

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED TO **SAVE SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS FROM THE SCOURGE OF WAR**, WHICH TWICE IN OUR LIFETIME HAS BROUGHT UNTOLD SORROW TO MANKIND, AND TO REAFFIRM FAITH IN **FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS**, IN THE DIGNITY AND WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON, IN THE **EQUAL RIGHTS** OF MEN AND WOMEN AND OF NATIONS LARGE AND SMALL, AND TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH JUSTICE AND RESPECT FOR THE OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM TREATIES AND OTHER SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CAN BE MAINTAINED, AND TO **PROMOTE SOCIAL PROGRESS** AND BETTER STANDARDS OF LIFE IN LARGER FREEDOM, AND FOR THESE ENDS TO PRACTICE TOLERANCE AND **LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE** WITH ONE ANOTHER AS GOOD NEIGHBOURS, AND TO UNITE OUR STRENGTH TO **MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY**, AND TO ENSURE, BY THE ACCEPTANCE OF PRINCIPLES AND THE INSTITUTION OF METHODS, THAT ARMED FORCE SHALL NOT BE USED, SAVE IN THE COMMON INTEREST, AND TO EMPLOY INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY FOR THE **PROMOTION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT OF ALL PEOPLES**, HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.



United Nations

# UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation

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# UN Peacebuilding: an Orientation



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Peacebuilding Support Office  
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# FOREWORD

By Judy Cheng-Hopkins,

*Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support*

Building peace in countries emerging from conflict is a huge, complex undertaking. It involves a myriad of different players. Its very definition is the subject of vigorous debate. Those of us who work as peacebuilders are therefore faced every day with the question: how do we build sustainable peace?

This paper aims to bring some clarity to the perspective of the peacebuilder, especially the UN peacebuilder. It is not an academic study of peacebuilding, nor does it offer definitive solutions to its problems. Instead, it contains practical guidance on how to deal with the recurring challenges of planning, programming, prioritization and resources. To enhance its practical relevance, the paper contains many examples of real life peacebuilding, its mistakes as well as its successes. These are lessons shared by our UN colleagues who carry out peacebuilding in the field. They illustrate how the principles described in this paper apply in actual peacebuilding situations.

This paper is aimed at UN and other practitioners who may have wide experience in other areas but who are relatively new to peacebuilding, particularly partners of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), such as those working with the Peacebuilding Commission or implementing Peacebuilding Fund projects.

Much of the paper is based on the Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict of June 2009, which addressed peacebuilding throughout the UN system. The focus of that report was the first two years after the main conflict ends: a crucial window of opportunity to get early peacebuilding activities underway, yet one which the international community has too often missed. But peacebuilding is not restricted to that early period. This paper recognizes, therefore, that peacebuilding is typically a much longer-term process. The Peacebuilding Fund, for example, can support peacebuilding for several years after conflict has ended.

Peacebuilding involves a great number and variety of stakeholders – starting with the citizens of the countries themselves where peacebuilding is underway. It is neither a purely political, security nor developmental process, but one that must bring together security, political, economic, social and human rights elements in a coherent and integrated way. This paper, therefore, is a collective endeavour, developed by PBSO in conjunction with many other parts of the UN system engaged in peacebuilding, whose contribution I gratefully acknowledge.

Launch of the 'Sport for Peace' Programme aimed at promoting reconciliation and development in Liberia. This cultural performance was part of the 'Sport for Peace' soccer tournament launch.

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## The scope of peacebuilding

### DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

There are many possible definitions of peacebuilding and varying opinions about what it involves. The term itself first emerged over 30 years ago through the work of Johan Galtung, who called for the creation of peacebuilding structures to promote sustainable peace by addressing the “root causes” of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution.<sup>1</sup>

Peacebuilding became a familiar concept within the UN following Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, which defined peacebuilding as action to solidify peace and avoid relapse into conflict. In 2000, the Brahimi Report defined it as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.” The UN’s understanding of peacebuilding has continued to evolve ever since.<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary-General’s Policy Committee has described peacebuilding thus: “Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the

country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”<sup>3</sup>

### THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF PEACEBUILDING

The initial post-conflict period in most countries is characterized by significant insecurity and political uncertainty. Peace processes can advance, but they also often suffer periods of regression. Many countries are governed by transitional political arrangements until after the first post-conflict elections, when newly elected representatives have assumed their executive and legislative functions.

So the success of peacebuilding depends in part on the political decisions of those involved (national and local governments, communities, donors, the UN itself), in part on effective leadership (by national governments and within the UN), and on resources like human capital or donor financing.

### ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF PEACEBUILDING

#### National ownership

Peacebuilding is primarily a national challenge and responsibility. It is the citizens of the countries where peacebuilding is underway, with support from their governments, who assume the responsibility for laying the foundations of lasting peace. National ownership is essential to success.

<sup>1</sup> *Three approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Peacebuilding*, Johan Galtung, 1976

<sup>2</sup> See Annex: the evolution of peacebuilding

<sup>3</sup> Decision of the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee, May 2007

## National capacity

National capacity development must be central to all international peacebuilding efforts from the very start, as part of the entry strategy, not the exit. Indeed, a core objective for peacebuilding is to reach as soon as possible the point when external assistance is no longer required, by ensuring that all initiatives support the development of national peacebuilding capacities. This is a challenge, especially in the early days when peace is fragile and national capacity is often displaced and severely limited. Nevertheless, peacebuilding must focus proactively on (re)building national capacity, otherwise peace will not be sustainable. To support this effort, a collective assessment of existing capacities should be conducted early on.

## Common strategy

Inclusive peacebuilding involves many actors. The key to effective peacebuilding lies in an agreed common strategy, nationally owned, with clear priorities against which the UN, the international community and national partners can allocate resources.<sup>4</sup> A common strategy should be:

- Nationally owned, derived from an inclusive planning process, with many and diverse stakeholders consulted as the strategy is developed; and
- Based on an assessment of the country's situation (e.g. through a Post-Conflict Needs

<sup>4</sup> "Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives." Secretary-General's Policy Committee, May 2007

Assessment or Strategic Assessment) including analysis of conflict drivers and risk.

## PHASES OF PEACEBUILDING

Most peacebuilding happens once conflict – i.e. major, large-scale violence – has ended. But some peacebuilding tasks can start even during conflict. For example, in pockets of peace, civil society organizations, local government or traditional actors may be promoting conflict resolution mechanisms, or seeking to provide basic services or develop livelihood opportunities. The UN can support them.

It is important to start assessing capacity as soon as the end of conflict is in sight (particularly national capacity, but also other potentially useful capacity in the country or the region, such as resident staff or NGOs). This preparatory groundwork enables the UN to respond more quickly and effectively once a negotiated settlement has been reached and/or elements of peace are established, as well as to capitalize on any opportunities to build peace from the bottom up where pockets of stability exist.

At that point, the volume of peacebuilding action is expected to ramp up significantly. In this early period, people are ready for change, have high expectations and can easily revert to conflict if they do not feel tangible benefits from peace. However, this is where the international community has been weakest (hence the emphasis in the Secretary-General's report<sup>5</sup> on the crucial window of the first 24 months after conflict).

<sup>5</sup> *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009 - paragraphs 2-3

## RULE OF LAW IN SOMALIA

"Gaps in the justice and security sector during an ongoing conflict leave communities exposed to violence and deprived of physical and legal safety. To address this in Somalia, the UNDP Rule of Law programme has focused on developing competent police and judiciary through training and rehabilitation of failing infrastructure, raising awareness of human and legal rights among communities, establishing legal aid clinics, demobilizing armed forces and groups, and studying and supporting traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. This has allowed war-affected communities to access legal information, counselling and representation – making small steps towards justice in an otherwise lawless environment."

— *Early Recovery Team, UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery*

## SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOMALIA

"To complement the engagement of the international community in supporting rule of law in Puntland, Somalia, the UN Peacebuilding Fund recently approved a \$1 million project to provide immediate support to critical security sector reform elements in Puntland. The purpose is to improve security by building the capacity of the civilian police in the Puntland, similar to interventions in South and Central Somalia, with an emphasis on improving command, control and management structures, and training."

— *UN Peacebuilding Fund*

Seizing this early window of opportunity is vital. But peacebuilding is a lengthy process, which goes far beyond this initial two year period. A country's peacebuilding priorities and needs will change over time. The UN may be expected to play a more prominent role in the early days, while national capacity is being developed and national actors may need considerable external support, and when a transitional government's legitimacy may be weak prior to the first post-conflict elections.

## PEACEBUILDING'S RELATION TO CONFLICT PREVENTION, PEACEKEEPING, PEACEMAKING, HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

There is no simple, clear cut definition of peacebuilding that sets it apart from conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian and development assistance.<sup>6</sup> For one thing, there is considerable overlap of goals and activities along

<sup>6</sup> See Annex

the spectrum from conflict to peace. For another, various peacebuilding activities may take place in each phase of the spectrum. The UN Charter clearly outlines the mandate of the whole UN system to engage in peacebuilding. The first preambular paragraph speaks of saving "succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and the first article states that the purpose of the UN is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace."

In most post-conflict situations there are many international actors who contribute to peacebuilding as security, development and humanitarian staff. Humanitarian and sometimes development staff may already be in a country during conflict, so they are ready on the ground (albeit at diminished capacity) once conflict ends.

At that point the Security Council may mandate the deployment of a UN country presence. The UN would then draw from its various capacities the resources required to respond to that country's

specific post-conflict security, political, humanitarian and development challenges. A new mission may be designed<sup>7</sup> in parallel with a peace process, or after a peace has been signed.

If the Security Council approves the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation, then UN peacekeepers (formed military and police units, observers and advisers) deploy to support national security actors in establishing the safety and security needed for peacebuilding to get underway. In addition, UN peacekeepers increasingly play a significant role as early peacebuilders themselves.<sup>8</sup> The mandates of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations include many peacebuilding tasks, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), support to electoral processes and re-establishing governmental authority.<sup>9</sup> International and national civilian staff are employed to support those tasks.

Special Political Missions and integrated peacebuilding missions, too, have received mandates covering a wide range of peacebuilding tasks. In those cases, security can be augmented by UN-endorsed multilateral (including regional) security forces; or it may be provided by the national government.

Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and Special Political Missions are financed from Member States' assessed contributions, but that funding

<sup>7</sup> The process may be led by DPKO or DPA.

<sup>8</sup> See the 2008 DPKO Capstone Doctrine, titled *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, for the spectrum of activities currently undertaken by UN peacekeepers, and others, to secure international peace

<sup>9</sup> See for example UNSCR 1509 (2003) defining UNMIL's mandate in Liberia

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS AND YOUTH AT RISK IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

The 1,000 micro projects in Cote d'Ivoire aim to provide quick peace dividends to conflict-affected communities and former combatants through the provision of socio-economic reintegration options to former combatants, militias, youth associated with armed conflicts and youth at risk. As the country goes through a critical transitional period, the project helps to create an environment conducive to peaceful elections. The direct beneficiaries of the reintegration projects include 1,099 ex-combatants and 803 youth at risk. 22 % of the beneficiaries are women. It has facilitated the reintegration of 3,483 beneficiaries through microprojects in sectors such as agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing and artisanal skills, reaching 24 localities and partnering with 22 national structures. Beneficiaries also received training in civic education and accounting."

— *Funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund and implemented by UNDP*

does not cover the whole universe of peacebuilding tasks in their mandates. To succeed, therefore, they have to work in partnership with UN humanitarian and development actors, and with the World Bank, regional organizations, civil society, bilateral and other multilateral donors, and the private sector.

## PEACE DIVIDENDS

"A peace dividend should be timely and tangible: can people see it, or feel it, or use it, or spend it? And can they connect receipt of the dividend to political milestones – to a ceasefire or peace treaty, to DDR, to newly opened returns and resettlement, or to participation in new governance arrangements? If not, the presumed dividend may not be recognized at all; or it may be perceived as another ad hoc emergency or development project. Dividends help to meet people's expectations for improved welfare and increased opportunity following a conflict; these expectations, left unfulfilled, can cause a conflict to flare up again, or contribute to a culture of violence and lawlessness, or discourage people's participation in building lasting peace."

— *Sarah Laughton and Nicholas Crawford, WFP*





MINUSTAH's Jordanian Battalion assists a school, Lycée de Damia, near Cité Soleil in Haiti. The battalion delivers milk, rice, flour and tea, all of which come from their own supplies of food, to 600 students.

© UN Photo/Sophia Paris

## THE MOST FREQUENT NEEDS

Peacebuilding priorities will be different in every post-conflict country and will vary over time.

In the first 24 months after a major cessation of hostilities, “national and international efforts ... should focus on meeting the most urgent and important peacebuilding objectives: establishing security, building confidence in a political process, delivering initial peace dividends and expanding core national capacity.”<sup>10</sup> The most commonly requested needs in this early period include:

- Support to basic safety and security, including mine action, protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, strengthening the rule of law and initiation of security sector reform
- Support to political processes, including electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, and developing conflict-management capacity at national and subnational levels
- Support to the provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, health and primary education, and support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees
- Support to restoring core government functions, in particular basic public administration and public finance, at the national and subnational levels

<sup>10</sup> *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009 – paragraph 15

- Support to economic revitalization, including employment generation and livelihoods (in agriculture and public works) particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants, as well as rehabilitation of basic infrastructure”<sup>11</sup>

Some countries may need peacebuilding initiatives aimed at their particular conflict drivers, such as drugs and crime, illegal exploitation of natural resources, or land reform. Conflict drivers can also include cross-cutting issues such as lack of respect for human rights, bad governance, lack of social integration and cohesion, lack of gender equality, and HIV/AIDS.<sup>12</sup>

Although this is a potentially broad agenda, peacebuilding in a specific country situation will not involve all these activities. Instead, it should be a selective, prioritized and sequenced strategy, tailored to the specific country circumstances. Indeed, prioritization is essential to effective peacebuilding. Priorities will vary from country to country, at different moments in time, and between different financing mechanisms (for example, the Peacebuilding Fund<sup>13</sup> focuses on four priority areas).

## SETTING PEACEBUILDING PRIORITIES

It is difficult to decide on the priorities for peacebuilding activities when so much appears urgent and resources and capacity are limited. A key crite-

<sup>11</sup> *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009 – paragraph 17

<sup>12</sup> AIDS contributes to instability by weakening state, economic, and social capacities, and increasing the number of orphans.

<sup>13</sup> See Peacebuilding Fund, page 37

## YOUTH PROGRAMMES

“I would emphasize the need to focus on youth. They represent the biggest danger to peace consolidation, but also the biggest opportunity with their energy, natural optimism and innovative mindset. Public-works programmes employing young people not only help to rebuild local infrastructure, but give young people a stake in their community. They can be combined – as in Burundi – with afternoon training and discussion sessions animated by youth leaders in health and life-skills, gender sensitivity, reconciliation and non-violent communication. We add to this microcredits and advice for youth who want to start up small businesses and an apprenticeship/vocational training scheme, using existing local enterprises. Gender balance is ensured and the discussions are designed to cover women’s rights issues.”

– *Barbara Piazza Georgi, UNFPA Burundi*

rior is the effect of the activity. The top peacebuilding priorities are those that will enhance peace consolidation, or that will significantly reduce the risk of relapse into conflict and begin to resolve key causes of the conflict.

Priority-setting must reflect the unique conditions and needs of the country rather than be driven by what international actors can or want to supply.<sup>14</sup>

Post-conflict transitional political authorities and newly elected governments frequently ask for assistance in assessing national needs and prioritizing actions to address potential conflict drivers. The UN and the international community often fail to do this, allowing priorities to be dictated by mandates or by availability of resources, rather than by the country’s most urgent needs.

<sup>14</sup> *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009 - paragraph 16

Getting the timing and sequencing<sup>15</sup> right among priorities requires a delicate balance and difficult trade-offs within the framework of a coherent strategy. Creating a safe environment or helping returnees to resettle, for example, might be obvious early goals. But the “ripeness” of an action needs to be considered; an activity pursued too early after conflict can sometimes undermine a fragile peace. For example, while the holding of elections is the most frequent outcome of a peace agreement, and electoral processes can contribute to more legitimate political authority, they may also be a source of tension and renewed conflict if they are rushed, if quality is sacrificed to speed, and if the political environment is not conducive to a credible and accepted result. One of the greatest strategic

<sup>15</sup> Sequencing should be interpreted as the need to consider the right timing of actions – some of which may be required simultaneously, rather than sequentially.

challenges in the early post-conflict phase is to ensure that, whilst moving quickly, decisions taken in the short term do not prejudice medium- and long-term peacebuilding.<sup>16</sup>

Prioritization is essential but difficult, given the many competing issues and the different groups involved, all with their own recent experience of violent conflict. Hard choices must sometimes be made between supporting implementation of provisions in a peace agreement and responding to changing realities, especially given that peace processes are not linear processes.

In addition, given the fragmentation of the UN system at the country level, effective prioritization of peacebuilding tasks within the UN family is, inevitably, linked to the strength and coherence of the UN's senior leadership team in country. The leadership team, in particular the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Deputy SRSG and Resident Co-ordinator/Humanitarian Co-ordinator (RC/HC) (whether multi-hatted as DSRSR or not) need to work together to overcome this fragmentation and the breadth of mandates to help national actors establish key peacebuilding priorities.<sup>17</sup> In this regard, having institutionalized structures for collaboration among UN actors at the field level is crucial.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009 - paragraph 20

<sup>17</sup> This is the primary goal of the element of the Secretary-General's Decision on Integration that requires an integrated strategic framework.

<sup>18</sup> For more information on the minimum requirements for integrated field coordination at the field level, see the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) guidelines for the field.

In some areas, effective prioritization will require consultation. For example, what people most value as early peace dividends differs among countries. In Afghanistan, many report that access to education for all children has had a powerful demonstrative effect. In Haiti's Cité Soleil, people valued access to water and sanitation. In Liberia, national leaders felt that installing street lighting in the capital within the first 100 days after the peace deal inspired women's confidence in the peace process.

## THE NEED FOR CONFLICT SENSITIVITY

Peacebuilding is about “how” things are done as much as about “what” is done. Strengthening or rebuilding the foundations of a society that has been torn apart by conflict is not business as usual. “Protracted conflict and violence leave behind not only physical destruction and institutional disarray, but also a torn social fabric characterized by mistrust, apprehension and enormous difficulties in even imagining the possibility of working together towards common goals. Sometimes the most scarce resource in a fractured society is not funding or institutional capacities: it is the sheer will to stay together...”<sup>19</sup>

Peacebuilding activities and actors must take a conflict-sensitive<sup>20</sup> approach. This requires engagement in a conflict analysis exercise in order to identify both the structural causes of conflict, and

<sup>19</sup> Bernardo Arévalo de León, Joint Programme Unit for UN / Interpeace Initiatives, UNOPS

<sup>20</sup> Conflict sensitivity analysis aims to ensure that a project does not exacerbate existing tensions or create new ones.

## SEQUENCING

“Locally led input on sequencing and timing actions is essential for success. Legitimate national and local representatives of the host nation should participate fully in shaping sequencing and timing of actions. The UN Peacebuilding Commission and its Peacebuilding Support Office have pioneered this consultative path with groundbreaking work in Burundi and Sierra Leone. Knowing if or when to strengthen substate, suprastate, or nonstate institutions; avoiding an often inappropriate replication of Western institutional models; and avoiding recreating institutions that caused conflict in the first place requires local input and deep consultation.”

— *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, United States Institute of Peace, 2009*

## PRIORITIZATION IN TIMOR-LESTE

“The challenge in the initial phase of a peacekeeping mission is not to allow the need for stabilization to overrule longer term capacity building (concentrating on the urgent at the cost of the important). Arguably in Timor-Leste police reform was delayed because in the initial post-crisis period the UN did not consult with the national institutions sufficiently. The plan that was put together in 2006-7 is effectively being ignored by national authorities who are now undertaking their own strategy.”

— *Michael von Tangen Page, UNDP Timor-Leste/UNMIT*

## SETTING PRIORITIES

“Some activities identified as priorities for development cooperation, or even peacebuilding (e.g. administrative reforms, technical capacity building) may not be achievable in the immediate aftermath of conflict. For example, parliamentary capacity building is a huge challenge, possibly an unrealistic aim, in a context of political mistrust and insufficient legitimacy. At the very least such capacity building would have to be carefully tailored to reflect current circumstances, perhaps even delayed until the political situation is more stable. Otherwise we risk wasting money, achieving technical delivery but without any lasting impact.”

— *Boubacar Kane, BINUB*

(which may be different) the current triggers – or accelerators – of potential renewed conflict.

A thorough understanding of the causes of conflict should allow peacebuilding programmes to be designed and implemented in a conflict sensitive way – e.g. not hiring all programme staff from a single ethnic group; providing skills training not only to ex-combatants, but also to other community members. While this is not always in practice feasible, it should be the goal.

Conflict sensitivity, while necessary, is not sufficient for peacebuilding. The distinctive feature that will identify an activity as peacebuilding is whether or not it will significantly reduce the risk of relapse into conflict.

Take for example building a road. In a post-conflict situation it may be desirable to employ as many people as possible, in order to provide job opportunities in a war-damaged economy. But building the road is not necessarily a peacebuilding activity unless (for example) unemployment had been defined as a conflict trigger, or the project strategically employs local labour to generate jobs for potential spoilers or for those not benefiting from the peace dividend, or promotes reconciliation by encouraging parties from different sides of the conflict to work together, or opens up an area where members of the war's losing side had previously been isolated without road links.

Another example is the provision of essential social services to vulnerable groups. Providing services to a given group may be a peacebuilding investment if it addresses a phenomenon of exclusion that was

one of the causes of violent conflict, responds to an emerging driver of conflict, or builds confidence among a constituency which is particularly reluctant to engage in the peace process.

## CHALLENGES OF PEACEBUILDING

Peacebuilding happens in an insecure, politically fragile and therefore challenging environment. Funding needs, the number of actors involved and their (often competing) priorities and objectives, and people's expectations of the benefits of peacebuilding: all these present additional challenges.

### The financial challenge

A funding gap may ensue when the humanitarian response to a crisis begins to draw down but fully fledged development assistance is not yet in place. It may also occur because donors are unwilling to fund critical but high-risk political and security activities. Yet this is the moment when a country most needs timely, strategically targeted financial support to undertake critical peacebuilding efforts. Identifying these needs, writing project proposals within the context of a coherent peacebuilding strategy, and securing funding quickly<sup>21</sup> are all major challenges for post-conflict countries.

### The challenge of coordination

*Coordination among national actors:* It has been emphasized above that national ownership is essential to successful, sustainable peacebuilding. But national ownership requires coordination

among many national actors. Consider three examples of the coordination challenge national actors may face at different stages of peacebuilding:

- In the immediate aftermath of conflict, the accommodations needed among political leaders in power-sharing transitional political arrangements;
- After the first post-conflict elections, contesting centres of power among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, as well as among different ministries (intensified by the need to link national budgeting processes to peacebuilding priorities); plus the need to involve other peacebuilding stakeholders like civil society and the private sector in the peacebuilding process; and
- After further rounds of elections, (re)emergent local government structures which may mirror and compete for social services, health, infrastructure and other resources deemed peacebuilding priorities.

Complicating factors can include the roles played by traditional leaders, a politicized civil society and/or media, weak communications systems, and a lack of management and coordination capability in the civil service (which makes it difficult for national governments to play their part in coordinating international support for peacebuilding).

*Coordination of the international response:* Where there are many international actors involved in a country, it can be very difficult to agree on one common strategy for peacebuilding, and to agree

## KENYA VOLUNTARY SCHEME

“The PBF funded Neighborhood Volunteer Scheme was set up as a response to the post-election violence in Kenya in December 2007. The widespread riots that erupted after the contested announcement of the election result displaced many and caused extensive loss of livelihood and decreased access to basic services. It severely affected social cohesion within communities. The Neighborhood Volunteer Scheme, implemented by UNDP and UN Volunteers, taps the inherent resources and capacity of local people. This includes youth leaders, retired professionals and community opinion leaders whose actions helped dissipate the tension caused by the post-election violence. Volunteers were trained in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, counselling and access to basic services. The scheme also targeted at risk youth to encourage them to participate in community peace initiatives. The NVS approach has proven to be practical and effective in supporting community-based peacebuilding and reconciliation. It has led to controlling potential conflict flare-ups, has promoted peaceful coexistence between tenants and landlords, and has successfully prepared the ground for the return of IDPs.”

—UN Peacebuilding Fund

<sup>21</sup> See Section III: Resources for Peacebuilding

## CONFLICT SENSITIVITY IN TIMOR-LESTE

“I’d like to stress some elements which have proven to be key in Timor-Leste. One has been ensuring a harmonized approach between the Government and the implementing agencies (or at least amongst UN agencies) when it comes to fees paid to daily workers, so as to avoid competition for labour and/or creating further community tension (e.g. if the UN pays a higher daily rate than the Government, or if one agency pays more than another one).

Another important aspect has been that a labour-intensive approach can actually yield good quality infrastructure outcomes. This often requires expensive investment in good quality engineering oversight on the part of the implementing entity/ project manager. In the long run, however, it is often cost-effective both in terms of transferring basic construction skills to local workers and ensuring quality infrastructure that lasts beyond the lifespan of the typical cash-for-work project. In the effort to move quickly and disburse as much cash as possible to conflict-affected communities, we often ‘throw money down the drain.’”

— *Geraldine A. Arias, UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste*

## RECONCILIATION IN GUATEMALA

“In Guatemala we implemented a project to build reconciliation at the local level, in which the key was to support local initiatives focused on local needs, where it was necessary to count on the help and support of the parties that were in conflict. So, for instance, in the case of two communities that had been in dispute for several years, we invited them to build a small bridge across the ravine that divided them. Both communities believed that this was an opportunity for them, and decided to work together. And after the bridge was built, the communities continued doing things together, because they had now realized that they were able to do so.”

— *Fernando Masaya Marotta, UNDP Guatemala*

## RETURN AND REPATRIATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

“Working with displaced populations, often uprooted through violent conflict, it is plainly evident that reconciliation is a cornerstone to any sustainable return/repatriation. Thus reconciliation, an activity considered to be inherently political, is often intrinsic to the work of UNHCR, directly and indirectly, in post-conflict settings. Bosnia is one example I faced where Annex 7 of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement charged my agency, UNHCR, with the return and repatriation of displaced populations, within and outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given there had been no decisive military victory by parties to the conflict and no fully satisfactory peace settlement, implementing the return process was close to impossible. This was particularly so in areas where minorities had been ethnically purged from their homes. Minority return did, however, become more realistic through discussions organized by us at UNHCR under the aegis of working groups on return and repatriation, held at national, regional and local levels between all stakeholders.”

— *Sivanka Dhanapala, UNHCR*

on division of roles and responsibilities. A strong UN leader supported by an experienced team is essential to good coordination, but it is not enough without the political will to work together too. Hence the call to Member States in the Secretary-General’s recent report to align their support behind common peacebuilding strategies which should be nationally owned.

*Internal UN coordination:* Since UN staff in a country come from different parts of the UN family, there are often structural barriers to working as a team, e.g. different planning and budgeting cycles, different ways of getting funding, accountability to different governing bodies and different working practices such as the proportion of national staff employed. These policy and institutional differences often lead to misunderstandings. Much work is underway at headquarters level to resolve these differences or mitigate their effects, often learning from innovative examples from UN teams in the field.

In order to maximize the individual and collective impact of the UN’s response in activities required to consolidate peace, the Secretary-General has “reaffirm[ed] integration as the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation and/or special political mission, whether or not these presences are structurally integrated.”<sup>22</sup> To achieve this purpose, there should be a strategic partnership at the country level between the UN mission/office and the Country Team, including a shared vision of the UN’s strategic objectives, closely aligned or integrated planning, a set of agreed timelines and responsibilities for the delivery of tasks critical to consolidating peace, and a set of agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.<sup>23</sup> The Integration

<sup>22</sup> Decision of the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee, June 2008

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

## CONFLICT SENSITIVITY IN TAJIKISTAN

“Under the 1997 Peace Agreement in Tajikistan, the senior leadership of the United Tajik Opposition entered into various power-sharing agreements, leaving mid-level commanders still in the field with their fighters and without a tangible share of the peace dividend. Since this group was viewed as potential spoilers, under a job creation and housing programme, the mid-level commanders were the first to receive houses built by a combination of their fighters and trained contractors. To ensure that a portion of the programme directly benefited women, during the construction phase war-widow heads of households were hired to prepare lunch for the workers. After each group had built a modest house for their commanders, the fighters realized that they had the skills and confidence to build a house from the ground up. The commanders and fighters became instant stakeholders in sustaining the peace, house construction boomed and cash circulated amongst the former combatant communities. The Secretary-General credited the programme as having played a major role in the Peace Process.”

— *Basil Comnas, UNDP Iraq*

Vote Counting in  
Timor-Leste Elections  
in 2007

© UN Photo/Martine Perret



## COORDINATION ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS

“Coordination between the international financial institutions and the UN on women’s rights is an area of particular importance. Economic liberalization efforts should be harmonized with support to governance reform to avoid the risk of marginalizing women if the new economy kicks in before they gain access to the market, land rights, and property.”

— Winnie Byanyima, UNDP

Steering Group, the multi-stakeholder USG/ASG authoritative body on UN system-wide integration, has issued guidance to UN missions and agencies, funds and programmes in 18 countries where the concept of integration applies.<sup>24</sup>

### The communication challenge

Expectations of rapidly improved living conditions can be very high in the immediate post-conflict period. A strategic communications campaign can help to narrow the gap between what is expected and what can realistically be provided. Goals of such a campaign may include:

<sup>24</sup> For more detailed guidance, see the IMPP guidance package, covering UN strategic assessment, the role of the headquarters, and the role of the field. In particular, the guidelines for the field include minimum standards for integrated field coordination and possible models for various types of UN presences.

- To provide essential information about the security situation and what is being done to protect people;
- To inform the population of social, economic and political initiatives underway to improve their lives, thus enabling them to participate; and
- To publicize the dividends of peace and thus build support for the peace process.

However, in the immediate aftermath of conflict, weakened public and private media may not be able to provide accurate, independent and reliable information. Misinformation, absence of information and changing facts are likely to be constant challenges. The international community may be asked to support direct delivery of information about peacebuilding activities to target populations, and should work to rebuild the capacity of national media in the process.

## BURUNDI: AN INTEGRATED UN APPROACH

“Coordination and integration are hard work. Harmonizing work plans, strategies, styles, and work cultures continues to be a work-in-progress. But at BINUB, we did not have a choice. Integration was the model that was ‘drumbeat’ and institutionalized from the beginning.

In the human rights and justice sector, UNDP, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, and DPKO work together toward commonly agreed objectives and work plans. Hardware (cars, offices, computers) and software (staff expertise, substantive knowledge) are shared. More importantly, once the broad outcomes and objectives are agreed upon, a budget is prepared in a collaborative and transparent manner. Everyone knows who is contributing X and who is responsible for Y. This allows for a more rational and informed decision-making process that avoids duplication.

For example, on justice and rule of law, UNDP leads with programming expertise and financial support; DPKO and OHCHR contribute staff; UNICEF and UNIFEM add their perspectives on juvenile justice and gender issues respectively. On transitional justice, OHCHR leads with substantive expertise; UNDP joins with administrative and financial support (including a chief technical advisor). On human rights, OHCHR gives strategic direction with day-to-day support from DPKO and UNDP. In the end, it works because BINUB’s leadership has made integration a priority and set the tone. Colleagues share information and collaborate on joint programming initiatives. That’s not necessarily innovation or integration, but rather, good common business sense.”

— Awa Diouf, Gustavo Gonzalez and Francis James, *UN Integrated Mission in Burundi*

## COMMUNITY RADIO IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

“Informed and inclusive public debate on social and political issues is central to sustainable peace, and radio is often the only medium available to a wide audience in countries emerging from conflict. In the Central African Republic, PBF funds a community radio project implemented by the Central African Government and UNESCO, installing community radios in 2 localities in the rural East and West. It aims to train 32 community members in producing and broadcasting radio programmes on social and political themes such as the return and reintegration of displaced and refugees, updates on progress with DDR and the Inclusive Political Dialogue, the fight against HIV/AIDS and the promotion of women’s rights. Both ownership of programme content, and the management of the radio, will lie within those communities and will facilitate the active engagement of community members in the peace building process and the creation of a culture of peace.”

— *UN Peacebuilding Fund*

## SIERRA LEONE: SPREADING THE MESSAGE

“In Sierra Leone between 2006 and 2008 the establishment of a UN country communications group (UNCG), comprising communications specialists and peacebuilding staff from over 18 UN agencies, funds and programmes, including the Integrated Office (UNIOSIL), proved useful. The group’s members knew the country’s communications and media infrastructure well. To bridge the absence of professional local or national media capacities and the tribal language problems, traditional communications were used. During the 2007 election campaign, groups such as ‘Artists for Peace’, comedians and traditional dancers, used plays, dance and song to convey the social, economic and political initiatives underway to improve people’s lives, even in remote villages. This was done based on scripts and peacebuilding or election documents provided to the artists and ‘translated’ together with them into forms of artistic expression. These communications and public awareness campaigns were complemented by the UNIOSIL radio station, at that time the only reliable news source covering most of the country in six local languages. All artists who participated in the campaign were invited by the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General to thank them for their work towards peace.”

- *Christian Holger Strohmann, Chief Public Information Officer / Spokesperson, UNIOSIL, Sierra Leone (February 2006-April 2008)*

United Nations Angola  
Verification Mission  
(UNAVEM III) helps  
support demining  
process in Angola

© UN Photo/John  
Charles Monua





## Planning for Peacebuilding

National ownership is a prerequisite for successful peacebuilding. But the UN is often expected to co-ordinate international support to national efforts. This section describes how the UN goes about planning its peacebuilding interventions in a country where conflict has just ended, including its leadership of the other main actors involved.

### INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PLANNING PROCESSES

In the immediate aftermath of conflict, once a peace agreement has been signed, people expect immediate results. Indeed an early peace dividend, visibly provided by national actors, is important to generate confidence in the peace process.

The Secretary-General's recent report therefore calls for the senior UN representative on the ground to convene relevant actors in the immediate aftermath of conflict and develop an early strategy and action plan focusing on immediate national priorities, appropriate sequencing of priority initiatives, and clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for activities that have to be implemented or supported by the UN and funded right from the start, including through an early Peacebuilding Fund disbursement. Relevant World Bank activities should also be reflected<sup>25</sup> in this plan, as well as activities planned by key donors and other multilateral institutions.

To do this, the senior UN representative should be able to draw on support from pre-established integrated headquarters teams (representing the key "pillars", and usually including the World Bank). To develop the plan, they would select from the available array of tools and mechanisms, including those in the Integrated Mission Planning Process

<sup>25</sup> *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009 - paragraph 44

(IMPP) toolkit, such as the Strategic Assessment<sup>26</sup> and the Integrated Strategic Framework<sup>27</sup>, but also possibly a Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) that is tailored, recognizing the need for speed at this stage<sup>28</sup>.

The resulting early strategy and action plan would identify the priorities for peace consolidation for the first six to nine months after conflict, to be agreed with the national authorities and key international actors. It would provide:

- a macro-level strategic approach for international support; and
- a limited action plan, identifying a few immediate priorities (with clear roles and responsibilities) in order to create an early peace dividend.

This early strategy and action plan should be considered jointly by the various multilateral sources of prepositioned pooled funding so that it can be funded quickly.

The process of compiling the early strategy and action plan would in most cases also result in advice

<sup>26</sup> See UN Guidelines on Strategic Assessment, May 2009

<sup>27</sup> Guidance on elaborating and implementing the ISF is part of the UN IMPP Guidelines on integrated planning for UN field presences, November 2009.

<sup>28</sup> The flexible and modular nature of the Post Conflict Needs Assessment – Transitional Results Framework (PCNA-TRF) makes it easy to apply it to different circumstances. A PCNA-TRF can be used to assess a whole country or just a region. It can be used after a civil war, inter-state conflict or a protracted political crisis. It can also be used when a country needs to stabilize its situation to focus on development and needs to rally national and international actors behind a short term recovery strategy.

and recommendations to the Secretary-General/ Security Council on the type of UN presence<sup>29</sup> required, including any modifications of existing UN strategy and capacity.

During the six to nine months while the early strategy and action plan is being implemented, the more substantive, inclusive planning for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery will be carried out by national and international stakeholders. This should result in:

- An agreed common strategy, nationally owned, with clear priorities behind which the UN and international community align their support. The exact form of this strategy varies considerably across the board (recent examples have included the “Compacts” in Afghanistan and Iraq, the “Country Assistance Framework” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the National Priorities Programme in Timor-Leste, and in several countries the (interim) Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper). They have in common the fact of being based on a thorough consultative needs assessment, usually the PCNA, including a sound conflict analysis. They are developed on an inclusive basis, involving all relevant stakeholders, including civil society. They also usually have as a central objective the resumption of “normal” relations between the country and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). By the time an agreed common strategy has

29 e.g. UN peacekeeping operation, Special Political Mission, or strengthened UN Country Team.

been developed, the UN and international community should be in a position to align their support to this strategy. This has often been marked by an International Donors’ Conference. Ideally, national budgeting processes should also begin to be aligned to the common strategy at this stage, so that national resources – however limited – are directed towards the same priorities.

- A Strategic Framework for the UN’s involvement with peace consolidation – which will include the appropriate UN response to the peace consolidation challenges in the national strategy, as well as those peace consolidation tasks mandated by the Security Council, where applicable. In principle, where there is a peacekeeping operation or Special Political Mission and a UN Country Team (UNCT) this framework will be an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF); where there is only a UNCT it will be a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).<sup>30</sup> The Peacebuilding Commission has developed Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies for this purpose for the countries on its agenda, although at a later stage rather than immediately after the end of conflict.

30 Some UN field presences may consider whether an existing in-country tool, such as an UNDAF or an integrated peacebuilding strategy, could be adapted to fulfil the minimum standards for ISFs. However, complex UN architectures with multiple mandated presences and multi-dimensional operations (e.g. that include police and/or military components) would require an ISF based on the IMPP guidelines.

## CONSTRAINTS TO EFFECTIVE PLANNING

In practice, the planning process may be less clear cut than the description above implies. In a fragile post-conflict environment, planning for recovery and development has significant political dimensions; it is not a purely technical process. It has to take account of existing capacities on the ground (expertise and people).

The weak institutional and technical capacity of post-conflict governments has to be taken into account in designing plans for such countries. This means avoiding being locked into static plans that cannot accommodate changes of circumstances or personalities; having contingency plans for when things go wrong (and accepting their cost implications). Effective communications have to be built into planning, so that expectations are managed, people’s reactions are heard and direction can be quickly changed if things go wrong. Senior leadership must be fully involved in the planning process.

UN planning capacity in post-conflict countries is often limited, or not well coordinated between missions and Country Teams. UN planning is often insufficiently results-oriented.<sup>31</sup>

In certain contexts, the political nature of peacebuilding may pose challenges to the objective of deliver-

31 The Integration Steering Group is addressing these issues, and Guidelines on Integrated Mission Planning Processes are intended to improve the quality of planning.



### QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS IN TIMOR-LESTE

“On Quick Impact Projects, the UN Mission in Timor-Leste had some resources for small projects at community level. In order to avoid the (much criticized) disconnect between the work that the UN agencies had been doing, and initiatives funded by QIP, we established a simple consultation mechanism which enabled the QIPs Committee to ensure that all QIPs would be coherent with the projects supported by the UN agencies.”

– Geraldine Arias, UNMIT

ing humanitarian assistance in an impartial manner. This must be recognized, and discussed.<sup>32</sup>

## INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ACTORS INVOLVED IN PEACEBUILDING

There is typically a wide range of actors involved in peacebuilding, from national governments to the UN and multilateral organizations, the World Bank and IFIs, regional neighbours and organizations, bilateral donors, NGOs, the private sector, etc. With such a variety of actors, and given the need to ensure that their efforts are aligned in support of one common peacebuilding strategy, the need for leadership and coordination is clearly very great.

32 Guidance on how to address the need to protect “humanitarian space” in the context of UN integration is under development.

In most cases, the international community looks to the UN to lead the international response and coordinate the actors involved. Depending on the shape of the UN's presence in a country, leadership will be vested either in a Resident Coordinator or an SRSG. That person is expected to lead the UN in implementing a shared strategic vision, which requires an integrated assessment and planning process for all UN activities.<sup>33</sup> This in turn requires not just high quality leaders, but also expert technical support teams.

Given the regional dimensions of many contemporary conflicts (including refugee movements, cross-border ethnic networks, flows of natural resources and arms, financial transactions and pandemics), regional organizations are increasingly at the forefront of peace processes, including in mediating and guaranteeing peace agreements, and monitoring their implementation.<sup>34</sup> Regional actors may sometimes be better equipped than global actors to adapt and apply universal principles to a local context.

## WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN PEACEBUILDING

Women's participation in peace negotiations and post-conflict peace consolidation – both as agents of peace, and in order to address their concerns as victims of conflict – is increasingly recognized as a vital contribution to long term recovery and

33 As mentioned above, tools for integrated planning include the IMPP toolkit (for countries where there is a PKO or Special Political Mission), the UNDAF guidelines and the transitional planning toolkit.

34 *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009 - paragraph 13

stability. During conflict women may have taken on community leadership roles or non-traditional employment. Once peace is established, these roles should be recognized and women fully involved in governance and economic recovery and development.

The Security Council has paid special attention to this in its resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888 and 1889.<sup>35</sup> These address the impact of war on women<sup>36</sup> and acknowledge the importance of women's contributions to sustainable peace and their full and equal participation in decision-making processes.

- SCR 1325 is the first SCR to link women to the peace and security agenda. It calls for increased participation of women at all levels of decision-making; to mainstream a gender perspective in post-conflict processes; to ensure a gender perspective in UN programming, Security Council missions and UN peace operations; and to protect the needs of women and girls in conflict.
- SCR 1820 is the first SCR to recognize conflict-related sexual violence as a matter of international peace and security. It affirms that sexual violence affects not only the health and safety of women but the economic and social stability of nations, demands that parties to armed conflicts

35 S/RES/1325(2000), S/RES/1820 (2008), S/RES/1888 (2009), and S/RES/1889 (2009) on Women, Peace and Security. See also UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict <http://www.stopraperow.org/>

36 See also UNSCR 1612 (2005) on child soldiers, including girls; and the work of the Secretary-General's Special Representative for children in armed conflict.

prevent and punish sexual violence, calls for guidelines to make peacekeeping responses to sexual violence more effective, seeks proposals to minimize the susceptibility of women and girls, and aims to improve data collection.<sup>37</sup>

37 OP 11 of SCR 1820 "stresses the important role the Peacebuilding Commission can play by including in its advice and recommendations for post-conflict peacebuilding strategies, where appropriate, ways to address sexual violence committed during and in the aftermath of armed conflict, and in ensuring consultation and effective representation of women's civil society in its country-specific configurations, as part of its wider approach to gender issues"

- SCR 1888 strengthens tools for implementing 1820 through assigning leadership, building judicial response expertise, and calling for improved monitoring and reporting on conflict-related sexual violence.<sup>38</sup>
- SCR 1889 addresses women's exclusion from peacebuilding planning and institu-

38 SCR 1888 reaffirms the role of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in promoting inclusive gender-based approaches to reducing instability in post-conflict situations and urges the PBC to encourage all parties in the countries on its agenda to incorporate and implement measures to reduce sexual violence in post-conflict strategies (OP 18).

## WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN PEACEBUILDING

"The litmus test for women's effective participation often is their ability to create alliances in public life with men, the safety of women's assets and livelihoods, and the degree of gender mainstreaming in needs assessment and strategy documents."

— *Anne Marie Goetz, UNIFEM*

## WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN

"As violent conflict continues to escalate in Afghanistan, the question of how to reach and effectively work with Afghan women is especially pertinent for UN agencies with development mandates. As access to women in Afghanistan is, even in times of peace,

mediated by men, the participation of women in peacebuilding and negotiation processes becomes a challenge of extremely complex proportions. Enforcement of 1325 requires accountability to a constituency that in Afghanistan is missing and whose absence is intentionally sought by a vast majority of the population, many of whom may not even identify with the Taliban. Except in moments of political expediency, the question of "Where are the women?" is relegated to an afterthought. Meanwhile, to ask if women are at the peace table seems obscene when their presence in the public market alone puts them at risk of summary execution."

—*Theresa de Langis and Wenny Kusuma, UNIFEM Afghanistan*

Congolese women, representing local civil society, rejoiced in the conference hall next door, after the signature of a peace agreement.

© UN Photo/Marie Frechon



## GENDER ISSUES IN SIERRA LEONE

“Learning from their engagement with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission process, Sierra Leonean Women’s Rights NGOs became more vocal in challenging gender-based violence. While their recommendations on reparations have not been implemented, three Gender Laws were passed in 2007 protecting women’s rights: the Devolution of Estates Act, the Registration of Customary Marriages and Divorces Act, and the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. These laws address the role and rights of women in the family domain, including enhancing rights and security for women in customary marriage; setting the marriage age at 18; and in the case of intestacy, providing for women to inherit a specific percentage of the deceased husband’s estate. The challenge of implementation remains. As well as the age old challenge of silence, additional challenges to addressing SGBV in Sierra Leone include weak judicial institutions, lack of confidence in the system by aggrieved parties, and a lack of awareness that SGBV is a crime and violates the rights of women.”

— *Nana Busia, UNDP Sierra Leone*

## WOMEN’S PEACEBUILDING PRIORITIES

“Women’s own priorities for post-conflict recovery are usually very clear: basic security, repatriation for displaced people, recovery of property and livelihoods, and support to women’s economic activity. In addition, women prioritize family and reproductive health care, particularly in contexts where there have been elevated levels of sexual violence. More research is needed on the costs of failing to respond to women’s security needs in contexts where sexual violence remains rampant after conflict, such as Liberia and DRC. Anecdotal accounts suggest that this has a massive negative impact on women’s economic activity, above all by restricting their mobility in accessing recovering markets and engaging in commercial activity. It also can prevent women from engaging in local or national politics, which is a net loss to prospects for inclusive and democratic governance.”

— *Anne Marie Goetz, UNIFEM*

## SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN BURUNDI

“In Burundi, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) has been used as a weapon of war to intimidate, humiliate, and destroy families and communities. Any peaceful resolution of conflict in the Great Lakes region will have to incorporate a SGBV strategy to address this horrific problem, and to repair the trauma that individuals, families and communities feel when their sisters, wives, mothers and daughters are assaulted in such manner and numbers.

A renewed effort to combat impunity for SGBV focuses on strengthening the capacities of police, prosecutors and judges to do their job: to prioritize cases of SGBV, to publicly prosecute offenders, and to punish and jail them. To date, offenders have had what amounts to a free pass due to a dysfunctional prosecution and court system. No more. In addition, BINUB aims to support SGBV survivors by providing community-based ‘one-stop shop care centres,’ modelled on South Africa’s innovative Thuthuzela Care Centres, where survivor-friendly social, medical and legal assistance is provided. Much more remains to be done. A regional approach, incorporating experiences and best practices of our Congolese and Rwandan colleagues, needs to be explored. Finally, legislative reform must urgently address the inherent unequal status of women in Burundi, where women have no right to inherit property, leaving many in abusive relationships.”

— *Francis James, BINUB*

tions and consequent lack of adequate funding for their needs, inadequate safety and services. It strengthens tools for the implementation of SCR 1325 including by calling for global indicators to monitor 1325, and for the Secretary-General to report within a year on measures to increase women’s participation in post-conflict peacebuilding. It also emphasizes the need to develop effective financial and institutional arrangements to guarantee women’s full and equal participation in the peacebuilding process.<sup>39</sup>

In post-conflict settings following a peace agreement, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, coupled with the proximity of demobilized soldiers, may increase the incidence of sexual and gender-based violence. Ending impunity for gender-based violence is a critical measure of peace consolidation.

Integrating women into peacebuilding processes offers new degrees of democratic inclusiveness, more durable economic growth, and human and social capital recovery. Transition should provide a window of opportunity for promoting gender-sensitive policies, including through affirmative action in social and economic spheres. For example, it is important to reform property and inheritance

<sup>39</sup> SCR 1889 encourages the PBC and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) to ensure systematic attention to and mobilization of resources for advancing gender equality, and to encourage the full participation of women in this process (OP 14); and requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Security Council within 12 months on addressing women’s participation and inclusion in peacebuilding and planning in the aftermath of conflict, taking into consideration the views of the PBC (OP19).

law to protect the rights of women, and to ensure appropriate provision is made for groups left particularly vulnerable in the wake of conflict, such as widows and women heading households.

Three principal strategies have been identified for mainstreaming a gender equality perspective into peacebuilding:

- Addressing the particular impact of conflict on women’s recovery – especially sexual and gender based violence;
- Supporting women’s full and equal participation in and ownership of peacebuilding and decision-making processes; and
- Ensuring that national priorities for recovery – political, social and economic – redress inequalities of the past and positively influence gender relations and contribute to gender equality.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>40</sup> *Independent Expert Paper: Women and Peacebuilding*. Commissioned by UNIFEM and PBSO as a background paper to the Working Group on Lessons Learned Session. Jennifer F. Klot, Social Science Research Council, 29 January 2007

## Resources for Peacebuilding

The UN has effectively been engaged in peacebuilding since its foundation. Almost all UN departments, funds, programmes and agencies have a role delivering peacebuilding services to countries in need. This section describes three recent additions to the UN's peacebuilding architecture and the principal sources of funding for peacebuilding.

### THE UN'S PEACEBUILDING ARCHITECTURE

The Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Support Office and Peacebuilding Fund are part of a broader UN peacebuilding architecture. They were established in 2005-6 by the Security Council and the General Assembly to provide sustained attention towards, and to mobilize resources for, countries undertaking peacebuilding, and to work with other UN bodies to support coherence and effectiveness in post-conflict peacebuilding.

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is the intergovernmental advisory body that supports peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict. It brings together all the relevant actors, including international donors, the international financial institutions, national governments, and troop contributing countries to promote greater coherence; it marshalls resources for peacebuilding; and works with national actors to propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. It reports annually to the General Assembly.

The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) was established to assist and support the Peacebuilding Commission, administer the Peacebuilding Fund, and support the Secretary-General's efforts to coordinate the UN system in its peacebuilding efforts.

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is the UN's global multi-donor trust fund that provides a critical bridge

between conflict and recovery in countries for which no funding mechanism is yet available. It targets the immediate needs of countries emerging from conflict or at risk of relapsing into conflict.


### THE UN PEACEBUILDING FUND

The UN Peacebuilding Fund was launched in 2006 to provide fast, flexible and catalytic funding to countries at risk of relapsing into conflict. It has four priorities:

- Respond to imminent threats to the peace process and support peace agreements and political dialogue;
- Build or strengthen national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict;
- Initiate economic revitalization and generate peace dividends for the population at large; and
- Re-establish essential administrative services.

By the end of April 2010, the PBF had supported 137 projects in 16 countries that can be grouped by results in 13 outcome areas. Support to the implementation of peace agreements and building capacity to resolve conflict peacefully are the largest PBF priority areas, receiving approximately 45% and 27% respectively of PBF funds. The two main PBF results are socio-economic reintegration of former combatants and national dialogue

**PBF approved project budgets by priority areas and outcomes as of 30 June 2010**



and reconciliation. The PBF often funds the initial stages of reintegration projects, when the political risk of failure may deter the international community from coming on board with large donations. With the funding of national dialogue projects, identified by the 2009 five donor review as the most underfunded peacebuilding area, the PBF is covering a real gap. As a result of the revision of the terms of reference of the Fund and the follow-up to the Secretary-General's 2009 report on peacebuilding, contributions to projects aimed at providing early peace dividends increased in early 2010.

The PBF relies upon voluntary contributions from Member States, organizations and the private

sector. Contributions totaling US\$342 million have been received as of June 2010. Solid results-based planning, monitoring and reporting are key requirements of the PBF, not least in order to facilitate documentation of best practices and South-South exchange. A breakdown of approved projects and priority plans identified the sectors in which outcomes were achieved, as summarized in the above diagram.

The PBF delivers fast and flexible funding through two funding facilities:

The Immediate Response Facility (IRF) helps to jumpstart peace initiatives that can be scaled-up into longer-term programmes. It is designed to be

flexible, fast and provide those working in the field with a funding tool for single or multiple projects. Proposals that meet the criteria receive funding within days.

The Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF) is a country programme driven by national stakeholders. Upon receipt of a Priority Plan identifying key peacebuilding needs, the PBSO will review and establish a country allocation and delegate project approval authority to the Joint Steering Committee (JSC). Once formed, the JSC can focus attention on the long-term peacebuilding agenda.

After extensive consultations with donors, Member States and partners, the revised terms of reference of the PBF were approved by the UN General Assembly in June 2009. Key features of the new arrangements include:

- Expanded PBF priority areas now include initiatives that deliver immediate peace dividends to the population at large;
- Three funding window structure is replaced with two flexible funding facilities; and
- Synergy between the Peacebuilding Commission and the PBF is improved through greater alignment of planning documents.

Subsequently, the PBF guidelines for dispensing the next generation of UN funding for peacebuilding were revised in consultation with implementing partners in the field. Main improvements include:

- Clearer application criteria, making application and approval time faster;

- A clear management framework that states who is responsible for achieving peacebuilding results at the project, national and global levels;
- An opportunity for NGOs to receive funding through partnerships with a recipient UN organization;
- Results-based reporting to Member States and donors; and
- Documentation of lessons learned to enable the UN and its partners to improve future performance.

The revised PBF terms of reference and guidelines can be found at <http://www.unpbf.org>

## OTHER SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR PEACEBUILDING

The principal sources of pre-positioned pooled funding, apart from the PBF, include:

- **The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF):** a stand-by fund established by the UN to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and armed conflicts. It provides seed funds to jump-start operations and fund life-saving programmes not yet covered by other donors.
- **The World Bank State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF):** The SPF has two main

Port au Prince, Haiti – Brazilian peacekeepers take part in a tug of war during a civic day in Cité Soleil. The Brazilian peacekeepers teamed up with Haitian NGO Athletique D’Haiti to offer the local children a day of activities and services, which included haircuts and dental care.

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objectives: 1. Support measures to improve governance and institutional performance in countries emerging from, in, or at risk of sliding into, crisis or arrears; and 2. Support the reconstruction and development of countries prone to, in, or emerging from conflict. All Bank member countries and non-members (on a case-by-case basis) are eligible for the SPF. Default World Bank practice is to flow funds through the recipient government budget system. However, in cases where government implementation and fiduciary capacity are very low, the Bank may enter into agreements with agencies of the UN, regional organizations, NGOs, and other public or private institutions acceptable to the Bank for the implementation of projects on behalf of the recipient countries.

- The **UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery**. This fast, flexible funding mechanism allows UNDP to respond effectively to crisis prevention and recovery needs. It is designed for quick action following a natural disaster or violent conflict, or when a unique opportunity arises to reduce disaster risk or prevent conflict.
- **UN Multi-donor Trust Funds**: A number of multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) administered by UNDP have been established recently in post-conflict settings. Funds from multiple donors are pooled and disbursed by an administrator to a number of recipients based on decisions made

by the appropriate country-level decision-making body/authority. These funds aim to support nationally defined priorities and to build national capacities.

- The **European Commission Instrument for Stability**. The Instrument for Stability is the EC's main thematic tool which provides for development cooperation measures, as well as financial, economic and technical cooperation measures with partner countries in contexts of crisis and emerging crisis on the one hand and of stable conditions for cooperation on the other hand.
- The **United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security**: Launched in March 1999 by the Government of Japan and the United Nations Secretariat, the UNTFHS is managed by the Advisory Board on Human Security/OCHA. The UNTFHS is available to all UN organizations, and when appropriate, in partnership with non-UN entities, to enhance the operational impact of the human security concept with a particular emphasis on vulnerable populations, such as women and children, in the least developed countries and countries in conflict.
- **DPA Trust Funds**: The DPA manages two funds related to peacebuilding, the **Trust Fund for Preventive Action** and the **Trust Fund in Support of the Special Missions and Other Activities Related to Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking**.

- **UN Trust Fund in Support of Ending Violence against Women**: established by General Assembly resolution 50/166 in 1996, the Trust Fund is managed by UNIFEM to support local, national, and regional efforts to combat violence against women.

greater relevance and usefulness in peacebuilding research.

PBSO should also be able to direct you to the right place for advice on:

- Assessment, planning and monitoring tools
- Conflict analysis and planning
- Thematic areas of peacebuilding (e.g. DDR, security sector reform, rule of law, etc.)
- Peacebuilding resources (civilian capacity, UN volunteers, etc.)

## SUPPORT FROM THE PEACEBUILDING SUPPORT OFFICE (PBSO)

PBSO does not directly implement peacebuilding initiatives, but it supports those who do.

- **Training**: PBSO can advise on what training courses on peacebuilding are available
- **Knowledge management**: PBSO runs the web-based Peacebuilding Community of Practice, uniting peacebuilding practitioners across the UN electronically. It provides real-time responses to questions from the field, online access to peacebuilding information, monthly newsletters and an annual workshop. The Community of Practice is currently open to UN staff members only. UN staff members may request subscription by sending a message indicating their UN email address, position, department/agency, and duty station to pb-cop@groups.un-network.org.
- **Research**: PBSO will not normally sponsor research, but it brings together institutions, policy makers and practitioners to promote

## The Evolution of Peacebuilding

The term peacebuilding first emerged through the work of Johan Galtung over 30 years ago. In his essay “*Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding*,” Galtung called for the creation of peacebuilding structures to promote sustainable peace by addressing the “root causes” of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution.<sup>41</sup> The concept gained currency in peace studies and among practitioners of conflict transformation in the following decades, but its widespread acceptance had to await the end of the Cold War.<sup>42</sup>

At the UN, “peacebuilding” came to the forefront of intergovernmental debates with Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s landmark report *An Agenda for Peace* (1992). This identified post-conflict peacebuilding as one of a series of tools at the UN’s disposal following preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Encompassing a wide range of activities, peacebuilding was defined as post-conflict “action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” Since 1992, numerous documents have helped refine the UN’s understanding of peacebuilding (see table below).

<sup>41</sup> Johan Galtung, “*Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding*,” in *Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research*, Vol II (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlert, 1976), 297-298.

<sup>42</sup> For a good summary of the evolution of peacebuilding, see: [www.peacebuildinginitiative.org](http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org)

As the concept of peacebuilding gained momentum, different parts of the UN revised or expanded their operations to respond to the changing nature of contemporary conflicts. The tragic consequences of failed peace agreements in the 1990s (e.g. Angola), renewed conflicts (e.g. Haiti and Rwanda) and protracted wars (e.g. Afghanistan, Sudan, DRC) highlighted the need for the UN to develop new approaches to the challenges of building sustainable peace in complex emergencies and intra-state conflicts. The emergence of multidimensional peace operations, the creation of new conflict units (e.g. UNDP/BCPR) and the design of new service lines (e.g. SSR, DDR and the rule of law) demonstrated the converging interest among humanitarian, development, political, security and human rights actors to help prevent and resolve conflict and to build sustainable peace. Relapse into violence in Haiti and Timor-Leste following UN interventions there reinforced the need for carefully-planned, well-coordinated exit strategies to prevent relapses and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace.

KEY UN PEACEBUILDING DEFINITIONS AND RELATED CONCEPTS		
1992	An Agenda for Peace	Introduced “peacebuilding” as a UN tool.
1995	Supplement to An Agenda for Peace	Emphasized the need for the institutionalization of peace
1994	An Agenda for Development	Contributed to linking the security, development, democratization and human rights agendas
1994	UNDP Human Development Report	
1995	An Agenda for Democratization	
1996	Inventory of Peacebuilding Activities	Highlighted the building blocs of post-conflict peacebuilding
2000	Brahimi Report	Defined peacebuilding as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.”
2001	No Exit without Strategy	Underlined three key peacebuilding objectives.
2003	Review of Technical Cooperation in the United Nations	Sought greater coordination in peacebuilding across the UN system
2004	A More Secure World	Called for creating the Peacebuilding Architecture
2005	In Larger Freedom World Summit Outcome	Elaborated and formalized Peacebuilding Architecture concept consisting of the <b>Peacebuilding Commission</b> , <b>Peacebuilding Fund</b> and <b>Peacebuilding Support Office</b> .
2006	UN Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory	Provided a snapshot of the wide range of peacebuilding activities undertaken by 31 UN agencies
2006	Policy Committee decision, September 2006	In determining strategies and operational plans, peacebuilding entails efforts to support ... country’s transition from conflict to sustainable peace, with a stable political order and basic institutions in place, the risk of relapse into conflict substantially reduced, and the country able to move to more normal development processes.
2007	Policy Committee decision, May 2007	Provided a “conceptual basis” for peacebuilding
2008	Capstone Doctrine	Situated peacebuilding within the UN’s comprehensive approach to addressing violent conflict
2009	Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict	Set out basic principles and features which have proven relevant across different contexts. Focussed on peacebuilding in the first 12-24 months after conflict.

**AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: SECRETARY-GENERAL BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, 1992 (paras. 20, 21)**

“The terms preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping are integrally related and as used in this report are defined as follows:

- Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.
- Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.
- Peacekeeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

The present report in addition will address the critically related concept of post-conflict peacebuilding - action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peacekeeping are

required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples...”

**SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE, SECRETARY-GENERAL BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, 1995 (paras. 47, 48)**

“The validity of the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding has received wide recognition. The measures it can use - and they are many - can also support preventive diplomacy. Demilitarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development can be as valuable in preventing conflict as in healing the wounds after conflict has occurred.

The implementation of post-conflict peacebuilding can, however, be complicated. It requires integrated action and delicate dealings between the United Nations and the parties to the conflict in respect of which peace-building activities are to be undertaken.”

**REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT AND THE PROMOTION OF DURABLE PEACE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, A/52/871 – S/1998/318, 13 April 1998 (para.63)**

“By post-conflict peace-building, I mean actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confron-

tation. Experience has shown that the consolidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict requires more than purely diplomatic and military action, and that an integrated peace-building effort is needed to address the various factors that have caused or are threatening a conflict. Peace-building may involve the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development. Peace-building does not replace ongoing humanitarian and development activities in countries emerging from crisis. It aims rather to build on, add to, or reorient such activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of a resumption of conflict and contribute to creating the conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery.”

#### **BRAHIMI REPORT (para. 13)**

“Peace-building is a term of more recent origin that, as used in the present report, defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peace-building includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic

development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.”

#### **UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, S/PRST/2001/5, February 20, 2001**

“The Security Council recognizes that peacebuilding is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, development, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms. This requires short and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it. These actions should focus on fostering sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence.”

#### **REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, “IN LARGER FREEDOM: TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT, SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL,”**

**A/59/2005, 21 March 2005 (para.114)**

“Our record of success in mediating and implementing peace agreements is sadly blemished by some devastating failures. Indeed, several of the most violent and tragic episodes of the 1990s occurred after the negotiation of peace agreements – for instance in Angola in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994. Roughly half of all countries that emerge

from war lapse back into violence within five years. These two points drive home the message: if we are going to prevent conflict we must ensure that peace agreements are implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner. Yet at this very point there is a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace. I therefore propose to Member States that they create an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission, as well as a Peacebuilding Support Office within the United Nations Secretariat, to achieve this end.”

#### **INVENTORY: UNITED NATIONS CAPACITY IN PEACEBUILDING, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, SEPTEMBER 2006:**

Adopted a broad definition of peacebuilding as “all activities necessary to assist a conflict-torn society to reach a point where violence is no longer a ready recourse, the risks of relapse into conflict are reduced, and the country can move onto a more development-oriented footing. Important parts of such an overall peacebuilding strategy include the provision of transitional security through peacekeeping and other efforts to maintain public order, support to a political process, life-saving humanitarian assistance, efforts to create a framework for economic recovery, and institutional development.”

#### **CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR PEACEBUILDING FOR THE UN SYSTEM ADOPTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’S POLICY COMMITTEE IN MAY 2007**

“Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”

#### **RELATED TERMS AND CONCEPTS**

As peacebuilding is about preventing relapse into conflict, conflict prevention and peacebuilding can overlap. “The Security Council recognizes that early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, preventive disarmament and post-conflict peacebuilding are interdependent and complementary components of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy” (S/PRST/1999/34, 30 November 1999)

## List of Acronyms

<b>ASG</b>	Assistant Secretary-General	<b>SGBV</b>	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
<b>BINUB</b>	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi	<b>SPM</b>	Special Political Mission
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration	<b>SRSG</b>	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
<b>DPA</b>	Department of Political Affairs	<b>SSR</b>	Security Sector Reform
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations	<b>UNCT</b>	United Nations Country Team
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of the Congo	<b>UNDAF</b>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
<b>DSRSG</b>	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General	<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>HC</b>	Humanitarian Coordinator	<b>UNDP/BCPR</b>	United Nations Development Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person	<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
<b>IFI</b>	International Financial Institution	<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>IMPP</b>	Integrated Mission Planning Process	<b>UNHCR</b>	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>ISF</b>	Integrated Strategic Framework	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>JSC</b>	Joint Steering Committee	<b>UNIFEM</b>	United Nations Development Fund for Women
<b>MINUSTAH</b>	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	<b>UNIOSIL</b>	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization	<b>UNMIL</b>	United Nations Mission in Liberia
<b>OHCHR</b>	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights	<b>UNMIT</b>	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
<b>PBC</b>	Peacebuilding Commission	<b>UNOPS</b>	United Nations Office for Project Services
<b>PBF</b>	Peacebuilding Fund	<b>UNSCR</b>	United Nations Security Council Resolution
<b>PBSO</b>	Peacebuilding Support Office	<b>USG</b>	Under-Secretary-General
<b>PCNA</b>	Post-Conflict Needs Assessment	<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>PKO</b>	Peacekeeping Operation		
<b>QIP</b>	Quick Impact Project		
<b>RC</b>	Resident Coordinator		





United Nations