



**THE PRESIDENT
OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

31 July 2015

Excellency


Reference is made to my letter dated 10 November, 2014, of which I appointed H.E. Courtenay Rattray, Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations to Chair on my behalf, the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Security Council Reform. In my letter, I encouraged Member States to move the process towards text based negotiations. I now have the honour to circulate to you a text, to form the basis for the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the reform of the Security Council.

This text is the outcome of a consultative, inclusive and transparent process. It is a product of Member States submissions and discussions in the IGN during 69th session. I am confident that all efforts have been made to afford an opportunity to Member States to participate throughout the process from its inception until now.

The text should be considered in conjunction with its annex as a comprehensive whole. The annex displays not only the original submissions of Member States to the Framework Document, but also six letters containing the positions of groups and Member States that indicated that they did not wish their proposals to be included in the body of the text.

Given this text's adherence to General Assembly Decision 62/557, it represents a sound basis upon which Member States can engage in text- based negotiations during the next phase of IGN.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Sam K. Kutesa

All Permanent Representatives
to the United Nations
New York

Intergovernmental Negotiations on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters

Issues of categories of membership; the question of the veto; regional representation; size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council; and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly.

a) CATEGORIES OF MEMBERSHIP

a.1 Permanent Members

- a.1.1. The Republic of China (People's Republic of China), France, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (The Russian Federation), The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The United States of America
- i. ...with no additional permanent seats:
Ireland, Liechtenstein, Panama
 - ii. ...plus additional permanent seats:
(The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Latvia, Malaysia, Monaco, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Viet Nam
 - iii. ...plus [x] additional permanent seats:
**Slovakia [5]; Georgia [5-6];
African Group, Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, L.69, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [6];
Australia, Hungary [up to 6]**
 - iv. ...plus Brazil, Germany, India, Japan and permanent African representation:
France, Kazakhstan, Romania, UK
- a.1.2. No less than two permanent seats for Africa. **African Group**
- a.1.3. Endorses the enlargement of the Security Council in the category of permanent members. At least two developing countries from Africa, two from Asia and two others from Latin America and the Caribbean should enter the Council as new permanent members. **Cuba**
- a.1.4. It is yet premature to specify the issue of this category of membership..In the event of possible expansion of permanent membership, Japan is totally unqualified to be a permanent member of the expanded Security Council under any circumstances since Japan still denies to liquidate its inhumane war crimes committed against a number of Asian countries during World War II, which placed Japan under the term of an enemy state in the Charter of the United Nations.¹ **DPKK**
- a.1.5. Not convinced by arguments for an increase in the number of permanent seats. Bringing in new permanent members would seem to carry the risk of perpetuating many of the deficiencies of current arrangements. **Ireland**
- In the event of possible expansion, description of an election process for additional permanent seats
- a.1.6. Upon adoption of a comprehensive framework resolution on Security Council reform, interested Member States prepared to assume the functions and responsibilities of permanent members of the Security Council would submit their candidatures in writing to the President of the General Assembly. The General Assembly will then proceed, as soon as possible, at a date to be determined by the President of the General Assembly to the election of the six new permanent members. **G4, L.69, Czech Republic**
- a.1.7. The rules of procedure of the General Assembly will be applied to the election of the new permanent members. **G4, L.69, Czech Republic**

- a.1.8. Election of new permanent members by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly through a secret ballot. **Belgium and Luxembourg, (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), G4, L.69, Czech Republic, Georgia, Monaco**
- a.1.9. The criteria of Article 23 (1) should also apply to the election of the new permanent members: "due regard being specifically paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution". **(The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), G4, L.69, Czech Republic**
- a.1.10. Having in mind the importance of these elections they should require broader support than regular elections for the non-permanent seats. **Croatia**
- a.1.11. Decision on the basis of consensus or the largest possible majority in the General Assembly. **Serbia**
- a.1.12. Expansion of permanent seats by consensual/unanimous endorsement of the regional group and respective decision/acclamation of the United Nations General Assembly. **Slovakia**
- a.1.13. The selection of Africa's representatives to be done by the African Union for submission to the General Assembly for election. **African Group**
- a.1.14. The election process of new members should remain as a prerogative of the General Assembly. **Peru**
- a.1.15. The manner in which new permanent members are chosen would depend on the outcome of discussions about the scope of enlargement. It is for the United Nations membership to designate new permanent members. **France, UK**

a.2 Non-permanent members with a two-year term

- a.2.1. Current two-year non-permanent seats (10)
 - i. ..plus additional non-permanent seats:
 - (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Croatia, Dominican Republic, France², Latvia, Malaysia, Monaco, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, UK³, Viet Nam**
 - ii. ..plus [x] additional non-permanent seats:
 - Czech Republic [4]; G4, Belgium and Luxembourg, Georgia [4-5];**
 - Australia [up to 5]; Ireland, Kazakhstan, Slovakia [5];**
 - African Group [not less than 5]; Hungary [not more than 6]; L.69, Montenegro [6]**
- a.2.2. A total of 5 non-permanent seats for Africa. **African Group**
- a.2.3. The number of non-permanent members for a term of two years should increase to 15 at least. **Cuba**
- a.2.4. Proceed first with the issue of enlargement of non-permanent seats. **DPRK**
In the event of possible expansion, description of an election process for additional two-year non-permanent seats
- a.2.5. Additional two-year non-permanent members will be elected by the General Assembly, in accordance with the current standard procedure for non-permanent seats. **(The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), G4, L.69, Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Monaco, Montenegro, Paraguay, Slovakia**
- a.2.6. The election process of new non-permanent members should remain as a prerogative of the General Assembly. **Peru**
- a.2.7. It is for the United Nations membership to elect all non-permanent members. **France, UK**

- a.2.8. The selection of Africa's representatives to be done by the African Union for submission to the General Assembly for election. **African Group**
- a.2.9. Member States should take into account the (i) aspirations of those countries whose contribution to the work of the Organization is undisputed (ii) financial contributions to the United Nations budget, as well as and (iii) participation in peacekeeping operations with the United Nations Security Council mandate. **Poland**
- a.2.10. New non-permanent seats should have exactly the same privileges and rights as the ones enjoyed by the current non-permanent members, without selective or discriminatory criteria being established. **Cuba**
- a.2.11. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from 15 to maximum 25/26, 2 of the 4/5 additional non-permanent members shall be chosen for a term of one year. **Belgium and Luxembourg**
Possible re-election of two year non-permanent seats
- a.2.12. Not opposed to immediate re-election of non-permanent members. **Cuba**
- a.2.13. It is for consideration whether countries holding two-year term seats would be free to stand again for a second term on completion of their first. It is also for consideration whether at the end of the second term they might be required to step down for a number of years before standing again. **Ireland**

a.3 New Category of Seats

- a.3.1. Remains open for this option, if negotiations can lead to the compromise between groups with the opposing views on new permanent membership. **Montenegro**
- a.3.2. Does not favor the creation of new categories or sub-categories of Member States. New categories would intensify current differences and would motivate division among members of the Security Council in lieu of contributing to more effective operation thereof. For instance, the accession of new permanent members without the right to veto would result in a new category, which is not supported. **Cuba**

Longer Term Non-Permanent Seats

- a.3.3. Six additional members elected to serve, on a permanent basis, for renewable terms of [8/10] years.⁴ **Liechtenstein**
- a.3.4. Non-permanent members with an eight-year term - a total of 6 seats. **Ireland**
- a.3.5. Should it find consensus, does not exclude an interim solution, where a new category of seats is created for longer periods than two years that can also be immediately renewable. **Hungary**

In the event of possible expansion, description of an election process for new seats

- a.3.6. Elections to fill the six seats with terms of [8/10] years shall be held after entry into force of the required Charter amendment and simultaneously with the regular elections of non-permanent members of the Security Council. Candidates for seats above shall not be eligible to serve as non-permanent members in accordance with Article 23, paragraph 2, of the United Nations Charter for the following [8/10] calendar years. **Liechtenstein**
- a.3.7. It is for consideration whether countries holding eight-year term seats would be free to stand again for a second term on completion of their first. It is also for consideration whether at the end of the second term they might be required to step down for a number of years before standing again. **Ireland**

Transitional Permanent Seats

- a.3.8. Open for discussion on a new category of membership, provided it does not compromise the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council decision making, creates opportunity (maybe for an interim period) for those Member States that wish to assume higher responsibility; and provides an acceptable platform for regional leading Member States to do so if endorsed by the regional group. **Slovakia**

- a.3.9. Open to the possibility of establishing a category of members with a long mandate, which could eventually become permanent members. This can be considered as a constructive evolution formula. **Peru**

In the event of possible expansion, description of an election process for new seats

- a.3.10. Election process to be decided by the rules of procedure, ideally on principle of regional endorsement. **Slovakia**

Gradual Removal of Categories

- a.3.11. The very nature of membership "categories" does not correspond to the democratic institution that we are trying to perfect. In the long run, we would like to see there are no membership categories, just as is the case in all the other United Nations bodies. By the United Nations Centennial in 2045, we envision a Security Council consisting of 24 members, all on equal standing, elected for three-year terms, with the opportunity for consecutive re-election.

Considering the commitments well into the 2030's as already acquired by some Member States in terms of their candidacy under the current membership structure of 5 permanent members and 10 non-permanent members on a two-year rotation. The final composition of the Security Council will be phased in over two stages.

The first stage, beginning in 2017 and ending in 2030, introduces five semi-permanent seats which entail a tentatively indefinite tenure without the right to veto, to accommodate the G4 and one member of the African Group; one additional non-permanent seat each for the Eastern European Group and the Arab States, and two for the Small Island Developing States.

The second stage introduces three-year election cycles beginning in 2030 for all positions in the Security Council. Measures to ascertain the re-election of the P5 until the United Nations Centennial in 2045 should be discussed and incorporated. **Panama**

Description of an election process for any type of new category of seats

- a.3.12. To be elected by the General Assembly, with the same procedure as the current non-permanent members. **Montenegro**

- a.3.13. The election process should follow current practices regarding non-permanent members. **Paraguay**

b) REGIONAL REPRESENTATION

- b.1. Appropriate geographic balance across the full membership of the Council. To better reflect contemporary geopolitical realities. **Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Dominican Republic, Latvia, Peru, Viet Nam**
 - b.2. The current composition of the Security Council does not reflect geopolitical realities, for which it needs to be balanced. Developing countries are underrepresented in the Council. **Cuba**
 - b.3. Need to address the non-representation and under-representation of some regions in the permanent and non-permanent category; this will help improve the legitimacy and accountability of the United Nations Security Council. **Brunei Darussalam, Singapore**
 - b.4. Reform should guarantee that all United Nations Member States are represented and included in an equal and democratic manner in the deliberations of international peace and security issues. **DFRK**
 - b.5. A reform that will ensure Africa's legitimate right to fair and equitable geographical representation in the Security Council: taking into account the principles, objectives and ideals of the UN Charter for a fairer world based on universalism, equity and regional balance within the UN system. **African Group**
 - b.6. Supportive of a reform which will ensure Africa's fair and equitable geographical representation in the Security Council. **Brunei Darussalam, Croatia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovakia**
 - b.7. Emphasize the necessity of one new non-permanent member seat for the Eastern European Member States that are considerably underrepresented in the Security Council. **Czech Republic**
 - b.8. Expansion in permanent and non-permanent categories for Africa; Expansion in permanent and non-permanent categories for Asia; Expansion in non-permanent category for Eastern European; Expansion in permanent and non-permanent categories for GRULAC; Expansion in permanent category for WEOG. **(The Bahamas Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago)**
 - b.9. The enlargement of the Security Council shall be guided by the principles of Article 23 of the Charter, based on the equitable geographical representation of the regional groups.⁵ **Hungary**
 - b.10. Any change in the Security Council composition should be based on the existing regional groups. **Ukraine**
 - b.11. Broader reform of geographical distribution. **Poland**
 - b.12. Implementation of geographical criteria in order to allow all regions to have an adequate presence within the enlarged Council. **Paraguay**
 - b.13. Close the gap between regional groups and improve rotations. **Slovakia**
 - b.14. Increase in the membership of the Council for each region should correspond to their respective proportion in the membership of the United Nations. **Viet Nam**
 - b.15. Do not support proposals for regional representation on the Security Council as this would be at odds with the fundamental tenets of the United Nations Charter, which makes clear that admission to the United Nations is extended to individual states. **France, UK**
- Cross-Regional Arrangements
- b.16. Member States should also make full use of the possibility of cross-regional arrangements to ensure that the diversity of the General Assembly membership is adequately reflected in the Council. **G4**
 - b.17. Small states must always be represented in the Council. If the Council's composition does not include a small state, at least one of the existing Council members will be appointed as a representative for small states in consultation with the members of the Forum of Small States. **Singapore**

- b.18. Regional groups shall coordinate to ensure that there is regular representation for small developing states in the non-permanent category. **L.69**
- b.19. Any enlargement of the Security Council should take into account the concerns of small and medium-sized Member States, including the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). **Belgium and Luxembourg, Netherlands**
- b.20. Member States should give due consideration during the nomination and election of non-permanent members to the adequate and continuing representation of:
 - i. Small Member States: **Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovakia**
 - ii. Medium Size Member States: **Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, Estonia, Latvia, Netherlands**
 - iii. Small Island Developing States (SIDS): **G4, Brunei Darussalam, Estonia**
- b.21. Increase the presence of Arab countries. **Slovakia**
- b.22. It is very important to increase the representation of Non-Aligned Movement Member States and other developing countries. **DPKK**
- b.23. Expansion should see more seats for the developing countries and equitable geographical representation in the enlarged membership, in both categories. **Malaysia**
- b.24. Expansion in the permanent and non-permanent category with developed and developing countries adequately represented. **Brunei Darussalam**
- b.25. Equitable geographic representation to the benefit of small and developing countries and regional and other specific groups. **Serbia**
- b.26. The reform should envisage increased representation in the Council of developing countries from Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean. **Ukraine**
- b.27. The main objective of the enlargement of the Security Council should be to rectify the underrepresentation of developing countries. Therefore, the increase in such categories should mostly stem from developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. The main objective of the enlargement of the Security Council should be to rectify the underrepresentation of developing countries. It must not expand by default. The enlargement of the Security Council should not be partial or selective, nor should it imply an increase in the number of members to the detriment of developing countries. The main increase for such categories should be in the number of developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. **Cuba**

b.29. Distribution of seats in the case of expansion of both permanent and non-permanent seats

b.29.1 New/ Additional permanent seats to be distributed as follows:

- i. African States:
African Group⁶ [no less than 2];
Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, L.69⁷, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [2]
- ii. Asia-Pacific States:
Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, L.69, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [2]
- iii. Latin American and Caribbean States:
Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, L.69, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [1]
- iv. Western European and Other States:
Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, L.69, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [1]

b.29.2 Additional two-year non-permanent seats to be distributed as follows:

- i. African States:
Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [1]; Belgium and Luxembourg, G4 [1-2];
African Group [no less than 2]; L.69 [2]
- ii. Asia-Pacific States:
Belgium and Luxembourg, G4, L.69, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [1]
- iii. Eastern European States:
G4, L.69, Belgium and Luxembourg, Croatia⁸, Czech Republic, Georgia⁹, Hungary¹⁰,
Kazakhstan, Latvia¹¹, Romania¹², Slovakia¹³ [1]
- iv. Latin American and Caribbean States:
G4, L.69, Belgium and Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan [1]
- v. Western European and Other States: Kazakhstan [1]
- vi. Small Island Developing States (SIDS) across all regions:
(The Bahamas Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago)¹⁴,
L.69 [1]

b.29.3 At least two developing countries from Africa, two from Asia and two others from Latin America and the Caribbean should enter the Council as new permanent members. **Cuba**

Range of Proposals in b.29

	Current permanent seats	New/ Additional permanent seats*	Current non-permanent seats	Additional non-permanent seats	Total
African States	0	2	3	1-2**	6-7
Asia-Pacific States	1	2	2	1	6
Eastern European States	1	0	1	1	3
Latin American and Caribbean States	0	1	2	1	4
Western European and Other States	3	1	2	0-1	6-7
Cross regional: Small Island Developing States	0	0	0	0-1	0-1
	5	6	10	4-7	25-28 seats

*Also note: Submission b.29.3

**Also note: African Group [no less than 2]

b.30. Distribution of seats in the case of creation of longer term non-permanent seats

- b.30.1 New longer term non-permanent seats with a term length of [8 **Ireland** or 8/10 **Liechtenstein**] years to be distributed as follows:
- i. African States: **Ireland, Liechtenstein** [2]
 - ii. Asia-Pacific States: **Ireland, Liechtenstein** [2]
 - iii. Latin American and Caribbean States: **Ireland, Liechtenstein** [1]
 - iv. Western European and Other States: **Ireland, Liechtenstein** [1]
- b.30.2 Additional two-year non-permanent seats to be distributed as follows:
- vii. African States: **Ireland** [2]
 - viii. Asia-Pacific States: **Ireland** [1]
 - ix. Eastern European States: **Ireland, Liechtenstein** [1]
 - x. Latin American and Caribbean States: **Ireland** [1]
- b.30.3 Leaves open the possibility of the creation of further two-year non-permanent seats in accordance with Article 23, paragraph 2, of the United Nations Charter, and does not specifically address the number or distribution of any such seats. **Liechtenstein** (Denoted by [x] in the below table)

Range of Proposals in b.30

	Current permanent seats	Current non-permanent seats	New longer term non-permanent seats	Additional two year non-permanent seats	Total
African States	0	3	2	2 or [x]	7 or [x]
Asia-Pacific States	1	2	2	1 or [x]	6 or [x]
Eastern European States	1	1	0	1	3
Latin American and Caribbean States	0	2	1	1 or [x]	4 or [x]
Western European and Other States	3	2	1	0 or [x]	6 or [x]
	5	10	6	5 or [x]	21 to 26 or [x] seats

b.31. Distribution of additional two-year non-permanent seats under any expansion model

- b.31.1 Distribution of additional two-year non-permanent seats in the event of any expansion model regardless of the distribution of potential additional permanent or any new category of seats
- i. African States: [2] **Montenegro**
 - ii. Asia-Pacific States: [1] **Montenegro**
 - iii. Eastern European States: [1] **Estonia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine**
 - iv. Latin American and the Caribbean States: [1] **Montenegro**
 - v. Western European and Other States: [1] **Montenegro**

b.32. Distribution of seats during the gradual removal of categories

b.32.1 By 2030 (first stage) the Security Council will retain the current structure of seats along with the addition of semi-permanent category of seats with a tentative indefinite tenure to be distributed as follows:

- i. African States: [1]
- ii. Brazil, Germany, India, Japan: [4]

And additional two-year non-permanent seats to be distributed as follows:

- iii. Eastern European States: [1]
- iv. Arab States: [1]
- v. Small Island Developing States: [2]

b.32.2 By 2045 (second stage) the composition of the Security Council will amount to a single category of three-year electable seats to be distributed as follows:

- i. African States: [4]
- ii. Arab States: [1]
- iii. Asia-Pacific States: [5]
- iv. Eastern European States: [3]
- v. Latin American and Caribbean States: [3]
- vi. Small Island Developing States: [2]
- vii. Western European and Other States: [6]

b.32.3 The proposed distribution of member seats takes into account the various other proposals on the table, as well as the proportion of countries in each region of the world, giving greater representation to developing countries, and bearing in mind that a few countries overlap groupings. **Panama**

c) THE SIZE OF AN ENLARGED SECURITY COUNCIL AND WORKING METHODS OF THE COUNCIL

c.1. Size of an Enlarged Security Council

c.1.1 A total of (21 - 27) seats

Montenegro¹⁵ [21]; Liechtenstein [22 or more]; Australia¹⁶ [21-26]; Panama [24]; Serbia [up to 25]; Czech Republic, Georgia, Slovakia [25]; G4, Brunei Darussalam¹⁷ [25-26]; Belgium and Luxembourg [maximum 25-26]; Romania [25-27]; Ireland, Kazakhstan [26]; African Group, Cuba¹⁸ [not less than 26]; Hungary [not more than 27]; L.69 [27]; France, Peru¹⁹ [mid-twenties]

c.1.2 The Security Council should be expanded in order to make it more broadly representative. At the same time, expansion of the Security Council should not hamper its effectiveness and ability to carry out its responsibilities as set out in the Charter. **Netherlands, UK**

c.2. Working Methods of the Council

Working Methods Impacted by Enlargement

c.2.1 Working methods of the enlarged Council should be conducted so as to help facilitate a more transparent, efficient, effective and accountable functioning of the Security Council as a whole. **Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Croatia, Ireland, Malaysia, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Serbia**

Votes Required for Decision Making

c.2.2 An affirmative vote of [14/15 **G4** / 15 **L.69**] from a total of [25/26 **G4** / 27 **L.69**] members of the enlarged Security Council will be required for a decision.

c.2.3 An expanded Security Council would maintain the same proportionality of 60% for voting purposes i.e. decisions would be adopted by the affirmative vote of 15 members. **Panama**

c.2.4 The majority required for decision-making in an enlarged Council is to be reflected in the necessary Charter amendments (art. 27 (2), 27 (3) and 109 (1)). **Hungary, Liechtenstein**

Presidency of the Security Council

c.2.5 The Security Council would be invited to consider taking measures to ensure that non-permanent members of the enlarged Security Council hold the Presidency of the Council at least once during their tenure. **Belgium and Luxembourg, (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), G4, L.69, Latvia, Liechtenstein**

Participation of Non-Permanent Members in the Work of the Council

c.2.6 An enlarged Council should not make it more difficult for non-permanent members to contribute actively to the work of the Council. **Belgium and Luxembourg, Netherlands**

c.2.7 The reform of the working methods should ensure participation on an equal footing of permanent members and non-permanent members within the Security Council. The enlarged Council should hold more open meetings, to improve the flow of information and exchange of ideas between members of the Council and other Member States. **Paraguay**

Privileges of Permanent Membership

c.2.8 Review of the privileges enjoyed by the permanent members outside the Security Council (e.g. membership in bodies such as ECOSOC and ICJ, practice of distributing senior positions within the United Nations system). **Liechtenstein**

Decision Making in Subsidiary Bodies

c.2.9 A thorough review of the working methods of the subsidiary bodies is required in the case of enlargement, in particular on decision-making. **Hungary, Liechtenstein**

c.2.10 Explore ways of alleviating the workload of the Council, e.g. assigning more tasks to subsidiary bodies on (sub)-regions. **Hungary** This would require extending the possibility of voting to subsidiary bodies. **Liechtenstein**

Secretariat Capacity

- c.2.11 Review of the capacities and the resources of the Secretariat required to service an enlarged Council. **Liechtenstein**

Other Issues Related to Working Methods

- c.2.12 Views the process of improving the working methods and the progress already achieved in the practice in this regard as a continuous process. **Monaco**
- c.2.13 Working methods would continue to be revised and adapted to allow greater openness and transparency for the greater membership of the United Nations, on whose behalf the Security Council operates. **Panama**
- c.2.14 Charter amendment has to be part of the package (Article 27 and 28 to 32). Working methods will be defined by Charter amendments (voting procedure) and the new Rules of Procedure. The new Rules of Procedure will have to be adopted by the Security Council and the entry into force of the Charter amendments. **Hungary**
- c.2.15 Adopt relevant procedures to increase the transparency and efficiency of the Council. **Georgia**
- c.2.16 Impartiality, non-selectivity and democracy should be fully upheld in all activities of the Security Council. **DERK**
- c.2.17 Uphold the primacy of and respect for the Charter in connection with its functions and powers, and in that regard to desist from the practice of engaging and initiating formal and informal discussions on the situation in any Member State of the United Nations or on any issue that does not constitute a threat to international peace and security, and contrary to the provisions of Article 24 of the Charter. **African Group**
- c.2.18 Avoid any attempts to use the Security Council to pursue national political agendas and to ensure the necessity of non-selectivity and impartiality in the work of the Council, and the need for the Council to strictly keep within the powers and functions accorded to it by the Member States under the United Nations Charter. **African Group**
- c.2.19 Greater transparency in the process of the accession of new United Nations Member States. **Kazakhstan**
- c.2.20 This is a separate discussion from the question of enlargement and, moreover, a matter for consideration by the Security Council, not the General Assembly. **France, UK**

Participation of Non-Permanent Members in the Work of the Council

- c.2.21 Elected members should be enabled to play a more active and effective role in the [proceedings and **Ukraine**] decision making process of the Council. (**The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago**)
- c.2.22 Early involvement of all Council members in the drafting of Council resolutions. **Lithuania**
- c.2.23 There is a need for more transparency and close consultations amongst all members of the Council on all matters that the Security Council is seized with. **Malaysia**
- c.2.24 There should be full and complete participation by elected members in penholding resolutions. **L.69**

Cooperation Between the Security Council and Entities Outside of the Council

- c.2.25 The Council should intensify cooperation and coordination with regional and sub-regional organizations. **Australia, Poland, Romania, Viet Nam**
- c.2.26 Further development of more meaningful relationship with international organizations. **Slovakia**
- c.2.27 The Council must improve its cooperation with regional organisations, particularly the African Union. Such cooperation must be serious and include providing assistance for AU's capacity building as per their requirement. **L.69**
- c.2.28 The Security Council should further enhance its cooperation with the United Nations Secretariat and the entire United Nations system. **Australia, Poland**

- c.2.29 More structured dialogue between the Council and the ICC. **Lithuania**
- c.2.30 The enlarged Council should facilitate more interaction with other United Nations bodies or legal institutions such as the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the International Criminal Court. **Paraguay**
- c.2.31 Encourages the United Nations Security Council to take advantage of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by seeking its advisory opinion, consistent with Article 96 (1) of the United Nations Charter... United Nations Security Council deliberations on contentious political issues would be better served if supplemented by an authoritative legal opinion. Although the legal opinions are not legally binding, they would contribute towards upholding the principle of respect for the rule of law as enshrined in the United Nations Charter. **Malaysia**

Subsidiary Bodies and Sanctions

- c.2.32 Assign chairmanships of subsidiary bodies in an equitable and transparent way. **Hungary, Ireland, Liechtenstein**
- c.2.33 All Council members should be involved in the decision-making on the distribution of chairmanships of subsidiary bodies of the Council, ensuring that the country specific and thematic lead roles are distributed evenly and appropriately among Council members. **Singapore**
- c.2.34 Regular review of the work of the sanctions committees, earlier appointment of chairs of subsidiary bodies, public briefings by chairs of sanctions committees, renew the work/establish a working group on sanctions. **Lithuania**
- c.2.35 Continue to improve the Council's handling of sanctions regimes, primarily in terms of ensuring their targeted and, when possible, time-limited character, spelling out concrete conditions for lifting, streamlining listing and delisting procedures, providing for periodic assessment. **Ukraine**
- c.2.36 Avoid any recourse to the imposition or prolongation of sanctions or their extensions by the Security Council against any State under the pretext or with the aim of achieving the political objectives of one or a few States, rather than the general interest of the international community. **African Group**

Agenda of the Security Council

- c.2.37 The Council will amend its procedures so that items do not remain on its agenda permanently/beyond (x) years. **L.69**
- c.2.38 The Council's agenda should equally reflect all States' needs and interests in an objective, rational, non-selective and non-arbitrary manner. **Cuba**
- c.2.39 The increasing tendency in the Security Council towards expansion of what poses a threat to international peace and security should be stopped. **Cuba**

Rules of Procedure of the Council

- c.2.40 The Council's rules of procedure should be formalized (**The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago**) [and disseminated to all United Nations Member States **Singapore**] in order to ensure transparency and accountability. **Malaysia**
- c.2.41 The Council's rules of procedure should be formalized in order to ensure transparency and accountability, since they have been provisional for over 70 years. **Cuba**
- c.2.42 Formalize the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, which have remained provisional for more than 60 years, in order to improve on its transparency and accountability. **African Group**

Use of Chapter VI Provisions

- c.2.43 The work of the Council should prioritise the utilization of Chapter VI measures to promote peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter. **Viet Nam**
- c.2.44 Before mandating measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council should ensure that all efforts for the pacific settlement of disputes through measures under Chapter VI have been exhausted. **L.69**

- c.2.45 Refrain from resorting to Chapter VII of the Charter as an umbrella for addressing issues that do not necessarily pose a threat to international peace and security, and to fully utilize the provisions of other relevant Chapters, where appropriate, including Chapters VI and Chapter VIII, before invoking Chapter VII which should be a measure of last resort, if necessary. **African Group**
- c.2.46 Resort to Chapter VII of the Charter as an umbrella for addressing issues that do not pose a threat to international peace and security should be avoided. The Council should fully apply the provisions in the Charter as applicable, including chapters VI and VIII, before referring to Chapter VII, which should be the last option if ever necessary. **Cuba**
- c.2.47 Imposing sanctions should only be considered after all means have been exhausted for a pacific solution/settlement of disputes in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter, and long and short-term effects of such sanctions have been carefully pondered. Sanctions should not be applied "preventatively" in cases of mere violation of International Law or international principles and standards. **Cuba**

d) THE QUESTION OF THE VETO

- d.1. [The new permanent members would as a principle have the same responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members. **Georgia**] [New permanent members shall not exercise the veto-right until a decision on the matter has been taken during a review, to be held fifteen years after the entry into force of the amendments to the Charter. **Czech Republic**] Amendments to the Charter shall reflect the fact that the extension of the right of veto to the new permanent members will be decided upon in the framework of a review. **Belgium and Luxembourg, G4**
- d.2. The veto should be abolished. So long as it exists, it should be extended to all members of the permanent category of the Security Council, who must enjoy all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including the right of the veto. **(The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), L.69, Dominican Republic**
- d.3. The veto is should be abolished but so long as it exists, it should be extended to all members of the permanent category of the Security Council, who must in this regard enjoy all prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the permanent category including the right of the veto as a matter of common justice. **African Group**
- d.4. New permanent members should have exactly the same privileges and rights as the ones enjoyed by the current permanent members, including the right to veto, without selective or discriminatory criteria being established. **Cuba**
- d.5. We would not oppose extension of the veto to new permanent members if the candidates to such permanent membership were to pursue such an extension. **France**
- d.6. Status of the permanent member of the United Nations Security Council is both a privilege and a responsibility - including the right of veto. All countries being considered as potential permanent members and countries that have the ambition to be considered should have the ability to carry all the responsibility that comes with United Nations Security Council duties and be able to prove in deeds that they do deserve it and are ready to take up this responsibility. **Slovakia**
- d.7. The new permanent members should also be accorded veto power so as to contribute towards a more balanced and representational decision-making process, particularly if it is agreed that all regions would be represented in the Security Council. **Malaysia**
- d.8. The veto should not be extended to new permanent members of an enlarged Security Council. **Australia, Chile, Ireland, Singapore, UK**
- d.9. On the basis of the principle of sovereign equality of all the United Nations Member States as enshrined in the Charter, no state should be granted the special privilege to exercise the veto power. **Philippines**
- d.10. Member States should be invited to continue discussions on the use of the veto in certain circumstances. **G4**
- d.11. The question of the veto would be addressed as part of the review [16 / 20 years] after the first elections in the new category of seats by the General Assembly. **Liechtenstein**

Voluntary Limitation/ Restraint of the Use of the Veto

- d.12. Permanent members of the Council should voluntary and collectively commit themselves to not using their veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending situations involving mass atrocity crimes. **Belgium and Luxembourg, Estonia, Ireland, Ukraine**
- d.13. Permanent members of the Council should voluntary and collectively commit themselves to not using their veto to block Council action aimed at preventing or ending:
- Genocide **Czech Republic, Lithuania, Montenegro, Singapore, Ukraine;**
 - War crimes **Czech Republic, Lithuania, Montenegro, Singapore, Ukraine;**
 - Crimes against humanity **Czech Republic, Lithuania, Singapore, Ukraine;**
 - Ethnic cleansing **Czech Republic, Montenegro;**
 - Massive human rights violations **Lithuania**

- d.14. Supports all initiatives facilitating timely and decisive action by the Security Council aimed at preventing or ending mass atrocities, including those calling for voluntarily agreeing to refrain from using the veto. **Hungary**
- d.15. If permanent members insist on casting a veto that blocks action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity they should produce alternative proposals that will end such atrocities or clearly explain to all United Nations Member States why they are prepared to see the continuation of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and a copy of the explanation should be circulated as a Security Council Document. **Singapore**
- d.16. Support a code of conduct for the voluntary limitation of the use of the veto by permanent members. **Belgium and Luxembourg, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland**
- d.17. Proposals made by some Member States on a voluntary code of conduct regulating the use of the veto in cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide certainly merit positive consideration. **Latvia**
- d.18. Support proposals for a code of conduct among the P5 regarding their use of the veto in the Security Council as a first step towards a process of reviewing the veto power of permanent members. **Philippines**
- d.19. More generally all Member States should commit to support timely action by the Security Council aimed at preventing or ending the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. **Belgium and Luxembourg**
- d.20. Self-regulation of the use of the veto by the permanent members. **Monaco**
- d.21. The veto should be used with maximum restraint with its eventual elimination. **Brunei Darussalam**
- d.22. Should aim to minimize the use of the veto. **Netherlands**
- d.23. Supports an adjustment of the veto right based on consensus of the current permanent members, taking into consideration the needs of the Council for faster action, greater involvement in conflict prevention and increasing efficiency. **Romania**
- d.24. The initiative on restraint of the use of the veto in situations of mass atrocity deserves close attention and ambitious follow-up, and could be taken forward independently of broader Security Council reforms. **Australia**
- Mandatory Restriction of the Use of the Veto
- d.25. The use of the veto should be restricted in cases which would block Council action aimed at preventing or ending:
- Crimes against humanity **Georgia, Kazakhstan, Peru;**
 - War crimes **Georgia, Kazakhstan;**
 - Ethnic cleansing **Georgia;**
 - Genocide **Georgia, Kazakhstan, Peru;**
 - Systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. **Peru**
- d.26. The use of the veto should be limited to only measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. **(The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), Peru, Viet Nam**
- d.27. Relevant procedural regulations should be elaborated to restrict the veto right of permanent members who are involved in a conflict under Security Council consideration. **Georgia**
- d.28. The veto should not in any case be used for blocking Council action in the event of aggression against a United Nations Member State. **Ukraine**
- d.29. The permanent members should recommit themselves to Article 27 (3) of the United Nations Charter obliging a party to a dispute to abstain from voting. **Ukraine**

Abolition of the Veto

- d.30. Support abolition of the veto. However, in event of its retention, new permanent members should also have right to veto. There should be no distinction between permanent members. While the veto is in existence, efforts must be made to limit its use in instances of the most serious crimes of international concern, crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, etc. **(The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago)**
- d.31. Abolishment of the use of the veto in conformity with the principle of sovereign equality as envisaged in the Charter. Nevertheless, we continue to call for a restraint in the use of veto powers especially in cases of international crimes of the most serious nature such as in instances of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. **Malaysia**
- d.32. It is indispensable to eliminate the veto immediately for being an anachronistic and undemocratic privilege. Until its elimination is attained, other mechanisms should be implemented in order to limit its use to the extent possible. **Cuba**
- d.33. The veto is an anachronistic tool, belonging in a period of our past history. Regardless of which membership formula we end up using for the Security Council, our aim should be to eliminate the veto. Until we reach the stage of full abolishment of the veto, we should continue to strive for it not to be used, especially in humanitarian situations. As an ethical statement, the P5 should refrain from using the veto when their national interest is involved. **Panama**
- d.34. Member States should aim for phasing out of the veto. **Ukraine**
- d.35. The veto is an exception to the principle of sovereign equality among States, and it should be progressively eliminated. **Peru**
- d.36. Supports the total elimination of the veto. To this end, in favour of its progressive elimination. **Paraguay**
- d.37. In general, favour the abolition of the veto. **Ireland**

Explaining the Use of a Veto

- d.38. Permanent members should explain non concurrent votes to the wider United Nations membership. **(The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago)**
- d.39. In a public session of the Council. **Peru**
- d.40. In particular with regard to its consistency with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and to circulate a copy of the explanation as a Council document. **Ukraine**

Veto Trigger Mechanism

- d.41. Establish a practice, in appropriate cases, of declaring, when casting a negative vote on a draft resolution before the Council, that such a negative vote shall not constitute a veto in the sense of Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter. **Singapore**
- d.42. The decision-taking process in the Council should be reformulated. Currently, non-procedural decisions require unanimity of the five permanent members, while this requirement can be reduced to the affirmative vote of two of them. **Peru**
- d.43. The exercise of the veto should be regulated so as to prohibit such power being the sole discretion of its holder to unjustly overrule the wishes of the majority. Call for a modified veto system whereby a minimum of three votes should be made a prerequisite to block a resolution. **Malaysia**

e) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Mandates of the General Assembly and the Security Council

- e.1. The relationship between the Security Council and General Assembly should be characterized by cooperation and mutual support with full respect for their respective mandates. The Security Council should concentrate on areas within its mandate and avoid encroachment on matters which fall under the purview of the General Assembly. **(The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago)**
- e.2. All resolutions of the General Assembly that clarify the relationship of the Security Council with the General Assembly and the main bodies should be observed. In Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council is not provided with competence to address issues which fall within the functions and powers of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, especially those related to the establishment of standards, legislation, administrative and budgetary matters and setting definitions. **Cuba**
- e.3. The enlarged Council is accountable to the General Assembly, since the Council acts on behalf of the wider membership of the United Nations. Member States have the right and duty to duly know and analyse the work of the Council. The relationship between the enlarged Council and the General Assembly must be of collaboration. **Georgia, Paraguay**
- e.4. Equal position and mutual complementarity (since their tasks are different) of the Security Council and the General Assembly as two of the main organs of the United Nations should be stressed. **Czech Republic**
- e.5. Strengthening of relations and better communication between the Security Council and the General Assembly for the purpose of safeguarding international peace and security in accordance with the authority and responsibility the two organs have under the Charter. **Dominican Republic, Monaco, Montenegro, Paraguay, Serbia, Slovakia**
- e.6. There is a need for a more balanced and stronger cooperation between the General Assembly and Security Council as defined in the United Nations Charter (Article 24). **Brunei Darussalam**
- e.7. It is necessary to attain a balanced and efficient relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, based on strict respect to the provisions of the Charter and in accordance with the respective mandates of these bodies. **Cuba**
- e.8. The two organs must work closely together within their respective sphere in the search for solutions to the plethora of challenges confronting the international community while seeking to foster harmonious interaction and ensuring cooperative relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly without encroaching on each other's mandates as spelt out in the Charter and to preserve the constitutional balance between them. **African Group**
- e.9. Address the growing concerns by Member states of the gradual encroachment by the Security Council on and the erosion of the authority and mandate of the General Assembly by fully and speedily implementing the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions 51/193, 58/126 and 59/31. **African Group**
- e.10. The Council should focus its time and efforts on dealing with issues concerning its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security as mandated by the United Nations Charter, rather than encroaching upon the mandate of the General Assembly. **L.69**
- e.11. There should be a clear delineation between the work of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council, based on their respective mandates. There is also the need to prevent the gradual encroachment of the work of the United Nations Security Council in matters that fall under the prerogative of the United Nations General Assembly. **Malaysia**

Role of the General Assembly

- e.12. Ensuring that the role and authority of the General Assembly including on questions relating to international peace and security be respected and to also guarantee the unfettered application of Articles 10-14 and 35 of the Charter and where appropriate Rules 7 to 10 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, which enable the General Assembly to take urgent action; all of which provide a strong basis for the General Assembly to assert itself and prevent the erosion of its powers by the Security Council.

African Group

- e.13. It is fundamental to strengthen the role and authority of the General Assembly as the main body of the Organization. The competence of the General Assembly includes issues related to the maintenance of international peace and security, as stated in Article 11 of the United Nations Charter. **Peru**
- e.14. The General Assembly should be strengthened in its role as the chief deliberative, policy making and representative organ of the United Nations. **(The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago)**
- e.15. Recalling the General Assembly resolution 377 (V), the role of the General Assembly shall be increased in cases of threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. Namely, if the Security Council fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security when there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including the use of armed force when necessary. The relevant changes shall be introduced to the Charter of the United Nations. **Georgia**

Coordination between the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

- e.16. Establish a timely flow and exchange of information between the two organs particularly through regular consultations between the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council. **G4, L.69, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Viet Nam**
- e.17. The provisions of effective and timely flow and exchange of information between the two organs particularly through frequent and regular consultations between the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council to review work plans and consult on specific issues of mutual concern. Such meetings can enhance more direct and dynamic exchanges between the two organs. **African Group**
- e.18. The President of the Security Council and the President of the General Assembly should hold monthly consultations on a regular basis. If any specific situation arises, such consultations should be more frequent. **Cuba, Malaysia**
- e.19. Establishing closer, more frequent and meaningful interaction between the Presidents of the Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council and Peacebuilding Commission. **Ukraine**

Cooperation and Communication between the General Assembly and the Security Council

- e.20. We should continue to work towards improving cooperation between these two important organs so that the United Nations can function as effectively as possible. **France, Romania, UK**
- e.21. Establish substantive dialogue between the General Assembly and the Security Council. **Montenegro**
- e.22. The relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, in general, should aim for closer cooperation, including improved exchange of information; and better coordination e.g., ensuring that Security Council and General Assembly meetings on the same topics are not held simultaneously. **Estonia, Kazakhstan**

Annual Report and Special Reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly

- e.23. The Security Council should submit an analytical, substantive and comprehensive evaluation of the Council's work in the annual report to the General Assembly. **G4, Belgium and Luxembourg, L.69, Australia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Malaysia, Ukraine**
- e.24. Annual reports on the work of the United Nations Security Council, should be prepared, pursuant to Article 15 paragraph 1 and Article 24 paragraph 3 of the United Nations Charter, to: (i) assess whether Security Council decisions have been implemented; (ii) analyse obstacles to implementation and reasons for non-implementation; and (iii) suggest mechanisms or measures to enhance implementation. **Singapore**
- e.25. The Security Council should submit to the General Assembly a broad and analytic yearly report, assessing its work, including those cases in which the Council has not reached any decisions, as well as the remarks by its members during the review of the items of its agenda. **Cuba**
- e.26. Focus annual United Nations General Assembly debate under agenda item "Report of the Security Council" for more specific outcomes, proposals on improving UNSC-UNGA interaction in addressing various cross-cutting issues. **Lithuania**
- e.27. Participation in the preparation of documents and reports of the Council, including its annual reports, should be more open and accessible to non-Council members. **Viet Nam**
- e.28. In the Council reports to the General Assembly, both annual and special reports as provided for in Article 15 and 24, the Council should give an account of its stewardship in regard to the prerogatives it exercises on behalf of Member States. More analytical and special reports as necessary. **(The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago)**
- e.29. The Council should submit special reports more frequently to the General Assembly in accordance with Article 15 (1) and Article 24 (3) of the Charter. **Belgium and Luxembourg G4, L.69**
- e.30. The Security Council should submit special reports for the consideration of the General Assembly under Articles 15(1) and 24(3) of the Charter of the United Nations, which have unfortunately never been submitted. **Cuba**
- e.31. Security Council's submission in accordance with Articles 15 and 24 of the United Nations Charter, special subject-oriented reports to the General Assembly for its consideration and on issues of current international concern. **African Group**
- e.32. Security Council shall submit, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly in accordance with Article 24 (3) of the Charter. **Ukraine**
- e.33. Security Council's submission in keeping with Articles 24(3) of the United Nations Charter, more comprehensive and analytical reports to the General Assembly, consisting among other things, of assessment of the work of the Council, views expressed by its members as well as the rationale for taking action on issues before it. **African Group**
- e.34. The Security Council should further its relationship with the General Assembly, the major organ with the participation of the entire membership of the United Nations, via increased consultations and reporting, especially on matters related to the majority of United Nations Member States. **Viet Nam**
- e.35. The enlarged Council should submit more comprehensive and analytical reports to the General Assembly. **Paraguay**

Participation and Access for Members of the General Assembly to the Work of the Council

- e.36. Broader consultations and other forms of interaction with non-Council members on a regular basis. **Ukraine, Viet Nam**

- e.37. The work of the Security Council should be as transparent and open as possible - non-member States should have better insight in the work and decision making process of the Security Council. **Czech Republic**
- e.38. Briefings to United Nations Member States by penholders or sponsors of Security Council resolutions in the event of fast-paced developments on the ground or in the Security Council. **Lithuania**
- e.39. Allow greater access for the whole membership to information regarding the work of the Council and enhance the Council's accountability through greater transparency, inclusiveness, openness in decision-making. **(The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago), Croatia, Netherlands, Peru**
- e.40. Open meetings of the Council in themselves do not create greater transparency. Transparency depends on the scope given to non-members to understand, appreciate and access the Council's decision making considerations. **Singapore**
- e.41. Improved format of meetings, with predictable and timely communication to the membership at large. **Slovakia**
- e.42. The existing practice to hold closed meetings with no records will be abolished, and access will be given to non-members to the Council's documentation and records. **L.69**
- e.43. The practice of holding closed meetings should be restricted. **Viet Nam**
- e.44. Non-member States of the Council specially affected by issues being considered by the Council should be given every opportunity to participate in the Council's deliberations in informal meetings and informal consultations. **Singapore**
- e.45. Allow for greater participation in and closer following of the Council's work for non-members, especially from the perspective of a small state. **Montenegro**
- e.46. Ensuring that members are fully informed of the nature and scope of the Security Council's activities not only through full informative press releases, but also by effectively communicating their views on issues of concern taken by Council in its informal consultations. Convening more formal meetings and informal consultations involving the interested parties prior to the adoption of decisions to allow for wider participation. **African Group**
- e.47. Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter must be fully implemented by consulting with Member States which are not members of the Security Council on a regular basis, especially members with special interest in the substantive matter under consideration by the Council, must be invited to participate in consultations before an outcome document on that item is adopted. **L.69, Netherlands, Slovakia**
- e.48. It should allow the concerning State, including those that are not members of the Security Council, to participate in the Council's discussions on issues that directly affect them under Article 31 of the Charter. **Cuba**
- e.49. The Council must ensure effective communication of its mandates and means of implementing them to non-members in clear and easily understandable ways, particularly for mandates that carry obligations on all Member States, for example, in implementation of sanctions. **Singapore**
- e.50. When a country that is not a member of the Security Council requests a meeting thereof, it should be convened immediately by the Council in pursuance of Article 35 of the Charter. **Cuba**
- e.51. Subsidiary bodies of the Council should work in such a way that they provide sufficient and opportune information on their activities to all members of the United Nations. It should ensure that non-Member States have access to subsidiary bodies, including the right to participate in their discussions. **L.69, Cuba**
- e.52. Establish its subsidiary organs in accordance with the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, and these organs should function in a manner that would provide adequate and timely information on their activities to the general United Nations membership. **African Group**

- e.53. More structured interaction, regular consultations and improved participation of the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission and the chairs of the country-specific configurations of the Commission in relevant debates and, in an appropriate format, in informal discussions. **G4, Malaysia**
- e.54. To send systematically draft resolutions and presidential statements also to non-member States of the Security Council. **Czech Republic**
- e.55. Non-Council members should be given access to the work of the Council, including its documentation and records. **Viet Nam**
- e.56. The tentative programme of work and forecast for the coming month, and changes to the programme of work, should be communicated to all non-members as soon as they are available to the Council. **Singapore**

Public Meetings, Public Briefings and Open Debates

- e.57. To enhance transparency and inclusivity of its work, the Security Council would be encouraged to meet, as a general rule, in a public format. **G4, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Peru, Ukraine, Viet Nam**
- e.58. Increase the number of public meetings, in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter and that these meetings should provide real opportunities to take into account the views and contributions of the wider membership of the UN, particularly non-Council members whose affairs are under discussion of the Council. **African Group**
- e.59. Increase the number of Security Council meetings in open format and that these meetings should provide real opportunities to take into account the views and contributions of the wider membership of the United Nations, particularly those non-member States of the Council specially affected by issues under consideration of the Council. **Singapore**
- e.60. The Security Council, as a general rule and in compliance with Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter, should convene public meetings open to all Member States of the United Nations in order to ensure that these meetings provide actual opportunity to bring opinions and contributions of the broadest membership of the United Nations into consideration, in particular, those of the States that are not members of the Council and which issues are discussed by this body. Closed meetings and informal consultations should be held only in exceptional cases. The Security Council should carry out substantive debates on topics of its own consideration and open to all Member States. **Cuba**
- e.61. Briefings of Special Envoys or Representatives of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat of the United Nations should be carried out in public meetings, unless there are extraordinary circumstances. **Cuba, Netherlands, Singapore**
- e.62. Allow for briefings by the Special envoys or Representatives of the Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat to take place in public meetings, unless in exceptional circumstances. **African Group**
- e.63. The Security Council should hold regular briefings on current issues and problems faced by the international community. **Czech Republic**
- e.64. Provide frequent, timely and quality briefings to the wider membership of the United Nations on matters discussed in the informal consultations and in the subsidiary bodies. Singapore [including "horizon-scanning" sessions. **Ukraine**]
- e.65. The Security Council should hold more open debates. **Estonia, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan**
Including on:
[Working methods. **G4, Ukraine**]
[Geographical issues of special concern to the wider membership. **Lithuania**]
- e.66. There should be more structured follow-up to the annual Security Council open debate on working methods. **Lithuania**
- e.67. Better time management at open debates. All states, both Security Council members and non-members, should observe speaking time limits. Consider establishing a ceiling for briefer numbers (e.g. three) at open debates for better time management. **Lithuania**

- e.68. It is necessary to guarantee that the opinions of Member States of the United Nations obtained in thematic public debates be reflected in the adopted relevant resolutions and presidential statements, in lieu of the current practice of adopting resolutions and delivering presidential statements without any reference to such debates. **Cuba**
- e.69. In instances where open debates are held, Council members should consider hearing the views of invited members of the wider membership before they pronounce on the issue being addressed. **(The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago)**
- e.70. Foster a forward looking approach through regular horizon scanning briefings by the Secretary-General to the Security Council. **Netherlands**
- e.71. Increase the use of Horizon Scanning briefings and Arria-formula meetings. **Estonia**
- e.72. Welcomes the holding of 'Arria-Formula' meetings to enhance closer interaction with non-Council members. **Malaysia**
- e.73. The Presidency of the Council should convene an open meeting or wrap-up session at the end of its Presidency to communicate to non-members the key outcomes and deliverables achieved under its Presidency. **Malaysia, Netherlands, Singapore, Slovakia**
- e.74. The Security Council should guarantee that its monthly evaluations be broad and analytic and should make them opportunely known. **Cuba**
- e.75. More briefings by the President of the United Nations Security Council to the larger United Nations membership, and these briefings should be more interactive and substantive. The current practice of reading from prepared texts agreed by United Nations Security Council members has constrained the President from engaging the wider United Nations membership on issues of major concern, including seeking their valuable views that could add value to the work of the United Nations Security Council as a whole. **Malaysia**
- e.76. More Q&A briefings on the Council's programme of work. **Ireland**
- e.77. Make more effective use of informal interactive dialogues. **G4, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania**
Consultation with Troop and Police Contributing Countries
- e.78. Consultation with and participation of Troop and Police Contributing Countries in decision making concerning peacekeeping operations must be made mandatory (as laid down in Article 44) and these discussions should be comprehensive covering the establishment, conduct, review and termination of peacekeeping operations, including the extension and change of mandates, as well as for specific operational issues. **L.69**
- e.79. Regular, timely and meaningful consultation with, and participation of, Troop, Police [and financial **G4**] Contributing Countries in decision making concerning peacekeeping operations **Australia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Slovakia, Viet Nam**
- e.80. Hold more regular and timely consultations with troop and police contributing countries and other states with particular engagement in United Nations peace operations, both during elaboration of their mandates and throughout their entire life cycle. **Ukraine**
- e.81. Enhance its relationship with the UN Secretariat and troop contributing countries (TCC), including through a sustained, regular and timely interaction. Meetings with TCCs should be held not only in the drawing up of mandates, but also in their implementation, when considering a change in, or renewal of, or completion of a mission mandate, or when there is a rapid deterioration of the situation on the ground. **African Group**
- e.82. Meetings with countries contributing troops should be convened not only when mandates will be established, but also during their implementation, when a change, renewal or completion of a mission's mandate is analyzed, or if a sudden worsening of the situation on the ground occurs. **Cuba**
- e.83. The Security Council should continue to strengthen its relationship with the Secretariat of the United Nations and the countries that contribute troops to peacekeeping operations, inter alia, by means of a sustained, periodic and opportune interaction. **Cuba**
- e.84. Regular and meaningful interaction between the Council and force/police commanders. **Lithuania**

- e.85. The Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations should involve TCCs more frequently and intensively in its deliberations, especially in the very early stages of mission planning. **African Group**
- e.86. Establish closer interaction between the Security Council, in particular its Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, and the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34). **Ukraine**

Selection and appointment of the Secretary-General

- e.87. General Assembly should be granted a more active role in the election of Secretary-General to make the process more transparent and inclusive. **Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan**
- e.88. Without contesting the Security Council's prerogative to this effect. The process should enable main candidates to present their vision, priorities to the general membership. Have straw polls of general membership on the shortlisted candidates before final decisions are made, to see who would best meet the expectations of Member States. **Lithuania**

f) Any other related matters:

Review

- f.1. [The situation created by the amendments to the Charter would be reviewed **L.69**] [15 **Belgium and Luxembourg, G4 / 10-15 (The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago)**] years after their entry into force.
- f.2. [16 / 20] years after the first elections in the new category of seats the General Assembly shall review the situation. The review shall include consideration of the categories of seats, the creation of additional seats of any category, including permanent seats, a review of the question of the veto as well as the implementation of the measures to improve the working methods of the Council. **Liechtenstein**
- f.3. A review clause that will allow Member States to carry out periodic revisions of the decisions made under this process. **Paraguay**
- f.4. It is expected that the issue of membership expansion and working methods of the Council would continue to be debated in the future, which may require regular review of these two issues. As such, a review mechanism is recommended. **Malaysia**

The Process of Charter Amendments

- f.5. Upon adoption of a comprehensive framework resolution and following the elections of the new permanent members, a resolution containing necessary amendments to the Charter would be submitted to the General Assembly in order to be adopted [at the earliest possible time **G4/** no later than twelve weeks. **L.69**]
- f.6. The Charter amendments necessary would be annexed to a General Assembly Resolution. Elections to fill the six seats with terms of [8/10] years shall be held after entry into force of the required Charter amendment and simultaneously with the regular elections of non-permanent members of the Security Council. **Liechtenstein**
- f.7. Should make a distinction between those measures which need the amendment of the Charter and those recommendations or proposals that do not require such action. In our view the zero draft of the General Assembly resolution should consist of two chapters: The first chapter should contain the Charter amendments. The second chapter should consist of the decision of the General Assembly (eg. On relationship of the Security Council and General Assembly) and the recommendations for the Security Council (eg. Rules of Procedure).

Hungary

General Points

- f.8. The reform of the Security Council must not be a postponed or ignored goal. A real reform of the United Nations will not be possible without a true reform of the Security Council. Urgent practical actions are a must. **Cuba**
- f.9. Reform is a complex matter and hopes that the broadest possible consensus can be achieved to move the process forward. **Brunei Darussalam**
- f.10. Any decision taken on reform should have the widest possible support of Member States and at the very least, be in keeping with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 53/30. (**The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago**)

1 DPRK-"It is yet premature to specify the issue of this category of membership. Discussions on the issue of categories are now in the initial stage, and even if category issue is agreed, there will be next step to be considered on the modalities and procedures on selection and election." "Japan still denies to liquidate its inhumane war crimes committed against a number of Asian countries during World War II, which placed Japan under the term of an enemy state in the Charter of the United Nations. DPRK expresses deep concern at the approach taken by Japan. Our concern is that Japan acts as if she must occupy a permanent seat of the enlarged Security Council, taking as if there is already an agreement on enlargement of permanent seats of the Security Council. Moreover, Japan is the enemy state and defeated state that had occupied the Asian countries and committed huge crimes against humanity during the Second World War which had been the cause and motivation of creation of the United Nations, and Japan is the only country that has not fully and convincingly made recognition, apology and compensation for its crimes up to this moment, 70 years since the foundation of the United Nations. Japan is too much

ambitious and impatient in the deliberations of the reform and this stems from its sinister and impudent purpose to bury forever its past crimes and the disgrace of enemy state through this process."

2 France- "moderate expansion"

3 UK- "moderate expansion"

4 Liechtenstein- "On a permanent basis" refers to the fact that Member States could continue to hold these seats as long as they continue to be re-elected."

5 Hungary- "Hungary does not reject, à priori, other supplementary models based on other criteria. If other categories are accepted the necessary adjustments in regional representation has to be carried out."

6 African Group- The African Group proposes an additional 6 permanent seats and not less than 5 additional two-year non-permanent seats. However, they have only specified the distribution of 2 permanent seats and two additional non-permanent seats for Africa leaving the rest open to further consideration.

7 L.69- The L.69 Group welcomes the appreciation of the C.10 towards the L.69 submission and in this regard, the L.69 Group reaffirms its support and alignment with the Common African Position.

8 Croatia- While Croatia supports additional permanent and non-permanent seats they have only specified the distribution of 1 additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group leaving the rest open to further consideration.

9 Georgia- While Georgia supports additional permanent and non-permanent seats; they have assigned 1 additional two-year non-permanent seat to the Eastern European Group and leaves additional permanent and non-permanent seats to be distributed according to the established practice.

10 Hungary- While Hungary supports up to 6 additional permanent and not more than 6 non-permanent seats they have only specified the distribution of 1 additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group leaving the rest open to further consideration.

11 Latvia- While Latvia supports additional permanent and non-permanent seats they have only specified the distribution of 1 additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group leaving the rest open to further consideration.

12 Romania- While Romania proposes additional permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, as well as additional non-permanent seats, they have only specified the distribution of 1 additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group leaving the rest open to further consideration.

13 Slovakia- While Slovakia supports 5 additional permanent and 5 additional non-permanent seats they have only specified the distribution of 1 additional non-permanent seat for the Eastern European Group leaving the rest open to further consideration.

14 The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago- "Reserve their position on the additional and total numbers in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of a reformed Council."

15 Montenegro- "Montenegro remains open for few additional seats, if there can be an agreement reached about new permanent or new category of membership."

16 Australia- "Important that Council membership remains at a workable size" 21-26

17 Brunei Darussalam- "mid-twenties" 25-26

18 Cuba- "With this number, the proportion between the members of the Security Council and Member States of the United Nations would approach the proportion there was at the time the Organization was founded."

19 Peru- "In order to reflect an equitable regional representation, the reformed Council membership should be enlarged to a number of members in the "mid-twenties"