






















# PBF Performance Framework

Last updated: 26 July 2022
































Outcome	Indicators	Means of Verification	Baseline (as of Dec 2019)	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Indicator definition/methodology
<b>Strategic peacebuilding &amp; prevention effects:</b> PBF investments lead to more and better nationally led peacebuilding & prevention interventions, including in cross-border and transition contexts, and in support of more inclusion of women and youth	1.0.1 % of PBF active projects considered "on track with evidence of peacebuilding results"	Project score tracked in PBF Reporting Dashboard	36.5%	Target 30% Achieved 19.2%	Target 30% Achieved 32.6%	Target 30%	Target 30%	Target 30%	The score is assigned by PBSO based on analysis of project progress reports, end evaluations and other sources. Inclusion criterion is all projects within 6 months of the project end date.
	1.0.2 Percentage of eligible countries that adopted country-level strategic frameworks to guide PBF investment strategy	SDCFs, ISFs, PBF Strategic Frameworks	N/A N/A	N/A N/A	Target 50% Achieved 12%	Target 60%	Target 70%	Target 80%	PBF revised its approach to PRF countries' 5-year eligibility requests in 2020. This revision calls for the adoption of country-level Strategic Results Frameworks (SRFs) to guide PBF investment strategy in certain country settings. PBF began rolling out this new policy in January 2021. These frameworks are designed to better articulate joint peacebuilding results and theories of change at the outcome level to allow for better monitoring by the UN Country Teams and, in time, evaluation of cumulative PBF project results through independent portfolio evaluations
<b>Outputs</b>									
<b>1.1:</b> PBF meets annual approval targets set for 2020-24	1.1.1 Total PBF annual approvals in USD	Annual PBF approval table	\$191m	Target \$175m Achieved \$173.7m	Target \$210m Achieved \$195m	Target \$295m	Target \$350m	Target \$400m	Annual approval targets relate to the "sustained growth scenario" set out in the PBF Strategy 2020-24. They are based on anticipated demand and management capacity as well as on available income and will have to be adjusted as these factors can fluctuate.
<b>1.2:</b> PBF approves projects in line with priority windows, and in support of gender-responsive peacebuilding	1.2.1 % of PBF approvals that support gender-responsive peacebuilding	End of year review of project budgets dedicated to GEWE	Target 30% Achieved 40%	Target 30% Achieved 40%	Target 30% Achieved 47%	Target 30%	Target 30%	Target 30%	This is the target set in PBF's Strategy 2020-24. To note: the UN's guideline is for all UN initiatives to have at least 15% of budgets dedicated to gender and women's empowerment.
	1.2.2 % of annual PBF approvals to transition settings	PBF Annual approval table	30%	Target 35% Achieved 20.4%	Target 35% Achieved 38.15%	Target 35%	Target 35%	Target 35%	Indicator calculated on the basis of dollar amounts, not numbers of projects.
	1.2.3 % of annual PBF approvals to women's and youth empowerment	PBF Annual approval table	21%	Target 25% Achieved 34.4% Disaggregated G-13.5%; Y-20.9%	Target 25% Achieved 26% Disaggregated G-13%; Y-13%	Target 25%	Target 25%	Target 25%	Indicator on Gender includes Gender Marker 3 projects in both GYPI and regular program; indicator on youth includes all projects that have a primary focus on youth in both GYPI and regular program. Projects that are GM 3 and primarily focused on youth are counted only in the Gender indicator, which will slightly undercount PBF's overall achievement.
	1.2.4 % of PBF approvals to cross-border initiatives	PBF Annual approval table	8%	Target 20% Achieved 16.5%	Target 20% Achieved 14%	Target 20%	Target 20%	Target 20%	

<p><b>1.3:</b> PBF distributes project approvals along priority areas as outlined in Terms of Reference</p>	<p>1.3.1 % of PBF approvals approved towards Implementing and Sustaining Peace Agreements</p>	<p>PBF annual approval table</p>	<p>16%</p>	<p> 19.3%</p>	<p> 15%</p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	<p>These indicators do not have predetermined targets as explained in the PBF Strategy, given that the Fund has to retain flexibility on specific needs identified. It is nonetheless important for the Fund to track to establish comparative emphasis and inform learning and partnership approaches.</p>
	<p>1.3.2 % of PBF approvals approved towards Dialogue and Peaceful Coexistence</p>	<p>PBF annual approval table</p>	<p>65%</p>	<p> 65.5%</p>	<p> 72%</p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	
	<p>1.3.3 % of PBF approvals approved towards Peace Dividends</p>	<p>PBF annual approval table</p>	<p>8%</p>	<p> 8.5%</p>	<p> 4%</p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	
	<p>1.3.4 % of PBF approvals dedicated approved towards Re-establishing Basic Services</p>	<p>PBF annual approval table</p>	<p>11%</p>	<p> 6.6%</p>	<p> 9%</p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	
<p><b>1.4:</b> PBF supports national ownership through establishment of Joint Steering Committees (or equivalent)</p>	<p>1.4: PBF supports national ownership through establishment of Joint Steering Committees (or equivalent)</p>	<p>PRF country tracker</p>	<p>50%</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p> 60%</p>	<p> 70%</p>	<p> 75%</p>	<p> 80%</p>	<p>The feedback loop is the Community-based monitoring mechanism, which will provide a vehicle for including the voices of our ultimate stakeholders within the JSCs (or their equivalents). JSCs include senior level government, UN, CSOs and donors at country level.</p> <p>PBF is committed to testing the viability of this approach, but full implementation will be contingent on: 1) sufficient Fund capitalization to allow for additional M&amp;E budgets to PBF Secretariats, and 2) evidence of uptake within the JSCs and broader UN of the information provided by stakeholders.</p>
				<p> 45</p>	<p> 84%</p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	
<p><b>1.5:</b> The PBF ensures a robust Monitoring, Evaluation &amp; Learning system</p>	<p>1.5.1 % of PRF countries with strategic frameworks where outcome-level data is collected</p>	<p>PRF country tracker</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p> 80%</p>	<p> 80%</p>	<p> 80%</p>	<p> 80%</p>	<p>The Fund has committed to support the collection of strategic outcome-level data within the first 9-12-month period for most tiers one and two countries seeking eligibility or re-eligibility as part of the 2020-2024 Strategic Planning cycle.</p> <p>PBF requires independent project end evaluations for all projects. The responsibility for conducting these lies with recipient entities. This indicator tracks compliance.</p>
	<p>1.5.2 % of projects requiring project evaluations for which a final evaluation has been completed</p>	<p>Project evaluation tracking table</p>	<p>0.3</p>	<p> &gt; than previous year</p>	<p> &gt; than previous year</p>	<p> &gt; than previous year</p>	<p> &gt; than previous year</p>	<p> &gt; than previous year</p>	
				<p> 36.4%</p>	<p> 40.7%</p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	

1.5.3 % of PRF countries with Strategic Frameworks that engage in community-based monitoring mechanisms or other feedback loops.	CBM analytic reports; minutes of JSC meetings	0%	 	 20%  33%	 30% 	 35% 	 40% 	<p>The feedback loop is the Community-based monitoring mechanism, which will provide a vehicle for including the voices of our ultimate stakeholders within the JSCs (or their equivalents). JSCs include senior level government, UN, CSOs and donors at country level.</p> <p>PBF is committed to testing the viability of this approach, but full implementation will be contingent on: 1) sufficient Fund capitalization to allow for additional M&amp;E budgets to PBF Secretariats, and 2) evidence of uptake within the JSCs and broader UN of the information provided by stakeholders.</p>
1.5.4 Number of Thematic Reviews commissioned annually	Terms of Reference finalized and consultancy contract issued	0%	 2 	 2 	 2 	 2 	 2 	PBF committed to commissioning up to two Thematic Reviews per year. Reviews tend to start at different times in the year and may not be published in the same calendar year.

2

Outcome	Indicators	Means of Verification	Baseline (as of Dec 2019)	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Indicator definition/methodology
<b>Catalytic effect:</b> PBF investments catalyze more investments in peacebuilding at country level, help unblock critical processes, and enable innovative approaches for peacebuilding and prevention	2.0.1 Additional \$ leveraged for peacebuilding initiatives after initial PBF investment	Three-year estimates in collaboration with PBF Secretariats, plus project reporting, and through portfolio evaluations	(2017-2019) 7 to 1	 10 to 1  7.65	 10 to 1  4.88	 10 to 1 	 10 to 1 	 10 to 1 	The PBF undergoes a yearly assessment to confirm direct and indirect funding its investments were able to mobilize through its initial investment. Direct funding signifies additional funding mobilized for specific PBF projects while indirect indicates funding to a thematic or sectoral area that was in whole or in part triggered by PBF's initial investment.
	2.0.2 % of PBF approved projects leveraging innovative/blended finance	PBSO tracking through annual approval table and reporting on projects identified as aiming at innovative/blended finance	N/A	N/A	 3.08% 				PBSO's Project Appraisal Committee will mark projects with clear pilot or innovation aspects and track them and their end evaluations to analyse their effects. There are not specific targets but rather an effort to better assess degree to which this kind of catalytic effect manifests itself.
<b>Outputs</b>									
<b>2.1:</b> PBF approves projects that are considered risk-tolerant	2.1.1 % of PBF approvals considered "high-risk" (Risk marker 2 & 3)	PBF annual approval table	N/A	 23.3% 	 29.86% 				Annual approval targets relate to the "sustained growth scenario" set out in the PBF Strategy 2020-24. They are based on anticipated demand and management capacity as well as on available income and will have to be adjusted as these factors can fluctuate.
<b>2.2:</b> PBF approves projects that seek to pilot new or untested approaches	2.2.1 % of PBF approved projects which include pilot components	Project Appraisal Committee (PAC) score card	N/A	 23.3% 	 29.86% 				PBF will not set targets for these types of initiatives but commits to tracking implementation of this new policy for evaluation at the end of Strategic Plan 2020-2024.

Outcome	Indicators	Means of Verification	Baseline (as of Dec 2019)	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Indicator definition/methodology
<b>Systemic coherence:</b> PBF investments enable the United Nations system and partners to implement more coherent and integrated approaches to peacebuilding in a timely manner	3.0.1 % of PBF approved projects that are joint UN-CSO projects	PBF annual approval table.	0%	10.6%	8.1%				Joint UN-CSO projects were first piloted in 2020 with the first Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative welcoming joint UN-CSO proposals. PBF will not set targets for these types of initiatives but commits to tracking implementation of this policy for evaluation at the end of Strategic Plan 2020-2024.
	3.0.2 Number of PRF countries where PBF planning is aligned with new SDCFs	Annual Strategic Reports from RCs, PBF/DCO reporting	N/A	N/A	1 2	2 	2 	2 	PBSO is coordinating with DCO to identify countries who start new Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks in a given year and where PBF can align or integrate its planning processes (such as eligibility applications and Strategic Framework)
	3.0.3 In countries with Peace and Development Advisors (PDAs), % of PBF countries where PDAs provided support to PBF processes including eligibility, design, implementation, and quality assurance	PDA reporting and annual survey through the Joint "PDA" Programme	95%	90% N/A	90% 95%	90% 	90% 	90% 	A joint indicator with UNDP/DPPA's Joint Programme on conflict prevention capacities (PDAs), indicative of complementarity of different key UN system-wide instruments
	3.0.4 % of government, UN and donor respondents who rate PBF's integration role highly	Annual targeted partner survey in PRF countries	N/A	N/A	50% 45%	50% 	50% 	50% 	PBSO is introducing a new limited survey in 2021, working through PBF Secretariats, that will ask a set of targeted questions on an annual basis
<b>Outputs</b>									
<b>3.1:</b> PBF supports both short term and medium-to-long term peacebuilding initiatives	3.1.1 % of PBF approvals to IRF and PRF facilities	PBF annual approval table	IRF - 43.2%/ PRF -56.8%	45%/55% 49%/51%	45%/55% 44%/56%	45%/55% 	45%/55% 	45%/55% 	
<b>3.2:</b> PBF provides support in UN peacekeeping and special political mission settings	3.2.1 % of PBF approvals in peacekeeping mission settings	PBF annual approval table	39%	20%	27%				
	3.2.2 % of PBF approvals in special political mission settings	PBF annual approval table	12%	6%	19%				
<b>3.3:</b> PBF provides funding to civil society organizations	3.3.1 % of PBF funding to civil society organizations	PBF annual approval table	8%	10.5%	16.3%				



Outcome	Indicators	Means of Verification	Baseline (as of Dec 2019)	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Indicator definition/methodology
<b>Fund efficiency &amp; effectiveness:</b> The PBF maintains and enhances management & governance systems that consolidate it as leading multilateral, pooled financing instrument with increased resources	4.0.1 Annual financial contributions to PBF in USD	MPTF Gateway	\$134.8m	\$200m \$180.2m	\$220m \$195m	\$275m 	\$330m 	\$385m 	
	4.0.2 # of contributors to PBF (disaggregating for existing versus new contributors in the current Strategic Plan)	MPTF Gateway	24	24 24	> than previous year 38 (17 new)	> than previous year 	> than previous year 	> than previous year 	
	4.0.3 % of donors with multi-year commitments	MPTF Office	6	8	11 15	12 	14 	16 	
	4.0.4 % of contributions from top 12 donors	MPTF Gateway	96%	< than previous year 95.2%	< than previous year 93.5%	< than previous year 	< than previous year 	< than previous year 	
<b>Outputs</b>									
<b>4.1:</b> The PBF manages funds in a responsible and transparent way	4.1.1 PBF overhead as percentage of annual contributions	Fund Status / Administrative Records	1.8%	Less than 3% 2.34%	Less than 3% 2.48%	Less than 3% 	Less than 3% 	Less than 3% 	Percentage of Direct & Other Costs from the Incoming Contributions in a given year
	4.1.2 Projects that are financially closed within one financial reporting year after project end date.	Project reporting dashboard: overdue analysis	N/A	50% 	60% 20.3%	65% 	70% 	75% 	Projects that are financially closed as a percentage of projects that are due to be financially closed
	4.1.3 The PBF commits to maximize transparency and accountability through regular, informative updates to donors.	Minutes meetings and Chair's summaries of meetings	N/A	N/A	4 meetings 4 GoF meetings	4 meetings 	4 meetings 	4 meetings 	

# PBF THEORY OF CHANGE

LAST REVISED 5 APRIL 2021



PEACEBUILDING  
FUND



Status: October 2022

The Peacebuilding Fund's (PBF) Strategy 2020-24 sets out how the Fund will capitalize on its unique comparative advantage as a timely, catalytic and risk-tolerant investor, with increased emphasis on quality assurance and learning, and a balanced approach to scale and focus. Meeting increased demand and supporting approximately forty countries requires faster and more systematic feedback loops for the benefit of beneficiaries and implementing partners and to inform the Fund's investment decisions. The PBF is increasingly supporting new approaches in high-risk environments, which requires adaptation and learning from failure. Balancing scale and focus means investments large enough to make a meaningful difference to catalyze national and international peacebuilding efforts while maintaining clear sight of the Fund's niche and priorities.

Implementing this strategy requires the Fund to manage a number of risks. The Fund has put in place a series of controls over the years but recognizes the need to continually adjust these to ensure the Fund remains "fit-for-purpose". This matrix organizes and registers the main risks that the Fund sees within its control to manage.

The Fund's risk management approach is informed by findings of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), as well as project and country portfolio-level evaluations and the Fund's regular Synthesis Review. As early as 2010, OIOS grouped key risks in relation to the operation of UN general trust funds, particularly those that give funds to entities outside the UN secretariat, into four categories: Loss of legitimacy, loss of financing, loss of knowledge capacity and loss of operational capacity. Many of these risks remain applicable for the PBF's operation and have been used as the base starting point for this risk management strategy. More recently, a subsequent 2019 OIOS audit of the PBF's programme and operational management found that the Fund had appropriate governance and coordination arrangements in place and was adequately enhancing its funding risk management, resource mobilization and project closure activities. It recommended that the Fund improve monitoring, documentation and evaluation of projects, and application of project evaluation results. PBF's Strategy 2020-24 explains measures the Fund has put in place in response to the 2019 audit recommendations. In addition, the Fund was reviewed by the Board of Auditors for work in years 2020 (A/75/5) and 2021 (A/76/5) for which responses, where applicable, are presented in this risk management matrix.

The PBF Secretariat uses the risk management matrix to monitor and track the status of key risks and related mitigating actions and is updated annually. The matrix is not to be considered as a separate work stream for the PBF; it is rather a lens on the PBF's regular workplan and maps our initiatives against the risk areas that they help mitigate and helps to identify potential gaps in risk mitigation.



Risk and Potential Impact	Existing Controls	Additional Mitigation Actions	Status October 2022
<b>RISK AREA 1 - Performance Monitoring and Accountability</b>			
<p>The PBF's <b>reliance on agency monitoring and evaluation systems</b> presents advantages in terms of cost savings and the ability to maintain a lean management structure. It is also a structure that has been reviewed and approved by agencies' executive boards and a function which is resourced at country and headquarter levels. A downside and risk to manage is each agency has different policies, practices and capacities which means limited uniformity and requires efforts to analyse and aggregate.</p>			
<p><b>Risk</b> Reliance on agency monitoring and evaluation systems leading to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Lack of adequate performance and results information.</li> <li>▶ Lack of verified and timely beneficiary level information.</li> <li>▶ Lack of credible project level evaluation.</li> </ul> <p><b>Potential Impact</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Inability to adequately demonstrate PBF results or impact at the project level.</li> <li>▶ Hampered learning and adaptation, and thus, improvement.</li> <li>▶ Possible loss of confidence by donors and member states.</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The <b>PBF Guidelines</b> (2018) delineate accountability and responsibilities for monitoring and evaluation and introduced mandatory, agency-led end-evaluations.</li> <li>2. Independent PBF <b>country portfolio evaluations</b> provide an additional level of assurance in PRF countries about the PBF's added value and help gauge performance at outcome level.</li> <li>3. <b>PBF Secretariats</b> in countries with larger portfolios provide frontline oversight and monitoring assistance while ensuring timely reporting.</li> <li>4. PBF's <b>biannual progress reporting</b> requirements allow PBSO to monitor project performance and take mitigating measures for underperforming projects.</li> <li>5. <b>PBF guidance</b> on project design, monitoring and evaluation, including community-based monitoring.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. With the Fund's Strategy 2020-24, beginning in 2021 the Fund is rolling out a new approach to develop outcome-level 'Strategic Frameworks' in PRF countries.</li> <li>ii. The Strategy 2020-24 committed to pilot new impact evaluation approaches. PBF has partnered with Germany on a special project launching in 2021 to this effect.</li> <li>iii. The Fund is seeking to encourage partners to incorporate Community-Based Monitoring and Evaluation (CBME) approaches.</li> <li>iv. Strengthen collaboration and coordination with agency evaluation departments to improve PBF coverage in agencies' own evaluations and studies.</li> <li>v. The Fund published an Evaluation Policy in 2022 with updated guidance in response to lessons learned and implementing Administrative Instruction (AI) on Evaluation, <a href="#">ST/AI/2021/3</a></li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. In 2022, Strategic Framework exercises have taken place or are planned in: Honduras, Liberia, DRC, Somalia, Niger and Sudan.</li> <li>ii. The Impact Evaluation Initiative PeaceFIELD formally launched in January 2021. Case study baseline reports are expected to be completed by December 2022. Selected Impact Evaluation case-studies include Darfur in Sudan, Mali – Niger cross border territories, and the Polochic Valley in Guatemala. Additional evaluations are currently planned for Geradef in Sudan and Sierra Leone – Guinea cross border territories. Discussions with Germany on the continuation of the initiative for the 2023 / 24 period are ongoing.</li> </ol>



3. Targeted **trainings** in collaboration with agencies for country teams of sub-regions facing particular programming challenges.
  4. Regular publication of independent PBF **thematic and synthesis reviews** (in collaboration with recipient agencies) for comparative lessons learning and transparency.
  5. Fund level **Strategic Performance Framework** (2020-24) with indicators monitored annually by PBSO and additional independent annual reviews by the UK FCDO.
- vi. The Fund's application to join the UN Evaluation Group was accepted in 2021 and PBSO initiated the creation of a dedicated sub-group dedicated to peacebuilding which commenced its work in early 2022.
  - vii. PBSO in 2021 commenced work on a new Impact Initiative to facilitate better peacebuilding impact measurement and communication across UN and wider peacebuilding community, to which the PBF will contribute.
- iii. The Fund cooperated with a visiting research fellow in developing better conceptualization and best practices for participatory data collection approaches including CBM&E. The PBF Niger, Cameroon and CAR M&E teams are currently developing pilot portfolio level data collection strategies that combine traditional and participatory collection and analysis methodologies.
  - iv. PBF continues to work with UN Staff College and agencies like FAO, WFP and WHO, UNDP on HQ-led capacity building initiatives for improved peacebuilding design, monitoring and evaluation. PBF collaborated with UN Women on a Thematic Review on gender-responsive peacebuilding and with UNV on a Thematic Review on local peacebuilding, published in 2021 and 2022, respectively. A Thematic Review with FAO and UNICEF on climate-related peacebuilding is in progress and expected to be published by March 2023, and a Thematic Review with OHCHR on peacebuilding and human rights was launched in Q4 2022 for publication in late 2023.

Risk and Potential Impact	Existing Controls	Additional Mitigation Actions	Status October 2022
<p><b><u>RISK AREA 2 - Partnerships</u></b></p> <p>The PBF makes grants primarily to UN agencies, funds and programmes and, to a lesser but increasing extent, civil society organizations. It occasionally also funds – mostly indirectly – governmental institutions in programme countries and may invest with regional organisations or multilateral development banks. There are potential risks pertaining to all fund recipients, and others that are specific to the type of partner. Given that the Fund preferences funding higher risk initiatives in conflict-affected contexts, <b>partners may not be able to implement projects as planned</b> and risk not spending funds received that could then be spent better elsewhere. A lack of inclusiveness may lead to situations where may lead to situations where PBF is not funding the partners best suited to address an identified issue, or not reaching the most relevant actors in a given context</p>			
<p><b><u>Risk</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Inability of partners to launch projects and spend funds received in a timely manner.</li> <li>▶ Too rigid management systems of partners prevent them from adapting to changeable contexts or revising programmatic approaches.</li> <li>▶ Lack of inclusiveness in partner selection</li> <li>▶ Existing partnerships insufficient for new or innovative approaches</li> </ul> <p><b><u>Potential Impact</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Possibility of delayed or untimely response and underspend.</li> <li>▶ Loss of effectiveness and peacebuilding impact.</li> <li>▶ Perception of PBF not being flexible enough to reach a diverse set of partners</li> <li>▶ Perception that PBF is not doing enough to innovate, including for increased catalytic financial effect.</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. PBF introduced a <b>tranche-based disbursement system</b> to grantees in 2016: the higher the risk, the more tranches (2-4). In cases of under-delivery or contextual changes that do not allow the full completion of a project the PBF will withhold outstanding tranches.</li> <li>2. <b>Resident Coordinators</b> have to submit and countersign every proposal and coordinate strategic partnership identification and development at country level (in PRF supported by PBF Coordinators).</li> <li>3. PBF policy on the <b>Gender Marker</b> aims to require that each project devotes least 30% of budgets on gender-sensitive peacebuilding. This is validated through detailed financial reporting.</li> <li>4. PBF <b>GYPI initiative</b> requires recipients to channel minimum of 40% of funds to local CSOs.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. The PBF put in place actions to enhance its support to local organizations in response to recommendations of the Thematic Review on gender-responsive peacebuilding and on local peacebuilding, published in late 2021 and early 2022, respectively.</li> <li>ii. Collaboration with DCO to align PBF prioritisation and planning processes with roll-out of new CCAs and UNSDCFs.</li> <li>iii. PBF in 2021 started to develop a new partnership with UNCDF to pilot innovative blended financing initiatives.</li> <li>iv. In response to the 2021 Chinese BoA recommendations, PBF has taken steps to further increase its ability to partners with civil society organizations.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. The Fund's "GPI 2.0" pilot initiative was launched in 2022 in four countries, aiming to test a cocreation approach for its Gender Promotion Initiative with the UN Country Team and local partners. The Fund furthermore agree on a partnership with Peace Nexus Foundation that will pilot project inception phase support for local organizations in 2023.</li> <li>ii. New PBF Strategic Frameworks seek to utilize the same indicators for prevention as contained in UNSDCFs when prevention is included. PBF will work with DCO and other parts of DPPA (Joint Programme on Conflict Prevention) to advocate for increased inclusion of prevention in UNSDCFs. Where possible (for example Bosnia and Hercegovina in 2022), new requests for eligibility to the PBF will be anchored in UNSDCFs.</li> </ol>

5. **Regular discussions of partnership issues** through the UN Peacebuilding Contact Group, and the QUNO-convened civil society network, and with key recipient agencies on a needs basis.
6. **Inclusion of civil society representatives** within Peer Review Groups accompanying and validating PBF thematic reviews.
7. **Due diligence assessments** of civil society recipients for every project conducted by MPTFO.

- iii. PBF approved a first project with UNCDF participation in 2021 in Burundi, followed in 2022 in eastern DRC. In 2022, PBF/PBSO have started to partner with UNCDF on the creation of a new innovative financing vehicle that would be managed by UNCDF but with participation of PBSO.
- iv. (See GPI 2.0 efforts in response to local peacebuilding thematic review, ref i) above).

Risk and Potential Impact	Existing Controls	Additional Mitigation Actions	Status October 2022
<b>RISK AREA 3 - Resource Mobilization</b>			
<p>Since inception in 2006, the PBF has received support from over 60 Member States. PBF however <b>relies on a small group of donors with a disproportionate share</b>. This makes PBF vulnerable to fluctuations in the support from the core group of donors.</p>			
<p><b>Risk</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Heavy reliance on a small group of donors.</li> <li>▶ Unpredictability of funding due to few multi-year contributions.</li> <li>▶ End-of-year cash reserves risk fuelling a perception of insufficient demand or absorption capacity.</li> </ul> <p><b>Potential Impact</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Inability to respond to needs in a timely manner.</li> <li>▶ Lack of engagement and proposals from key actors who might consider PBF funding too uncertain.</li> <li>▶ Perception of undue influence or donor/member state bias viz. top donors.</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. PBF maintains and updates a <b>resource mobilization strategy</b> targeting specific member states and groups. The strategy is revised regularly in consultation and discussed with the PBF Advisory Group.</li> <li>2. Quarterly briefings to the <b>PBF Group of Friends</b> (once p.a. at Ambassador level) to keep full group of donors informed and engaged</li> <li>3. <b>Annual Strategic Financing Dialogue</b> (since 2019) with Top Twelve Donors at capital level to ensure and maintain full buy-in in the Fund's strategy</li> <li>4. Regular <b>joint donor visits</b> to PBF partner countries.</li> <li>5. Enhanced <b>communication strategy</b> (since 2019) through social media, targeted publications and audio-visual material</li> <li>6. Dedicated <b>technical donor focal points</b> to ensure trust and direct communication with the PBF Secretariat.</li> <li>7. Members of the <b>PBF Advisory Group</b> constitute a broad and diverse representation of Member States and function as advocates for the PBF.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Ensure adequate staff capacity, procedures, tools and systems are in place to support resource mobilization efforts.</li> <li>ii. Adapt resource mobilization and communications strategy to strengthen initiatives to maintain, broaden and deepen of the donor base.</li> <li>iii. PBSO supported a UNGA High-Level conference on peacebuilding financing in April 2022. This accompanied a request by the SG to the Fifth Committee to provide \$100 million in assessed contributions to the Fund.</li> <li>iv. Full overhaul of the Fund's website and online presence</li> <li>v. New donor-facing reporting format introduced since 2021 as a summary "results report" companion to the annual Secretary-General report on the PBF.</li> <li>vi. PBF launched a new communication product in 2022 aimed primarily at donors, a periodic Newsletter with results stories and donor features.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. In 2021, PBF recruited a new P5 Senior Adviser/Deputy Chief focusing on strategy and partnerships, a new P2 Data Analyst and a UNV Web Developer.</li> <li>ii. The Fund has continued to adapt its resource mobilization strategy in consultation with the Advisory Group. In 2022, the Secretary-General submitted a proposal to the 5th Committee to introduce assessed funding for the PBF. Several donors have increased their commitments or are in the process of doing so, including Switzerland, Netherlands, Canada and the EU. But work to broaden the donor base beyond the traditional core donors needs to continue.</li> <li>iii. The high-level peacebuilding financing conference resulted in a unanimous GA resolution on peacebuilding financing in September 2022 which includes several aspects that both PBF and the UN more broadly need to follow up on going forward.</li> </ol>

vii. Integrate PBF resource mobilization efforts into broader UN initiatives to strengthen peacebuilding and prevention partnerships with emerging or non-traditional donors; and strengthen key donors' involvement to broaden and deepen the donor base.

viii. Keep staffing for the secretariat function a function of income of the previous year.

iv. The fund's website overhaul is almost complete; before end 2022, an interactive map will be added, complementing information available on the MPTFO Gateway 2.0.

v. In 2021 and 2022, the PBF organized virtual donor visits to partner countries due to pandemic travel restrictions. In December 2022, the PBF will resume in-person donor visits and plans to hold three donor country visits again from 2023.

vi. The Secretary-General appointed the seventh Advisory Group in August 2022, increasing the geographic balance.

vii. Fifth Committee continues to discuss.