain low. The Regional Risk Assessment on Terrorism Financing for Southeast Asia and Australia provides a model of collaboration and analysis that others would be well advised to follow.

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Africa in Focus: Boko Haram -Islamic State Connection
*A Journal of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, June, 2016*

**Highlights:**

- Security sources indicate that as of October 2015, 150 Nigerians have been recruited by Boko Haram to join IS. Boko Haram’s pledge of fealty was also celebrated with a parade of IS fighters across provinces of Al-Barakah, Homs, Halab (Aleppo), Al-Jazirah, Al-Furat, Al-Janub, AlRaqqa, Al-Khayr and Diglah.

- Following Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance, the group has received logistics and support from IS. On 20 April 2016, Chadian soldiers intercepted a large cache of weapons sent from IS affiliates in Libya to Boko Haram insurgents in the Lake Chad region. Brig. Gen. Donald Bolduc, commander of US Special Operations in Africa, confirmed the deepening links between IS and Boko Haram. Bolduc said the Boko Haram’s way of conducting ambushes, setting improvised explosive devices and undertaking high-profile attacks on hotels clearly show that it shares “tactics, techniques and procedures” with IS.

- Boko Haram is recruiting fighters in Nigeria and around the region, including in Chad, Niger, Mali, Libya, Senegal and Algeria. In February 2016, Nigerian security forces arrested Abdussalam Enesi Yunusa in Kano for recruiting five individuals for IS. Security forces also uncovered an IS cell in Daura, Katsina state, led by Ibrahim Mohammed Daura and five of his colleagues from the Ansaru faction of Boko Haram. Earlier, the military had arrested five IS cell members in Kano; they were going to Libya with their families to join IS.

- In November 2015, Makhtar Diokhané, a Senegalese national, was arrested in Niger. He was on his way to negotiate with Nigerian security services for the release of his associates who were arrested while fighting for Boko Haram. Investigations following Diokhané’s capture led to the disruption of his cell in Senegal and the arrest of other cell members. This included Diokhané’s wife, imams, and relatives of other Senegalese nationals fighting with Boko Haram. In January 2016, Malian authorities detained four West African nationals (two from Guinea Bissau, one from The Gambia and Guinea) who were travelling to join Boko Haram. In February 2016, eight more Senegalese were also arrested in Mauritania for allegedly planning to join Boko Haram. These arrested
individuals claimed that at least 23 Senegalese nationals have become Boko Haram members since 2015 and confessed that the terrorist group’s membership includes some Mauritanians as well.

- Nigeria is establishing a framework to train competent members of the local vigilante groups, hunters and members of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) for enrollment into the military and other security agencies. So far, bomb-making factories of Boko Haram have been discovered and shut down in Potiskum, Buni Yadi, Mubi, Gwoza, and Maiduguri.

- The Nigerian Governments’ soft approach is centred on mitigating violent extremism and rehabilitating both victims and perpetrators of the conflict. In this context, there is a plan to establish a North-East Development Commission to rebuild the region destroyed by terrorist activities.

- Government agencies and local NGOs such as the Adamawa Peace Initiative (API) are coordinating local community dialogue and reconciliation programmes within and between communities of different faiths with the approval of the government. Community leaders, traditional rulers and religious groups partake in this.

- Along with this, the government has also established the Presidential Initiative for the North-East (PINE) to cater for the needs of displaced people. PINE also ensures prompt and adequate delivery of relief materials, including medical supplies to them. Furthermore, in April 2016, the Nigerian government, through the Office of the National Security Adviser and with the help of the European Union Technical Assistance to Nigeria’s evolving security challenges, launched a manual for deradicalization of violent extremists in Abuja. The guide provides the framework for engaging with Boko Haram members in rehabilitation centres and in the military established camps.

- The pilot project began in Kuje prison on the outskirts of Abuja, the capital city, where 39 violent extremists were engaged for rehabilitation. Thirty-three of the violent extremists voluntarily accepted the programme and were selected to embrace education, arts therapy and different vocational training.

- Future Trajectory of the Boko Haram-IS Alliance: At a regional level, the growing security threat arises from mobilisation and recruitment across the region. With IS’ strongholds in Sirte, Libya, the recruitment of radical elements from Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia and other countries is likely to be on the increase if no urgent steps are taken to stop the tide. These areas have formed a strong support base for Boko Haram, which is already recruiting for IS.

- Boko Haram’s use of female suicide bombers has increased over the last few months. Although there are fewer incidents on Nigerian side of the border, the threat of female suicide bombers has amplified in northern Cameroon. This trend is likely to remain because Boko Haram retains the capacity to abduct more people, especially women and girls to be used as suicide bombers.

- As IS fighters are forced to relocate from Iraq, Syria and some parts of the Middle East, North and West Africa will be the likely destination. The Lake Chad border region - Boko Haram’s base - could become a recruitment hub for Islamic State West Africa Province, where some local Islamic sects share similar ideologies as IS.