

# **REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT STRATEGIC REVIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT OFFICE IN SOMALIA (UNSOS), PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2767 (2024)**

## **Introduction**

1. Following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2245 (2015), the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) replaced the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA), which had been established in 2009 under resolution 1863. Over the years, UNSOS has continued to provide logistical support to AMISOM, which was later reconfigured into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and, more recently, the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The Security Council authorization for AUSSOM is contained in Resolution 2767 (2024), which is for an initial period of 12 months, starting from 1 January 2025.

2. Resolution 2767 (2024) requested UNSOS to continue to provide – in accordance with the existing assessed financial and administrative arrangements – a logistical support package for:

- (a) up to 12,626 AUSSOM uniformed personnel, inclusive of 1,040 police personnel for phase 1 (until 30 June 2025) of the mission;
- (b) up to 11,826 AUSSOM uniformed personnel, inclusive of 680 police personnel, to AUSSOM from 1 July until 31 December 2025 for the first six months of phase two;
- (c) 85 AUSSOM civilians, to support AUSSOM's military and police tasks and enhance coordination between the United Nations, African Union and Somalia; and
- (d) the United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) on a cost-recovery basis.

3. Resolution 2767 (2024) also requested UNSOS to continue (in line with paragraph 2 (f) and (g)) to support up to 20,900 personnel from the Somali National Army (SNA) or Somalia National Police force, on joint or coordinated operations with AUSSOM until 31 December 2025 in full compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), through the provision of food and water, fuel, transportation, tents and in-theatre medical evacuation on an exceptional basis for joint SNA operations, with funding to be provided from an appropriate United Nations trust fund.

4. In addition, the Security Council requested UNSOS and UNTMIS, in full consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), to continue to support Somalia in planning for and developing its sovereign capacity in logistical support (in line with paragraph 29 of resolution 2687 (2023)). The Secretary-General was further requested to continue United Nations support to Somalia with training, equipment and mentorship to counter the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The United Nations was also encouraged to consult with the Somalia Explosive Management Authority and other relevant agencies in Somalia, as well as Somalia's bilateral training partners, to ensure coordination and alignment.

5. In mandating UNSOS to continue to provide the logistical package in accordance with the existing arrangements, the Security Council also took note of the report submitted to the Security Council on 26 November 2024, pursuant to resolution 2748 (2024) by the Secretary-General, produced jointly with the African Union Commission Chairperson and in consultation with Somalia and international stakeholders (the Joint Report). This Joint Report set out the overall mission design for AUSSOM; options for financing it; and recommended a “hybrid implementation” model – where UNSOS would continue to be financed in accordance with existing arrangements, while AUSSOM would be financed by the framework under resolution 2719 (2023), that is, through access to United Nations assessed contributions not exceeding 75 percent of AUSSOM’s annual total budget.

6. In light of the Joint Report, the Security Council requested (in operative paragraph 44 of Resolution 2767) the Secretary-General to carry out and submit to the Security Council and the General Assembly, by 1 April 2025, an independent strategic review of UNSOS, to enable the potential hybrid implementation of the framework established by resolution 2719 (2023) to AUSSOM from 1 July 2025 from within existing resources made available by the rightsizing of UNSOS, including the development of detailed recommendations for the optimization of UNSOS’s efficiency, performance, management and structures in the context of the authorization of AUSSOM, and an assessment of the potential operational implications for support to AUSSOM’s activities, as well as proposed mitigations.

7. In taking note of the Joint Report’s options for financing AUSSOM, as well as the proposed new mission specific reimbursement rate for the mission’s troop- and police-contributing countries, the Security Council also requested the Secretary-General to accelerate preparations towards the implementation of the framework established by resolution 2719 (2023) to AUSSOM, including, jointly with the African Union Commission Chairperson, mobilizing the necessary extra-budgetary resources from the international community in accordance with the principles of predictability, flexibility and sustainability.

8. In addition, it requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council, by 1 May 2025, a report detailing the progress made in preparations for the implementation of the framework established by resolution 2719 (2023) to AUSSOM under the “hybrid implementation” in the Joint Report, taking into account the strategic review requested in paragraph 44 to the resolution to enable delivery within existing resources made available by the rightsizing of UNSOS.<sup>1</sup>

## **Background and Approach to the Review**

9. In January 2025, the Secretary-General and the African Union Commission Chairperson appointed Ambassador Maman Sidikou (Niger) and Mr. Neil Cole (South Africa) to co-lead the independent strategic review of UNSOS, supported by a joint technical team from the African Union Commission and the United Nations Secretariat. In February and March, the joint AU-UN team conducted field visits and consultations key stakeholders in Addis Ababa, Mogadishu, Baidoa and New York, including the Federal Government of

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<sup>1</sup> This report should include (a) timelines and actions taken for the necessary deliberations and approvals by relevant UN bodies in accordance with their mandates and the UN Charter; (b) the status of the 25 percent of AUSSOM’s annual total budget to be jointly mobilized by the African Union and United Nations from the international community as extra-budgetary resources; and, (c) an update on preparations for the orderly and practical application of the “hybrid implementation” of the framework established by resolution 2719 (2023) to AUSSOM from 1 July 2025.

Somalia<sup>2</sup>; African Union Commission<sup>3</sup>; AUSSOM troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs); international partners<sup>4</sup>; the UN family, including UNSOS, UNTMIS, UNMAS and the UN Country Team (UNCT); and the president of the Field Staff Union in Somalia.

10. With the support of the successive African Union missions in Somalia, the country has made significant progress over the last decade and has achieved key milestones in its journey from conflict to reconstruction, including on its political, security and economic fronts. Successive African Union missions in Somalia, and the African Union member states contributing uniformed and civilian personnel, have made invaluable contribution and sacrifices to Somalia and significantly contributed to Somalia's state-building efforts by degrading al-Shabaab, providing security, developing the Somali Security Forces (SSF), and supporting peace and reconciliation. The United Nations supported these efforts through UNSOA/UNSOS, where UN member states have contributed more than \$8 billion in assessed contributions since 2009. Similarly, the European Union has committed over €2.6 billion to the African Union missions in Somalia since 2007. There is clear resolve amongst Somalia's international partners, who have also contributed considerably through voluntary contributions and bilateral assistance, to continue supporting Somalia in consolidating these hard-won gains.

11. In seeking to maximize efficiencies in UNSOS, to enable the hybrid implementation of the framework established by resolution 2719 (2023) for AUSSOM, the review team took a careful, comprehensive and consultative approach. Seeking to achieve predictable and sustainable funding for AUSSOM troop reimbursements must be balanced with the efficacy of UNSOS support to AUSSOM. In that regard, it is worth noting that the UNSOS's budget for 2024/25 (\$499.8 million) was based on ATMIS/AUSSOM requirements. Therefore, reductions in UNSOS' resources and capacity had to be carefully reviewed against the potential degradation of support to the military operations. Moreover, while the focus of the review was on UNSOS and AUSSOM, careful attention was also needed to the essential support that both missions provide to the Somali Security Forces (SSF). It was important to ensure that efficiency considerations, while important, should not inadvertently undermine effective transition to the national actors.

12. Therefore, the principles that guided the review were the need to identify efficiencies and cost reductions while ensuring support to the security transition to the SSF, while enabling an effective AUSSOM through a capable and efficient UNSOS. In line with these principles, the review worked to identify (a) costs that UNSOS could reduce while maintaining effectiveness; (b) things that UNSOS and AUSSOM could do differently together to reduce costs, including through greater efficiency efforts; and (c) things that AUSSOM could do to enhance efficiency and effectiveness – while remaining focused on supporting the final transition to the SSF. The compressed timeline for the review meant that it focused on UNSOS, but continued effort in all these three categories could be beneficial to maximize the efficiencies and performance of both UNSOS and AUSSOM.

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<sup>2</sup> President of the Federal Government of Somalia; Deputy Foreign Minister; Minister of State for Defence; National Security Advisor; Chief of Defence Forces; and Police Commissioner.

<sup>3</sup> The AU Commission Chairperson; Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security; Head of the Peace Support Operations Division; Special Representative and Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission.

<sup>4</sup> US, UK, UAE, Russia, Türkiye, UNOAU, EU, South Korea, Qatar, Japan, France, China, Italy, Saudi Arabia and Sweden.

13. The review team notes that while the Joint Report had recommended that the hybrid implementation model be achieved within the overall cost of UNSOS and ATMIS (approximately \$655 million), the Security Council decided, in resolution 2767 (2024), that it should be within existing UNSOS resources of \$499.8 million. UNSOS, the review team further noted, is already a light footprint mission with the lowest mission support to uniformed personnel ratio in all of UN peacekeeping, not including its additional support to the SSF. In this regard, while there were some opportunities for efficiencies, much of the cost reductions in the UNSOS budget entailed operational implications that required risk mitigation measures.

14. Moreover, it also notes that the UNTMIS withdrawal (by 31 October 2026) will put upward pressure on UNSOS's budget in future years. Many categories of support to the work of the UN in Somalia relies on the financial contribution from UNTMIS, including the UN Guard Unit (UNGU) at a cost of \$16 million per year<sup>5</sup>; local cost-sharing for security, facilities and infrastructure and field offices; as well as HRDDP monitoring and mitigation work undertaken by the mission to facilitate UNSOS' support to AUSSOM and SSF<sup>6</sup>. Many of these functions and costs will invariably fall onto UNSOS.

### **AUSSOM Requirements**

15. According to the AUSSOM concept of operations, the authorized strength of the mission is 11,911 personnel, comprising 11,826 uniformed personnel (11,146 military and 680 police personnel) and 85 civilians. The estimate for AUSSOM from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026 is \$190.2 million and includes the following: (a) military, inclusive of contingents, mission and force headquarters staff (\$152.9 million); (b) police, inclusive of police leadership, formed police units and individual police officers (\$14.6 million); (c) international civilian personnel (\$14.0 million); (d) operational costs covering official travel; facilities and infrastructure; ground transportation; information technology; medical; other services and supplies (\$3.9 million); other support, including quick impact projects (\$0.8 million); and (e) thematic programmatic activities (\$4.0 million).

16. UNSOS' budget provides for the delivery of a comprehensive non-lethal logistics package to AUSSOM, including reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment as well as support in critical operational areas such as aviation, medical, mine action, life support, and facilities and infrastructure. As pointed out in the Joint Report, this still leaves the sustainability and predictability of troop reimbursements to be addressed. While these uniformed personnel undertake peace enforcement operations against Al Shabaab, incurring a high number of fatalities and casualties, their reimbursements have lagged since November 2022, resulting in arrears of about \$100 million.

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<sup>5</sup> UNGU will likely stay through the liquidation period of UNTMIS, but may have to transition thereafter to UNSOS. UNGU was established by a decision of the Security Council and, therefore, will require a Council decision to transition. Consideration could also be given to converting this third-layer of the security architecture to a private security company as done in other missions, thereby achieving some savings.

<sup>6</sup> HRDDP mitigation may also need to be absorbed into UNSOS's budget from the 2026/27 period, but would need to be executed by another entity to avoid a conflict of interest.

17. During the review consultations, the African Union Commission presented the total annual AUSSOM requirements as \$190.2 million, as detailed in paragraph 15 above. Noting the commitment in paragraph 56 of the Joint Report that the African Union would finance the costs of AUSSOM's civilian personnel in the mission, the total AUSSOM requirements would amount to \$176.2 million, inclusive of death and disability.

18. Consistent with the practice in peacekeeping missions, budgeting and the reimbursements for military and police personnel of formed units deployed to AUSSOM will take into account the actual deployment of these uniformed personnel in the mission area. Troop reimbursements will also be made in accordance with the relevant deductions for non-functioning/non-deployed contingent-owned equipment (resolution 67/261), if any. The policies on troop/police personnel reimbursement as contained in resolutions 65/289, 66/264, 70/286 should there be instances of sexual abuse and exploitation, will also apply. In addition to troop reimbursements, reimbursements for death and disability for these two categories of personnel will be budgeted at the average expenditure over the last three years, or approximately \$5 million (based on the current African Union rate).

19. In applying the framework established in resolution 2719 (2023) for the AUSSOM troop and police reimbursement (including death and disability), 75 percent of this from the assessed budget will amount to approximately \$132.1 million, while the remaining 25 percent or approximately \$44.1 million will need to be jointly mobilized as extra-budgetary resources.

## **Review of UNSOS**

20. The review of UNSOS for efficiency, optimization and cost reductions was done collaboratively between the UN and the African Union. Each UNSOS section presented ideas to achieve savings within their existing 2024/25 (\$499.8 million) budget to the co-leads and the review team, with additional technical meetings held between the UNSOS and AUSSOM teams to review implications and mitigation measures together. The focus of the review centered on the existing operational costs (\$294.5 million) and the UNSOS' current staffing structure (\$93.2 million) for possible reductions. **Annex I** provides a breakdown of the financial resources for UNSOS, as included in the 2025/26 budget proposal.

21. The review team took a risk-based approach to assessing potential reductions, operational implications and mitigating measures. Through this process, AUSSOM and UNSOS identified a list of measures that would result in a cost reduction of \$43.2 million (or 15% of the approved operating costs) in the following areas: aviation (\$8.6 million); engineering and facilities (\$6.7 million); medical (\$0.4 million); life support (\$6.7 million); field technology (\$5.7 million); training (\$0.8 million); UNMAS (\$3.2 million); transport (\$0.4 million); information and media (\$3.2 million); supply chain (\$1.0 million); and the possible conversion of Dhobley from a forward operating base to a tactical operating base (\$6.4 million).

22. While the budget reductions may not immediately disrupt core operations, they will strain critical enabling capabilities essential for sustaining AUSSOM's effectiveness. There is also a risk of more significant impact as AUSSOM begins to implement the new Concept of

Operations (CONOPS) and the reductions start to manifest in UNSOS's reduced ability to support effectively. Within aviation support, the reductions will limit capacity for troop rotations, medical evacuations, and resupply to remote bases. Reduced fixed-wing and standby capacity will increase reliance on rotary-wing assets and commercial flights, potentially creating scheduling constraints and reduced resilience. The elimination of the Q-400 aircraft will remove capability to manage mass casualty evacuations and will also impact the morale of the troops as the aircraft is used for welfare flights between Mogadishu and Nairobi. In telecommunications, budget cuts may reduce AUSSOM's ability to maintain robust networks for reconnaissance, intelligence sharing, and operational coordination, hampering situational awareness.

23. Reductions in funding may also compromise camp security infrastructure, potentially delaying upgrades or maintenance of surveillance systems, perimeter defenses, and security lighting. Threat analysis capabilities may suffer, limiting timely risk assessments and intelligence synthesis vital for countering the threats posed by improvised explosive devices. Community radio operations, crucial for countering extremist narratives and strengthening public outreach, will be handed over and run locally. This may impact reduced broadcast reach, and reduce AUSSOM's ability to follow, monitor and pre-empt Al-Shabaab propaganda. In addition, warehouse management may be impaired causing delays in distributing critical supplies. This may also endanger the decentralization drive of the mission, which is seen as an imperative to ensure operational effectiveness and enable the security transition.

24. Reduced support to AUSSOM Mission Enabling Units could lead to fleet servicing delays due to limited technical expertise within the contingents. This may increase vehicle downtime and impact mission mobility. The reductions in training will impact staff capacity enhancement, especially for national staff. Moreover, reductions in facility management will potentially affect maintenance services that ensure hygiene standards and staff/troop welfare. Reduced availability of field defense stores and spare parts may compromise the camp/base protection and response time to generator outages. Collectively, these reductions risk degrading AUSSOM's operational flexibility, response capacity, and ability to secure gains achieved in stabilizing Somalia over the years, even if immediate disruptions are avoided. Additionally, support to the Somali security forces will also be impacted by any disruptions in the effective logistics support to AUSSOM as these are intertwined in the joint or coordinated operations.

25. In line with the objective to right-size UNSOS, the mission undertook an analysis within each pillar of the support office to determine the possible post reductions considering the new AUSSOM concept of operations as well as the reduced support activities following the phased drawdown of ATMIS from 2022 to 2024. The analysis focused on identifying the number of staff required to ensure business continuity and operational effectiveness noting that operational tempo is not expected to reduce in 2025/26. It is highly recommended to follow this initial analysis with a thorough review of staffing reductions necessary to align resources with the operational adjustments outlined in this review. This should include advisory support to UNSOS for effectively implementing an evidence-based rightsizing exercise.

26. Based on the preliminary analysis of potential reductions in staff positions deemed low or medium risk to operational effectiveness, the financial implications suggest a possible reduction of up to 20% in civilian personnel costs, resulting in savings of approximately \$18.4 million. This includes savings from posts/positions that will be abolished when UNTMIS closes in October 2026. Implementing a phased reduction approach would mitigate disruptions to operational support for AUSSOM.

27. From the above, the estimated total reductions from efficiency gains, optimization and reduced support activities of UNSOS amount to **\$61.6 million** (see **Annex II and III**) or **12.3%** of the 2024/25 budget (\$43.2 million in operational cost and \$18.4 million for posts/positions), to enable the hybrid implementation of resolution 2719 for AUSSOM.

### **Impact of projected UNSOS savings on the hybrid implementation of Resolution 2719**

28. As noted above, the 75 percent required for the AUSSOM's \$176.2 million requirements is \$132.1 million. The \$61.6 million savings from within UNSOS' existing resources would leave AUSSOM short of \$70.5 million within the 75 percent, and short of \$114.6 million in AUSSOM's total requirements. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to proceed under the hybrid implementation model, the General Assembly would have to appropriate an additional \$70.5 million from the peacekeeping assessed budget, while international donors would have to contribute \$44.1 million to meet the annual AUSSOM budget for troop reimbursements.

29. The review team believes that there are still opportunities to look for additional savings in future years in a phased manner. There are areas where AUSSOM could find more efficiencies, including in its contingent-owned equipment (major equipment) and self-sustainment. The upcoming review of the statement of unit requirements, as part of the reconfiguration, could be helpful in this regard. Comparative analysis may also be needed to assess whether it would be more economical for the T/PCCs to provide additional categories of self-sustainment<sup>7</sup> or for UNSOS to continue providing such support. In addition, there appears to be underutilization of military aviation assets in the mission, especially in light of the lack of cross-sector air support, even when provided for in the CONOPS. A deeper analysis of actual usage of existing military aircrafts may also present opportunities for cost reductions. Moreover, there are cost avoidance opportunities in the management of contingent-owned equipment beyond economic repair that should be destroyed in-country rather than repatriated at great cost.

30. As mentioned, there are also things that both AUSSOM and UNSOS could work on together to find more efficiencies. There could be potential savings in a reconfigured AUSSOM considering the most efficient and effective configuration of the aviation fleet and the new layout of its bases. With such changes, it might be possible to find efficiencies in the resupply of life support to the bases, however, such changes would take time to implement.

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<sup>7</sup> Security Council, in resolution 2010 (2011), decided, on an exceptional basis and due to the unique character of the AU mission in Somalia, to extend logistical support to cover augmentation of some limited areas of self-sustainment, including catering equipment and training, communication equipment, sanitary and cleaning materials, furniture and stationery.

31. Lastly, there are areas where UNSOS could work on to find more efficiency gains, by reviewing the manner in which it executes some aspects of its support package. Some potential areas to reassess are the mine action delivery model, which still relies predominantly on UNOPS; and greater use of local procurement, especially for delivery of supplies to SSF.

## **Recommendations**

32. The overall cost reduction of \$61.6 million identified represents the balance between the current UNSOS support for AUSSOM and the acceptable risk levels to its operations. This amount, as stated above, is insufficient to fully meet the 75% needed from the assessed budget for troop reimbursements (at the mission specific rate of \$1,000 proposed in the Joint Report) in the 2025/26 budget period, without additional assessed budget. Moreover, this overall identified cost reduction will not be fully available on 1 July 2025 and will need to be phased during the course of the 2025/26 budget year. Furthermore, contributions from the African Union will also be important to address requirements under the 25%.

33. On the operational support front, implementation of reduced support and costs would need to be phased, both to ensure mitigation measures are put in place and also to allow the necessary time to amend and demobilize contracts. On the staffing front, while UNSOS can reduce positions with low and medium risks for its operational support to AUSSOM, a more thorough review should be done by UNSOS to ensure an in-depth analysis is undertaken to guide reductions in staffing levels. Additional support in operational workforce planning, in the context of a light footprint, to review and align staffing and structures with priorities and the concept of operations, can be sought from Headquarters. This is important because the staffing level and composition of UNSOS had been specifically configured to provide effective support to the successive African Union missions and its concept of operations. Furthermore, the implementation of the staffing reduction may have to take into consideration the delayed reconfiguration of ATMIS to AUSSOM as it entails several activity-intense components, including the reorientation and realignment of all troops (both African Union and Somalia security forces) to the new mission disposition, including the closing and handing over of forward and tactical operating bases. This reconfiguration will also include the repatriation of existing troops/equipment and deployment of new ones. While these activities were initially forecasted to take place in phase 1 of the concept of operations, between January and June 2025 (i.e., within the 2024/25 budget period), consultations between the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union (including troop contributing countries) were still continuing into 2025. A formal communication from the African Union on the composition of the troop-contributing countries in AUSSOM is still pending. Therefore, adequate staffing capacities in UNSOS will be required to support the full realization of phase 1 of the AUSSOM strategic concept of operations, which can be expected to continue into the 2025/26 budget period.

34. Resolution 2767 (2024) endorsed the Joint Report's recommendation for one-off additional costs to enable the reconfiguration and realignment of AUSSOM during phase 1 of the CONOPs. UNSOS estimated that it would require between \$43.2 million (scenario 1) and \$50.5 million (scenario 2) as part of these one-off costs to facilitate AUSSOM phase 1 reconfiguration, including the repatriation and emplacement of troops. Scenario 1 is based on

the CONOPs, including the handover of 24 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), closure of 5 FOBs, the construction of 3 new locations (2 Main Operating Bases (MOBs) and 1 Tactical Operating Base (TOB)), and the expansion of 16 MOBs/TOBs. Scenario 2 is based on the Federal Government of Somalia's proposed laydown as presented to the African Union in February 2025 and includes the handover of 9 FOBs, closure of 2 FOBs, construction of 3 new locations (2 MOBs and 1 TOB), and the expansion of 10 MOBs/TOBs. As there is no agreement on the CONOPs yet, and implementation of Phase 1 has not started, it is foreseen that these one-off costs will be completed within the 2025/26 budget year. A breakdown of one-off additional costs for AUSSOM phase 1 reconfiguration is shown in **Annex IV**.

35. Additional reduction of support and costs may be possible, but would require a far more in-depth review of the entire UNSOS and AUSSOM operations, including the support provided to the Somali Security Forces, even though this support is funded from voluntary contributions. The United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission should continue their collaboration to identify further efficiency gains across all three groups (military/police; civilian personnel; and operations) of the UNSOS budget. Given the proportion of UNSOS' budget directly dedicated to AUSSOM operation, an exclusive focus on the support office itself will not yield sufficient savings. Therefore, there is a need to deepen the analysis on things that UNSOS and AUSSOM could do differently together to achieve greater efficiency, and things that AUSSOM could do to enhance efficiency and effectiveness.

36. With enhanced efficiencies, optimization and cost reductions in both UNSOS and AUSSOM, serious consideration can be given to implementing resolution 2719 (2023) through a single budget model. This would need to be complemented with robust and effective joint mobilization of the 25% of the annual budget. Taking into account budget formulation timelines, the United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission could continue to work together to streamline their operations, maximize efficiencies and further reduce costs between now and December 2025 in order to submit a single budget under the framework established by Resolution 2719 (2023) for the 2026/27 budget period. While efficiencies should be maximized, there should be flexibility to the current ceiling of \$499.8 million for both missions, in view of the current AUSSOM concept of operations being supported by a light footprint UNSOS.

37. The positive AUSSOM-UNSOS partnership also extended to the Federal Government of Somalia. All government interlocutors appreciated the excellent tripartite relationship and commended UNSOS and its leadership for the collaborative engagements. While many of the discussions with Somali counterparts centered on the support and challenges related to voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund, three aspects should be kept in mind. First, UNSOS' support to the SSF is based on the infrastructure established to support AUSSOM and that a significant change to that structure would impact the support to the SSF. Second, an increasing number of fatalities and casualties now occur among the Somali Security Forces. For example, in 2024, 87% of the 723 casualty evacuation cases were for Somali soldiers. Therefore, measuring support to AUSSOM must also consider critical Somali requirements, particularly as they assume greater security responsibilities, to ensure the transition process is not jeopardized. Third, UNSOS has developed a robust national

capacity-building program across several components (such as aviation), and continued investments are essential to sustain the positive legacy of strengthening Somalia's sovereign capacity.

## **Conclusion**

38. While the strategic review focused on questions of efficiency, efficacy and financing, it is worth recalling the importance of AUSSOM and UNSOS to the stability of Somalia, the region and beyond. There is broad consensus that a capable and well-supported AUSSOM remains indispensable. The consolidation of hard-won gains in Somalia, and the price already paid in financial resources and lives lost, should be kept in mind as AUSSOM enters its final transition to Somali security forces. While there are understandable global financial constraints and multiple competing global priorities, the considerable progress made (to date) in and around Somalia has been worth the sustained attention and investment of the African Union, United Nations, and their member states. As we close in on the transition of security responsibilities to the Federal Government of Somalia, the international community needs to stay the course to the end. Given AUSSOM's vital role in maintaining security in Somalia, it is critical that the international community establishes a sustainable, predictable and adequate funding mechanism that has the full support of the Security Council.

39. UNSOS is an effective, high value and efficient support office. Its budget has been reduced from a peak of \$582 million in the 2017/18 budget period (when AMISOM comprised 22,126 personnel) to \$499.8 million in the 2024/25 budget period supporting 12,626 ATMIS personnel. As a light footprint office supporting a mission engaged in difficult peace enforcement operations, the staffing level of UNSOS is not amenable to mathematical ratios between civilian staff and military personnel. This independent strategic review represents an effort to provide the Security Council and General Assembly with an in-depth, impartial and nuanced view of what cost reductions and efficiencies may be possible from within UNSOS' 2024/25 budget. A careful, phased and risk-based approach can support the strategic aim of the international community in Somalia, while also laying a solid foundation for the implementation of resolution 2719 (2023) for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council.

## **Annexes**

- Annex I: Financial resources of UNSOS
- Annex II: UNSOS Operational Cost Reductions and Impact Analysis
- Annex III: Cost Reductions from Transitioning Dhobley to a Tactical Operating Base
- Annex IV: Breakdown of one-off additional costs

## Annex I: Financial resources of UNSOS

(Thousands of United States dollars; budget year is 1 July to 30 June)

Category	Expenditure (2023/24)	Apportionment (2024/25)	Cost estimates (2025/26)	Variance	
				Amount	Percentage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)=(3)-(2)	(5)=(4)÷(2)
<b>Military and police personnel</b>					
Military observers	—	—	—	—	—
Military contingents	126 430.3	104 789.5	106 827.9	2 038.4	1.9
United Nations police	110.3	232.8	227.2	(5.6)	(2.4)
Formed police units	6 467.4	7 078.3	6 227.4	(850.9)	(12.0)
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>133 008.0</b>	<b>112 100.6</b>	<b>113 282.5</b>	<b>1 181.9</b>	<b>1.1</b>
<b>Civilian personnel</b>					
International staff	86 221.7	84 121.8	87 209.9	3 088.1	3.7
National Professional Officer	3 312.2	2 383.7	4 113.8	1 730.1	72.6
National General Service staff	4 787.5	4 715.1	5 235.2	520.1	11.0
United Nations Volunteers	1 252.7	1 323.7	1 390.0	66.3	5.0
General temporary assistance	1 194.4	341.9	557.4	215.5	63.0
Government-provided personnel	242.7	294.4	247.9	(46.5)	(15.8)
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>97 011.2</b>	<b>93 180.6</b>	<b>98 754.2</b>	<b>5 573.6</b>	<b>6.0</b>
<b>Operational costs</b>					
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—	—	—
Consultants and consulting services	255.2	372.1	508.7	136.6	36.7
Official travel	1 611.3	1 555.9	1 533.9	(22.0)	(1.4)
Facilities and infrastructure	94 533.1	87 341.8	97 133.4	9 791.6	11.2
Ground transportation	12 893.1	11 967.6	15 002.2	3 034.6	25.4
Air operations	94 099.8	100 504.8	115 947.6	15 442.8	15.4
Marine operations	1 086.6	578.0	600.5	22.5	3.9
Communications and information technology	36 170.7	33 800.8	36 394.7	2 593.9	7.7
Medical	9 041.5	7 919.8	8 461.1	541.3	6.8
Special equipment	—	—	—	—	—
Other supplies, services and equipment	53 264.9	50 443.2	49 593.2	(850.0)	(1.7)
Quick-impact projects	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>302 956.2</b>	<b>294 484.0</b>	<b>325 175.3</b>	<b>30 691.3</b>	<b>10.4</b>
<b>Gross requirements</b>	<b>532 975.4</b>	<b>499 765.2</b>	<b>537 212.0</b>	<b>37 446.8</b>	<b>7.5</b>
Staff assessment income	9 027.3	8 209.6	9 177.9	968.3	11.8
<b>Net requirements</b>	<b>523 948.1</b>	<b>491 555.6</b>	<b>528 034.1</b>	<b>36 478.5</b>	<b>7.4</b>
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Total requirements</b>	<b>532 975.4</b>	<b>499 765.2</b>	<b>537 212.0</b>	<b>37 446.8</b>	<b>7.5</b>

## Annex II: UNSOS Operational Cost Reductions and Impact Analysis

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category</i>	<i>Proposed reduction</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Impact of the reduction</i>	<i>Estimated demobilization</i>	<i>Mitigation measures</i>
<b>Air operations</b>	1 fixed-wing C-130 (located in Tunisia)	3,800	Low. The impact would be low on the four sectors and the C-130 has not been operated for due to the high costs. In addition, the C-130 does not have the permission to operate inside Somalia.	By 1 July 2025	No applicable mitigation measures and the residual risk is estimated to be low.
	1 fixed-wing Citation Jet II standby, Air Medical Evacuation (AME) (located in Nairobi)	300	Medium: limited fixed-wing passenger and cargo movement	By 1 July 2025	UNSOS will repurpose the DHC-8-300 located in Mogadishu as the AME standby aircraft. The DHC-8 standby will have a greater capacity to carry patients and life support supplies. Additionally, by positioning the standby aircraft in Mogadishu, the reaction time will significantly decrease from 2 hours to 30 minutes. The residual risk is estimated to be low.
	1 fixed-wing DHC-8-Q-400 (located in Nairobi)	4,500	Medium: no fixed wing for mass casualty evacuation or TCC/IPO rotations, and staff welfare from and to Nairobi/Mogadishu	By 1 July 2025	AUSSOM and UN staff will depend on commercial flights for travels. The residual risk is estimated to be Medium.
		<b>8,600</b>			
<b>Engineering and Facilities</b>	Reduction of facility/ground maintenance, cleaning, pest and vector control, plant and equipment maintenance.	2,800	Medium: potential staff welfare, medical and hygiene-related issues.	By 1 July 2025	Troops in sector HQ will perform the cleaning and ground maintenance services in their areas. The residual risk is estimated to be medium to low.
	Reduction in the miscellaneous acquisitions for: field defense supplies, Hesco protections, spare parts, chemicals, related, containers and freight.	2,700	Medium: reduced quantity of field defense supplies/generators requirements to be issued, risk to not be able to absorb additional or unforeseen requirements.	By 1 July 2025	The residual risk is estimated to be low.

<i>Category</i>	<i>Proposed reduction</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Impact of the reduction</i>	<i>Estimated demobilization</i>	<i>Mitigation measures</i>
	Bulk water supply service	600	Medium to high: dependence to be drilled boreholes.	By 1 July 2025	The Mission will drill boreholes wherever possible. The residual risk is estimated to be medium to high.
	Tree plantation/ Digital Satellite Television (DSTV) subscription	600	Low: (a) potential environmental issues if the mission does not plant trees and seedlings; and (b) the Mission is currently paying \$40 per person for DSTV subscription. The cancellation of the DSTV could have an impact on staff welfare and mental health.	By 1 July 2025	The AUSSOM troops would perform tree planting/seedlings tasks, and staff will pay for the DSTV subscription. The residual risk is estimated to be low.
		<b>6,700</b>			
<b>Medical</b>	Reduced specialized non-life threatening dental and physiotherapy services	400	Low: non-life threatening services	By 1 July 2025	Flight/commercial ticket and subsistence allowances for patients to be treated in Nairobi. The residual risk is estimated to be low.
		<b>400</b>			
<b>Life Support</b>	Reduction in the individual cost of the rations	4,000	Low: the budget for rations is based on the Cost Individual Day Rate (CIDR) from the ration contract, which represents the daily cost to feed each troop member. Currently, the CIDR is set at \$6.04 but troops are ordering food with a lower CIDR, as a result, the average CIDR can be decreased to \$5.10, potentially leading to savings in the overall ration costs.	By 1 July 2025	The residual risk is estimated to be low.
	Reduction of aviation fuel consumption related to the fleet reconfiguration	2,000	Low: fuel reduction corresponding to the reduction of 3 fixed wings as described in the air operations section above.	By 1 July 2025	In the event of a sudden increase in the air fleet, the primary mitigation measure will be to utilize the local fuel reserves to ensure continuity of operations. The residual risk is estimated to be low.

<i>Category</i>	<i>Proposed reduction</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Impact of the reduction</i>	<i>Estimated demobilization</i>	<i>Mitigation measures</i>
	Reduction of the strategic fuel reserve	700	Medium: the fuel requirements have been calculated based on current trends in historical consumption: (a) diesel reserves have decreased from 3 million liters to 2.4 million liters; and (b) Jet A1 reserves have been reduced from 1 million liters to 0.8 million liters. Additionally, the Local Reserve (LR) in Mogadishu for the Jet A1 has been reduced from 300,000 liters to 260,000 liters.	By 1 July 2025	The mission will closely monitor consumption patterns and assess whether the Strategic Reserve (SR) levels need to be revised accordingly to ensure adequate supply. The residual risk is estimated to be medium.
<b>6,700</b>					
<b>Communication and information technologies</b>	Radio Managed Services (Motorola & Codan), including infrastructure maintenance of towers and public address systems, ECM installations, and Checkpoint firewall annual maintenance	1,500	Low: change from external contractors to the services being taken over by the AUSSOM troops.	By 1 July 2025	The AUSSOM troops will be responsible, under self-sustainment, with the deployment of light towers for their communications. The residual risk is estimated to be Low
	Reduction in maintenance of IT equipment & support, including ICT staffing services, UNGSC maps on demand, satellite imagery, internet services	2,100	High: inability to extend telecommunications systems and maintenance/installation.	By 1 July 2025	UNSOs will be responsible for radio communications at locations which are shared with AUSSOM. The residual risk is estimated to be low.
	Reduced cost of spares, consumables, equipment acquisition & replacement of UAS/VTC screens	1,200	Medium: toners, supplies, communications spares, cables, peripherals, keyboards, mouse.	By 1 July 2025	Reduce printers by 50%. Leverage UN -General Reserve for SDS stocks from liquidated missions. The residual risk is estimated to be low.

<i>Category</i>	<i>Proposed reduction</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Impact of the reduction</i>	<i>Estimated demobilization</i>	<i>Mitigation measures</i>
	Reduction of telecommunications & network services – cabling, software maintenance, freight and other services	900	High: it would impact AUSSOM's capability for reconnaissance, camp security, threat analysis, and patrol perimeters.	By 1 July 2025	AUSSOM will provide COE equipment for micro-UAS. This will depend on the AU/UN/TCC/PCCs MOU. The residual risk is estimated to be low.
		<b>5,700</b>			
<b>Training</b>	Reduction of internal and external trainings/meetings/conferences	300	Medium: impact on the training activities/capacity building provided to AUSSOM	By 1 July 2025	On-site and online sessions. The residual risk is estimated to be medium.
	Reduction of training sessions for staff	500	Low: impact on the capacity building of staff members, especially national staff.	By 1 July 2025	On-site and online sessions. The residual risk is estimated to be medium.
		<b>800</b>			
<b>Mine Action</b>	Contractors	1,300	Low: change management and potential longer response times and limited ability to deal with multiple tasks simultaneously and to manage unplanned or emergency situations.	By 1 July 2025	Efforts will be made to streamline the contract process. The residual risk is estimated to be Low.
	Streamlining Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) training and mentoring contract.	1,400	Medium: less EOD/IEDD trainers and mentors available to support TCCs.	By 1 July 2025	TCCs to maximise the deployment of troops that have previously been trained by UNMAS and have operational experience in Somalia. Live mentoring will be replaced by After Action Review (AAR). There will be a reliance on TCCs to fill the capacity gap. The residual risk is estimated to be medium.

<i>Category</i>	<i>Proposed reduction</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Impact of the reduction</i>	<i>Estimated demobilization</i>	<i>Mitigation measures</i>
	Streamlining Mission Enabling Unit (MEU) support. Reduction in support to Mission Enabling Unit (MEU). Withdrawal of Combat Engineering support, Training and licensing of heavy machinery operators and mechanics.	500	Medium: Reduction in non-Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) support through MEU.  The troops will not receive in-country training in the use of MEU provided equipment and no Combat Engineering technical advice will be provided.	By 1 July 2025	TCCs to ensure that appropriate capacity in non-Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) support (e.g., Plant operators and operations officers) are deployed. The residual risk is estimated to be medium.
		<b>3,200</b>			
<b>Transport</b>	Reduction in labour of maintenance of MEU provided by third party contractors.	400	Medium: potential delays in maintenance and potential lack of technical expertise within contingent of the fleet composition.	By 1 July 2025	AUSSOM will provide the labour for the maintenance and UNSOS will provide the spare parts. The residual risk is estimated to be medium, due to the potential lack of technical capabilities and frequent rotations of troops/technicians of AUSSOM and their capacity to adhere to minimum maintenance requirements, which may result in accelerated degradation of the MEU fleet.
		<b>400</b>			
<b>Public communication</b>	Discontinue UNSOS support to Community Radio Stations	2,200	Low: the Mission is implementing a potential exit strategy earlier than planned.	By 1 July 2025	Handing over radio equipment to the communities to maintain good relationships. The residual risk is estimated to be low.
	Terminate radio monitoring and Interpretation services.	100	Low: there will be no need for monitoring once radios are handed over.	By 1 July 2025	Interpretations services will be provided by national staff from AUSSOM and UNSOS national staff. The residual risk is estimated to be low.
	Decrease printed/promotional materials.	400	Low: limited promotional materials will be printed.	By 1 July 2025	The focus will be on the radio and digital programmes. The residual risk is estimated to be low.

<i>Category</i>	<i>Proposed reduction</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Impact of the reduction</i>	<i>Estimated demobilization</i>	<i>Mitigation measures</i>
	Monitoring and evaluation of the impact of public information services	500	Medium: no real time feedback available anymore from audiences.	By 1 July 2025	Continuation of annual citizens perceptions surveys instead real time feedback. The residual risk is estimated to be medium.
		<b>3,200</b>			
<b>Supply Chain</b>	Reduction in physical Verification services	200	Low/medium: potential delays in delays in reporting or discrepancies in asset verification  The cost of physical verification services will be reduced by decreasing the frequency of verifications in regional locations while optimizing overall coverage to maintain efficiency (currently is performed by third party contractor).	By 1 July 2025	UNSOS is enhancing planning and logistics to maintain required coverage efficiently. The residual risk is estimated to be low.
	Reduction in CWS Central Warehouse Section	600	Low: delay in issuance of materials.  Reduction of cost by lowering labour and resource requirements by streamlining frequency of distributions and optimizing processes such as packing and issuing items.	By 1 July 2025	UNSOS is optimizing logistics, prioritizing shipments, and proactively managing procurement to minimize any disruptions. The residual risk is estimated to be low.
	Reduction in CWS Central Warehouse Section Disposal Services	100	Low: potential delay in disposing armoured vehicles  The number of assets ready for disposal that requires physical dismantling will be reduced, thereby lowering associated costs.	By 1 July 2025	UNSOS will conduct reviews to ensure that disposal generate income rather than incur additional costs. The residual risk is estimated to be low.
	Reduction in CWS MHE rentals	200	Medium: inability to move containers including access to stocks	By 1 July 2025	MHE will be integrated into warehouse services contract, and the mission's MHE will be maintained and repaired on

<i>Category</i>	<i>Proposed reduction</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Impact of the reduction</i>	<i>Estimated demobilization</i>	<i>Mitigation measures</i>
	.		Equipment rentals with contractors will be discontinued, with a focus on collaborating with the Transport Section and warehouse service contractor to meet warehouse requirements for Material Handling Equipment		schedule to prevent operational disruptions. The residual risk is estimated to be low.
		<b>1,100</b>			
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>36,800</b>			

### Annex III: Cost reduction from Transitioning Dhobley to a Tactical Operating Base (TOB)

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	Proposed reduction	Amount	Impact	Estimated demobilization	Mitigation measures
<b>Air operations</b>					
	1x MI-8 Helicopter in Dhobley: Air Medical Evacuation and Passenger Cargo	3,200	High: potential delayed medical evacuation resulting in risk to life; and reduced capacity to transport passengers and cargo between Kismayo and Dhobley, currently 3,800 passengers and 1,100 tons of cargo capacity.	By 1 July 2025	<p>Mitigation Measures: UNSOS will assign aeromedical or utility helicopters to evacuate emergency casualties or provide logistical and administrative support to Main Operating Bases (MOBs) and Tactical Operating Bases (TOBs) within the Kenyan Defence Forces' operational area. The nearest available helicopters include one utility Mi-8 stationed in Kismayo under a commercial long-term charter agreement and two aeromedical evacuation-configured helicopters based in Mogadishu under a similar agreement.</p> <p>The residual risk is considered high due to the reliance on alternative helicopters from Kismayo or Mogadishu for emergency casualty evacuations in the northern part of the Dhobley operational area. This assessment is based on the Mission's inability to guarantee the transportation of casualties from a potential incident or accident site—primarily in the northern part of the area of responsibility—to the nearest Level II hospital within the critical two-hour timeframe. This delay could lead to loss of life and damage to the organization's reputation.</p>
		<b>3,200</b>			
<b>Engineering</b>	Minimum and remote routine facilities management services	200	<p>High: reduced maintenance services.</p> <p>The exposure to this salty environment significantly accelerates rust formation and structural deterioration in prefabricated buildings and infrastructure. This could potential lead to premature failure to metal</p>	By 1 July 2025	Careful and detailed evaluation of all facility management requests. Support the Dhoblay by sending technician from Kismayo. The residual risk is estimated to be medium.

<i>Category</i>	<i>Proposed reduction</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Impact</i>	<i>Estimated demobilization</i>	<i>Mitigation measures</i>
			reinforcements, fasteners, and joints in prefab buildings.		
	No solid Waste Management Services	200	High: proper waste disposal is critical in camps to maintain hygiene, prevent disease outbreaks, and ensure a healthy living environment for troops. If incinerators are not used, garbage accumulation can lead to several serious hygiene and health concerns.	By 1 July 2025	AUSSOM to take over the responsibility of training troops in the operation of incinerators. Additionally, support will be provided to Dhobley by sending a technician from Kismayo. The residual risk is estimated to be medium.
	No Routine pest control service	300	High: potential creation of an environment for insects and pests to thrive if troops do not cut grass and trim plants regularly. During the rainy season, stagnant water collects in overgrown areas, providing perfect breeding grounds for mosquitoes. If pest control measures are not in place, the risk of malaria outbreaks increases significantly.	By 1 July 2025	AUSSOM to take over the responsibility of the ground maintenance. The residual risk is estimated to be medium.
	No general cleaning services	100	Risk medium to low. Failure to maintain cleanliness in the camp can lead to several hygiene-related issues, negatively impacting troop health and overall living conditions.	By 1 July 2025	AUSSOM to take over the responsibility of cleaning services. The residual risk is estimated to be medium to low.
	Reduced and remote Plant & Equipment service(Generator/	200	High: proper operation and maintenance of essential equipment, such as generators, the Water Treatment Plant (WTP), and	By 1 July 2025	AUSSOM to take over the responsibility. Training of the troops on operation of the generators/AC/WTP and WWTP. The residual risk is estimated to be medium.

<i>Category</i>	<i>Proposed reduction</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Impact</i>	<i>Estimated demobilization</i>	<i>Mitigation measures</i>
	AC/WTP/WWTP Management Services)		the Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP), are critical for the functionality of the camp. Failure to run regular maintenance can lead to serious operational failures and financial implications (costly replacements, supply chain delays, and operational disruptions, impacting the overall efficiency and sustainability of the camp).		
<b>1,000</b>					
<b>Life Support</b>	Operation and Maintenance fees and Local Reserve (LR) – Sector HQ Dhobley from a FOB to a TOB	1,000	Medium: the operations and maintenance of facilities will not be provided anymore.	By 1 July 2025	AUSSOM to use COE equipment for the maintenance of delivery points. The residual risk is estimated to be medium due the current lack of COE equipment.
	Downgrade of fuel facility from a FOB to a TOB	400	Medium: No aircraft fuelling facilities anymore.	By 1 July 2025	AUSSOM to be fully self-sustain. The residual risk is estimated to be medium.
	Reduction of consumption for the Jet A1 - Relocation of air fleet with infrastructure (movement of AUSSOM KDF including support element/personnel to Kismayo) reduction of air assets and fuel consumption	600	Medium: medical evacuation and availability of refilling the aircrafts. If the fuel infrastructure (delivery point - <i>similar to patrol station</i> ) is reduced, there will be no capacity to refuel bigger air assets (such as Q400)	By 1 July 2025	The mission must ensure the continuity of small-scale operations for Dhobley. This may lead to more frequent flights using smaller air assets when larger operations or emergencies arise. The residual risk is estimated to be medium.

<i>Category</i>	<i>Proposed reduction</i>	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Impact</i>	<i>Estimated demobilization</i>	<i>Mitigation measures</i>
		<b>2,000</b>			
<b>Communication and information technologies</b>	Reduction of internet services	100	Low: UNSOS support will be transferred to AUSSOM TCCs as part of self-sustainment.	By 1 July 2025	AUSSOM TCCs as part of self-sustainment. The residual risk is estimated to be low.
		<b>100</b>			
<b>Mine Action</b>	Explosive detection dogs Team -Removal of 1x EDD Team (2 Dogs and a handler)	100	Medium: no explosive detection dogs if the explosive detection dog's capacity is removed.	By 1 July 2025	All searches and checks to be carried out manually by TCCs. The residual risk is estimated to be medium.
		<b>100</b>			
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>6,400</b>			

## Annex IV: Breakdown of one-off additional costs

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Thousands of United States dollars				
	<u>Scenario 1:</u> <i>AUSSOM</i> <i>CONOPS</i>	<i>Explanations</i>	<u>Scenario 2:</u> <i>FGS</i> <i>proposed</i> <i>laydown for</i> <i>AUSSOM</i>	<i>Explanations</i>
<i>Category</i>				
<b>Military Contingents</b>				
Travel on emplacement, rotation and repatriation	4,500	Estimated repatriation of 1,908 troops from Burundi and deployment of 1,091 troops from Egypt.	4,500	Estimated repatriation of 1,908 troops from Burundi and deployment of 1,091 troops from Egypt
Rations	259.8	Associated 30 days of rations for relief in place during the transition.	259.8	Associated 30 days of rations for relief in place during the transition.
Freight and deployment of contingent-owned equipment	16,448.7	Repatriation of COE that is no longer required in the mission based on the new CONOPs.	14,155.0	Repatriation of COE that is no longer required in the mission based on the new CONOPs.
	<b>21,208.5</b>		<b>18,914.8</b>	
<b>United Nations police</b>				
Travel on emplacement, rotation and repatriation	39.9		39.9	
	<b>39.9</b>		<b>39.9</b>	
<b>Formed police units</b>				
Travel on emplacement, rotation and repatriation	327.8		327.8	
Rations	40.8		40.8	
Freight and deployment of contingent-owned equipment	1,328.8		1,328.8	
	<b>1,697.4</b>		<b>1,697.4</b>	
<b>TOTAL uniformed personnel</b>	<b>22,945.8</b>		<b>20,652.1</b>	
<b>Facilities and infrastructure</b>				
	Handover of 24 FOBs, closure of 5 FOBs, construction of 3 new locations (2 MOBs and 1 TOB), and expansion of 16 MOBs/TOBs.		Handover of 9 FOBs, closure of 2 FOBs, construction of 3 new locations (2 MOBs and 1 TOB), and expansion of 10 MOBs/TOBs.	

	<u><b>Scenario 1:</b></u>	<i>Explanations</i>	<u><b>Scenario 2:</b></u>	<i>Explanations</i>
	<b>AUSSOM CONOPS</b>		<b>FGS proposed laydown for AUSSOM</b>	
<i>Category</i>				
Acquisition of engineering supplies	12.5		12.5	
Acquisition of prefabricated facilities, accommodation and refrigeration equipment	148.8		148.8	
Construction, alteration, renovation and major maintenance	21,931.4		15,953.4	
Petrol, oil and lubricants	241.9		241.9	
	<b>22,334.6</b>		<b>16,356.6</b>	
<b>Ground transportation</b>		Requirements for trucks, low beds, material handling equipment, including operators at AUSSOM operating bases, to support reconfiguration/realignment operations. In addition, maintenance and readiness of Mission Enabling Units (MEUs) to support various operations in Main Operating Bases (MOBs) and Tactical Operating Bases (TOBs).		Requirements for trucks, low beds, material handling equipment, including operators at AUSSOM operating bases, to support reconfiguration/realignment operations. In addition, maintenance and readiness of Mission Enabling Units (MEUs) to support various operations in Main Operating Bases (MOBs) and Tactical Operating Bases (TOBs).
Rental of vehicles	218.4		218.4	
Repairs and maintenance	2,000.0		2,000.0	
Spare parts	548.0		548.0	
Petrol, oil and lubricants	114.8		114.8	
	<b>2,881.2</b>		<b>2,881.2</b>	
<b>Communications and information technology</b>		Setup of Tetra radio and internet services in the 3 new locations. Additionally, 2 towers will relocate, and 10 sites will require new FTS services mainly because of the increased number of troops in the locations.		Setup of Tetra radio and internet services in the 3 new locations. Additionally, 2 towers will relocate and some sites will require new FTS services because of the increased number of troops in the locations.
Communications and information technology equipment	2,039.3		2,839.2	
Telecommunications and network services	-		75.4	

	<u><i>Scenario 1:</i></u> <i>AUSSOM CONOPS</i>	<i>Explanations</i>	<u><i>Scenario 2:</i></u> <i>FGS proposed laydown for AUSSOM</i>	<i>Explanations</i>
<i>Category</i>				
Maintenance of communications and information technology equipment and support services	30.0		30.0	
	<b>2,069.3</b>		<b>2,944.6</b>	
<b>Other supplies, services and equipment</b>				
Other freight and related costs	307.9		347.9	
	<b>307.9</b>		<b>347.9</b>	
<b>TOTAL operational costs</b>	<b>27,593.0</b>		<b>22,530.3</b>	
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>50,538.8</b>		<b>43,182.5</b>	