GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
UNITED NATIONS CIVILIAN POLICE
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
PREFACE

The United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines is the product of extensive consultations with representatives of Member States, international police experts, former UN Police Commissioners of peace operations, and the Lessons Learned Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

The Principles and Guidelines lays out the DPKO and Civilian Police Unit’s perspectives and policies for the operations of UN Civilian Police in peace operations. It is to be used by police-contributing Member States to prepare their officers for service in UN peace operations.

In addition, the Principles and Guidelines is intended to be a handbook for Police Commissioners as well as senior UN management serving in headquarters and peace operations. It is also meant as an aid outlining the parameters of civilian police responsibilities to orient planning and operational activities.

This text does not replace or supersede the Rules and Regulations of the UN, related administrative issuances, Standard Operating Procedures of peacekeeping field operations, or other United Nations directives.

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INTRODUCTION

In its 1998 and 1999 reports, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations requested the Secretariat to compile guidelines on general principles regarding the role of civilian police. In its 2000 report (A/54/839) the Special Committee clarified that these guidelines should articulate a comprehensive set of policies concerning the activities of civilian police in peacekeeping operations and should be in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and consistent with norms of international law.

The report is divided into the following sections:

I. Background on Civilian Police in Peace Operations
II. Principles for Civilian Police Operations
III. Guidelines for Civilian Police Operations
IV. Other Relationships, Responsibilities and Duties of Civilian Police
I. BACKGROUND ON CIVILIAN POLICE IN PEACE OPERATIONS
Today, the United Nations is frequently asked to intervene in post-conflict situations in which the root causes of conflict remain unsettled and the basic political, legal, economic, social, and governmental institutions are in flux. In post-conflict environments, there may be no consensus as to the structure, role, and composition of public administration and the legal system, in general, and law enforcement institutions, in particular. There may also be no domestic agreement on the essential organizational and operational elements of democratic policing and the criminal justice infrastructure may be fragile. In the worst case scenario, the entire spectrum of law enforcement institutions, including the legally constituted local police agencies, if they exist at all, may be crippled by the activities of parallel illegal structures and organizations who wield de facto policing powers because their origins and authority are rooted in the conflict. These parallel illegal structures may, in fact, dominate the political and economic landscape and, thereby, subvert or mold governmental institutions to further their own criminal enterprises. In such cases, local stability and sustained political and economic development depend upon the successful removal of these criminal enterprises from their sources of control and power.

A functioning law enforcement and criminal justice system that upholds and enforces the rule of law and is adaptive to the needs of the residents of the mission area is a requisite for and one of the principal cornerstones of civil authority, political stability, and economic development. In some post-conflict environments, the law enforcement and criminal justice systems may be the first institutions of local civil authority to be rebuilt after the cessation of hostilities. In such cases, the institutions and practices of law enforcement and criminal justice are the incubators from which democratic public administration practices will
spread throughout the post-conflict environment. Consequently, in peacekeeping operations the Civilian Police (CIVPOL) component is often asked to play a prominent role in the transition from conflict to lasting peace, security, and development.

Security Council mandates are varied. They may authorize the CivPol component to initiate a series of training programmes to strengthen the local police services and make them more effective and efficient in their conducting their public service responsibilities, which are to provide a safe and secure environment in which the residents of the country can exercise their legally established freedoms and enjoy their universally recognized human rights. Mandates may also authorize the CivPol component to reform and restructure local police agencies and/or mentor and monitor local police officers. These activities are not mutually exclusive and are carried out in accordance with United Nations endorsed police practices.

In mission areas where there is a near complete vacuum in local civil authority, the Security Council may also mandate a United Nations peace operation to carry out a transitional administration. Included in such a mandate, the CivPol component may be authorized to exercise executive authority for law enforcement within the larger criminal justice system. When so authorized, the CivPol component will be accountable for the full range of law enforcement functions comparable to those performed by the police services of Member States. The CivPol component may possess executive authority until such time as the local police services are able to assume responsibility for law enforcement, which under all circumstances is the desired end-state of the CivPol component’s activities. It must be recognized, however, that when entrusted with executive law enforcement authority, the CivPol component will effectively be mandated by the Security Council.
to perform two related, but separate and distinct responsibilities, the first to provide law and order for all residents within the mission area and the second to pass that authority onto a rebuilt local police service.

It must also be pointed out that when the CivPol component is authorized to exercise executive authority, it may take over those responsibilities only after they have been under the control of an international military peacekeeping force for an extended period of time. The series of transitions of executive authority from an international military force to the CivPol component and, ultimately, to local police services are intricate and pose significant challenges to all parties concerned to minimize periods in which potential security vacuums may arise.
II.

PRINCIPLES FOR CIVILIAN POLICE OPERATIONS
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The principles of UN peacekeeping are applicable to the CivPol component of a peacekeeping operation.

A. Consent and Cooperation

Peace operations typically require the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict. However, respect for formal commitments made by these parties may not be evident at all levels. Promoting adherence to commitments made at every level is an ongoing task of the CivPol component and its personnel.

B. Impartiality and Objectivity

The impartial and objective fulfillment of the mandate, regardless of provocation and challenge, is essential to preserving the legitimacy of the operation and the consent and cooperation of conflicting parties. The effort to maintain impartiality, however, must not promote inaction or undermine the mission’s mandate.

CivPol personnel must discharge their tasks professionally, firmly, and objectively without fear or favour. No party to the conflict should gain unfair advantage as a result of the activities of the CivPol component.

C. Minimum Use of Force

The rules regarding the use of force by law enforcement officials are contained in Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials. The latter document emphasizes that force may be used only when absolutely necessary and only to the extent required for the performance of legitimate law enforcement functions. These documents inform the activities of CivPol personnel whether they are armed or unarmed. The UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by the Law Enforcement Officials particularly applies when CivPol personnel are authorized to carry firearms, while the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials is always applicable to all CivPol personnel.

D. Clear and Achievable Mandate Legitimacy

The Security Council establishes a mandate. It is important for explicit and realistic objectives to be stated in the mandate so that the peace operation, and the political and material support on which it depends, can be focused and directed towards generally recognized and agreed ends. The CivPol Commissioner must understand the mission’s objectives in order to direct the activities of the CivPol component at all levels. The CivPol Commissioner must also understand the parameters by which the success or failure of the mission will be determined.

E. Continuous and Active Support of the Security Council and Contributing Countries

Where the root causes of conflict often remain unsettled in post-conflict environments patience, determination, and persistence are required to achieve the mandated objectives of the peacekeeping operation. It is understood that the members of the Security Council and other Member States in a position to do so will take the necessary and
decisive political and diplomatic action in support of the Secretary-General to ensure that the decisions of the Council are carried out. Additionally, the support of police contributing Member States in the form of personnel and material assistance must be sustained for the duration of the mandate for the CivPol component to achieve its goals.

F. **Legitimacy**

The legitimacy of a peace operation is its most important asset and derives from the operation having been mandated by the Security Council, which by Charter agreement of all Member States of the United Nations is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The legitimacy of the CivPol component is enhanced by a wide geographic distribution of its personnel. It is also based upon the skill and experience of the CivPol personnel, their ability to achieve the tasks mandated to them, and their conducting themselves in a professional manner in accordance with the international human rights instruments regarding law enforcement officials. These instruments can be found in *Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments*.

G. **Unity of Effort and Command**

UN peacekeeping operations are collaborative, multidimensional, and complex enterprises that require unity of effort and command to be effective. To achieve unity of effort, the different components of a peacekeeping operation must cooperate toward the achievement of a common goal. It is imperative that all personnel at all levels coordinate their work and nurture cooperative working relationships within, between, and among components and other
UN family organizations as well as non-governmental organizations who may be operating in the mission area. Unity of command must be observed within the CivPol component. All CivPol personnel are responsible and accountable to a CivPol Commissioner who, in turn, is directly accountable to the Special Representative of the Secretary General. It is not acceptable for CivPol personnel to receive or accept instructions from national authorities on operational matters. Such practices not only jeopardize the effectiveness of an operation and the safety and security of its personnel, but undermine the legitimacy of the institution of United Nations peacekeeping.

H. Transparency

All Member States contributing police personnel, the parties to the conflict, as well as the local population must be fully aware of the CivPol component’s mandate, its functions and responsibilities, and what the component expects of the local law enforcement agencies.

I. Mobility and Adaptability

To fulfill its mandate, the CivPol component must have unhindered freedom of movement within the mission area. The CivPol component must continuously evaluate and respond to the changing situation in the mission area. This requires operational flexibility by the component itself as well as experienced CivPol personnel capable of adapting to continually changing circumstances and tasks.
III.

GUIDELINES FOR CIVILIAN POLICE OPERATIONS
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The establishment of a peace operation requires quick action, close coordination among many partners, and the timely and predictable provision of the necessary skilled human, sufficient logistical, and required financial resources. Action by Member States is crucial to success in these circumstances, particularly with regard to the last of these requirements.

The following guidelines are designed to facilitate the rapid development of options, approval of plans and their subsequent execution.

A. Phases of Civilian Police Operations

United Nations peacekeeping operations can be divided into four distinct phases, each with its separate planning, operational, and logistic support requirements. This framework can also be applied to CivPol operations, regardless of whether the CivPol component is entrusted with executive authority or not. The phases are:

1. Initial development or standby phase;
2. Pre-deployment phase;
3. Conduct of operations and sustainment phase; and
4. Re-deployment and liquidation phase.

Under certain circumstances, it is not always easy to distinguish between these phases. The situation, the evolution of the conflict and the induction of the mission will pragmatically dictate the sequence and the possibility of achieving the tasks foreseen in each phase.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the initial development and pre-deployment phases may be affected by:

1. Little or no advanced warning;
2. Uncertainty of the mission aim and tasks as long as there is no mandate authorized by the Security Council; and
3. Uncertainty of the duration of mandate.

The initial development and pre-deployment phases may also be affected by considerations as to the eventual mandate authorized by the Security Council. In particular, the question whether the CivPol component may be granted executive authority will affect the two phases due to the fact that the human, logistical, information technology, and financial resources associated with being entrusted to execute all law and order functions as required by an executive mission are significantly more onerous than those called for by a non-executive mission. Because the magnitude of CivPol responsibilities are incomparable between executive and non-executive mandates, pre-mission planning will vary significantly if the presumption exists that the CivPol component may be granted executive authority.

Given time constraints, it is crucial to define and maintain an efficient division of labor between those tasked with development and planning of a peacekeeping operation and those responsible for the implementation of those plans. Coordination, cooperation, and flexibility are of the utmost importance.

Although the four phases can be shortened, conducted concurrently or eliminated as the situation demands, the tasks involved must be performed.

1. Initial development or standby phase

This phase begins when the Secretary General determines that a particular situation might necessitate UN involvement and ends with the preparation of the initial concept of logistical support. This phase may include the following activities:

a. Initial assessment;

b. Initial survey;
c. Initial concept of operations; and

d. Initial concept for logistical support.

Although the basic contours of this phase do not vary whether the CivPol component is granted executive authority or not, the breadth and depth of planning activities are significantly different if the mandate were to grant the CivPol with responsibility to perform all law and order functions. If the presumption exists that the CivPol component may be granted executive authority, planning activities must by necessity be bifurcated because of the two distinct tasks implicit in a peacekeeping operation entrusted with executive authority.

First, planning must take into account CivPol requirements to exercise all law enforcement functions comparable to those performed by the police services of any Member State. One starting point for such planning begins with estimating the personnel requirements of the CivPol component as a police force entrusted with executive authority. A common ratio of residents to police officers is 500:1. This ratio, however, cannot be mathematically applied because the law and order environment in a peacekeeping mission is not comparable to one in a stable country in which the rule of law is firmly established. In the post-conflict environment additional factors need to be taken into account, such as, inter alia, the persistence of armed conflict; the prevalence of illegal parallel structures and criminal enterprises who wield de facto policing powers and who have the capability to mold the political environment to further their criminal goals; the likely existence of a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons; the possibility that an international military force may be performing policing functions prior to the deployment of the CivPol component; and the necessity to secure the free and fair
conductor of elections in the near future. Furthermore, the planning will need to assess the state of transport and communication facilities within the mission area and how they may impact the performance of policing powers and estimate personnel requirements based upon those assessments. Finally, the condition of the judicial system, border regime, and corrections institutions need to be evaluated and the affect their current state may have on CivPol’s ability to enforce law and order.

It must also be recognized that in peacekeeping operations with executive authority, it is highly problematic to permit CivPol to be evacuated given their responsibilities for law enforcement even in the face of acute security concerns. Consequently, it is crucial to be aware beforehand of the potential trouble spots within the mission area so that temporary supplementation plans can be developed and the associated manpower for such contingencies estimated prior to deployment.

Finally, it is not sufficient to plan a peacekeeping operation in which CivPol is invested with executive authority through the use of gross personnel statistics. An alternative systematic method of pre-mission planning is to anticipate, first, the specific functions and tasks that CivPol will be required to perform, second, determine the skills and capabilities those tasks require and, only third, estimate the number of CivPol officers needed for each and every discrete job classification and skill set. Given an estimate of the type of skills required and the number of officers needed who possess those skills, preliminary plans for the rapid deployment of a CivPol component can be developed using a database in which are recorded available and pre-qualified CivPol officers. Therefore, the recruitment and selection of CivPol personnel of the bulk of
the CivPol complement can be planned based upon the
aforementioned narrowly defined police disciplines.
Such recruitment can be planned based upon the
selection of individual CivPol officers and through alter-
native methods such as formed police units or special-
ized national contingents. (The establishment of
regional international CivPol pre-mission training
centres may be useful for the training of CivPol officers
prior to their deployment to peace operations.)
Estimating personnel needs, however, must be
complemented by the comparable logistical and equip-
ment plans associated with the potential exercise of
executive authority. Such logistical and equipment
plans need to take into account all the resources and
capabilities customarily associated with police
services in Member States. In addition to routine police
equipment necessary to daily law enforcement opera-
tions, logistical resources may include such items as,
inter alia, emergency and specialized police vehicles,
specific weaponry for close protection units, informa-
tion technology necessary for collection of criminal
statistics and analysis, crowd control equipment,
forensic laboratories, surveillance facilities, and equip-
ment to enforce border and custom regimes regarding
forged documents and illegal narcotic shipments.
Second, planning must be conducted in how to rebuild
the local police services so that they can eventually
assume executive authority. The purpose of such plan-
ning is to estimate the CivPol component’s personnel,
material, logistical, information technology, and finan-
cial needs to accomplish this aspect of the mandate.
First and foremost is the conceptualization of what the
new local police service will look like and how it will be
organized and structured as well as the local laws
needed to accomplish any police reform. In this regard,
planning must determine, inter alia, local police services’ current and future needs and organizational structure (number of officers, command and rank structure, types of police services and disciplines required, etc.); methods for the recruitment and selection of local police officers; training programmes for the local police in police academies, colleges, and in-service; and all the related personnel, financial, and logistical institutional elements associated with rebuilding a police service from the ground up such as budgeting, cost accounting, personnel policies, information technology, equipment and facilities maintenance, etc. In addition, the plans for the establishment of a Police Trust Fund to assist the financing of local police service capital and equipment needs must also be devised. It should be noted that everything that is required by the CivPol component to exercise executive authority will eventually be needed by local police services when they assume ultimate responsibility for law enforcement.

In addition, the two transitions in the exercise of law enforcement authority must be anticipated. First, the modalities of a potential transition from international military forces performing law enforcement functions to their assumption by the CivPol component must be established. Second, given the desired end-state in which local police services are held accountable for all law enforcement functions, the transition from the CivPol component exercising executive authority to the local police services performing those responsibilities must be drawn up. The modalities of this second transition is of paramount concern especially as it is more than likely that during the transition local police officers may be on duty working alone while the CivPol component retains executive authority and, thus, ultimate responsibility for law enforcement.
If there is no presumption that the CivPol component may be entrusted with executive authority, planning activities may not necessarily encompass all of the aforementioned elements. Furthermore, there may be no need to anticipate and plan for the above-mentioned transitions. Nevertheless, it is assumed that many of the factors mentioned above will have to be taken into account.

This phase requires not only the early participation of the Civilian Police Division (CPD) in DPKO initial development activities, but also the CPD’s having an independent institutional capability to conduct the necessary specialized police planning tasks through the use of standardized methodologies and templates. Strong interdepartmental coordination and the integration of resources and information from various sources within DPKO, UN agencies and police-contributing Member States are also essential.

2. Pre-deployment phase

The pre-deployment phase begins with the completion of the initial concept of logistical support and proceeds through the submission of the Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council. The pre-deployment phase culminates with a Security Council resolution authorizing a peacekeeping operation, in which the CivPol component’s manpower is specified and from which a budget can be prepared. The Security Council mandate assigns overall responsibility for the operational and technical control over the peacekeeping mission to DPKO. DPKO then, formally requests contributions from Member States and prepares operational and logistic guidelines.

Because the pre-deployment stage is crucial in the formulation of the mission’s future budget, it is imper-
tive that consideration be given whether the CivPol component may be entrusted with executive authority by the Security Council. The magnitude of the responsibilities and obligations under which a CivPol component will operate if granted executive authority has significant budgetary implications and, thus, must be taken into account during pre-deployment budgetary activities.

In addition to participation of the CPD in all DPKO pre-deployment activities, it is of the utmost importance that the CivPol component’s senior management be identified and recruited to ensure their involvement during this stage of pre-mission planning. Their early involvement will assist in the smooth implementation of the mandate.

The pre-deployment phase includes the following activities:

a. Technical survey;

b. Finalization of the concept of operations;

c. Finalization of the concept of logistical support;

d. Development of operational Plans;

e. Force generation; and

f. Production of guidelines to the police-contributing Member States.

The development of this phase requires strong interdepartmental coordination and the integration of resources and information from various sources within DPKO, UN agencies and police-contributing Member States.
3. Conduct of operations and sustainment phase

This phase begins with the deployment of CivPol personnel to the mission area and ends with the termination of the CivPol mandate.

Within this phase, the roles and responsibilities of the civilian police fall under two distinct organizational structures: (1) the CPD within DPKO headquarters; and (2) CivPol component in the field mission.

The CPD has two separate functions: (1) policy and planning; and (2) mission management. Policy and planning refers to developing specialized and standardized plans, methodologies, tools, and strategies pertaining to the full range of civilian police activities as well as preparing planning contingencies for potential field missions in the aforementioned development and pre-deployment phases. Mission management encompasses three related activities: (1) monitoring, evaluating, and reviewing the activities and performance of CivPol components in field missions; (2) assisting police-contributing Member States in their recruitment and selection of CivPol personnel for service in field operations; and (3) administering the deployment and rotation process for all international civilian police officers.

The activities of the CivPol component of peace operations can be divided into four basic mandates: (1) training; (2) reform and restructuring; (3) mentor and monitoring; and (4) establish and building. Crosscutting these four mandates are the questions whether CivPol personnel possess executive or non-executive authority and whether CivPol personnel are authorized to carry firearms or perform their duties unarmed. In all cases, the CivPol component is an integral part of the United Nations Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines.
peace operation and works at all times under the
authority of the Head of Mission.
Regardless of the mandate under which a CivPol
component operates, it must be recognized that the
component’s activities will have significant political
repercussions. In a post-conflict environment, all of the
CivPol component’s activities will in one way or
another influence the balance of power between and
among the local political actors. Even the most tech-
nical police reforms will have political consequences,
which may not be entirely predictable. At the same
time, the success of the CivPol component’s opera-
tions often hinges upon the consent and/or acceptance
of its activities by those same political actors, whose
sources of power will be inevitably affected both posi-
tively and negatively. Recognition of the range of polit-
cal effects that the component’s activities will have
only increases the importance of the component being
fully integrated into the overall strategy of the peace
operation.
The long term success of the CivPol component’s
operations requires a consistent, patient, and
unswerving effort to persuade the local police service’s
personnel, whether they are new recruits or experi-
enced officers, that the component’s activities are in
their own professional self-interest. One of the keys to
convince the local police is to assist in the installation of
managerial systems that are self-sustainable and adap-
tive to the needs of the local police and political culture.
A cadre of highly trained, technically proficient police
officers is a necessary, but insufficient condition to
strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of local
police agencies’ ability to fulfill their public service.
Appropriate managerial models and tools are essential.
The following guidelines are divided into the four types of mandates under which CivPol component operates and, thereafter, lay out prescriptions for executive and non-executive and armed and unarmed peacekeeping operations. These four mandates are not mutually exclusive in that CivPol activities performed under one mandate may also be engaged in during the life span of another.

a) Training

Training local police officers is the most fundamental and basic element in all CivPol peace operations. The primary goal of training is to strengthen local police services by making their provision of their public service responsibilities more effective and efficient, an objective which does not depend upon whether the CivPol component is entrusted with executive authority or not. Rather, the objective of bolstering a local police service through training is of the utmost importance when the CivPol component is entrusted with executive authority because a comprehensive training programme is the keystone to the eventual transfer of executive authority back to local police officials.

The range and scope of training programmes initiated by the CivPol component, however, heavily depends upon the type of mandate conferred by the Security Council and the technical expertise of the local police officers. One issue at stake is whether the mandate obligates the CivPol component to enhance the capacities of the policing institutions themselves, above and beyond fortifying the professional skills of individual police officers. Both “reform and restructure” and “establish and build” mandates imply that the local police institutions are not sufficiently developed to be able to
provide or support the requisite public service. Consequently, under those mandates the CivPol component cannot limit its courses to those focusing on the professional technical capabilities of individual police officers, but must be able to offer training programmes that strengthen the local police's institutional development. Such courses may concentrate on the needs of middle and senior management and may include such topics as, inter alia, crisis management, the relationship between civilian and police authorities, public relations, the relationship between judicial and police authorities, personnel management, budgeting, logistics, procurement, facilities and equipment maintenance, asset management, and information technology. It should be noted, however, that these courses need not be confined only to “reform and restructure” and “establish and build” peace operations, but may be applicable as well to other mandates.

There are four distinct audiences for CivPol training: (1) new recruits; iv (2) currently serving local police officers, sworn and non-sworn; (3) middle and senior management, sworn and non-sworn; and (4) local police trainers. There are also two different sites at which CivPol training can be conducted: (1) police academies and colleges; and (2) in-service fieldwork.

Because of scarce mission resources, the Police Commissioner must prioritize the topics, targets, and timing of CivPol training programme as there is an inevitable trade-off between the breadth/scope and the depth/penetration of training. One of the

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iv As done in El Salvador, Haiti, Kosovo and East Timor, see Lessons Learned, LLU/DPKO (Generic guidelines to be developed).
crucial decisions to be made will be the speed with which local police trainers are educated and the moment at which they can begin to assume responsibility for conducting the training programmes themselves. It must be acknowledged, however, that under an “establish and build” mandate, the development of local trainers can begin only after individuals potentially capable of performing that function have proved themselves to be highly skilled police officers. (To assist the Police Commissioner in managing the trade-off an outline of local police personnel who can be targets for training and the types of courses that may be offered is attached, see Annex I, Establishment of Training Priorities.) The Police Commissioner’s prioritization will be facilitated if the evaluation and assessment of the current and future capabilities of the local police services conducted during the development and pre-deployment stages were sufficiently comprehensive.

The Police Commissioner must also evaluate the capacity of local police to absorb the training and tailor CivPol training to that absorption rate. One method of evaluating the absorption capabilities of the local police is through the CivPol component’s mentoring activities. Consequently, it is important to coordinate the CivPol’s training and mentoring programmes and tightly integrate them. Other methods also exist such as the institution of advanced management processes to measure police activities and efficacy as well as surveying the recipients of the police’s public service.

As mentioned above, the importance of training the local police is of paramount importance when the
CivPol component is entrusted with executive authority because the rapid training of local police personnel is the principal method of achieving the desired end-state: the assumption of law enforcement functions by the local police services. A well-conceived and consistent CivPol training programme may also minimize the security vacuum that can emerge during the transition from CivPol to local police executive authority. In addition, when the CivPol component is entrusted with executive authority, analysis of the training absorption rate is crucial to minimize the potential of a security vacuum during the transfer of executive authority to local police services.

The goals and objectives of training must be clearly defined in association with local police authorities. One of the priorities of training must be to ensure that the law enforcement agencies acquire the capability of training themselves across the range of technical policing skills to ensure the future sustainability of the CivPol project.

b) Reform and Restructuring
The reform and restructuring of local law enforcement institutions has increasingly been incorporated into the CivPol mandate by the Security Council. A “reform and restructure” mandate presumes the existence and functioning of a local police, but recognizes the need substantially to bolster and strengthen it to provide the requisite public service of comparable democratic policing services. Under a “reform and restructure” mandate the CivPol component may also exercise executive authority.

Based upon the development and pre-deployment planning and with the cooperation and agreement...
of local police officials, senior politicians, the Police Commissioner prepares the objectives, timetable, envisioned end-state for the reform and restructuring of the local police agencies. In addition, the Police Commissioner establishes specific measurable benchmarks for the various phases of the peace operation by which the progress of the reform and restructuring activities can be evaluated. The objectives must be clearly defined and there must be a coherent and consistent understanding of what the final product will be by local as well as UN peacekeeping authorities.

It must also be acknowledged that the CivPol’s component’s reform and restructuring activities must be tied into comparable reforms of the judiciary and corrections systems. If not, police law enforcement activities will be undermined and the credibility of local police officers eroded in the minds of the public they are to serve.

One of the other keys to a successful reform and restructuring programme is for the CivPol component to seize the initiative and set the agenda as quickly and decisively as possible. If the CivPol component does not seize the initiative at the outset of the peacekeeping operation, it may be difficult for the component to do so later and, therefore, may be compelled to be in a reactive position vis-à-vis the local parties to the conflict. Another key element is a thorough integration and incorporation of CivPol training and mentoring activities into the reform and restructuring process. This is especially important when the CivPol component exercises executive authority and is in the process of transferring that authority to the local police services.
III. GUIDELINES FOR CIVILIAN POLICE OPERATIONS

The following guidelines are presented to assist Police Commissioners in the practical planning of reform and restructuring activities. The guidelines present a ten step phased program, all the steps of which can be introduced during the first twelve months of a CivPol reform and restructuring mandate. It is acknowledged that although the ten steps are meant to occur sequentially, there is considerable overlap between the phases as many of them will take place simultaneously.

Step 1:
At the beginning, it is vital for the CivPol component to initiate monitoring the activities of the local police as quickly as possible. During the initial period, it is more important to gain penetration and depth in monitoring than scope. It may also be advisable to concentrate resources in a limited number of areas and local police services/stations, those that had been identified as of paramount political and security importance by the initial and technical surveys and the concept of operations. It is also recommended immediately to monitor the activities of senior police officials. As resources arrive, monitoring can be expanded and established across the board.

Step 2:
The CivPol component launches a comprehensive public information campaign. There are two distinct targets of the campaign: (1) police officers and (2) the public served by the police services. The themes of both campaigns are UN endorsed standards of democratic policing philosophies and practices and the UN’s intention to hold the police to...
those standards. During the course of the first year, the tenor of the public information campaign will change to match the evolving situation on the ground and emphasize each stage through which the reformation and restructuring of the local police services is progressing.

Step 3: The Police Commissioner establishes a planning and policy unit within the CivPol component whose task is continuously to re-evaluate the progress, direction and efficacy of the reform and restructuring process. This re-evaluation process must be rigorous and it would be beneficial if specific measurable benchmarks are continuously monitored and refined in order to assess the efficacy of reform and restructuring activities. The planning and policy unit must also keep track of the environment in which the local law enforcement agencies operate. In particular, close attention must be paid to the relationship between the criminal justice system and police agencies; between the media and police; and, finally, between the political establishment and the police. The police do not operate in a vacuum and it is incumbent upon the planning and policy unit to recognize and take into account the myriad relationships that affect police performance.

Step 4: The Police Commissioner initiates rewriting the local police code of conduct to meet the standards of UN endorsed democratic policing philosophies and practices. Appropriate administrative and disciplinary procedures are also written to protect the rights of police officers involved in disciplinary investigations.
Step 5:
As the code of conduct is being written, the certification process of the local police officers is launched. The certification process, which is an ongoing process, includes the following:

1. The issuance of temporary police IDs to currently serving officers; the issuance of IDs also necessitates creation of a single UN local police personnel management database in which all relevant information (personal, education, police experience, financial, housing, disciplinary issues, etc.) on police officers will be compiled;

2. The introduction of transitional courses for police officers; course material includes UN endorsed democratic and community policing philosophies and practices, human rights, political reconciliation, and the introduction to the new code of conduct; senior and middle management personnel must be the first to take the transitional courses; and

3. Comprehensive background checks on serving police officers to determine if they are capable of performing the necessary public service and if the information they have supplied is accurate.

Step 6:
The Police Commissioner initiates a review of the operations and curricula of the police academy, college, and in-service training programmes with the intention of, first, retraining the academy and college teachers and, thereafter, initiating new courses for retraining and upgrading experienced police officers and the induction of new recruits. Over the course of the first year, the types of
classes taught will change as increasing numbers of police officers are retrained/upgraded, new recruits are inducted, and the police academy and college teachers retooled.

Step 7:
The field mission establishes a Police Trust Fund to allocate capital resources for the modernization of the local law enforcement institutions based upon priorities delineated by the Police Commissioner. Funding must first concentrate on the infrastructure cornerstones of rebuilding an institution: training facilities, local police stations, communications equipment, information management networks, police vehicles, and police uniforms.

Step 8:
The Police Commissioner launches a review of and initiates development of new report forms for all police operations and activities. New report forms will include, *inter alia*, local police station operation/duty room complaint; incident; investigation; traffic accident; use of force; exhibit register; detention, arrest, incarceration, and release; and public complaint report forms. In-the-field classes must be organized to introduce the reports to currently serving police officers. It must be kept in mind that the new reporting forms lay the foundation upon which a future information management system will be constructed for the analysis of crime data and the planning of police operations.

Step 9:
The Police Commissioner initiates a review of and develops the plans to overhaul the structure of the local police institutions. Included in this review is a thorough appraisal of the local police legislation and regulations to ensure that local law can accommo-
date the proposed changes in organizational structure, function, and practice or is amended appropriately. (It is expected that this review and the concomitant development of detailed plans are based upon the initial and final concept of operations.) This includes, *inter alia*, the total number and specific functions of authorized police officers, specialized police units, and support staff; total number of authorized police stations; the rank structure, organizational division, and required qualifications of local personnel of a national ministry of interior, regional/cantonal ministries of interior, and local police stations; and the types of police services and disciplines required. New personnel and administrative procedures are also introduced. Essential among the new procedures are, *inter alia*, job descriptions for all police positions; qualifications and criteria for the selection of officers to positions; and new job performance assessment and promotion systems. Finally, internal affairs departments are reorganized, the new disciplinary procedures introduced, and internal affairs investigators trained or retrained. If necessary, a demobilization process is initiated. In case of a reduction in the size of the police force, programmes for the excess number of police must be considered. Retirement must not be seen as the only alternative.

Step 10:
The Police Commissioner launches a review of the financial structure of the local police services. Particular attention must be given to the sources of police funding, preparation of police budgets, and cost accounting of police expenditures. If necessary, the CivPol component must introduce reforms for all police financial systems and procedures. Simultaneously, a cost of living analysis
must be conducted in order to determine a fair and equitable police salary scale, without which democratic and community policing philosophies and practices will have difficulty being adopted.

c) Mentor and Monitoring

Traditionally monitoring was the primary activity of the CivPol component. In a post-conflict environment, however, the CivPol component’s monitoring function has been superseded by other activities. Customarily monitoring presumes that the local police provide a reasonably proficient level of public service, a capability typically beyond that of local police services in a post-conflict environment, and that the CivPol function is to watch and report on the sustainability of that level of service.

This does not imply that monitoring no longer has a role to play in CivPol peacekeeping operations. Rather it means that monitoring is a narrowly circumscribed activity and must not be called upon to accomplish an objective for which it is unsuitable.

Mentoring and monitoring are different activities and are not mutually exclusive. Either mentoring or monitoring may be mandated by the Security Council and may be utilized during different phases during a peace operation. Both, however, are tasks that require the CivPol officer to work directly with the local police, often on a one-to-one basis. The difference between mentoring and monitoring lies in the activism of the CivPol officer. When mentoring the CivPol officer directly engages the local police colleague, counseling and guiding his/her partner in the performance of duties and may be the principal type of activity performed by CivPol officers when the mandate concentrates on...
the provision of expert advice to local police services. It should be noted, however, that when counseling and guiding local police services, CivPol officers may remain responsible for observing, recording, and reporting on the local police’s activities. Mentoring is also an integral part of the CivPol component’s training activities as it assists in bringing the course material imparted at the police college and academy down to the local police officer’s day-to-day tasks and is one method by which CivPol can assess the local police’s absorption of their training.

The establishment of a comprehensive mentoring programme is absolutely essential in the transition of executive authority from CivPol back to the local police. During the transition, mentoring is especially pertinent when local police officers are on duty and working alone while the CivPol component retains executive authority. Mentoring, therefore, is one mechanism by which any potential security vacuum can be minimized.

When monitoring, the CivPol officer – while remaining active – takes a less involved stance in the local police’s performance of duties. Instead of counseling, advising and guiding, the CivPol officer observes, records, and reports on the local police’s activities. In the post-conflict environment, the CivPol component’s monitoring activities are important at the very outset of the mission and as an exit strategy and follow-up task once the mentoring process has been completed. Monitoring is also crucial in maintaining awareness of the human rights situation in the mission area.

It should be noted that random CivPol patrolling does not constitute monitoring. Random patrolling,
however, may give the local population confidence that its security is being enhanced because CivPol personnel appear to be present and active throughout the mission area. The Police Commissioner must evaluate and manage this trade-off between monitoring and random CivPol patrolling.

Police Commissioner must prioritize the targets of CivPol mentor/monitoring activities. Because of scarce mission resources, there is an inevitable trade-off between the breadth/scope and the depth/penetration of CivPol mentor/monitoring activities. The Police Commissioner, therefore, must manage the trade-off by recognizing political necessities and factoring in which geographic regions within the mission area experience high rates of criminal activity in order to achieve the goals of the mission. This will require making difficult decisions and accepting that many substantial police activities will remain unmentored and unmonitored. (To assist the Police Commissioner in managing the trade-off, an outline of all local police personnel who can be targets for mentoring and monitoring is attached, see Annex II, Establishment of Mentoring and Monitoring Priorities.)

To mentor/monitor CivPol personnel typically work with language assistants. One of the factors that the Police Commissioner must manage in determining the trade-off between the breadth and depth of mentor/monitoring is the assignment of language assistants to CivPol personnel. In fieldwork, the ratio of one language assistant to every 1.5 CivPol personnel is optimal. In regional or mission headquarters, the ratio of one language assistant to every 4 CivPol staff members may be optimal. Increasing the ratio inevitably reduces the
CivPol component’s ability to conduct its operations efficiently and effectively.

Similar ratios apply to the provision of vehicles for CivPol personnel, because mentor/monitoring requires conducting daily joint patrols with local police officers. For security reasons, it is unadvisable for CivPol personnel to conduct joint patrols in the vehicles of the local police. Furthermore, without freedom of movement, CivPol officers cannot perform their responsibilities. Increasing the ratio inevitably reduces the CivPol component’s ability to conduct efficient and effective mentoring/monitoring and, thus, achieve the objectives assigned to it.

To mentor/monitor the activities of the local police most effectively requires 24 hour coverage 7 days a week for each and every local police officer as they perform their daily duties. Such blanket coverage is impractical and infeasible. To compensate for this inability, CivPol personnel must be physically co-located with the local police. Co-location is not an end in itself, but a means to better, more productive mentoring and monitoring. Working with the local police on a daily basis in the local police stations facilitates trust, good communication, and mutually beneficial working relationships designed to promote democratic and community policing philosophies and practices.

At the same time, the CivPol component requires its own police stations. CivPol police stations are intended to give the local population access to CivPol personnel outside the purview of the local police and to provide CivPol personnel alternative sources of information about the inner workings of the local community and the provision of local
policing services. CivPol stations must be centrally located in population centres and, ideally, open 24 hours a day, 7 days week. The Police Commissioner must evaluate and manage this trade-off between co-located mentor/monitoring and the establishment of local CivPol stations.

Local police are expected to follow the laws of the host country. They are also expected to observe UN endorsed democratic and community policing and criminal justice standards as well as all universally recognized human rights norms. If the local laws violate the UN endorsed standards, it is imperative for CivPol personnel to advise the local police on appropriate police practices and advise the Police Commissioner of the need to revise the contravening laws.

The efficacy of mentoring and monitoring depend greatly on the willingness of the local police to cooperate. Regardless of the degree of cooperation, mentoring and monitoring activities require that CivPol personnel have unimpeded access to:

1. All incoming calls to the local police by members of the public;
2. All personal approaches to the local police stations by members of the public;
3. All incident, crime, investigation, forensic and case reports;
4. All exhibits collected by local police;
5. All daily roster, shift, and duty schedules and reports;
6. All other documents, directives, and instructions relating to the operation, management, administration, finance, and performance of local police activities;
7. All scenes of any local police activity, arrests/detentions, house-searches, seizures, etc.;
8. All interrogations and/or interviews of any member of the public by local police; and
9. All premises used by law enforcement officials, including rooms and premises for detention and storage rooms for seized goods.

Although conducting investigations is not a normal part of mentoring or monitoring, the CivPol component may conduct investigations, especially when the local police is not providing CivPol personnel with acceptable access to information, crime scenes, interviews, interrogations, exhibits, etc., or when local police officers are alleged to be involved in illegal activities and/or human rights violations.

CivPol personnel must report through their established chain of command on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. Incident reports must be written whenever CivPol personnel attend or observe an incident. The incident report must contain accurate, detailed information concerning the complainant, victim of the alleged crime, attending local police officer, witnesses, suspects, time, date, and place.

If CivPol personnel witness or obtain information concerning an alleged local police violation of UN endorsed democratic and community policing practice or a violation of human rights, an incident report must be written detailing the received information. If remedial action is not taken by the local police after the alleged contravention has been brought to their attention and proven accurate, CivPol personnel are required to file a non-compliance report. If the violation is severe, CivPol personnel are required to file a non-compliance report regard-
less of whether remedial action has been taken by the local police.

Non-compliance reports must also be issued whenever local police officers or officials do not comply with reasonable requests for information and access by CivPol personnel. Obstruction of the work of CivPol personnel by local police is also grounds for the issuance of non-compliance reports.

Refusal of the local police to cooperate is reported as a non-compliance report. How this is dealt with has to be developed in each mission, depending on the structure of the CivPol component itself and also the level of contacts with the local police.

If several non-compliance reports are filed against a local police officer or official, the CivPol component may seek to issue a de-certification warning or to de-certify the police officer.

d) Establish and Building

Recently, the CivPol component has also been tasked by the Security Council to establish and build new local police institutions in post-conflict environments in cases in which no functioning local police service exists after the cessation of hostilities. An establish and build mandate may be one part of a wider international transitional administration and may be a follow-on activity after the intervention of international military forces to impose the semblance of security in the mission area.

One of the keys to a successful establish and build programme is for the CivPol component to seize the initiative and set the agenda as quickly and decisively as possible. If the CivPol component does not seize the initiative at the outset of the peace-
keeping operation, it may be difficult for the component to do so later and, therefore, may be compelled to be in a reactive position vis-à-vis the local parties to the conflict. Another key element is a thorough integration and incorporation of CivPol training and mentoring activities into the process, especially as the training programme is the pivotal element in building a new local police service.

Based upon the development and pre-deployment planning, the Police Commissioner prepares the objectives, timetable, and envisioned end-state for the establishment and building of the local police agencies. The objectives must be clearly defined and there must be a coherent and consistent understanding of what the final product will be by local as well as UN peacekeeping authorities. In addition, the Police Commissioner must establish specific measurable benchmarks for the various phases of the peace operation by which the progress of the establish and building activities can be evaluated.

It must also be acknowledged that the CivPol component’s establish and building activities must be tied into comparable reforms of the judiciary and corrections systems. If not, police law enforcement activities will be undermined and the credibility of local police officers in the minds of the public they are to serve eroded.

The following guidelines are presented to assist Police Commissioners in planning and directing establish and build activities. The guidelines present a ten step phased programme, all the steps of which can be introduced during the first twelve months of a CivPol establish and build mandate. It is acknowledged that although the ten steps are meant to occur sequentially, there is considerable
overlap between the ten phases as many of them will take place simultaneously\textsuperscript{vi}.

Step 1:
It is imperative for all future CivPol activities that law and order be imposed throughout the mission area as quickly as possible. It is expected that the CivPol component may work closely with UN or regional military forces during this phase of imposing law and order.

Step 2:
The CivPol component launches a comprehensive public information campaign in close coordination with the remainder of the peacekeeping operation. There are two distinct targets of the campaign: (1) prospective police officers and (2) the public served by the police services. The themes of both campaigns are that law and order will improve the lives of all residents living in the mission area and that UN endorsed standards of democratic policing philosophies and practices will be instilled in the new police agency. During the course of the first year, the tenor of the public information campaign will change to match the evolving situation on the ground and emphasize each stage through which the CivPol component’s establish and building activities progress.

Step 3:
The Police Commissioner establishes a planning and policy unit within the CivPol component whose task is to re-evaluate the direction and plans of the establish and build process and continually assess the component’s progress through the use of

\textsuperscript{vi} As done in El Salvador, Haiti, Kosovo and East Timor, see Lessons Learned, LLU/DPKO (Generic guidelines to be developed).
specific measurable benchmarks. This re-evaluation process is ongoing and continuous. The planning and policy unit must also keep track of the environment in which the local law enforcement agencies will operate. In particular, close attention must be paid to the relationship between the criminal justice system and police agencies; between the media and police; and, finally, between the political establishment and the police.

Step 4:
The Police Commissioner initiates the recruitment and selection of new police officers. It is important to begin the process with untrained, raw recruits who will undergo a period of initial training. The reason to begin with raw recruits is to provide the local population with jobs for the young and to build the new law enforcement institutions beginning with a clean slate. After the first class of raw recruits has been inducted, the second class of recruited police officers may be selected from those who had served as police officers prior to the conflict. (As recruits pass through the police academy, it is imperative that their personnel information is entered into a single UN local police personnel management database into which all relevant information [personal, education, police experience, financial, housing, disciplinary issues, etc.] is compiled.)

Step 5:
As raw recruits are being selected, the Police Commissioner establishes the police academy and college. It is imperative to select and initiate the training of the academy and college teachers as expeditiously as possible.
Step 6:
The Police Commissioner initiates writing the local police code of conduct to meet the standards of UN endorsed democratic and community policing philosophies and practices. Appropriate administrative and disciplinary procedures are also written to protect the rights of police officers.

Step 7:
The Police Commissioner develops the structure of the new local police institutions. Included in the development of the new local police structure must be a thorough appraisal of the local police legislation and regulations to ensure that local law can accommodate the proposed changes in organizational structure, function, and practice or is amended appropriately. (It is expected that the Police Commissioner's formulation will be based upon the initial and final concept of operations.) This includes, *inter alia*, the total number of authorized police officers and support staff, total number of authorized police stations, the rank structure and organizational division of a national ministry of interior, regional/cantonal ministries of interior, and local police stations; and the types of police services and disciplines required. New personnel and administrative procedures are also developed. Essential among the new procedures are, *inter alia*, job descriptions for all police positions; qualifications and criteria for the selection of officers to positions; and new job performance assessment and promotion systems.

Step 8:
The Police Commissioner establishes the Police Trust Fund to allocate funds for the building of the local law enforcement institutions. Funding must
first concentrate on the infrastructure cornerstones of building an institution: training facilities; ministries of interior (national and regional/cantonal) and local police stations; communications equipment; information management networks; police vehicles; and police uniforms.

Step 9:
The Police Commissioner initiates development of new report forms for all police operations and activities. New report forms will include, inter alia, local police station operation/duty room complaint; incident; investigation; traffic accident; use of force; exhibit; exhibit register; detention, arrest, incarceration and release; and public compliant report forms.

Step 10:
The Police Commissioner develops the financial structure of the local police services. Particular attention needs to be given to the sources of police funding, preparation of police budgets, and financial accounting controls of police expenditures. Simultaneously, a cost of living analysis must be conducted in order to determine a fair and equitable police salary scale, without which democratic and community policing philosophies and practices will have difficulty being adopted.

It should also be noted that when mandated to establish and build a local police service, the CivPol component may also be granted executive authority for all policing activities during the period in which no functioning local police service exists. A peacekeeping operation in which the CivPol component is entrusted with executive authority assumes that the CivPol component will possess a full range of law enforcement capabilities (human
resources, logistical capacities, appropriate police equipment, information technology systems designed for crime analysis and police management) comparable to those of police services of Member States. Included in the full complement of policing capabilities may be the use of formed police units for such activities as crowd control and close protection services.

In a peacekeeping operation in which the CivPol component is entrusted with executive authority, CivPol may assume their law and order functions only after those activities have been performed by an international military force for an extended period of time. At the onset of CivPol operations, therefore, the modalities of the transition from military to CivPol performance of law enforcement functions may have to be arranged and implemented.

Similarly, the desired end-state for CivPol operations is the handing over of executive authority to a local police service. Consequently, the transition from a CivPol exercise of executive authority to the local police services’ assumption of responsibility for all law and order functions will need to be carefully managed. As noted earlier, the CivPol training and mentor/monitoring programmes are among the principal methods of managing that transition.

4. Re-deployment and liquidation phase

Prior to the completion of the mandate, re-deployment starts. The planning and execution of this phase includes the repatriation of national contingents and their equipment and the re-deployment or disposal of UN-owned assets. The liquidation aspect of the phase involves the
planning and execution of all activities related to the closure of a peace operation.

B. Executive Power

Recent mandates from the Security Council have given the CivPol component executive powers. The task of upholding law and order in the host country must, in all cases, be seen as an interim solution. When performing executive police duties, CivPol personnel must rely only on UN endorsed criminal justice standards. Nevertheless, CivPol personnel must be thoroughly briefed and intimately conversant with the laws they are required to enforce and the judicial system through which alleged perpetrators will be processed.

While possessing executive authority, CivPol personnel must also have an excellent understanding of the culture(s) of the host country. Police practices, while adhering to UN endorsed standards, must be cognizant of the needs of the population and be adaptive to them.

C. Armed Civilian Police Missions

CivPol personnel may be granted permission to carry firearms in the mission area. It is imperative that CivPol personnel have clear and concise instructions regarding when and where they are allowed to carry firearms and when and how they are permitted to use them. Such standards must include, inter alia, the storage of weaponry, issuance of weaponry, proper methods of carrying and maintaining weaponry, and appropriate use of force.

When CivPol personnel are authorized to carry firearms, a range of ancillary CivPol functions and activities are required. Such ancillary functions and activities

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vii UNMIK and UNTAET, generic guidelines to be developed.
III. GUIDELINES FOR CIVILIAN POLICE OPERATIONS

include, *inter alia*, firearms training and testing facility, firearm maintenance capacity, and a secure armory.

D. Formed Police Units

Formed police units may be authorized by the Security Council to be part of the CivPol component. Formed police units must be under the operational command of the Police Commissioner\textsuperscript{viii}.

To secure availability, formed police units must be deployed as whole units. These units must bring their own operational equipment and weapons with them when deploying. Therefore, a Memorandum of Understanding must be signed with contributing Member State.

The Police Commissioner must develop tactical and operational standards for the deployment and operational use of formed police units. Once deployed, formed police units must be trained in the standards developed by the Police Commissioner.

\textsuperscript{viii} MIPONUH, UNMIK, UNTAET, standard MOU developed, generic guidelines and concept of operations to be developed.
IV.

OTHER RELATIONSHIPS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF CIVILIAN POLICE
IV. OTHER RELATIONSHIPS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF CIVILIAN POLICE

Due to the complexity of peacekeeping mandates in post-conflict environments, the CivPol component works with and coordinates its activities with numerous other components, partner organizations, and agencies working in the peacekeeping mission area, a number of which are described below. Furthermore, in post-conflict environments, the CivPol component may be requested to perform functions outside what is normally defined as traditional policing activities, especially under those circumstances in which CivPol is entrusted with executive authority.

A. Military - Civilian Police

The primary task of either UN commanded or regionally directed international military forces in peacekeeping missions is to secure and maintain the cessation of hostilities between and among the formerly warring parties. International military forces often provide a framework of security within which the CivPol component can carry out its specific mandate. Since the military are frequently the first to be deployed in the area of operation they may assume law enforcement responsibilities until the CivPol component is deployed and fully functional. (Security for members of the CivPol component and other international personnel when under immediate threat is often part of the military’s responsibility.)

It is essential for the international military component and the CivPol component to work together closely because the cessation of active hostilities between the formerly warring parties and the maintenance of law and order are not one and the same. This is especially true when the CivPol component is entrusted with executive authority and enters the post-conflict environment after the introduction of international military forces. It is also important for the CivPol component to have good relations with the
international military component because in a post-conflict environment a number of CivPol activities, such as weapon searches, may not be possible without the active support of the military. The international military component is the ultimate international law enforcement force and, therefore, serves as the back up and the power base for the CivPol component.

B. Institutions Exercising Jurisdiction over Crimes of International Concern - Civilian Police

In the past, international war crimes tribunals have been established to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in specified territories. An International Criminal Court may eventually have similar responsibilities conferred to it. Such institutions may conduct their operations where peacekeeping operations are deployed.

In peace operations in which the CivPol component does not exercise executive authority, the component is not responsible for investigating alleged crimes of international concern. During exhumations and search and seizure operations conducted during investigations of crimes of international concern, the CivPol component may be asked to assist by monitoring the activities of local police who provide security for such operations. Additionally, members of the CivPol component may come across information concerning alleged crimes of international concern during the normal course of their duty. In such situations, the CivPol component may be asked to transmit this information to a relevant international judicial body in the context of overall cooperation between that body and the peacekeeping operation.
If the CivPol component possesses executive authority, they may exercise the same obligations as the police forces of Member States.

C. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration – Civilian Police

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration activities in a peacekeeping environment have been described at length in the Secretary-General’s recent report on the role of peacekeeping in DD&R (S/2000/101).

Although the confiscation of weapons usually takes place only within specified cantonment areas, the CivPol may be ordered to man weapon confiscation checkpoints. CivPol personnel may also be called upon either to monitor the disarmament process and report on incidents or to assist in the seizure of weapons and explosives.

D. Humanitarian Assistance – Civilian Police

Humanitarian assistance activities include delivering food, medicine, and other forms of relief assistance to displaced populations or those being resettled. In peacekeeping missions, in which the CivPol component does not exercise executive authority, the unit may be asked to report on incidents related to the delivery and distribution of aid and to monitor the local police as they provide security for the delivery and distribution of such aid. The CivPol component may also be tasked to train, mentor, advise, and monitor local police forces in their protecting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. It is important to note that although the provision of security for refugees and internally displaced persons is of utmost importance,
remains a secondary task for CivPol personnel when they are not entrusted with executive authority.

In peacekeeping missions in which the CivPol component exercises executive authority, it falls within the responsibility of the component to provide protection and security for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, humanitarian aid workers, the civilians they serve, and the aid being delivered.

E. Electoral Assistance - Civilian Police

In post-conflict environments, elections are often associated with a wide range of public disturbances such as voter intimidation, serious public order incidents, and bloodshed. In peacekeeping missions in which the CivPol component does not exercise executive authority, CivPol personnel may be requested not only to monitor the activities of the local police in providing security for all election related events, but to train local police in how to do so. CivPol personnel may also be asked to assess the security requirements for election related events such as political rallies, the siting of polling stations and the transportation of politicians to and from events. When international staff are involved in elections, CivPol personnel may also be requested to provide security for them. Through these measures the CivPol component helps to promote the ability of the general public has to exercise their democratic right to vote.

In peacekeeping missions in which the CivPol component possesses executive authority, all policing functions in support of fair and free elections may be exercised by CivPol personnel.
IV. OTHER RELATIONSHIPS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF CIVILIAN POLICE

F. Mine Action - Civilian Police

Mine action operations include, among other activities, mine removal; mine surveys and mapping; construction of mine databases; training of de-miners; and the development and organization of mine awareness campaigns. The CivPol component assists the Mine Action Services by reporting on incidents or engaging in following up investigations of incidents involving mines. For their own safety, CivPol personnel must undergo mine awareness training.
ANNEX 1  ESTABLISHMENT OF TRAINING PRIORITIES

A. Police Academy

1. Recruits
   a. community policing philosophies and practices
   b. uniform
   c. traffic
   d. crime
   e. border
   f. court
   g. internal affairs
   h. crime analysis
   i. cross-cultural sensitivity
   j. conflict resolution and mediation
   k. political reconciliation and civic culture

2. Teachers
   a. community policing philosophies and practices
   b. uniform
   c. traffic
   d. crime
   e. border
   f. court
   g. internal affairs
   h. crime analysis
   i. cross-cultural sensitivity
   j. conflict resolution and mediation
   k. political reconciliation and civic culture

B. In-Service Training

1. Police College
   a. Experienced Working Personnel
      i. Officer
ANNEX 1

ESTABLISHMENT OF TRAINING PRIORITIES

a) community policing philosophies and practices  
b) uniform  
c) traffic  
d) crime  
e) border  
f) court  
g) internal affairs  
h) crime analysis  
i) forensics  
j) crowd control  
k) anti-terrorism  
l) organized crime  
m) gender crime  
n) cross-cultural sensitivity  
o) conflict resolution and mediation  
p) political reconciliation and civic culture

ii. Middle Management

a) community policing philosophies and practices  
b) uniform  
c) traffic  
d) crime  
e) border  
f) court  
g) internal affairs  
h) crime analysis and planning  
i) forensics  
j) crowd control  
k) anti-terrorism  
l) organized crime  
m) gender crime
iii. Senior Management
   a) community policing philosophies and practices
   b) uniform
   c) traffic
   d) crime
   e) border
   f) court
   g) internal affairs
   h) crime analysis and planning
   i) forensics
   j) crisis management
   k) operations
   l) personnel
   m) administration and logistics
   n) public information
   o) finance
   p) information technology
   q) working with civil authorities
   r) cultural sensitivity
   s) conflict resolution and mediation
ANNEX 1  ESTABLISHMENT OF TRAINING PRIORITIES

  t) political reconciliation and civic culture

b. Experienced Non-working Personnel
   i. Officer
      a) see above B.1.a.i.
   ii. Middle Management
      a) see above B.1.a.ii.
   iii. Senior Management
      a) see above B.1.a.iii.

c. Teachers
   i. community policing philosophies and practices
   ii. uniform
   iii. traffic
   iv. crime
   v. border
   vi. court
   vii. internal affairs
   viii. crime analysis and planning
   ix. crowd control
   x. anti-terrorism
   xi. organized crimes
   xii. gender crimes
   xiii. forensics
   xiv. crisis management
   xv. operations
   xvi. personnel
   xvii. public information
   xviii. administration and logistics
   xix. finance
ANNEX 1  ESTABLISHMENT OF TRAINING PRIORITIES

xx. information technology
xxi. working with civil authorities
xxii. cross-cultural sensitivity
xxiii. conflict resolution and mediation
xxiv. political reconciliation and civic culture
d. Training Administrators
   i. Middle Management
      a) administration and logistics
      b) information technology
      c) personnel
      d) cross-cultural sensitivity
      e) conflict resolution and mediation
      f) political reconciliation and civic culture
   ii. Senior Management
      a) administration and logistics
      b) finance
      c) information technology
      d) personnel
      e) cross-cultural sensitivity
      f) conflict resolution and mediation
      g) political reconciliation and civic culture

2. Field Training
a. Experienced Working Personnel
   i. Police Officer
      a) see above B.1.a.i.
   ii. Middle Management
      a) see above B.1.a.ii.
   iii. Senior Management
      a) see above B.1.a.iii.
b. Experienced Non-working Personnel
   i. Police Officer
      a) see above B.1.a.i.
   ii. Middle Management
      a) see above B.1.a.ii.
   iii. Senior Management
      a) see above B.1.a.iii.

c. Teachers

3. Out of Country Training
   a. Middle Management
      i. Operations
      ii. finance
      iii. administration and logistics
      iv. working with civil authorities
      v. crisis management
      vi. public information
      vii. anti-terrorism
      viii. organized crime
      ix. crowd control
   b. Senior Management
      i. operations
      ii. finance
      iii. administration and logistics
      iv. working with civil authorities
      v. public information
      vi. anti-terrorism
      vii. crisis management
      viii. international criminal intelligence
A. Senior Management

1. Ministry of Interior
   a. Minister
   b. Deputy Minister
   c. Chiefs and Deputies of Departments
      i. Uniform Police
      ii. Traffic
      iii. Crime
      iv. Border
      v. Internal Affairs
      vi. Crime Analysis and Planning
      vii. Court
      viii. Forensics
      ix. Finance
     x. Personnel
     xi. Information Technology
     xii. Public Information
     xiii. Administration & Logistics

2. Regional/cantonal Ministry of Interior
   a. Minister
   b. Deputy Minister
   c. Chiefs and Deputies of Departments
      i. Uniform Police
      ii. Traffic
      iii. Crime
      iv. Border
      v. Internal Affairs
      vi. Crime Analysis and Planning
      vii. Forensics
ix. Finance
x. Personnel
xi. Information Technology
xii. Public Information
xiii. Administration & Logistics

3. Municipal/local police services
   a. Chief of Police
   b. Deputy Chief of Police

B. Middle Management
   1. Chief and Deputies of Departments
      a. Uniform
      b. Traffic
      c. Crime
      d. Internal Affairs
      e. Crime Analysis and Planning
      f. Forensics
      g. Court
      h. Finance
      i. Personnel
      j. Information Technology
      k. Public Information
   2. Duty Room officers
   3. Shift leaders
   4. Team and Unit leaders
      a. Crowd Control
      b. Anti-terrorism
      c. Organized Crime
d. Gender Crimes

C. Police Officer
1. Uniform
2. Traffic
3. Crime
4. Internal Affairs
5. Border
6. Court
7. Special Units
   a. Crowd Control
   b. Anti-terrorism
   c. Organized Crime
   d. Gender Crimes
8. Forensic Technicians
9. Finance
10. Personnel
11. Information Technology
12. Administration and Logistics

D. Other
1. Correction/Penal
2. Customs/Immigration
3. Marine/ Harbor
4. Financial/Taxation
5. Park/Game Warden