SSR AND PEACEBUILDING

THEMATIC REVIEW OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) TO PEACEBUILDING AND THE ROLE OF THE PEACEBUILDING FUND
# Thematic Review of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peacebuilding

## Table of Contents

**Acknowledgements** ................................................................................................................. 02

**List of Acronyms** ..................................................................................................................... 03

**Executive Summary** ............................................................................................................... 05

**Thematic Review of SSR and Peacebuilding** .......................................................................... 13

- **Introduction** .......................................................................................................................... 13
- **Methodology Supporting the Review** ....................................................................................... 14
- **Conceptual Framework and Definitions** .................................................................................. 15
- **Strategic Positioning of PBF** .................................................................................................... 16
- **Review of Current Thinking on SSR and Peacebuilding** ....................................................... 19
- **SSR and Peacebuilding: Areas of Convergence and Complementarity** ................................. 21
- **Identifying Promising Practices and Factors That Contributed to Successful PBF-Funded SSR** 22
- **Evaluating Cost-Effectiveness of PBF-Funded SSR Activities** ........................................... 35
- **Recommendations** .................................................................................................................. 37

**Bibliography** .............................................................................................................................. 40

**Annexes** .................................................................................................................................. 44

- **Annex 1 – Draft Methodology for the PBF Thematic Reviews** .................................................. 45
- **Annex 2 – Final Question Set Supporting the Research Methodology for the Case Study Field Work** 48
- **Annex 3 – PBF Funding Allocations for SSR Activities** ............................................................ 49
- **Annex 4 – Literature Review: SSR and Peacebuilding** ............................................................. 50

**List of Figures**

- Figure 1: Strategic Positioning of Peacebuilding Interventions in Burundi, CAR, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone .... 16
- Figure 2: PBF Funding for SSR – By Country ................................................................................ 18
- Figure 3: PBF Funding for SSR – By Activity ............................................................................. 19
- Figure 4: Project Data from Inception to Completion for SSR PBF-Funded Projects in Burundi ........ 30
- Figure 5: Cost-Effective PBF-Funded SSR Projects .................................................................... 35

**List of Boxes**

- Box 1: Including ‘Softer’ Elements in Hardware-Intensive PBF-Funded SSR Projects: The SNR in Burundi. .... 23
- Box 2: The Impact of the IRF-Funded Proconsogui in Guinea (2008) .......................................... 28
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CAR- Central African Republic
CHIESECS - Chiefdom Security Committees
CNOSCG - National Council of the Organizations of the Civil Society of Guinea
CSO - Civil Society Organization
DCAF - Democratic Control of the Armed Forces
DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DPKO - Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
ERSG - Executive Representative of the Secretary-General
ESC - Economic and Social Council
FDN - Forces de Defense Nationale
FOSSEPEL - Force spéciale de sécurisation du processus électoral
GoSL - Government of Sierra Leone
INCAF - International Network on Conflict and Fragility
IRF - Immediate Relief Facility
ISC - Integrated Services Centre
ISSAT - International Security Sector Advisory Team of the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
JSC - Joint Steering Committee
MACP - Military Aid to the Civil Power
MISP - Minimum Initial Service Package
OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONS - Office for National Security
ORoLSI - Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions
PBC - Peacebuilding Commission
PBF - Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO - Peacebuilding Support Office
PNB - Police Nationale de Burundi
PPP - Peacebuilding Priority Plan
PROCONSOGUI - Le programme de concertation sociale en Guinée
PRS - Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP - Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RSLAF - Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
SNR - Service national de renseignement
UN - United Nations
UNDESA - United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO - United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNIPSIL - United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
EXECCUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

1. This “thematic review” examining SSR and peacebuilding is part of a series of multi-partner studies examining different thematic areas of peacebuilding.\(^1\) All studies focus on sector engagements supported by the PBF. The objective of these studies is to identify good practices in each area and, in particular, to identify the factors that contribute towards making a particular intervention successful and sustainable. All thematic reviews are “cross-country” and seek to draw lessons learned that contribute to a greater understanding about:
   - the effectiveness and peacebuilding relevance of current practices in the fund use to inform better selection of PBF projects in the future;
   - the added value, comparative advantage and best strategic positioning of PBF’s funding arrangements from a more programmatic than project-based view aiming for a more lasting peacebuilding impact; the sector relevance and comparative advantage of UN engagement for the peacebuilding process in particular contexts.

2. The PBC’s vital role in facilitating support for national strategies to consolidate and sustain peace has been emphasized by the Secretary-General.\(^2\) To date, the PBF has supported SSR related projects in ten countries, constituting approximately US$ 44 million, or 19 per cent of its total US$ 228 million expenditure. Of this total, approximately 72 per cent of this funding has gone towards ‘hardware’ issues, that is, infrastructure, and operations support and equipment. Twenty-one per cent has gone towards training and discipline related issues, while only 7 per cent to ‘security-sector wide’ initiatives\(^3\), including in the area of governance (i.e., oversight and management). The significant PBF-funded investment in SSR, and the ‘hardware-intensive’ approach adopted by many of the approved priority peacebuilding projects (as opposed to security sector-wide initiatives including in the area of governance), suggest the need for a fuller examination into PBF-funded SSR programmes/projects in order to understand the strategic impact of this investment on building sustainable peace.

Requirement

3. The Thematic Review of SSR and Peacebuilding was completed under the overall supervision of the Chief of the Policy, Planning and Application Branch of the PBSO, and a number of PBSO desk officers representing the countries examined in the Review.

The report addresses the following issues, using case studies as examples and evidence, as appropriate:

a) Promising practices in SSR and peacebuilding, especially of a programmatic nature, within the respective sector;
   - Reflecting on the various types of activities that have been undertaken, i.e., including infrastructure, assessment and analysis, training and discipline, operations support and equipment, security sector wide initiatives, including in the area of governance, and/or more generally, between supporting the ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ of SSR.

b) Identification of approaches and factors that are deemed to have contributed to successful SSR in ways that serve peacebuilding;

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\(^1\) The other reviews are focusing on: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; Social Service Provision, Peace Dividends and Peacebuilding; Economic Revitalization and Youth; Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding; Elections.

\(^2\) Ibid., p.4

\(^3\) As described by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations General Assembly (A/64/19, A/65/19)
• Approaches that are catalytic, support national ownership and build capacities at all levels, encourage civilian oversight and management (effective security sector governance) at all levels, are sensitive to context and conflict causes and dynamics;

• that support the development of an overall SSR strategy and work within relevant policy frameworks or strategies (i.e., the national development plan); and that support the implementation and/or development of relevant provisions in peace agreements;

• that promote synergies with other thematic areas and aim for aggregate impact.

Research methodology

4. The research methodology supporting this review involved the following processes:

• A research design exercise

• A short desk-based review of the SSR and peacebuilding literature

• A roundtable organized and facilitated by ISSAT4 in Geneva in which the lead researcher participated

• An opportunity to share the findings emerging from the literature review with the other research consultants supporting the project and a wider SSR stakeholder group in New York

• Field missions undertaken in four PBF-funded countries (Central African Republic, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) and one desk-based study carried out on a fifth PBF-funded country (Burundi).

• The production of 5 case study reports

• The production of a synthesis paper which considers the findings from across the 5 national case studies reviewed.

Key Messages

5. The consultant was tasked to undertake a short literature review on SSR and peacebuilding. The findings of this literature review were cross-referenced with the data findings of the fieldwork from the five countries examined (Burundi, CAR, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone). This wider analysis concluded with the following ‘key messages’:

a) PBF funding is one of a number of sources of funding for SSR. As SSR is considered a tool of peacebuilding, and as PBF funding is only short-term in nature, PBF funding cannot be expected to address all SSR priorities. However, the future potential of the PBF to shape comprehensive strategies in countries emerging from conflict suggests that i) PBF funding can play an important role in keeping existing SSR programmes ‘on track’ by addressing contingencies and unforeseen SSR-related priorities which emerge over medium to long-term timeframes, ii) PBF stakeholders and structures should be used to inform both new and existing multi-year SSR programmes, and iii) support for ‘ii’ above will require effective partnerships between the PBF and the wider SSR community.

b) PBF-funding supporting SSR ‘hardware’ (infrastructure and equipment) is generally viewed to be a positive development. However, investments in institutional governance or oversight remain very low (if not non-existent) in comparison with the investment in train and equip priorities. This questions the extent to which such a disproportionately high investment in ‘hardware’ has had any impact on wider SSR and peacebuilding goals. In order for the ‘hardware’ to support the sustainable effectiveness and efficiency of the security sector, and serve as an effect multiplier for wider peacebuilding, such ‘hardware’ invest-

4 For further information on DCAF’s ISSAT, please see http://issat.dcaf.ch/.
ments should only follow a sufficient investment in the ‘software’ (i.e., on ‘security sector wide’ initiatives, including in the area of oversight and management, political dialogue and advocacy, capacity-building, education and training), or a complementary ‘software’ element should be written into the peacebuilding project proposal in such a way that the investment in the ‘hardware’ becomes contingent on progress being made in the ‘software’ area.

c) There is an important and mutually dependent link between security and justice which is well-supported by both scholarly and policy literature. The analysis of the 5 case studies examined in this work indicated that this critical linkage is often not developed in a way which ensures that a) the justice sector develops in accordance with the development of wider security actors; and b) both the judicial and law enforcement systems can provide the mutual support required to promote the rule of law. Efforts to capture important information statistics have provided effective support to these initiatives. For example, consolidated data on current, repeat and potential offenders can inform more effective planning across law enforcement agencies. In cases where first-time offenders are committed, more discretion can be exercised with regards to lighter sentencing and punitive measures such as community service.

d) Despite the important role played by non-state actors in support of SSR, traditional SSR approaches do not tend to prioritize grass-roots engagements. Grass-roots issues are at the heart of peacebuilding challenges. The concept of peacebuilding, and its commitment to ‘tackle the root causes of conflict’ is a complementary and overarching framework that can ensure that traditional state-centric security sector institutions develop effective ways of engaging with the communities which are most affected by security-related issues.

e) Effective SSR programmes are informed by effective and broad national dialogue processes. In post-conflict environments, ‘component-specific’ SSR (such as defence reform and police reform programmes) often begins in advance of such broad-based consultation. In other experiences, SSR programmes have been initiated only after the conclusion of national dialogue processes. Support is required for both initial and follow-on dialogue, thereby supporting an ‘iterative’ process which is entirely consistent with SSR principles. It is in this context that the PBF has added value, and has produced a number of catalytic effects.

f) The catalytic nature of peacebuilding engagements increased when an individual project formed part of a larger strategic framework. This was the case for PBF projects which supported the Government of Burundi’s Defence strategy, the Government of CAR’s Inclusive Political Dialogue, the Government of Guinea’s PROCONSOGUI, the Government of Liberia’s Justice and Security Programme (and the Liberia Peacebuilding Programme which took peacebuilding beyond PBF-funded activities) and the Government of Sierra Leone’s draft ONS National Security Policy. Projects which formed part of a larger strategic framework also tended to attract follow-up funding.

g) Through both its Peacebuilding Recovery Fund and its Immediate Relief Facility (IRF)\(^5\), the PBF can be used to fund activities that would otherwise be unlikely to receive funding. The IRF provides enormous utility for addressing potential ‘spoilers’ and unanticipated issues and processes impacting on the security sector which emerge as a result of a changing strategic environment. The IRF is unrivalled and nothing similar is accessible from any other international donor funds, most of which are linked to specific tasks and activities without much room for flexibility. It is often also the case that external funding for security and development assistance cannot be disbursed except in the form of large transactions and an endorsed programme. As potentially derailing events often demand interventions which are not necessarily expen-

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\(^5\) The PBF has two funding windows: the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) provides rapid funding for immediate peacebuilding and recovery needs; the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF) is driven by national ownership and stakeholder engagement in the management of PBF resources at the country level. Application for both facilities should be based on a joint prioritization of critical peacebuilding needs identified by government and the UN system in-country. The PRF embodies the fundamental concepts of peacebuilding and is the traditional entry point to PBF resources. The IRF was created for those situations that call for an immediate response. Senior UN representatives in country are encouraged to consult with the PBSO prior to applying for the PBF.
sive, but which, if left unattended, have the potential to impact negatively on progress across many parts of the security sector; this type of flexibility and immediate release of funds has proven to be invaluable.

h) Due to the immediate security (and ongoing development) requirements of post-conflict countries, peacebuilding actors will often find that there may already be some form of ‘embryonic’ planning capacity within some parts of the security and/or development communities. This capacity should be assessed by peacebuilding actors (particularly the JSCs) in order to identify sources of potential support the development of conflict analysis, strategic peacebuilding frameworks and peacebuilding priorities. PPPs should also consider the priorities set out in existing strategic frameworks, as these projects proved to have a much higher rate of further funding and incidence of catalytic effects.

i) Most of the delays in the PBF-funded SSR projects, and especially those relating to the ‘hardware’ of SSR, occurred as a result of procurement-related issues and errors concerning project management. Procurement processes and project management are central to the effective implementation of peacebuilding projects. The PBF should consider ways of leveraging existing UN procurement and project management expertise to assist in the design and oversight of peacebuilding projects. Parallel systems should not be developed if national capacity exists to support elements of the PBF project management cycle. This risks undermining the credibility of the PBF. If national capacity is not sufficiently strong to support projects, PBF project stakeholders should engage with this weak capacity to ensure that these functions benefit from the PBF project experience. The experience of the UN Integrated Services Centre (ISC) in Burundi helped address a number of project management and procurement-related delays and problems but still took time to set up and staff.

j) Less conventional security institutions which do not neatly conform to the UN’s accepted definition of the security sector, such as Land, Forestry, Local Government and Labour Ministries, contribute to the sustainability of longer-term SSR. The broader mandate of peacebuilding provides a useful opportunity to consider development requirements of government ministries which must serve to support, and indeed augment, the security sector. Effective analysis and broad consultation and dialogue will lead to the more precise identification of these requirements. The development of cross-government leadership supporting peacebuilding could learn from the effective leaders in the security sector, particularly where such leaders are not always interested in applying their knowledge and skill sets in support of the consolidation of peace.

k) Careful and in-depth analysis should be undertaken to evaluate the way in which peacebuilding objectives are supported by proposed peacebuilding projects. This ‘base’ analysis should go beyond a ‘conflict analysis’ and inform more specific strategic peacebuilding objectives and the general programme areas supporting these objectives. Once strategic objectives have been identified, interdependent effects across these objectives and potential programme areas should be evaluated (ideally by the JSC) in order to inform sequencing, prioritization and evaluation indicators.

l) Lasting capacity development is understood as the process whereby people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time. In this context, enablers supporting capacity development in a PBF-recipient country should be evaluated. UNDP has identified four core issues that influence capacity development: institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge and accountability. Research findings informing this paper indicate that a lack of accountability mechanisms,

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6 The accepted UN definition of the security sector describes the security sector as ‘a broad term used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country’. Generally speaking, this definition includes statutory and non-statutory security providers and their managers and overseers. See Secretary-General’s Report on SSR, United Nations, A/62/659–S/2008/39.

7 See the OECD’s definition of capacity development in OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms, created on 23 July 2007, found at http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7230. This definition has also been quoted in the UN DESA’s Strategy for Capacity Development, Economic and Social Affairs, 2011, and UNDP’s Enhancing the UN’s Contribution to National Capacity Development, 2006.

which form an important part of capacity development, can undermine progressive capacity development initiatives elsewhere across the security sector. Parliamentary capacity and strengthened oversight mechanisms are required to oversee the activities and budget of the security institutions, pass new laws/bills, adopt amendments to existing laws/bills, and ratify new policy/strategy documents and decrees which, amongst other things, outline the roles and responsibilities of the security institutions. Support for oversight and accountability of actors and mechanisms, including the civil society, should be considered by all peacebuilding projects. By definition, SSR requires a focus on both effectiveness and accountability of the security sector. The gradual and sustained development of civil society is important and could be facilitated by using CSOs to support ‘information/data capture’ projects (such as the one described in serial b) above which discussed the utility of bolstered support for justice sector development). Due to the different societal norms and traditions – and based on the different national security priorities impacting on southern-based developing countries – peacebuilding interventions should be supported, where possible, by south-south exchanges and dialogue. Other peacebuilding forums, such as the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, should also be used by the PBC to facilitate the sharing of southern experience and knowledge.

Recommendations

1. Based on the key messages above, and a review of the management and implementation capacity of the UN to support PBF-funded SSR, the following recommendations are made:

Recommendation 1: Funding in support of national dialogue processes – Due to the catalytic effects felt by the national dialogue processes in 4 of the case studies examined in the review, the PBF funding for SSR should, where possible, prioritize support for a national dialogue on peacebuilding. The JSC should evaluate the extent to which a national dialogue process has already been developed. It is sometimes the case that a national dialogue on SSR will precede a national dialogue on peacebuilding. In this case, PBF funding could be used to support the continuity of this dialogue in a way that reaches all regions of a country, and in a way that broadens the dialogue beyond SSR to issues relating to wider governance, social cohesion and socio-economic development; considerations which are important for both longer-term SSR and peacebuilding. Lessons from the past have demonstrated that funding in support of national dialogue is often difficult to leverage. The PBF could add significant value added to this important pre-requisite for comprehensive SSR.

Recommendation 2: Potential IRF projects should be given formal consideration in PPPs – Based on the fluid strategic environment in which SSR takes place, PPPs should make recommendations for contingency projects which could anticipate areas where emergencies or blockages could occur (e.g., forthcoming elections, instability in particular regions, etc.). The IRF has made an invaluable, and innovative, contribution to the sustainability of national SSR programmes and thus should be given formal consideration in planning documents. IRF funding that may be required in advance of PPPs being finalized could be used for supporting national dialogue processes as described above in recommendation 1. IRF funding should also be considered as a way of facilitating the development of cross-institutional relationships, and as a way of providing a forum for national middle and senior government leaders to support the sharing of knowledge and good practice.

Recommendation 3: Where possible, PBF planning should draw on the support of existing national planning capacity – PBF-funded SSR projects should draw on what in some cases represents the most optimal institutional planning capacity in the country’s security sector in order to produce synergies, and to help expand this planning capacity into other government ministries and institutions. Based on increasing evidence that security planning communities are slowly merging with development planning communities, depending on the stage of post-conflict SSR, there is a likelihood that a further expansion in planning capacity will be well-positioned (i.e., as a result of a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and/or National Security Sector Review exercises) to help

9 Ibid.
inform peacebuilding priorities. Where security discussions precede peacebuilding discussions, the security/development planning capacity should also be drawn on in order to support the development of a conflict analysis. The planning capacity should be used to inform the prioritization and appropriate sequencing of proposed PBF priorities. Project evaluation criteria should include the need to address the cross-impacts of the project on other non-conventional security ministries whose strengthened capacity, as the research indicates, is critical for the success of longer-term SSR.

**Recommendation 4: Conflict analyses and project prioritization should address the critical linkages between the criminal justice component of the security sector and wider security institutions** – Conflict analyses undertaken by the JSC should seek to address the gaps in the critical linkages between the criminal justice and security sectors. In order to ensure a degree of coherency across the development of both sectors, these gaps should be used to inform and evaluate SSR-related proposals for PBF funding. Proposed projects that ensure that police training curricula tackle these linkages – or which seek to develop reliable knowledge systems which consolidate data which is central to the functioning of both sectors – serve as two of many examples of projects which could build better coherency between security and criminal justice.

**Recommendation 5: Ensuring an element of ‘software’ is included in support for ‘hardware-focused’ SSR projects** – In the interest of promoting sustainability, optimal impact and catalytic effects, PBF projects which fund SSR ‘hardware’ should seek to ensure that some form of ‘software element’ is built into the project proposal, as a complement to the ‘hardware’ elements. This could include security sector-wide initiatives such as those outlined by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/65/19, A/64/19), i.e., the development of “national security sector strategies; security sector legislation; security sector reviews; national security sector development plans; national dialogue on security sector reform; and national management and oversight capacities [and] national coordination bodies for security sector reform”.10 Where appropriate, PBF funding disbursements could be tranched into two phases, with further funding for ‘hardware’ becoming contingent on progress made on the ‘software’ project elements.

**Recommendation 6: Addressing the importance of ‘grass-roots’ engagement for SSR-related PBF projects** – Due to the critical role played by ‘grass-roots’ civil society organizations in peacebuilding, UN PBSO should include a provision for ‘grass-roots engagement’ (and perhaps also ‘grass-roots outreach’) in the criteria used to evaluate proposed peacebuilding projects and programmes. Based on the existing confusion surrounding the concept ‘grass-roots organization’, PBSO should also articulate what it means by a ‘grass-roots organization’. Such clarification would inform both the national strategic concept document, and the conflict analysis advising SSR-related peacebuilding projects, in terms of what is understood to be a ‘grass-roots’ group or organization in the national context. If a PBF-funded SSR engagement does not allow grass-roots CSOs to access PBF funding, they will disengage as CSOs cannot afford to advise/inform peacebuilding processes “out of pocket”.

**Recommendation 7: Ensuring that PBF-funding develops capacity in the functions on which it will rely in the future** – PPPs should consider the existing procurement, administrative and financial management capacity of the recipient government to support elements of project implementation. Indigenous capacity that can meet the ‘stress test’ should be used to support implementation. Where capacity is too weak to play a leading role in elements of peacebuilding projects, a capacity-building element supporting these implementation functions should form one of the project objectives and thus be included in the project evaluation criteria. Duplication of competent national implementation, governance and oversight mechanisms should be avoided.

**Recommendation 8: Ensuring that peacebuilding monitoring and evaluation does not get lost at the technical level** – The recommendations of an earlier evaluation of the PBF have called for PBF-funded interventions

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10 See the Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/65/19, A/64/19)
to be ‘more strategic’. This would necessitate the development of clear strategic peacebuilding objectives (as opposed to ‘themes’ only), and requires a degree of coherency between strategic objectives and programme/project goals. Clarity on these issues will provide better indicators for evaluation and will cater for the development of a ‘results chain’. UN PBSO should ensure that the project reports and narratives accessible through the ‘MDTF Gateway’ comment on the extent to which the project is supporting its intended outcomes and impacts. This is not necessarily a consistent practice across the project reports.

Recommendation 9: Ensuring that PBF-funded SSR projects support national capacity development, particularly in the area of ‘accountability’ – the analysis produced by the JSC that supports the Strategic Framework concept and the PPP should include an assessment of national capacity for peacebuilding. Research findings informing this paper indicate that a lack of accountability mechanisms, which form an important part of capacity development, can undermine capacity development elsewhere across the security sector. In this context, PBF programmes should consider current levels of accountability in priority project areas. As such, it is recommended that Strategic Concept documents produced by the JSC consider the effectiveness of current accountability mechanisms – such as Parliamentary and civil society capacity - in each of the priority areas it identifies. In addition, guidance for the submission of PBF project proposals should require all applicants to elaborate on the project’s potential to support (or have a ‘catalytic effect’ on) relevant accountability mechanisms.

If funding does not permit for a significant investment supporting accountability mechanisms, other partners – possibly through a ‘Friends of the PBF’ forum – should be advised of areas where additional funding (or existing programmes) could help ‘gap-fill’ for the PBF, and produce catalytic effects. The limits of the PBF need to be recognized. The utility of the JSC, and the depth of the consolidated analysis it produces, should not be used only to inform short-term PBF projects.

In the case where civil society organizations are weak, PBF funding should consider an element of support for the development of a civil society network (through, for example, the provision of seed funding for network secretariats) and ensure that CSOs (perhaps through the network) are engaged with the oversight and monitoring/reviewing functions for all PBF-funded projects. Where respondents felt that national mechanisms could be used more efficiently to support project implementation, most government respondents welcomed a role for CSOs in the project oversight.

Recommendation 10: The provision of support for integrated project services – Based on the high number of implementation problems and delays in project completion that came as a result of procurement or project management-related challenges, UN PBSO should leverage existing UN expertise in project management and procurement. The ISC concept proved useful in Burundi, particularly in light of the Government’s lack of procurement, contracting and project management experience. This important capacity is central to the management of future projects that support all areas of peacebuilding beyond SSR. Further research should examine good practice and lessons learned drawn from the ISC experience in both Cape Verde and Burundi and be used to inform recommendations for PBF project implementation capacity.

Recommendation 11: The provision of ‘good practice’ and more strategic guidance supporting SSR in the context of peacebuilding – Lessons from the PBC’s in-country experience should be channelled into the current and ongoing International Dialogue on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding. The g7+ forum should also be used for the purposes of shared knowledge and experience in peacebuilding. The OECD’s INCAF Secretariat could provide and excellent mechanism for the dissemination of PBF-related reviews, good practice and lessons. This support should draw on existing SSR ‘good practice’, and be complemented by UN-funded ‘south-south’ exchanges between PBF-recipient countries.

UN PBSO and the other members of the IASSRTF, which is co-chaired by DPKO and UNDP, should work closely to develop a number of ‘guidance notes’ which support a more strategic approach to peacebuilding as part of the set of guidance notes currently under development. Such ‘guidance notes’ could include, for example, ‘Strategic peacebuilding and SSR: The Role of the PBC and PBF’; ‘The contribution of SSR to the PRSP process’; ‘The relationship between SSR and Peacebuilding’; ‘Comprehensive vs. component-based approaches to SSR’; and ‘Challenges to Longer-term SSR’. These more ‘strategic frameworks’ and guidance will also help stimulate a broader, more strategic-level debate on the future of UN peacebuilding.

As the IASSRTF is currently developing guidance notes which largely focus on the UN’s strategic level engagement in the provision of SSR assistance – and which make the link between issues such as governance and SSR, and peace agreement and SSR – the UN should consider disaggregating responsibilities for guidance note development between PBSO (to focus on the strategic level issues) and the IASSRT (to focus more on ‘how-to’, operational level guidance).
A THEMATIC REVIEW OF SSR AND PEACEBUILDING

Introduction

1. In post-conflict contexts, the United Nations has emphasized the importance of a comprehensive approach to security to support sustainable peace, and secondly, that the interdependent and mutually reinforcing conditions for sustainable peace can only be achieved within a broad framework of the rule of law.¹² According to the UN, SSR ‘describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.’¹³ The Security Council has further stated that SSR ‘should be a nationally-owned process that is rooted in the particular needs and conditions of the country.’¹⁴ The approach should be holistic and coherent, providing a transparent framework for reform that is consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and international laws and human rights standards.

2. While there is no single model of SSR, common features across states and societies include consideration for: a legal and constitutional framework providing for the use of force in accordance with international standards; an institutionalized system of governance and management; mechanisms for the oversight of security provided by the authorities and institutions; systems for financial management and review as well as the protection of human rights; capacities to provide effective security¹⁵; transparent mechanisms for interaction amongst security actors; and, a culture of service that promotes unity, integrity, discipline and respect for human rights in shaping the manner in which security actors carry out their duties.¹⁶

3. The PBC’s vital role in facilitating support for national strategies to consolidate and sustain peace has been emphasized by the Secretary-General.¹⁷ To date, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has supported SSR related projects in ten countries, constituting about US$ 44 million, or 19 per cent of its total US$ 228 million expenditure. Of this total, approximately 72 per cent of this funding has gone towards ‘hardware’ issues, that is, infrastructure, and operations support and equipment. Twenty-one per cent has gone towards training and discipline-related issues, while only 7 per cent to issues of governance and oversight. In the UN Secretary-General’s Report “Securing Peace and Development: The UN’s role in SSR”, the importance of operational capacity for SSR and issues concerning infrastructure, training and equipment (‘hardware’) is acknowledged.¹⁸ However, the Report also recognizes the importance of effective governance and civilian oversight of the security sector, and the fact that such issues as normative and consultative frameworks, institutional management and oversight mechanisms (‘software’) are often neglected in security sector reform processes, which can undermine the objectives intended to be achieved by such reform and result in a net decrease in security.

4. With concern for ensuring maximum impact of its significant funds allocated to SSR projects, the PBF is keen to examine existing PBF projects, and current thinking within and outside the UN to help shape future programming. In particular, there is interest in exploring how the PBF can be strengthen its support to ensuring public accountability of security sector, and how it can better identify, measure and monitor peacebuilding results.¹⁹

¹³ Ibid., p.6.
¹⁵ Structures, personnel, equipment and resources.
¹⁶ Ibid., p.6.
¹⁷ Ibid., p.4
¹⁹ Introductory paragraphs were taken directly from the consultant’s terms of reference supporting the thematic review.
This Thematic Review does not attempt to evaluate PBF experiences more broadly. Several other recently-commissioned evaluation reports have already addressed wider issues concerning the effectiveness of SSR interventions.\(^2^0\) Instead, the Review focuses only on an analysis of SSR-relevant PBF activities with cross-referencing to wider PBF activity where appropriate. In this context, the remaining structure of the Review is presented as follows: methodology, strategic positioning of the PBF, key findings from the literature review, promising practices and key factors contributing to the success of PBF-funded SSR activities, cost-effective PBF projects and overall recommendations.

Methodology supporting the Review

Research team

1. The invitation for proposals supporting the PBF-SSR Thematic Review was received in December 2011. UN PBSO contacted the consultants selected to take forward the work in January 2012. A lead consultant was asked to undertake fieldwork for one case study (Sierra Leone), produce the subsequent case study report, and prepare the overall ‘synthesis paper’ at the end of the project; a second consultant\(^2^1\) was engaged to undertake two field missions to Guinea and the Central African Republic (CAR) and to produce the subsequent reports for both case studies. The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) provided an SSR adviser\(^2^2\) to undertake fieldwork for a fourth case study (Liberia) and produce the subsequent case study report, and a ‘desk-based’ case study\(^2^3\) report for a fifth case study (Burundi).

2. The role of the Principal Researcher (hereafter referred to as ‘the researcher’) also included a short literature review on Peacebuilding and SSR linkages. Following a request for the literature review to also include the outcomes of interviews with SSR practitioners, a decision was made to 1) engage in discussions with SSR practitioners during a trip to New York which the researcher had planned in support of another research project in March 2012; and 2) request that the ISSAT host a roundtable meeting in Geneva which would include the participation of experienced SSR practitioners. This meeting took place on 17 March 2012.\(^2^4\)

3. The field missions for the 4 out of the 5 case studies were carried out between February 2012 and May 2012. The last field mission to Sierra Leone took place between 29 April and 5 May 2012.

4. Prior to commencing the literature review, the researcher used the methodology from the PBF thematic review\(^2^5\), and a number of other assessment documents, to inform the development of a ‘question set’ that would provide all of the researchers with a common and consistent framework for interviews purposes. The question set was developed on the assumption that each interview would have a maximum limit of 90-120 minutes and that, depending on the respondent, all questions would not necessarily apply to everyone. The final question set was endorsed by the sponsor in February 2012.\(^2^6\)

Limitations

5. Under the 30 days allocated to the terms of reference of the lead consultant, the researcher had limited capacity to manage the other project workstreams, as well as completing all logistical arrangements for her fieldwork.

\(^2^0\) Ball and van Beijnum, op. cit.
\(^2^1\) Dr Dominique Bangoura is an independent consultant and the President of the Paris-based Observatoire Politique et Stratégique de l’Afrique (OPSA).
\(^2^2\) Ms Natacha Meden is a Senior SSR Adviser with the Geneva-based International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT).
\(^2^3\) Due to the recent and significant in-country experience of the Senior SSR Adviser, ISSAT on SSR and peacebuilding-related issues in Burundi, UN PBSO requested that a desk-based case study be undertaken for Burundi.
\(^2^4\) The researcher is grateful to ISSAT for organizing the roundtable meeting at such short notice and for its excellent facilitation of the meeting.
\(^2^5\) See annex 1 for Draft Methodology for PBF Thematic Reviews.
\(^2^6\) See annex 2 for a copy of the final question set which supported the analytical framework for each of the five national case studies (including the desk-based study of Burundi).
in Sierra Leone, the case study report and the overall final synthesis paper. For these reasons, the researcher is grateful to the two other consultants for meeting their commitments in a timely way. The researcher is also grateful to both PBSO and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) for providing support for the organization of the field mission to Freetown.

6. It should be noted that delays were incurred in completing the field missions and the subsequent case study reports. These sorts of delays are inevitable and, in two cases, came as a result of the in-country missions preferring to host the researchers at a different time than the originally scheduled visit. The delay in the completion of 3 case studies has limited any time for further consultation amongst the researchers, wider post-mission consultation and external validation to be incorporated into this final synthesis paper. However, following the receipt of feedback from UN PBSO, a period of 6 days was made available for further consultation and follow-up discussions.

Conceptual framework and definitions

In order to gain insight into the main questions of this study – what the critical linkages are between SSR and peacebuilding and how PBF funding practices should evolve according to address these linkages – a broader understanding of the terms “peacebuilding” and “SSR” is required. As evidenced in the supporting literature review, although there is a lack of consensus on and some confusion surrounding its meaning, peacebuilding was defined in 2007 by the United Nations Secretary-General's Policy Committee as involving:

“...a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development.”28

In the January 2008 Report of the UN Secretary-General, SSR is described as:

“...a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.”29

The Report also describes the ‘security sector’ as a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight.30 This typically includes – but is not confined to - the defence, police, intelligence, corrections and border security forces, and those responsible for the design and implementation of security such as relevant ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included.31

Because a democratic and accountable security sector is critical for conflict management and the preservation of peace and security, SSR is a ‘tool’ for peacebuilding. This is particularly the case for countries emerging from conflict and fragility where an unaccountable, and often ‘bloated’, security sector is responsible for sustained violence and an inability to address the root causes of conflict.

In countries where sufficient capacity exists, national security reviews and policy processes sometimes inform SSR programmes, and enhance the strategic nature of SSR. However, in countries emerging from conflict, post-conflict SSR often becomes prioritized and shaped according to the provisions of peace agreements between parties to the

27 Following the mission to Sierra Leone, the lead researcher was able to speak at length with the consultant who completed case studies on Burundi and Liberia as these case studies had been completed at a much earlier stage than the other 3 case studies.
30 Ibid., p.5
31 Ibid.
conflict. Evidence in the wider SSR literature also indicates that, due to stabilization imperatives, post-conflict SSR requirements tend to prioritize ‘train and equip’ programmes, and not the enhanced capacity of oversight and governance mechanisms. Peacebuilding presents an opportunity for post-conflict SSR engagements to be informed by an even broader analysis which considers important requirements for social cohesion and economic recovery in parallel to SSR priorities. This broader approach is critical for supporting longer-term SSR, the sustainability of which depends on a stable economy and high levels of social capital.

Therefore, for the purposes of this study, SSR is referred to as a ‘tool’ for peacebuilding. In order to make informed recommendations on how SSR can be better supported in the context of peacebuilding, and by using data from the PBF-funded SSR engagements of five country case studies, this paper investigates the key linkages between SSR and peacebuilding. In doing so, through both desk and field-based research, the paper exposes trends, anomalies and areas for improved peacebuilding practice.

**Strategic positioning of the PBF**

**Strategic context**

7. As peacebuilding interventions take place in fragile and conflict-affected states, the PBF recipient countries examined in this report share many similar characteristics including a post-conflict environment in need of rebuilding and economic stimulation; an environment of distrust between the country’s citizen’s and the national government; social fractures between communities and across ethnic/tribal groups which had become further deepened as a result of conflict; and ongoing regions and/or elements of instability and violence, despite different forms of international interventions on the ground.

8. The post-conflict theatres into which PBF funding was introduced were all operating in different stages of their peace consolidation. As such, priorities differed across the case studies and remained dependent on the both the cycle of violence and the progress of – and capacity supporting - the national planning processes.

9. Table 1 below illustrates the key peacebuilding priorities for each of the 5 cases studies and, as a result of these priorities as well as the broader data findings, present the strategic positioning of PBF funding in each country.

**Figure 1: Strategic positioning of peacebuilding interventions in Burundi, CAR, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PBF-RECIPIENT COUNTRY</th>
<th>PEACEBUILDING PRIORITIES</th>
<th>STRATEGIC POSITIONING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>• promote good governance</td>
<td>To encourage a more holistic approach to SSR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• strengthen the rule of law within security sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• strengthen the justice sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• promote human rights and reconciliation and fight impunity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• support the management of land issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32 See annex 4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>• security sector reform&lt;br&gt;• promoting good governance and state of law&lt;br&gt;• revitalization of communities affected by conflict</td>
<td>To initiate meaningful inclusive political dialogue to inform parallel pacification and stabilization measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>• promoting national reconciliation and unity after clashes pre- and post-election in June and November 2010&lt;br&gt;• the defence and security sector reform&lt;br&gt;• employment policy for youth and women</td>
<td>To unblock socio-political impasses and to deal with imminent and emerging threats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>• strengthening the rule of law&lt;br&gt;• supporting SSR&lt;br&gt;• promoting national reconciliation</td>
<td>To provide support for the provision of a cross-sectoral approach and mechanism supporting SSR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>• youth empowerment and employment&lt;br&gt;• democracy and good governance&lt;br&gt;• justice and security&lt;br&gt;• capacity-building of public administration&lt;br&gt;• energy and power</td>
<td>To preserve the momentum towards peace consolidation that the country had achieved over the past decade; dealing with imminent and emerging threats.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. The data in Table 1 underscores the prominence of SSR in all case studies. Generally speaking, strategic peacebuilding objectives appear to fall under the following more generic categories:

- SSR
- Socio-economic development
- Facilitating social cohesion
- Governance and public sector management
11. There appears to be a good degree of complementarity between SSR and other peacebuilding priorities, and significant overlap in each form of ‘intervention’. With the exception of one case study, all countries examined in the review had already experienced SSR processes on the ground. The summary of generic strategic peacebuilding objectives above includes two important areas – socio-economic development and facilitating social cohesion - which many SSR lessons learned documents often cite as being non-existent in the SSR experiences of the past and, as a result, which impact on the lack of momentum and sustained process supporting SSR. The remaining area, governance and public sector management, has always been central to effective and comprehensive SSR programmes. However, as findings in the literature review indicate, the importance of expanding governance and public sector management efforts to the less conventional security institutions is critical for the longer-term sustainability of SSR programmes and for a country’s national security more broadly.

12. In conclusion, the strategic positioning of peacebuilding in the five countries under study suggests that a) SSR will almost always feature in post-conflict peacebuilding interventions, albeit in relative stages of maturity; b) that other strategic priorities emerging from the PPPs provide a wider more comprehensive national framework in which SSR can develop c) that there is some degree of overlap across each strategic objective.

13. For reasons outlined above, it is not surprising that a significant level of funding for SSR activities has been provided to each of the five countries examined in this review. The pie charts presented in annex 3 illustrate the proportion of spending on PBF-SSR-related projects (relative to PBF funding allocated to other thematic areas) for all five countries. These funding allocations underscore the significant PBF investment in SSR activities.

14. Table 3 below illustrates the overall SSR expenditure of all PBF allocations as of January 2011. While these expenditures are based on different levels of overall PBF expenditure, the findings can be analysed in conjunction with the pie charts, which confirm the significant percentage of PBF funding allocated to SSR in all national case studies.

Figure 2: PBF funding for SSR – By country (Data source: UN PBSO, 2012)
15. Of a total PBF expenditure of US$ 228,126,881.68, US$ 43,620,792 (or 19.12 per cent) of these funds was allocated to SSR projects and programmes. When broken into type of activity (illustrated in Table 3), the following observations can be drawn:

a) Infrastructural expenditure accounts for the highest spending across PBF security sector projects. This is particularly the case for infrastructure development supporting the army, the correction services and the joint programmes33 supported by security sector actors;

b) Police training and discipline absorb 23 per cent of the overall PBF funding for SSR projects; and Investments in institutional governance or oversight remain very low (if not non-existent) in comparison with the investment in train and equip priorities. (This questions the extent to which such a disproportionately high investment in ‘hardware’ had any impact on wider SSR and peacebuilding goals).

16. The summary of the strategic positioning of the PBF in each country case study, and the data findings presented above, clearly indicate that SSR plays a major role in peacebuilding interventions. The next section will present a summary of key findings from a literature review on SSR and peacebuilding34, which will be used to augment the data analysis based on fieldwork in the five country case studies.

**Review of current thinking on SSR and Peacebuilding**

1. This thematic review is supported by a literature review on SSR and peacebuilding (attached at annex 4). A summary of the findings are presented below and organized into three areas: Conceptual issues, issues relating to strategic implementation, and areas of convergence and complementarity.

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33 ‘Joint programmes’ refers to programmes or projects involving two or more security sector institutions working together to implement the programme/project objectives. Joint training involving both the army and police serves as an example of a ‘joint programme’.

34 See annex 4 for a copy of the full literature review.
Conceptual issues

2. Supporting post-conflict interventions – Since the late 1990s, SSR has been developed as a concept which is applicable to a range of societies experiencing economic, political and institutional transitions. This highlights the utility of SSR programmes beyond the post-conflict context. As peacebuilding seeks to address the root causes of conflict, and to support the consolidation of peace, peacebuilding has become considered as more of a post-conflict intervention instrument.

3. Relationship between stabilization and post-conflict SSR - The emergence of ‘stabilization’ as a new post-conflict agenda during the early 2000s has exposed an element of inherent conflict between stabilization and the principles of SSR, a relationship which some scholars have described as ‘uncomfortable bedfellows’. Although operationally-focused SSR activities tend to take place in stabilization environments, universal principles of SSR including long-term engagements, local ownership, wide consultation and ‘demand-driven’ versus ‘supply-led’ approaches are difficult to uphold. It is also the case that stabilization activities often occur when the requisite amount of institutional governance capacity has not been developed to oversee the ‘train and equip’ type of SSR programmes which are more characteristic of stabilization interventions. SSR was originally conceived by the development community in support of, and in the ‘spirit’ of, conflict prevention, an agenda which resonates more closely with the objectives of peacebuilding.

4. The availability of good practice, normative frameworks and guidance - A review of the current SSR strategic conceptual and policy-related developments suggests that the wider community of SSR policymakers and practitioners is reasonably well-served with normative frameworks, guidance and repositories of lessons learned and research to date. A review of the developments supporting the peacebuilding community suggests that the same level of guidance and normative frameworks do not exist for peacebuilding. Although helpful technical guidance has been produced for the purposes of PBF funding, wider norms and good practice are not readily available. This issue may also be linked to the relative immaturity of the overall relationship between the many different actors supporting peacebuilding. The literature also comments prolifically on the lack of a clear definition of peacebuilding and the confusion that exists over the many different ways that the concept is implemented and practised.

Issues relating to strategic implementation

5. Working with a strategic framework - More recent SSR interventions have observed the utility in progressing SSR in the context of a wider national security framework. This encourages a ‘comprehensive’ rather than a ‘component-based’ approach to SSR. However, national security means different things to different countries. For example, the national security requirements for island nations such as Jamaica and Indonesia would require a strong focus on tourism and maritime security; in contrast, the national security requirements of land-locked and fertile countries such as Uganda and South Sudan may require more of a focus on agriculture and border security. Conventional SSR programmes, and the limited mandates, resources and expertise which support these programmes, do not (and cannot) always address the needs of less conventional security institutions (i.e., Ministries of Land, Labour and the Environment) whose reforms are fundamental to the primary functions of post-conflict Governments. This point relates to the broader issue of ‘longer-term SSR’ which has been described by some scholars as being a critical dilemma for external actors.

6. Research indicates that donor-funded peacebuilding interventions have not prioritized the development of strategic frameworks for peacebuilding. Although the intention and guidance exists which supports the development of a strategic approach, peacebuilding has, in the past, tended to be project-led with strategic objectives for peacebuilding being ‘lost’ at the technical level. The requirement for more strategic approaches to peacebuilding could learn from similar recommendations made of the SSR community and calls for more ‘strategic SSR’ which have now been developed and implemented.

7. Increased cooperation and synergies between the security and development communities - In post-conflict countries where SSR and development-focused efforts have operated in parallel, there is evidence that development and security planning are slowly merging, and being both considered as fundamental to national planning.
This is a positive step towards considering the important and mutually dependent ‘interplay’ between security and development. The recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) of Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Afghanistan serve as evidence of where SSR considerations are thought to have been central to reaching development objectives. Research in Sierra Leone suggests that more conventional development objectives (such as the modernization of the educational sector; and the development of road and rail networks) now feature as the priorities of the country’s draft national security policy.

8. **Project/programme activities become informed by peace agreements** - SSR priorities in post-conflict environments are often informed by the provisions of peace agreements, compacts or roadmaps which identify short-to-medium term priorities. In this context, there is often a requirement to undertake DDR and the restructuring and operational reform of the security sector. National political dialogue also often features as a priority laid down in peace agreements which can subsequently inform wider peacebuilding planning. It is therefore not surprising that a significant proportion of PBF funding is spent in support of SSR.

### SSR and Peacebuilding: Areas of convergence and complementarity

9. **Limits to the ‘whole of government’ model** - While both SSR and peacebuilding require comprehensive, and ‘whole of government’, approaches in order to achieve lasting and meaningful peace and stability, different legal traditions around the world require that the justice function of government operates separately and distinctly from the rest of government (e.g., Dutch-Romano Law). This often poses challenges for donor-based concepts of comprehensive ‘security and justice sector reform/development’ in both SSR and peacebuilding interventions. While not an insurmountable challenge, the ‘joined-up’ capacity and culture of recipient governments is often very low, if non-existent. Support for ongoing national dialogue processes can help nurture a more comprehensive government capacity for ‘joined-up’ planning, which can subsequently provide more effective support for comprehensive security and justice programmes.

10. **Engagement at the ‘grass-roots’ level** - Research has exposed the limitations of SSR in a state where an element of ‘statelessness’ exists. In this context, ‘gap-filling’ is required to work with grass-roots level organizations which exist outside of the state but which contribute positively and meaningfully to the security of communities. The PBF’s support to the Sierra Leone Office of National Security’s (ONS) for the development of the Chiefdom Security Committees (CHIESECS) and the Ethiopian Government’s support to the tribal elders in the ‘Kebeles’ (an Amharic word for the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia) serve as examples of how grass-roots engagements have filled gaps which state-centric security interventions have, in that past, not tended to consider. The wider remit of peacebuilding requires grass-roots efforts to support broader social cohesion and the development of local political legitimacy across all regions. The contribution that peacebuilding makes to SSR can therefore provide important ‘strategic augmentation’ to a concept which has traditionally been supported by approaches which engage state institutions.

11. **The relationship between SSR and related programmes** - Whereas programmes such as DDR and Rule of Law have often run in parallel – or as part of – broader SSR programmes, despite the obvious linkages between these areas, research indicates that the linkages have not been made clear. Rule of Law remains ill-defined with different donor organizations tending to interpret it according to their mandate and competencies. As such, activities fundamental to pursuing the course of justice and law enforcement in different societies are often not addressed in ‘rule of law’ programmes.

12. **DDR programmes have implications for wider functions of government** (Ministries of Land, Agriculture, Labour, etc.) which often require additional support from different donor funding frameworks whose mandate goes beyond conventional SSR. Country-based peacebuilding programmes extend beyond SSR to include governance, public sector management and national reconciliation programmes. This implies that peacebuilding frameworks could serve as useful post-conflict donor frameworks in which SSR becomes further developed.
Identifying promising practices and factors that contributed to successful PBF-funded SSR

13. The section outlines a number of critical and consistent findings across the five case studies reviewed.

Focus of PBF Funding For SSR

14. PBF funding for SSR forms one of a number of potential sources of SSR funding. Based on the PBF mandate of supporting short-term interventions which produce ‘catalytic’ effects in the areas of institution-building, conflict resolution, economic revitalization and the restoration of administrative services, recognition must be given to the limitations of PBF SSR funding. Having said this, the objectives and focus of the PBF generally align with the principles of SSR, as articulated in both the OECD’s ‘Handbook on Security System Reform’ and in the UN Secretary-General’s report ‘Securing Peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform’. Perhaps one issue which challenges these principles is the short-term nature of PBF funding which could pose challenges for locally-owned SSR processes. However, the national ownership supporting PBF-funded projects, which emerges as a result of the joint decision-making structures (i.e., the JSC) - and the PBF’s commitment to producing ‘catalytic’ effects - both go some way to ensuring that longer-term, locally owned national capacity for SSR is produced. However, based on the PBF’s wider mandate, and its funding limitations and short-term focus, the PBF’s core contribution to new and existing SSR activities could include support for contingencies which prevent existing SSR programmes from becoming ‘derailed’ and which could inform the work of external actors with a mandate to support SSR. This is in line with one of the 10 principles of SSR outlined in the UN Secretary-General’s Report which stipulates that the efforts of national and international partners supporting SSR must be well coordinated.

Key message 1: PBF funding for SSR is one of many SSR funding sources. The unique contribution that PBF funding brings to SSR activities is its provision of short-term funding which helps guard against contingencies which might otherwise have a disruptive impact on existing SSR activities. However, the potential for PBF-SSR funding to produce locally owned and longer-term impact depends on the extent to which well-targeted PBF projects produce catalytic effects and the extent to which support for SSR is well-coordinated across the wider donor community.

Investment in SSR ‘Hardware’ vs. ‘Software’

15. Earlier sections presented data that underscores the heavy investment in SSR hardware, particularly in the area of corrections services, national armed forces and a range of cross-sectoral or ‘joint programmes/projects’. These activities range from the building and furnishing of military barracks and prisons to the provision of vehicles and motorbikes supporting the greater ease of mobility for security sector actors. Arguably, this large and disproportionate investment in SSR ‘hardware’ goes against the SSR principles of ensuring a balance between ‘train and equip’ programmes, and the wider governance and management of the security sector which facilitate democratic control and oversight of the operatives.

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37 Ibid.
16. However, discussions with many respondents across the country case studies indicated that, whereas mainstream SSR funding tended to support many mentoring, training and advisory programmes, a point is often reached where a significant investment in equipment and infrastructure is required to complement the newly acquired skill sets and to support perceptions of increased professionalism. The issue of ‘institutional pride’ is also important to security sector actors. The UK Government’s investment in the construction of the Government of Sierra Leone’s (GoSL) Office of National Security (ONS) serves as a good example of a logical and progressive ‘next step’ in the wider SSR effort which followed the development and training of a highly competent staff and trusted relationships with all other security ministries. Even today in Sierra Leone’s capital city of Freetown, the ONS continues to be a ‘hub’ where national middle and senior security sector managers meet and develop cross-sectoral plans. The construction and refurbishment of the military barracks in Burundi also supported the development of ‘institutional pride’.

17. A review of all ‘hardware-intensive’ PBF-funded SSR projects indicates that catalytic effects and sustainable project outcomes as a result of these investments increased considerably if investments in SSR ‘hardware’ were complemented by sufficient attention given to ‘software’. In the case of Burundi, the investment in the construction of new courts and judicial infrastructure did not result in an increase in peoples’ access to justice as there was no element of ‘enhanced governance of the justice sector’ contained in the PPP for Burundi. In contrast to this example, and due to the ongoing governance and management training, the impact of the support given to the refurbishment of the military barracks for the Burundi armed forces yielded a positive and more catalytic outcome. The funding of the Government of Burundi’s National Intelligence Service (SNR) project described in Box 1 provides further evidence of catalytic effects as a result of including complementary ‘software’ elements with hardware-intensive’ projects.

18. No ‘hardware-intensive’ projects appeared to be funded in Guinea. While research findings suggest that the SSR hardware-intensive projects in CAR were not sufficiently augmented with ‘software’ elements, two projects relating to wider socio-economic initiatives (and not SSR) helped to further underscore the importance of taking a balanced approach to funding both hardware and software. These projects included the construction of a children’s youth centre (PBF/CAR/K-5) and the construction of classrooms (PBF/CAR/K-7), both of which included complementary funding for education and training.

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38 PBF/BDJ/B-3, a project entitled “Support for the National Intelligence Service (SNR) to uphold the Rule of Law”.
Key message 2: PBF-funding support for SSR ‘hardware’ (infrastructure and equipment) is generally viewed as a positive development. However, in order that the ‘hardware’ is used in a way which supports the effectiveness and efficiency of the security sector, and produces further catalytic effects for wider peacebuilding, such an investment should only follow a sufficient investment in the ‘software’ (i.e., completion of different forms of management/governance training across the institution), or a complementary ‘software’ element should be written into the peacebuilding project proposal in such a way that the investment in the ‘hardware’ becomes contingent on progress being made in the ‘softer’ area.

Bolstering the attention given to justice sector development

19. The gap-filling approach that the PBF provided in support of the Justice sector was beneficial to wider and ongoing security reforms. These approaches added considerable value in terms of resourcing and coordinating justice to be a major player in the cross-government security sector (albeit less so in Burundi than the other four case studies). Respondents indicated that, in most of the ongoing SSR programmes, there did not appear to be a good link between security and justice. The Burundi desk-based research concluded that, of the four justice sector development projects funded by the PBF, there was no connection between these projects and projects related to the security sector. Data from both Sierra Leone and CAR indicate that the justice community was bridged somewhat more effectively with the wider security sector once projects supporting the construction, refurbishment and capacity-building supporting the prisons were completed.

20. One example taken from the case of Sierra Leone drew on the experience of the police and how SSR-funded police training had not been conducive to the link between the police and justice. More specifically, police training programmes had not taught police officers such things as how to properly secure a crime scene, or how to keep records/take photos in a way which allows justice to take its proper course.

21. One area which provides positive synergies between the justice and security sectors is the development of reliable statistics and support for ‘information capture’. In Liberia, an element of the Joint Security and Justice Programme (JSJP) sought to put into place a ‘security-wise’ record-keeping system that was coherent across the justice chain and involved the police, the correction services, the Office of the Solicitor-General and the public defenders. In Sierra Leone, information technology systems and training in the Magistrates’ Court and the ONS also each helped initiate a much more effective approach to record keeping and bolstered areas of natural linkages between the justice and security sectors.

Key message 3: There is an important and mutually dependent link between security and justice which is often not developed in a way which ensures that 1) the justice sector develops in accordance with the development of wider security actors; and 2) both the judicial and law enforcement systems can provide the mutual support required to promote the rule of law. Efforts to capture and archive important data relating to linkages between the criminal justice sector and law enforcement have provided effective support to these initiatives.

PBF-funded ‘grass-roots SSR’

22. Conventional SSR interventions tend to prioritize support to the those security sector actors which have the statutory right to use force, as well as the organizations charged with the oversight and management of these security actors. As discussed in the literature review, as a result of the proliferation of non-state security providers (and traditional security and justice systems) in weak and fragile states, it is important for post-conflict SSR programmes to reach out to these organizations, both in the capital cities and peripheral areas, and take a more comprehensive societal approach to supporting security reforms. This is particularly the case when many communities become the primary victims of the wartime violence and retributions.

23. The need to develop local political legitimacy in support of the security sector requires engagement at the ‘grass-roots’ level. The expression ‘grass roots’ means different things to different people. The Open Society defines a grass-roots organization as a “self-organized group of individuals pursuing common interests through
volunteer-based, non-profit organization that usually has a low degree of formality but a broader purpose than issue-based self-help group, community-based organization or neighborhood association.”

24. Feedback from the national case studies indicated that there was a tendency for both donors and governments to engage with either international or competent capital city-based NGOs (including bright young college graduates who produce well-versed and well-formatted project proposals); a tendency which often resulted in ‘the grass-roots box being checked’ but which did not lead to meaningful engagement with grass-roots organizations.

25. It is for reasons described above that the promotion of social dialogue in Guinea (PROCONSOGUI) in 2008 was deemed successful. The project supported social dialogue in 33 prefectures and 3 national “Days of Dialogue and Initiatives”. Respondents in Guinea felt that the dialogue process served as the official launch of ‘peace-building’ which could inform subsequent SSR programmes. Two projects in Sierra Leone which also provide good examples of ‘grass-roots SSR projects’ include the support to the GoSL’s ONS for the development of the Chiefdom Security Councils (CHIESECS), and the Makona River Union project, the latter of which has sought to improve relations between three border communities in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone which share similar traditions, customs and people across porous borders. The impact of both projects has led to enhanced border security and early warning systems, the empowerment of communities to play a meaningful role in national security and a degree of engagement with the traditional systems of governance which work in peripheral regions and which, when engaged cooperatively and progressively with state institutions, can help to build enormous political capital and institutional legitimacy.

26. The ‘Gbarnga Hub’ in Liberia is one of a number of ‘hubs’ being developed to provide a ‘forward operating base’ for the police and the border and immigration services. As these departments fell under the chain of command of the Ministry of Justice, justice was also included and played a central role. As part of the public outreach dimension linked to the Gbarnga Hub, a call for proposals was put out to civil society organizations. The result was that Monrovia-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were selected for this role; a decision which resulted in what were described as ‘in and out visits’ with little or no effective engagement with the communities. Although one proposal for this work had outlined a strategy based on the empowerment of communities and grass-roots organizations, this proposal was not considered as it was submitted by an international NGO. Some respondents felt that this represented an opportunity lost.

27. Despite the importance of engaging at the grass-roots level, the proportion of PBF funding committed to these types of projects represents what has been described as a ‘drop in the ocean’ compared to support given to capital city-based state institutions.

Key message 4: Despite the important role played by nonstate actors in supporting SSR, traditional SSR approaches do not tend to prioritize grass-roots engagements. Grass-roots issues are at the heart of peace-building challenges. The concept of peacebuilding, and its commitment to ‘tackle the root causes of conflict’ is a complementary and overarching framework that can ensure that traditional state-centric SSR institutions develop effective ways of engaging with nonstate actors and the communities which are most affected by security-related issues. As such, both grass-roots ‘engagement’, and grass-roots ‘outreach’, should both be prioritized.

National dialogue is central to the development of national security Frameworks

28. Over the past 10 years, national dialogue has contributed positively to the development, understanding and acceptance of security reforms and support for government security priorities. This dialogue is important for securing the views of the people in all parts of a country and for generating a discussion on the national values,
interests and goals which a national security framework should seek to promote and defend. National dialogue processes have also been supportive in bringing together security and development communities.

29. The above notwithstanding, it is often the case where post-conflict SSR processes develop under the leadership of one line Ministry, and not as a result of a national political dialogue process. It is then up to that lead Ministry to develop SSR in as inclusive a way as possible. In either case, a national dialogue on security and development priorities is a central ingredient to the development of effective national plans and strategies. It also serves to build confidence across, and gain confidence in, the security actors and their intentions.

30. In the case studies of CAR, Guinea and Sierra Leone, national dialogue processes were initiated either before more comprehensive SSR processes commenced, or following initial developments of a more limited SSR process. Securing support for such processes is not always straightforward, albeit significant funding is often required to support an iterative number of meetings.

31. Through the use of IRF funding, the PBF supported the PROCONSOGUI in Guinea. The project contributed to the creation of a political framework for dialogue and mediation (between government and political parties/civil society and between civilian and military people) and to the restoration of democratic institutions following the transition of leadership. Support for this dialogue process included three National Days of Dialogue, the outcome of which constituted the basis of projects in the PPP. Respondents in CAR, indicated that the PBF-funded “Inclusive Political Dialogue” held in Bangui in 2008 also served as an effective confidence-building measure and gave the Government more credibility and authority.

32. In Sierra Leone, a national dialogue supporting national security predated the PBF’s role. In support of the 2007 National Security Review, the ONS went out to all regions and districts and solicited views and feedback on security-related issues. Despite this exercise having been undertaken, the need for the ONS to continue these country-wide consultations and dialogue led the Government to request PBF funding to support this purpose. Feedback from national authorities suggests that the PBF was minded only to fund dialogue in regions which were experiencing problems at that time. Following suggestions from the ONS that this process should support a wider approach (based on the argument of equality and that ‘today’s problem regions will be different next month’), it requested that funding be provided for dialogue in all 17 regions of the country. In the end, the ONS took forward this project in the absence of PBF funding. This issue created some frustration towards the UN as the issues of national dialogue and consultation had already been agreed as a cross-Government priority that the Government did not wish to have only partially implemented.

Key message 5: Effective SSR programmes are informed by effective and broad national dialogue processes. In post-conflict environments, ‘component-based’ SSR often begins in advance of such broad-based consultation. In other experiences, SSR programmes have been initiated following national dialogue processes. Support is required for both initial and follow-on dialogue, thereby supporting an ‘iterative’ process which is entirely consistent with SSR principles. It is in this context that the PBF has added value, and has produced a number of catalytic effects.

Capacity of the security planning community in support peacebuilding

33. In post-conflict countries, the need to give urgent priority to addressing the behaviour and conduct of, and the control over, the security sector can sometimes result in the development of initial national planning capacity on the ground to support other initiatives. Based on the good understanding of ‘strategy’, and the linkage between ‘strategy’, ‘programmes’ and ‘projects’ within the defence establishment, this planning capacity can often be helpful in bringing other indigenous actors on board, particularly in discussing issues related to the national security strategy/policy, a framework which has implications for all aspects of government. Development planning capacity may also exist based on indigenous supporting national development strategies. This is not to suggest that a military-led planning approach be pursued for PBF purposes, but rather to underscore the benefits of appraising any existing national planning capacity which may have supported existing security and development planning, which could also be leveraged for the purposes of informing peacebuilding objectives.
34. As discussed in the main messages of the literature review, and due to similar indigenous personalities working in support of the many national strategy documents, there is emerging evidence in some countries that development and security planning processes are beginning to inform each other more effectively. Evidence in all of the country case studies examined indicated that, where there was a national security strategy and a poverty reduction strategy paper, the peacebuilding priorities and the mechanisms supporting peacebuilding planning, had been informed by these documents. In Liberia, peacebuilding priorities were in line with the national security strategy and the poverty reduction strategy; in Sierra Leone, the outcome of the 2007 National Security Review and the 2008 Poverty Reduction Strategy (entitled ‘Agenda for Peace’) helped inform the PPP. Indeed, it was decided in Sierra Leone that the 2008 ‘Agenda for Peace’ document would serve as the Strategic Peacebuilding Framework supporting the second envelope of PBF funding, thereby precluding the need to develop a second strategic framework document. The scope for existing strategies to be ‘merged’ and the development of national ‘buy-in’ at the highest level of government suggests that peacebuilding interventions can support the coming together of a number of separate but related and overlapping initiatives. It also indicates that peacebuilding is advancing in accordance with strategic principles of SSR, which include wide consultation and local ownership.

35. In the case study of Burundi, while the planning capacity had been developed within the armed forces, these efforts remained rooted to defence issues and were not expanded to include other actors. Even following the first PBF allocation, a division remained in Burundi between defence and the rest of the security-related actors. For this reason, the strategic planning capacity of the security sector was not leveraged in an optimal way. In Liberia, the security planning capacity did develop in the context of justice, intelligence and the law enforcement agencies, however, defence reform efforts remained separate and disconnected.

36. If peacebuilding can, in the medium to longer term, provide a framework for the development of a national strategy, there is scope for PBF funding to play a positive role in bringing non-security ministries into the planning process. Such progress could help develop a strategic planning community that represents wider security, governance and socio-economic development objectives. This not only ensures that security does not remain the dominant focus, but also sensitizes other ministries to the fact that national security priorities in post-conflict and developing countries contexts do not always involve conventional security objectives. In Sierra Leone, the draft national security policy indicates that objectives such as the development of road, rail and transportation networks; the modernization of the education system and strengthened national registration processes serve as current national security priorities. It is therefore imperative that related government ministries (i.e., transportation, immigration and education) are brought into these discussions.

37. Interestingly, the catalytic nature of peacebuilding engagements increased when an individual project formed part of a larger strategic framework. This was the case for PBF projects which supported the Government of Guinea’s PROCONSOGUI, the Government of CAR’s Inclusive Political Dialogue, the Government of Sierra Leone’s draft ONS National Security Policy, the Government of Liberia’s Justice and Security Programme (and the Liberia Peacebuilding Programme which took peacebuilding beyond PBF-funded activities) and the Government of Burundi’s Defence strategy. Projects which formed part of a larger strategic framework also tended to attract follow-up funding.

Key Message 6: Due to the immediate security (and ongoing development) requirements of post-conflict countries, peacebuilding actors will often find that there may already be some form of ‘embryonic’ planning capacity within some parts of the security and or development communities. This capacity should be assessed by the JSCs in order to identify sources of potential support for the development of conflict analysis, strategic peacebuilding frameworks and peacebuilding priorities. PPPs should also consider the priorities set out in existing strategic frameworks, as these projects proved to have a much higher rate of further funding and

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43 During fieldwork undertaken in Sierra Leone in April 2012, two government Ministers confirmed that the PPP and the PRSP ‘shared the same analysis.’

44 This point is made more generally in the 5th and last Review of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi (2011).
incidence of catalytic effects.

Support to SSR provided by the ‘Immediate Relief Facility’ (IRF)

38. As the pie charts presented in annex 3 indicate, a significant amount of funding for SSR was also facilitated by the PBF's IRF funding. In all of the five country case studies, the IRF projects played an important role in providing quick catalytic effects, and ‘unblocking’ potential stalemates to the peace process and addressing imminent emergencies. A number of respondents described IRF funding as having added real value to the UN’s contribution to peacebuilding. Many respondents in the UN missions also supported this view, suggesting that this funding could be drawn on expeditiously to ‘avert a crisis’ or be used as a ‘panic button’. These funds did not require the rigorous project planning and approval processes underpinning the normal PBF funding allocations, but only a request from the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG). Personnel from the UN missions described the IRF as a pot of funding that could accept significant risk, and something that was not mirrored in any other donor funding facility except those falling under the humanitarian and early recovery funding.

39. IRF funding proved particularly important for supporting SSR. In countries recovering from conflict, and certainly in four out of five of the case studies examined, SSR preceded any formal peacebuilding interventions. However, the strategic environment in which SSR takes places is fluid and SSR plans can often be disturbed by expected and unexpected events such as elections, humanitarian disasters and military coups. In addition, PPPs also need to consider political imperatives such as reaching ethnic quotas and power-sharing arrangements, which may result in areas of duplication. For this reason, IRF funding can help existing SSR programmes to stay ‘on track’ and not become derailed as a result of certain events.

40. Examples of IRF support to SSR are many and varied. IRF funding supporting the demobilization of, and the ‘disassociation of adults’ affiliated with, the last rebel group in Burundi provided an effective ‘bridging mechanism that enabled the process which led to the disarmament of the combatants themselves.

Box 2: The impact of the IRF-funded PROCONSOGUI in Guinea (2008)

The positive and catalytic outcomes of the IRF-funded PROCONSOGUI process in 2008 have been discussed in earlier sections. In addition to this commentary, it is worth noting that, despite the high number of social movements in 2006-2007 which featured labor unions and CSOs on the streets demanding political change and better working/living conditions as well as political change, the Conte regime remained deaf to these calls and responded through the use of repression. The appointment of the new Prime Minister Lansana Kouyate in February, 2007 did not eliminate these political blockages and distrust between military and civil population. By 2008, the socio-economic problems were at their highest levels. At this time, initiatives were taken in Guinea by the National Council of the Organizations of the Civil Society of Guinea (CNOSCG), the Civil-Military Committee, and the Economic and Social Council (ESC) to establish a broad national dialogue in all the country to bring change, necessary reforms and social cohesion. This led to the PBF-funded PROCONSOGUI initiative which provides an example of where the use of IRF funding to create the conditions for a national dialogue helped to avert a deep crisis.

An example of the effective use of IRF funding in Sierra Leone concerned the relationship between the military and the police which, as a result of the 2008 elections, proved problematic in terms of a lack of mutual respect, a clear knowledge of, and appreciation for, roles and responsibilities in each institution and the command and control requirements for joint operations. Anticipating the upcoming 2012 general elections in Sierra Leone, IRF funding was used to improve this working relationship and support joint training, joint
exercises and joint dialogue. A similar use of IRF funding in CAR supported the Special Force for the Security of the Electoral Process (FOSSEPEL) in the lead up to the June and November 2010 elections. As these elections were the first free and fair presidential elections since independence in 1958 it was important that they were well-managed.

41. Other examples of IRF funding in Sierra Leone included an investigation into the causes of the bi-election violence in 2010 and the engagement of women in SSR processes. Both projects were considered successful, the first due to the confidence this brought the communities and civil society that investigative action would be taken and that individuals would be held to account for the election violence; and the second project, for demonstrating the way in which women can have a ‘voice’ in SSR processes. The result of this project was the election of the first female to chair a District Security Committee and a higher number of women attending the district security committee meetings.

Key Message 7: The IRF provides enormous utility for addressing potential ‘spoilers’, and unanticipated issues and processes impacting on the security sector which emerge as a result of a changing strategic environment. The IRF is unrivalled and nothing similar is accessible from any other international donor funds, most of which are linked to specific tasks and activities without much room for flexibility. It is often the case that external funding cannot be disbursed except in the form of large transactions. As potentially derailing events often demand interventions which are not necessarily expensive, but which – if left unattended to – have the potential to impact negatively on progress across many parts of the security sector. This type of flexibility and immediate release of funds has proven to be invaluable.

Using local capacity and preventing the duplication of existing systems

42. If peacebuilding seeks to be innovative and to take risks, it should use local systems such as financial management and procurement capacities as much as feasible. New parallel structures should be avoided if deemed by the national government to be unnecessary. Although there is a likelihood that national procurement capacity will not in place in time for an initial PBF disbursement, an effort to develop catalytic effects supporting the development of this local capacity should be included in a project proposal, or even in the overall strategic priorities for peacebuilding.

43. In reviewing the project reports from the five country case studies, it is clear that most negative project results tend to be associated with project delays, particularly where the development of infrastructure was concerned. Table 3 below illustrates the delays incurred in all of the SSR-related PBF-funded projects in Burundi. The data indicates an average delay of 11.5 months for each project. In Liberia, many similar delays occurred as a result of subjecting PBF projects in excess of US$ 200,000 to the timelines of the normal UN procurement system; a system in which it is difficult to expedite beyond the normal cycle and in which priorities are difficult to push through.

45 PBF/IRF-21, project entitled “Support to the Government of Sierra Leone Police and Armed Forces” (2010).
46 PBF/IRF-20, project entitled “Support to the Security Forces” (2010).
47 In addition to the data in Table 3, the researcher examined all end-of-project reports for PBF-funded, ‘hardware-orientated’ SSR projects.
**Figure 4 – Project data from inception to completion for SSR PBF-funded projects in Burundi (Source: Meden, 2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project No.</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Government Implementing Partner</th>
<th>Budget (US$)</th>
<th>Approval date</th>
<th>Date of first transfer</th>
<th>Expected closure</th>
<th>Delay (months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBF/BDI/B-2</td>
<td>Barracking of the FDN to reduce the impact of their presence within the population</td>
<td>MDNAC</td>
<td>*4,812,150</td>
<td>5 Apr 2007</td>
<td>31 May 2007</td>
<td>31 Dec 2010</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/BDI/B-5</td>
<td>Promotion of discipline &amp; improvement of relationship between FDN &amp; population</td>
<td>MDNAC</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>26 Oct 2007</td>
<td>11 Dec 2007</td>
<td>31 Dec 2009</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/BDI/B-1</td>
<td>Launch of civilian disarmament &amp; of fight against small arms proliferation</td>
<td>MISP / CTDC</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>29 Mar 2007</td>
<td>24 Apr 2007</td>
<td>31 Oct 2011</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/BDI/B-3</td>
<td>Support for the National Intelligence Service to uphold the Rule of Law</td>
<td>SNR</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>27 Jun 2007</td>
<td>9 Aug 2007</td>
<td>31 Oct 2009</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/BDI/B-4</td>
<td>Support to the PNB (community policing)</td>
<td>MISP / PNB</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>5 Jul 2007</td>
<td>9 Aug 2007</td>
<td>31 Mar 2011</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMER/8</td>
<td>Support to Phase 1 of the second DDR process in Burundi</td>
<td>N/A (direct UN implementation)</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>11 May 2009</td>
<td>20 May 2009</td>
<td>31 Dec 2010</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: * figures indicate an estimated budget.
44. Other procurement challenges occurred as a result of faulty initial design specifications and the sourcing of incompatible supplies. For example, the work supporting the rehabilitation of the water and sanitation facilities for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) incurred delays as a result of the short capacity of the contractor (who had come in with the lowest initial quote), and the requirement to re-order and re-install new water pumps with a smaller diameter than those that had initially been ordered. In addition to causing significant delays, the capacity shortfall of the initial contractor led to the project being US$ 60,000 over budget.

45. Similar observations were made towards the construction of the Mafanta prison in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Issues such as faulty ventilation systems and electrical work, and a razor-wire fence surrounding the compound falling down in a number of places, led to a further US$ 166,000 required to ‘make good’ on the faulty work. These additional funds were provided by the Justice Sector Coordination Office, but came during a time when the funds should have supported the development of critical capacity in the justice sector. While a number of respondents blamed the implementing partner for these problems, it should also be noted that the beneficiary ‘signed off’ on both the design and the completion phases of the project. This suggests that the beneficiary should also share an element of responsibility for the errors and that support for more effective project management is also required.

46. In terms of the aforementioned projects, a number of respondents discussed the tendency for the implementing partners to use their own network of contractors, as opposed to the existing network of trusted and ‘proven’ government contractors. It was felt that the use of the government network of contractors was particularly important for supporting the work of the security institutions.

47. One good practice emerged from the case of Burundi, where a UN Integrated Service Centre (ISC) was developed. This built on the positive experience of a similar concept which had been used in Cape Verde and which helped to address the numerous procurement delays, many of which arose due to the technical nature of a large number of the PBF-funded projects. The experience in Burundi indicates that the ISC eased the capacity constraints but still took considerable time to set up and staff.

48. Lastly, parallel systems should not be developed where national mechanisms already exist. Feedback in Sierra Leone indicated that that the UN had created an office responsible for investigating issues impacting on the sharing of assets provided for the joint army-police training programmes funded under the IRF project. In this context, staff were drawn from the National Joint Operations Centre that was developed in the wake of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone drawdown. Respondents stated that the existing remit of the ONS is to deal with issues that arise from the sharing of security sector assets, a responsibility that was supported by national security laws. In this context, it was felt that the newly created office brought with it its own bureaucracy, duplicated existing national mechanisms, circumvented national procedures and generated an element of resentment towards the UN. Similar questions were also asked in Guinea, but geared more towards the lack of coordination between international partners, and between the international partners and national actors on SSR. Although the Guinean Government had given the role of coordination to the UN, questions arose amongst technical and financial partners on the efficiency of this coordination, and whether or not the framework, mandate, procedures, responsibilities enable the UN to play this role.

Key message 8: Most of the delays in the PBF-funded SSR projects occurred as a result of procurement-related issues and errors relating to project management. Procurement processes and project management are central to the effective implementation of peacebuilding projects. Parallel systems should not be developed if national capacity exists to support elements of the PBF project management cycle. This risks undermining the credibility of the PBF. In the case that national capacity is not sufficiently strong to support projects, PBF project stakeholders should engage with this weak capacity to ensure that these functions benefit from the PBF project experience. The experience of the UN ISC in Burundi yielded a positive on the procurement delays and problems but still took time to set up and staff.

48 This workstream fell under PBF/SLE/B-4 entitled “Capacity Development to the Justice System to prevent Delays in Trials and to Clear backlog of Cases (2007).
Catalysing support for cross-government security processes

49. As indicated in the summary of literature review findings, long-term SSR depends on the wider engagement of non-security government ministries. This is particularly the case for ensuring that the wider socio-economic development goals of a country are supported. It is also important for ensuring that the gains made by developing the leaders and personnel of the security-related institutions do not outpace the same levels of development across other important government departments.

50. Earlier sections of this report indicated the contribution that peacebuilding interventions can bring to the development of a wider national planning community. In this context, it is also important for PBF funding to realize the impact that weaker non-security Government actors will have on the progress made by more traditional security actors. Many of the delays incurred in the SSR-related construction projects in Burundi came as a result of land ownership/rights issues, thereby highlighting important and complementary role played land ministries in supporting these projects. In CAR, the Ministry of Social Affairs and National Solidarity played a central role in the projects involving the protection of women and children affected by conflicts.49

51. An example shared in Sierra Leone concerned the weak institutional capacity of the Ministry of Land, Environment and Country Planning. During the years of conflict in Sierra Leone when some land owners had left the country, many unsanctioned homes were constructed on these plots. Following the return of these landowners, the police had to be called in to enforce the eviction of the families and the demolition of the dwellings. While such a role fell outside of the responsibilities of the police, the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Land, Environment and Country Planning was too weak to support this enforced action. This issue led to a number of heated confrontations between the communities and the police which did not bode well for the progress that the police had been making in terms of their relationships with the communities.

52. Similar incidents were reported to have occurred in water catchment areas in Sierra Leone where, as a result of weak institutional capacity, the Ministry of Land, Environment and Country Planning’s forest rangers could not sufficiently manage the high number of ‘squatters’ who were cutting down the trees in these areas and burning the wood to produce charcoal. Numerous other examples were shared with the researcher as regards the weak capacity of local government to fight fires and clear rubbish and waste off the streets, and the Ministry of Labour’s capacity to protect workers employed by international explorative and extractive companies who, as a result of their mistreatment, initiated demonstrations in these communities.

53. A commitment to the development of wider government capacity supporting key functions of government (particularly those functions on which the Gross Domestic Product relies most) depends also on effective leadership. Across the five case studies examined, there was a large degree of variability in terms of the national leadership coordinating SSR. In some cases, this capacity was already in place, in other cases the appointment of an SSR coordinator came as a result of a recommendation from the UN mission. In countries where the leadership supporting the coordination and implementation of SSR (or ministerial elements of broader SSR) worked effectively, such leaders should play a role in supporting the development of leadership capacity across Government.

Key message 9: Non-security institutions contribute to the sustainability of longer-term SSR. The broader mandate of peacebuilding provides a useful opportunity to consider development requirements of government ministries which must serve to support, and indeed augment, the security sector. Effective analysis and broad consultation and dialogue will lead to the more precise identification of these requirements. The development of cross-government leadership supporting peacebuilding could learn from the effective leaders in the security sector.

49 See, for example, projects PBF/CAF/A-3 and PBF/CAF/B-2.
Reporting on and evaluating the impact of PBF Funding

54. For most of the PBF projects across the five counties examined in this review, the project reports do not elaborate on the strategic objectives of peacebuilding and the wider impact of each individual project. The reports tend to comment on technical level detail and ‘nitty-gritty’, which prevents the readers (or, indeed, UN PBSO) from understanding the wider impact of the projects. It was felt that this issue was also as a result of the lack of clarity of overall strategic peacebuilding objectives and the programme and project implications that flow from this. In this context, evaluation approaches such as the Theory of Change, are difficult to develop.

55. Although UN PBSO has now increased the timeframes of project proposals to something which allows for the evaluation of impact, in many projects there does not appear to be a clear connection between strategic peacebuilding objectives, wider programme areas, desired catalytic effects and the individual project objectives.

56. Sequencing issues are also important considerations and should be informed by the in-depth analyses of the interdependent effects of progress in different peacebuilding areas. While the author was not privy to the Strategic Peacebuilding Frameworks of the countries examined, the PPP documents reviewed suggested that this interdependent analysis had not been undertaken in any depth. Interviews in the field suggest that only a partial discussion took place on some of the interdependent effects and the cross-impacts of the peacebuilding projects but only by the Technical Committees. While respondents generally felt that the PPP documents all included a reasonably good conflict analysis, once peacebuilding priorities were identified, there was a lack of interdependency analysis which evaluated the potential impact across these areas.

Key message 10: Careful and in-depth analysis should be undertaken to evaluate the way in which peacebuilding objectives are supported by proposed SSR-related peacebuilding projects. This analysis should go beyond a ‘conflict analysis’ and inform more specific strategic peacebuilding objectives and the general programme areas supporting these objectives. Once strategic peacebuilding objectives have been identified, interdependent effects across these objectives should be evaluated (ideally by the JSC) in order to inform sequencing, prioritization and evaluation indicators. It is also recommended that the UN leverage some of its SSR expertise (i.e., IASSRTF) to assist in the interdependency (or ‘cross impact’) analysis in order to inform more effective sequencing and prioritization of PBF-funded SSR programmes and projects.

Consideration of issues relating to oversight and strengthened parliamentary capacity

57. Fieldwork on the ground in all of the case studies indicated that, while civil society organizations were brought into the peacebuilding process and involved in the technical consultations and project oversight arrangements, their support tended to decrease over time. This was due largely to the lack of funding supporting their costs, and the opportunity costs that local NGOs had to consider for taking almost a full day to attend a PBF-project related meeting. Respondents from CSOs in a number of case studies stated that receiving security checks and being processed at the front gates of security compounds took considerable time and that it was often necessary to take a full day out of the office in order to attend one PBF-related meeting. General speaking, many CSO representatives had felt that they had become ‘free advisers’ supporting the UN and the national governments.

58. The research also indicated that progress in SSR was rarely supported by enhanced parliamentary capacity. For example, being a coastal country, SSR in Sierra Leone (as well as other important peacebuilding objectives such as socio-economic development and community cohesion) required the support of maritime security laws and institutions, the absence of which invite more opportunities for transnational crime and fish poaching. During the field mission, the researcher was informed that there are no boats available which are capable of patrolling the country’s Economic Exclusion Zone. Moreover, draft laws on maritime security were still waiting Parliamentary approval. The ONS informed the researcher that fines for some crimes and misdemeanors were still based on laws passed in 1949.50

50 One example of such a law was described to involve a fine of 5 Leones which, at the time of writing, amount to less than US$ 0.01.
59. Although one parliamentary committee was involved in the project supporting the SNR in Burundi, no efforts were made to engage parliament in Burundi (or the House or Senate in Liberia) with the exception of including parliamentary representatives on the JSC. Respondents in both CAR and Guinea suggested that no PBF-funding was used to support Parliament. In 2010, the Conseil National de Transition (the name for parliament) adopted a new constitution, a new electoral code, and many new laws supporting SSR. At the time of writing, a PBF project\textsuperscript{51} is planned to support the CNT over the coming months. The lack of support for parliamentary capacity may be linked to the lack of clarity on strategic goals in the Strategic Concept documents and the PPPs and, more importantly, to the lack of parliamentary representation on the JSCs. Further clarity on strategic peacebuilding goals would encourage broader consideration for what is critical to achieve the stated strategic goals; elements of which should include implications for key oversight bodies including Parliament. However, as the PBF cannot embrace all priority projects, it may be that ‘catalytic’ effects can be produced simply on the basis of an analysis that indicates the importance of parliamentary capacity in certain areas. These analytical findings could be shared with wider PBF partners – possibly referred to as ‘Friends of the PBF’ – with a mandate and core competencies to address these, and other, priority areas. For example, organizations with a mandate to helping strengthen weak parliamentary capacity, such as the National Democratic Institute, could be supported by a PBF ‘Friend’ to gap fill in this area. It may also be beneficial to allow CSOs and national government ministries to apply for PBF funding supporting directly, without having to go through a UN partner agency.

Key message 10: Lasting capacity-building involves support to accountability mechanisms, including parliament and civil society organizations. PBF-funded projects have tended to prioritize the strengthening of government institutions, but not accountability mechanisms. Parliamentary capacity and strengthened oversight mechanisms are required to pass new laws/bills, amend existing laws/bills, and ratify new policy/strategy documents and decrees which, amongst other things, outline the roles and responsibilities of security sector actors. Support for oversight and accountability mechanisms should be considered by all peacebuilding projects. The UN should ensure that parliament is represented on the JSC. It should also consider allowing CSOs and national government ministries to apply to the PBF directly for funds supporting potential SSR projects. If funding does not permit for a significant investment supporting accountability mechanisms, other partners – possibly through a ‘Friends of the PBF’ forum – should be advised of areas where additional funding (or existing programmes) could help ‘gap-fill’ for the PBF, and produce catalytic effects. The limits of the PBF need to be recognized. The utility of the JSC, and the depth of the consolidated analysis it produces, should not be used only to inform short-term PBF projects.

The value in sharing experiences across and between PBF recipient countries

60. As Burundi and Sierra Leone were the first recipients of PBF funding, these national experiences did not benefit from input from the experiences of other previous recipients of PBF funding. However, a reasonable exchange between these two countries emerged which has been described by some respondents as having been very constructive for knowledge sharing on common issues such as preparations for elections, PBF review processes, and issues relating to national reconciliation. In terms of the latter, a number of respondents referred to the utility in bringing like-minded societies together to discuss approaches to reconciliation in the African context. This, it was felt, was significantly different to the reconciliation experiences and approaches to ‘forgiveness’ of western European states and North America.

61. It is also important to note the parallel contribution made by the International Dialogue and the emerging discussions on peacebuilding and statebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected states. Respondents in both CAR and Guinea spoke of how they benefitted from the south-south dialogue which took place through the International Dialogue involving the G-7+, particularly that which was exchanged at the meeting in Dili, Timor-Leste. This aligns with the issue raised in the literature review which analysed the current research efforts of the OECD’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility and the need for the outcome of this study, and particularly the implications for achieving the peacebuilding goals envisaged in the ‘New Deal’, to help inform the future work of the PBC.

\textsuperscript{51} See PBF/GUI/B-3 (2012)
Key message 11: Due to the different societal norms and traditions – and based on the different national security priorities impacting on southern-based developing countries - where possible, peacebuilding interventions should be supported by south-south dialogue. Other south-south peacebuilding forums, such as the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, should also be used by the PBC to facilitate the sharing of southern experience and knowledge.

Evaluating cost-effectiveness of PBF-funded SSR activities

62. In the absence of a PBSO agreed definition of ‘cost-effectiveness, this thematic review considers ‘cost effectiveness’ to be defined as a PBF project which meets its stated objectives and produces an optimal level of catalytic effects and sustainable outcomes. In this context, Table 6 below provides data on a number of projects which were considered to be most cost-effective.

Figure 5 – Cost-effective PBF-funded SSR projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>INVESTMENT (US$)</th>
<th>REASONS WHY PROJECT WAS COST-EFFECTIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PBF/BDI/B-2 - Barracking of the FDN to reduce the impact of their presence within the population</td>
<td>4,812,150</td>
<td>• funding only covered 12/14 barracks and remaining funds were covered by Dutch Government funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• element of complementary ‘software’ delivered by PBF/BDI/B-5, “Promotion of discipline and improvement of relationships between the FDN and the population and PBF/BDI/A-5 “Support to the social reintegration of displaced families living in barracks” and PBF/BDI/A-6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• some of the training curriculum supporting the PBF/BDI/B-5 project was integrated by the FDN into its regular curriculum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/GIN/B-4 – Biometric Census of Defence Forces</td>
<td>3,035,343</td>
<td>• project produced data in a timely, effective way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• project data was later used to inform SSR plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• the project helped to ensure that 4,000 men recruited during Dadis Camary period and 3,000 (mainly young) men on the country’s borders were without matriculation numbers. This then informed the PBF-funded reinsertion project (PBF/GIN/D-1 “Economic insertion of young people and vulnerable women”) which involved about 2,000 young people who were armed and who had been trained with handling weapons. As these individuals were no longer paid, it was necessary to provide them with some support for employment and social reinsertion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Number</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/GIN/EMER-3 – Support for the PROCONSOGUI</td>
<td>The project helped to officially ‘initiate’ peacebuilding and was followed by one similar project (PBF/GIN/H-1- Support inclusive and sustainable dialogue) and by another project dedicated to mediation. Six other follow-on BBF-funded were informed by the PROCONSOGUI dialogue. The project therefore had a catalytic effect on the design of approximately 8 other PBF projects. These projects were linked and complemented each other.</td>
<td>• the project helped to officially ‘initiate’ peacebuilding and was followed by one similar project (PBF/GIN/H-1- Support inclusive and sustainable dialogue) and by another project dedicated to mediation. Six other follow-on BBF-funded were informed by the PROCONSOGUI dialogue. The project therefore had a catalytic effect on the design of approximately 8 other PBF projects. These projects were linked and complemented each other. • as a result of this project, SSR was identified as a priority by consensus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/SLE/B-7 - Support to ONS</td>
<td>• Project enhanced capacity for early warning, communication, coordination and enhanced community engagement. • Project combined with another PBF-funding initiative that raised the participation levels (and leadership) of women in security-related decision-making forums. • ONS is currently expanding these efforts to cater for all regions and not only the 7 border regions. • ONS has continued to support representatives from each community and has made these representatives feel part of the formal GoSL security architecture. • ONS has continued to support fuel and reparation requirements for the motorbikes provided to the community representatives.</td>
<td>1,572,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBF/IRF/21 - Support to the GoSL police and the armed forces</td>
<td>• Project sustained itself on a Government-funded basis. • Project expanded its ongoing scope to include joint exercises, and the inclusion of other sectoral actors beyond the police and the military. • Project helped facilitated the development of joint doctrine and guidance, such as the GoSL Handbook on ‘Military Assistance to the Civil Powers’ (MACP).</td>
<td>891,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Recommendations**

**Recommendation 1: Funding in support of national dialogue processes** - Due to the catalytic effects felt by the national dialogue processes in 4 of the case studies examined in the review, where possible, the PBF funding for SSR should prioritize support for a national dialogue on peacebuilding. The JSC should evaluate the extent to which a national dialogue process has been developed. It is sometimes the case that a national dialogue on SSR will precede a national dialogue on peacebuilding. In this case, PBF funding could be used to support the continuity of this dialogue in a way that reaches all regions of a country, and in a way that broadens the dialogue beyond SSR to issues relating to wider governance, social cohesion and socio-economic development; considerations which are important for both longer-term SSR and peacebuilding. Lessons from the past have demonstrated that funding in support of national dialogue is often difficult to leverage. The PBF could add significant value-added to this important prerequisite for comprehensive SSR.

**Recommendation 2: Potential IRF projects should be given formal consideration in PPPs** - Based on the fluid strategic environment in which SSR takes place, PPPs should make recommendations for contingency projects which could anticipate areas where emergencies or blockages could occur (e.g., forthcoming elections, instability in particular regions, etc.). The IRF has made an invaluable, and innovative, contribution to the sustainability of national SSR programmes and thus should be given formal consideration in planning documents. IRF funding that may be required in advance of PPPs being finalized could be used for supporting national dialogue processes as described above in recommendation 1) above. IRF funding should also be considered as a way of facilitating the development of cross-sectoral relationships, and as a way of providing a forum (or perhaps a ‘retreat’?) for national middle and senior security sector leaders to support the sharing of knowledge and good practice.

**Recommendation 3: PBF planning should draw on the support of security sector’s planning capacity** - PBF-funded SSR projects should draw on what can sometimes be described as a good level of initial national planning capacity both the security and development sectors in order to produce synergies and to help expand this planning capacity to other government ministries. Based on increasing evidence that security planning communities are slowly merging with development planning communities, depending on the stage of post-conflict SSR, there is a likelihood that a further expansion in this embryonic planning capacity will be well-positioned (i.e., as a result of the production of a National Security Review and/or a Poverty Reduction Strategy) to address issues beyond SSR relating to social cohesion, governance and socio-economic development. Where these planning exercises precede peacebuilding planning, the national planning capacity should also be drawn on in order to support the development of a conflict analysis. The initial planning capacity within both the security and development communities should be used to inform the work of the JSC, and the prioritization and appropriate sequencing of proposed PBF priorities. Project evaluation criteria should include the need to address the cross-impacts of the project on other non-conventional security ministries.

**Recommendation 4: Conflict analyses and project prioritization should address the critical linkages between the justice and the security sectors** - Conflict analyses undertaken by the JSC should seek to address the gaps in the critical linkages between the justice and security sectors. In order to ensure a degree of coherency across the development of both sectors, these gaps should be used to inform and evaluate SSR-related proposals for PBF funding. Ensuring that police training curricula support the requirements of the justice sector – and the development of reliable knowledge systems which consolidate data which is central to the functioning of both sectors, provide two of many examples of projects which could build better coherency between security and criminal justice.

**Recommendation 5: Ensuring an element of ‘software’ in ‘hardware-driven’ projects** - In the interest of project sustainability, optimal impact and catalytic effects, PBF projects which fund SSR ‘hardware’ should seek to ensure that some form of ‘software element’ is built into the project proposal. Examples of ‘software’ could include additional awareness training on issues relating to democratic government and management, perhaps involving a relevant accountability mechanism (e.g., a parliamentary committee) to oversee and evaluate the progress in training. Where appropriate, PBF funding disbursements could be tranched into two phases, with further funding for ‘hardware’ becoming contingent on progress made on the ‘software’ project elements.
Recommendation 6: Addressing the importance of ‘grass-roots’ engagement and grass-roots ‘outreach’ for SSR-related PBF projects – Due to the critical role played by ‘grass-roots’ organizations in peacebuilding, UN PBSO should include a provision for both grass-roots ‘engagement’ and grass-roots ‘outreach’ in the criteria used to evaluate proposed peacebuilding projects and programmes. The national Strategic Framework Concept document, and the conflict analysis informing SSR-related peacebuilding projects, should clarify what is understood to be a ‘grass-roots’ organization in the national context. If a PBF-funded SSR engagement does not allow grass-roots CSOs to access PBF funding, they will disengage as CSOs cannot afford to advise/inform peacebuilding processes “out of pocket”.

Recommendation 7: Ensuring that PBF-funding develops capacity in functions on which it will rely in the future – PPPs should consider the existing procurement, administrative and financial management capacity of the recipient government to support elements of project implementation. Indigenous capacity that can meet the ‘stress test’ should be used to support implementation. Where capacity is too weak to play a leading role in elements of peacebuilding projects, a capacity-building element supporting these implementation functions should form one of the project objectives and thus be included in the project evaluation criteria. Duplication of competent implementation, governance and oversight mechanisms should be avoided at all costs.

Recommendation 8: Ensuring that peacebuilding monitoring and evaluation does not get lost at the technical level – The recommendations of an earlier evaluation of the PBF have called for PBF-funded interventions to be ‘more strategic’. This would necessitate the development of clear strategic peacebuilding objectives (as opposed to ‘themes’ only) and require a degree of coherence between strategic objectives and programme/project goals. Clarity on these issues will provide better indicators for evaluation and will cater for the development of a ‘results chain’. UN PBSO should ensure that the project reports and narratives accessible through the ‘MDTF Gateway’ comment on the extent to which projects are supporting their intended outcomes and impacts. This does not necessarily reflect current practice across existing project reports.

Recommendation 9: Ensuring that PBF-funded SSR projects support national capacity development, particularly in the area of ‘accountability’ – The analysis produced by the JSC that supports the Strategic Framework concept and the PPP should include an assessment of national capacity for peacebuilding. Research findings informing this paper indicate that a lack of accountability mechanisms, which form an important part of capacity development, can undermine progressive capacity development initiatives elsewhere across the security sector. In this context, PBF programmes should consider current levels of accountability in priority project areas. As such, it is recommended that Strategic Concept documents produced by the JSC consider the effectiveness of current accountability mechanisms – such as Parliamentary and civil society capacity - in each of the priority areas it identifies. In addition, guidance for the submission of PBF project proposals should require all applicants to elaborate on the project’s potential to support (or have a ‘catalytic effect’ on) the four above-mentioned areas for capacity development.

Support for oversight and accountability mechanisms should be considered by all peacebuilding projects. If funding does not permit for a significant investment supporting accountability mechanisms, other partners – possibly through a ‘Friends of the PBF’ forum – should be advised of areas where additional funding (or existing programmes) could help ‘gap-fill’ for the PBF, and produce catalytic effects. The limits of the PBF need to be recognized. The utility of the JSC, and the depth of the consolidated analysis it produces, should not be used only to inform short-term PBF projects.

In the case where civil society organizations are weak, PBF funding should consider an element of support for the development of a civil society network (through, for example, the provision of seed funding for network secretariats) and ensure that CSOs (perhaps through the network) are engaged with the oversight and monitoring/reviewing functions for all PBF-funded projects. Where respondents felt that national mechanisms could be used more efficiently to support project implementation, most government respondents welcomed a role for CSOs in the project oversight.

Recommendation 10: The provision of support for integrated project services – Based on the high number of implementation problems and delays in project completion that came as a result of procurement or project management-related challenges, UN PBSO should leverage existing UN expertise in project management and procurement.

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52 Ball and van Beijnum, op. cit.
The ISC concept proved useful in Burundi, particularly in light of the Government’s lack of procurement, contracting and project management experience. This important capacity is central to the management of future projects that support all areas of peacebuilding beyond SSR. Further research should examine good practice and lessons learned drawn from the ISC experience in both Cape Verde and Burundi and be used to inform recommendations for PBF project implementation capacity.

**Recommendation 11:** The provision of ‘good practice’ and more strategic guidance supporting SSR in the context of peacebuilding – Lessons from the PBC’s in-country experience should be channelled into the current and ongoing International Dialogue on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding. The g7+ forum should also be used for the purposes of shared knowledge and experience in peacebuilding. The OECD’s INCAF Secretariat could provide and excellent mechanism for the dissemination of PBF-related reviews, good practice and lessons. This support should draw on existing SSR ‘good practice’ and be complemented by UN-funded ‘south-south’ exchanges between PBF-recipient countries.

UN PBSO and the other members of the Inter-Agency SSR Task Force (IASSRTF), which is co-chaired by DPKO and UNDP, should work closely to develop a number of ‘guidance notes’ which support a more strategic approach to peacebuilding as part of the set of guidance notes currently under development. Such ‘guidance notes’ could include, for example, ‘Strategic peacebuilding and SSR: The Role of the PBC and PBF’; ‘The contribution of SSR to the PRSP process’; ‘The relationship between SSR and Peacebuilding’; ‘Comprehensive vs. component-based approaches to SSR’; and ‘Challenges to Longer-term SSR’. These more ‘strategic frameworks’ and guidance will also help stimulate a broader, more strategic-level, debate on the future of UN peacebuilding.

As the IASSRTF is currently developing guidance notes which largely focus on the UN’s strategic level engagement in the provision of SSR assistance – and which make the link between issues such as governance and SSR, and peace agreement and SSR – the UN should consider disaggregating responsibilities for guidance note development between PBSO (to focus on the strategic level issues) and the IASSRT (to focus more on how-to, operational-level guidance).
Bibliography


ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 – DRAFT METHODOLOGY FOR THE PBF THEMATIC REVIEWS ............................................. 42
ANNEX 2 – FINAL QUESTION SET SUPPORTING THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR THE CASE STUDY FIELDWORK ................................................................................................. 45
ANNEX 3 – PBF FUNDING ALLOCATIONS FOR SSR ACTIVITIES ...................................................... 46
ANNEX 4 – LITERATURE REVIEW: SSR AND PEACEBUILDING. .................................................... 47
ANNEX 1 – DRAFT METHODOLOGY FOR THE PBF THEMATIC REVIEWS

Thematic Review Aims and Outputs

The thematic reviews aim to identify promising practices and processes in key sectors, and in particular, to identify the factors that contributed towards making programmatic sectoral interventions relevant, catalytic and sustainable for peacebuilding. These cross-country studies will be based on desk and field research, drawing lessons learned that contribute to greater understanding about the:

1) Effectiveness and strategic relevance of current PBF sectoral funding practices to inform better future selection;
2) Added value, comparative advantage and best strategic positioning of PBF’s funding arrangements from a more thematic and programmatic, rather than project-based view, aiming for a more lasting peacebuilding impact; and
3) Sector relevance and comparative advantage of UN engagement for the peacebuilding process in particular contexts, and considerations that might inform future decision-making.

The following outputs are envisaged:

1) Promising practices and processes in peacebuilding, especially of a programmatic nature, within the respective sector;
2) Identification of factors that are deemed to have contributed to effective and strategically relevant sectoral peacebuilding interventions; and
3) Recommendations drawn from analysis of PBF’s strategic positioning in the contexts examined, for specific criteria or questions that PBF can integrate into its guidance and procedures to help identify projects that have potential to provide a lasting impact in terms of peacebuilding.

The studies will contribute to PBSO’s mandate as defined in the founding resolutions, which asks PBSO to identify “best practices with respect to cross-cutting peacebuilding issues”. This role has been given further shape and clarity by the Policy Committee53 and in the more recent reviews of the Peacebuilding Architecture and the PBF54, which have collectively stressed the need to develop knowledge products in partnership with and for the benefit of the UN system as a whole.

Outline of SSR study

1. Executive Summary
2. Background and rationale
   a) Background to thematic reviews, including the objectives, scope and specifics on intended outcomes and way forward, i.e. processes that recommendations will feed into
   b) PBF’s approach to SSR support (past and present, objectives, rationale, funding patterns), and key challenges and questions that prompted the review
   c) Research approach, contributing agencies and methodology used throughout the review process
3. Review of current thinking on SSR-peacebuilding linkages

53 Secretary-General’s Policy Committee decision of 22 May 2007.
54 OIOS Inspection and Evaluation Division, Evaluation Report, 30 December 2008, Recommendation 6, p. 27.
(Desk review and interviews with key SSR practitioners from various agencies)

a) United Nations policy discussions and programming (linkages with peacebuilding conceptually and operationally overall, and with respect to key sectors, such as SSR and economic recovery, and to cross-cutting issues such as youth and gender); past program evaluations, reviews, lessons learned studies, etc.

b) Wider SSR scholarly and practice literature on the linkages (methodological and conceptual frameworks that help us understand the linkages)

c) Policy and comparative advantages/ mandates of key stakeholders in SSR processes and peacebuilding linkages

4. Examination of SSR programs

a) Field research (two-three case studies will be selected on the basis of agreed criteria)\textsuperscript{55}

b) Desk study of existing program reviews, evaluations, etc.

c) Interviews at HQ level with key stakeholders involved in the relevant programs

5. Key findings of study (sections 3 and 4)

a) Promising practices and key challenges for SSR and peacebuilding

b) Evolving consensus areas and knowledge/practice gaps

c) Sectoral coherence and synergies with other sectors for aggregate peacebuilding impact

6. Implications for PBF Strategic Positioning

7. Recommendations (as identified across the research and cases)

a) for specific criteria or questions that PBF can integrate into its guidance and procedures

b) for the wider UN SSR community to consider in planning and implementation of SSR activities in support of peacebuilding

UN Agency Participation

PBSO invites agency participation in this thematic review, knowing that agencies are doing their own work in this area that the study can greatly benefit from. UNDP and DPKO are offering technical and strategic support, although the form is yet to be determined. Together, we have developed a proposal for ISSAT to contribute a consultant, and we are adapting the proposal to endeavor to meet their mandate more fully to benefit from their services.

We hope that agencies with interest in peacebuilding linkages with their SSR work can participate in the following ways:

- Support the methodology development and the overall review of literature and practice
- Seek to ensure that the study benefits from their own evaluations, ongoing studies, and field staff working on programs that should be highlighted in the study
- Review drafts and support a collective effort to map findings and recommendations

\textsuperscript{55} Mission type; Recipient agencies; Hardware and Software; Existence of other evaluations/quality; “Best” and “Worst” Practice; Number of projects; Timing; Joint Engagement; Thematic linkages.
Ideally, agencies interested in the study will consider appointing a focal point for this work that can advise the SSR consultant and senior consultant overseeing the reviews. If other agencies wish to participate in the field research of particular cases, with their staff and/or through support of a local or international consultant, this would be welcome.

**Timeline**

- January – consolidate overall research strategy and agency participation, as well as background / rationale; development of ToR and comparative case examination; literature review;
- February – Case study field work;
- March – drafting of full report - circulate, agree on recommendations.

Submit: April 15 2011
ANNEX 2 – FINAL QUESTION SET SUPPORTING THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR THE CASE STUDY FIELDWORK

A. Strategic approach, depth/breadth of analysis and interdependencies between SSR and Peacebuilding

1. To what extent do the priorities for peacebuilding and the priorities for SSR converge? To what extent are these programmatic areas mutually dependent and reinforcing?

2. For whom is SSR a priority in the respective countries: the national government, the country as a whole (government and civil society – elite and representative), or the international community only (UN, multi-lateral and bilateral)?

3. How have SSR and peacebuilding priorities been informed? Through what analytical process and/or from which national strategy/policy documents fora? To what extent have these processes been consultative, iterative (i.e. conflict sensitive, flexible and adaptable to respond to changing political economy, etc.) and considered issues related to gender and youth?

4. How critical is SSR for peacebuilding in that specific context? What are the linkages between SSR and peacebuilding (this should stand out in the country’s peacebuilding strategy or programme)?

B. Management of SSR and Peacebuilding programmes

1. What are the inputs and activities supporting the programme? What are the outputs and outcomes? In your opinion, is the rationale and logic across the ‘value chain’ (i.e., inputs-activities-outputs-outcomes) sound? If not, identify areas where a tighter linkage is required. Is impact easy to measure?

2. What are the strategic and programme management mechanisms in place to support: a) SSR, and b) peacebuilding? Are these mechanisms coordinated, mutually reinforcing or competing/unhelpful?

3. How were the projects funded by the PBF prepared, reviewed and approved? Are they part of a broader programme or standalone activities?

4. To what extent have countries eligible for PBF funding benefited from the experiences of their predecessors?

C. Capacity development for both SSR and Peacebuilding

1. Are UN missions/country teams able to obtain guidance readily on the challenges they may face as they support national authorities on peacebuilding initiatives?

2. Are national structures able to obtain the necessary guidance?

3. Is the UN configuration in a given country adequately equipped to support the implementation of PBF funded projects?

4. Are DPKO programme and administrative staff able to receive the training and guidance they need to successfully support the implementation of PBF projects (as UNDP regulations, rules and procedures govern PBF funded projects)?

5. To what extent are PBF-funded SSR related projects upholding accepted SSR standards, policy and practice?

6. Are the in-country representatives of the PBC members who are part of the relevant country configuration actively engaged? Is there an effective ‘feedback loop’?
ANNEX 3 – PBF FUNDING ALLOCATIONS FOR SSR ACTIVITIES

Burundi projects (excluding emergency window)

- Democratic Governance: 60%
- Security: 29%
- Human Rights: 8%
- Emergency Window: 2%
- Property & Land: 1%
ANNEX 4 – LITERATURE REVIEW: SSR AND PEACEBUILDING

Introduction

Reviewing the literature on linkages between SSR and peacebuilding exposes a lack of scholarly thinking in this area. While the general debate on SSR has been united with other intervention discourse such as rule of law and stabilisation, no meaningful discussion has been undertaken on the relationship between SSR and peacebuilding. However, in accessing a small number of sources, and the ‘grey literature’ which includes peacebuilding evaluations and project reports, a number of linkages are exposed. This data helps evolve the current debate on peacebuilding which is still considered to be ‘underdeveloped’. In this context, this short literature review will cover current thinking which supports SSR and peacebuilding separately. It will then address a number of key areas where the two concepts meet, and where further efforts supporting the strategic development of peacebuilding could respond to current challenges for SSR.

Developments in the SSR debate

SSR as a concept

Since the early debate on SSR which emerged in the late 1990s, the concept has evolved to becoming a wide programmatic approach to donor-funded and ‘homegrown’ efforts to build more accountable, well-governed and operationally effective security sectors. In this context, and although the debate on SSR has become rooted in the post-conflict experience, SSR is practised and applied across a range of transitional societies including developing, middle incomes and developed states. This represents a fundamental difference between SSR and peacebuilding in that the latter focuses mainly (and some would argue, only) on post-conflict and conflict-affected states. However, this distinction is important as post-conflict SSR brings about an enormity of challenges that SSR – on its own – is unable to tackle. Moreover, and underscored in later sections, non-conventional security institutions emerge as important actors in supporting long-term SSR and have typically not been targeted by international SSR assistance programmes.

The coming together of cross-policy strands which supported SSR work provided sufficient evidence to support the important relationship between security and development. As a result, a number of policy documents were produced on this subject, most notably the UK Government’s 2005 DFID Paper entitled “Fighting to Build a Safer World: A strategy for security and development” (DFID, 2005). However, as different scholars (Collier, et al., 2003, Stewart, 2004) attempted to produce empirical evidence on the underpinnings of this relationship, some doubt was cast on the extent to which ‘critical connections’ between the two fields could be established (Tschirgi, Lund and Mancini, 2010). A paper produced by the International Peace Academy in 2005 stated that there were still significant gaps between both policy and research, and knowledge and practice; and that preventive (vs reactive) approaches were required to address these gaps (Ibid., 2005).

In the face of this empirical challenge, other scholars (Fitz-Gerald, 2004; Chandler, 2010; Rostock, et al., 2011) have analysed the positive contributions made by institutional and structural developments which occurred as a result of calls for ‘joined-up’ and ‘Whole of Government Approaches’ (OECD, 2006) to address the relationship between security and development. These trends were important in building cross-government relationships and in evolving a less traditional cadre of international development actors who appeared more comfortable about dealing with security actors and institutions. To a certain extent, evidence of in-country cross-Government and cross-community relationships has now emerged in the more recently published Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) of low-income countries which expose the strategic relevance of governance, security and conflict resolution to development.56

‘Stabilisation’ also emerged as a new post-conflict agenda in 2004; an agenda that has been described by some as being ‘open-ended’ and, as a result, one that has left itself open to different interpretations by the communities

56 For more information, see the most recent PRSP documents for Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Uganda.
who contribute to these operations (Collinson, Elhaway, Muggah, 2010). The concept has also been critiqued for being discussed solely in the ‘post-conflict’ context (and not the wider political-economic context) and for the way in which it remains so generally defined (Fitz-Gerald, 2009). When analysed in parallel to the scholarly debate on SSR, it becomes clear that, while there are many similarities between the two concepts, their simultaneous practice remains problematic, particular in terms of ensuring that security sector ‘stabilisation’ interventions are guided by strategic SSR principles (Sedra, 2009).

The concept of SSR has also been discussed in the context of other intervention debates such as ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘statebuilding’. Based on its development origins, and its commitment to cross-Government conflict prevention, SSR enjoyed wider support from the security-related government departments of most donor countries. However, short-term stabilisation requirements very quickly monopolised the SSR effort and reinforced SSR’s brand as a ‘post-conflict’ instrument. Although recognition was given to the difficulties of generating political interest and popular support for conflict prevention, efforts to re-establish the importance of conflict prevention have emerged in the United Kingdom, where ideas have been developed on ‘upstream prevention’ (UK Government, 2011) as an instrument to steer the well-funded stabilisation agenda in support of wider foreign policy priorities. In light of emerging research on the increasing incidence of conflict in middle-income states (World Bank, 2011) and the greater potential role for these states in conflict prevention (OECD, 2012; Fitz-Gerald and Macnamara, 2012), demand increased for more conceptual and practical developments in this area.

The discussion on SSR and statebuilding has also emerged with some interesting insights which expose the limitations of SSR interventions. Egnell and Halden discuss the difficulties of undertaking SSR in states where an element of ‘statelessness’ exists; and reinforce the need to identify the degree of ‘stateness’ in a country prior to initiating SSR (Egnell and Halden, 2009). Another study on national security processes in Afghanistan highlights the limitations on conventional SSR practices in states with prominent traditional security systems (Hamilton-Baillie and Dennys, 2011). A study undertaken in 2010 by the US Institute of Peace (USIP) reported on the difficulties of supporting justice sector development in the context of conventional SSR when approximately when most of the justice in Afghanistan is non-state (USIP, 2010). These arguments expose the need for future SSR approaches to adopt a more grass-roots approach to promote ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ SSR. In this context, the ongoing work on ‘conflict sensitive approaches’ to SSR serves as a positive development in this area (Saferworld, 2009).

SSR has also been discussed in the context of thematic areas such as DDR and Rule of Law. A number of analysts have commented on the conceptual similarities, differences and interdependencies between SSR and DDR (Bryden, 2007; W. A Knight, 2009; M. Knight, 2009). However, all infer that SSR programmes, on their own, are not sufficiently equipped to manage the economic, development and reconciliation-related workstreams required to support DDR. In terms of rule of law, Chuter cautions the international community in its rather hasty promotion of ‘rule of law’ as a programmatic instrument and not something which should represent a fundamental core value of society (Chuter, 2011). Other authors in this area such as Hills and Baker focus mainly on the international policing element of SSR, yet often link this to the general concept of ‘rule of law’ (Hills, 2012; Hills, 2009; Baker, 2002).

Guidance and Frameworks supporting SSR

Undoubtedly, the work of the multilateral policy community made an enormous contribution to the continued evolution and practice of SSR. In 2005, the OECD-DAC developed Guidelines on Security System Reform, which were endorsed by the Ministers of member states and aid agencies. Notable in the content of the Guidelines was an emphasis on extending the dialogue for SSR beyond the government, as well as the vital roles for parliaments and civil society groups to play as advocates, watchdogs and providers of knowledge on policy issues and citizens’ needs (OECD, 2005). The importance of this extended and inclusive dialogue was also reinforced by the research findings of the 2011 World Development Report, which evidenced an important linkage between the relative success of institutional transformation and the inclusion of a plurality of actors (World Bank, 2011, p.23). In addition to successive meetings held by the donor community to discuss a common understanding and practical application of the Guidelines,

57 Guidance notes on ‘Security Sector Stabilisation’ and ‘Security Sector Reform and Stabilisation’ have been produced by the UK Government’s Stabilisation Unit (at the time the ‘Post-conflict reconstruction unit’) in 2006 and the ISSAT in 2011.
the way in which the Guidelines shaped and informed national policy and practice also demonstrated the value of this policy advocacy approach. For example, in 2009, the Government of Canada developed its own ‘SSR Guidelines’ which were largely based on the OECD-DAC publication but with one additional guideline which recognized the linkage between overseas assistance and Canada’s domestic security priorities (DFAT, 2011).

Following a two-year consultation period, the development of the OECD-DAC Guidelines in 2005 was taken to a further level in 2007 with the publication of the OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (OECD, 2007). The purpose of the Handbook was to examine the practical challenges in the implementation of SSR and to make security and justice delivery more effective. The Handbook exists electronically and has been translated into many different languages, which has helped to further socialize ideas and lessons from the global SSR experience. It serves as a vehicle that preserves the SSR knowledge and experience built up since the late 1990s and still features as a reference for international training programmes. Its text has informed the development of wider international policy on SSR, both in the European Union and the United Nations, the latter of which released the UN Secretary-General’s Report in January 2008 entitled “Securing peace and development: The role of the United Nations in supporting Security Sector Reform” (UN, 2008). The UN’s endorsement of SSR gave the concept serious international profile which further mainstreamed SSR norms and principles across UN member states.

Notwithstanding some of the funding limitations, the above chronology of SSR strategic conceptual and policy-related developments suggests that the wider community of SSR policymakers and practitioners is reasonably well-served with normative frameworks, guidance and repositories of lessons learned and research to date. Consistent across these approaches are the calls for wide inclusive approaches to SSR which involve a broad range of civil society actors. Throughout this period, these ideas and concepts have been further socialized by a plethora of academic conferences, online debates and the production of edited volumes which address SSR research gaps and new applications.

**Strategic approaches to SSR**

There has also been an increasing recognition of the value of using broader national security consultations and national security policy/strategy development exercises to inform more specific and priority areas for further SSR assistance. The utility of these exercises was demonstrated by the development of the Security Policy Framework in Uganda in 2002; the development of a National Security Policy in Jamaica between 2005 and 2007; the Kosovo Internal Security Sector Review in 2005-2006; and the national security policy consultations in Botswana during 2008 and 2009. In all cases, the perceived need for assistance in one part of the security sector led to a proposal for a broader analysis to be used to inform ways in which support could be best channelled. This approach has proven to be effective in drawing in support from a wider cross-Government community, as well as civil society groups and traditional leaders. For example, religious leaders in Jamaica proved invaluable for identifying root causes of gang-related criminal violence; tribal leaders were effective in raising the security concerns of communities in rural locations in Botswana; and academics were effective at drawing on their own research and empirical evidence bases to analyse security concerns in Uganda. These approaches resonate with the principles provided in SSR guidance, such as wide consultations and local-ownership; and, moreover, the outcomes of these processes are often successful at influencing the work of a range of bilateral and multilateral actors working in the country, including wider development interests. Having said this, the 2011 World Development Report indicates that much of the assistance for priority development tasks remain slow, in particular where best-fit needs on the ground fall outside the regular donor boxes (World Bank, 2011, p. 190).

The wealth of normative frameworks and well-supported strategic guidance supporting SSR has also enjoyed good levels of ‘public relations’ across the international donor community and civil society. As a result, some would argue that SSR has developed into something more strategic than it actually is, and that its sheer breadth and depth accounts for the extent to which it has become popularised as a concept. However, the benefits of popularising the concept, profiling the concept through academic research and international conferences, empowering SSR regional networks throughout the developing south and having multilateral (i.e., OECD and UN) and bilateral (i.e., UK and the Netherlands) who have ‘championed’ the SSR agenda lends to the concept’s global eminence.
One could also make the assumption that these longer-term approaches to SSR should take a more strategic approach in line with broader development strategies and international development frameworks (such as the PRSP) although there is currently no published literature evidencing this link. One challenge to this SSR approach is the difficulty in engaging more conventional security sector actors from the outset and the tendency for the international development community to work with like-minded partners and conventional development ‘tools’, many of which are not easily transferable to the more traditional security domain (Fitz-Gerald, 2010). The net result of this parallel engagement is that the work of security and development communities does not often merge together and become mutually supportive and reinforcing. Therefore, the problem is not only related to the poor consideration of development objectives by SSR actors, but also poor SSR considerations of development actors. Both need to develop a better understanding of each other, and the frameworks and modus operandi which guide their respective approaches.

Lastly, SSR activities are often linked to the text of international peace agreements and the obligation on the part of one or more parties to the peace agreement to undertake ‘SSR’. As part of the 1997 Conakry Peace Plan to end the conflict in Sierra Leone, the seven-point peace plan devised for the early return of constitutional governance in Sierra Leone included the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants; the same approach was taken during the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, which saw the 2002 Sun City Peace Accord mandating the UN Special Envoy to oversee the DDR and resettlement of armed groups (ICG, 2002). Other examples could also be discussed, such as the Bonn Agreement which called for the rebuilding of Afghanistan’s domestic justice system; the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, which called for the interim formation of integrated units of 21,000 soldiers; and the peace agreements of the 5 case studies discussed later in this report.

Although many of the DDR and security-related initiatives embodied in peace agreements have implications for, and require support from, development actors, neither are conditions not always favourable for broader development programmes to support security reforms, nor are these linkages between security and development requirements spelled out in most peace agreements. In most immediate post-conflict stabilisation and early recovery interventions, long-term development goals are often not considered until a certain degree of institutional capacity to manage and oversee development work is created. In addition, more traditional development donors will also be restricted in terms of contributing to post-peace agreement SSR activities in unstable and high-risk environments.

A number of different approaches characterise the way in which SSR activities become initiated on the ground. While it is often the case that defence-related initiatives signal the need for a more strategic level national security review (as was the case in Botswana in 2007 and Uganda in 2002), more strategic approaches which support the development of national strategic policy frameworks have demonstrated reasonable levels of success at creating inclusive approaches from the outset which feature a plurality of actors. In addition, these approaches offer the greatest likelihood of development activities being coordinated with security considerations, and ‘front-loaded’ into planning for SSR activities.

A recent research project undertaken by the author is also worth a mention. In further investigating the origins of strategic SSR processes in-country, the case studies of Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste and Uganda were examined to evaluate the extent to which normative SSR frameworks are applied in practice, and to determine the strategic ‘success’ factors underpinning meaningful SSR. The findings exposed the planning competencies found in both the security and development communities but also the failure in two of the three cases studied for these planning communities to be brought together. In the case where these communities were brought together (Sierra Leone), the paper concluded that more effective analysis was produced to inform both the national security policy and the PRSP. Moreover, the close involvement of the wider development planning community in the national security dialogue led to the production of a draft national security policy (still undergoing review) which ‘front-loaded’ development priorities such as the modernisation of the education system, the development of road and rail infrastructure and the development of a national registration system (Fitz-Gerald, 2011). These findings provide evidence of the centrality of development programmes in SSR and reassert the importance of the development ‘roots’ (Van Veen, 2008; Schnabel and Farr, 2011) underpinning SSR.

However, bridging the security and development communities becomes difficult when SSR programmes designed to ‘stabilise’ post-conflict countries are designed with a predominant emphasis on ‘train and equip’ programmes (see
As an environment becomes more stable, and as the emphasis expands to prioritizing the development of well-governed institutions, a wider international assistance community is required to manage this effort. Such management and coordination is also important as initial SSR efforts are then left to the management of indigenous organizations with perhaps funding for only a limited number of discreet areas (i.e., justice sector development) continuing. Ongoing research also suggests that weaknesses which emerge across a range of ‘second tier’ security institutions can impact negatively on the progress of comprehensive SSR programmes (Fitz-Gerald and Conteh, 2012 (forthcoming). This issue infers the need for more thinking to emerge on ‘long-term SSR’, which Michael Brzoska has described as being a critical dilemma for external actors (Brzoska, 2006).

In summary, despite the pre-dominance of cases of post-conflict SSR, the concept supports interventions across a range of different transitional societies. The international community is ‘well-served’ with normative frameworks and strategic guidance for SSR. In addition, as a result of effective strategic communications and the efforts of leading multilateral and bilateral actors, the SSR agenda has achieved global eminence and a high level of political and financial commitment. However, on the basis of its post-conflict experience, SSR does not merge easily with other intervention discourse such as stabilization, conflict prevention, DDR and Rule of Law. The rise of the ‘non-Weberian state’ also poses challenges for SSR as a fundamentally state-centric intervention tool. Having said this, SSR has become more ‘strategic’ as a result of an emphasis placed on wider national security frameworks, and the way in which some of these processes go on to inform national development agenda. A significant challenge in the future will be in sustaining externally-funded ‘comprehensive’ longer-term SSR.

**Developments in the peacebuilding debate**

The definition of ‘peacebuilding’ has been with us in somewhat loose form since the publication of UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace. The document defined peacebuilding as involving “comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people” (UN, 1992). However, the concept itself appeared to be shaded by the debates on well-funded peacekeeping missions - and on Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 ‘peacekeeping’ - which featured during this decade. For this reason, it is not surprising that a number of security practitioners still tend to associate the term ‘peacebuilding’ with issues relating to lines of demarcation and the use of military force.58

In 1997, John Paul Lederach published some compelling research on the various issues and activities that peacebuilding must entail in order to realise the ambitious objectives envisioned in Agenda for Peace. Lederach’s work described peacebuilding in terms of being a process underpinned by a long-term commitment that included investment, the gathering of resources and materials, architecture and planning, coordination of resources and labour, construction and ongoing maintenance (Lederach, 1997). Lederach also appears to be the first scholar that places emphasis on the role of peacebuilding in ‘transforming relationships’ and promoting ‘sustainable reconciliation’. This work was followed by a subsequent definition of peacebuilding being published in the 2000 Report of the Brahimi Panel on peacekeeping reform. This definition referred to “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to assemble the foundation for peace and to provide the tools for building on the foundations something that is more than just the absence of war” (UN, 2000).

Research published in 2003-2004 on conflict and poverty ‘traps’ (Collier et al., 2003 and Collier et al., 2004), the incidence of conflict relapse (SIPRI, 2003) and the costs of conflict relapse (Collier and Chauvet, 2005) continued to influence the ongoing debate on post-conflict peacebuilding. At the 2005 World Summit in New York, a proposal was tabled by the High Panel on threats, challenges and change which proposed the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). It is argued that, to a large extent, this proposal was rationalised and supported by the conflict prevention agendas of a number of donor states such as Canada, Germany and the Nordic countries (Berdal, 2009).

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58 Based on discussions which emerged at a roundtable on linkages between peacebuilding and SSR, hosted and facilitated by ISSAT, Geneva, 17 March 2012 (See report on meeting at annex 3).
Later the same year, the UN General Assembly and the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a multi-year standing Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) for post-conflict peacebuilding. Arrangements for the establishment of the PBF were set out in the Secretary-General’s report Arrangements for establishing the PBF. The PBF’s terms of reference were annexed to the report and identified the governance arrangements as the General Assembly guiding the operations of the PBF and offering policy guidance; a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to support the development of integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; an independent PBF Advisory Group to provide advice and oversight on the speed and appropriateness [and performance] of the fund allocations; and a UN Peacebuilding Support Office (UNPBSO) which, under the authority of the Secretary-General, retains responsibility for the overall management of the PBF; lastly, a Multi-Partner Trust Fund was also created to serve as the administrative agent of the PBF (UN, 2006).

Establishing these UN structures and organs supporting peacebuilding served as a positive step in making the concept of peacebuilding more visible and more tangible. In 2007, the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee stated that “peacebuilding [involved] a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development.” (UN, 2007). An August 2008 report issued by the UN Secretary-General described peacebuilding as consisting of a wide range of activities associated with capacity-building, reconciliation and societal transformation (UN, 2008). This gave rise to a number of clear thematic areas which underpinned the concept. During a 2011 retreat of the Peacebuilding Commission, introductory remarks given by UNDP Administrator Helen Clark underscored that,

“Peacebuilding is a political process. It depends on political will and leadership, but it is about development and supporting societies to recover from conflict. There is no substitute for building national capacities and ownership to make that happen.”

Confusion, inconsistency and incoherence

Even since the establishment of the PBC and PBSO, analysts have continued to raise issues concerning the absence of any universally agreed meaning of peacebuilding (Barnett et al., 2007; Call, 2009; Berdal, 2009; Lappin, 2009; de Coning, 2011). Even since the expansion of the PBC’s activities, Catherine Morris of the Peacemakers’ Trust suggests that the term is still too broadly used and often ill-defined, connoting activities that go beyond crisis intervention such as longer-term development, and building of governance structures and institutions (Morris, 2011).

Beyond the conceptual confusion is also the many different ways in which peacebuilding is understood and practised by the many organizations that sign up to it. As some scholars have suggested, there is no shortage of support for peacebuilding on paper; however, even since the creation of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) the amount of investment supporting peacebuilding is still regarded as low in comparison to the costs of conflict (Barnett et al., 2007). However, a more recent report issued by the World Bank confirmed that “global funds for peacebuilding and statebuilding have also increased in recent years to fill financing support gaps in transition settings”; in this context, the report uses the example of the World Bank’s Statebuilding and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) which is able to augment the PBF in support of longer-term development planning (World Bank, 2011).

In addition to the uncertainties in funding, commentators suggest that some agencies practise long-term peacebuilding, where others engage in short-term interventions only (Berdal, 2009). In 2007, Barnett, et al. carried out a study on 25 organizations, all of which purported to have a mandate for peacebuilding. One of the most interesting, and perhaps concerning, outcomes of the research was in the number of different definitions of peacebuilding, and also in the similarity between the definitions of peacebuilding and the definitions of other post-conflict instruments,

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59 Resolution A/60/180 and the Security Council (Resolution S/RES/1645-2005).
even within the same organizations (e.g., crisis response, post-conflict reconstruction, post-conflict recovery, etc.) (Barnett et al., 2007).

Analysts such as Call and de Coning recognise the differences in mandates and competencies across the agencies examined in the above-mentioned study and suggest that the interpretation of peacebuilding through different organizational lenses has made peacebuilding ‘supply-driven’, as opposed to ‘demand-driven’ (Call, 2009, de Coning, 2011). However, their different perspectives appear to embrace these inevitable differences and infer that such a collection of different perspectives could work in support of peacebuilding. In this context, de Coning suggests that peacebuilding models should remain abreast of different (and sometimes competing) national and organizational interests (de Coning, 2009). This view is in line with that promoted by Donais who suggests the need to promote both ‘liberal’ and ‘communitarian’ peacebuilding in order to optimise local ownership of peacebuilding programmes for the beneficiaries (Donais, 2009). Lappin discusses the ‘transdisciplinarity’ of peacebuilding which, according to his research, results in the kind of innovation which is not naturally encouraged by other intervention instruments (Lappin, 2009).

However, promoting coherence across different ideologies, mandates, competencies, disciplines and organizational interests requires strategic leadership. Berdal suggests that, although the UN remains the dominant actor in peacebuilding, its weak analytical capacity and lack of ‘strategic lens’ renders it incapable of filling this role (Berdal, 2009). Having said this, Benner and Rotman argue that the UN has increasingly become more of a ‘learning organization’ and, as such, should be in a position to make a positive cross-agency contribution to peacebuilding in the future (Benner and Rotman, 2011).

Of the available peer-reviewed literature on peacebuilding, most focused on the evolution of the concept, the organizations and structures which support the concept, and a range of case studies and thematic areas which contributed to peacebuilding objectives. Within this pool of literature, only two articles were identified which commented on the linkages between SSR and peacebuilding. The first was a piece written by Hideaki Shinoda based at Hiroshima University entitled “Towards a Sustainable Strategy of Peacebuilding: An Examination of Negative and Positive Justifications of SSR”. The article argued that SSR could be pursued more positively in accordance with the doctrine of peacebuilding, and that SSR strategy should be examined from the perspective of peacebuilding (Shinoda, 2007). The author grounds his views in the widespread acceptance of the three dimensions of peacebuilding including stability creation, restoration of state institutions and addressing socio-economic dimensions of conflict.

Another article by Sriram et al., discusses the complementarities between peacebuilding and SSR, DDR and transitional justice. In particular, it focuses on some of the synergies created by more technical interventions and suggests that, although we treat these processes separately, they overlap in concept and many of the initiatives can be ‘friendly’ to the promotion of human rights (Sriram et al., 2007). Sriram’s reference to overlapping intervention ‘instruments’ reflects the arguments profiled by Barnett, et al., although the latter work goes further to underscore the creation of good institutional capacity should a priority for peacebuilding (Barnett et al., 2007). More specifically, the paper’s main argument is that the objective of restoring state institutions is often treated as secondary to stability creation and addressing of socio-economic dimensions of conflict when it should take precedence over both (Barnett et al., 2007). This research is further supported by the findings of the individual PBF project evaluations, which indicate that a re-focus is required in support of peacebuilding’s capacity for the security sector. The WDR 2011 corroborates this point by claiming that, “should we fail to grasp just how fundamental security and justice are to the whole enterprise of peacebuilding, the sole beneficiaries of our inattentiveness, and much to their delight—will continue to be organized crime—the very offspring of war itself (World Bank, 2011, p 273).

Within the ‘grey literature’ and the project data on peacebuilding, a number of other trends can be observed. In 2009, Ball and Van Beijnum produced a Review of the Peacebuilding Fund which included fifteen recommendations for improving on the functionality of the PBF. These recommendations included strengthening the strategic focus of PBF funding, ensuring the better prioritization of priorities, and supporting early planning for sustainability. Taken from the intensive review of PBF-recipient countries, these findings further support the arguments in the mainstream literature which call for strategic leadership and coherence. The findings are also corroborated by the individual PBF
project assessments, which suggest that both SSR and peacebuilding objectives appear to ‘get lost’ in the technical projects. The individual PBF project reviews also expose a lack of resources for monitoring and evaluation in the projects of a more technical nature (PBF, 2011).

However, issues regarding monitoring and evaluation become problematic based on the short 12-month funding timeframes of most PBF projects. Call suggests a framework for evaluating peacebuilding outcomes which includes ‘no war recurrence’ (as a security perspective); ‘root causes’ (as a social perspective); legitimate regimes and effective states (as a political perspective) and ‘economic recovery’ (as an economic perspective) (Call, 2009). This proposed framework builds on the arguments supporting the utility of a multi-perspective and multi-disciplinary approach to peacebuilding described in earlier sections.

**Conclusion**

The findings of this short literature review suggest that, whereas the international community appears to be ‘well-served’ in terms of being guided by a well-defined and well-communicated concept of SSR which is supported by useful normative frameworks, the same cannot be said for peacebuilding. Definitions of peacebuilding still appear to be too general, confusing, duplicative and unhelpful for supporting what is, in principle, a well-supported and much-needed agenda for lasting peace. This is particularly the case as questions emerge over the resources and vision supporting externally-funded, long-term SSR. In this context, peacebuilding could learn from the experience of SSR in terms of the support given to its conceptual development, ‘branding’, strategic communications, and progressive policy development.

Notwithstanding the conceptual difficulties which confront peacebuilding, there appears to be a good degree of acceptance and support for the promotion of a multi-disciplinary and multi-perspective approach to the concept. However, making this approach successful requires exceptional leadership, strategic capacity and a higher degree of political and financial investment supporting peacebuilding which is more comparable to the costs of conflict. With a wealth of project and evaluation data also supporting the need for a more strategic approach to peacebuilding, progressing this agenda could lead to the more flexible accommodation of both short-term and long-term agency-based interventions in the future.

In addressing the relationship between peacebuilding and SSR, a number of interdependencies emerge which suggest that post-conflict SSR is best pursued under the model of peacebuilding. Such an approach would also help resolve a number of outstanding issues in the relationships between SSR and DDR; SSR and stabilisation; and SSR and the rule of law. It is clear that a wider agenda is required to embrace what have typically been regarded as ‘state-centric’ approaches SSR, and to support its longevity. This wider agenda is also required to consider the development of ‘second tier’ security institutions. The peacebuilding agenda should also capitalize on the planning capacity which develops in the SSR community and which strengthens as a result of subsequent PRSP processes. This will enable mechanisms such as the PBF to support ‘strategic augmentation’ in the future, and not just the operational-level ‘gap filling’ and the instigation of ‘catalytic effects’. Such ‘strategic augmentation’ will not only be important for the provision of guidance for longer term SSR, but also in informing the priorities of a range of other agencies with a mandate to support peacebuilding.