ICJ REJECTS YUGOSLAVIA'S REQUEST FOR ORDER TO HALT USE OF FORCE BY FRANCE, REMAINS SEIZED OF CASE
Press Release
ICJ/576
ICJ REJECTS YUGOSLAVIA'S REQUEST FOR ORDER TO HALT USE OF FORCE BY FRANCE, REMAINS SEIZED OF CASE
19990603 (Reissued as received.)THE HAGUE, 2 June (ICJ) -- Today, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected the request for the indication of provisional measures submitted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in the case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. France). The decision was taken by twelve votes to three.
In its Order, the Court also stated that it cannot, at this stage of the proceedings, accede to France's request that the case be removed from the List. It thus remained seised of the case. The subsequent procedure has been reserved for further decision by fourteen votes to one.
Since the Court included on the Bench no judge of the nationality of Yugoslavia, that State appointed a judge ad hoc.
Background information
On 29 April 1999 Yugoslavia filed an Application instituting proceedings against France "for violation of the obligation not to use force", accusing that State of bombing Yugoslav territory "together with other Member States of NATO" (see Press Release ICJ/569). On the same day, it submitted a request for the indication of provisional measures, asking the Court to order France to "cease immediately its acts of use of force" and to "refrain from any act of threat or use of force" against the FRY.
As a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court, Yugoslavia invoked Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948, as well as Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court. Article IX of the Genocide Convention provides that disputes between the contracting parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice. As to Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, it provides that when a State files an application against another State which has not accepted the jurisdiction of
the Court, the application is transmitted to that other State, but no action is taken in the proceedings unless and until that State has accepted the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of the case.
Reasoning of the Court
In its Order, the Court first emphasizes that it is "deeply concerned with the human tragedy, the loss of life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo which form the background" of the dispute and "with the continuing loss of life and human suffering in all parts of Yugoslavia". It declares itself"profoundly concerned with the use of force in Yugoslavia", which "under the present circumstances . . . raises very serious issues of international law". While being "mindful of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and of its own responsibilities in the maintenance of peace and security under the Charter and [its] Statute", the Court "deems it necessary to emphasize that all parties before it must act in conformity with their obligations under the United Nations Charter and other rules of international law, including humanitarian law".
The Court then points out that it "does not automatically have jurisdiction over legal disputes between States" and that "one of the fundamental principles of its Statute is that it cannot decide a dispute between States without the consent of those States to its jurisdiction". It cannot indicate provisional measures without its jurisdiction in the case being established prima facie (at first sight).
Concerning Article IX of the Genocide Convention, the Court states that it is not disputed that both Yugoslavia and France are parties to that Convention, without reservation, and that Article IX accordingly appears to constitute a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded. The Court however finds that it must ascertain whether the breaches of the Convention alleged by Yugoslavia are capable of falling within the provisions of that instrument and whether, as a consequence, the dispute is one over which the Court might have jurisdiction ratione materiae (as to the subject). In its Application, Yugoslavia contends that the subject of the dispute concerns inter alia "acts of the Republic of France by which it has violated its international obligation . . . not to deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to cause the physical destruction of a national group". It contends that the sustained and intensive bombing of the whole of its territory, including the most heavily populated areas, constitutes "a serious violation of Article II of the Genocide Convention", that it is the Yugoslav nation as a whole and as such that is targeted and that the use of certain weapons whose long-term hazards to health and the environment are already known, and the destruction of the largest part of the country's power supply system, with catastrophic consequences of which the Respondent must be aware, "impl[y] the intent to destroy, in whole or in part", the Yugoslav national group as such. For its part, France contends that the genocide, as defined by
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the 1948 Convention, consists of two elements: "One objective: the destruction of all or part of a national or religious group as such. The other is subjective: an intention to achieve this result, which is in conflict . . . with 'the most elementary principles of morality'". It asserts that "the NATO forces . . . are making all efforts to ensure that the civilian population suffers no needless harm" and stresses "the manifest absence in this case of the element of intention" and "the total silence of the applicant State" on this point. It appears to the Court that, according to the Convention, the essential characteristic of genocide is the intended destruction of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group; the Court further states that "the threat or use of force against a State cannot in itself constitute an act of genocide within the meaning of Article II of the Genocide Convention". It adds that in its opinion, it does not appear at the present stage of the proceedings that the bombings which form the subject of the Yugoslav Application "indeed entail the element of intent, towards a group as such, required by the provision" mentioned above. The Court considers therefore that it is not in a position to find, at this stage of the proceedings, that the acts imputed by Yugoslavia to France are capable of coming within the provisions of the Genocide Convention; and Article IX cannot accordingly constitute a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court could prima facie be founded in the case.
As to Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, the Court stresses that, in the absence of consent by France, it cannot exercise jurisdiction in the case, even prima facie.
The Court concludes that it "lacks prima facie jurisdiction to entertain Yugoslavia's Application" and that it "cannot therefore indicate any provisional measure whatsoever". However, the findings reached by the Court "in no way prejudge the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits of the case" and they "leave unaffected the right of the Governments of Yugoslavia and France to submit arguments in respect of those questions".
The Court finally observes that "there is a fundamental distinction between the question of the acceptance by a State of the Court's jurisdiction and the compatibility of particular acts with international law". "The former requires consent; the latter question can only be reached when the Court deals with the merits after having established its jurisdiction and having heard full legal arguments by both parties". It emphasizes that "whether or not States accept the jurisdiction of the Court, they remain in any event responsible for acts attributable to them that violate international law, including humanitarian law" and that "any disputes relating to the legality of such acts are required to be resolved by peaceful means, the choice of which, pursuant to Article 33 of the Charter, is left to the parties". In this context, "the parties should take care not to aggravate or extend the dispute". The Court reaffirms that "when such a dispute gives rise to a
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threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the Security Council has special responsibilities under Chapter VII of the Charter".
Composition of the Court
The Court was composed as follows in the case: Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President; President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans; Judge ad hoc Kreca; Registrar Valencia-Ospina.
Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, Judges Shi, Koroma and Vereshchetin have appended declarations to the Court's Order. Judges Oda and Parra-Aranguren have appended separate opinions. Judge ad hoc Kreca has appended a dissenting opinion.
The text of the declarations and a brief summary of the opinions will be published later as an addendum to the present Press Communiqué. The full text of the Order, declarations and opinions appears on the Court's website (http://www.icj-cij.org).
The nine other cases concerning Legality of Use of Force submitted by Yugoslavia to the Court form the subject of separate press releases.
Information Office: Mr. Arthur Witteveen, Secretary of the Court (tel: + 31 70 302 23 36). Mrs. Laurence Blairon, Information Officer (tel: + 31 70 302 23 37). E-mail address: information@icj-cij.org.
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