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THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
LE PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ

2 June 2022

Excellency,

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 76/262 of 26 April 2022 (A/76/262) I hereby submit a special report on the use of the veto at the 9048th meeting of the Security Council held on 26 May 2022 under the item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

A blue ink signature of Ferit Hoxha.

Ferit Hoxha
President of the Security Council

His Excellency
Mr. Abdulla Shahid
President of the General Assembly
United Nations
New York

Special Report of the United Nations Security Council

This Special Report of the United Nations Security Council is submitted upon the invitation of the United Nations General Assembly in operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly Resolution 76/262, and in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations.

On May 26, 2022, the Security Council held its 9048th meeting to take action on draft resolution S/2022/431, attached as Annex 1 to this Report. The draft resolution was proposed by the United States. The meeting was held under the agenda item “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

At the meeting held on May 26, 2022, the result of the voting was as follows:

Thirteen votes in favor: Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America

Two votes opposed: China and the Russian Federation

Zero abstentions

The resolution was not adopted due to negative votes cast by two Permanent Members of the Security Council.

A verbatim transcript of the meeting is attached as Annex 2 to this Report.



Security Council

Distr.: General
26 May 2022

Original: English

United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolutions 825 (1993), 1540 (2004), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 1887 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017), as well as its Presidential Statements of 6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7), 16 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13), and 29 August 2017 (S/PRST/2017/16),

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Expressing its gravest concern at the intercontinental ballistic missile launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("the DPRK") on 24 March 2022, as well as the series of other recent ballistic missile launches by the DPRK, all in violation of the DPRK's international obligations in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), and 2094 (2013), which were reaffirmed in resolutions 2270 (2016) 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017) and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT") and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to regional and international peace and stability,

Underlining the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community and *expressing* great concern that the DPRK continues to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by diverting critically needed resources away from the people in the DPRK who have great unmet needs, *regretting* that the DPRK has prevented vitally needed humanitarian aid from reaching its most vulnerable populations, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, *further regretting* that the DPRK seeks to divert resources from its agricultural and medical sectors for its unlawful nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, thereby depriving the people in the DPRK of adequate food, medicine, and medical treatments, and *emphasizing* the importance that the DPRK return to unconditional and meaningful dialogue toward a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation,

Expressing its gravest concern that the DPRK's ongoing nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities have destabilized the region and beyond, and *determining* that there continues to exist a clear threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming the need for all Member States to take concrete actions aimed at fully and effectively implementing the measures under resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017) and this resolution,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. *Condemns* in the strongest terms the intercontinental ballistic missile launch conducted by the DPRK on 24 March 2022, as well as the series of other recent ballistic missile launches by the DPRK, all in violation and flagrant disregard of the Security Council's resolutions;

2. *Reaffirms* its decisions that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests, or any other provocation; shall immediately suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and in this context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on all missile launches; shall immediately abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and immediately cease all related activities; and shall abandon any other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner;

3. *Calls upon* the DPRK to fully implement and respect all UN Security Council resolutions related to its WMD and ballistic missile programmes;

4. *Decides* that the DPRK shall not launch cruise missiles or any other delivery system capable of delivering nuclear weapons;

Designations and Control Lists

5. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I and II of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and *decides* further that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution and to individuals acting on their behalf or at their direction;

6. *Decides* that the Committee may designate individuals for measures under paragraphs 8 (d) and 8 (e) of resolution 1718 (2006) and entities for measures under paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) that have engaged in or provided support for, including through other illicit means, activities prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017), and this resolution, and *clarifies* that if a vessel has engaged in activities prohibited by the above-list resolutions, any entity providing insurance services to such vessel could be designated for measures under paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006);

7. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items covered in paragraphs 8 (a) (i) and 8 (a) (ii) of resolution 1718 (2006);

8. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the items in INFCIRC/254/Rev.14/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 2, or the most recent versions of these documents, as updated by the Nuclear Suppliers Group;

9. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the items in S/2022/429, or the most recent versions of this document, as updated by the Committee;

10. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall apply to the items in S/2022/430, or the most recent versions of this document, as updated by the Committee;

11. *Decides* that the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in annex III of this resolution;

12. *Decides* that paragraph 12 of resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 6 of resolution 2371 (2017), and paragraph 6 of resolution 2375 (2017) shall be replaced by the following:

Decides that the Committee, if it has information indicating that vessels are, or have been, related to nuclear- or ballistic missile-related programmes, or activities (including the transport of items) prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017), or this resolution, or the evasion of sanctions, may designate the vessels for any of the following measures: (a) the Flag State of a designated vessel shall de-flag the vessel; (b) the Flag State of designated vessel shall direct the vessel to a port identified by the Committee, in coordination with the port State; (c) all Member States shall prohibit a designated vessel from entering their ports, unless in case of emergency, in case of return to the vessel's last port of call, port in the vessel's flag state or home port, in case of entry for inspection of the vessel, or unless the Committee determines in advance that such entry is required for humanitarian purposes or any other purposes consistent with the objectives of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017), or this resolution; (d) a vessel designated by the Committee shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006);

13. *Decides* that:

a. All vessels currently designated for de-flagging under paragraph 12 (a) of resolution 2321 (2016) shall henceforth be designated under paragraph 12 (a) of this resolution;

b. All vessels currently designated for a port entry ban under paragraph 12 (c) of resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 6 of resolution 2371 (2016), or paragraph 6 of resolution 2375 (2016) shall henceforth be designated under paragraph 12 (c) of this resolution;

c. All vessels currently designated for an asset freeze under paragraph 12 (d) of resolution 2321 (2016) shall henceforth be designated under paragraph 12 (d) of this resolution;

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to create, maintain, make accessible, and update as appropriate a consolidated list that includes: (a) vessels designated under paragraph 12 of this resolution, and (b) vessels designated for an asset freeze under paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006), as clarified by paragraph 12 of resolution 2270 (2016), including vessels designated under paragraph 23 of resolution 2270 (2016);

15. *Decides* that the measures specified in subsections (a) and (c) of paragraph 12 of this resolution shall also apply to the vessels listed in Annex IV of this resolution;

Sectoral

16. *Recalls* paragraph 28 of resolution 2397 (2017), and *decides* to decrease the aggregate amount of crude oil to which the measures imposed by paragraph 4 of resolution 2397 (2017) shall not apply from 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons to 3 million barrels or 393,750 tons, and *reaffirms* that all other provisions of that paragraph continue to apply;

17. *Recalls* paragraph 28 of resolution 2397 (2017), and *decides* to decrease the aggregate amount of refined petroleum to which the measures imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017) shall not apply from 500,000 barrels to 375,000 barrels or 46,875 tons, and *reaffirms* that all other provisions of that paragraph continue to apply;

18. *Decides* that the DPRK shall cease the export of mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes (HS Code Chapter 27) and clocks and watches and parts thereof (HS Code Chapter 91) and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of the above-mentioned items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, and *further decides* that for sales of and transactions involving all commodities and products from the DPRK whose transfer, supply, or sale by the DPRK are prohibited by this paragraph and for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution, all States may only allow those shipments to be imported into their territories up to 30 days from the date of adoption of this resolution with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 45 days after the date of adoption of this resolution;

19. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in their territories, of all tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes (HS Code Chapter 24);

20. *Decides* that all Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction, and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction from procuring or facilitating the procurement of information and communication (ICT) technology -related services from the DPRK;

Malicious Cyber Activity

21. *Expresses deep concern* over the DPRK's pattern of malicious activity using ICT against other Member States and individuals and entities subject to their jurisdiction, including financial institutions, for the purpose of evading sanctions and contributing to its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and *calls upon* all Member States to take appropriate measures within their own jurisdictions, and in accordance with their respective legal processes, to prevent the DPRK and its nationals from using their territories to conduct or facilitate such malicious ICT activity, and *clarifies* that such measures could include but are not limited to, repatriating to the DPRK any DPRK national conducting malicious activities using ICT-enabled devices or networks and closing businesses associated with any such DPRK national;

22. *Decides* that the DPRK shall immediately halt the use of ICT to gain unauthorized access to United Nations ICT systems, including but not limited to unreleased Panel of Experts communications and investigations, Council and Committee Member communications, and United Nations Secretariat communications and confidential data, and *calls upon* the DPRK to fully adhere to the UN General Assembly-affirmed framework of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace and its

set of voluntary norms, and *reconfirms* and *underscores* the applicability of international law in cyberspace;

Sanctions Implementation

23. *Recalls* paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017), and *decides* that the final clause of the paragraph (beginning with “and *further decides*”) shall be replaced by the following:

and *further decides* that, after three months from the date such vessels were frozen (impounded), this provision shall not apply if the Member State (following consultation with any relevant flag States) notifies the Committee that adequate arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future violations of these resolutions and explains such arrangements in detail, and *directs* the Committee to designate the vessel under subsections (a) and (c) of paragraph 12 of this resolution if the vessel subsequently contributes to violations of these resolutions;

24. *Notes with great concern* that the DPRK continues to evade sanctions through deceptive maritime practices, *reaffirms* the maritime measures aimed at stopping such deceptive practices imposed in paragraph 17 of resolution 1874 (2009), paragraph 17 of resolution 2094 (2013), paragraphs 18, 19, 20, and 22 of resolution 2270 (2016), paragraphs 9, 22, 23, 24, and 30 of resolution 2321 (2016), paragraphs 8 and 11 of resolution 2375 (2017), and paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, and 15 of resolution 2397 (2017), and *calls upon* all Member States to redouble efforts to implement these measures;

25. *Reaffirms* the measures imposed in paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017), and *clarifies* that such measures apply to all DPRK nationals earning income in a Member State’s jurisdiction, irrespective of whether they have a valid work authorization or other type of visa status;

26. *Decides* that Member States shall report to the Security Council within ninety days of the adoption of this resolution, and thereafter upon request by the Committee, on concrete measures they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of this resolution, *requests* the Panel of Experts, in cooperation with other UN sanctions monitoring groups, to continue its efforts to assist Member States in preparing and submitting such reports in a timely manner;

27. *Calls upon* all Member States to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017) and this resolution and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to inspecting, detecting and seizing items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions;

28. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee, as set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1718 (2006), shall apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution and *further decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009) and modified in paragraph 1 of resolution 2345 (2017), shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in this resolution;

29. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017), or this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their

obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Development of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972;

30. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017), or this resolution, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution or previous resolutions;

31. *Emphasizes* that the measures set forth in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017) and this resolution shall in no way impede the activities of diplomatic or consular missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations;

Political

32. *Reiterates* its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, *condemns* the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, and *emphasizes* the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare, inherent dignity and rights of people in the DPRK; and *affirms* its commitment to addressing the COVID-19 pandemic in the DPRK;

33. *Regrets* the DPRK's massive diversion of its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and a number of expensive ballistic missile programs, *notes* the findings of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance that over forty percent of people in the DPRK are undernourished and that seventy percent of the population suffers from food insecurity, including a very large number of pregnant and lactating women and under-five children who are at risk of malnutrition and nearly a quarter of its total population suffering from chronic malnutrition, and, in this context, *expresses* deep concern at the grave hardship to which the people in the DPRK are subjected; *calls* on the DPRK to facilitate full, safe, and unimpeded humanitarian access;

34. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017) and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017), and this resolution, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK, *stresses* the DPRK's primary responsibility and need to fully provide for the livelihood needs of people in the DPRK, *decides* that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such

organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions, *further decides* that the Committee may exempt humanitarian assistance activities relating to the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the civilian population of the DPRK that are undertaken by, or in coordination with, the United Nations as a package rather than on a case-by-case basis, and *directs* the Committee to continue reviewing exemption requests and extensions thereto for activities relating to the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the civilian population of the DPRK on an expedited basis;

35. *Decides* that a list of well-defined categories of items, to include as appropriate items related to the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the civilian population of the DPRK, shall be exempt from relevant sectoral measures under resolution 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017), and this resolution, on the condition (1) that such items will be used solely by international and non-governmental organizations for the purpose of carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK, (2) that such items do not have applications to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic-missile related, or other WMD-related programs or activities, and (3) that the supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK of any item on the list has been notified to the Committee in advance, along with information on the routing and shipping information for such items, *directs* the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to issue such a list no later than 10 months from the adoption of this resolution, *encourages* the Committee to consult with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the UN Resident Coordinator in formulating this list, *directs* the Committee to conduct a review of the list 180 days following its issuance and every 180 days thereafter, *decides* that if the Committee does not approve the renewal of the list within any 180-day review period, the list of categories of items exempt from relevant sectoral measures shall cease to apply, and *further decides* that if the supply, sale, or transfer of an item has been properly notified to the Committee pursuant to this paragraph, but is subsequently removed from the list, the exemption from relevant sectoral measures shall continue to apply to that item or category of items for up to 90 days from the date the item or category of items was removed from the list, after which it will be subject to relevant sectoral measures and the case-by-case exemption process set forth in paragraph 34 of this resolution;

36. *Directs* the Panel of Experts to include in its midterm and final reports reporting on incidents of the diversion of any items on the list set forth in paragraph 35 of this resolution for the benefit of the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic-missile related, or other WMD-related programs or activities;

37. *Expresses* its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic, and political solution to the situation and to achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, *welcomes and encourages* efforts by the Council members as well as other concerned States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue, and *urges* the DPRK to engage in meaningful discussions with all relevant parties to build a basis for sustainable peace and security;

38. *Affirms* that it shall keep the DPRK's actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK's compliance;

39. *Expresses its determination* to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK intercontinental ballistic missile launch or any other launch contributing to the development of a ballistic missile system or technology capable of such ranges or nuclear test;

40. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I

Travel Ban/Asset Freeze (Individuals)

KIM SU IL

a. *Description:* Kim Su Il has been a Vietnam-based representative of the Munitions Industry Department [KPe.028], which is responsible for overseeing the development of the DPRK's ballistic missiles. As of early 2019, he was responsible for exporting from the DPRK commodities subject to UN restrictions such as anthracite coal and titanium ore concentrate. This trade activity earned foreign currency for the DPRK regime.

b. *AKA:* 김수일

c. *Identifiers:* Date of Birth: 04 Mar 1985; Passport number: 108220348 (DPRK) Expires: May 18, 2023; Passport number: 745220480 (DPRK) Expires: June 2, 2020; Location: Vietnam; Gender: Male

Annex II

Asset Freeze (Entities)

1. KOREA NAMGANG TRADING CORPORATION

a. *Description:* Korea Namgang Trading Corporation (NTC) is a Pyongyang-based company that has engaged in, facilitated, and has been responsible for the exportation of workers from the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), including exportation to generate revenue for the Government of the DPRK or the Workers' Party of Korea. Since at least 2018, NTC has maintained laborers in multiple countries, including the Russian Federation, Nigeria, and numerous countries in the Middle East. It has been involved in the logistics cycle of exporting DPRK workers overseas and handling the visas, passports, departures, and overseas employment for DPRK personnel, prior to repatriating funds back to the DPRK.

b. *AKA:* DPRK Namgang Trading Company

c. *Location:* Pyongyang, DPRK

2. LAZARUS GROUP

a. *Description:* The Lazarus Group targets institutions such as government, military, financial, manufacturing, publishing, media, entertainment, and international shipping companies, as well as critical infrastructure, using tactics such as cyberespionage, data theft, monetary heists, and destructive malware operations. Created by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as early as 2007, this malicious cyber group is subordinate to the 110th Research Center, 3rd Bureau of the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) [KPe031]. The 3rd Bureau is also known as the 3rd Technical Surveillance Bureau and is responsible for many of the DPRK's cyber operations. In addition to the RGB's role as the main entity responsible for DPRK's malicious cyber activities, the RGB also continues to be the principal DPRK intelligence agency and is involved in the trade of DPRK arms. Lazarus Group actors use social engineering tactics against employees of target entities, deploy a variety of custom and commonly known malware for espionage and destructive purposes, and conduct financially motivated operations. One of the Lazarus Group's objectives is to gain access to sensitive military and government networks, and private sector networks across a range of industries. Information gleaned through these accesses inform the DPRK's ability to circumvent sanctions and violate relevant Security Council resolutions. In 2020, the Lazarus group targeted critical infrastructure in India, a part of targeting aeronautics and defence sectors using "DTrack" malware. Furthermore in 2020, the Lazarus Group conducted cyber operations against German and Russian defence companies as well as Russian energy and information technology sectors, which was a part of a cybercampaign called "ThreatNeedle". In March 2021 the Lazarus group conducted cyber activity from the DPRK against Japanese organizations. The group primarily used spear phishing tactics and perpetrated 350 individual attacks against one Japanese government institution alone during 2021. In April 2021, the Lazarus group used backdoor malware called "Vyveva" against a South African Freight and logistics firm. The malware, "Vyveva" is capable of exfiltrating files and modifying file stamps through the utilization of the dark web TOR platform for command and control. The access on the movement of goods enables the DPRK to navigate sanctions effectively and the information enables other hackers to deploy ransomware to generate revenue.

b. *A.K.A.:* APPLEWORM; APT-C-26; GROUP 77; GUARDIANS OF PEACE; HIDDEN COBRA; OFFICE 91; RED DOT; TEMP.HERMIT; THE NEW ROMANTIC CYBER ARMY TEAM; WHOIS HACKING TEAM; ZINC

c. *Location:* Potonggang District, Pyongyang, Korea, North

3. HAEGUMGANG TRADING CORPORATION

a. Description: Haegumgang Trading Corporation falls under the Military Cooperation General Bureau of the UN-designated Ministry of People's Armed Forces [KPe.054] and has worked with the Mozambique Company "Monte Binga" under a \$6 million contract that included surface-to-air missiles, P12 air defense radar, tank refurbishment, and man-portable air defense systems. Additionally, the company entered into a €10.5 million contract to repair and upgrade surface-to-air missile Pechora systems and P-12 air defense radar for the United Republic of Tanzania and the DPRK military technicians were residing at a Tanzanian military facility at Nyumbu, and had been engaged in the upgrade of the P-12 radars since February 2017.

b. AKA: Name (International): Haegumgang

c. Location: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Annex III

Items, Materials, Equipment, Goods and Technology

Additional Missile-Related Items

1. Electronic Items
 - a. Digital signal processors with a 40 Mhz or greater clock rate
 - b. Digital-to-analog converter chips with a 12 bit or greater resolution
 - c. Hybrid Synchro/Resolver-to-digital converter chips with 14 bit or greater resolution.
 - d. Radiation hardened microcircuits to protect against nuclear effects (e.g. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), X-rays combined blast and thermal effects)
 - e. Systems on Chip (SoC) with embedded FPGA.
2. Guidance, Navigation and Control usable in rocket systems
 - a. Micro-electro-Mechanical Fiber Optic Gyroscopes capable of withstanding 10 g or more
 - b. Gyro-astro compasses and other devices which derive position or orientation by means of automatically tracking celestial bodies or satellites.
 - c. Radar and laser radar systems, including altimeters.
 - d. Telemetry or telecontrol equipment including tracking systems and range instrumentation radars.
 - e. Inclinometers
3. Materials for rocket systems
 - a. AlMg6 aluminum alloy or equivalent.
 - b. Hastelloy, Inconel and, Incoloy superalloys with at least 50% nickel in either solid or powder form.
 - c. Brazing foils containing Mn: 17% Ni: 14% Sn : 6% Cu: remainder
 - d. High silica fiber, cloth or fabric (suitable for heat shielding in hot zones)
4. Production Equipment
 - a. Hydraulic presses with a 40 ton or greater capacity.
 - b. Vacuum pressure casting machines.

Additional Nuclear-Related Items

1. Gloves suitable for use with radioactive materials
2. Tanks, vessels, dewars, and other storage containers made from corrosion resistant materials, less than 175mm in diameter or otherwise engineered for criticality safety
3. Fast-reacting anion or cation exchange resins and absorbents used in mining, milling and other mineral and ore extraction processes
4. Tantalum sheets with a thickness of 2.5 mm or greater from which a circle of 200 mm diameter can be obtained

5. Bulk Lithium – all isotopes
6. e-beam welders with a chamber size of 0.5 m³ or greater
7. Plasma spray systems, atmospheric or vacuum, for the deposition, processing and in-process control of inorganic overlays, coatings and surface modification
8. Oxidation furnaces having a radiant heater to uniformly heat the retort to a temperature of 673 K (400 C) or more
9. Explosive lenses designed to uniformly initiate the detonation of the surface of a high explosive charge
10. Oscilloscopes having a bandwidth of 1 GHz or greater
11. Insulated gate bipolar transistors (IGBTs) and IGBT modules
12. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs)
13. Rotary vane vacuum pumps capable of an inlet volume flow rate of 15 m³/h or greater and capable of producing an ultimate vacuum better than 13 kPa
14. Roots vacuum pumps capable of an inlet volume flow rate of 200 m³/h or greater and capable of working with PerFluoroPolyEther (PFPE) lubricant
15. Absolute Pressure transducers capable of measuring absolute pressures with better than 1% accuracy
16. Fluorine resistant epoxy resins and associated hardeners for use with carbon and glass fibers to produce composite structures
17. Monel welding rods

Annex IV**SIN PHYONG 2 (formerly TIANYOU)****IMO: 8817007**

The DPRK-flagged *SIN PHYONG 2* (formerly *TIANYOU*) delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK at least four times between July and October 2019 and continued to deliver refined petroleum to DPRK ports in 2020 and 2021. These volumes were not timely reported to the 1718 Committee as required by UNSCR 2397 OP5.

UNICA**IMO: 8514306**

The presumed stateless *UNICA* delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK at least five times between July and October 2019 and continued to deliver refined petroleum to the DPRK in 2020 and 2021. These volumes were not timely reported to the 1718 Committee as required by UNSCR 2397 OP5.

UN HUNG (formerly VIFINE)**IMO: 9045962**

The formerly Sierra Leone-flagged *VIFINE* delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK at least five times between May and July 2019 and continued to deliver refined petroleum to the DPRK in 2020 and 2021. These volumes were not timely reported to the 1718 Committee as required by UNSCR 2397 OP5.

BONVOY 3**IMO: 8714085**

The presumed stateless *BONVOY 3* delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK at least twice between August and September 2019 and continued to deliver refined petroleum to the DPRK in 2020 and 2021. These volumes were not timely reported to the 1718 Committee as required by UNSCR 2397, OP5.

DIAMOND 8**IMO: 9132612**

The presumed stateless *DIAMOND 8* delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK on 27 October 2019, and continued to deliver petroleum to the DPRK in 2020 and 2021. These volumes were not timely reported to the 1718 Committee as required by UNSCR 2397 OP5.

United Nations

S/PV.9048



Security Council

Seventy-seventh year

Provisional

9048th meeting
Thursday, 26 May 2022, 4.45 p.m.
New York

President: Mrs. Thomas-Greenfield (United States of America)

Members:

Albania	Mr. Hoxha
Brazil	Mr. Costa Filho
China	Mr. Zhang Jun
France	Mr. De Rivière
Gabon	Ms. Koumby Missambo
Ghana	Ms. Oppong-Ntiri
India	Mr. Tirumurti
Ireland	Ms. Byrne Nason
Kenya	Mr. Kimani
Mexico	Mr. Gómez Robledo Verduzco
Norway	Ms. Juul
Russian Federation	Mr. Nebenzia
United Arab Emirates	Mrs. Nusseibeh
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . .	Mr. Kariuki

Agenda

Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (<http://documents.un.org>).

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The meeting was called to order at 4.45 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Japan and the Republic of Korea to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2022/431, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the United States of America.

I now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the United States.

Today's vote could not be clearer. Here are the facts. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's 25 May launch of three ballistic missiles included yet another intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch. The United States assesses that this is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's sixth ICBM launch since the beginning of 2022. That is a threat to the peace and security of the entire international community.

It is undeniable that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to illustrate its commitment to advancing its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic-missile programmes in violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. The Council made a commitment to respond to exactly that kind of escalation. We cannot allow the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to normalize those unlawful and destabilizing actions, nor can we let the Democratic People's Republic of Korea divide the Security Council and exhaust our capacity to respond decisively.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has now conducted six ICBM tests without any response from the Security Council, despite the commitment that the Council made in resolution 2397 (2017) to take further measures in the event of an additional ICBM launch. Following that commitment by the Council, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea suspended

ICBM tests for five years. But its ICBM launches in recent months have tested the integrity and the will of the Council to carry out its commitments. Thus far, we have not done so.

We cannot let this become the new norm. We cannot tolerate such dangerous and threatening behaviour.

Some Council members have argued that a presidential statement is the appropriate response to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's ICBM launches. May I remind my fellow Council members that we have tried to propose press elements and a press statement following many of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's launches this year, including the 24 March ICBM launch. We were told, however, that any such statement could lead to escalation or destabilize the Korean peninsula.

In fact, the exact opposite has happened. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has taken the Council's silence as a green light to act with impunity and escalate tensions on the peninsula. It has engaged in an unprovoked series of 23 — let me repeat that — 23 ballistic-missile launches since the beginning of the year and is actively preparing to conduct a nuclear test.

Council action is not the reason for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's escalation, because Council inaction is certainly enabling it. Today's vote is the Council's opportunity to stand by its word. It is the Council's responsibility to act in response to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's ICBM launches. Only through a resolution can we deliver on the commitment made by the Council in resolution 2397 (2017).

With the adoption of this draft resolution, we can send a message to all proliferators that we will not stand for any actions on their part that seek to undermine international peace and security. We took a deliberate and Council-wide approach to negotiations to ensure that all members have a voice in this draft resolution. That certain Council members refused to engage, despite our commitment to and demonstration of inclusivity throughout this process, is their choice, and it is their choice alone.

If adopted, this action-oriented draft resolution will restrict the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's ability to advance its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic-missile programmes, streamline sanctions implementation and further

facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. It also takes an urgently needed step towards addressing the concerning coronavirus disease outbreak in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

We ask all Council members to stand with us against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unlawful actions and vote for the adoption of the draft resolution. This should continue to be an area of Council unity, and now is the time to act.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Against:

China, Russian Federation

The President: The draft resolution received 13 votes in favour, 2 against and no abstentions. The draft resolution has not been adopted owing to the negative vote of one permanent member of the Council.

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the voting.

Mr. Zhang Jun (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The Chinese delegation voted against the draft resolution contained in document S/2022/431, submitted by the United States, which is intended to impose additional sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That is a prudent decision made by China after it repeatedly weighed the pros and cons of the issue on the basis of its consistent position on the Korean peninsula nuclear issue, comprehensively analysing the circumstances surrounding the current escalation of tensions on the peninsula, and fully taking into account the negative consequences that could arise once the draft resolution has been adopted, including for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's domestic response to the coronavirus disease.

As a close neighbour of the peninsula, China is extremely concerned about the situation there and has

always insisted on maintaining its peace and stability, working for its denuclearization and resolving issues through dialogue and consultation. For a long time, China has been making unremitting efforts to that end. In dealing with the recent manifestations of the persistent tensions on the peninsula, China has called on all the parties to exercise calm and restraint and refrain from actions that could increase tension and lead to miscalculations. With regard to the peninsula issue, the Security Council should play a positive and constructive role, and its actions should help de-escalate the situation and prevent it from deteriorating and even spiralling out of control.

With its ups and downs, the peninsula issue has remained unresolved for decades. Events have repeatedly demonstrated that dialogue and negotiations are the only viable way to resolve the problem. As a main stakeholder in the peninsula question, the United States is directly responsible for promoting dialogue and negotiations. In 2018, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea took a series of measures to denuclearize and de-escalate the situation, and its leaders and those of the United States met in Singapore, where they reached an important consensus on establishing a new phase in their relations, including building a peace mechanism and advancing the denuclearization process on the peninsula.

Regrettably, the United States has not reciprocated the positive initiatives taken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in accordance with the principle of action for action. Talks between the two countries have remained at an impasse, as has the denuclearization process, and the tensions on the peninsula continue to rise. The situation has evolved into its current state primarily owing to the United States' flip-flopping policies and failure to abide by the outcomes of previous talks. That is an irrefutable fact.

The facts have also shown that reliance on sanctions will not help to resolve the peninsula issue. Security Council sanctions are a means, not an end in themselves. The Council has so far adopted 10 sanctions resolutions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, establishing an extremely harsh and complex sanctions regime while at the same time working to move in the right direction, aimed at resolving the peninsula issue through dialogue. China firmly believes that the Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are an integral whole and should be implemented comprehensively, thoroughly and

accurately. The countries concerned should not have a one-sided emphasis on the implementation of sanctions alone but should also work to promote a political solution and ease sanctions where appropriate. The starting point of the draft resolution on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea jointly proposed by China and Russia in the Council is the alleviation of the impact of humanitarian difficulties and those related to livelihoods in the country and to inject momentum into achieving a political settlement on the peninsula.

In the current situation, additional sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will not only fail to resolve the problem but will lead to further negative consequences and an escalation of the confrontation. Their humanitarian impact will also be worse, especially against a backdrop of the emerging coronavirus cases in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Additional sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will only add to the misery of its people, and therefore neither just nor humane. Under the provisions of the draft resolution proposed by the United States, the supply of crude oil and refined petroleum products to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would each be reduced by 25 per cent. The export by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of related products would be further restricted. Those measures have no relevance to settling the nuclear issue on the peninsula, and the only conceivable result would be to sever a lifeline for the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and worsen their plight. It is obviously self-contradictory to push for increasing sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea while claiming to be willing to provide humanitarian assistance, and China does not endorse that approach.

China attaches great importance to the unity and cooperation of the Council. In order to reduce the level of contention and reflect the Council's constructive role, China has always called on all parties to adopt a cooperative attitude to the peninsula issue. We support the necessary action taken by the Council, but the goal should be to promote dialogue and negotiations and create a favourable environment for a political solution. With regard to the draft resolution proposed by the United States, China has repeatedly expressed the hope that the United States would consider issuing a presidential statement instead, as the best way to garner consensus among Council members and avoid confrontation, an approach endorsed by most Council

members, with the United States alone dissenting. The United States has insisted that the Council should take action if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were to launch another intercontinental ballistic missile, as stipulated in previous Security Council resolutions. But the kind of action that the Council should take should be decided through consultations, not dictated by a single member.

In the current circumstances, the Council should consider what is actually impeding peace and stability on the peninsula and should be concerned about the real difficulties regarding the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and their livelihoods, with a view to injecting an impetus into resolving the peninsula issue. We call on the Security Council to play an active role in providing humanitarian and anti-epidemic assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea rather than creating obstacles. Regrettably, China's reasonable proposal was rejected. In the circumstances, we had no choice but to vote against the draft resolution.

Peace and stability on the Korean peninsula are related to the common interests of the countries of the region and therefore require joint efforts by all countries. The security of all countries is indivisible, and the security of one country cannot be based on the insecurity of others. The developments on the peninsula that have led to the current situation deserve our reflection. The United States has recently been vigorously promoting an Indo-Pacific strategy that is of necessity linked to the latest developments on the peninsula. It has been promoting cooperation on nuclear submarines with certain countries that carries serious risks of nuclear proliferation. With much fanfare it has been developing offensive-weapon systems, such as hypersonic weapons, and has sold cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads to other countries, thereby significantly undermining the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The United States also continues to promote and expand military exercises, strengthen military alliances with certain countries involved in the region and engineer small, exclusive circles. One particular politician from a certain country concerned has made frequent pro-nuclear statements and has advocated nuclear sharing with the United States. Those moves all send the wrong message and have had a negative impact on the resolution of the nuclear issue involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We advise

the countries concerned to prioritize international and regional peace and security, abandon their Cold War mentality and refrain from going any further down the wrong path.

The situation on the peninsula is at a dangerous juncture. China once again calls on all the parties to exercise calm and restraint and urges the United States to meaningfully reflect on its policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, adhere to the overarching principle of finding a political settlement, take meaningful action to respond to the legitimate and reasonable concerns of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and create conditions for the de-escalation of the situation and a resumption of dialogue and negotiations. China will continue to play a constructive role in maintaining the peninsula's peace and stability and achieving its denuclearization.

Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Russia voted against the draft resolution (S/2022/431) proposed by the United States. We are sorry that our American colleagues ignored the frequent clarifications we made during the drafting of the text in consultations and at recent Security Council meetings. We said we would not support this kind of document. Our appeals for it to be issued as a presidential statement instead went unheeded.

As a matter of principle, we have repeatedly said that imposing new sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a dead end, and we have emphasized the fact that increasing the sanctions pressure on Pyongyang is mistaken, ineffective and inhumane. Many restrictive resolutions have been adopted regarding Pyongyang since 2006. However, as history has shown, the sanctions route has been able neither to guarantee security in the region nor regulate issues related to missile and nuclear non-proliferation. The security issues in the region, which also directly affect Russia, cannot be resolved through primitive and unskillful means that have serious collateral consequences for ordinary people.

In the past year the situation on the peninsula has only got worse. Our Western colleagues are accustomed to shifting all the blame onto the North Korean authorities, but they completely ignore the fact that Pyongyang's repeated calls for the United States to cease its hostile activities — which would open up opportunities for dialogue — have not been taken seriously. We hear nothing from our American

colleagues except about the need for sanctions. The steps that Pyongyang took in 2018 and 2019 to meet us halfway and send positive signals have constantly been called into question, and the Council has been unable to find the strength to respond to them appropriately, while alternative pathways to a political and diplomatic settlement, including the Russian-Chinese humanitarian draft resolution, have been rejected. We are now suffering the consequences of the West's short-sighted policies. We are unfortunately witnessing a continuing deterioration in the potential of the political and diplomatic process thanks to the hard-line policy led by the United States, which has basically destroyed the positive progress made on the Korean peninsula a few years ago.

Strengthening the sanctions pressure on Pyongyang is not only futile but extremely dangerous considering the humanitarian consequences of such measures. The sanctions package adopted against Pyongyang in 2016 and 2017 primarily affected the lives of ordinary North Koreans. Even before the start of the pandemic, there was a serious shortage of medicines in the country, the economy was stagnant and the banking and financial restrictions effectively cut off North Koreans' ability to buy consumer goods. I want to emphasize that all of that began even before the country closed down in the face of the threat of the spread of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in 2020. Unfortunately, a few weeks ago COVID-19 did manage to penetrate the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the epidemiological situation there is now a very difficult one. We believe it is completely irresponsible to propose new sanctions when the North Koreans are dealing with a challenge that should rather lead us to consider ways of helping their country overcome it. The urgency of expanding the humanitarian exemptions from the sanctions measures that we and our Chinese colleagues have proposed has only become greater.

It has long been obvious to anyone genuinely concerned with resolving the situation in North Korea that it is futile to expect unconditional disarmament from Pyongyang under the threat of a sanctions spiral and so-called guarantees based on unsubstantiated promises. And the creation of new military blocs in the region, such as the union of the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia known as AUKUS, raises serious doubts about their good intentions, including on the part of Pyongyang, and is counterproductive from the point of view of establishing a dialogue. We also

heard threatening statements about Pyongyang during President Joe Biden's recent tour of the countries of the region.

In general, what we are seeing is that the primacy of finding political and diplomatic solutions to conflicts all over the world is paralysed. Preventive diplomacy, whose praises many Member States, including the author of the draft resolution, love to sing, is cast aside as soon as it comes to countries that are not considered part of the so-called civilized world. It seems that our American and other Western colleagues are suffering the equivalent of writer's block, given that they have no response to crisis situations other than the imposition of sanctions. Russia has always considered such measures to be the most extreme possible response, requiring constant fine-tuning and calibration. I am not even discussing unilateral sanctions here, which make it impossible to implement Security Council resolutions and undermine our ability to respond collectively and multilaterally, including in the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

We would like to emphasize once again that Russia opposes any military activity jeopardizing the security of the Korean peninsula and the countries of North-East Asia. However, security issues that directly concern our country, among others, cannot be resolved through the primitive use of a sanctions cudgel, as they can have serious collateral effects. We firmly believe that the quest for mutually acceptable political and diplomatic solutions is the only possible way to reach a peaceful solution to the Korean peninsula question and establish robust security mechanisms in North-East Asia. Only the involvement of all players in the region in the process on an equal footing, without attempts to monopolize it, can have positive results. That should be our main task, whose resolution will make it possible to normalize the situation in the region. At the same time, we should point out that the lack of progress on the political track threatens to further increase tensions on the peninsula, and regrettably we are already witnessing that.

Mr. Kimani (Kenya): Kenya voted in favour of adopting draft resolution S/2022/431. The Security Council's resolutions have been clear, but unfortunately the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has chosen not to comply with them. Instead, its missile launches, particularly in the past five months, have undermined the stability of the Korean peninsula. Added to the launches, one of which threatened the territorial integrity of a Member State, are the statements it has

been making about its accelerated development and use of nuclear weapons.

What we have learned in the past few months is that actions undermining international peace and security concern not only the countries immediately affected but even the most distant. Today we are suffering from rapidly rising food and energy costs as a result of a conflict that is far from our borders. The undermining of the security and stability of the Korean peninsula risks escalating into a crisis that would directly harm a region that is linked to Africa through a great history of trading and investment at a time when development is key to our own peace and security. For that reason, we must appeal to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to end its current posture and seek a dialogue that leads to a lasting solution.

We also regret the current policy of protracted sanctions, which continue to cause extensive suffering and underdevelopment in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and we appreciate the willingness of some delegations to seek a statement by the President of the Security Council that would have demanded consensus among its members. While we encourage consensus and unity, they must be robust enough to send a clear signal about the importance of halting any further undermining of the stability of the Korean peninsula.

We believe that the diplomatic avenues available to the stakeholders in the immediate security situation should be used with more determination to find compromises. Lacking the willingness to compromise in negotiation, we will remain trapped in the risky ground between provocation and blockade.

Instead, we encourage all relevant parties to undertake trust-building initiatives. The missile launches should cease, and there should be a review of the sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which have had adverse effects on civilians.

Finally, Kenya reaffirms its long-standing commitment to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and a world free of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Gómez Robledo Verduzco (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): The continued launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of ballistic missiles, including of intercontinental range, pose a clear threat to international peace and security. That is why Mexico

voted in favour of draft resolution S/2022/431, which we just considered.

Such tests, as well as the intention of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to strengthen its nuclear capabilities, are in clear violation of Security Council resolutions and the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

The text of the draft resolution contained important provisions expressing the commitment to a peaceful and diplomatic solution and to achieving the complete and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. We therefore regret that the draft text was not adopted due to the veto of two permanent members.

In the light of the recent adoption of General Assembly resolution 76/262, we now look forward to the convening of a meeting of that organ, as well as the special report to be prepared by the Council, in order for the highest international organ to hear those permanent members discuss the issue and take the decisions that it deems appropriate.

Regardless of today's outcome, we urgently call for a return to the negotiating table.

Mr. Hoxha (Albania): Albania voted in favour of draft resolution S/2022/431. We regret the outcome of the vote.

We believe that the Security Council missed a precious opportunity to come together and give a robust response to the continuous and persisting violations of its own resolutions by the regime of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That is utterly disappointing. There is nothing more harmful to international law, Security Council resolutions and international norms than when they be disrespected. There is nothing more damaging to the credibility and relevance of the Security Council than its inability to deliver because it is blocked. There is hardly anything more worrisome than when the Council fails to take its responsibility to contribute by action to the maintenance of peace and security because it is divided.

All those who have lost trust in the United Nations and its bodies have another reason to be unhappy and critical. The message that the Council conveyed today with this result is to tolerate those that breach the provisions of documents that were adopted for providing and guaranteeing safety and security.

As we all know, just yesterday the Democratic People's Republic of Korea launched another intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) — its sixth ICBM launch this year and the twenty-third in less than five months.

We reiterate our condemnation of those provocations, which violate Security Council resolutions, but also put openly at threat the global and regional security of the Korean peninsula.

We have seen it more than once: what happens somewhere may have an impact everywhere. Therefore, a tolerance for the dangerous course of the militarization and nuclear proliferation of a country is licence to do the same, if not more, for any other rogue State.

We deplore the use of the veto to prevent the Council from acting, which can be translated only as support for such illegal activities.

Let me conclude by reiterating our call for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to stop its destabilizing activities and give peace a chance through engagement in meaning dialogue, without preconditions.

Ms. Byrne Nason (Ireland): I would like to deliver an explanation of vote regarding Ireland's position on this issue.

Ireland voted in favour of today's draft resolution S/2022/431, following the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in contravention of Security Council resolutions.

The actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea threaten peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and the wider region, as well as undermining the global disarmament and non-proliferation framework. Given the continued destabilizing activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Council must be clear, determined and united in answering those actions. The draft resolution is a necessary and balanced response by the Council.

It is deeply regrettable that this draft resolution was blocked, in the face of such clear violations of Council resolutions, and given the Council's earlier decision, under resolution 2397 (2017), that it would take action should the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conduct further ICBM launches. That sends a deeply negative message regarding the Council's willingness to uphold its own resolutions, as well as regarding

global disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. It undermines the aim of the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The use of the veto to block Council action on this draft resolution is deeply regrettable, as indeed it is whenever it occurs. We know that our frustration is shared by the wider United Nations membership, as demonstrated by the consensus adoption of the veto initiative resolution 76/262 by the General Assembly in April. We look forward to the swift issuance of a special report by the Security Council, in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations.

In concluding, I want to repeat that Ireland has long called for an end to the use of the veto and for reform of the Security Council. We reiterate that call today.

Ms. Oppong-Ntiri (Ghana): The situation in the Korean peninsula is concerning for global peace and security. As members of the Council, we have a responsibility to the wider membership to act in moments when acting proactively can help prevent destabilization of international peace and security.

It is in that context, and mindful of previous resolutions, that Ghana voted in favour of draft resolution S/2022/431, on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Although the draft resolution was not adopted, the expressed position of 13 members of the Council shows an overwhelming convergence of the international community's position on the matter and sends a clear message to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that the 23 missiles that it has launched this year alone, and the ones that it launched in previous years, are unacceptable to the international community and are in blatant violation of its international obligations, as expressed in multiple Security Council resolutions.

By today's action in the Council, it should be clear to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that its reported intention to accelerate the development of its nuclear capabilities at the highest possible pace, as well as its threat to use nuclear weapons if its national interest is threatened, would be deemed as contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which enjoin all States Members to be peace-loving.

While we regret the lack of unanimity on this draft resolution, the balance of views is that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is obliged to take up the offer of unconditional dialogue by the United States and to take concrete, immediate and urgent steps to de-escalate the tensions on the Korean peninsula.

The humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which was already dire, has been exacerbated by the outbreak of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in the country. We are informed by the World Health Organization and other partners that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has yet to accept offers of millions of doses of COVID-19 vaccines under the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) programme and other bilateral arrangements. It is important that we help the Democratic People's Republic of Korea overcome its mistrust in order to avoid the needless loss of innocent lives and plug into the international cooperative arrangements that can support it in saving the lives of its people through access to the COVID-19 vaccines, therapeutics and other medical equipment that it needs to fight the virus.

We also encourage the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to streamline its internal processes to enable much-needed medical and other humanitarian supplies to reach its people. We urge its leaders to allow the United Nations humanitarian agencies back into the country and support efforts by the United Nations system to re-establish the banking channel with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We hope that in future the Council will be able to act in a united manner to preserve peace on the Korean peninsula.

Ms. Juul (Norway): Norway strongly condemns the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's recent series of ballistic-missile launches, including the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, in clear violation of several Security Council resolutions. We are also deeply concerned about the disturbing rhetoric we are hearing about nuclear weapons and developments in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear programme. Norway therefore voted in favour of draft resolution S/2022/431 in response to those developments and the threat that the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea poses to both regional and international peace and security.

The proposed draft resolution would have broadened the humanitarian exemption mechanisms considerably. That would have been a timely update given the critical humanitarian needs in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, especially in the wake of the recent reports of the spread of coronavirus disease throughout the country. We regret that the use of the veto prevented the Security Council from fulfilling its mandate and taking necessary action on this very serious and escalating security and humanitarian situation.

We recognize that in accordance with its consensus resolution 76/262, the General Assembly will now take up this issue for discussion in line with its own responsibilities with regard to international peace and security. And we expect the Council to comply with the provision of resolution 76/262 inviting it to submit a special report on the issue for the Assembly's consideration. We call on the Secretariat to produce such a report in consultation with the Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, and to annex to it the *précis-verbal* from this meeting.

The current path of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is not only a threat to regional and international peace and security, but it also aggravates an already dire economic, humanitarian and human rights situation for the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The United Nations cannot remain silent simply because of the veto in the Security Council.

Mr. Costa Filho (Brazil): As a country committed to the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime, as well as to the Charter of the United Nations and the decisions of the Security Council, Brazil voted in favour of draft resolution S/2022/431.

Brazil condemns in the strongest possible terms the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's launch of a series of ballistic missiles, and in particular its launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles, in violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. In that regard, it was critical for the Council to demonstrate unity in order to send a clear message to the Democratic Republic of Korea that the body that bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security would not tolerate the violation of its decisions or disregard for the Charter of the United Nations. And if it had been adopted, the draft resolution

would also have sent a powerful deterrent message to other potential proliferators.

We would like to express our appreciation to you and your team, Madam President, for the transparent and inclusive manner with which you led the negotiation process for the draft resolution. Taking into consideration the concerns of various Council members with regard to technical, security and humanitarian aspects of the text helped us to achieve a more robust and legitimate result. The draft resolution outlines important and innovative elements, such as those related to measures to combat malicious cyber activities and to establishing a list of well-defined categories of items for humanitarian purposes, taking into account the recent outbreak of the coronavirus disease that the North Korean population is dealing with. Although we share the concerns about the humanitarian impact of sanctions and their effectiveness in changing States' behaviour, especially in cases of comprehensive sanctions regimes that tend to last indefinitely, we understand that the Security Council cannot turn a blind eye to its responsibilities. We need firm and timely responses to violations of Council decisions, or we risk becoming irrelevant.

Mr. Kariuki (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom deeply regrets that the adoption of draft resolution S/2022/431 was blocked by Russia and China.

North Korea's resumption of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) testing, including an ICBM test yet again this week, is a serious escalation and a significant threat to international peace and security. It is clear that there is wide support in the Council and beyond for seeing the Council speak up and deliver on its responsibilities. It has been almost five years since the Council responded to North Korea's repeated tests of banned weapons. The fact that two members have kept the Council silent only serves to embolden the North Korean authorities. We are concerned about the possibility that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea may resume its testing of nuclear weapons. The Security Council has a particular responsibility to address that serious threat to peace and security. North Korea must not be allowed to test missiles and other weapons with impunity.

The votes against this draft resolution today also represent a missed opportunity to better support the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of North Korea, including urgently needed humanitarian

assistance related to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19). We encourage the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take up the offer of vaccines from the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) and of assistance from international partners, and to respond to the United States' offer of new talks without conditions.

I would like to thank the United States for the consultative process that this text went through. Our United States colleagues made every effort to accommodate the views of other Council members within the draft resolution.

Ms. Koumy Missambo (Gabon) (*spoke in French*): I welcome the Ambassadors of Korea and Japan to this meeting.

North Korea has once again launched more ballistic missiles, in addition to the significant number it has launched since the start of the year, only worsening tensions and increasing the risks to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and well beyond. My country condemns those launches, as well as all demonstrations of force that might increase security risks on the Korean peninsula and undermine regional stability. We are also concerned about the potential of this trend to make nuclear threats more acceptable, which does not bode well for collective peace and security.

Since we began our term on the Security Council, my country has consistently advocated for a resumption of negotiations with North Korea aimed at finding a diplomatic solution to the situation, putting an end to the escalation, easing tensions and leading to peaceful coexistence. We now reiterate that appeal because the status quo right now is neither acceptable nor satisfactory. The peoples of the region, including in North Korea, have a right to live without that constant threat. We must do everything we can to bring all the parties to the negotiating table, and the Security Council cannot continue to meet to take note of statistics and issue futile condemnations. That inaction will undermine the Council's credibility.

My country is very concerned about the increasing tensions, as well as about the fact that the North Korean people are prisoners of this crisis, which has lasted far too long, and that many of North Korea's neighbours live in dread of a potential threat with irreparable consequences. We supported draft resolution S/2022/431 as it was submitted to the Security Council because we will never understand the logic of missile launches.

In conclusion, we reiterate how urgent it is to resume negotiations with North Korea with the aim of finding a lasting solution that guarantees peace and stability on the entire peninsula. We call on all the parties to engage in diplomatic negotiations on the basis of what was agreed in 2017.

Mr. De Rivière (France) (*spoke in French*): On 24 May North Korea once again fired three ballistic missiles, and there is every indication that it is preparing for another nuclear test. The speed and gravity of North Korea's provocations since the beginning of the year are unprecedented. In the face of that escalation, we have spared no effort to ensure that the Security Council speaks with one voice, because we cannot allow North Korea to pursue the development of its nuclear and ballistic programmes with impunity and to violate all of the Security Council's unanimously adopted resolutions.

France believes firmly that the sanctions regime must be strengthened and updated in new areas. That was the objective of draft resolution S/2022/431, presented today, which we supported unhesitatingly. Today we deeply deplore the result of the voting, which shows how the Council is divided. The use of the veto amounts to protecting the North Korean regime and giving it a blank cheque to launch even more weapons. The Council was not up to the challenge of this major proliferation crisis today. France will continue its efforts to ensure that the Council is able to act and can regain the unity it has had on this issue since the adoption of resolution 1718 (2006), more than 15 years ago. At the same time, the relaunch of a genuine political process is more urgent than ever. Continuing to do nothing will pose a major risk to regional stability and to the international non-proliferation architecture.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the United States.

It goes without saying that this is a disappointing day for the Security Council. It has refused to take action in response to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unlawful launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles. I wish that I could say I am surprised. We have been circulating the text of draft resolution S/2022/431 for nine weeks. In that time, the countries that vetoed the draft resolution have refused to engage on it, despite our commitment to inclusivity and flexibility during consultations. Before today, the Security Council had a remarkable record of consensus and collective action

on this issue, going back many years. In 2016 and again in 2017, the Council unanimously responded to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's provocations with resolutions that imposed sanctions and brought collective condemnation of a very real threat to peace and security. Today, two permanent members of the Security Council chose to veto rather than act. And so, we may ask, what has changed?

It is not the gravity of the threat that has changed. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is still expressing its intention to advance its programme for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles, and it has flagrantly violated the Security Council's resolutions 23 times this year alone by launching ballistic missiles, including six intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) — a missile system that in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's hands poses a grave threat to international peace and security and to Council members. The world is facing a clear and present danger from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That is why 13 of us supported this draft resolution — because it is, and was, the right thing to do.

It is not the Security Council's clear mandate that has changed either. In 2017 the Security Council unanimously and unambiguously decided that the Council would impose further restrictions in the event of another the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ICBM launch. And as I mentioned earlier, restraint and silence on the part of the Council has not eliminated or even reduced the threat. If anything, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been emboldened by its inaction.

It is not the dire humanitarian situation that has changed. The people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are suffering, and even though the United States has offered urgent humanitarian and coronavirus disease (COVID-19) relief to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in good faith and independent of the lack of progress on denuclearization, those offers of assistance have gone unanswered.

It is not the willingness of the United States to engage in diplomacy with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and others that has changed. We have made serious, sustained efforts, publicly and privately, to pursue diplomacy with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea without preconditions. And we have urged China and Russia to engage with the rest

of the Security Council on this text, offering sincere flexibility. As Secretary Blinken said just this morning, "It is in all of our interests to uphold the rules, norms and treaties that have reduced the spread of weapons of mass destruction".

So what is it? What has changed? The only thing that has changed is the refusal of permanent members of the Security Council to do their job. That has resulted in the Council's failure to fulfil its responsibilities to maintain international peace and security by negotiating on the text of today's draft resolution, as well as the failure of those members to preserve the Council's unity and credibility. They have decided to shield a proliferator from facing the consequences of its actions, and they have demonstrated the worthlessness of their word by giving an explicit nod of approval to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. For that, they will have to explain themselves to the General Assembly. And I fear that in the coming weeks they will have to explain why they have enabled the further provocations that will surely come.

Today's reckless outcome means that the threat from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will continue to grow. It will continue to grow more dangerous, and it sends a clear message to other proliferators that they can act with impunity. The Council must stand up to the threat of WMD proliferation, whether it comes from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or anyone else. I also want to make it clear that sanctions are not responsible for the dire humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It is the result of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's own policies of spending resources on a WMD programme to the neglect of its own people. And we will continue to offer humanitarian assistance, including COVID-19 assistance, as I mentioned earlier. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has only to accept it.

We resolve to continue to work to restrict the development of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unlawful WMD and ballistic-missile programme together with the countries that are willing to stand up for the international non-proliferation regime and that refuse to ignore the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's repeated violations of Security Council resolutions.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I give the floor to the representative of Japan.

Mr. Ishikane (Japan): Japan deeply regrets the result of the voting.

I carefully listened to the explanations of vote by the members of the Security Council who voted against draft resolution S/2022/431. Still, the reasons behind the objection to the draft resolution remain totally unclear and unconvincing

In December 2017 when Japan presided over the Council, it unanimously adopted resolution 2397 (2017), which stipulates that further restrictions on oil will be imposed in the event of a North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch. All permanent members of the Council agreed to that stipulation at the time. It is deeply regrettable that, at this time, the agreement was not respected by some of those members. Such inconsistent behaviour seriously undermines the credibility of the Council.

North Korea continues its destabilizing nuclear and missile activities, including repeated ICBM launches, in violation of numerous Council resolutions. Those actions gravely threaten the peace and security of the region and beyond. Yet we have seen no Council resolutions adopted as a result of those activities. We cannot help but ask: What is the veto for? What is the Security Council for?

Yesterday North Korea again launched ballistic missiles, including an ICBM-class ballistic missile. Japan strongly condemns North Korea's continued provocative acts and believes that they further reinforce the need for the Council to adopt a new sanctions draft resolution.

Today's draft resolution, put forward by the United States, was indeed a well-considered one. While it sought to update and strengthen sanctions, including in key areas such as oil and the cyberdomain, it also incorporated humanitarian perspectives and duly reflected the situation of the ongoing pandemic in North Korea. Japan would like to pay its deep respects to the tireless efforts by the United States and other Council members that have patiently engaged in serious consultations to bring this balanced text to the table. The draft resolution also expressed deep concern about the grave hardship to which the people in North Korea are subjected. In that context, we urge North Korea to take concrete measures towards the immediate resolution of the abductions issue.

Given the state of affairs in the Council today, I would like to conclude with three clear points.

First, existing Security Council resolutions continue to be in effect. Today's veto does not negate the need for their strict implementation. Japan urges all Member States to fulfil their obligations in that regard. Japan also expects that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) will continue to be fully functional.

Secondly, the Security Council needs to continue to explore ways to address the ever-growing threat of North Korea's nuclear and missile activities. The most appropriate way to address that serious challenge to the maintenance of international peace and security remains the adoption of a new draft resolution by a strong and unified Council.

Thirdly, at the formal meeting of the General Assembly to be held in 10 working days following the exercise of today's veto, Japan hopes to see all Member States raise their voices against the illegal and destabilizing activities by North Korea and the non-fulfilment of the responsibilities of the Security Council due to the exercise of veto — despite the repeated violations of Security Council resolutions by North Korea.

The President: I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. Cho Hyun (Republic of Korea): I would like to thank you, Madam President, for convening this meeting. I am grateful for having been invited to take part in this important meeting.

We all vividly remember that we gathered here in the Chamber on 11 May (see S/PV.9030) in response to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile in March. Along with other delegations at that time, my delegation condemned the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's ballistic-missile launches and called upon North Korea to choose a path of engagement instead of one of confrontation and escalation.

Almost every member of the Security Council urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cease its provocations and stressed the need for dialogue. Unfortunately, our continued call for dialogue and engagement fell on deaf ears, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea once again responded with additional launches.

Against that backdrop, the Republic of Korea again condemns in the strongest terms the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's ballistic-missile launches, which constitute a flagrant violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. These provocative actions by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea threaten the peace and security of the Korean peninsula, the region and beyond. Furthermore, if left unchecked, such actions will also undermine the very foundation of the global non-proliferation regime.

It is simply shocking to see that, even in the face of the country's recent massive coronavirus disease outbreak, which its State media described as, "the greatest upheaval in our history since the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea", the country does not relent in the development of its weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic-missile programmes. Instead of fully committing to curbing the pandemic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is still preoccupied with its nuclear and ballistic capabilities, diverting its scarce resources to be vainly blown up in the sky.

Following the news of the outbreak, we were the first to immediately offer help. We extended our hand of unconditional assistance to tackle the pandemic, yet the country's response was a clenched fist of ballistic-missile launches. Those launches, particularly amid the ongoing pandemic, distinctly demonstrate where the Pyongyang regime places its national priorities — in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic-missile programmes over its own people. Indeed, we watch in horror as the people starve and suffer. But we also clearly see that the money is spent on weapons and that this is where the regime's attention remains. This cannot, and should not, go on; and we must act accordingly.

In that context, it is with deep regret that the Council failed to adopt draft resolution S/2022/431, which is long overdue. My delegation is concerned that this could send the wrong signal to both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other potential WMD-proliferators — that they can do whatever they want with impunity. As I emphasized earlier, unchecked provocations will only embolden the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's continued escalatory behaviour. Right now, we are looking at the possibility of another nuclear test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. At the same time, Pyongyang recently released statements threatening

the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons. All of those developments are a cause for significant concern and clearly indicate the direction that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is headed. I truly hope that today's decision will not be taken as *carte blanche* for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to do whatever it wants.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should realize that it will gain nothing from continued provocations. As such, we urge Pyongyang to positively respond to the call for dialogue to establish peace on the Korean peninsula through complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. The Republic of Korea remains committed to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and will continue to offer dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to that end.

The President: The representative of China has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

Mr. Zhang Jun (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): In her earlier statement, the representative of the United States levelled a slew of accusations, echoed by a non-Council member, against China's position. China categorically rejects those accusations. We must point out that they are entirely unfounded.

China has been a responsible member of the Security Council and has engaged responsibly in the Council's work. My country has worked hard to maintain Council unity. We have been facilitating greater cooperation within the Council in order to enable it to fulfil its mandate, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Such is the weight of the Security Council's mandate that each and every decision made in the Chamber has profound and far-reaching implications. It is precisely for that reason that China has been extremely prudent and responsible when casting its vote whenever a draft resolution is put to a vote. It is important to highlight that voting in favour or against a draft text, or abstaining in the voting, is China's prerogative as a member of the Security Council. China's position is independently self-determined and does not need to be aligned with that of the United States. Such an alignment is not required under the Council's rules of procedure. China's voting position is based on its assessment as to whether a proposal contributes to a solution, whether it helps maintain international and regional peace and

security and whether it can head off greater tensions or a broader disaster.

Those considerations also constitute an important yardstick by which to measure the Council's work. The function of the Council is not to adopt draft resolution after draft resolution and make statement after statement ad infinitum, or to assert its authority through sanctions and the use of force. In fact, if the Council — with no regard for principles — were to adopt certain draft resolutions that lead to dire consequences and catastrophes for the sanctioned countries and territories, it would be nothing but an act of irresponsibility and dereliction of duty. In that regard, it is useful to reflect upon the tragedies that are playing out in Libya and elsewhere. The Council has some painful lessons to learn in that regard, with the benefit of hindsight.

The reason draft resolution S/2022/431 was not adopted is very clear. It is not China's fault in the slightest. If the United States had accepted the proposals of China and some other members of the Council, this situation could easily have been averted. In fact, perhaps some people wanted this very situation to come about, in line with their cynical intentions.

China is a close neighbour of the Korean peninsula, whose peace and stability is a matter of international peace and security as well as China's own security. In order to ensure the peninsula's peace and stability, China must discharge its own responsibility in that regard. We shall continue working to safeguard the peace and security of the peninsula, ensure the peninsula's non-nuclearization and find a political solution to the issue.

The President: I shall now make a further statement in my capacity as the representative of the United States.

In response to my colleague from China, we do not ask China to align with the United States, but rather to support Security Council resolutions that they have already agreed to.

Draft resolution S/2022/431 failed today because China and Russia vetoed it. We do agree that this is a threat to security. It is a threat to our security, the security of our partners in the region and to China and Russia. That is why we thought it necessary to move forward with the draft resolution.

There has been some discussion over several days about a proposal for a presidential statement submitted by China, about which we were asked various questions. I want to be clear that we never saw any draft of that proposal. China said that it would consider a presidential statement but, when pressed, it said that the only acceptable provision was to update the weapons-control list, which the Council already has authorization to do, pursuant to previous resolutions.

I will therefore go back to where I started by stating that this veto protects the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which has launched six intercontinental ballistic missiles since the beginning of the year, in explicit violation of multiple Security Council resolutions.

China and Russia can therefore explain their actions to the General Assembly in that regard.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

The representative of China has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

Mr. Zhang Jun (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I do not want to take up too much of the Security Council's time, as time is a precious resource and I do not want to prolong our discussions.

In fact, after my explanation of vote and supplemental intervention, I gave a comprehensive explanation of China's position. I only wish to further point out that the United States representative enumerated numerous reasons to illustrate its position and to demonstrate that its position has not changed.

However, a review of the most recent period and an examination of what senior United States officials said and did, including during their visit to North-East Asia, points to the fact that the way that the United States approaches the Korean peninsula is, in fact, changing. That change is what has led to today's complex situation.

How shall we go about solving the issue of the Korean peninsula? The answer does not hinge on whether or not the Council adopts a new draft resolution. The crux of the matter is whether or not anyone wants to use this issue as a card in their so-called Indo-Pacific strategy or treat it as a chess piece on the chessboard of that strategy. That is the nature of the issue.

As far as China is concerned, we have consistently advocated for a political solution to the

issue — the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. That position has not changed. If the position of other countries has also not changed, it is very possible for us to join hands and work together in the pursuit of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

However, if some are covertly devising other plans, with the end result being the spread of the flames of war to North-East Asia and the Korean peninsula, China would have no choice but to take stern and firm action to defend the peace and stability of the peninsula and that of the Asia-Pacific region — because that is what we have to do in order to meet our responsibilities.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.